LEXICAL DECOMPOSITION
MEETS CONCEPTUAL
ATOMISM
PAOLO ACQUAVIVA
PHOEVOS PANAGIOTIDIS
ABSTRACT: Asking what can be a substantive word in natural language is closely
related to asking what can be a basic lexical concept. However, studies on lexical
concepts in cognitive psychology and philosophy and studies on the constitution of
lexical items in linguistics have little contact with each other. We argue that current
linguistic approaches that decompose lexical items into grammatical structures do
not map naturally to plausible models of the corresponding concepts. In particular,
we claim that roots, as the purported carriers of lexeme-specific content, cannot
encapsulate the conceptual content of a lexical item. Instead, we distinguish
syntactic from morphological roots: the former act as differential indices, and the
latter are forms which may or may not correlate with a stable meaning. What
expresses a lexical concept is a structure which can be of variable size. We explore
the view that basic lexical items are syntactically complex but conceptually simplex,
and that the structural meaning defined by a grammatical construction constrains the
concept associated with it. This can lead to predictive hypotheses about the possible
content of lexical items.
KEYWORDS: concepts, roots, lexical decomposition
1
1. CONCEPTS AND WORD STRUCTURE*
Taking DOG to represent the concept associated with the word dog seems a
straightforward choice, but it presupposes a clear notion of what is a word.
To see that there is an issue, and that the issue is linguistic in nature, it
suffices to ask whether the two word forms present in put up (syntactically
separable, as in put him up) map to one or to two concepts; or whether break
corresponds to a single concept BREAK in all its uses, including strongly
idiomaticized ones like break wind (contrast wind-breaker, in the sense of a
garment). Far from being a terminological quibble, this is a substantive issue
about the discrimination between simple and complex concepts. If the notion
of wordhood lexicality that is relevant for conceptualization is based on
morphological criteria, break up is not only a complex expression but also a
complex concept, assembled out of two simple concepts in the same way as
BROWN COW is. If instead a simple concept corresponds to a ‘semantically
simple’ word, then we must decide what counts as semantically simple—a
task that seems identical to the task of deciding what counts as a concept,
resulting in circularity: a b jointly form a simple concept because they are a
concept.
For different reasons, researchers in linguistics and in cognitive
psychology are not generally overly worried about the linguistic bases of
concept individuation. eginning their overview of the extensive literature
on concepts, Laurence and Margolis (1999:4) note that ‘For a variety of
reasons, most discussions of concepts have centered around lexical concepts.
Lexical concepts are concepts like BACHELOR, BIRD, and BITE—roughly,
ones that correspond to lexical items in natural languages.’ Correspondingly,
Fodor (1998:121) states the thesis of Conceptual Atomism as the view
according to which ‘most lexical concepts have no internal structure’, and
makes it clear that the property of being linguistically a single word is indeed
crucial, by adding that (p.122, note 3) ‘actually, of course, DOORKNOB
isn’t a very good example, since it’s plausibly a compound composed of the
constituent concepts DOOR and KNOB.’ Expressions like ‘concepts
(/lexical meanings)’ (Fodor 2008:26) are in line with this perspective.
*
We wish to thank the audience and organizers of the first NetWordS workshop. P.
Acquaviva’s research was supported by an Alexander von Humboldt fellowhip, which is
gratefully acknowledged. Faults and omissions are the authors’ responsibility.
2
Laurence and Margolis (1999:4) actually acknowledge that defining
simple concepts as those associated to lexical words is not entirely
straightforward, and add a footnote specifying that ‘the concepts in question
are ones that are usually encoded by single morphemes. In particular, we
don’t worry about the possibility the one language may use a phrase where
another uses a word, and we won’t worry about what exactly a word is (but
for alternative conceptions, see Di Sciullo and Williams 1987).’ But of
course, being monomorphemic is not the same thing as being semantically
basic: witness lexemes that are morphologically but not semantically
complex like con-ceive, or lexicalized compounds like home run, french
window, or indeed cranberry; and the reference to Di Sciullo and Williams’
book merely points to the existence of a whole dimension of theoretical
debate.
On the linguistic side, research into the primitives and the constituent
structure of lexical meaning represents a long and richly diverse tradition of
studies, but typically one that never had much direct dialogue with
psychological research into the representation of concepts—even though the
notion of simple concepts is linguistically rooted. Linguistic analyses of
lexical concepts traditionally decompose the content of lexical words into
different kinds of representations (cf. Jackendoff 1972, 1990, Pinker 1989,
Pustejovsky 1995, Wunderlich 1997, among many others). Apart from
differing in the primitives chosen to represent lexical structure, these
approaches differ in the type of structure envisaged. Jackendoff (2002:334339) hypothesizes two distinct types of structure, both of which are nonsyntactic: Conceptual Structure, understood as ‘a hierarchical arrangement
built out of discrete features and functions’, and Spatial Structure,
understood as ‘encoding the spatial understanding of the physical world’.
