Journal of Public Deliberation
Volume 8 | Issue 2
Article 7
12-30-2012
he World Bank and the Globalization of
Participatory Budgeting
Benjamin Goldfrank
Whitehead School of Diplomacy, Seton Hall University, benjamin.goldfrank@shu.edu
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Recommended Citation
Goldfrank, Benjamin (2012) "he World Bank and the Globalization of Participatory Budgeting," Journal of Public Deliberation: Vol. 8:
Iss. 2, Article 7.
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he World Bank and the Globalization of Participatory Budgeting
Abstract
his article addresses the long-standing controversy over the World Bank’s role in the promotion of
participatory budgeting (PB). Some on the let have celebrated the Bank’s funding and advocacy for PB as
signifying the legitimacy or mainstream success of the process, while others see the Bank’s endorsement of PB
as a sign that participatory budgeting is becoming watered down and losing its transformative potential, if it
ever had such potential. his debate has mostly been an ideological one, and litle research has been done to
provide evidence to either side. he article is the irst to address what the Bank is doing to promote PB and
why. It makes six main points. First, the originators of participatory budgeting, the Workers’ Party in Brazil, is
not promoting it as strongly as it used to. Second, the World Bank has become the most active promoter of PB
(perhaps alongside the United Nations Development Program). hird, within the Bank, some promote PB as
part of its fairly standard pro-market agenda, while others share many of the same goals as PB’s originators.
Fourth, though the Bank has become very important for the difusion of PB, overall PB remains marginal
within the Bank. Fith, the Bank has litle inluence over the eventual outcomes of PB in diferent countries
because it has litle or no control over many of the factors that afect PB in practice. And sixth, because PB’s
efects have strong potential to be positive, the Bank’s role in promoting PB should be encouraged.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Brian Wampler for the invitation and comments, Margarita Rivas for research assistance,
and Sêrgio Baierle for comments on an earlier drat. he paper was presented at the ALACIP Conference in
Quito, Ecuador, in June 2012, and I received helpful comments there from Andrés Hernández Quiñones,
Yanina Welp, and Egon Montecinos.
his symposium is available in Journal of Public Deliberation: htp://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol8/iss2/art7
Goldfrank: The World Bank and the Globalization of Participatory Budgeting
It is no secret that the practice of participatory budgeting (PB) globalized
over the past decade, expanding well beyond its South American origins.
Hundreds of thousands of people now contribute directly to decision-making on
municipal budgets on an annual basis in over a thousand cities across the world.
More surprising is that one of the primary organizations behind this dissemination
of PB is the World Bank. Not only has the World Bank surpassed the Workers’
Party – which, along with social movements in various Brazilian cities, has been
credited with inventing PB in the late 1980s – as the main advocate of PB in
recent years; the Bank has arguably become its most important and influential
exponent and unquestionably its champion with the greatest resources. How did
this happen? How has participatory budgeting gone from local innovation in
democratic practice by avowedly socialist parties to international aid project?
Why does the World Bank promote PB? And what are the effects of such
promotion on how PB functions? Should those who supported the autochthonous
versions of PB in Brazil and elsewhere be wary of World Bank attention to PB or
welcome it?
In this article I attempt to start to answer these questions, focusing mostly
on the World Bank’s motives. After documenting the stagnation or even decline
of PB promotion by the Workers’ Party and the extension of such promotion by
the World Bank (and other international development organizations), I examine
competing perspectives on the World Bank’s advocacy of participatory
approaches and particularly PB. Borrowing from Jeffrey Jackson’s The
Globalizers (2005), I go on to suggest that some World Bank officials have
adopted PB as a “global script” for modern municipal governments, a recipe that
facilitates the Bank’s neoliberal agenda (that is, an agenda of following the socalled Washington Consensus policies of privatization, liberalization,
deregulation, and generally reducing the role of the central state). Yet I also show
that the World Bank is not monolithic. On one hand, many of the Bank’s PB
promoters share several of the same goals as PB’s originators; on the other,
overall, PB remains marginal within the Bank despite the Bank’s importance for
PB’s diffusion. In the last section, I argue that in general the introduction of PB
often has unintended consequences and that the Bank has little influence over the
outcomes eventually produced. Because of the potential for those outcomes to be
positive, I conclude that the Bank’s promotion of PB should be welcomed.
