Draft REPORT for The Independent Complaints Directorate NOT TO BE QUOTED WITHOUT PERMISSION In the line of duty? Shooting incident reports and other indicators of the use and abuse of force by members of the SAPS David Bruce and Gabriel O’Malley Criminal Justice Policy Unit Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 13 July1999 (January 2000 version) Acknowledgements We would like to express out thanks to: The South African Police Service for providing us with access to data on various issues relating to the use of force including shooting incidents and civil claims against the SAPS. The members of the SAPS and ICD who assisted us in collecting the various components of the data on which this report is based. Zaid Kimmie and Mark Isserow of the Community Agency for Social Enquiry who ran the data sets and conducted the initial statistical analysis of the shooting incident data. The Royal Danish Embassy who funded the writing of this research report. Note: the report as is currently stands is a draft report. In particular it appears that there may be a need to revise some of the shooting incident figures in relation to the possibility of duplication of data. We therefore request that if figures from the report are to be used this is done in consultation with David Bruce, who can be contacted at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Tel: (011) 403-5650 ext 152, Fax: (011) 339-6785. E-mail: dbruce@csvr.org.za CONTENTS Glossary Section A Introduction: sources of information on police uses of force 1. Data provided by the South African Police Service (SAPS) 2. Statistics provided by the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) 3. Other sources Section B Evaluation of key data sources 1. Overall analysis of data on shooting incidents 2. Comparison of data from the three provinces Section C. Fatalities and other aspects of shooting incidents 1. Overall levels of deaths as a result of police action (a) Accounting for variations in rates of deaths as a result of police action (b) Evaluating the number of deaths 1 – a proportion of overall homicides 2. A projected national picture of firearm use by the SAPS 3. Incident where people are killed or wounded (a) Evaluating levels of deaths as a result of police action 2 – lethality index 4. Legality of shooting incidents (a) Overall Legality of Shooting Incidents Incidents involving fatalities and woundings 5. Off-duty shootings (a) Involvement of police reservists in shooting incidents 6. Other general characteristics of shooting incidents (a) Missed/warning shot incidents (b) Time of Day 7. Characteristics of police shooters (a) Number of officers involved in incidents Age and Experience Rank (d) Police officers involved in a large number of shooting incidents 8. Variations in rates of shootings reported by police stations Section D. Indicators regarding other uses of force Complaints submitted to the ICD Criminal and disciplinary cases against SAPS members Civil claims against the SAPS (a) Claims (b) Payments Section E Recommendations Data collection relating to the use of force General strategies to control the use of force Greater emphasis on and control of the off-duty use of firearms by police Police Reservists Further research F Conclusion Appendix 1: Comparison of existing data sources on use of force by the SAPS - to be completed Appendix 2: Distribution by year of shooting incidents recorded on SAPS data in all policing areas Appendix 3: Profile of 4756 shooting incidents in 15 policing Areas in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Free State Appendix 4: Fatal shooting incidents – variations in proportions of incidents declared legal and illegal by policing area. Appendix 5: Stations and Area Commands recording 20 or more shootings Appendix 6: Criminal and disciplinary cases against SAPS members Appendix 7: Civil claims against the SAPS Reference Glossary Provinces, areas, and stations - All police stations are part of a police “area” (formerly district) under an area commissioner. All areas in turn fall under the provincial commissioner. Note that while all stations fall within a police area there are also units which are linked to the area which are not attached to a particular station. Similarly there are usually also units which fall under the province which are not linked to a particular unit. “Deaths as a result of police action” are referred to in ss53(2)(b) of the SAPS Act, 58 of 1995. , in terms of which the Independent Complaints Directorate is required to investigate “all deaths in police custody or as a result of police action”. These deaths are in general caused by a use of force by the police but would also possibly include a number of deaths caused for instance in vehicle accidents. References to the “three provinces” are references to the Eastern Cape, Western Cape and Free State, the provinces which maintained a reasonably high standard of recording of shooting incidents in the 1995-1998 period. Missed/warning shots – a missed shot is a gunshot which is fired at a target and which does not hit the target. A warning shot is a gunshot fired with the intention of discouraging a person from a course of action (such as fleeing) but which is not intended to hit that person. In fact “missed shot incidents” are incidents where all shots fired miss the target. In an incident where a person is killed or wounded there may also be a number of missed shots. Incidents where the target hit is not the original target are not recorded in this report as missed shot incidents. The terms police officer and member of the SAPS are used in this text interchangeably and the word “officer” is therefore not a reference to rank. In fact the distinction between “officer” and “non-officer” ranks is only relevant in this report with respect to the fact that the persons who is responsible for investigating a shooting incident is intended to be off officer rank (Standing Order 251.15.2) unless prevailing circumstances indicate that this is not practical (Standing Order 251.15.3) Use of force – a use of force is in this report is a physical use of force. Some texts on policing also refer to non physical forms of force (sometimes referred to as psychological force). Section A Introduction: Sources of information on police uses of force What indicators are there regarding the use of force by the SAPS, how reliable are they, and in so far as they may be reliable what picture do they provide to us regarding the use of force by members of the South African Police Service? This report sets out to address theses issues by examining data provided by the SAPS and ICD on the use of force by members of the South African Police Service. 1. Data provided by the South African Police Service (SAPS) The main information, which we received from the SAPS, was in the following forms: SAPS Standing Order 251 requires that “a full factual report” be compiled following any incident where a member “fires a weapon, allows a weapon to be fired or orders the firing of a weapon” and sets out the issues which needs to be covered in such a report. The researchers were fortunate to be granted access to details regarding all shooting incidents recorded on the centralised SAPS data base for the years 1996, 1997 and 1998, a total of 7566 shooting incidents. As will be seen (Section B) the data was first evaluated in terms of its reliability. This evaluation indicated that data from the 15 policing areas which make up the Western Cape (4 areas), Eastern Cape (8 areas) and Free State (3 areas) demonstrated a higher degree of reliability than that from other provinces. As will be shown the data from these three provinces also demonstrates a high degree of correspondence with ICD data on deaths as a result of police action in shooting incidents for 1998, the one full year during which the two data sets overlap. A detailed analysis of the shooting incident reports from these three provinces, comprising 4756 or 63% of the total number of incidents recorded on the SAPS data files, was therefore conducted with a view to identifying overall patterns in relation to recorded firearm usage by SAPS members. The SAPS also provided data relating to complaints received against SAPS members, criminal and disciplinary convictions – over the years 1994 – 1997, and civil claims – for the years 1995 – 1997. These were also used in so far as they were seen to provide indicators regarding the use of force by the SAPS. Statistics provided by the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) Since it started operating in April 1997 the ICD has been producing statistics which, in so far as they are relevant as indicators of the use of force, may be seen to fall into two categories. In terms of ss53(8) of the SAPS Act, the police are required to notify the ICD of all “deaths in police custody or as a result of police action”. The ICD receives notification of most of the deaths which it records in this category directly from the SAPS. However there are also cases which the ICD finds out about deaths from other sources such as reports in the press. The ICD statistics reflect “deaths in police custody” and “deaths as a result of police action” under separate headings. Deaths as a result of police action are in general deaths resulting from the use of force by members of the SAPS. ICD statistics on deaths as a result of police action are therefore one, and in fact possibly the most reliable, indicator of overall levels of the use of force by the SAPS; The ICD also collects statistics on complaints, which it receives. Some of these relate to alleged cases of assault, assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, or torture. However, as will be shown there are good reasons to suspect that this information in not particularly reliable as an indicator of overall levels of any of the alleged behaviors. Other sources A variety of other data sources were consulted in so far as the provided useful points of reference or comparison. These included research reports and articles that have been written relating to the use of force by the SAPS and a selection of sources from other countries which it was thought might provide useful comparative information. The South African sources are listed in Appendix 1 and compared in terms of the time periods, which they cover, their apparent reliability and other factors. As is apparent from Appendix 1 there is a significant degree of variation between these key data sources in that: They differ in terms of whether they reflect lethal uses of force, or both lethal and non-lethal uses of force (see Table 1 in Appendix 1); They differ in the degree to which they reflect possible uses of force in custody and non occupational violence by members of the SAPS (see Table 1 in Appendix 1); They differ in relation to whether they reflect uses of force involving firearms only, uses of force primarily involving firearms, or a range of uses of force including those involving firearms, other weapons, or no weapons (see Table 1 in Appendix 1). They reflect different time periods (see Table 2 in Appendix 1); They differ in the degree of comprehensiveness. Where the data is not comprehensive it appears that some data sources are more representative (as a sample of the overall phenomenon which it is suggested they represent) than are others (see Table 2 in Appendix 1). It is apparent therefore that these different data sources are not comparable in a strict sense. However they are used in this report in an attempt to “build up a picture” of the patterns and variations in the use of force by SAPS members. Using these data sources the report therefore does the following: In section B we focus on evaluating our key data source – the SAPS data on shooting incidents – with a view to establishing whether any part of this data is in any way reliable as a source of information. In section C we briefly discuss the ICD data on deaths as a result of police action which include both shooting and non-shooting related deaths. We then present an in depth analysis of shootings by members of the SAPS – primarily relying on data relating to shooting incidents in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Free State. In section D we look at information relating to ICD information on complaints against the police and SAPS information on complaints and charges – of a criminal or disciplinary nature – and civil claims lodged against members of the SAPS. In doing so we evaluate two issues. The primary purpose of this section is to try and establish whether there are any sources of information, which can serve as indicators relating to uses of force by members of the SAPS, which do not involve the use of firearms. This category of use of force incidents includes use of fatal use of force incidents, which are not shooting related, and “lower order” uses of force – forms of the use of force that are not generally associated with deaths or serious injuries (henceforward less-than-lethal – or LTL – force). This section also raises the issue of whether any of these indicators measure levels of “abuse” of the capacity to use force by members of the SAPS. In our conclusion we make recommendations regarding maintaining reliable and accessible statistics relating to the use of force by the SAPS and focus on general issues relating to control of the use of force as well as the issue of off duty shootings by members of the SAPS. Section B Evaluation of key data sources 1. Overall analysis of data on shooting incidents This report relies primarily on the data provided by the SAPS relating to shooting incident reports recorded on the SAPS centralised database. The original data file covered the period 1996 to 1998 (inclusive) and contained the following fields: date and time of incident area in which incident occurred number of police personnel involved number of arrests made number of people wounded number of people killed name, rank, age, years of service of police personnel involved whether or not the person shot was the original target the duty status of the police personnel whether or not the action was legal. The accuracy of the data is heavily dependent on whether individual police stations reported shooting incidents involving their staff and whether these were recorded by area or provincial offices on the centralised SAPS PERSAP database. Table 1 provides the distribution of overall shooting incidents by province and compares it to the total population according to the 1996 census and murder rates in 1997 – the middle year of the three years covered by the shooting incident data. Table 1. Proportion of total recorded shooting incidents in each province over three years compared to proportion of national population and proportion of total number of murders in 1997. No of shooting incidents recorded: 1996-1998 % of total recorded shooting incidents: 1996-1998 % of national population: census ‘96 Number of murders recorded: 1997 % of total recorded murders 1997 Western Cape 2039 27 10 3129 13 Eastern Cape 1587 21 15 4219 17 KwaZulu-Natal 1272 16 20 6200 25 Free State 1130 15 6 1285 5 Gauteng 741 10 18 5645 23 Northern Cape 321 4 2 538 2 North West 237 3 8 1351 5 Mpumalanga 163 2 7 1240 5 Northern Prov 4 0(0.05) 12 981 4 Other/Unspec 72 1 TOTAL 7566 100(99) 100(98) 24588 100 As is indicated in Table 1 virtually 90% of the data reflects incidents recorded in 5 provinces. However: The proportion of the total number of shootings recorded in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Free State and Northern Cape are far higher than their proportions of the national population and murder rates. By contrast the proportions of the total number of shootings recorded in KwaZulu-Natal, North-West, Mpumalanga, Gauteng and particularly Northern-Province are significantly lower than their proportions of the total national population and murder rates. As is indicated in Table 2 the number of recorded incidents has declined annually since 1996. However closer scrutiny of the data reveals that this appears to be related to a dramatic decline in recording of data from shooting incidents reports on the SAPS data system. Table 2. Number of reported incidents, by year Year Frequency Percent 1996 3076 41 % 1997 2291 30 % 1998 2199 29 % Total 7566 100 % A full breakdown of the data received, by year is reflected in Appendix 2. This indicates that i. The three provinces Western Cape, Eastern Cape, and Free State appear to have given provided a higher standard of data than other provinces. This is reflected firstly in the fact that the provinces have provided a comparable level of data in all three years and secondly by the fact that there are not dramatic variations in the data indicating a degree of consistency in recording practise in each of the areas over the time period concerned. Even Umtata in the Eastern Cape, appears to have maintained a higher degree of consistency in recording than most of the areas in other provinces. These three provinces which together hold approximately 32% of South Africa’s population have accounted for 63% (4756) of the 7566 shooting incident reports recorded ii. With the exception of five other areas in different provinces (Umfolozi and Tugela in KwaZulu-Natal, Gordonia and Diamantveld in the Northern Cape, and Marico in the North West, all policing areas show very little consistency in terms of shooting incidents reports recorded. The Northern Cape is the one other province which has a reasonable claim to being included in the group of provinces with more reliable shooting incident data but has been excluded on the basis that 70% of its data is from one area. The area in question, Diamond Fields accounts for about 40% of the murders in the province during the period 1996-1998. Most of the areas of KwaZulu-Natal show dramatic fluctuations in terms of number of shooting incidents recorded. In particular however in Gauteng, North West and Mpumalanga very few incidents (other than in Marico) were recorded after 1996. The reason for the decline in recorded shootings is therefore primarily that the system for recording shooting incidents from these areas stopped operating with the same degree of effectiveness after 1996. In Northern Province a total of four incidents have been recorded over the entire time period. The implication therefore appears to be that the differences in recorded shooting incidents between 1996 and 1997 and 1998 is as a result of a collapse in the system for recording of shooting incidents on the SAPS database in a significant number of policing areas. Overall then it can be assumed that the differences in total number of shootings recorded in the different provinces over the three year period are more of a reflection of differences in recording practice than of shooting levels. Furthermore even in 1996 it appears that the system for recording of shooting incidents left much to be desired. Thus for instance it would appear open to question that the totals recorded in Gauteng in 1996 reflect the true extent of police involvement in shooting incidents in the province. Furthermore in Northern Province incidents recorded in 1996 obviously don’t even reflect a tiny proportion of the total number of shootings in that province. 