The Geopolitical Dimensions of the Ukrainian Crisis

The Geopolitical Dimensions of the Ukrainian Crisis1 INTRODUCTION In another attempt to resolve the pressing “Ukrainian Crisis”, the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany have agreed to a detailed package of measures in order to alleviate the ongoing war and extensive violence in the southeastern regions of Ukraine 2 . Many news reporters and a significant number of international relations analysts have heavily commented upon/discussed the possibilities for success of the Minsk II agreement; all agree that at a very minimum it has brought to an end open hostilities in Ukraine. However, the future still remains uncertain. To cut a very long way short, this latest important development that involves commitment at the highest political level available to stop all military activities in the burden regions, took place on the 11th of February 2015 in the city of Minsk. The talks that led to the deal, overseen by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), were organized in response to the collapse of the Minsk Protocol ceasefire in January–February 20153. The new package of measures is intended to revive the Protocol, which had been agreed to during September 2014, with differences between them summarized in figure 1. Figure 1: Comparing the agreements to terminate the Ukrainian Crisis Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31435812, accessed April 2015. 1 Dr. Dimitrios Dalaklis, Assistant Professor in the World Maritime University (WMU). P. Kirby, "Ukraine crisis: Leaders agree peace roadmap", in: www.bbc.com, 12th of February 2015. Ukraine became gripped by civil unrest when (former) President Yanukovych announced his refusal to sign an association agreement with the European Union. An organised political movement (known as “Euromaidan”) demanded the continuation of the effort for closer ties with the European Union, as well as the ousting of Yanukovych. This movement was ultimately successful, culminating in the February 2014 revolution, which effectively removed Yanukovych and his government from power. Acceptance of the new government was not a seamless process; following the flight of Yanukovych out of Ukraine on the 23rd of February 2014, protests by proRussian and anti-revolution activists began in the largely Russophone region of Crimea. These were followed by large demonstrations in cities across eastern and southern Ukraine, including the cities of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv and even Odessa, a very important port for maritime transport activities within the Black Sea. See also: "Ukraine crisis fuels secession calls in pro-Russian south", The Guardian, 24th of February 2014. 3 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (Press release): "OSCE Chairperson-in-Office gives full backing to Minsk package", 12th of February 2015. 2 1 It is true that the starting point for this very prolonged crisis in Ukraine4 was the 21st of November 2013, when the (former) President Viktor Yanukovych suspended the necessary preparations for the implementation of an association agreement with the European Union (EU)5. This decision resulted in mass protests by all his opponents; although many different groups can be further sub-categorized in this very diverse team, all of them are often described under the term "Euromaidan" in the media. After months of such protests that involved extensive use of violence from both government forces and the various opposition groups, to include a noteworthy number of human casualties, Yanukovych was ousted by the protesters’ activities on the 22nd of February 2014, when he fled out of the Ukrainian capital city of Kiev. This was a very significant tipping point for the evolution of Ukrainian contemporary history. Following that development, further unrest broke out in the largely Russophone eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, from where the previous regime had drawn most of its support. An ensuing political crisis in Ukrainian autonomous region of Crimea resulted in the annexation of Crimea by Russia on the 18th of March 2014. Subsequently, civil unrest in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (oblasts) of Ukraine evolved into a full scale civil war between the post-revolutionary Ukrainian government and pro-Russian insurgents. It is also a wide spread secret that many members of the current regime which is now in power in Kiev hold a very negative opinion about the Minsk II agreement; behind the curtains President Poroshenko is often criticized for conceding to the “enemy” and that his signature was simply a retreat -a de facto loss of territory to the (Russian) aggressor. But, continuation of this approach boils down to the choice between continuing the war until Kiev succeeds in restoring full control over separatist regions and negotiating. The former requires a military victory, which is a very questionable issue with the Russian military superiority used to counterbalance any advances of the Ukrainian army. Today, this is a very popular debate in Kiev. Those who insist on continuing the ATO (anti-terrorist operation), also require the delivery of advanced military equipment from the West and its contribution in retraining the battered Ukrainian troops. However, President Vladimir Putin can play that “game” too and under even better terms to secure that he will finally prevail: each time Kiev’s victory will seem close, Moscow will simply increase support for separatists demonstrating that it will continue to bring superior force to bear until Kiev agrees (once more?) to negotiate on the status of the two main regions in question (Donetsk and Luhansk)6. Food for thought for the future: if necessary the Russians can easily further destabilize the Ukrainian government by spreading the unrest and insurgent activities in other near-by regions. The United States (US) and EU countries have imposed sanctions upon Russia, in an effort to revert its course of action. However, this direction leads to a dead-end: sanctions have no power to change the military facts