The Fall of the PT and the Rise of the Bank in the Diffusion of Participatory
Budgeting
In the early 1990s, roughly a dozen cities in South America practiced what would
now be called participatory budgeting, including not only the well-known
Brazilian cases such as Porto Alegre under the Workers’ Party (PT), but also the
Uruguayan capital of Montevideo and Ciudad Guyana in Venezuela under similar
political parties on the left. Twenty years later, PB is practiced in hundreds of
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cities and on every continent. Other studies have examined the diffusion of PB in
specific countries (Hernández-Medina 2007; Wampler and Avritzer 2005; Spada
2010), in Latin America (Goldfrank 2007a; 2007b), and world-wide (Sintomer et
al. 2010). My aim here is to suggest that while the PT was originally the most
important actor advancing the spread of participatory budgeting, in the past
decade the World Bank – and other international development organizations – has
surpassed the PT. Of course, it seems natural that global diffusion of a successful
experiment like participatory budgeting would be undertaken by international
organizations rather than a political party. Yet there is a sense, in many of these
studies of diffusion and in the pronouncements of the major networks of local
authorities supporting participatory democracy (Red FAL 2007), that the diffusion
of PB has entailed its being watered down, pasteurized, or made into “PB-lite”
(Chavez 2008). In other words, the fear is that, under its new development
agency sponsors, participatory budgeting no longer represents a genuinely
transformative instrument of popular sovereignty but rather a technical tool for
efficient local government.
When did the PT’s enthusiasm for participatory budgeting begin to wane
while World Bank support for it waxed? My best guess is around 2003. Until
then, the PT had rapidly expanded participatory budgeting to nearly every large
city under its mayors. After the 1996 United Nations Habitat II meeting in
Istanbul, where Porto Alegre’s PB won the distinction of international “best
practice,” the Workers’ Party mandated that its mayors in all cities with
populations of 100,000 or more introduce PB (Wampler and Avritzer 2005). By
the 1997-2000 period, 96 percent of the cities with 50,000 people or more
controlled by the PT were using participatory budgeting, it was present in over
100 Brazilian cities, and several PT-controlled state governments had begun to
adopt it at the state level (Spada 2010, 13; Wampler and Avritzer 2005; Goldfrank
and Schneider 2006). Furthermore, Workers’ Party officials were traveling across
Brazil, Latin America, and the world to disseminate participatory budgeting,
either through bilateral contacts between municipalities or through development
donor-sponsored international conferences and exchanges. The PT seemed to
believe in the slogan adopted by the Porto Alegre municipal administration in
1999: “Orçamento Participativo – Bom para todo mundo” (Participatory
Budgeting – Good for Everyone, or Good for the Whole World). However, in the
early 2000s, after winning the presidency under Lula, the PT failed to promote
participatory budgeting either within or from the national government. Unlike the
PT’s national program for government in 2002, which suggested an attempt at a
national participatory budgeting process, neither the 2006 nor the 2010 program
directly mentioned participatory budgeting. And, at the municipal level, in the
2005-2008 period, the percentage of PT-controlled cities with over 50,000
inhabitants using participatory budgeting had declined to 73 (Spada 2010, 13).
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Goldfrank: The World Bank and the Globalization of Participatory Budgeting
Altogether, of Brazil’s roughly 5,500 municipalities, currently about 200 use PB
(Sintomer et al. 2010, 9), but Brazil no longer houses the largest number of cities
with PB.1
That claim belongs to Peru, where, supported by millions of dollars of
World Bank programmatic social reform loans, PB is mandatory for all of the
country’s 2,040 sub-national governments according to a 2003 law (World Bank
2004, 2; Goldfrank 2007a, 119). Indeed, a recent study conducted by the Bank
reports the participation of approximately 150,000 Peruvians in PB every year,
and that only counts those in the 600 regional and municipal governments that
took part in the study (Banco Mundial 2011, 1-2). The World Bank’s support for
PB in Peru – the world’s most important site of the practice – is emblematic of the
Bank’s leading role in the global diffusion of PB. Other international
organizations clearly play or have played important roles in supporting PB as well
– especially, for example, the German aid organization GTZ in the Dominican
Republic (Hernández-Medina 2007) and elsewhere, USAID in El Salvador (Bland
2011), and the European Union more generally (Sintomer et al. 2010) – but the
World Bank stands out for the number of PB programs it supports, the number of
methods it uses to promote PB, and the amount of resources and research it has
dedicated to PB. Only the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and its
Habitat Division match or rival the Bank in these regards, and frequently the
UNDP and the Bank jointly promote PB.
Precise figures detailing World Bank financial support for PB remain
elusive on the Bank’s websites, even with its new Open Data initiative.
Nonetheless, by my estimate, the Bank has provided loans or grants of at least 280
million dollars in support of PB and PB-related projects in at least fifteen
countries since 2002. These figures most likely underestimate the amount of
money and the number of countries involved, but they include Bank-supported PB
projects in: Albania, Bangladesh, Bosnia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Gambia,
Honduras, Indonesia, Kyrgyz Republic, Madagascar, Mozambique, Peru,
Philippines, Uganda, and Uruguay.2 In addition to offering grants and loans in
support of PB projects, at some additional cost, the World Bank has also
1
Nonetheless, one sign that part of the PT remains supportive of participatory budgeting is that
after winning the gubernatorial election in 2010, the party re-started its PB process in the state of
Rio Grande do Sul following two terms in which other parties had discontinued it.