2. Comparison of data from the three provinces The data from the three provinces Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Free State therefore appears preferable to that from the other provinces and possibly to be of good quality for building up an overall picture of shootings by members of the SAPS during the three years in question. But questions must still remain about to what extent the data accurately reflect overall shooting levels and other characteristics of shooting incidents. Table 3 compares the proportion of shooting incident reports from each of the three provinces with the proportions of population and proportions of average number of murders. Table 3: Proportion of total recorded shooting incidents in each province over three years compared to proportion of national population and proportion of total number of murders in 1997. No of Shooting incidents recorded over three years % of total recorded shooting incidents: 1996-1998 Population as per 1996 census (‘000s) % of total population in three provinces Average Annual no of murders recorded: 1996-1998 % of murder as per total for three provinces Western Cape 2039 43 3957 31 3129 36 Eastern Cape 1587 33 6303 49 4219 49 Free State 1130 24 2 634 20 1285 15 TOTAL 4756 100 12 894 100 100 Most significantly while the Western Cape and Free State both have a higher proportion of the reports relative to proportion of population the Eastern Cape has a far lower proportion of the total number of reports (33%) relative to its proportion of the population (49%). This might mean for instance that the Eastern Cape is a less violent place than are the other two provinces. However the statistic on proportion of murders indicates that the Eastern Cape has a proportion of murders similar to its proportion of the population. In so far as level of violent crime is a predictor of police shootings it may therefore be the case that the Eastern Cape has a higher level of under-reporting than do other provinces. What types of shootings are least likely to be reported? One possibility is that shootings where no-person is killed or wounded (missed/warning shot incidents) may not be recorded in shooting incident reports more so than shootings where a person is killed or wounded. Another possibility is that unlawful shootings are unlikely to be reported on. Differences in number of shootings declared to be illegal are analysed later in the report. The fourth last column of Appendix reflects incidents where no one is killed or injured indicating that the average rate for such incidents was 76% of all recorded shooting incidents in the three provinces. Table 4. Proportion of warning/missed shot incidents in each area Police Area Number no wounds or deaths incidents % Total number of incidents Boland 456 84% 541 East Metropole 644 89% 772 Southern Cape 113 79% 143 Western Metropole 456 78% 583 Western Cape: Sub-total 82% Drakensberg 84 72% 117 East London 282 72% 394 Grahamstown 64 70% 91 Karoo 97 85% 114 Port Elizabeth 323 81% 398 Queenstown 87 52% 168 Uitenhage 149 84% 178 Umtata 28 22% 127 Eastern Cape: Sub-total 70% Eastern Free State 228 76% 299 Northern Free State 311 72% 430 Southern Free State 278 69% 401 Free State: Sub-total 72% Total 3600 76% 4756 As can be seen from Table 4 the area in the Western Cape with the lowest proportion of missed/warning shots is the Western Metropole with 78%. By comparison none of the areas in the Free State have a proportion of missed/warning shots higher than 76%. The greatest fluctuations are however in the Eastern Cape where two areas in particular (Queenstown and Umtata) have a particularly low proportion of missed shots. As a result of the influence of these areas on the overall provincial statistics the Eastern Cape therefore records an overall lower proportion of missed/warning shots (70%) than does the Free State (72%) while the Western Cape statistics are significantly higher than both of the others. It therefore appears reasonable to infer that, unless police shooters in the Umtata and Queenstown policing areas and in the Eastern Cape and Free State generally are significantly more accurate than those in the Western Cape, or that warning shots are used in a higher proportion of incidents in the Western Cape, that the reasons for the differences in proportions of missed/warning shots are to do with the likelihood that police in the Western Cape record a higher proportion of their missed/warning shot incidents than do police in the other two provinces. The inference is therefore that the data from the Western Cape is more reliable than the data from the other two provinces in presenting an overall picture of police shootings. Furthermore the data from the Eastern Cape may be particularly unreliable due to the influence particularly of recording practice in the Queenstown and Umtata areas. Should we therefore exclude the data from the Eastern Cape and possibly also that from the Free State? A further point of comparison between the two data sets is ICD data on deaths as a result of police action. As indicated the ICD has been involved in recording deaths as a result of police action since April 1997. The year 1998 is therefore the only full year in relation to which the ICD’s data and the data on shooting incident overlaps. To what extent then is there correspondence between the two sets of data? Table 5 compares the total number of deaths recorded in the shooting incident reports with those recorded by the ICD in each province in 1998. Table 5. Recorded deaths as a result of police shootings in 1998 ICD –Shooting related deaths as a result of police action SAPS – fatalities in shooting incidents Deaths recorded by SAPS as a percentage of those recorded by ICD Gauteng 117 1 1 Northern Province 20 0 0 North West 13 6 46 Mpumalanga 32 0 0 KwaZulu-Natal 110 60 55 Free State 28 29 104 Eastern Cape 50 48 96 Western Cape 39 36 92 Northern Cape 5 7 140 Total 45 The data reflected in Table 5 appears to give further credibility to the supposition that the data provided from the Free State, Western Cape, and Eastern Cape is reasonably reliable particularly with respect to shooting incidents which resulted in fatalities. Furthermore Table 4 also once again appears to indicate that the SAPS shooting data from the Northern Cape is also relatively reliable. However for the reasons indicated earlier n the data from this province has not been used. It is important perhaps not to overstate the significance of the correspondence between the data in relation to these three provinces. At a very basic level it merely means that the data suggests that fatal shooting incidents involving the police that are reported to the ICD are also likely to be recorded in shooting incident reports. The ICD may wish to examine the shooting incident data to establish whether or not these actually correspond with the deaths “as a result of police action” which it has recorded. In summary then: The SAPS data relating to shooting incidents appears to be reasonably reliable for the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Free State and not, with the exception of one or tow policing areas, for the rest of the country. The data appears to be reliable in relation to the recording of fatal shooting incidents and therefore probably also incidents resulting in injury. The data may not be equally reliable for all of the three provinces in relation to the recording of “missed/warning shot” incidents. In particular it appears that the Eastern Cape data may be particularly unreliable in this regard. Despite some reservations then, in what follows we will take the data from these three provinces in trying to put together a picture of consistencies and variations in patterns of shootings by members of the SAPS.  Section C. Fatalities and other aspects of shooting incidents As stated the objective of this report is primarily to attempt to clarify what indicators exist relating to the use of force by members of the SAPS and, to identify what information is provided by these indicators with regard to levels and patterns in the use of force by the police. In the section we focus on shootings by the SAPS – the primary cause of deaths as a result of police action. 1. Overall levels of deaths as a result of police action Table 6 shows the total number of deaths as a result of police action recorded by the ICD in each province. The table also provides the provincial populations as provided by the 1996 national census. In the last column the rate per 100 000 relative to the population of each province is provided. There is therefore a significant degree of variation with provinces like KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng, the Free State, Western Cape and Mpumalanga recording noticeably higher rates of deaths than the other provinces. Table 6: Deaths as a result of police action over two years relative to provincial populations April ‘97- March ‘98 April ’98 – Mar ‘99 Total: April ’97 – Mar ‘99 % of national total number of deaths Provincial Population (‘000s) % of national total population Rate of deaths as a result of police action per 100 000 Gauteng 135 132 267 25 7,348 18 3.6 N Prov 25 28 53 5 4,928 12 1.1 North W 17 25 42 4 3,354 8 1.3 Mpum 36 37 73 7 2,800 7 2.6 KwaNatal 165 148 313 30 8,417 21 3.7 Free State 36 34 70 7 2,633 6 2.7 E. Cape 47 66 113 11 6,302 16 1.8 W Cape 40 62 102 10 3,956 10 2.6 N Cape 5 13 18 2 840 2 2.1 TOTAL 506 545 1051 0 40,583 2.6 (a) Accounting for variations in rates of deaths as a result of police action The rate of fatalities is potentially influenced by the nature of policies and laws, which restrict firearm use by the police and the degree of seriousness with which such policies are implemented by managers within police departments. The new amendment to section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act therefore has the potential to contribute significantly to reducing the overall level of deaths as a result of police action in South Africa. At the same time there appear to be other factors which apparently bear some relationship to the rate at which such deaths may occur. In addition to population size, and the crime rate (particularly of types of crime which might justify the use of lethal force by the police in effecting arrests) studies have attempted to identify other variables which may also be useful as "predictors" of variations in the rates of the use of force by the police - the focus of such studies has often been on firearm usage by the police and specifically killings by police officers. Other factors which might in general be expected to correlate with or impact on the number of such deaths include: disposition of offenders towards violence against the police; the types of weapons used by members of the offender population; the number of police serving the population concerned (the police to citizen ratio); the overall effectiveness of the police in identifying and apprehending offenders, and linked to the latter; the number of arrests; In addition to the type of factors listed here, Geller and Scott point to studies in the USA which have attempted to identify whether other combination of factors "related to levels of violence in communities explain at least some of the variation in police killings of civilians". Factors which have been analysed in this regard include income inequality, the level of food stamp and welfare receipt, measures of social cohesion (such as divorce, unemployment and suicide rates) and levels of gun density within communities. (1991, pp. 450-451) Finally other studies have suggested that political factors are also likely to have an impact on the level at which such killings occur (e.g. Chevigny, 1995; Jacobs and O’Brien, 1998 (b) Evaluating the number of deaths 1 – a proportion of overall homicides One important element in evaluating the use of police force is the proportion of the overall number of intentional homicides (i.e. both murders and justifiable homicides) committed by the police. This indicator depends on proportions, rather than actual levels of violence, and therefore reflects the level of police violence in relation to the level of violence in the societal context in which they live and work. Therefore, it can be useful when making international or domestic comparisons. However those involved in making such comparisons need to observe a certain degree of caution particularly as practices for recording crime differ from country to country. Thus for instance: Practice may differ from country to country as to whether all intentional homicides are recorded in murder statistics. Thus it is not clear whether people killed by the police are recorded in national murder. Furthermore it appears that some studies focus strictly on fatal police shootings as a proportion of overall homicides while other studies include non-shooting related deaths as a result of police action. In Table 7 therefore the proportion of shooting homicides by the police is compared to overall homicide rates in the three provinces. As can be seen the proportion of shooting homicides by the police in the Western Cape as compared to the overall number of homicides rose incrementally each year between 1996 and 1998; jumping from .797% of the overall homicides in 1996, to 1.01% in 1998. The Free State saw a higher jump between 1996 and 1997 (from 2.17% to 4.513%), but a precipitous fall from 1997 to 1998 (4.513% down to 2.49%). The Eastern Cape witnessed a slight increase between 1996 and 1997 (1.69% to 1.28%), and an almost imperceptible decrease between 1997 and 1998 (1.28% down to 1.27%). The overall numbers for the three provinces show a decrease in all three years, with a high of 1.69% in 1996 to a low of 1.33% in 1998. Table 7: Shooting homicides by police as a % of the total intentional homicides Province 1996-Total Homicides 1996-Shooting homicides by police (% of total) 1997-Total Homicides 1997-Killings by police (% of total) 1998-Total Homicides 1998-Killings by police (% of total) Western Cape 3259 26 (.797%) 3129 30 (.958%) 3534 36 (1.01%) Free State 1339 29 (2.17%) 1285 58 (4.513%) 1162 29 (2.49%) Eastern Cape 4212 48 (1.14%) 4219 54 (1.28%) 3769 48 (1.27%) Total 8810 103 (1.69%) 8633 142 (1.64%) 8465 113 (1.33%) To help understand the relevance of the proportions in the three provinces, it may be useful to compare them with those seen in some American cities with relatively large numbers of police homicides, and to Rio de Janeiro of Brazil. In making these comparisons however it should be noted that: In section 1 (see Table 5) we indicated that while there was a high degree of consistency between SAPS and ICD data there were nevertheless discrepancies between the figures for police related shootings fatalities provided by the two agencies. While the SAPS in the Free State, for instance, recorded a higher number of shooting related fatalities than did the ICD in 1998 (29 instead of 28), overall for the three provinces the ICD recorded 117 such fatalities while the SAPS recorded 113 (97% of the number recorded by the ICD). While it may be the case that both ICD statistics and SAPS statistics contain inaccuracies the possibility exists that the SAPS data underestimates the total number of police shooting related fatalities. Furthermore, as can be seen from Table 8, police shooting related fatalities may only account for as few as 89% of the overall number of deaths as a result of police action. In an earlier study of 165 ICD dockets shooting were found to have accounted for 106 out of 110 (96%) deaths as a result of police action with the remainder being vehicle deaths (3) and a non-firearm related uses of force (1). Of the 54 deaths in police custody dockets analysed in the study 4 were the consequence of a use of firearms by the police and another 5 were believed to be caused by non-firearm related uses of force by the police. Therefore out of a total of 116 use of force related deaths either in custody or outside of custody, 110 (94%) were the result of shootings by the police (Bruce, 1998, p. 10). Potentially therefore the SAPS data on shooting related fatalities may only represent in the region of 86% of the total number of intentional homicides connected to the police. I.e. if shootings account for 89% of deaths and the SAPS data only reflects 97% of shootings than this indicates that SAPS data reflect 86% of the total number of deaths as a result of police action. In 1991, police in Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Houston were responsible for less than 4% and police in Chicago and New York were responsible for less than 2% of the total number of intentional homicides. (Cano, 1997, p. 33) By contrast in 1995, in Rio de Janeiro, police shootings accounted for the death of 358 opponents, 9.3% of those killed intentionally in Rio de Janeiro that year (Cano, 1997, p.33). The international statistics therefore suggest then that, relative to the overall murder rate the level of deaths as a result of police action in the three provinces is not necessarily particularly. In particular: Even if one takes into account the fact that recorded shooting related deaths may account for roughly 86% of deaths as a result of police action the overall numbers for the three provinces remain at less than 2% of overall recorded murders. These proportions are therefore commensurate with those in New York and Chicago, roughly half of those in Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Houston, and less than one fifth of that in Rio de Janeiro. The Free State police recorded a relatively high proportion of the overall number of deaths in 1997 being responsible for 4.513% of the total homicides in the province. However the next year the rate dropped back below the international average seen above. For the full three year period Free State police shootings accounted for 116 deaths or 3% relative to the total number of intentional homicides (based on murder rates) in the province. If one adjusts this figure in relation to the figure of 86% of the overall number of deaths as a result of police action it increases to 3.6 % or figure comparable to that recorded in major American cities like Los Angeles and Philadelphia. We will therefore assume that existing statistics provide at least a rough approximation of the overall number of people killed by the police. Presuming this to be the case the above data may be seen to provide one indicator of whether or not the SAPS are responsible for a disproportionately large number of deaths. Taking the overall number of deaths as a result of police action recorded by the ICD during the two year period April 1997 to March 1999 (1051 deaths) compared to the total number of murders recorded in official statistics over the 1997 and 1998 calendar years (49 463) provides a statistic of 2.1%. If this and the statistics from the three provinces can in fact be used as a meaningful form of comparison then they indicate that the current overall rates of deaths as a result of police action are not necessarily particularly high when compared to indicators from major American cities and certainly do not indicate a level of police violence comparable with that in a city such as Rio de Janeiro. While this set of statistics does not necessarily imply that, relative to the intentional homicide rate in general, the SAPS accounts for a disproportionately high number of deaths, this should not be taken to imply that there is not value in measures being introduced to reduce the overall level of these deaths. Thus although comparisons with some major US cities are not unfavourable to the SAPS the overall number of people killed by police in the US is smaller than the total number killed by the SAPS although the population is roughly seven times larger than that of South Africa. Thus in 1990 for instance the US police killed fewer than four hundred in a one year period, a number lower than the yearly rate for South Africa (Geller and Scott 1992 cited in Cano, 1997, p.32). However it appears that the US figures for 1990 reflect a substantial decline in the overall number of fatalities as a result of police action in the US. Thus in the US it proved possible to bring about substantial reductions in the number of people killed by the police. This was achieved without reducing the overall effectiveness of the police in dealing with the problem of crime. There is no apparent reason why an effort can not be made to bring about such substantial reductions in South Africa. 