Lieber (2004) also envisages two distinct components in her model of lexical
meaning, an unstructured repository of encyclopaedic information (the
‘Body’) and an function-argument structure (the ‘Skeleton’) encoding
primitive conceptual properties, neither of which corresponds to a syntactic
structure. In contrast with these approaches, the influential model of Levin
and Rappaport Hovav (1995, 2005) proposes a structural interpretation of
their meaning by means of a single representation, which describes the
argument- and event structure of a verb by means of primitive predicates
(like BECOME) and constants /roots (notated BREAK, for example) forming
a lexical semantic template like that illustrated in (1):
(1)
noncausative break:
[ y BECOME BROKEN ]
3
Importantly, the same constant / root may appear in different templates, as in
to shovel (remove) - to shovel (put); in other words, what identifies a verb as
a lexical item is neither the semantic template (which typically generalizes
over a verb class) nor the ‘root’ (which, understood as a label, may appear in
different templates, like shovel), but the conjunction of both. Finally, among
the approaches that decompose lexical meaning into a grammatical structure,
a family of analyses explicitly take this structure to be syntactic, that is,
generated accorded to the same principles that underlie sentence construction
(Hale and Keyser 1993, 2002, Arad 2005, Halle and Marantz 1993, Embick
and Marantz 2008, Borer 2005a,b, Ramchand 2008). As an illustration, the
syntactic structure in (2) models for Hale and Keyser (2002) the abstract
structure underlying uses of box as a locatum verb, as in to box the salt.
(2)
V
V
PP
PP
N{salt}
P
N{box}
A causative verbal head V takes as complement a PP which expresses a
locative relation between an argument in specifier position (here, salt) and
another argument in the complement position of P (here, box). V and P, and
P and N(box) are in head-complement relation, but not V and N(salt). This
makes it possible to lexicalize V-P-N(box), but not V-N(salt)-P, as a single
word (the verb to box in its sense ‘to put into a box’), deriving the
lexicalization pattern they boxed the salt, and correctly ruling out *they
salted the box. We will focus on approaches deriving from this type of
analysis, questioning the way they deal with non-structural, idiosyncratic
aspects of lexical meaning that are essential to a word’s conceptual content
but apparently lack any grammatical relevance.
As Laurence and Margolis (1999) note, representing the content of a
lexical item as a structural arrangement of semantic primitives enjoys
widespread currency in linguistic analyses, but results problematic for the
view it presupposes of lexical concepts as structural representations
involving sets of precisely identified semantic primitives. In particular, the
idea that linguistic word-internal structure may explain the content of lexical
concepts and their mutual relations inherits the problems associated with
‘classical’ theories of concepts as structures articulated into smaller
components:
4
• decomposition into semantic primitives faces a regress problem: what do
primitives like CAUSE or THING mean, if they are not the same as the
corresponding lexical words?
• if lexical meaning was analyzable into constituent parts and their
relations, we would expect definitions reflecting the structural
decomposition of a concept to accurately describe its content: but this
typically fails, since word meaning systematically cannot be give a
unique and precise definition or paraphrase;
• if lexical concepts were constituted of linguistic constructs, possession of
these concepts would require being aware of their content; yet competent
speakers often don’t seem to know certain aspects of the meaning of the
words they use, even supposedly constitutive ones;
• attested prototype effects, like the fact that a certain representation of
grandmother is felt as better representing the concept than others, are
unexpected if the content of GRANDMOTHER simply consists in a
hierarchical arrangement of semantic primitives, defining in this case a
biological relation.
This type of empirical shortcomings do not seem to have had an impact on
linguistic analyses of the structure of lexical items. In part this is due to a
widespread perception that such matters do not concern what speakers know
about lexical items as linguistic representations; the content of lexical
concepts certainly includes a fair deal of non-linguistic knowledge, but, it
may be argued, this is irrelevant for an account of what speakers know when
they know a word as a product of the language faculty. Grimshaw 1993
(cited in Laurence and Margolis 1999: 55, Jackendoff 2002: 338) has
articulated this position in a particularly strong form: ‘Linguistically
speaking, pairs like [break and shatter] are synonyms, because they have the
same structure. The differences between them are not visible to the
language.’
In effect, most syntactic decompositional analyses to lexical structure
largely share this view, in practice if not as an explicitly stated principle.
This is a problem, however. If the semantic relations between concepts like
DOG and CAT lie outside the purview of linguistic theory, as a theory of the
computational capacity of the mind to represent linguistic knowledge in a
way that explains the productivity and compositionality of linguistic
expressions, then it is hard to see why the relation between DOG and
ANIMAL should not be likewise ‘not visible to the language.’ And if such a
canonical example of hyponymy relation as that between DOG and
ANIMAL falls outside the scope of linguistic theory, then much of what
5
speakers know about the mutual relations between word meanings becomes
inaccessible to linguistic explanation, as a matter of principle. Thus, the
systematic semantic deviance of comparisons like # a dog is smaller than an
animal, involving two nouns in hyponymy relation, would have to be
explained outside a linguistic theory, or not explained at all. Likewise, the
fact that the difference in animacy between the senses of hands as ‘hands of
a clock’ and ‘hands of a person’ prevents a conjunction like # the clock’s
hands look funny, but mine don’t, could not be an empirical explanandum of
linguistic analysis, even though these and similar patterns are part and parcel
of what speakers know about language, more specifically, about words and
their combinatorial possibilities in sentences (as opposed to concepts and
their mutual relations outside of a linguistic context). Current
decompositional approaches to lexical semantics are forced to ignore these
facts, which were an important part of earlier work in generative grammar
(the data and discussion are from Bever and Rosenbaum 1970; cf. also Cruse
1982), and to deal exclusively with purely structural aspects of lexical
meaning. The result has been a near-exclusive attention to verbal semantics,
especially argument- and event structure. Apart from representing a
significant empirical limitation, this development bars the way towards a
linguistic theory of a possible word, psychologically and philosophically
plausible theory of how words map to concepts.