2
Other sources indicate further countries, including India and Russia, but I was only able to locate
confirmation in more than one document of Bank-supported PB projects in those countries listed
above. This list does not include the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) in Indonesia,
which is similar to participatory budgeting but the Bank does not use the term to describe it. From
1998 to 2008, the KDP spent 1.3 billion dollars, including Bank loans and grants and government
financing (http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFIC
EXT/EXTEAPREGTOPSOCDEV/0,,contentMDK:20477526~menuPK:502970~pagePK:3400417
3~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:502940,00.html#Key_Principles), accessed September 6, 2012.
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sponsored several PB workshops in Eastern Europe and Africa and trained
hundreds of citizens in PB through its Community Empowerment and Social
Inclusion program (World Bank 2005a, 26), as well as joining with UN-Habitat to
fund “regional participatory budgeting knowledge and action centers” in Latin
America and Africa, CIGU (Centro Internacional de Gestión Urbana) and MDPESA (Municipal Development Partnership – Eastern and Southern Africa),
respectively (World Bank 2009, 5). These centers, and the Bank itself, offer elearning courses on PB and provide advice, training, and research to local
government officials and NGOs wishing to introduce or improve PB. The Bank
even has a program designed to promote PB through South-South cooperation, the
Africa-Latin America Peer-to-Peer Mutual Action Learning Initiative. Finally,
the Bank has published extensively on PB, from short notes to research papers to
an entire volume in its Public Sector Governance and Accountability Series (Shah
2007) alongside books on topics such as fiscal management, public service
delivery, performance accountability, and combating corruption. In Latin
America, according to Sintomer et al. (2010, 26): “The World Bank is now the
most important body publishing research on PB at the continental level.”
The Bank, the Left, and PB: Persuasion or Co-optation?
Many studies have noted the rise of PB promotion by the World Bank, yet very
few have directed more than a few words to the specific question of what has
driven the Bank – once best known and often reviled for structural adjustment
programs and dam-building projects – to become one of PB’s most active
advocates.3 At the same time, several scholars have examined the World Bank’s
turn towards participatory, civil society-based approaches to poverty reduction in
general, and particularly the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers or PRSPs (Armah
2008; Dijkstra 2011; Rückert 2007). Contrasting the Bank’s own publications
regarding PB with that of most outside observers of PRSP, one finds a persuasion
perspective and a co-optation perspective. In many publications, Bank officials
seem to have been convinced of arguments in favor of citizen participation as
beneficial for development; they advance essentially the same reasons for
supporting PB as its original leftist party and social movement advocates; and
they often use the same language in their advocacy. On the other hand, the
Bank’s critics view its adoption of participatory approaches in general as an
attempt to co-opt the ideas and the activists of its civil society opponents in order
to neutralize them or to use them to help advance a neoliberal agenda.
In most World Bank publications on PB, such a neoliberal agenda is
absent, and the democratizing, empowering, and poverty reduction aspects of PB
are strongly emphasized. The opening lines of the “Overview” chapter from the
3
There are too many studies to list here, but good starting points for the Bank’s promotion of PB
would include Sintomer et al. (2010); for the Bank and structural adjustment, Abouharb and
Cingranelli (2006); and for the Bank and dam construction, Jackson (2005: Chapters 6 and 7).
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Goldfrank: The World Bank and the Globalization of Participatory Budgeting
Bank’s book on participatory budgeting provide a good example, as they were
written by Anwar Shah, the head of public sector governance at the World Bank
Institute:
Participatory budgeting represents a direct-democracy approach to
budgeting. It offers citizens at large an opportunity to learn about
government operations and to deliberate, debate, and influence the
allocation of public resources. It is a tool for educating, engaging, and
empowering citizens and strengthening demand for good governance.