2. A projected national picture of firearm use by the SAPS As indicated therefore not all of the recorded deaths as a result of police action are the result of firearm use by the police. See footnote 5 and above. In addition it is not necessarily the case that all deaths, which are the consequence of firearm use by the police, would be recorded by the ICD as “deaths as a result of police action”. For instance a person might be fatally injured following a shooting by the police in custody. It is not clear to what extent the ICD follows consistent practice in recording such deaths but it appears that at least some such deaths are recorded by the ICD as deaths in police custody. Table 5 separates out non-firearm related and firearm related deaths using the ICD statistics for the two year period April 1997 – March 1999. In the second last column the table then uses this data to develop a projected average number of shooting incidents per year over the 1996-1998 period. This is done by using the data provided in the shooting incident reports for the 3 provinces which indicates that on average SAPS members are involved in 1000 shooting incidents for every 75 persons killed. The average annual number of deaths as per ICD data was therefore multiplied by a factor of 1000/75 to get a projected annual number of shooting incidents per province. The projected provincial average number of shooting incidents per province is then added to get a projected annual average number of shooting incidents for the three years of 6225. Table 8: Shooting related deaths as a result of police action recorded by the ICD used as a basis for developing a projected annual average number of shooting incidents. 24 months: non-shooting related deaths 24 months: total deaths as a result of police action 24 months: Shooting deaths only % shooting deaths in province Average annual number of shooting deaths as per ICD data Projected average annual number of shooting incidents: 1996-1998 Annual Average Recorded in SAPS data: 1996-1998 Gauteng 22 267 245 26 122 1627 247 N Prov 7 53 46 5 23 307 1 North W 8 42 34 4 17 227 54 Mpum 5 73 68 7 34 453 79 KwaNatal 37 313 276 29 138 1840 424 Free State 9 70 61 7 30 400 377 E. Cape 10 113 103 11 51 680 529 W Cape 12 102 90 10 45 600 680 N Cape 4 18 14 1 7 93 107 114 100 In evaluating this table it should be noted that: The projected annual average is less than the actual annual average reported in both the Western Cape and the Northern Cape. This is despite the case that the Northern Cape data only appeared to reflect relatively high levels of reporting from one or two of the four policing areas in the province; As indicated in section 1 the data from the three provinces – particularly that from the Eastern Cape, may under-represent the total number of incidents particularly by under-representing shooting incidents where no one is killed or injured. It is quite likely that the statistic of 75 to 1000 therefore significantly under-represents the total number of shooting incidents. As will become apparent there appear to be other significant variations in shooting patterns and trends and in the reporting of shooting incidents between for instance different policing areas, stations and even police officers. It is therefore not necessarily the case that the statistic provided here provides a reasonable reflection of the overall national shooting picture. It would therefore appear reasonable to assume that the projected average of 6225 shootings a year is in some ways a conservative figure – to what degree however must at this point remain a matter for speculation. Using the figure of 6225 shootings as an annual average Table 9 therefore uses a more detailed breakdown of the statistics from the three provinces during the years 1996 –1998 in an attempt to provide a projected picture of overall annual national shootings. The right hand column of table 9 is therefore an attempt to provide a rough overall picture of the shooting incidents in which police were involved during an average year based on ICD data relating to fatal police shootings for the period April 1997 to March 1999 and SAPS shooting incident reports for the three year period 1996- 1998. Note that: The projected average figure of 467 deaths per year is a figure for firearm related deaths and not the total of use of force related deaths. As indicated by table 5 shootings appear to account for roughly 89% (937 out of 1051) of “deaths as a result of police action”. o-one is killed or injured. It is quite likely that the statistic of 75 to 1000 therefore significantly under-represents the total number of shooting incidents. See also foot note 5 above Note the distinction between number of people killed (358 in the three provinces), wounded (1002) and arrested (3902) and incidents where people were killed (311), wounded (876), and arrested (3600). Table 10 should assist with the interpretation of this information pointing out that in roughly 3% of incidents more than one person was killed or wounded. In a small proportion of incidents (probably less than 1%) people were both killed and wounded. There is therefore a small degree of overlap between incidents where a person is wounded and one where a person is killed. The level of overlap between incidents where a person is arrested and another killed or wounded is potentially much greater. The figure of 132 cases where the person who was hit was not the original target represents 3% of the total number of incidents. However it represents 11% of the total number of incidents (1156) where someone was killed or wounded. Table 9: Projected total national shootings and their consequences during an average year based on 1996-1998 data from the three provinces Outcome of shooting incident Data from three provinces: three years % - relative to total incidents Projected national total: three years Projected national total: average year No of people killed 358 7.5 1401 467 No of people wounded 1002 21 3921 1307 No of people arrested 3902 82 15315 5105 No of incidents where person killed 311 6.5 1215 405 No of incidents where person wounded 876 18 3363 1121 No of incidents where person arrested 2217 47 8778 2926 No of incidents where no-one killed or wounded 3600 76 14193 4731 No of incidents where no-one arrested, killed or wounded 2070 44 8217 2739 No of incidents where person hit was not original target 132 3 561 187 Total number of incidents 4756 100 18675 6225 3. Incident where people are killed or wounded As indicated in Table 9 the proportion of incidents where a person is killed represents 6.5% of the total number of incidents and that for the proportion of incidents where a person is wounded represents 18% of the total. Table 10 gives a rough indication of the number of people killed or wounded per incident indicating that in 76% of incidents recorded in the three provinces no-one was killed or wounded, a single person was killed or wounded in 21% of incidents while 3% of the time, more than one person was wounded or killed. For the 3%, there were 105 in which two people were wounded or killed, 18 incidents in which three people were wounded or killed, and of the rest, one incident where what would appear to be an exceptionally large number of people (12) were wounded or killed. These figures therefore indicate why the number of people killed or wounded exceeds the total number of incidents where people where killed or wounded. Table 10. People killed or wounded per incident Number killed or wounded Count % Cumulative % 0 3600 75.7 75.7 1 1018 21.4 97.1 2 105 2.2 99.3 3 18 0.4 99.7 4 9 0.2 99.9 5 3 0.1 99.9 6 1 0 100 9 1 0 100 12 1 0 100 Total 4756 100 100 (a) Evaluating levels of deaths as a result of police action 2 – lethality index Another statistics, which has been used as an indicator of possible police abuses of the capacity to use force, is the comparison between the number of people killed by the police and the number of people they injure when shooting (see Table 11). In particular a high kill to injury ratio would suggest the likelihood of widespread summary executions where police deliberately “take out” suspects whom they have apprehended. This ratio of persons killed to persons injured in a city is termed its lethality index. Figures quoted by Chevigny indicate that in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s the Chicago Police Department had a .44/1 lethality index, and the New York Police Department had a .33/1 lethality index. By contrast Buenos Aires (1.5/1), Jamaica (1.9/1) (Chevigny quoted in Cano, 1997, p.34), and Rio de Janeiro (2.7/1) all possess alarmingly high indexes (Cano, ibid). These far outstrip those seen in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape, and Free State as reflected in the shooting incident reports received from the police. Table 11: Ratio of people killed by police shots to people injured Province # Killed by police shots # Wounded by police shots Lethality Index Western Cape 92 347 .27/1 Eastern Cape 154 398 .39/1 Free State 112 221 .51/1 Total 358 1002 .36/1 The total lethality index of the three provinces between the years 1996 and 1998 is .36/1. In other words according to the data contained in the shooting incident reports in the three provinces roughly 25% of those who were hit by police gunfire died. This proportion resembles that seen in Chicago (31%) and New York (25%) but is far lower than the indices for, for instance Buenos Aires (60% of those hit), and particularly Rio de Janeiro (73%). One conclusion to be drawn from this data is that while summary executions may occur they are not practiced systematically by members of the SAPS who are involved in shooting incidents 4. Legality of shooting incidents (a) Overall Legality of Shooting Incidents Sub-section 15.5.2.8 of Standing Order 251, the Standing Order which provides for the submission of shooting incident reports, provides that the report must state whether the shooting “was legal or not”. It might be expected by outsiders that the police officer responsible for producing such reports would consistently “white wash” the police involved in these incidents and exonerate them from any blame. Instead what appears from the data received is that the police declare a relatively large number of these incidents to have been “not legal”. As is apparent from Table 12 this appears particularly to be the case in incidents where people are killed (41%) and where the person hit (whether killed or injured) was not the original target (42%). Table 12. Proportion of police shootings declared legal and illegal by category of shooting in the three provinces, 1996-1998 Outcome of incident Legal % (No.) Not Legal % (No.) Fatality 59% (184) 41% (127) Wounded 78% (682) 22% (194) Someone wounded or killed 73% (849) 27% (307) More than one person killed 71% (98) 29% (40) Incorrect target hit 58% (76) 42% (56) Someone injured or arrested 87% (2349) 13% (337) No-one wounded or killed 90% (3255) 10% (345) An arrest occurred during incident 94% (2089) 6% (128) All incidents 86% (4104) 14% (652) What is difficult is to evaluate the significance of the fact that a relatively high proportion of shooting incident reports, and particularly reports relating to fatal incidents, contain a finding that the shooting was not legal. Thus after the report has been completed, particularly in incidents where a person has been killed or wounded, the report is sent through to the area or provincial headquarters of the SAPS where the report is supposed to be evaluated by members of the SAPS legal services division. We unfortunately have no information on what kind of process is involved in such an evaluation and how, for instance, legal officers usually respond to the large number of reports where it is indicated, according to the data received, that the shooting was unlawful. In particular we therefore actually have no idea about in what proportion of cases where a shooting incident report indicates that a shooting was not legal, actual disciplinary or legal steps are taken against the police officer involved. Shooting incident reports are in fact simply the first step in a bureaucratic process of evaluating shooting incidents and do not have the status of legal finding. Potentially there may be at least three tendencies which might impact on the way in which the legality of shooting incidents is evaluated in the shooting incident report: The police officer might give an honest evaluation of the situation. Nevertheless unless the officer has a relatively sound understanding of the legal issues associated with the use of force such an evaluation might not actually be legally valid. The police officer might not have much confidence in his/her own ability to evaluate the situation and be primarily concerned to avoid a reprimand for inappropriately declaring an obviously (to another person) illegal shooting to be legal. He or she might therefore tend to “err on the side of caution” particularly in relation to shooting incidents where a person has been killed by declaring such shooting to be “not legal”. Particularly if a shooting incident report does not actually generally carry much weight those responsible for producing these reports may not actually be particularly concerned with the implications of finding that the shooting is not legal and may, in fact be more concerned to protect themselves against a possible reprimand for exonerating a police officer for a shooting which was later judged to have been unlawful. The police officer might for instance be concerned with his or her popularity with other officers or might have an inclination to be somewhat contemptuous of legal provisions relating to the use of force and “whitewash” shooting incidents – with the result that only in exceptional circumstances would shooting incidents be declared illegal. There is of course another possibility. The provision which requires that the report should state whether the shooting was “legal or not” also indicates that “[If doubtful, this should be specifically mentioned]”. The police officer responsible for writing the report could reasonably, particularly if concerned to honestly evaluate the incident, be uncertain about whether the shooting was legal or not. This might be because of a lack of clarity about the legalities or because of insubstantial or conflicting evidence about what actually happened during the incident. It would therefore be reasonable that in a lot of cases shooting incident reports express uncertainty about the legality of incidents. However there is no record of the uncertainty in the data on shooting incidents which we received which either records shootings as legal or not legal. One particular issue on which there is little clarity is why such a high proportion of shootings which have fatal consequences are declared to be not legal while a relatively small proportion of shootings where no one is killed or injured are declared to be illegal. While some of these may be warning shot incidents part of what is implied is that, in many circumstances, a shooting which would have been declared unlawful had the shooter hit the target is declared legal because the shooter missed. Standing Order 251 actually requires that warning shots be recorded separately from shots fired at the target. Unfortunately in the request for data which we made to the SAPS we did not ask for a breakdown of incidents in terms of whether both types of shots or only one type were fired. Some may argue that it is a positive sign that shooting incidents which have more serious consequences are viewed in a more critical light. However what is far from clear is whether the evidence at hand shows that a consistent (and preferably rigorous) standard is applied to the evaluation of shooting incidents. (Note however that more than half of the total number of incidents which were declared not to be lawful were in fact incidents where no one was killed or injured). At base level then we cannot be sure that variations in proportions of shootings declared to be unlawful (whether by shooting type or by other variables such as policing area) reflect different bureaucratic practices or real differences in the legality and illegality of shootings. In particular we suspect that if a more consistent standard was applied to the evaluation of all shooting incidents there would be a higher level of consistency between the proportion of shootings in all categories which are declared to be not legal. Whether this would mean that fewer fatal shootings or more shootings in which there were no deaths or injuries would be judged to be not legal is impossible for us to ascertain. However, without having a more in depth insight into the significance of whether a shooting is judged to be legal or illegal our only option at this point is to take these judgements at face value as an indicator of the opinion of the officer charged with investigating the shooting incidents at the point at which he or she completed the report. Thus for instance certain stations reported a particularly high proportion of the overall number of shooting incidents as illegal. Of stations recording over twenty shooting incidents in the 1996-1998 period, for instance, six showed illegality rates of over 30%. From the data provided for instance Batho police station reports the highest rates of illegality with 48% of the 29 reported shooting incidents having been declared to be illegal. Furthermore, Hennemen, A Komm Umtata, Graaff-Reinet, King William’s Town, and Umtata all have illegality rates of 30% or more (Hennemen with 45% on down to Umtata with 30%). In fact however the station which reported the greatest number of illegal incidents was East London which reported a total of 20 such incidents (as opposed to the 14 reported in Batho). However these 20 incidents only represented 12% of the total of 173 incidents reported by East London station in the three year period. Incidents involving fatalities and woundings Particularly if the shooting incident reports are taken at face value than one of the more alarming statistics in Table 12 is the legality of shooting incidents which resulted in a fatality. Only 59% of all shooting fatalities between 1996 and 1998 were declared to have been legal shootings. If the finding in the shooting incident report reflects a serious belief on the part of the officer charged with investigating the incident that the shooting is lawful or unlawful then this suggests that the police have engaged in haphazard, dangerous shooting. Table 13 provides a breakdown of each province individually. A more complete breakdown by area (see Appendix 4) shows even more dramatic variations with the East Metropole having found 9% (3) fatal incidents to have not been justified while areas in the Eastern Cape found up to 63% (17 fatal incidents in Queenstown) and 78% (7 fatal incidents in Uitenhage) to have been unlawful. Table 13. Proportion of fatal incidents declared legal and illegal by province Province (Total) Legal % (Total) Not Legal % (Total) Western Cape (83) 81% (67) 19% (16) Eastern Cape (135) 47% (63) 53% (70) Free State (95) 57% (54) 43% (41) Total (311) 59% (184) 41% (127) As seen in Table 12, a far higher proportion of incidents in which someone was wounded are found to have been legal than is the case in incidents involving a fatality. The average rate at which incidents in which a person was wounded were found to have been legal was 78% for the three