By contrast, we hold that a theory of UG should have something to
say about the way lexical items relate to their conceptual content. We will
take as our point of departure a specific syntactic approach to lexical
decomposition, which most clearly dissociates the grammatical components
of a word from a non-grammatical core, and focus on the properties which
can and cannot be attributed to this root element as a key locus for the
relation between syntactic representation and conceptual content.
2. ROOTS IN LEXICAL DECOMPOSITION
Work in Distributed Morphology and Borer’s (2005a,b) Exoskeletal
approach both envisage maximally underspecified root terminals embedded
inside a number of syntactic shells, which collectively define syntactic
constructions that define lexical categories; a noun, adjective, or verb is for a
construct, in whose innermost core lies a category-neutral root. There are
many important differences between the two approaches, and indeed
between the two conceptions of roots, the most apparent being that
Distributed Morphology, but not Borer, mandates the presence of
categorizing heads, [n], [v], or [a], immediately governing the root and
categorizing it (with possible complications for complex roots). For present
6
purposes, however, what counts is the role of the root in determining lexical
semantic properties, understood as lexeme-related properties which remain
constant across grammatical contexts (we undertake a fuller appraisal in
Acquaviva and Panagiotidis, in preparation). Both models assume that all
roots are non-categorized, so even the unique categorial determination of
monomorphemic words like fun, tall, or idiot is inferred from the context;
categorial underspecification, however, does not directly imply that roots
lack the kind of semantic information which makes a difference between a
noun and a verb. Analyses within Distributed Morphology, when they
address the topic, typically treat the root as a meaningful element, whose
content selects a suitable syntactic context; Harley and Noyer (2000:365),
for example, state that 'The speaker knows that these roots [ GROW, DESTROY
] denote events that may occur spontaneously, like growing, or that may be
truly externally caused [...] This knowledge is part of the real-world
knowledge of the speaker about the meaning of the root ... '. Importantly,
however, work in this framework stresses that a root’s meaning is emergent
in a context. In the most comprehensive treatment of the issue in this
framework, Arad (2003, 2005) develops insights by Marantz (1997) to
defend a view of roots as radically underspecified but still meaningful
elements which give rise to distinct interpretations depending on their
immediate context. More precisely, Arad distinguishes roots with a relatively
stable and well-defined meaning, from a more theoretically interesting type
of roots whose semantic content cannot be stated in isolation, but emerges as
a cluster of conceptually related words, giving rise to what Arad calls
Multiple Contextual Meaning. Roots of the first type tend to form one or
very few words only (as Hebrew nouns for animal, plants, food, or kinship
terms, like kelev ‘dog’, sukar ‘sugar’, ax ‘brother’, axot ‘sister’ ); roots of
the second type give rise to larger word families, with a more or less
recognizable semantic relatedness which can be very faint indeed; for
example, XŠB in xašav ‘think’, xišev ‘calculate’, hexšiv ‘consider’, BXN in
mixvan ‘examination’, boxan ‘quiz’, mavxena ‘test tube’, avxana ‘diagnosis’
(Arad 2005:82); but also QLT in miqlat ‘shelter’, maqlet ‘receiver’, qaletet
‘cassette’, qalat ‘absorb, receive’ (Arad 2005:97). Despite the clear
statement that roots of this second type do not define a lexical sense without
a context, they are unambiguously qualified as semantically contentful signs.
Indeed, other analyses in this framework make crucial use of the varying
semantic content of different roots, like Harley’s (2005:46-50) derivation of
the Aktionsart opposition between the unergatives drool (atelic) and foal
(telic) from roots being respectively unbounded/mass and bounded/count.
In contrast, the category-free heads which correspond to roots in
Borer’s (2005a,b) framework lack any kind of grammatically legible
7
information, as a matter of definition (with the exception of roots involved in
idioms; cf. Borer 2005b:354). In a programmatically anti-lexicalist
framework that consigns to syntax all grammatically relevant information of
lexical words, these elements are the non-grammatical residue, which appear
as listed phonological forms, or ‘listemes’: ‘By listemes we refer to a pairing
of a conceptual feature bundle with a phonological index’ (Borer 2005b:25).
Being void of syntactically relevant information does not mean that listemes
lack content, however; on the contrary, Borer views them as encapsulating
the non-syntactic information which defines a lexical item (Borer 2005b:9):
Within an XS-[exoskeletal] model, then, the particular final
meaning associated with any phrase is a combination of, on the
one hand, its syntactic structure and the interpretation returned
for that structure by the formal semantic component, and, on the
other hand, by whatever value is assigned by the conceptual
system and world knowledge to the particular listemes
embedded within that structure. These listemes, I suggest,
function as modifiers of that structure.
In different ways, then, Distributed Morphology and Borer’s Exoskeletal
model posit contentful root elements at the core of their syntactic
decompositions of substantive lexical items, which determine lexemespecific and encyclopaedic aspects of lexical semantics either by themselves
or as a function of their context. Our claim, now, is that roots in a syntactic
decomposition sense cannot have this sort of content.
3. ROOTS ARE NOT MEANINGFUL SIGNS
In this section we will review some empirical evidence that roots do not
carry any meaning and/or semantic content that could be identifiable outside
of a grammatical structure, not just because they need a local context to
determine a specific interpretation, but more radically because they are not
signs. In fact, the evidence suggests that any sort of lexical meaning is a
property of roots embedded in a grammatical structure, which can be of a
rich and complex nature. The conclusion that will emerge is that there is no
such thing as non-structural meaning, even at the level of ‘word’.