The enhanced transparency and accountability that participatory
budgeting creates can help reduce government inefficiency and curb
clientelism, patronage, and corruption. Participatory budgeting also
strengthens inclusive governance by giving marginalized and excluded
groups the opportunity to have their voices heard and to influence
public decision making vital to their interests. Done right, it has the
potential to make governments more responsive to citizens’ needs and
preferences and more accountable to them for performance in resource
allocation and service delivery. In doing so, participatory budgeting
can improve government performance and enhance the quality of
democratic participation. (Shah 2007, 1)
Other Bank publications on PB in specific countries reflect similar language and
goals. For instance, the Bank’s PB toolkit on Albania includes “social inclusion,
poverty reduction, and empowerment” as potential benefits of PB, and states:
The traditional budgeting process can often contribute to social exclusion
and poverty due to elite capture, lobbies, and powerful interests. By
increasing the voice of ordinary citizens and the most vulnerable groups,
PB can potentially re-direct public investments towards basic services in
poor neighborhoods. The social learning and civic mobilization
mechanisms embedded in PB helps empower vulnerable groups to
increase their voice in budget decisions. (Social Development Team 2006,
3)
And the latest World Bank report on PB in Peru maintains: “Conceptually, PB’s
objective is to democratize and make more transparent the public budgeting
process by creating formal channels of participation and thus promoting the
inclusion of economically and politically weak sectors in negotiations over
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spending allocation. The ultimate desired goal of implementing PB is the
reduction of poverty” (Banco Mundial 2011, 3; my translation).4
These texts sound quite similar – though not identical – to the arguments
made by the political parties on the left that introduced participatory budgeting
processes in the early 1990s. The PT in Porto Alegre, the Frente Amplio in
Montevideo, and La Causa R in Caracas all called for new channels of citizen
participation to democratize local government, grant citizens greater power over
public spending, increase transparency, and extend public services to previously
neglected areas (see Goldfrank 2011, 37-45). The one study I found that is
focused on explaining World Bank support of PB argues, as the subtitle states,
that it is a case of “convergence of leftist and neoliberal approaches” (Theuer
2010). Daniela Theuer (2010) documents the rising importance of participation in
World Bank publications over the course of the 1990s and shows how the Bank
was both responding to civil society actors’ demands for participation and good
governance and also attempting to avoid cost overruns and corruption in its
projects. One piece of evidence for her convergence thesis is that: “Former
members of Porto Alegre’s administration were hired as consultants for Hugo
Chávez in Venezuela as well as for the World Bank” (Theuer 2010, on-line). It is
tempting to see the Bank’s adoption of key ideas promoted by the left in recent
years – like participation, inclusion, and empowerment – as a victory.
Many academic observers of the World Bank’s participatory turn,
however, express a greater degree of skepticism (see Rückert 2007). As
mentioned, the critics focus mostly on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers,
which were introduced to accompany the second round of the Bank’s Highly
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and which called on the recipient
countries to formulate macroeconomic and social policies to reduce poverty in a
participatory fashion in order to receive the HIPC funds. Reviewing the World
Bank’s annual development reports and other publications to deconstruct its
approach to participation and poverty reduction, Paul Cammack (2004, 204) finds
evidence that the Bank intended to use participation to redefine and reduce the
state’s role in providing public services and collective goods and to push that role
onto citizens instead. Cammack (2004, 190) portrays the Bank as guarding
ulterior motives: “While the Bank’s commitment to poverty reduction is real,
within limits, it is conditional upon, and secondary to, a broader goal. Its principal
objective is the systematic transformation of social relations and institutions in the
developing world, in order to generalise and facilitate proletarianisation and
4
Some of the Bank-supported advocates of PB go even further in their claims. George Matovu,
the head of the MDP-ESA, concludes his presentation on the MDP-ESA’s promotion of PB with
the following: “It has emerged from this paper that participatory governance in general and
participatory budgeting in particular can be a panacea to most developmental problems faced by
African countries” (Matovu 2007, 20).
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Goldfrank: The World Bank and the Globalization of Participatory Budgeting
capitalist accumulation on a global scale, and build specifically capitalist
hegemony through the promotion of legitimating schemes of community
participation and country ownership.”
In her examination of the PRSP process in Nicaragua, Arne Rückert
(2007) agrees with Cammack, and adds the notions that the rise of participatory
discourse represents the international financial institutions’ response to the
questioning of the neoliberal policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus
and that this response is an attempt at co-optation. According to Rückert (2007,
97):
International institutions have the function of coopting elites from the
periphery and absorbing counterhegemonic ideas to create or ensure
the dominance of the hegemonic ideology. First, hegemonic
institutions involve peripheral elites to give an appearance of broad
representation and to legitimize the policies they pursue. In the PRSP
process, incorporating CSOs into the policymaking process could be
seen as an attempt to coopt civil society actors in the developing world
into the development framework of the IFIs, and to legitimize the
contested neoliberal policy reforms in developing countries. Second,
hegemonic institutions absorb counterhegemonic ideas and concepts to
make it seem as though the concerns of critics are being heard and
taken seriously.