provinces. Nevertheless some area statistics do stand out. In the Southern Free State, of a total of 78 incidents where people were wounded over the course of three years, 33 of those incidents (42%) were categorized as illegal by the police. Both Grahamstown (50%) and Karoo (57%) have high rates of illegal wounding too, although each region reported fewer than twenty-one incidents. The proportion of all shooting incidents in which someone was wounded or killed which were found to have been legal or illegal is seen in Table 14. The three province total of legal shootings that wounded or killed someone stands at 73% of all such shootings. In the Western Cape, 87% of these shootings were legal, while in the Eastern Cape and the Free State the percentage was below 70%. Table 14. Proportion of incidents where someone was wounded or killed declared legal and illegal by province Province (Total) Legal % (total) Not Legal % (Total) Western Cape (370) 87% (328) 13% (42) Eastern Cape (473) 65% (307) 35% (166) Free State (313) 68% (214) 32% (99) Total (1156) 73% (849) 27% (307) According to the shooting incident reports therefore in more than one quarter (27%) of the incidents where someone is injured or killed and substantially more than a third of incidents where someone is killed (41%) the shootings where judged not to be lawful. Particularly in the Free State and Eastern Cape that even higher proportions of shootings where a person is killed or injured are declared to be not legal. As seen in Table 12 in 42% of the cases where the police hit a person who was not the original target the action was judged to be legal. Sub-paragraph 15.5.4.2 of standing order 251 actually refers to “whether or not it was the original target (s)/ victim(s) fired at”. The implication appears to be that a positive indication in this section could be a reference to e.g. a vehicle which was not the original vehicle fired at. However in this report we have assumed that the cases where the target hit was not the original target refer to cases where people were hit by stray bullets. We would welcome any clarification indicating that this is not the case. The proportion of these cases which were judged not to be legal therefore resembles the proportion of cases where a person was killed which were judged not to be legal. While cases were the incorrect target was hit do not necessarily point to unlawful police conduct – the shooting could be a reasonable mistake – one would perhaps expect a higher proportion of these shootings to be judged to be illegal. Of all the shooting incidents between 1996 and 1998, one hundred and thirty two (3%) hit an incorrect target. Furthermore, 9.7% of the people the police shot and wounded or killed were not the intended target. These statistics therefore provide cause for serious concern that in a large number of incidents where a person is killed or injured the shooting is not at face value legally justified. If what the numbers say is to be believed then there is a widespread pattern of unjustifiable gunfire in circumstances where this causes a death or injury. As we will show however the data relating to the legality of fatal shootings becomes even more disturbing in relation to shootings involving off-duty police officers. 5. Off-duty shootings The data in Table A is a sobering reflection on the state of off-duty policing. Of the 6,114 officers involved in these shootings, 85.1% of them were on duty at the time, 1.7% put themselves on-duty, and 13.1% were off-duty. For the purposes of this study, those who put themselves on-duty are categorized as on-duty. Although off-duty police officers participated in 16.5% of all recorded incidents, they accounted for 23.2% of all incidents where someone was wounded, 36% of all incidents where the incorrect target was hit, and a staggering 43% of all fatalities. According to the data reflected in Table 15 when they discharged their guns, off-duty police officers were twice as likely as their on-duty counterparts to wound or kill someone, three times as likely to hit the wrong target, and almost four times as likely to kill someone. Off-duty shooting have a lethality index if 0.65/1. A person is killed in 40% of incidents involving an off duty police officer where the person is hit by the gunfire. Table 15. Overall proportions of on and off duty shootings incidents where incorrect target was hit, person wounded, and person killed Duty Status Total # incidents (%) # of incidents where incorrect target hit (% of all incorrect target incidents) % incidents in which incorrect target is hit # of incidents where people wounded (% of all incidents where people wounded) % of incidents in which wounded someone # of incidents where people killed (% of all incidents where people killed) % of incidents in which person/s killed On-duty 3971 (83.5%) 85 (64%) 2.1% 672 (76.7%) 16.9% 178 (57%) 4.5% Off-duty 785 (16.5%) 47 (36%) 6% 204 (23.2) 25.9% 133 (43%) 16.9% Total 4756 132 876 311 As seen in Table 16, while only involved in 16.5% of the total number of shooting incidents, off duty police accounted for a gruesome 43% of incidents in which fatalities where involved. These statistics are particularly pronounced in the Free State where off-duty police officers were involved in 28% of all shootings incidents but accounted for 51% of all fatal incidents and in the Eastern Cape, where off duty police accounted for 18% of shooting incidents but 47% of all fatal incidents in the province. In the Western Cape, although off-duty police officers were involved in only 9% of all shooting incident, they were accountable for 26% of the shooting fatalities. Table 16. Provincial Breakdown of on/off duty police incidents involving a fatality Status Total # of Shooting Incidents Total # of incidents where people killed (% of fatal incidents) % of total # of shooting incidents which were fatal Free State On-duty 817 (72%) 47 (49%) 6% Off-duty 313 (28%) 48 (51%) 15% Eastern Cape On-duty 1303 (82%) 70 (53%) 5% Off-duty 284 (18%) 63 (47%) 22% Western Cape On-duty 1851 (91%) 61 (74%) 3% Off-duty 188 (9%) 22 (26%) 12% Total On duty 3971 (83.5%) 178 (57%) 4.5% Off duty 785 (16.5%) 133 (43%) 16.9% What is most disturbing about the data relating to off-duty shooting is therefore the high contribution which these shootings make to the overall level of fatalities with 133 out of the total of 311 fatal incidents having involved off-duty police officers. Of these incidents 63 were in the Eastern Cape, 48 were in the Free State and 22 in the Western Cape. In fact while in general 17% of the recorded incidents involving off duty police resulted in a fatality in the Eastern Cape 22% (almost one in every four) of these incidents was fatal. Potentially one reason for such a high fatality rate is that a smaller proportion of the non-fatal incidents involving off-duty police officers are recorded in the shooting incident data. In all likelihood, off-duty police officers discharge their guns more frequently than is seen in the data here. It is however also possible that the circumstances in which off-duty police officers use their guns might tend to be quite different from the circumstances in which police use their guns while on duty. For instance if it were the case that off-duty shootings tended to happen at closer range than the average on duty shooting, or warning shots tended to be less of a feature of off duty shootings, then this might also contribute to there being a lower proportion of missed/warning shots recorded for off duty shootings. Overall roughly 28% of the time that a police officer from the three provinces was involved in an incident where someone was injured or killed he was off-duty. When the three South African provinces are broken down individually, it becomes clear that there is a real discrepancy in patterns. In the Western Cape in 14% (52 out of 368) of the incidents when someone was shot and killed or injured by a policeman, that policeman was off-duty. This number rises to 30% (141 out of 473 incidents) when in the Eastern Cape, and escalates to 41% (128 out of 313 incidents) in the Free State. In a disturbing 33% of the incidents where more than one person was killed or wounded in an incident (46 out of 138 incidents) the police officer was off-duty. One point of comparison is a study of on- and off-duty shootings in Michigan state between 1976-1981, where off-duty police officers contributed to 17% of incidents where persons were killed or wounded (Horvath, 1987, p. 231). By comparison with these data it seems that the proportion of off-duty shootings involving a fatality or injury in the three provinces – and potentially throughout South Africa - is relatively high. Several factors might potentially be relevant to understanding the issue: First, members of the SAPS (like the police in many other countries) are expected to place themselves on duty in certain situations even when they are off-duty. As far as we are aware the exact nature of the obligation of a police officer to “place himself on duty” is not clearly defined anywhere. What exists is a general expectation, backed up by the potential for reprimand or discipline, that police officers will do so particularly where they are faced with a situation of a more serious crime in progress. It is not known, for instance, to what extent training equips deals with the potential dynamics of a situation which a police officer might encounter while off duty but our impression is that the issue is not covered in police training. While police officers may deal with some such situations relatively effectively this is not necessarily generally the case. As noted by Geller and Scott, “Police officers traditionally have considered their responsibility for off-duty action to include aggressive intervention (termination of crimes and arrest of suspects) and not just careful observation and notification of on-duty police. The arming of off-duty police, a practice which has been severely criticised by some commentators ... facilitates such aggressive action. But police frequently are at a tactical disadvantage while off duty, being out of radio communication with other officers and usually not having the opportunity to plan a course of action as they travel to a suspected crime scene… [O]ff –duty officers who happen to be socialising in a tavern when armed robbers enter may be in no condition to outdraw the holdup men, yet the presumed imperative to take police action may prompt an ill-advised confrontation. Geller and Scott go on to note that off-duty police officers who are out of uniform do not possess the same legitimacy to intervene that on duty officer have. An attempt to interfere in a situation may often be perceived as aggression, and therefore received with more resistance. A further possible explanation for the high rate of off-duty shootings is that police officers may live in high crime neighborhoods themselves, and therefore be exposed to situations where the use of force appears to be necessary when off-duty. Thus disproportionate off-duty lethality might also be explained by the mere chance that off-duty police officers in these areas are frequently found in situations which require them to shoot and kill. There may therefore be legitimate reasons for off-duty shootings. In fact the overall proportion of incidents where a person is injured or killed which occur off-duty (28%) is only slightly higher than that in some US cities. According to sources cited by Geller and Scott studies conducted in a number of major American cities indicate the proportion of civilians shot by off-duty officers has tended to lie somewhere between 17% and 26%. (Geller and Scott, 1991, p. 460). The proportion of persons who are shot by off duty officers in the US is regarded by some observers as quite large and is therefore not necessarily cause for complacency. Furthermore the proportion of fatal incidents which occur off duty (43%) is a particular cause for concern as becomes even more apparent in relation to data on the legality of off-duty shootings. As is apparent from Table 17 for entire data set (covering 7566 shootings nationwide) included 549 incidents involving fatalities. Of these 33% were judged to be not legal. However as is reflected in Table 18 the picture changes dramatically when these fatal incidents are evaluated according to whether they happened on or off duty. Altogether 12% of fatal incidents which occurred while the police officer was on duty were judged to be legal while 71% of fatal off-duty incidents were judged to be illegal. While there is a need for further examination of this issue it would appear that this evidence doesn’t support the contention that, for instance, fatal off-duty incidents primarily occur as a result of police officers being faced with situations where they are compelled to act in defence of their own lives. The statistics here therefore would appear to suggest that the high number of off-duty fatalities is not a by-product of attacks on police officers as, we presume, officers compiling shooting incident reports would not in general judge pure defence of life shootings to be unlawful. Table 17. Fatal incidents, by legality of action (entire data set) Action legal? Frequency Percent Y 367 67 N 182 33 Total 549 100 Table 18. Legality of fatal incidents, by duty status of police (entire data set) Y N AAN 88% 12% 336 SELF AAN 100% 0% 14 VAN 29% 71% 199 TOTAL Table 19. Proportions (%) of on and off duty fatal incidents declared not legal in the three provinces Total number of fatal incidents No declared not legal No of fatal incidents on duty No of fatal incidents not legal – on duty % of fatal on duty incidents not legal No of fatal incidents off duty No of fatal incidents not legal – off duty % of fatal off duty incidents not legal Western Cape 83 16 61 5 8% 22 11 50% Eastern Cape 133 70 70 18 26% 63 52 83% Free State 95 41 47 5 11% 48 36 75% Total 311 127 178 28 16% 133 99 74% Table 19 shows the major differences between proportions of on and off duty fatal incidents which were declared not legal. The overall figure of 74% of off duty fatal shootings which are declared to be not lawful in the shooting incident reports amounts to persuasive evidence that there is a most serious problem relating to off duty firearm usage by police officers. Most striking is the Eastern Cape which reflects the highest overall number of fatalities, the highest proportion of on duty fatalities declared illegal (26%) and an exceptionally high proportion (83%) of off duty shootings declared to be illegal. The Free State similarly records an exceptionally high proportion of off duty fatal incidents (75%) as unlawful. The proportion of on duty fatal incidents declared unlawful (11%) is comparable to the low number in the Western Cape. In the Western Cape the proportion of off duty fatal incidents declared unlawful (50%) is low by comparison with other provinces. Nevertheless even a figure of 50% should still be seen as providing room for concern. Effectively even in the Western Cape a high proportion of fatal firearm usage off duty was judged by fellow police officers to be prima facie unlawful. We off course are not in a position to evaluate to what extend off-duty incidents which are illegal might not be recorded in shooting incident reports. However it appears unlikely that the shooting incident reports exaggerate the picture with respect to off-duty shootings – though we have expressed some reservations about interpreting the exact significance of this component of the reports. Later on we will report on information from the SAPS that during the years 1994 to 1997 an average of 223 police officers were charged and 40 convicted of murder each year. However we have no way of knowing to what extent these charges relate to the incidents of shooting – on and off duty – which are deemed not legal by the officer charged with investigating the incidents. Nevertheless it would appear that the data on off duty shootings could in some ways be seen as the SAPS’ own indictment on a large proportion of shootings by off duty police officers. (a) Involvement of police reservists in shooting incidents Altogether for the 4756 incidents recorded reservists were indicated as having been involved in 352 (7%) of them. However it should be noted that the proportion of incidents involving reservists varies quite substantially by station. Thus for instance a police station like Maitland which recorded a total of 72 shooting incidents recorded only one as involving a reservist. On the other hand of the roughly 70 stations recording more than 20 shootings 10 record at least 20% of these shooting incidents as having involved reservists. Particularly notable are Ravensmead (43%), Kensington (38%) and Wellington (32%) in the Western Cape and Bethelsdorp in the Eastern Cape (37%). The other six stations are Paarl East, Elsies River, Bishop Lavis, and Steenberg in the Western Cape, Gelvandale in the Eastern Cape and Thabong in the Free State all of which record between 20 and 27% of incidents as having involved reservists. At the other end of the spectrum sum of the stations which only recorded a total of 1 incident indicate that this involved a reservist while for some stations which recorded 2 incidents indicate that 50% of incidents involved reservists. Table 20: Reservists’ contribution to various categories of police shootings Province Incorrect Target Hit (% of rest of police force) Fatality Occurred During Incident (% of rest of police force) Wounding Occurred During Incident (% of rest of police force) Fatality or Wound Occurred in Incident (% of rest of police force) Western Cape 3.4% 2.6% 16.5% 18.2% Eastern Cape 5.5% 7% 23.2% 30.1% Free State 8.1% 4.1% 32.6% 36.7% Total 4.5% (2.6%) 3.7% ( 6.7%) 20.1%(18.2%) 23.2% (24%) As seen in Table 20 in 4.5% of incidents in which reservists’ were involved the incorrect target was hit. This percentage is almost twice the rate for that of the rest of the police service in the three provinces. In particular reservists in the Free State were particularly poor shots, as they hit the wrong target 8.1% of the time they discharged their weapons. For shooting incidents in the three provinces overall (excluding Reservists) in roughly one in eight incidents where a person was injured or killed, the wrong target was hit. The reservists’ rate was even worse, as roughly the wrong target was hit in roughly one out of every five incidents. However, reservists’ rates are comparable to the rest of the force with respect to frequency of a wounding, and frequency of a wounding or fatality. The Reservists’ had a relatively low fatality rate compared to the rest of the force. For incidents in which they were involved a person was killed roughly half as often as in incidents when they were not involved. Overall it would appear that greater care needs to be taken to ensure that reservists are properly trained in the use of firearms. 