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2014, T. Thellefsen and Bent Sørensen, eds. The Peirce Quote Book: Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words, Mouton de Gruyter, 2014, 437-442.
I do not call the solitary studies of a single man a science. It is only when a group of men, more or less in intercommunication, are aiding and stimulating one another by their understanding of a particular group of studies as outsiders cannot understand them, that I call their life a science”. (MS 1334: 12–13, 1905). This beautiful quotation from Charles S. Peirce comes from his “Lecture I to the Adirondack Summer School 1905” and was catalogued as MS 1334 (Robin 1967). In 1986 Kenneth L. Ketner chose fifteen pages (7–22) of the Notebook I of these lectures to represent Peirce’s conception of science in the volume Classical American Philosophy (Stuhr 1987: 46–48). “The Nature of Science” was the appropriate title assigned to that selection, which up to then had been almost unknown to the majority of Peirce scholars. Sara Barrena translated the piece into Spanish in 1996 (Barrena 1996: 1435–1440) and we chose the quotation above as the motto for our then incipient group of Peirce scholars in the Spanishspeaking world because it so finely expressed the aim of our undertaking. Against the traditional image of the philosopher as a solitary thinker near the stove, we wanted, following Peirce, to encourage cooperation and communication between our researchers not only as something useful, but as something essential for the real development of science
2016
According to Charles S. Peirce and to Mariano Artigas, science is the collective and cooperative activity of all those whose lives are animated by the desire to discover the truth. The particular sciences are branches of a common tree. The unity of science is not achieved by the reduction of the special sciences to more basic ones: the new name for the unity of the sciences is cross-disciplinarity. This is not a union of the sciences themselves, but rather the unity and dialogue of scientists, the real inquirers into the truth. In the light of Peirce's and Artigas's teachings, we can see that philosophers are in just the right place to call for this unity of sciences. This call should not be seen as promoting a return to the old scientism, but seeks a deep dialogue between the particular sciences and philosophy in order to deal with the presuppositions of the scientific enterprise. The key to the cross-disciplinarity of knowledge is not revolution, but rather shared efforts in a unique mixture of continuity and fallibilism, of affection and reason, of the attempt to understand others' disciplines as well as our own.
2014
This contribution describes —with some documentary support from Peirce's correspondence of his first and second European trips— Peirce's conception of science as a collective and co-operative activity of all those whose lives are animated by the desire to find out the truth, whose lives are animated by "an impulse to penetrate into the reason of things". The paper has two sections: first, Peirce as an inventor and builder of research instruments around which scientific communities are built, and, second, Peirce's experience of cooperation in science.
2016
This contribution describes —with some documentary support from Peirce's correspondence of his first and second European trips — Peirce's conception of science as a collective and co-operative activity of all those whose lives are animated by the desire to find out the truth, whose lives are animated by "an impulse to penetrate into the reason of things". The paper has two sections: first, Peirce as an inventor and builder of research instruments around which scientific communities are built, and, second, Peirce's experience of cooperation in science.
Finally someone has saved future Peirce scholars from having to piece together for themselves the comparative points in Peirce's development as it concerns his most widely read essays. The significance of the Popular Science Monthly articles of 1877–78 for pragmatism and for Peirce's thought is universally known. Cornelis de Waal here brings together the comprehensive story of these articles and their eventual fate. He documents it in a way that anyone can grasp, and through careful study of this text, many essentials relating to the development of Peirce's thought can be learned.