Rückert (2007, 103-109) goes on to detail how the supposedly participatory
process for developing Nicaragua’s PRSP in fact involved very little if any
influence by Nicaraguan civil society organizations, how the International
Monetary Fund team controlled the macroeconomic policy portion of the PRSP,
and how the ultimate product retained most of the neoliberal prescriptions of the
old structural adjustment programs while adding some spending to reduce
poverty.
Is it fair to apply these evaluations of the World Bank’s PRSP processes to
participatory budgeting? That is, is it fair to suggest that participatory budgeting
is a counterhegemonic idea that has been co-opted by the Bank as a way,
ultimately, to legitimize neoliberal policies? Or should one view the Bank’s
support of PB as genuine convergence with the left? My own interpretation, laid
out further below, is that within the World Bank one can find both kinds of PB
advocates – those who believe in PB’s democratizing potential and those who use
the language of participation as a kind of Trojan horse for their own marketizing
agenda – but that the Bank as an institution is not committed to PB in the same
way that it has embraced Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. The few hundred
million dollars the Bank has loaned or granted to PB-related projects (some of
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which are related to PRSPs in any case) represents a minute portion of total Bank
funding, something on the order of less than one tenth of one percent just of IBRD
loans.5 In other words, despite the Bank’s importance in the globalization of
participatory budgeting, PB is not very important to the Bank. As the
globalization of PB proceeds, the results of Bank-promoted PB continue to differ
considerably from city to city, likely depending less on which type of Bank
advocates are doing the promoting than on the varying local political, social, and
economic contexts, including the kinds of politicians in office, the civil society
organizations willing to participate, and the level of resources available.
Participatory Budgeting as a Global Script
My understanding of the World Bank’s role in the globalization of
participatory budgeting builds on the work by Jeffrey Jackson (2005). In his
study of how development agencies operate in Honduras, Jackson offers a number
of ideas about globalization that help illuminate the diffusion of participatory
budgeting. First, he posits that globalization is done by “globalizers” –
international development workers – and that their motivations are not entirely
altruistic. For Jackson (2005, 2), globalization is about development agencies like
the World Bank creating “a framework of global governance that develops and
maintains the policies necessary to promote their various global agendas
throughout the world.” Importantly, while the overall goal is “to advance global
capitalism” there is no one single agenda but rather “a multiplicity of agendas”
with varying degrees of importance; and, like the development agencies
themselves, some agendas are “hegemonic and others are peripheral” (Jackson
2005, 10, 9). Jackson (2005, 9-10) calls these agendas “global cultural scripts” or
“the various recipes, rules, and frames of reference that define and constrain how
independent nation-states can operate in the global context…. [G]lobalization
entails nations following the same recipes (more or less) for how societies should
function…. I argue that development organizations are the main promoters of
these global scripts.” Certainly, PB is one of many recent global scripts,
especially for municipal governments, and the leading development agency – the
World Bank – is promoting it. Yet, as we have seen, PB is something of a
peripheral agenda within the Bank.
Promotion of PB is spread across various units of the Bank, mostly less
important ones in terms of resources, including especially the Social Development
Department. Much of the Bank’s PB promotion and research activities have been
financed not by the Bank’s main sources but by specific Northern European
5
Perhaps it would be fairer to compare PB-related projects to all those geared towards social
development. Rough calculations, based on an average of four percent of IBRD loans ($11 billion
annually from 2002 to 2010) going towards the Social Development, Gender, and Inclusion
(SDGI) thematic portfolio (World Bank 2005b, 58), suggest that PB-related projects made up
about six percent of the SGDI portfolio.
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Goldfrank: The World Bank and the Globalization of Participatory Budgeting
funds, particularly the Norwegian-Finnish Trust Fund for Environmental and
Socially Sustainable Development and the Bank Netherlands Partnership Program
(TFESSD), or in partnership with Northern European governments. The Swedish
and Dutch governments, for example, paid for the World Bank Institute’s research
and publication of its volume, Participatory Budgeting (Shah 2007, xvii), and
TFESSD supports CIGU and MDP-ESA (World Bank 2009, 5). As Michael
Watts (2001, 283, 284) once wrote concerning the Bank’s attention to social
capital, participatory budgeting has been a way for the “Bank’s disenfranchised…
to stimulate debate within and among the Bank’s divisions and provide a ground
on which the hegemony of the neo-liberal doctrine might be engaged”; but “in
terms of staffing, resources and legitimacy within the Bank structure, the social
capital [read PB] group remains wholly insignificant. The center of gravity
within the institution resides elsewhere, quite specifically with the unassailable
power of the ‘structural adjustment people.’”