6. Other general characteristics of shooting incidents (a) Missed/warning shot incidents Over the three year period between 1996-1998, there was a total of 4756 shooting incidents among the three provinces. In roughly 24% (1156) of those incidents, someone was wounded or killed. The implication is therefore that in 76% of the incidents in the three provinces no one was killed or injured. If it not clear however in what proportion of these incidents no attempt was made to hit a person – i.e. presumably the only shots fired were warning shots – and in what proportion the shots were intended to hit a person but missed. Table 21 records data from a number of US jurisdictions cited by Geller and Scott indicating that in the places referred to “missed shots” accounted for between 69% and 82% of overall shooting incidents. Only in one of these localities did the statistics distinguish between missed and warning shots. In section 1 we suggested that the overall number of missed/warning shot incidents might be under-represented in the data which we have. In the Western Cape particularly the proportion of missed/warning shot incidents was 82%. However even if this is a more accurate reflection of the overall rate of missed/warning shots the figure still is comparable to that recorded in at least one of the American jurisdictions (Chicago recorded a hit rate of 18% in the years 1974- 1978). Table 21. “Hit rates” recorded in a variety of US jurisdictions. (Sources: Horvath (1987); others cited in Geller and Scott, 1991, p. 450) Police department city, or state, time period and number of incidents Proportion of shots which hit civilians Michigan State: Five years to end August ‘81 - Sample of 1585 incidents where shots were discharged 13% involved warning shots, 60% were shots that missed and 27% either wounded or killed the person fired at i.e. in 60 out of 87 incidents (69%) where a person was fired at the shots missed. Los Angeles Police Department: 1980 –1988 - 28% of incidents resulted in either death or wounding New York Police Department: 1987 - 223 firearm discharge incidents 26% resulted in either the death or wounding New York Police Department: 1988 - 245 firearm discharge incidents 31% resulted in either the death or wounding Chicago: 1974 –1978 18% resulted in either the death or wounding New York City: 1971-1975 31% resulted in either death or wounding Taking into account Geller and Scott’s caution against comparing hit rates across either cities or studies it nevertheless appears that SAPS rates may be similar to those seen in American cities. What is perhaps of greater concern is the overall number of shootings involving SAPS members. Geller and Scott indicate for instance that in 1987 the New York Police, responsible for policing a city of 7 million people, were involved in 223 firearm discharge incidents. In the Western Cape by contrast, a province of 4 million people, the police were involved in an average of 680 incidents each year between 1996 and 1998. (b) Time of Day As seen in Table A, 49% of all shootings took place between 8:00pm-4:00am and two thirds (66.5%) take place in the period from 4p.m. – 4 a.m. As one would expect, the percentage of the total number of deaths which occurred in this time frame (42%) is roughly proportional to the number of shooting incidents which occurred. However, within these two times frames, there was a rise in the percentage of shots which neither injured nor killed someone. Between 8:01pm-12:00am, 76% of the shooting incidents resulted in no one being hit and between 12:01am-4:00am, 81% of the shooting incidents resulted in no one being hit (between 4 am and 8 am. the proportion returns to 76%). This relative decline in accuracy might be due to the fact that shooting accurately at nighttime is more difficult. It could also be that officers were more willing to shoot during the night, even if the chance of hitting the proper target was slim, because there may have been less people around who might be injured, and less of a chance that a civilian would witness any unjustified gunfire. Table 22: Time of day in which shooting incident occur Time of Day Total % of Shooting Incidents (total #) % of Shooting Incidents within time frame in which no one Killed or Injured % of total deaths due to police shootings 4:01am-8:00am 9.2% (437) 76% 13% 8:01am-12:00pm 11.4% (539) 72% 13% 12:01pm-4:00pm 13% (618) 74% 12% 4:01pm-8:00pm 17.5% (827) 72% 19% 8:01pm-12:00am 25.3% (1197) 76% 22% 12:01am-4:00am 23.7% (1121) 81% 20% 7. Characteristics of police shooters (a) Number of officers involved in incidents Table 23 provides a general profile of the number of police officers involved in shooting incidents indicating that 95% of incidents involve one or two police officers. While 81% of incidents are reported as having only involved one officer however this may be taken as merely indicating the number of officers involved in shooting during the incident and not as necessarily indicating that the officer was unaccompanied. Table 23: Number of Officers Involved (%) Province 1 2 3 4 5 6+ Total Western Cape 1575 (77%) 347 (17%) 66 (3%) 25 (1%) 15 (1%) 11 (1%) 2039 Eastern Cape 1282 (81%) 219 (14%) 55 (3%) 13 (1%) 10 (1%) 8 (1%) 1587 Free State 972 (86%) 114 (10%) 23 (2%) 12 (1%) 3 (0%) 6 (1%) 1130 Total 3829 (81%) 680 (14%) 144 (3%) 50 (1%) 28 (.5%) 25 (.5%) 4756 Age and Experience According to the shooting incident report data reflected in Table 24 the average age and experience of all officers involved in shootings in each of the three provinces rose steadily from 1996-1998. This is probably attributable to fact that a moratorium was placed on recruitment during 1996 and 1997 with the first new group of recruits since 1995 only being inducted into the SAPS late 1998. It is therefore understandable that the average age and experience of shooters rose accordingly. Table 24: Average Age of officers involved in shooting incidents Province Average 1996 1997 1998 Total Western Cape Average Age 27 29 30 29 Average Experience 7 8 9 8 Eastern Cape Average Age 29 31 31 30 Average Experience 7 8 9 8 Free State Average Age 29 30 31 30 Average Experience 7 8 9 8 Rank According to Nel and Conradie (1998, p. 6) the SAPS is consists of 129 000 official of whom 59 800 are involved in the visible policing component and a further 21 000 are involved in Detective Units or Special investigation Units. The figures provided in Table 25 are based on the composition of the Visible Policing component of the SAPS and not the SAPS as a whole while the data on shooting incidents is taken from the entire data set of 7566 shooting incidents. Note that the data here appears to imply that only one police officer is involved in each incident or that those involved in each incident are always of the same rank. Possibly the data purely reflects the first police officer whose rank is recorded next to each incident. As indicated in Table 25, Constables account for a proportion of the total number of shooting incidents (36%) which is slightly disproportionate to the proportion of the visible policing component of the SAPS. Sergeants constitute 60% of the visible policing component but account for 50% of all incidents while Inspectors were involved in a proportion of shooting incidents also slightly less than their overall representation in the visible policing component. Thus, constables took part in a disproportionate number of shooting incidents, but this may be due to the amount of time they spend on the frontline as compared to that spent by other police officers of different ranks. Table 25. Rank of police officers who discharged their gun in shootings incidents Rank (Total) % of visible policing component Total incidents in which involved % of total incidents in which involved Constable (12,964) 22 2718 36 Sergeants (35,720) 60 3776 50 Inspector (7,768) 13 813 11 Other rank (3306) 5 259 3 All ranks (59 758) 100 100 (d) Police officers involved in a large number of shooting incidents As indicated in Table 26 82% of police officers whose names are recorded in the data on shooting incidents appear to have been involved in only one incident in the three year period. Another 21% were involved in 2 or 3 incidents. The remainder were involved in 4 or more incidents. Table 26. Number of incidents per officer Number of incidents Number of officers % 1 3508 82% 2 700 16% 3 185 4% 4 70 2% 5 29 1% 6 13 0% 7 9 0% 8 2 0% 9 5 0% 10+ 2 0% Total 4253 100% Adams notes that the Christopher Commission “documented that a small group of Los Angeles police officers used force with above average frequency”. However the interpretation of findings such as these needs to be undertaken with caution and take account of officers work styles and assignments. “Some officers are more active in their crime control efforts, and self-initiated officer activities are more likely to arouse resentment and resistance amongst citizens; some officers are assigned regularly to high risk areas where the proportion of violence-prone offenders is higher. However, when its findings were corroborated by a variety of indicators the commission concluded that officers who use force recurrently are a good place to start looking for officers who use excessive force” (1996, p. 56). Does the data which we received indicate that members of the police service who use force a lot account for a disproportionately large number of fatalities or injuries. In an attempt to explore this issue we looked at the data relating to all police officers – 130 in all - who were involved in four (4) or more incidents. Table 27: Profile of shootings involving police involved in 4 or more incidents relative to profile of all shooting incidents Outcome of shooting incident All incidents reported % - relative to total incidents Incidents involving 130 police involved in 4+ incidents % - relative to total number of incidents in which 130 police involved No of people killed 358 7.5 19 2.9 No of people wounded 1002 21 149 23 No of people arrested 3902 82 784 121 No of incidents where person killed 311 6.5 16 2.5 No of incidents where person wounded 876 18 117 18 No of incidents where person arrested 2217 47 372 57 Total number of incidents 4756 100 649 100 Table 27 appears to indicate that the 649 reported shooting incidents involving the 130 police officers who were involved in 4 or more incidents do not indicate a pattern of excessive injury and killing and instead indicate the opposite. In fact what is the most striking feature of this group of police officers is in fact the relatively high number of arrests (effectively a rate of 12 arrests for every 10 incidents) which amounts to an increase of 50% on the overall arrest rate for shooting incidents in general (8 arrests for every 10 shooting incidents). A further feature of this group is that the proportion of people wounded (23 per 100) is slightly higher than the proportion for shooting incidents as a whole (21 per 100) while the number of deaths is relatively lower. In fact of the 130 only 11 (8%) were actually linked to incidents where people had been killed. Eight of the 11 had each been responsible for the death of one person, 2 of the 11 were responsible for 2 deaths each (in the following section these officers are referred to as Officer P and Officer S), and one of them was responsible for 7 deaths (Officer B). (Those police officers – 42 in all - linked to two or more deaths are discussed in more detail in the next section). As is indicated in Table 28 of these 11 officers, 5 - including the 2 who had each killed 2 people - are not linked to any incidents of injury, 2 are linked each to 1 such incident, 2 are each linked to 2 persons being injured and one is linked to the injury of three people. Finally the officer linked to the death of 7 people is also linked to 3 incidents where people were injured (actually 10 people injured or killed in 6 incidents). Table 28. People injured and killed by police officers involved in 4 or more incidents and at least one fatality No of police officers No of people killed by each officer No of people injured by each officer Total number of people killed or injured by each officer 3 1 0 1 2 2 0 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 1 3 4 1 7 3 10 11 police officers 19 people killed 12 people injured 31 people injured or killed Of the remaining 119 police officers 57 are not linked to any incidents where a person is injured. This therefore leaves a group of 62 police officers who are linked to 137 people who were injured. A breakdown of these officers is given in Table 29 Table 29. Officers involved in 4 or more shooting incidents, not linked to fatalities, but linked to 1 or more injury. Number of people injured in incidents in which each officer involved Number of police officers Total number of people injured 1 28 28 2 16 32 3 10 30 4 3 12 5 1 5 6 2 12 7 1 7 11 1 11 TOTAL Of the 130 officers involved in 4 or more incidents therefore 73 are linked to incidents where people where killed or injured. Of these 42 (8 in Table 28 and 34 in Table 29) were linked to the death or injury of at least 2 people and 22 were linked to the injury or death of at least 3 people. At the same time, as is indicated in Table 30 the 62 police officers who are linked to injuries but not fatalities sustained a high number of arrests. In fact they have an arrest rate which is fractionally higher than that for the overall group of 130 police officers who were involved in 4 or more incidents. Table 30: Profile of shootings involving 62 police involved in 4 or more incidents who are linked to injuries but not fatalities. Outcome of shooting incident % - relative to 4756 incidents in three provinces % - relative to incidents involving all 30 police involved in 4+ incidents Incidents involving 62 police officers involved in 4+ incidents associated with at least 1 injury and no deaths % - relative to total number of incidents in which 62 police involved No of people killed 7.5 2.9 0 0 No of people wounded 21 23 137 42 No of people arrested 82 121 403 124 No of incidents where person killed 6.5 2.5 0 0 No of incidents where person wounded 18 18 106 33 Incidents where person arrested 47 57 194 60 Total number of incidents 100 100 325 100 Thus police officers who are reported to have fired their guns more than four times had a higher arrest rate than their peers, who shot less frequently, appear to have achieved during shooting incidents. Thus, they shot their guns more frequently, obtained more arrests, killed fewer, but wounded more people than did their peers. Interestingly however this group also included a large number who, according to the reports, didn’t injure or kill any one at all. How did they compare in terms of arrests with their peers who were involved in killing or injuring one or more people? Table 31: Police who were involved in four or more incidents – compared according to different categories Category Number in group Number of people killed or injured Total number of recorded incidents Total number of arrests Arrests per 100 shooting incidents Killed at least one person 11 31 59 42 71 Injured at least one person but none killed 62 137 325 403 124 No-one killed or injured 57 0 265 339 128 Total 168 120 According to the shooting the group of police officers involved in four or more incidents can be categorised into roughly three groups. The one group which includes all members involved in incidents where people have been killed has a relatively low arrest rate. On the other hand the group constituted by police officers who have injured one or more people but not killed any has a particularly high arrest rate. However this group is surpassed by another with an exceptionally high arrest rate obtained without apparently killing or wounding anybody. While we may be inclined to suspect that in particular the police officers linked to the greatest number of cases of injury and particularly for instance a police officer who is linked to 7 deaths, are guilty of abuses of their capacity to use force, without closer examination of the facts of the cases in which they have been involved we need to be wary of coming to conclusions. The group of police officers who are involved in four or more shooting incidents therefore may include some who repeatedly and consistently abuse their capacity to use force but appears to also include a significant number who may be distinguished purely in that they are more active in their efforts to control crime, and in addition to using their firearms frequently also frequently have reports compiled on the incidents where these firearms are used. As we shall see in the following section there may however be another group of police officers who, while using their firearms frequently do so without these incidents being reported. 8. Variations in rates of shootings reported by police stations Table 32 contains indicates the distribution of deaths by police stations indicating that 75% of the deaths are linked to 72 stations where two or more people were killed in shooting incidents. Note that the total of 457 stations actually exceeds the total of approximately 443 police stations in the three provinces. This is primarily because of the fact that shootings linked to some units are reported by the Area Commissioners office (represented by the letters AK or DK) and not by station level. Table 32: Distribution of deaths in shooting incident by police station or Area Command No of deaths Sum of deaths Cumulative percentage of deaths No. of stations or Area Commands Cumulative total of stations or Area Commands Total number of incidents 8+ 80 22 7 7 517 7 14 26 2 9 100 6 12 30 2 11 88 5 20 35 4 15 187 4 24 42 6 21 181 3 48 55 16 37 405 2 70 75 35 72 723 1 90 100 90 162 1027 0 0 295 457 1528 Appendix 5 contains a list of 66 police stations and 4 Area Commissioners offices (in what follows both stations and area commissioners offices are referred to as stations) which recorded 20 or more shootings also indicating the number of fatalities and injuries reported by each of the stations during the three year period. Note that: The list includes the majority of stations (roughly 40) which recorded 2 or more deaths. Presumably therefore the other 30 or so stations which recorded 2 or more deaths reported less than shooting 20 incidents overall during the three year period. The list includes 21 (11%) of the 193 stations in the Eastern Cape, 15 (14%) of the 106 stations in the Free State and 30 (21%) of the 144 stations in the Western Cape. There appears therefore first of all to be a reasonably significant difference in the proportion of stations from each province recorded as being linked to 20 or more shooting incidents over three years with the proportion in the Western Cape being twice that in the Eastern Cape. Overall the number of stations represents 15% (66 out of 443) of the total number of police stations. If the data were entirely reliable the implication would be that the other 85% of stations were all linked to less than 20 shooting incidents during the period in question. We however suspect that this is not the case and that (particularly in the Eastern Cape) the data indicates significant levels of under-reporting. To take possibly the most glaring example the total number of people recorded as killed or injured by police at Umtata station (49) actually exceeds the total number of shooting incidents recorded (43). Also from the Eastern Cape both Motherwell (23 incidents) and Idutywa (21 incidents) record a number of people killed and injured which is over 55% of the number of shooting incidents reported by them. The two right hand columns record data from the latest report of the SAPS Crime Information Analysis Centre (CIAC). The data represents an attempt to develop a measure of the relative levels of crime dealt with by each station in each province. The measure is based on recorded crime during 1998 in 17 categories. It is weighted in favour of more serious violent crime (including for instance assault GBH but not common assault) and certain forms of property crime (including both theft out of and theft from motor vehicles) and therefore emphasises more serious crime in general and not just violent crime (CIAC, 1/98, pp. 16-17). Effectively the measure does two things: Firstly the measure provides a means for ranking stations in each province and in South Africa as a whole according to the levels of serious crime which they face. Thus for instance it appears noteworthy that: Maitland police station in the