Let us begin with some remarkable cases. It is received wisdom within
the Distributed Morphology research on the systematic idiomaticity of the
structure below the first categorizing shell (e.g. nP or vP) that the categorizer
projection acts as a sort of limit, below which interpretation is / can be / must
be non-compositional (Marantz 2000; see also Marantz 2006, where inner
8
versus outer morphology phenomena are explained in this way). In this
perspective, the opposition between event nominalization and result nominal
of collection in (3) must be due to different grammatical structures
corresponding to the two readings (see Borer 2003). But since the root is the
same, neither the difference in syntactic structure nor that in ontological
typing (event vs. object) can be even indirectly a function of the root:
(3)
collection1
‘the frequent collection of mushrooms by Eric’
collection2
‘let me show you my collection of stamps’ (result nominal)
Still, it can be argued that the two structures, while different, share a
semantic core because they only differ in terms of outer morphology, above
the first categorizing shell. However, as discussed in Panagiotidis (2011), we
can have radically different meanings across the first categorizing shell. A
telling example is the one below from Greek:
(4)
a. [VoiceP nom-iz-]
‘think’
b. [nP [VoiceP nom-iz-] ma]
‘coin, currency’
c. [aP ne- [VoiceP nom-iz-] men-]
‘legally prescribed’
A large number of words relating to law, regulation and the like is derived
from the root nom-. However, when the root is verbalized, yielding the
verbal stem nom-iz- in (i) above, the meaning assigned is ‘think, believe’. So
far there is nothing exceptional, as Marantz (2000; 2006) and Arad’s (2005)
Multiple Contextual Meaning predict exactly this, roughly that roots are not
assigned meaning until they are categorised.
See however what happens when we take the verbal stem, a vP by
hypothesis, and nominalize it, using the run-of-the-mill nominalizer –ma in
(4b). Unlike the explicit predictions in Arad (2005), and as Borer (2009)
points out with similar examples, the already categorized element nomizdoes not keep its meaning. What happens instead is that the whole [nP n vP]
structure is (re-)assigned a new, unrelated and completely arbitrary meaning,
that of ‘coin, currency’. Perhaps equally interestingly, the participle derived
in (4c) from the selfsame verbal stem carries a meaning as if nomiz- meant
‘legislate, prescribe by law’. In other words, in (4c), the vP embedded within
an adjectival shell also fails to keep its “fixed” meaning of ‘think, believe’
and the whole aP participle means ‘legally prescribed’.
The underlying question raised by such and similar examples
concerns the semantic malleability of roots. Assuming that they are very
underspecified semantically, one might ask how underspecified they can be
9
before they become semantically vacuous. The most obvious example is
provided by the Latinate roots like -ceive, -mit, or -verse, which in English
underlie a variety of semantically unrelated lexemes like con-ceive and receive, ad-mit and per-mit, con-verse and per-verse. In a language like Italian,
this type of element does not have a special non-native or even learned
status, yet roots like mett- which yields as diverse words as those for di-mettere ‘dismiss / resign’, s-mett-ere ‘quit’ and s-com-mett-ere ‘wager’. The
likes of mett- can be found in a number of languages, including Greek esth-:
(5)
esth-an-o-me ‘feel’
esth-is-i ‘sense’
sin-esth-is-i ‘realisation’, ‘awareness’
esth-i-ma ‘feeling’, ‘love affair’, ‘boyfriend / girlfriend’
sin-esth-i-ma ‘emotion’
esth-is-iaz-mos ‘sensuality’
esth-an-tik-os ‘sensitive, emotional’
esth-it-os ‘perceptible’, ‘tangible’,
an-esth-it-os ‘unconscious’, ‘insensitive’
esth-it-ir-ios ‘sensory’
esth-it-ik-os ‘esthetic’, ‘beautician’
Despite the illusory affinities suggested by the Latinate English glosses (G.
Longobardi, p.c.), the class of concepts words derived from esth- is broad
enough to render impossible the task to associate the root itself with any kind
of cognitively coherent concept, no matter how underspecified or vague, and
even to the exclusion of ‘beautician’.
The problem for the hypothesis of contentful roots is not just that all
too often no identifiable content appears to be there. In some cases there is
evidence that the different interpretations must be linguistically visible for
language-internal purposes. This happens when the same root yields
interpretations of different ontological types (like (3) above), which differ
for the purposes of further morphological derivations, after the root has been
categorized, as in the following Greek example:
10
(6)
paradosi1
‘tradition’
(result / *process nominal)
paradosi2
‘delivery’, ‘surrender’
(result / process nominal)
paradosiakos relative to paradosi1
(i.e. ‘traditional’), # paradosi2
Acquaviva (2009a, forthcoming) discusses the related case of English
deverbal nominalizations in -ment, which generally cannot be input to -al
affixation (cf. agree - agree-ment - * agree-ment-al) except when they have
a non-transparent interpretation as entity-denoting nouns rather than
deverbal nominalizations; for example, argue - argu-ment1 ‘logical category’
/ argu-ment2 ‘arguing event’ - argu-ment-al, only interpretable as ‘relative to
the logical category’, not *’relative to arguing’. Again, the root by itself
cannot discriminate between the two readings, yet the readings must be
linguistically visible, and are not just grammar-external.