on the ground, with the Korean or the Iraqi example probably being the strongest examples in that direction. Professor John J. Mearsheimer, while discussing the route of events that led into all these tragic developments in Ukraine has very correctly pointed out that7: “According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed 4 The territories that today constitute the modern Ukraine state are inhabited since ancient times and a significant portion of them play a key-role in the formulation of Russian identity itself. During the Middle Ages, the areas under discussion were the epicentre of East Slavic culture; the powerful Kievan Russ were forming the basis of a rather powerful and mighty state-entity. Following a large fragmentation during the 13th century, the territory was contested, ruled and divided by a variety of external powers, including Lithuania, Poland, the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungary and finally Russia. A Cossack republic emerged and prospered during the 17th/18th centuries, but Ukraine's territories remained divided until they were consolidated into a Soviet republic in the 20th century. Finally, it became independent in 1991, with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 5 R. Balmforth, "Kiev protesters gather, EU dangles aid promise", in: reuters.com, 12th of December 2013. 6 N. Sokov, “How the Ukrainian crisis is like three-dimensional chess”, The Washington Post, in: http://www.washingtonpost.com, 15th of March 2015. 7 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014 Issue. 2 Crimea out of a long-standing desire to resuscitate the Soviet empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other countries in eastern Europe. In this view, the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 merely provided a pretext for Putin’s decision to order Russian forces to seize part of Ukraine”. Without any intention to participate in the blame-game, it is obvious that Putin’s annexation of Crimea and his support towards the insurgents contain a strong element of aggression. But, it is also true that the US and its European allies also share the responsibility for the crisis. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) continuous enlargement and the EU’s significant expansion eastwards and around the Baltic Sea can also be interpreted as very aggressive actions by the Russian side. In the international relations domain, when red lines are crossed it should be expected that a decisive reaction will follow swiftly. The purpose of the current analysis will not be to duplicate the series of events that led into the break-up of civil war in Ukraine, or summarize the latest developments of the military confrontation between its army and the pro-Russian insurgents. By taking into account that the current state of affairs is extremely fragile, it will first summarize a few geographical details of the country under discussion and then briefly discuss the so called “classical geopolitical theories” in order to pave the way for a sustainable solution in Ukraine. Conceived about two centuries ago, these geopolitical theories are still valid as explanatory tools of the Russian reaction to the turbulent events in this torn-apart country and the annexation of Crimea; they can also provide the necessary framework for preventing the return of the confrontation in the years to come. A FEW DETAILS ABOUT THE UKRAINIAN STATE Ukraine lies within Eastern Europe (see figure 2), covering a rather extended area. The country under discussion borders Russia to the east and northeast, Belarus to the northwest, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary to the west, Romania and Moldova to the southwest, and the Black Sea and Sea of Azov to the south and southeast, respectively 8. Ukraine is a unitary republic under a semi-presidential system with separate powers: legislative, executive, and judicial branches. Its capital and largest city is Kiev. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine continues to maintain the second-largest military in Europe, after that of Russia, when reserves and paramilitary personnel are taken into account. With the inclusion of Crimea, the country is home to 45.4 million people 77.8% of whom are Ukrainians by ethnicity, and with a sizable minority of Russians (17%), as well as Romanians/Moldovans, Belarusians, Crimean Tatars, and Hungarians. Ukrainian is the official language of Ukraine; its alphabet is Cyrillic. The dominant religion in the country is Eastern Orthodoxy 9. Figure 2: Ukraine and the Crimea Peninsula (the later shown in light green) Source: wikipedia.org/wiki/ Europe-Ukraine_(disputed_territory) 8 9 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook, accessed April 2015. http://countryeconomy.com/demography/population/ukraine, accessed May 2015. 3 Ukraine has long been termed as “global breadbasket” because of its extensive, fertile farmlands; the country still remains one of the largest grain exporter world-wide. Although its economy is now devastated by the civil conflict and the conduct of ATO, it includes a very large heavy industry sector, particularly in aerospace and industrial equipment. In terms of geopolitics, apart from the extremely important port of Odessa10, particularly discussion is necessary for the Crimean Peninsula and Sevastopol. There is a very simple explanation why: The Black Sea Fleet is a large operational-strategic command of the Russian Navy, operating in the Black Sea as well as the Mediterranean Sea. Its ships are based in harbors of the respective region, while aviation and naval infrastructure facilities are based in various locations in Crimea (mainly Sevastopol11) and Krasnodar Krai. Last but not least, the territory of Ukraine plays a very important role in the transport of Russian energy resources such as gas towards the West via pipe-lines (see figure 3). Indeed, the vast majority of these very valuable resources is transiting the Ukrainian terrain in order to reach both the local market and the always “hungry for energy” European one12. Figure 3: Existing and proposed Russian gas transport pipe-lines Source: wikipedia.org/wiki/Pipeline_transport. 