Western Cape recorded 72 shooting incidents, placing it in 7th position in terms of the total number of incidents recorded while it is placed 39th on the he list of police stations in the Western Cape in terms of levels of recorded crime. In fact Maitland recorded 13 fatal incidents, the third highest number of fatal incidents recorded by a police station. Graaff-Reinet police station, 29th on the list of police stations in the Eastern Cape in terms of levels of recorded crime recorded 9 deaths placing it amongst the “select” group of 7 stations which are linked to 8 or more deaths. However an explanation for this high number of deaths is also recorded in the data. The police officer linked to the highest number of deaths overall – officer A – killed 8 of these 9 people in a single incident in November 1996 - while off-duty. Secondly the weighted frequency is some means of comparing different stations in relation to the overall level of more serious crime which they have to deal with. However a police station which deals with a large number of cases of theft out of motor vehicle is likely to be weighted more heavily than a police station which deals with a large but comparatively much smaller number of cases of rape or murder for instance. Thus for instance Cape Town Central (41 000) has a weight virtually three times higher than that of Khayelitsha though the latter station may for instance deal with far higher levels of interpersonal violence. The measure therefore is not exactly correlated with types of crime which would justify shootings by the police. Nevertheless the measure provides a means for comparing stations in relation to the level of (recorded) serious crime which they deal with. The CIAC indicates that the upper quartile of stations in South Africa – the twenty five percent of police stations in South Africa (275 police stations out of 1100) recording the highest frequencies – all recorded weighted frequencies of 4514 or more. Table 33. Number of police stations in each province which fell in and outside of the upper quartile (25%) of stations recording the highest levels of crime in South Africa. Total number of stations in upper quartile i.e. with weighted frequency of 4514 or more Number of stations in upper quartile recording 20 or more shootings Number of stations in upper quartile recording less than 20 shootings Number of stations not in upper quartile recording 20 or more shootings No No % No % No Eastern Cape 26 16 62 10 38 5 Free State 14 11 79 3 21 4 Western Cape 47 28 60 19 40 2 TOTAL 87 55 63 32 37 11 Table 33 indicates that while the Western Cape has the highest number of stations recording 20 or more shootings it also has the highest proportion of such stations (28 out of 30 or 93%) in the upper quartile and the lowest overall number (2 stations) which fall outside of the upper quartile. By contrast 76% of the stations in the Eastern Cape (16 out of 21) and 73% of the stations in the Free State (11 out of 14) which recorded 20 or more shootings are in the upper quartile. Particularly if we assume that the Eastern Cape and Free State have higher levels of under-reporting – indicated by smaller proportions of recorded missed shot incidents - this may suggest that: Shootings in the Western Cape tend to be linked more closely to levels of serious crime. If levels of reporting in the other provinces improved the number of stations recording more than 20 shooting incidents would increase. At the same time 19 stations (40% of station in the upper quartile) in the Western Cape and 10 stations (38% of stations in the upper quartile) in the Eastern Cape did not record 20 or more shootings in the three year period. This may reflect the fact that some stations maintain relatively low levels of shooting despite having relatively high levels of crime. Some of these stations may therefore be examples of good practise in controlling the use of firearms by police officers or may simply be in areas which are relatively less violent despite having high levels of crime. At the same time it would appear that these statistics are also likely to reflect that a significant number of shooting incidents are not recorded in the shooting incident data. It seems that we have already demonstrated the likelihood of high levels of under-reporting in the Eastern Cape and Free State. Is it likely that there is also a significant level of under-reporting in the Western Cape? Three police stations in relation to which it might be reasonable to ask questions are Mitchell’s Plain, Manenberg and Guguletu. As is evident from the far right hand column of Table 34 according to a document developed by the SAPS early in 1997 police officers based at these three stations were responsible for total of 22 deaths in shooting incidents during the 30 month period January 1994 – June 1996 and period of time which overlaps slightly with the time period covered by the shooting incident reports (SAPS 500, see Appendix 1). Is it possible that in the earlier time period the police at these stations could have killed 22 people while in the later time period they killed only 5 and that the total number of people injured in shooting incidents (27) could only slightly exceeds the total number of people killed in the earlier period? In particular it appears reasonable to ask questions about Mitchell’s Plain which recorded a weighted crime index figure of 35 000 the second highest of all the stations in the three provinces but in the 36 month time period covered in the shooting incident reports recorded 44 shooting incidents (11 shooting every nine months). We would like to believe that all of these three stations are models of improvement in controlling the use of force such that they have been able to bring about dramatic reductions in the number of people killed by their police officers. But if this is not the case then the implication may be that there are significant levels of under-reporting also at some stations in the Western Cape. Effectively this may mean that rather than a representative picture of shootings in the three provinces we simply have a picture of shootings at stations which report a higher proportion of shooting incidents. Table 34. Shooting incidents at Guguletu, Mitchell’s Plain and Manenberg Police Station compared to shooting fatalities recorded during January 1994 – June 1996 period. Stations Total Number of People Killed Total Number of people Wounded Total Number of Incidents Position in provincial station index Weighted Crime Incidence Frequency (‘000s) Position in provincial station index Shooting fatalities recorded January 1994 – June 1996 Guguletu 4 10 54 WC21 9.2 21 10 Mitchells Plain 0 12 44 WC2 35.0 2 6 Manenberg 1 5 33 WC20 9.3 20 6 TOTAL 5 27 131 22 Section D. Indicators regarding other uses of force While there are significant limitations, particularly in coverage of some of South Africa’s major provinces it appears the shooting incident reports may have given us some idea of the profile of firearm usage by members of the SAPS. But there are at least two other aspects of the use of force on which it appears that the information is far more insubstantial: As indicated above (see Table 8) 114 ( 11% of the total of 1051 deaths, an average of 57 per year) of the deaths as a result of police action recorded by the ICD between April 1997 and March 1999 were recorded as not being related to shootings by SAPS members. One major question therefore concerns these deaths and the circumstances in which they occurred. Secondly the use of firearms is generally understood to represent the severest “end” of a “continuum of force”. In general it can be assumed that the members of police services will use force far more frequently than they use their firearms (though we should not assume that the use of force is an everyday occurrence for the average police officer). Forms of the use of force which do not generally cause serious injury or death (unless abused) can be referred to as “less-than-lethal” (or LTL) force. While LTL force is not as serious in terms of its consequences it can nevertheless be extensively abused. The fact that LTL force does not have such serious consequences may in fact be a reason why it is likely to be abused even more than firearms and other forms of lethal force are abused. A question therefore arises as to whether there are ways of monitoring LTL force thereby potentially being better placed to control it and discourage abuses of it. What other indicators might there be relating to the use of force by the police and to what extent do these assist in developing a profile of uses of force, whether fatal or less than lethal, which do not involve the use of firearms. It would appear that the only consistent sources of such information might be information relating to complaints, charges and claims lodged against the police. In this sub-section three potential sources of such information are examined. Two problems immediately become apparent in evaluating such information. The first question concerns what categories of complaints, charges, or claims against members of the police service can be seen to be representative of the use of force. In the rest of this section the categories of offence or claim which have been selected generally involve some form of violence or force. The focus will be primarily on offence categories such as murder, culpable homicide, attempted murder and assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm – assault GBH – and common assault as well as firearm related offences. The reason for focusing on these offences is that a police officer, in the ordinary and lawful performance of his or her duties, may find him or her self being accused of misconduct relating to one of these categories as a result of a use of force which might have exceeded the bounds of what was necessary but which also ma have not. Thus for instance Maguire and Corbett police forces in England and Wales (excluding London) recorded a total of 22 439 complaints in 1989. Of these roughly 6280 (28%) were complaints of assault. For a sample of 264 dockets which they analysed 87 (33%) included at least one allegation of assault. They go on to state that, “Most complaints of assault by police officers are arrest-related: 87 (33%) of the 264 cases included a complaint of assault, and in 79 of these the alleged police violence either followed or preceded the arrest ... The victims of the alleged assaults were predominantly males under the age of 30, and three-quarters had at least one conviction. Nearly all the complainants asserted that they had been assaulted at the scene of the arrest – predominantly in the street” (1991, pp. 43-44). The problem of police brutality is in fact partly a problem of “overzealous” police who abuse their power to use force in fulfillment of their ordinary occupational role. In other words a police officer may abuse his or her capacity to use force – use excessive force - while believing that s/he is trying to fulfil his or her occupational responsibilities. The problem of excessive force is therefore a general problem associated with the police capacity to use force. Statistics relating to police involvement in other forms of violent criminality such as robbery or rape are arguably therefore not possible indicators of “excessive force”. This is not to say that, for instance certain such activities are not carried out during the course of police duties. A police officer may for instance rob someone or rape someone who has been arrested. A police officer who rapes a prostitute, or someone else who has been arrested, may even rationalise his criminal behaviour in terms of his occupational role - as a form of punishment for instance. The distinction between these forms of police criminality and criminal excessive force is therefore not necessarily watertight. However this report has restricted itself to a focus on forms of criminality, which are likely to, or may, relate more directly to the problem of excessive force and therefore relate specifically to the issue of the use of force. This then links to the second problem: Even if we identify a list of offences which may potentially be linked to the use of force, as we will see (with the partial exception of civil claims) existing data does not indicate to what extent the alleged illegal acts which are recorded were performed in an occupational role. An assault complaint recorded against an SAPS member may be an allegation of an unlawful assault committed during an arrest or may relate for instance to a bar fight or domestic incident which he had been involved in. Allegations of criminality involving violence are therefore not necessarily linked to the occupational role. They may relate to actions performed which are not related to the police function. 1. Complaints submitted to the ICD One potential source of information relating to such non-lethal force would appear to be the ICD which receives complaints relating to alleged crimes and misconduct involving members of the SAPS. Table 35 provides a breakdown of complaints received by the ICD over the two year period April 1997-March 1998 in selected categories relating to uses of force by the police. Table 35: Selected ICD statistics relating to police conduct involving use of abuse of force as proportion of total cases recorded by ICD over two years Complaint category April ’97 – March ‘98 April ’98 – March ‘99 Combined total: April 1997 – March 1999 % of all complaints/ cases recorded Death as a result of police action: - shooting related 451 486 937 20 Deaths as a result of police action: - non-shooting related 55 59 114 2 Sub-total: Deaths as a result of police action 506 545 1051 22 Attempted murder and assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm 157 311 468 10 Torture 68 60 128 3 Assault common 71 69 140 3 Sub-total: complaints relating to non-lethal violence/force 296 440 736 16 TOTAL: cases relating to lethal or non-lethal violence or force 802 985 1787 38 Deaths in police custody 219 189 408 9 Complaint categories not listed above 948 1565 2513 53 Total cases recorded by the ICD 1969 2739 4708 100 In summary then over the two year period ending March 1999 38 % of the cases recorded by the ICD related to alleged uses of force or criminal violence by members of the SAPS. However if we assume that ICD statistics provide a fairly accurate picture of fatal uses of force by the police the same cannot be said for non-fatal uses of force by the police. Thus for instance as indicated in Table 6, SAPS shooting incident statistics indicate that for every person killed in a shooting incidents involving the police roughly three people are wounded (lethality index of .36/1). In general it can be assumed that the “profile” of use and abuse of force in a police organisation would be one where non-lethal and in general “lower order” uses of force would be more prevalent than lethal uses of force. The ICD statistics however indicate the opposite and in fact represent an “inverted pyramid” with deaths (22%) outnumbering cases of alleged attempted murder, assault GBH and torture (combined 13%) and the latter outnumbering cases of common assault (3%). Furthermore while the category of torture is presumably directly linked to alleged acts which were performed by police officers in the course of their duties the same cannot necessarily be assumed in relation to the other complaints recorded. Thus the cases of assault might be cases of alleged domestic violence or alleged “arrest related assault” of the type referred to by Maguire and Cobbett. As we will also see (see Appendix 6 table 6A) the number of cases recorded by the ICD in many of these violent crime categories represents only a fraction of the number recorded by the SAPS. To take only one example during the two year period 1996 – 1997 the SAPS recorded 7671 complaints or allegations of assault against its members. During the first two years in which it was in operation the ICD on the other hand recorded 140 such cases. 2. Criminal and disciplinary cases against SAPS members Tables 6A and 6B (see Appendix 7) summarise some figures, provided by the Minister of Safety and Security in answer to questions in Parliament, in relation to a number of categories of complaints or charges lodged against SAPS members. The figures were given in response to a question asked of the Minister of Safety and Security by JA Marais in the National Assembly in May 1998 (Question 643). However serious questions need to be asked about the reliability of data provided by the SAPS on this issue. Thus not only is some of this information contradicted in a another set of statistics provided in answer to questions asked in Parliament but a further set of figures is provided by the SAPS Crime Information Analysis Centre (CIMC, 1/97, pp. 38- 39). In their first quarterly report for 1997 for instance the following figures were recorded: 142 cases of murder (as opposed to 248 reflected in Table 6A); 164 cases of attempted murder (as opposed to 649 reflected in Table 6A); 39 cases of rape (as opposed to 85 reflected in Table 6A); 177 cases of assault GBH (ass opposed to 1287 reflected in Table 6A); 419 cases of common assault (as opposed to 3854 reflected in Table 6A); 251 cases of theft (as opposed to 879 recorded in Table 6B) 351 cases of malicious damage to property (as opposed to 36 recorded in Table 6B). The data in Table 6C is also contradicted by other data provided by the SAPS. According to the CIAC report quoted above 462 members of the SAPS (0.4% of all SAPS members) were either convicted of crimes or paid admission of guilt fines in 1996 (1/1997, p. 39). According to the data provided in Table 6C the number was 1303 which represented 0.95% of all SAPS members. Therefore in addition to the fact it is not possible to ascertain to what extent any of the alleged acts reflected in these tables were occupationally related “uses of force” the data provided by the SAPS on these issues appears to be inconsistent and unreliable. Civil claims against the SAPS (a) Claims Appendix 7 records a selection of data provided by the SAPS on civil claims against SAPS members. As indicated in Table 7A and 7B the SAPS received claims in relation to 525 deaths during the years 1995-1998. As indicated in Table 7A however the number of claims which they received for deaths fell fairly dramatically from 159 to 67 per year (a drop of 68%) during the four year period. Similarly the number of claims for injuries also dropped fairly substantially (by 29%) from 1995 to 1998 despite escalating in 1996. However it is not clear to what extent these deaths are deaths as a result of police action and specifically shooting related. They may be deaths in police custody or even deaths of police officers where it was alleged that the SAPS had been negligent in some way. They may also be deaths in motor vehicle accidents. Table 7C indicates that in the single year between April 1995 and March 1996 the SAPS received 340 claims for shooting incidents and 880 for assaults (common). Presumably the 340 claims for shooting incidents related to deaths and injuries (though they may also have been for damage to property). However it is not clear what number of deaths and injuries the SAPS related to shooting incidents were involved. Table 7C therefore indicates that roughly 22% (1220 out of 5507) of the claims received by the SAPS related to uses of force. At the same time in terms of value these claims accounted for 55% (R152 million out of R277 million) of the total amount claimed from the SAPS. (b) Payments While the information in Table 7A and 7B covers a period of four calendar years most of the information relating to payments made in relation