Even clearer cases where the same root under-determines differences
in linguistic behaviour are displayed in cases like the ones studied in
Basilico (2008), where the same (atomic) root is compatible with different
selectional restrictions, according to the grammatical environment within
which it is embedded:
(7)
the criminals cooked a meal / #an evil scheme
the criminals cooked up an evil scheme
(Basilico 2008)
v
v
cook up
cook
up
This type of examples is particularly instructive, as it brings out an
ambiguity in the notion of root: atomic element individuated
morphologically (here, cook), or innermost category-free element, defined
syntactically and possibly complex (here, cook up). This will play an
important part on our discussion.
Finally, we can push further the empirical point that lexical meaning is
not established and fixed within the first categorizing shell; in fact, we also
find cases where the basic lexical predicate is determined only by the choice
of inflectional morphemes, after a significant amount of structure has been
built. Consider Russian, where the root tsvet in different inflectional
11
paradigms (noun declensions) derives both the word for ‘colour’ and the
word for ‘flower’:
(8)
SINGULAR
PLURAL
tsvet
‘colour’
tsvet-á ‘colours’
tsvet-ók
‘flower’
tsvet-´y ‘flowers’
Even though FLOWER is a basic-level concept, the noun lexicalizing this
concept is derived in the singular by the addition of the diminutive suffix -ok
with individualizing function. There are, to be sure, an archaic form tsvet
with the meaning ‘flower, blossom’, and a regular plural tsvet-kí from tsvetók; but in so far as the paradigm in (8) reflects a stable synchronic pattern, it
shows that what individuates the concept FLOWER is neither the root by
itself (also appearing in tsvestí ‘to blossom’) nor, crucially, the root with a
nominal suffix, which is absent in the plural, but the choice of one among
two alternative inflectional classes, which emerge in the nominative /
accusative plural. Further evidence that lexical meaning can be fully
established at the inflectional level comes from the numerous idiosyncratic
(specialized) interpretations for morphologically regular inflectional plurals
(cf. Acquaviva 2008), like the English brain (count) - brains (count / mass),
or the Cypriot Greek nero (‘water’), plural nera (‘heavy rain’).
4. TWO TYPES OF ROOTS
According to Distributed Morphology, roots are syntactically active
elements (but see De Belder 2011 for an interesting alternative). Moreover,
they are:
(9) i. category-neutral and categorized in the course of the derivation;
ii. meaningful, although there is no consensus on how much content they have;
iii. phonologically identified as forms.
We have a number of objections on these (see also Acquaviva 2009b, Borer
2009; Harley 2012). The first is of a conceptual nature: if roots are indeed
meaningful, then they are equivalent to verbs, nouns and adjectives except
for a categorial label. This in turn raises serious concerns on the nature,
purpose and inescapability of categorization in natural language (see
Panagiotidis 2011 for discussion). The second objection concerns two
interlinked facts: on the one hand, there exists unconstrained variation
12
between roots that appear to be very specified (e.g. sugar), extremely
impoverished (e.g. mett- in Italian or mit- in English) and all the in-between
shades. Moreover, even if we argue for impoverished and semantically
underspecified roots, we are still with left with the empirical problems
adumbrated in the previous section, namely that roots too often do not
capture a coherent meaning (what connects, for instance, the noun book to
the verb to book? what logical or ontological type should the root book
have?). This renders unlearnable the purported ‘common semantic
denominator’ the roots are supposed to express.
It seems, then, that roots in the technical sense this term has in
Distributed Morphology cannot have all the three properties attributed to
them. Taking into account also the recent contributions by Borer (2009) and
Harley (2012), we propose an alternative which abandons (9ii) and crucially
qualifies (9iii) (see also Acquaviva, forthcoming, Panagiotidis 2011,
Acquaviva and Panagiotidis, in prep.).
First, we think that it is necessary to distinguish between roots as
morphological objects and roots as elements of syntactic computation. In
doing so, we embrace generalized Late Insertion, not just for non-root
syntactic material, as in Galani (2005: Ch. 5-6); Siddiqi (2006: Ch. 3);
Haugen (2009). Thus, syntactic roots will be associated with different
morphological roots (Vocabulary Items, essentially: forms) in particular
syntactic contexts, as sketched below:
(10)
CAT <—> cat
GO <—> go
GO, [Tense: Past] <—> went
Given this dissociation, we can use the notion of morphological roots to
account for the multiple ‘radicals’ or ‘stems’ that occur, for instance, in
French or Latin inflection and derivation (Aronoff 1994, Bonami, Boyé and
Kerleroux 2009). Thus conceived, morphological roots may display
categorial specifications like being exclusively nominal or verbal, as has
been reported for some languages (cf. Hale and Keyser 2002:254) and we
expect there to exist constraints on their form (a case in point being the
Semitic three-consonant skeleton). Moreover, the same Vocabulary Item
(form) that spell out roots, may also spell out functional terminals and semilexical categories, as is the case of will (the future marker or the noun); see
also De Belder (2011). In fact, a notion of morphological root related to, but
distinct from, that of syntactic root correctly predicts the existence of such
‘semilexical’ categories.