10 Odessa is the third largest city in Ukraine; it is a major seaport and transportation hub located on the north-western shore of the Black Sea. 11 The city has a population around 340,000, concentrated mostly near the Bay of Sevastopol and the surrounding areas. The location and navigability of its harbours have made Sevastopol a strategically important port and naval base throughout history. 12 D. Dalaklis, “Geopolitics of Energy: The Case of Southeastern Europe” (in Greek), Hellenic Navy Review vol. 588, August 2014, pp. 34-55 with emphasis on 48. 4 CLASSICAL GEOPOLITICAL THEORIES EXPLAINED The Greek (historian, but with significant military experience as a former general) Thucydides was the first to ever conceive what geopolitical analysis really is, by interpreting the political decisions of the protagonists of the Peloponnesian War -and in that particular period of time- in terms of power. However, the formation of concrete analytical tools for the comprehension and apparently the increase of power were considered indispensable only after the culmination of the industrial revolution and the rapid socio-political changes that the specific phenomenon created. As a result, geopolitics officially appeared as an academic discipline roughly two hundred years ago, in a politically unstable period of history, during which the exploration of the earth had been completed and the major (colonial) powers focused on searching for new methods of increasing their power and establishing their dominion. And that is the reason why concepts such as war, secret diplomacy and imperialism, are interrelated with geopolitics 13 . During the second half of the 19th century two important geopolitical theories were developed; these approaches appear to be contradictory at first sight, but in essence they are complementary to each other. The first influential idea was put forward by the British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder, who emphasized the control of “Heartland” (see figure 4) as an interim step towards world dominance14. The term was conceived in order to describe vast land masses of Europe and Asia (Eurasia), which are protected from the glaciers of the Arctic North. One of their most significant characteristic is that they have easy access to the sea and overlook canals and important straits (maritime traffic choke-points). Subsequently, he suggested that if a state (or a confederation/bloc of states) manages to control that specific area (continental power) the way to world domination is open15. Figure 4: Comparing Mackinder's “Heartland” Source: G. Chaliand & J. P. Rageau, Strategic Harmondsworth - UK, 1985, p. 21. Atlas, Penguin Books Ltd, According to Mackinder, Russia, already very close to the epicenter (heart) of three different continents (Europe-Asia16 and Africa) is covering many prerequisites; in case it 13 C. Flint, Introduction to Geopolitics, Routledge, New York, 2006, p. 13. See more in: Η. J. Mackinder, «The Geographical Pivot of History», Geographical Journal, vol. 23, 1904 and Britain and the British Seas, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1902. 15 For more details see D. Dalaklis, “Energy Resources at the Eastern Mediterranean Basin: A solution for the EU's Debt Crisis or a Point of Friction?”, Revista Geopolitica, nr. 49-50, 2013, pp. 271-4. 16 A certain number of geopolitical analysts hold the opinion that a substantial distinction between the continents of Europe and Asia does not exist and that these 14 5 expands its sphere of influence to the "warm" coasts of Eurasia, then the combination of its huge resources and free access to major trade routes will make the prospective of a global empire visible. Central European territories, as well as the countries around the Baltic and the Black Sea constitute a very vital region, which offers the possibility to the continental power that has control over them to both avert every inimical action coming from the sea and to profit by all the routes of land transport (i.e. rail) in a way that surpasses all the competitive advantages that maritime transport offers. Indeed, Mackinder's best-known saying is the following: “The one that governs Eastern Europe prevails over the Heartland. The one that governs the Heartland prevails over the Global Island. The one that governs the Global Island prevails upon the globe"17. The second theory under discussion was expounded by the American naval officer Alfred Thayer Mahan, who delved into how Great Britain utilized in a variety of ways its fleet to become dominant in the international system of the 16th-17th century era 18 . Mahan put forward the idea that “Τhe nation which will dominate the seas shall control the whole world”. His theory is very simple in its conception, since he focused mainly on the fact that maritime power is the “servant of expansion”, since control of the oceans and the seas provides with the opportunity to deliver passengers and goods more easily and economically than all means of transport moving on land. Mahan is the greatest theoretician on maritime power. According to his dogma, no country can be regarded as a global power if its navy is not potent and sufficient enough to promote its power and presence all over the world. At the same time, Mahan underlined the fact that the objective of naval power should be the control of maritime routes, which is achieved by a vast number of large and mighty warships which circulate all over the globe. Even today, the aforementioned models of how states should behave in order to become a global player strongly influence international relations, as well as the lives of ordinary people. Under the above mentioned framework, the change of the Ukrainian government from to Yanukovych towards Poroshenko in the Russian views signifies just another effort to prevent Russia to utilize the Black Sea region in order to project its revived naval power; Putin’s response to the events on Ukraine has been defensive, not offensive. On the other hand, access to warm seas, with the