to civil claims relates to the three (financial) years April 1995 – March 1998. A further point which must be borne in mind is that the data relating to payments relates to claims made in different years. About 60% of payments made in any one year relate to claims which were made anything between 2 and 5 years previously. (Director Sutton, SAPS, personal communication, June 1999). Tables 7E, 7F and 7G relate to 7 categories of claim which appear to be related to the use of force. In addition to the categories “shooting” and “assault” (some of these “unrest related) which were referred to in Table 7C there are also the categories “injuries:bystanders”, “loss of support: deaths and disabilities” and “damage to property”. It is not clear to what extent the latter three categories relate to the use of force. Potentially all three categories of claim might for instance arise in relation to shooting incidents or motor vehicle accidents (payments in the latter category are not recorded in these tables). It is not clear therefore to what extent the “shooting incidents” category includes all shooting incident related claims and whether or not therefore it covers claims relating to injuries to bystanders in such incidents. This issue is not clarified by Table 7D – covering payments over a 14 month period ending in July 1996 - which indicates that damage to property related claims should possibly not be regarded as linked to the use of force. However the Table still does not actually clarify to what whether, for instance, a car damaged accidentally in a shooting incident would be classified as a “shooting incident” or “damage to property related claim”. Table 7D generally provides indications relating to the circumstances associated with assault and shooting incident claims. Note that “dog bites and other incidents” make up 29% of “assaults (common)” while almost 50% of the assault payments made at that time were for assaults (probably including torture) “during detention/questioning/other forms of unlawful force”. Other aspects which emerge include: Table 7E indicates that payments made for “unrest related” assaults and shooting incidents decline during the 1995 to 1998 period and were effectively eliminated as a category of payment in the 1997-1998 financial year. For an unknown reason the same appears to apply to the category “loss of support: deaths and disabilities”. Of the seven categories the category for which the largest number of claims were made was that of “damage to property” (the number of payments made for vehicle collisions – 3789 – is more than double the total number of payments made in all of the seven categories i.e. 1489). The number of payments made for “common assault” only slightly exceeds the total number of payments made for shooting incidents (89% of the former). However the average payment for shooting incidents (particularly unrest related of which however there are a relatively small number) far exceeds that for any other category. Table 7A indicated a trend of declining number of death and injury related claims being made against the SAPS during the four year 1995 to 1998. Table 7E indicates that this trend appear also to have been borne out in terms of payments made for assaults (down from 167 to 103) and shooting incidents (down from 140 to 95) during the three year period covered. The number of claims paid out for “damage to property”, the other major category reflected in Table 7E fluctuated quite dramatically (motor vehicle accidents showed a similar fluctuation) with the result that the number of payments made in the first and third years was roughly the same. Table 7F shows that shooting incidents (not unrest related) accounted for 31% of the total amount paid out by the SAPS during the three year period while common assault accounted for a further 8%. In all the 7 categories accounted for 52% of the total amount of R97 million paid out during the three year period. In fact the total amount paid out for the 3789 motor vehicle claims (R30 925 000) only exceeded the amount paid out for the 378 shooting incidents by R306 000. As soon as a civil claim is settled and the compensation paid out the state attorney has to determine whether the SAPS members whose actions were the subject of the claim should enjoy state protection (ESP) or forfeit it (FSP). The guidelines are set out in treasury instructions and address issues such as whether the person acted within his or her duties and acted in good faith (bona fide). If it is decided that the member acted outside of these standards he or she forfeits state protection and the state may exercise its right to recover the amount paid out from him or her. As is indicated in Table 7G in 96% of the cases of common assault and 98% of the shooting incidents for which the SAPS was held liable it was decided that the SAPS members concerned should enjoy state protection (ESP). Information on civil claims made against the SAPS therefore, in addition to being a further potential source of information relating to some shooting incidents, also may provide a certain level of information about forms of less than lethal force (including extreme forms of such force such as torture) involving members of the SAPS. While the last year for which we have information on the number of assault claims lodged is the 1995 – 1996 financial year, in that year the total number of claims lodged (880 – see Table 7C) exceeded the total number of less than lethal force complaints received by the ICD (736 – see Table 35). Furthermore the fact that the overwhelming majority of these claims (96%) are judged to enjoy state protection indicates that they are probably occupationally related. Section E Recommendations Amendment to s 49(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act is likely to have a profound impact on the trends relating to the use of force by members of the SAPS. Nevertheless there is likely to be a need for ongoing scrutiny of issues relating to the use of force by members of the SAPS. This will be necessary not only in the interests of holding members of the SAPS to account but also in the interests of providing support to SAPS members in relation to issues relating to the use of force. Data collection relating to the use of force Some form of centralised monitoring of shooting incidents would appear to be a necessity for both the SAPS and ICD. The SAPS therefore needs to ensure effective reporting of shooting incidents and the recording of data with a view to monitoring trends in shootings relating to the police. The SAPS should give renewed emphasis to the importance of reporting all shooting incidents and should sanction those who deliberately disregard this requirement. Furthermore a high standard of shooting incident investigation should be encouraged which potentially applies comparable standards both to incidents where people are wounded or killed and to other incidents. If unnecessary shootings which miss their target are criticised this may help police officers to avoid unnecessary shootings which hit their target. There would therefore potentially be value in a system of shooting incident (and other use of force) review which is focused on promoting learning around the use of force in the SAPS. Such a system may need to be separated from processes which are potentially punitive in their nature in order to be effective. The SAPS needs to ensure that proper records are kept regarding complaints, charges and convictions (criminal and disciplinary) against SAPS members and needs to ensure that this data is reported in a reliable manner. Data relating to complaints, charges and convictions of SAPS members would in general be more useful if instances which allegedly occurred on duty were recorded separately from those off duty. In monitoring the use of force by the SAPS, accessing information on civil claims against SAPS members may prove to be a fruitful exercise for the ICD. However care will have to be taken to ensure that the information received is recorded in a form which, inter alia, uses categories which make it meaningful.  General strategies to control the use of force American example shows that it is possible to monitor and in the medium term reduce the levels of use of lethal force. However LTL force is far more difficult to monitor and therefore to control. In the US there appears to be a pattern of abuse of LTL force apparently a reflection of the fact that control strategies have overwhelmingly focused on lethal force. Preferably, despite the lower visibility of LTL force (or at least of the consequences of such force), South African strategies should attempt to control both levels of force particularly in terms of their abuse. Greater emphasis on and control of the off-duty use of firearms by police While we will stop short of recommending an across the board withdrawal of service pistols from members of the SAPS while off duty it is abundantly clear by now that the whole area of off-duty firearm possession and use by police officers is a significant problem area – both in terms of its implications for the victimisation of off duty police officers as well as in relation to the problem of off duty firearm use. Some suggestions are: General awareness amongst police officers of the risks and responsibilities associated with firearm possession; Clearer guidelines with respect to the responsibilities of police officers to “place themselves on duty” when off duty. We are in fact not opposed to the idea of removing from members of the SAPS the obligation to place themselves on duty. It might in fact be preferable that they be placed in the position of ordinary citizens. Suggesting to police officers that they consider the option of going “gun free” when off duty particularly in areas where there is not a history of attacks on police officers. Enforcing strict discipline against police officers who irresponsibly display or use their firearms. In particular clear guidelines need to be developed and enforced relating to alcohol consumption and firearm possession and use. Placing an onus on police officers who are experiencing personal or job related difficulties which have the potential to impact on their professional behaviour to seek help. Police Reservists A particular cause for concern is the far higher rate of incorrect targets hits by police reservists. The use and arming of police reservists appears therefore to be associated with a higher risk of shootings where the person hit was not the original target. Greater care should be taken by the SAPS in ensuring that police reservists who are armed have appropriate firearm training. Where this possible they should be discouraged from using firearms. Further research Potential areas for further research might include: The reasons for high levels of victimisation of and victimisation by off duty police officers and the link to firearm possession. This report primarily focuses on three provinces. There would be great value in more detailed examination of patterns and problems associated with the use of force – particularly shootings - in South Africa’s other 6 problems and particularly in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. Problems and patterns associated with non-firearm related forms of the use of force. The whole issue of the degree to which the Criminal Justice system and SAPS internal disciplinary system are effective in dealing with SAPS members who abuse the power to use force. Those examining SAPS shooting incidents in future should request the data on warning shots to also be included. Race and gender as variables both in relation to shooters and victims The spatial distribution of police shootings and the reasons why and degree to which shootings and other forms of the use of force are associated with specific localities. F Conclusion This report points to two major causes of concern. The first of these is an apparent breakdown in the system for monitoring the use of firearms by SAPS members through the reporting of shooting incidents and the recording of these incidents on a centralised database in 6 of South Africa’s nine provinces. The second is the general issue of off-duty firearm use by SAPS members. The report also indicates however that existing data sources do not provide much information on non-firearm related uses of force. Such forms of the use of force are known to be difficult to monitor. While the evidence presented here therefore does not demonstrate this to be the case there may be a problem of abuses of force of force of this kind. The report is merely an analysis of official data sources and cannot be taken as a rigorous scientific analysis of actual SAPS practice relating to the use of force. As it stands the report does not serve as a major indictment of on-duty firearm use by SAPS members. The information provided indicated that the level of fatalities “as a result of police action” recorded by the SAPS is not necessarily exceptional in relation to that recorded in many US cities, if one takes into account general levels of societal violence. However in a context of massive levels of societal violence the fact that police use of force is not necessarily high relative to societal violence does not justify a lack of concern. Furthermore it does not imply that force, when it is used is necessarily used appropriately, effectively or justifiably. We therefore hope that this report will feed into a process in the SAPS in which greater attention is paid not only to monitoring of the use of force and to improving the ability of SAPS members to use force appropriately as well as to improving understanding around how effective policing can be carried out while uses of force which are not really necessary are avoided. Appendix 1: Comparison of existing data sources on use of force by the SAPS - to be completed This appendix outlines what are believed to be the major existing sources of statistical data on the use of force by the South African Police Service. SAPS data A SAPS report covering 500 deaths in police custody or as a result of police action which occurred primarily during the 30 month period July 1994 to December 1996, and of which roughly two thirds are attributed to the use of force (henceforward SAPS 500). Data provided by the SAPS listing roughly 7566 shooting incidents during the years 1996-1998. The data is analysed in more detail in section B of the report. (Henceforward SAPS shooting incidents); Data provided by the SAPS in relation to questions asked in parliament relating to the conviction of SAPS members for criminal (Henceforward SAPS criminal) and for both criminal and disciplinary offences. (Henceforward SAPS criminal and disciplinary) Whether the data relates to police "use of force" is not at all clear, as there is no indication which cases, particularly of a criminal nature, were committed in occupational circumstances and which were committed in non-occupational circumstances. Some of this data is contradictory; SAPS data relating to civil claims against the SAPS in so far as this relates to the use and abuse of force (Henceforward SAPS civil); There are also two reports (Minnaar, 1998, and Nel and Conradie, 1998) on murders of police. They could also be analysed in relation to, to what extent they provide indicators re: (mis)use of force by the police e.g. evidence of cops being shot by other cops. Independent Complaints Directorate data The other primary data source is the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD). Since it started operating in April 1997 the ICD has been involved in producing statistics which are updated on a monthly ICD basis. Broadly these consist of: Statistics relating to deaths in police custody or as a result of police action (classified by the ICD as class 1 complaints). Deaths as a result of police action (prior to custody) are virtually all deaths as a result of the use of force - usually firearms - by the police. Some deaths in police custody may also be the result of the use of force by the police though sometimes, where this is the case, an attempt might be made to conceal the exact circumstances in which the death occurred. The SAPS is required in terms of ss53(8) of the Police Act to notify the ICD of all deaths “in police custody or as a result of police action”. General statistics relating to complaints received by the ICD. These generally are classified as complaints that allege that a member committed a serious offence (class III complaints) and complaints that a member committed a less serious offence or act of misconduct in violation of SAPS regulations (class IV complaints). Some complaints under both class III and IV allege acts of violence by members of the SAPS and can be seen as amounting to allegation of unlawful use of force. Other data sources Two studies (Bruce, 1998, and Dissel, 1999) which have in one way or another involved a survey of ICD dockets. A report covering all deaths as a result of the use of firearms in Metropolitan Cape Town during the years 1984 - 1991 (Hansson, 1997). Another report by Hansson also records police shootings during the mid 1980s ( … ). Figures relating to “people killed by the police during the 1970s and 1980s are also recorded in Foster and Luyt (1995). In the following two tables the data is evaluated in terms of whether they reflect lethal and non-lethal use of force, location of use of force (in or outside of custody) and whether it is occupational, and whether they reflect use of force involving firearms or also other uses of force  Table 1A Data sources compared in terms of whether they reflect lethal and non-lethal use of force, location of use of force (in or outside of custody) and whether it is occupational, and whether they reflect use of force involving firearms or also other uses of force. Is use of force reflected lethal, or non lethal Is police use of force outside of custody, inside custody or non-occupational violence involving members of the police service Is this strictly firearms or other weapons and uses of force included? SAPS 500 Covers only deaths including deaths which are not the result of police use of force. Does not cover non-lethal use of force. Two-thirds of the deaths recorded are as a result of shootings which are presumably mostly prior to custody. A few of the use of force related deaths may have occurred in custody. Over 90% of use of force related deaths are as a result of shootings. A few deaths are also attributed to other use of force such as the use of police dogs. SAPS shooting incidents Includes incidents where persons were killed or injured and where no one was killed or injured. Presumably mostly police duty related shootings outside of custody. Only covers shootings. SAPS criminal Covers convictions for range of offences including offences involving violence both lethal and non-lethal. Not possible to discern whether these are in or outside of custody or non-occupational. No indication is given if or what weapons were used. SAPS criminal and disciplinary Covers complaints, criminal and disciplinary convictions for range of offences including offences involving violence both lethal and non-lethal. Not possible to discern whether these are in or outside of custody or non-occupational. No indication is given if or what weapons were used. SAPS civil Presumably includes both lethal and non-lethal. Not possible to discern whether these are in or outside of custody but are presumably generally occupationally related. No indication is given if or what weapons were used. Minnaar Covers only lethal violence where police are killed. In cases where murder involved another member of the police service it is presumed that this was not occupational use of force but this is not necessarily always the case. Geller and Scott (1991) give examples of police accidentally falling victim to occupational use of force by other police but it is not known if this applies to any of these cases. Where murders are by fellow police officers no indication is given regarding weapon used though this information is given for overall number of murders of police. Nel and Conradie As for Minnaar. As for Minnaar. As for Minnaar. ICD data Class III and Class IV categories include cases of non-lethal violence. No indication is given as to whether the behaviour falls into any of these three categories though it is presumed that it generally relates to alleged occupational misuse of force. In relation to deaths ICD data distinguishes between deaths in custody and deaths as a result of police action. However it is not clear what practice is in relation to classification of deaths in police custody that are a result of police action and to what extent ICD practice in classifying these deaths is at all consistent. Furthermore deaths that are not occupationally related are generally recorded with other deaths as a result of police action. Deaths as a result of police action are caused by firearms in over 90% of cases. Deaths in custody as a result of police action and Class III and IV complaints involving violence may but do not necessarily involve firearms or other weapons. Hansson Covers killings by means of firearms including killings by police. Out of 446 alleged police shooters, 378 (85%) were on duty, and 68 (15%) were off duty though it is not clear that their use of force was not occupational. Firearms only. Foster and Luyt Includes statistics derived from SAIIR reports and questions in parliament relating to “persons killed” and “persons wounded” by police. By implication excludes cases where use of force did not result in death or injury. Presumably primarily covers occupational related deaths outside of custody Presumably firearms cause most deaths and injuries recorded but this is not specified.  