13
The consequence of the above dissociation is that we can now
conceive syntactic roots, as distinct from morphological ones, as abstract
indices (cf. Acquaviva 2009b, Harley 2009; 2012). By this we mean purely
formal objects internal to the faculty of language in the narrow sense; that is
to say, elements that are defined only as constituents of a formal syntactic
representation, but have no grammar-external status—in particular, not
definable, independently of a syntactic structure, as sound-meaning
mappings, or even as abstract instructions to ‘fetch’ or ‘activate’ concepts
(contrast Pietroski 2008:319, Pietroski and Hornstein 2009, Boeckx
2010:28-29). What we are essentially claiming is that a syntactic root is a
syntax-internal criterion of lexical identity, so that two otherwise identical
syntactic constructions count as different formal objects if they differ in the
root, and as identical (that is, tokens of the same type) if the root is the same.
Given this characterization, there is no semantic variation to explain between
root types, nor learnability problems raised by some elusive conceptual
content detached from one or another lexical item; because there is no
semantic content in roots. Instead, we argue, roots act as labels to identify
(UG-internally) the structures which correspond to lexical words, and it is
these which support conceptual content. The following section will make
explicit the implications of our proposal for the relation between lexical
conceptual content and syntactic structure.
5. MAPPING WORD STRUCTURE AND CONCEPTUAL
CONTENT
It seems a truism that if lexical items are grammatically complex, then the
corresponding lexical concepts are also complex. If the hypothesis we put
forward can be substantiated, however, the structural complexity of a word
at the linguistic level does not necessarily correspond to complexity in its
conceptual content. To see why, recall that syntactic decompositional
approaches aim at representing in syntactic terms the grammatically relevant
information encapsulated in a lexical word, by means of a structure
generated by the same principles that also generate the productive
construction of sentences. Now, lexical words also have a non-grammatical
content, idiosyncratic and encyclopaedic, which cannot be associated to a
word-invariant grammatical shell. It seems natural to associate this
irreducibly lexical residue to a root element. But if independent empirical
and conceptual arguments make it problematic to associate with roots even
this type of content, the question where idiosyncratic lexical meaning is
represented must receive a different answer.
14
The answer we suggest is that a word’s conceptual content does not
correspond to one particular piece of the syntactic construction, but
corresponds to a construction as a whole. Syntactic heads express content
regimented into grammatical features, and collectively determine a
grammatical interpretation; say, count noun, or unaccusative change-of-state
verb, or causative verb. A root at the core of such a construction merely
labels it; for that purpose, it does not matter whether it is a single node,
realized as an invariant phonological form, or a complex node like cook up
in (7). Assuming that pairs like break and shatter, black and white, or dog
and cat have identical structural representations, what we claim is that they
are differentiated, at the abstract syntactic level, before lexicalization by
different morphological roots, by syntactic roots. What distinguishes
morphological roots from each other is their phonological content and
possibly the alternations they determine (think of -ceive / -cept). Syntactic
roots do not differ by virtue of their semantic content, because they don’t
have content, but by a differential marking, like subscripts. It is by virtue of
having different subscripts that the structures corresponding to dog and cat
count as different syntactic objects, independently of semantic interpretation.
This means that they are criteria of lexical identity across syntactic
representations. Simple concepts, qua lexical concepts, map to lexical items
that are identified by roots. In a way, therefore, our conception of roots
provides a UG-internal signature for lexical concepts. Something like this
notion would appear to be independently necessary, according to Margolis
and Laurence (2007:583), who argue for a notion of mental orthography as
shorthand for ‘the formal properties that allow the cognitive system to
reidentify tokens of the same representation type’.
Consider again Borer’s (2005b:9) statement quoted above in section 2,
to the effect that a lexical item consists of ‘its syntactic structure and the
interpretation returned for that structure by the formal semantic component,
and [...] whatever value is assigned by the conceptual system and world
knowledge to the particular listemes embedded within that structure.’ Instead
of claiming that the second, conceptual component is regularly associated to
grammatically inert listemes (a conclusion that has no independent
motivation, even though it may appear natural as a null hypothesis), we
claim that an empirically more satisfactory solution consists in taking the
structural-grammatical meaning as a semantic template which constrains the
conceptual content associated with the structure. If the syntax of a verb
involves a causative v head, the lexical concept associated with it should be a
causative verb (like kill); but a semantically causative verb does not have to
decompose semantically into a non-causative part and a CAUSE predicate
definable independently of this particular lexical concept. In essence, then,
15
we argue that there exist morphological and syntactic roots, defined on
morphological and syntactic criteria, but that there are no semantic roots as
distinct from basic lexical concepts; in particular, not as the semantic content
of syntactic or morphological roots.
Of course, it is at best insufficient, and at worst circular, to say that a
concept may map to ‘whatever’ grammatical construct defines a lexical word
(N. Hornstein, p.c.); but the claim that concepts do not map to fixed-size
syntactic pieces is coherent and compatible with the observed data. As cases
like the Russian tsvet-ók show, a single lexical concept can be expressed by
a noun with different structures in the singular and plural; and especially a
category like number may easily be an intrinsic component of the lexical
concept, as is clear in ‘collective’ plurals like the Spanish padres, which
shifts the meaning of padre / padres ‘father / fathers’) to that of ‘parents’,
but only denoting mother-father pairs (so, a grandmother and her daughter
cannot be padres, despite being parents; see section 3 above and Acquaviva
2008). It seems plausible that the domain of conceptual lexicalization cannot
extend beyond a nominal or verbal extended projection, probably definable
as a syntactic Phase corresponding to a DP or a vP; in fact, this is expected if
we take seriously the notion of Phase as derivational cycle whose output is
consigned to interpretation (Acquaviva and Panagiotodis, in prep.).