Sam Dallyn’s (2008) study of the Bank’s PB pilot program in Albania
supports such an interpretation. For example, Dallyn (2008, 1-2, 16-17) finds that
the Bank only provided $10,000 to support the initiation of PB in four regions,
compared to a budget of over $225 million for total projects in Albania at the
time, and that while the Social Development Department team wanted to place PB
within the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy for Albania, the more powerful
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management unit prevented that. Moreover,
key players in the Bank remain unconvinced by PB. Take Anwar Shah, cited
earlier. Shah (2008, 209-213) lists participatory budgeting as a development
approach that has not met high expectations in improving government
performance in providing citizens access to basic services. Though Jackson
(2005) notes the competition among international development agencies over
which global scripts are prioritized, clearly there is competition within the major
donor organizations as well. In the World Bank, one finds competition among
detractors of PB and both kinds of advocates mentioned above, the mostly
Northern European-funded true believers and those who support PB as part of a
modernizing neoliberal agenda.
The latter type of advocate fits into a second key theme in Jackson’s take
on globalization, the notion that the development agencies are gradually changing
nation-states in the developing world (so-called “emerging markets”) into
“neoliberal states” that are functional for global governance. According to
Jackson (2005, 138-40), these neoliberal states offer three main services:
providing infrastructure like ports and roads that facilitate global trade; adopting
neoliberal reforms such as “fiscal and monetary policies that ensure
macroeconomic stability, foreign investment, and export-oriented economic
growth”; and supplying social order through “a wide range of activities under the
broad rubrics of ‘poverty reduction,’ ‘social development,’ and ‘social safety
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nets.’”6 Some World Bank officials view participatory budgeting precisely in this
way, that is, as a local government reform that facilitates the performance of these
services. The former manager of the World Bank Institute’s urban program, Tim
Campbell, for example, sees PB and other new forms of local participation as part
of a “new model of governance” – one that is more fiscally disciplined and more
efficient – in many Latin American cities (Campbell 2003, 145). According to
Campbell (2003, 98, 175), the World Bank should continue to support the
consolidation of this new model and expand it for reasons that Jackson would find
familiar:
The Bank and its borrowers have new reasons to resuscitate the idea of
an urban strategy to foster an appropriate role for cities, to gauge their
potential contribution to speeding or enhancing growth, to address
problems of large agglomerations, and to steer them away from selfdefeating ventures like city-sponsored enterprises of several decades
ago. Trade-induced growth is itself a reason to coordinate city efforts
in planning and coordinating infrastructure to link urban markets and
manufacturing with intraregional investments such as railways,
highways, and ports.
Cities not only have a crucial role in providing infrastructure and boosting
trade. Campbell (2003, 98) stresses that “local democratic participation is
becoming a potentially important underpinning in the responsible management of
the financial system and, ultimately, part of the mechanism to guarantee
macroeconomic stability.”
Throughout his discussion of the new local
governance model in Latin America, Campbell holds up PB and Porto Alegre as
exemplary: “Municipalities in leading cities began to take on attributes of private
businesses attending to customers. No practice is more illustrative of this change
than participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre” (Campbell 2003, 151). For the new
fiscally responsible municipal government model, Campbell (2003, 171-172) sees
participatory budgeting as co-existing with and even helping to reinforce
privatization of public services and reduction of municipal personnel costs. He
approvingly – and in my view mistakenly – reports that “Tarso Genero [sic]
reduced Porto Alegre’s staff by one fourth” (Campbell 2003, 152; cf. Goldfrank
2011, 62-63). The other type of Bank advocate of PB, what I have called the true
6
Of course, a state need not be neoliberal to provide infrastructure, stability, and a social safety
net. And in recent years some of the political parties on the left that first introduced participatory
budgeting at the local level – like the PT in Brazil and the Broad Front in Uruguay – have reached
national office and adopted policies similar to what Jackson describes here. In that sense, and
particularly with regard to macroeconomic stability, there has been a convergence from the left
towards policies long supported by the Bank.
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Goldfrank: The World Bank and the Globalization of Participatory Budgeting
believers, also mention PB’s benefits for fiscal discipline and reducing costs, but
they emphasize more Jackson’s final prong for neoliberal states – poverty
reduction and social development (see, e.g., Social Development Team 2006, 23).
A third set of ideas in Jackson’s work may help illuminate how both kinds
of Bank advocates of PB have achieved such importance in disseminating PB.