Table 1B: Time periods covered by different data sources used and indications regarding comprehensiveness and representivity. Pre ‘94 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Comprehensiveness and reliability SAPS 500 July -Dec T T Possible that report covers less than half of the deaths during this period but that is reasonably representative in terms of the picture, which it provides. SAPS shooting incidents T T Only covers data from shooting incidents, which have been entered on the SAPS database. Even in police areas, which have recorded a fairly high, number however doubts exist relating to the comprehensiveness and representivity of data. SAPS criminal T T T T Not known SAPS criminal and disciplinary T T T T Jan - 26 May Not known SAPS civil Presumed to be a fairly accurate reflection of the outcome of civil claims against the SAPS. Minnaar T T T T Believed to provide accurate picture. Nel and Conradie T T T T Believed to provide accurate picture. ICD data April 97 - March 98 April 98 - March 99 It is presumed that the deaths recorded by the ICD represent a high proportion of deaths in police custody or as a result of police action during the periods covered. However it is possible that the data is more comprehensive for some provinces than it is for others. The data regarding Class III and IV complaints merely records cases, which are reported to the ICD. There is no reason to assume that this data is in any way representative of, for example, the total number of assaults by members of the SAPS. Hansson 1984 - 1991 Comprehensive analysis of existing official documentary sources regarding firearm related fatalities Foster and Luyt 1970 -1985 Not know to what extent these statistics provide an accurate or comprehensive picture but it is presumed that they significantly under-represent the true state of affairs. Expressly exclude those killed and wounded during 1976-77 in civil unrest.  Appendix 2: Distribution by year of shooting incidents recorded on SAPS data in all policing areas Western Cape 1996 1997 1998 N OOS-METROPOOL (BELLVILLE) 34% 32% 34% 772 WES-METROPOOL (KAAPSTAD) 32% 37% 31% 583 BOLAND (PAARL) 30% 39% 31% 541 SUID-KAAP (OUDTSHOORN) 26% 37% 37% 143 TOTAL Eastern Cape 1996 1997 1998 N PORT ELIZABETH 39% 31% 30% 398 OOS-LONDEN 32% 33% 36% 394 UITENHAGE 30% 33% 37% 178 QUEENSTOWN 30% 38% 33% 168 UMTATA 17% 30% 54% 127 DRAKENSBERG (ALIWAL-NOORD) 21% 46% 33% 117 KAROO (CRADOCK) 40% 33% 28% 114 GRAHAMSTAD 32% 33% 35% 91 TOTAL KwaZulu-Natal KwaZulu-Natal 1996 1997 1998 N MIDDELLANDE (PIETERMARITZBURG) 12% 48% 40% 517 DURBAN 55% 5% 40% 385 UMFOLOZI (ESHOWE) 33% 29% 38% 212 TUGELA (NEWCASTLE) 17% 42% 41% 139 UMZIMKULU (PORT SHEPSTONE) 77% 15% 8% 13 ULUNDI 83% 17% 6 TOTAL Free State 1996 1997 1998 N NOORD-VRYSTAAT (WELKOM) 36% 39% 25% 430 SUID-VRYSTAAT (BLOEMFONTEIN) 38% 34% 28% 401 OOS-VRYSTAAT (BETHLEHEM) 31% 39% 29% 299 TOTAL Gauteng 1996 1997 1998 N JOHANNESBURG 100% 183 OOS-RAND (GERMISTON) 99% 1% 177 PRETORIA 100% 119 SOWETO 100% 75 VAALRAND (VEREENIGING) 99% 1% 71 WES-RAND (KRUGERSDORP) 100% 65 NOORD-RAND (KEMPTON PARK) 61% 24% 16% 51 TOTAL Northern Cape 1996 1997 1998 N DIAMANTVELD (KIMBERLEY) 26% 44% 31% 226 GORDONIA (UPINGTON) 38% 30% 31% 86 BO-KAROO (DE AAR) 100% 6 NAMAKWALAND (SPRINGBOK) 100% 3 TOTAL North West 1996 1997 1998 N MARICO (RUSTENBURG) 25% 39% 36% 174 MOOIRIVIER (POTCHEFSTROOM) 85% 13% 2% 53 MOLOPO (MMABATHO) 100% 10 TOTAL Mpumalanga 1996 1997 1998 N OOSTELIKE HOEVELD (SECUNDA) 95% 4% 1% 83 HOEVELD (MIDDELBURG T) 100% 62 LAEVELD (NELSPRUIT) 94% 6% 18 TOTAL Northern Province 1996 1997 1998 N BOSVELD (NYLSTROOM) 100% 3 GIYANI 100% 1 CENTRAL 0 FAR NORTH 0 TOTAL Other Other 1996 1997 1998 N UNKNOWN 100% 29 NASIONALE HOOFKANTOOR 75% 7% 18% 28 PROVINSIALE WES-KAAP 33% 67% 6 PROVINSIALE VRYSTAAT 100% 4 PROVINSIALE NOORD-KAAP 33% 33% 33% 3 PROVINSIALE KWAZULU/NATAL 100% 1 PROVINSIALE OOS-KAAP 100% 1 TOTAL  Appendix 3 Profile of 4756 shooting incidents in 15 policing Areas in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and Free State Total number of people . . . Incidents involving a fatality. Incidents during which someone was wounded. Arrests No wounds or deaths No arrests, injuries or deaths Incorrect target hit? Total number of incidents Year Killed Wounded Arrested Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % Boland 1996 6 15 124 6 4% 13 8% 63 39% 144 88% 86 53% 0 163 1997 5 34 161 4 2% 28 13% 96 45% 180 85% 104 49% 4 2% 212 1998 10 29 167 9 5% 27 16% 95 57% 132 80% 60 36% 4 2% 166 East Metropole 1996 11 22 198 10 4% 14 5% 116 44% 238 91% 136 52% 4 2% 262 1997 9 43 239 8 3% 38 15% 141 57% 203 83% 95 39% 6 2% 246 1998 16 61 249 14 5% 50 19% 133 50% 203 77% 112 42% 4 2% 264 Southern Cape 1996 1 5 28 1 3% 5 14% 16 43% 31 84% 20 54% 1 3% 37 1997 1 6 61 1 2% 5 9% 25 47% 47 89% 26 49% 2 4% 53 1998 2 20 101 2 4% 16 30% 36 68% 35 66% 13 25% 6 11% 53 Western Metropole 1996 8 12 191 5 3% 10 5% 85 45% 173 92% 93 49% 3 2% 188 1997 15 57 230 15 7% 51 24% 122 57% 151 70% 73 34% 8 4% 215 1998 8 53 181 8 4% 41 23% 99 55% 132 73% 72 40% 7 4% 180 Drakensberg 1996 3 5 27 3 13% 3 13% 18 75% 18 75% 4 17% 0 24 1997 6 12 27 4 7% 9 17% 15 28% 42 78% 31 57% 2 4% 54 1998 5 10 22 5 13% 10 26% 13 33% 24 62% 15 38% 2 5% 39 East London 1996 10 8 52 10 8% 7 6% 37 30% 108 86% 78 62% 2 2% 125 1997 18 45 84 17 13% 40 31% 56 44% 73 57% 43 34% 14 11% 128 1998 15 30 147 11 8% 29 21% 73 52% 101 72% 46 33% 5 4% 141 Grahamstown 1996 4 2 16 4 14% 2 7% 10 34% 23 79% 13 45% 1 3% 29 1997 3 10 18 3 10% 8 27% 13 43% 19 63% 12 40% 0 30 1998 0 11 22 10 31% 16 50% 22 69% 11 34% 1 3% 32 Karoo 1996 8 3 28 1 2% 3 7% 13 29% 42 93% 29 64% 1 2% 45 1997 2 4 8 2 5% 4 11% 5 14% 31 84% 29 78% 2 5% 37 1998 1 8 9 1 3% 7 22% 8 25% 24 75% 24 75% 2 6% 32 Port Elizabeth 1996 6 9 119 6 4% 8 5% 71 46% 142 91% 79 51% 0 156 1997 9 29 113 9 7% 24 20% 63 52% 89 73% 47 39% 5 4% 122 1998 4 31 100 4 3% 25 21% 61 51% 92 77% 50 42% 7 6% 120 Queenstown 1996 11 17 20 11 22% 16 32% 18 36% 26 52% 21 42% 4 8% 50 1997 9 24 60 8 13% 20 32% 29 46% 36 57% 20 32% 2 3% 63 1998 8 25 36 8 15% 22 40% 27 49% 25 45% 16 29% 3 5% 55 Uitenhage 1996 1 1 24 1 2% 1 2% 18 33% 52 96% 36 67% 0 54 1997 7 12 72 5 8% 11 19% 36 61% 45 76% 18 31% 3 5% 59 1998 3 11 62 3 5% 10 15% 33 51% 52 80% 30 46% 1 2% 65 Umtata 1996 5 10 10 5 24% 9 43% 9 43% 7 33% 6 29% 2 10% 21 1997 4 31 16 4 11% 29 76% 15 39% 6 16% 5 13% 2 5% 38 1998 12 50 67 8 12% 46 68% 44 65% 15 22% 8 12% 0 68 Eastern Free State 1996 6 21 68 5 5% 12 13% 28 30% 78 83% 56 60% 1 1% 94 1997 9 30 99 8 7% 27 23% 41 35% 83 71% 55 47% 6 5% 117 1998 4 18 59 4 5% 17 19% 43 49% 67 76% 39 44% 0 88 Northern Free State 1996 9 25 126 9 6% 25 16% 77 50% 121 78% 65 42% 1 1% 155 1997 14 43 136 11 7% 42 25% 105 62% 117 69% 51 30% 7 4% 169 1998 11 25 109 11 10% 24 23% 60 57% 73 69% 36 34% 2 2% 106 Southern Free State 1996 14 25 103 13 8% 20 13% 58 38% 121 79% 80 52% 2 1% 153 1997 31 31 47 23 17% 30 22% 32 24% 84 62% 71 52% 3 2% 136 1998 14 29 66 11 10% 28 25% 45 40% 73 65% 56 50% 0 112 Total 1996 103 180 1134 80 6% 134 10% 521 40% 1086 84% 666 51% 18 1% 1997 142 411 1371 114 8% 328 22% 653 46% 1003 70% 585 41% 60 4% 1998 113 411 1397 85 6% 312 21% 786 52% 1070 70% 588 39% 44 3% Total number of people . . . Incidents involving a fatality. Incidents during which someone was wounded. Arrests No wounds or deaths No arrests, injuries or deaths Incorrect target hit? Total number of incidents Year Killed Wounded Arrested Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % Count % Sub-totals 1996 6 10 41 85 51% 1% 1997 8% 22% 46% 70% 41% 4% 1998 113 411 1397 7% 24% 52% 70% 39% 3% TOTAL 7% 18% 47% 76% 44% 3% 6.54  Appendix 4: Fatal shooting incidents – variations in proportions of incidents declared legal and illegal by policing area. Justified Not justified Total AREA Count % Count % Boland 15 79% 4 21% 19 East Metropole 29 91% 3 9% 32 Southern Cape 2 50% 2 50% 4 Western Metropole 21 75% 7 25% 28 Drakensberg 7 58% 5 42% 12 East London 18 47% 20 53% 38 Grahamstown 4 57% 3 43% 7 Karoo 2 50% 2 50% 4 Port Elizabeth 10 53% 9 47% 19 Queenstown 10 37% 17 63% 27 Uitenhage 2 22% 7 78% 9 Umtata 10 59% 7 41% 17 Eastern Free State 9 53% 8 47% 17 Northern Free State 19 61% 12 39% 31 Southern Free State 26 55% 21 45% 47 TOTAL 184 59% 127 41% 311 Appendix 5: Stations and Area Commands recording 20 or more shootings Stations Total Number of People Killed Total Number of people Wounded Total Number of Incidents Rank in provincial station index Weighted Crime Incidence Frequency (‘000s) OOS-LONDEN 17 27 173 EC3 17.8 L LE GRANGEPLEIN 5 22 102 EC2 17.9 KUILSRIVIER 2 20 86 WC3 21.2 KHAYELITSHA 3 11 81 WC8 15.0 WELKOM 8 21 79 FS2 17.5 KAAPSTAD SENTRAAL 9 11 75 WC1 41.0 MAITLAND 13 18 72 WC39 6.2 WORCESTER 4 16 64 WC4 18.4 BELLVILLE-SUID 1 5 61 WC6 15.1 THABONG 6 20 59 FS6 10.3 QUEENSTOWN 7 13 55 EC5 12.7 GUGULETU 4 10 54 WC21 9.2 PAARL-OOS 0 8 51 WC19 9.6 RAVENSMEAD 2 5 51 WC31 6.7 BETHLEHEM 1 8 49 FS4 11.0 ELSIESRIVIER 1 13 49 WC13 11.5 PARKWEG 9 13 49 FS1 32.6 BELLVILLE 1 6 48 WC7 15.0 BISHOP LAVIS 3 4 48 WC5 15.7 PAARL 1 8 47 WC10 14.1 MITCHELLS PLAIN 0 12 44 WC2 35.0 UMTATA 15 34 43 EC1 19.2 HERMANUS 2 4 42 WC42 5.5 DK KAAPSTAD 2 16 41 GRAHAMSTAD 3 4 39 EC6 12.6 OUDTSHOORN 2 8 39 WC15 10.4 PHUTHADITJABA 3 11 39 FS98 5.9 UITENHAGE 0 2 39 EC14 8.7 STRAND 2 8 38 WC17 10.0 GELVANDALE 0 3 37 EC10 11.8 PHILIPPI 3 2 37 WC43 5.4 MANENBERG 1 5 33 WC20 9.3 STELLENBOSCH 1 6 33 WC16 10.4 ALIWAL-NOORD 2 1 32 EC47 3.0 DK BLOEMFONTEIN 0 1 31 KRAAIFONTEIN 1 2 31 WC11 13.1 ODENDAALSRUS 1 4 31 FS8 6.1 BATHO 3 7 29 FS3 13.4 NEW BRIGHTON 6 3 29 EC9 11.9 SOMERSET-WES 2 3 29 WC33 6.5 CRADOCK 2 1 28 EC24 5.4 GRASSY PARK 0 6 28 WC22 9.2 HUMEWOOD 1 3 28 EC4 145 KWAZAKELE 1 6 28 EC8 12.0 MAOKENG 4 4 28 FS13 5.1 WELLINGTON 0 0 28 WC36 6.3 BETHELSDORP 2 5 27 EC11 9.7 KING WILLIAMSTOWN 2 4 27 EC15 8.3 ATLANTIS 2 3 26 WC24 8.1 GRAAFF-REINET 9 7 26 EC29 4.3 HUMANSDORP 1 5 26 EC35 3.8 KROONSTAD 0 5 25 FS7 7.8 TSEKI 0 5 25 FS26 3.1 BOTSHABELO 2 6 24 FS10 5.5 CERES 1 3 24 WC55 4.1 STUTTERHEIM 1 4 24 EC28 4.3 FICKSBURG 1 1 23 FS20 3.7 MOTHERWELL 2 11 23 EC12 9.2 VIRGINIA 1 5 23 FS11 5.4 DK PORT ELIZABETH 1 1 22 EC KAMESH 2 4 22 EC23 5.6 MDANTSANE 5 3 22 EC13 8.9 NYANGA 2 3 22 WC25 8.0 STEENBERG 0 7 22 WC35 6.3 A KOMM UMTATA 3 5 21 EC GEORGE 0 3 21 WC23 8.7 IDUTYWA 3 11 21 EC30 4.0 KENSINGTON 1 5 21 WC58 3.5 HEIDEDAL 2 2 20 FS19 3.8 HENNENMAN 2 6 20 FS30 2.3 TOTAL 199 529 2794  Appendix 6: Criminal and disciplinary cases against SAPS members The following information was provided by the SAPS in response to questions asked in parliament (see part 2 of Section D). As indicated however the figures are contradicted by other figures provided by the SAPS. Table 6A: Complaints/charges lodged against members of the SAPS for offences possibly related to the use of force and rates of criminal and disciplinary convictions (Source: SAPS) 1994 1995 1996 1997 Average per year Convictions as a % of complaints/charges 1997 national conviction rate for offences in this category Murder Complaints/charges 156 230 248 256 3 Criminal convictions 30 47 44 38 40 18 17 Disciplinary convictions 10 4 14 8 4 Culpable Homicide Complaints/charges 84 102 149 165 125 Criminal convictions 10 12 12 11 11 9 7 Disciplinary convictions 3 7 8 10 7 6 Attempted murder Complaints/charges 494 696 649 679 630 Criminal convictions 43 51 50 41 46 7 6 Disciplinary convictions 27 19 153 54 63 10 Assault GBH Complaints/charges 875 741 1287 1572 1119 Criminal convictions 148 142 41 69 100 9 13 Disciplinary convictions 48 35 18 54 39 3 Assault (common) Complaints/charges 3531 3053 3854 3817 3564 Criminal convictions 183 157 242 157 185 5 10 Disciplinary convictions 17 66 54 27 41 1 Pointing firearm Complaints/charges 541 599 664 834 660 Criminal convictions 27 50 46 35 40 6 Disciplinary convictions 55 37 27 22 35 5 Table 6B: Complaints/charges lodged against members of the SAPS for selected other offences Offence category 1994 1995 1996 1997 Average per year Percentage convictions in each category 1997 National conviction rate for offences in this category Rape Complaints/charges 65 81 85 115 87 Criminal convictions 7 7 7 6 7 8 7 Disciplinary convictions 6 5 3 12 7 8 Theft Complaints/charges 827 642 879 1201 887 Criminal convictions 26 59 57 55 49 6 6 Disciplinary convictions 20 17 45 37 30 3 Armed Robbery Complaints/charges 41 43 65 169 80 Criminal convictions 6 15 12 16 12 15 3 Disciplinary convictions 2 3 25 5 9 11 Malicious Damage to Property Complaints/charges 339 270 351 494 364 Criminal convictions 10 8 15 13 12 3 Disciplinary convictions 5 21 3 12 10 3 Table 6C. Total number of complaints and convictions against SAPS member 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total number of complaints/charges against SAPS members 11 651 11 459 15 179 17 526 Total number of SAPS members convicted of crimes 1263 1303 1201 1283 Percentage of the total number of employees of the SAPS who were convicted of crimes in each year O.95 0.92 1.00  Appendix 7: Civil claims against the SAPS Table 7A: Civil claims lodged against the SAPS by year: 1995-1998 NATIONAL YEAR JAAR NUMBER INCIDENTS NUMBER CLAIMANTS CLAIMS: DEATHS CLAIMS: INJURIES CLAIMS: OTHER AMOUNT CLAIMED (‘000s) TOTAL 95 4716 4797 R402,766 TOTAL 96 5182 5759 R310,922 TOTAL 97 6715 7149 R442,075 TOTAL 98 6383 6921 R339,604 GRAND TOTAL 95-8 R AVERAGE /YEAR 95-8 5749 61565 131 1088 4529 R373,842 % OF TOTAL NO OF CLAIMS 95-8 100% 2% 19% 79% Table 7B: Civil claims lodged against the SAPS by province: 1995-1998 PROVINCE YEAR JAAR NUMBER INCIDENTS NUMBER CLAIMANTS CLAIMS: DEATHS CLAIMS: INJURIES CLAIMS: OTHER AMOUNT CLAIMED (‘000 RANDS) % OF TOTAL CLAIMS NO OF CLAIMS FOR DEATHS AND INJURIES Gauteng 95-8 29 Eastern Cape 95-8 13 Northern Province 95-8 6 KwaZulu-Natal 95-8 23 Mpumalanga 95-8 4 Northern Cape 95-8 1 Free State 95-8 6 North West 95-8 6 Western Cape 95-8 10 GRAND TOTAL 95-8 Table 7C: Civil claims against the State for the period 1995-04-01 to 1996-03-31 nature op claim Number of claims Amount claimed (‘000s) Vehicle collisions 2 310 R 45 862 Assaults (common) 880 R 41 237 Shooting incidents (compensation for damages) 340 R111 418 Disposal of/loss of/Damage to property while in the safekeeping of the SAPS 310 R 4 414 Alleged illegal seizure of property (Return or compensation for damages) 419 R 7 476 Illegal/malicious arrest, detention and prosecution 1 248 R 67 211 TOTAL 5 507 R277 621 NOTE: Global amounts for claims, which are relevant to more than one cause of action, were not included in the above statistics.  Table 7D. Figures from 16 month period, April 1995 – July 1996 providing indication of circumstances relating to certain categories of payments. Nature of claim Number of incidents #*# Total paid out (‘000s) ASSAULT (COMMON) *Unlawful force, exceeding the limits of force (arrest/resisting) *Assault during detention/ questioning/other forms of unlawful force *Dog bites and other causes 82 (25%) 148 (46%) 93 (29%) R1 914 R2 251 R1 410 Sub-total 322 R5 557 SHOOTING INCIDENTS *Appeal to section 49 of the Criminal Procedure Act unsuccessful *Unlawful use of firearms/wounding of innocent third parties *Probabilities favour the claimant (as a result of, among other things, contradictory/unreliable evidence of members) *Other miscellaneous causes 13 (6%) 123 (53%) 22 ( 9%) 75 (32%) R4 030 R7 074 R 688 R2 513 Sub-total 233 R14 306 UNLAWFUL DISPOSAL OF/LOSS OF/ DAMAGE TO PROPERTY WHILE IN THE SAFEKEEPING OF THE SAPS *Lost out of SAP-13 store *Vehicles stored at salvage premises *Other (e.g. safes/charge office) 21 (18%) 65 (57%) 28 (25%) R 53 R 836 R 286 Sub-total 114 R 1 176 Table 7E: Number of payments made for categories of claim apparently related to he use of force and average payment in each category. CLAIM CATEGORY Number of payments 1995/1996 Financial year Number of payments 1996/1997 Financial year Number of payments 1997/1998 Financial year Total no. of Payments for 3 financial years 1995-1998 TOTAL PAYMENTS for 3 financial years 1995-1998 (‘000s) Average payment in each category (‘000s) Common Assault 167 157 103 18 Assault: Unrest Related 16 13 0 58 Shooting Incidents 140 143 95 81 Shooting incidents: Unrest related 7 2 0 88 Injuries: Bystanders 5 12 2 9 Loss of support: Deaths and disabilities 8 15 1 19 Damage to property 174 250 179 14 Sub-total 33 Other payments for compensation and ex gratia payments 1546 1750 1540 9 GRAND TOTAL 2063 2342 1920 15 Table 7F: Amounts paid in relation to each category of claim apparently related to the use of force and % of total amount paid in each category. CLAIM CATEGORY 1995/1996 Financial year (‘000s) 1996/1997 Financial year (‘000s) 1997/1998 Financial year (‘000s) Total payments for 3 financial years 1995-1998 (‘000s) % of total payments in each category 1995-1998 Common Assault 3,444 2,649 1,646 8 Assault: Unrest Related 678 1,016 0.00 2 Shooting Incidents 11,134 10,276 9,208 31 Shooting incidents: Unrest related 289 508 0.00 1 Injuries: Bystanders 22 151 8 0.2 Loss of support: Deaths and disabilities 202 261 9 0.5 Damage to property 1,088 4,952 2,767 9 Sub-total 52 Other payments for compensation and ex gratia payments 12,824 17,844 16,387 48 GRAND TOTAL 29,684 37,661 30,026 100 Table 7G. Number and percentage of payments in each category of claim apparently related to the use of force which enjoyed or forfeited state protection. CLAIM CATEGORY State Protection forfeited State protection enjoyed Total No. of payments % enjoying state protection Common Assault 410 427 96 Assault: Unrest Related 28 29 97 Shooting Incidents 371 378 98 Shooting incidents: Unrest related 0 9 9 100 Injuries: Bystanders Injuries: Bystanders 0 19 19 100 Loss of support: Deaths and disabilities 0 24 24 100 Damage to property 599 603 99 GRAND TOTAL 98 PAGE 3 PAGE 1 PAGE 63