5. CONCLUSION: COMPLEX WORDS, SIMPLE CONCEPTS
Lexical decomposition, as a hypothesis on the constituency of words as
linguistic representations, captures fundamental aspects of lexical
competence. On the other hand, it is problematic as a hypothesis on the
internal constituency of lexical concepts. Our main point is that
decomposition becomes problematic even from a linguistic perspective, as
soon as we ask where a lexical grammatical structure hosts non-grammatical
conceptual content; resorting to roots, in particular, proves empirically
inadequate. The result of our linguistically motivated alternative hypothesis
is that a word can be linguistically complex but conceptually simplex.
Conceptual atomism, as defined by Fodor (1998:121), holds that
‘most lexical concepts have no internal structure’. Since we still claim that
the grammatical structure of words comprehends meaningful elements, we
do not take this thesis to mean that lexical words are semantically
unanalyzable as linguistic objects (in particular, they are not semantic atoms
in a Mentalese; contrast Fodor 2008). What we claim is rather that a word’s
conceptual content is not on a par with such grammatically encoded
meaning, as the content of one syntactic piece among others, but belongs
outside UG-generated representations and is mapped to them in such a way
16
as to respect the semantic templates defined by grammar. It remains
possible, then, to envisage syntax-external atomic concepts mapped to
complex syntactic structures.
The difference we envisage between lexical concepts and the UGinternal content of syntactic lexical representations does not mean that the
two have nothing to do with each other. On the contrary, a principled
relation between the two can lead to predictive hypotheses on what can be a
possible lexical word in a natural language. For instance, Fodor (1998:164165) argues that while REDSQUARE is conceivable as a primitive concept,
without having RED and SQUARE, there can be no primitive, atomic
concept ROUNDSQUARE, as opposed to the complex ROUND SQUARE
(as the conceptual content of the phrase round square). Such a hypothetical
basic concept could never identify anything at all, and would therefore lack
all semantic content on principled grounds; while contradictory properties
can be entertained, and the predicate round square is perfectly well-formed,
this could not exist as a basic concept (‘there can be no primitive concept
without a corresponding property for it to lock to’). If that is correct, it
amounts to a prediction about language: namely, that no simplex noun in any
natural language can have this conceptual content. In a similar vein, further
assumptions and hypotheses about the conceptual bases of lexical nouns can
lead to rule out the existence of words meaning ‘number of planets’ or
‘undetached rabbit part’ as simplex lexical concepts (Acquaviva,
forthcoming).
Finally, it bears emphasizing that the thesis of conceptual atomism,
and our contention that syntactic lexical decomposition is compatible with it,
does not deny the cognitive complexity of concepts. The content of a word
enters in a complex network of relations with the content of other words, as
CAT and ANIMAL. But inferences can be necessary though not
constitutive: taking water contains hydrogen to be necessarily true, it is still
possible to have the concept WATER without having the concept
HYDROGEN; cf. again Fodor (1998:74):
It’s perfectly consistent to claim that concepts are individuated
by the properties they denote, and that the properties are
individuated by their necessary relations to one another, but to
deny that knowing about the necessary relations between the
properties is a condition for having the concept.
Word meaning, in conclusion, is indeed cognitively complex, but not as a
reflex of grammatical complexity. We take it to be a strength of our analysis
that it makes linguistically motivated decompositions of lexical items (more)
17
compatible not only with conceptual atomism, but also with views that,
without embracing conceptual atomism, emphasize the lack of one fixed
structure for lexical concepts; cf. Murphy (2002:441): ‘Thus, it can be very
difficult to know where to draw the line between what is part of the word
meaning “per se” and what is background knowledge. It is not clear to me
that drawing this line will be theoretically useful.’ A linguistic analysis of
the construction of lexical content which could be related to a
psychologically and philosophically plausible view of lexical concepts is
certainly a desirable goal. Our proposal is a contribution towards that goal.
REFERENCES
Acquaviva, P. & P. Panagiotidis. In preparation. Roots and lexical semantics.
University College Dublin - University of Cyprus.
Acquaviva, P. (2008). Lexical Plurals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Acquaviva, P. (2009a). Roots, categories, and nominal concepts. Lingue e
linguaggio 8, 25–51.
Acquaviva, P. (2009b). Roots and Lexicality in Distributed Morphology . In A.
Galani, D. Redinger & N. Yeo (Eds.) York-Essex Morphology Meeting 5, 1–21.
Acquaviva, P. Forthcoming. The roots of nominality, the nominality of roots. In A.
Alexiadou et al. (Eds.), The Syntax of Roots and the Roots of Syntax. Oxford
University Press.
Arad, M. (2005). Roots and Patterns: Hebrew Morpho-Syntax. Berlin: Springer.
Arad, Maya. (2003). Locality Constraints on the Interpretation of Roots: The Case of
Hebrew Denominal Verbs. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 21(4),
737–778.
Aronoff, M. (1994). Morphology by Itself. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Basilico, D. (2008). Particle verbs and benefactive double objects in English: High
and low attachments. Natural Language and Linguistic Theory 26, 731–729.
Bever, T. & P. Rosenbaum. (1970). Some lexical structures and their empirical
validity. In R. A. Jacobs and P. S. Rosenbaum (Eds), Readings in English
Transformational Grammar (pp. 3–19). Waltham, MA: Ginn and Company.
