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2012
There is a compelling simplicity to the theoretical approach to moral judgment proposed by Gray, Young, and Waytz (this issue; henceforth GYW). On their approach, all that is needed to account for the large body of empirical findings on moral judgment is a description of the prototypical moral encounter—a moral agent who brings harm to a moral patient. This is what psychological theorizing ought to look like: explaining the observed complexity of a phenomenon by appealing to more basic, general, psychological mechanisms.
2011 •
Journal for The Theory of Social Behaviour
Nothing More than Feelings? The Role of Emotions in Moral Judgment2000 •
… help or hurt decision making?: a …
Reason and Emotion In Moral Judgment: Different Prototypes Lead to Different Theories2007 •
2018 •
Moral evaluations occur quickly following heuristic-like intuitive processes without effortful deliberation. There are several competing explanations for this. The ADC-model predicts that moral judgment consists in concurrent evaluations of three different intuitive components: the character of a person (Agent-component, A); their actions (Deed-component, D); and the consequences brought about in the situation (Consequences-component, C). Thereby, it explains the intuitive appeal of precepts from three dominant moral theories (virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism), and flexible yet stable nature of moral judgment. Insistence on single-component explanations has led to many centuries of debate as to which moral precepts and theories best describe (or should guide) moral evaluation. This study consists of two large-scale experiments and provides a first empirical investigation of predictions yielded by the ADC model. We use vignettes describing different moral situations in which all components of the model are varied simultaneously. Experiment 1 (within-subject design) shows that positive descriptions of the AD D-, and C-components of moral intuition lead to more positive moral judgments in a situation with low-stakes. Also, interaction effects between the components were discovered. Experiment 2 further investigates these results in a between-subject design. We found that the effects of the AD D-, and C-components vary in strength in a high-stakes situation. Moreover, sex, age, education, and social status had no effects. However, preferences for precepts in certain moral theories (PPIMT) partially moderated the effects of the A-and C-component. Future research on moral intuitions should consider the simultaneous three-component constitution of moral judgment.
Recent work in experimental philosophy shows that folk intuitions about moral responsibility are sensitive to a surprising variety of factors. Studies by Nichols and Knobe (2007) suggest that whether people take agents to be responsible for their actions in a deterministic scenario depends on whether these actions are described abstractly or concretely, and on how serious moral transgression these actions seem to represent. Studies by Nahmias et. al. (2007) show that the kind of determinism involved can affect assignments of responsibility. When deterministic scenarios were described using reductionist explanations of action, subjects were significantly less prone to ascribe responsibility than when the deterministic laws were described as involving ordinary psychological concepts. Finally, a study by Knobe (2003) suggests that people are significantly more inclined to hold an agent responsible for bringing about bad side effects than for bringing about good side effects when the agent just doesn’t care about these side effects. Elsewhere (Björnsson & Persson ms), we have presented an analysis of our everyday concept of moral responsibility that provides a unified explanation of paradigmatic cases of moral responsibility, accounting for the force of both typical excuses and the most influential skeptical arguments against moral responsibility or for incompatibilism. In this article, we suggest that it also explains the divergent and apparently incoherent set of intuitions revealed by these new studies. If our hypothesis is correct, the surprising variety of judgments stems from a unified concept of moral responsibility. Björnsson, G.; Persson, K. (ms) The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility. Forthcoming in Noûs Knobe, J. (2003) Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language. Analysis 63, pp.190–93. Nahmias, E.; Coates, J.; Kvaran. T. (2007) Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: experiments on folk intuitions. Midwest studies in Philosophy XXXI Nichols, S.; Knobe, J. (2007) Moral responsibility and determinism: the cognitive science of folk intuitions. Noûs 41:4, 663-685
2022 •
2023 •
2012 •
Historia Constitucional
La Constitución de Cundinamarca: Primera del Mundo Hispánico2011 •
2021 •
European archives of oto-rhino-laryngology/European archives of oto-rhino-laryngology and head & neck
Cochlear implant cost analysis in adults: a European narrative review2024 •
2022 •
Signos Literarios
Taxonomía alimentaria, Le Ventre de Paris de Émile Zola: el estómago como extensión social2020 •
Journal of Crystal Growth
Growth and properties of wide bandgap (MgSe)n(ZnxCd1−xSe)m short-period superlattices2017 •
Alergologia Polska - Polish Journal of Allergology
Formodual – a new therapeutic option in asthma and chronic obturative pulmonary disease treatment with low copayment. Does the therapy cost influence patients’ compliance?2022 •
The London Journal
Silversmiths in Elizabeth and Stuart London: Their Lives and Their Marks2018 •
Nuclear Engineering and Technology
Pixel-Based Correction Method for Gafchromic®ebt Film Dosimetry2010 •