Specifically, Jackson (2005, 64-71, 142-146) notes how the development agencies
seek to position themselves as beneficial experts, as holders of specialized
knowledge, and how they use four mechanisms of power – insertion into local
politics (most helpfully by invitation from local authorities), surveillance to gather
information, agenda setting to place their recipes at the top, and garnering consent
of local authorities and citizens – both to maintain that expertise and to ensure
their policy prescriptions are followed. With regard to PB, we have already seen
how the Bank has published numerous studies to set itself up as the “Knowledge
Bank” that former Bank president James Wolfensohn wanted it to become
(Cammack 2004, 196). And the Bank now offers “expert” advice on participatory
budgeting through its on-line courses, site visits, and publications. In the Preface
to its book on participatory budgeting, World Bank Institute Manager of the
Poverty Reduction and Economic Management unit Roumeen Islam writes that
the book “advances the World Bank Institute’s agenda on knowledge sharing and
learning from cross-country experiences in reforming public governance. It is
intended to assist policy makers and practitioners in developing countries in
making more-informed choices” (Shah 2007, xv). The Bank’s expertise on PB
now garners invitations to research local PB processes and offer recommendations
for improvement, something is has carried out not only in Peru (Banco Mundial
2011, 3) but even in one of the original sites of PB, Porto Alegre (De Souza 2010,
39).
These invitations lead to a final pair of Jackson’s (2005, 15, 17) arguments
that offer some insight: that “local agendas succeed only as they are capable of
linking into the global agendas” and that “the greater benefits of the activities of
the international development profession accrue to the donor countries” (and I
would add development agencies) rather than to the recipient countries. The
literature on the global diffusion of participatory budgeting indicates that in many
if not most cases of sustained PB, local authorities linked up to external
supporters like the World Bank. It is more questionable, however, whether the
Bank received greater benefits from promoting PB than the local governments
that implemented it. Jackson (2005) highlights the contracts awarded to donor
country corporations and the jobs created for Northern development experts as the
major benefits they derive from providing development aid. Potential benefits the
Bank may gain from supporting PB include a more positive public image,
stronger collaborative relations with other international development agencies,
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and access to information on loan recipients. Possibly most important, the Bank
may benefit by using PB as a selling point for its loans and as a way to reduce
development project losses and failures due to corruption. With regard to the
former, in a Bank document selling itself to the Russian government, labeled
“World Bank Group: Comparative Advantages,” the Bank highlights its role in
promoting PB in several developing countries, including a pilot project in rural
Russia (World Bank 2006, Annex 3, p. 4). With regard to the latter, the Bank
frequently touts PB’s role in reducing corruption; some observers speculate that
this is a key reason the Bank supports PB (Dallyn 2008, 6, 19-20); and the Bank’s
website hosts a research paper offering evidence that Brazilian municipalities that
use PB have fewer and less serious corruption cases than those that do not use PB
(Zamboni 2007).
Of course, corruption is an important issue at the World Bank, given the
increasingly strident arguments against foreign aid on the basis that it is
squandered by corrupt local authorities (see, inter alia, Moyo 2010). Still, despite
the potential (but difficult-to-measure) benefits to the World Bank of promoting
PB, the fact that the Bank dedicates only a minute percentage of its resources to
doing so suggests that most Bank officials are not convinced that any benefits
derived outweigh the costs to the Bank, if indeed such benefits exist. But if they
do exist, would they outweigh the potential benefits to recipients of Banksupported PB? The next section addresses that question with a brief look at the
effects of participatory budgeting promoted by the World Bank.
Consequences of PB Promotion
Some observers argue that the Bank’s promotional role has negative
effects on the practice of participatory budgeting. Sintomer et al. (2010, 31) set
up a contrast between the original empowering Porto Alegre model of PB and a
Bank-supported model; they argue that “many Latin American PBs are mainly
top-down and are not based on the independent mobilization of civil society”; that
these PBs “only control a limited amount of money” and “rely on methodologies
that do not give any real decision-making power or control to community
organizations, which means they are highly unlikely to achieve an empowerment
of the poor”; and that the World Bank “wields major influence over these PBs.”
If true, these arguments would suggest that Bank-supported PB does not have
much to offer to recipients and that PB advocates should be wary of any Bank
role. However, the claims are difficult to verify, as Sintomer and his colleagues
do not provide evidence for them nor do they specify which cases of PB they
think meet these criteria.
Other studies have suggested a less nefarious role for the Bank. Dallyn
(2008, 22-30) finds several indications that the Bank-sponsored pilot projects of
participatory budgeting in Albania at least partially succeeded in mobilizing
citizens, including the poorest and most marginalized groups (like the Roma), in
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Goldfrank: The World Bank and the Globalization of Participatory Budgeting
creating a reasonably empowering PB process, and in becoming independently
sustained by continuing and spreading to other cities in Albania without Bank
support.7 In Peru, the emblematic case of Bank-supported PB, the results have
been mixed – in terms of level of participation, improving and equalizing access
to infrastructure and services, and including impoverished groups – but they have
improved over time (Goldfrank 2007a; Banco Mundial 2011). It is unclear
whether the Bank has played an important role in producing either the mixed
results or the improving results, but my sense is that it is unlikely.