Boeckx, Cedric (2010b). Defeating Lexicocentrism. Ms., CLT/UAB. Available from
http://ling.auf.net/lingBuzz/001130
Bonami, O., G. Boyé, & F. Kerleroux. (2009). L’allomorphie radicale et la relation
flexion-construction In B. Fradin, F. Kerleroux, & M. Plénat (Eds), Aperçus de
morphologie du français (pp. 103–125). Paris: Presses universitaires de
Vincennes.
Borer, H. (2005a). In Name Only. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Borer, H. (2005b). The Normal Course of Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
18
Borer, H. (2009). Roots and Categories. Paper presented at the 19th Colloquium on
Generative Grammar. University of the Basque Country, Vitoria-Gasteiz.
Cruse, D. (1982). Lexical Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
DeBelder, M. (2011). Roots and affixes: eliminating lexical categories from syntax.
LOT: Utrecht.
Di Sciullo, A.M. & E. Williams. (1987). On the Definition of Word. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Embick, D. & A. Marantz. (2008). Architecture and Blocking. Linguistic Inquiry
39(1), 1–53.
Fodor, J.A. (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J.A. (2008). LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Galani, A. (2005) The morphosyntax of verbs in Modern Greek. Unpublished PhD
thesis, University of York
Grimshaw, J. (1993). Semantic structure and semantic content in lexical
representation. Ms, Rutgers University. Published in Grimshaw, J. (2005). Words
and Structure (pp. 101–119). Chicago: CSLI.
Hale, K. & S. J. Keyser. (1993). On argument structure and the lexical expresson of
syntactic relations. In K. Hale & S. J. Keyser (Eds.), The View from Building 20:
Essays in Linguistics in Honor of Sylvain Bromberger (pp. 11–41). Cambridge,
Mass: MIT Press.
Hale, K. & S. J. Keyser. (2002). Prolegomenon to a Theory of Argument Structure.
Cambridge: MA: MIT Press.
Halle, M. & Alec Marantz. (1993). Distributed Morphology and the pieces of
inflection. In K. Hale & S. J. Keyser (Eds.), The View from Building 20: Essays
in Linguistics in Honor of Sylvain Bromberger (pp. 111–176). Cambridge, Mass:
MIT Press.
Harley, H. & R. Noyer. (2000). Formal versus Encyclopedic Properties of
Vocabulary: Evidence from Nominalisations. In B. Peeters (Ed.), The LexiconEncyclopedia Interface (pp.349–374). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Harley, H. (2005). How do verbs get their names? Denominal verbs, manner
incorporation, and the ontology of verb roots in English. In N. Erteshik-Shir &
T. Rapoport (Eds.), The Syntax of Aspect (pp. 42–64). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Harley, H. (2009). Roots: Identity, Insertion, Idiosyncracies. Paper presented at the
Root Bound workshop, USC, February 21, 2009
Harley, H. (2012). On the Identity of Roots. Unpublised ms., University of Arizona.
Haugen, J. (2009). Hyponymous objects and Late Insertion. Lingua 119, 242-262
Jackendoff, R. (1972). Semantic Interpretation in Generative Grammar. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Jackendoff, R. (2002). Foundations of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jackendoff, Ray. (1990). Semantic Structures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Laurence, S. & E. Margolis. (1999). Concepts and cognitive science. In S. Laurence
& E. Margolis (Eds.), Concepts: Core readings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
19
Levin, B. & M. Rappaport Hovav. (1995). Unaccusativity. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Levin, B. & M. Rappaport Hovav. (2005). Argument Realization. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Lieber, R. (2004). Morphology and Lexical Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Marantz, A. (1997). No Escape from Syntax: Don’t Try Morphological Analysis in
the Privacy of Your Own Lexicon. In A. Dimitriadis et al. (Eds.). University of
Pennsylvania Working Papers in Linguistics 4(2), 201–225.
Marantz, A. (2000). Words. Unpublished ms. MIT.
Marantz, A. (2006). Phases and words. Unpublished ms. NYU.
Margolis, E. & S. Laurence. (2007). The ontology of concepts—abstract objects or
mental representations? Noûs 41, 561–593.
Murphy, G. (2002). The Big Book of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pietroski, P. (2008). Minimalist meaning, internalist interpretation. Biolinguistics 2,
317–340.
http://www.biolinguistics.eu/index.php/biolinguistics/article/view/70/87
Pietroski, P. & N. Hornstein. (2009). Basic operations: Minimal syntax-semantics.
Catalan Journal of Linguistics 8, 113–139
Pinker, S. (1989). Learnability and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pustejovsky, J. (1995). The Generative Lexicon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ramchand, G. (2008). Verb Meaning and the Lexicon. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Siddiqi, D. (2006). Minimize exponence: economy effects on a model of the
morphosyntactic component of the grammar. Unpublished PhD thesis,
University of Arizona.
Wunderlich. D. (1997). Cause and the structure of verbs. Linguistic Inquiry 28, 27–
68.
_________________________
Paolo Acquaviva
University College Dublin
Newman Building, Belfield, Dublin 4
Ireland
e-mail: paolo.acquaviva@ucd.ie
Phoevos Panagiotidis
University of Cyprus
Dept. of English Studies
Kallipoleos 75
1678 Nicosia
Cyprus
e-mail: phoevos@ucy.ac.cy
20