For Peirce, science is decidedly a social enterprise. However, since Peirce defined science broadly as " the devoted, well-considered, life pursuit of knowledge, " what he said of science applies by and large to the acquisition and assessment of knowledge in general. In this paper I aim to shed light on Peirce's social epistemology by examining his views on scientific inquiry in the light of his philosophy of mind. I will argue that how Peirce recasts key concepts such as self, mind, thought, and person, has deep repercussions for how to interpret inquiry and assess its end product. The argument I present combines Peirce's notion of the scientific method as the fourth and most stable manner of fixing our beliefs developed in the late 1870s in Popular Science Monthly, with his notion of the self as he expressed in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy a decade earlier. Resumo: Para Peirce, a ciência é decididamente um empreendimento social. Entretanto, uma vez que Peirce definiu ciência de modo genérico como " a busca permanente, dedicada e ponderada do conhecimento " , o que ele disse da ciência se aplica, grosso modo, à aquisição e avaliação de conhecimento em geral. 1 Neste trabalho, pretendo fazer alguns comentários sobre a epistemologia de Peirce, analisando suas opiniões vis-à-vis a investigação científica à luz da sua filosofia da mente. Argüirei como a forma pela qual Peirce redefine conceitos-chave como ego, mente, pensamento e pessoa têm repercussões profundas na interpretação da investigação e avaliação do seu
Knowledge Organization, 2020
Charles Peirce’s classification of the sciences was designed shortly after the turn of the twentieth century. The classification has two main sources of inspiration: Comte’s science classification and Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Peirce’s classification, like that of Comte, is hierarchically organised in that the more general and abstract sciences provide principles for the less general and more concrete sciences. However, Peirce includes and assigns a superordinate role to philosophical disciplines which analyse and provide logical, methodological and ontological principles for the specialised sciences, and which are based on everyday life experience. Moreover, Peirce recognises two main branches of specialised empirical science: the natural sciences, on the one hand, and the social sciences, the humanities and psychology on the other. While both branches share logical and methodological principles, they are based on different ontological principles in studying physical nature and the human mind and its products, respectively. Peirce’s most basic philosophical discipline, phenomenology, transforms his early engagement with Kant. Peirce’s classification of aesthetics, ethics and logic as normative sub-disciplines of philosophy relate to his philosophical pragmatism. Yet his more overarching division between theoretical (philosophical and specialised) sciences and practical sciences may be seen as problematic. Taking Peirce’s historical account of scientific developments into consideration, however, I argue that his science classification and its emphasis on the interdependencies between the sciences could be seen as sustaining and supporting interdisciplinarity and interaction across fields of research, even across the divide between theoretical and practical sciences.
Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) was a practising physical scientist and for thirty-two years employed by the United states Coast and Geodetic Service – first and foremost surveying and conducting geodetic investigations, for example making measurements of the intensity concerning the gravitational field of the earth (cf. Fisch 1993). But Peirce was also a fine theorist of the logic and philosophy of science, and in a fragment (c. 1897) he accentuated that: ”…out of a contrite fallibilism, combined with a high faith in the reality of knowledge, and an intense desire to find things out, all my philosophy has always seemed to me to grow. . . .” (CP: 1.14). According to Peirce there is a real uncertainty in the world and in the inferences of the scientific inquirer; these are, of course, closely connected. Hence, the scientific inquiry can never stop. This does not mean, however, that Peirce was a scepticist (cf. Deely 1932: 124). Rather, Peirce`s interpretation of scientific knowledge was highly optimistic; according to him scientific theories are progressive, cumulative and – in the long run – convergent. Peirce had, as John Dewey (1859-1952) remarks in a review of ”The Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce”: ”…an intense faith in the possibility of finding out, of learning – if only we will inquire and observe” (Dewey 1932: 124). Peirce`s acknowledgement of fallibility seems to establish the cognitive task of the scientific inquirer and can be related to his scattered remarks concerning an ”ethics of inquiry”: how the inquirer ought to conduct his investigations in the light of fallibilism. In the following will try to take a look at the logical obligation of the scientist, to pursue truth for the sake of truth, which rests upon the ethical obligation, the identification of his interests of cognition with the interests of an indefinite community of inquiry. An important metaphysical concept seems to underpine this ”ethics of inquiry”, agapastic attraction or the living telos of reason. Only because the scientist can be attracted to reason by its intrinsic aesthetical goodness, is he able to fullfil his two obligations. The article will proceed like this; firstly, we will take a look at Peirce´s concepts of scientific knowledge and fallibilism. Then we will understand with Peirce that science is an ethical claim. And, finally, we will see how agapastic attraction can be a metaphysical underpining of the ”ethics of inquiry”.
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