Many factors affect the success of participatory budgeting, including how
it is designed, and the economic, social, and political conditions in which it is
implemented (Goldfrank 2007a). While at an initial point the World Bank may
influence the design of PB, the incumbent political authorities have the most
influence – and several Bank publications even complain about political
incumbents who fear losing power with PB and block effective participation or
refuse to implement PB decisions (Social Development Team 2006, 35; Banco
Mundial 2011, 9-13). And, like incumbents, the World Bank has virtually no
influence over key aspects of the local context like the bureaucratic competence
of municipal administrations, the strength of political actors opposed to PB, and
the vitality of local civic associations. Indeed, a key lesson from studies of
participatory budgeting is that the results are frequently not what the promoters
intended (Goldfrank 2007a, 100, 106). Often, this means that democratizing
intentions are frustrated, but incumbents attempting to use PB as a merely
cosmetic change to please international organizations or as a way of shoring up
their own support may face surprises as well. As Dallyn (2008, 30) concludes:
“Ultimately… it is the participants themselves who give PB life.”
Should supporters of the early experiments with participatory budgeting
then welcome World Bank promotion of it? A few orthodox Marxist critics of PB
have pointed to the Bank’s approval of it as a sign that PB helps to maintain the
status quo rather than hasten revolutionary changes and thus should be rejected by
the left (Fontana and Flores 2001); for several reasons, in my perspective this
would be a mistake. First, I am not convinced by the view apparently held by
some (Campbell 2003) that by adopting PB, citizens will come to recognize the
correctness or necessity of the neoliberal agenda of downsizing the state. That
certainly does not seem to have happened in Peru, where PB is most prevalent.
Whether one sees PB in Peru as top-down and disempowering or as gradually
improving, it has coincided with more resistance to neoliberalism than acceptance
in recent years, as witnessed by the rise of widespread anti-neoliberal protest as
7
The Social Development Team (2006, 33-35) also report improvements in services, inclusion,
and transparency as well as increased revenues for local governments in the pilot cities. Sintomer
et al. (2010, 40) recognize that after this pilot project, Albania became “one of the countries in
South-East Europe with the largest number of participatory budgets.”
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Journal of Public Deliberation, Vol. 8 [2012], Iss. 2, Art. 7
well as by the election of Ollanta Humala (whose campaign differed from how he
has governed). Second, as described above, some officials within the Bank,
especially those within the Social Development Department, share most of the
same goals as the early experimenters with PB. Persuading the rest of the Bank of
PB’s worth – and thereby deserving of more funding – would seem a superior
strategy. Recent econometric studies of PB in Brazil convincingly showing that
cities that adopt it tend to see a larger decrease in infant mortality than do cities
without it (Gonçalves 2009; Touchton and Wampler 2012) could help in that
regard.
Furthermore, even in the supposedly top-down cases of PB supported by
the Bank, Sintomer et al. (2010, 31) claim to see improved transparency and
accountability as well as less corruption and “some ‘pro-poor policies’ that help
mitigate somewhat the huge inequalities of Latin American societies.”
Participatory budgeting as promoted by the Bank – or by anyone else – may not
be a panacea for all that prevents egalitarian development, and it may not always
lead to major achievements by local government, yet, as Dallyn (2008, 31) writes,
“one of the reasons for its immediate appeal across many regions in developing
countries is that it is, in many cases, a drastic improvement on what has preceded
it.” In the end, participatory budgeting helps start a broad conversation about
social and economic priorities, and once started – even by a World Banksupported pilot project – it can develop into the democratizing and redistributive
process that would be, as the Porto Alegre slogan claimed, “good for the whole
world.”
Conclusion
This article has tried to offer a nuanced view of World Bank support for
participatory budgeting. To sum up, I have suggested that, while certain units of
the World Bank have promoted participatory budgeting as a script or recipe for
local governments across the globe – some as true believers in PB’s
transformative, democratizing, poverty-reducing potential and some who see PB
as supporting a neoliberal agenda that includes efficiency in local government – in
fact PB is quite marginal within the Bank. I have also hinted at what I think is
one reason for PB’s peripheral status among the Bank’s global agendas: the most
important units of the Bank are not persuaded that participatory budgeting does
enough to support neoliberal policy or to provide other benefits to the Bank and
the major donor countries. I agree with Dallyn’s (2008, 5, 32) assessment that PB
“will keep a small but significant place” in one of the Bank’s units, the Social
Development Department, but that it likely will remain marginal within the
Bank’s activities more generally. Nonetheless, even from this peripheral position,
advocates within the Bank likely will continue – and should continue – to play a
major role in the diffusion of participatory budgeting.
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Goldfrank: The World Bank and the Globalization of Participatory Budgeting
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