long-term objective of global dominion is a diachronic aspiration of any great continental power. The major naval power of the 21st century (the US) will always try to prevent it from happen. The US has every interest to stabilize the new pro-West government; this is part of a grand-strategy game of securing the entrainment, or else, the encirclement of the heartland, since it is unlikely to conquer it via its own military means. History can always provide useful guidance for international relations: it is interesting to note that even during the notorious “Cold War”, conflicts between the great powers of that era -USA and USSRwere mainly related to a specific strategic objective that as already discussed would pave the way towards global dominance. More specific, the USSR numerous times tried to secure “access to the warm seas” and the US concentrated every effort upon avoiding that event, either in the terms of forming alliances (i.e. both Greece and Turkey jointed NATO) or even via resorting into proxy wars, such as the continuous military confrontations in the Middle East. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS It is obvious that the role of the Crimea Peninsula and the land mass of Ukraine is paramount for the Russian security domain. Both Napoleon and Hitler used a similar path for their invasion into Russia: the plains of central Europe and Ukraine. There is no way for Russia to tolerate Ukraine joining the NATO; the need of a buffer (or comfort zone) is therefore necessary to deal with this high stake security need. Taking into consideration that even the presence of NATO military forces in the region can be continents should be regarded as an indivisible entity under the name Eurasia. See also A. Petersen, «Regions in Between: Europe, NATO and the Geopolitics of Shifting Frontiers», Turkish Policy Quarterly, volume 7-number 2, 2008, p. 59. 17 Η. J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality, Νοrton, New York, 1962, p. 150. See also G. Chaliand & J. P. Rageau, Strategic Atlas, Penguin Books Ltd, Harmondsworth UK, 1985, pp. 20-5. 18 See more in: A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1890. 6 interpreted by the Russian elite as another aggressive move that requires appropriate reprisals, the presence of NATO troops in Ukraine should be kept at very small numbers and with no (or very limited) fighting capabilities to avoid escalation. Apart from a rather extended borderline between Ukraine and Russia without any buffer in-between, for the Russian side there is also the question of the Black Sea. It is true that in naval terms both the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits are still very difficult obstacles to overcome. But, without effective control of the Black Sea there is no chance for this classical continental power to have access to warm seas (Mediterranean)19. As a result, it must have been easy to conclude that Putin’s reaction to the loss of Ukraine would be at the minimum related to the annexation of Crimea. Crimea will be completely integrated into the Russian Federation, since the Sevastopol naval base is the only available mean in order to “secure” Russia’s southwestern flank and allow its naval vessels to effectively operate and exercise control of the Black Sea. His decision to move forward no matter of the sanctions imposed should have come as no surprise: in his views the stake of losing Crimea is too high and justifies any current or future pain. Therefore even more sanctions will not contribute to a reverse of his course of actions and will provide the justification to maintain an even harder line that will pave the way for completely breaking apart Ukraine into smaller entities. After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core strategic interests, a point he had tried to convey towards the US-NATO and even EU with emphasis and repeatedly. In the wider context of international relations, the collapse of the Berlin wall which signifies the downfall of the USSR and brought the “Cold War” to an end, created a unique position for the USA: the privileged position of the sole superpower on Earth, with the ability to impose (one way, or another) its own will on the remaining competing powers/rivals. But, the failed military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq that resulted into a significant financial burden for the Americans, in combination with the recent financial recovery of Russia and the continuous Chinese economy enlargement have changed the contemporary status-quo. Therefore, it is necessary to accommodate everyone needs and this is a “win-win” way to create a viable future for Ukraine: the country can be awarded with a special status for ties with NATO, but any discussion to become a full partner of the alliance is a no-go area. This will only worsen the situation and allow military violence to return. Keep in mind that Russian actions to negotiate in a very quick pace with Turkey and Greece an alternative gas pipe-line to transport energy resources (Turkish/Greek stream) towards Europe clearly indicates that for Russia Ukraine is probably considered a lost case. On the other hand, the rise of the Russian military capabilities and its geographic proximity with the region under discussion will allow President Putin to safely hold the initiative in the sequence of events to follow. Taking into account that Ukraine’s joining of NATO will be a military nightmare for Russia, any developments in this direction will be strongly counteracted upon. It is useful to point out that this evolution could also be interpreted as a sign of weakness for the Russian President (and even endangers Putin’s future remaining in power). Therefore, his best strategy in the near future will be to display patience and simple undermine or even destroy any attempts of the Ukrainian government’s effort for financial recovery. Over time, the dissatisfaction of the people can work in Russian favor. The Georgian example is probably a guide for the future. With controlled military actions, he was able to completely change events on the tactical ground; the inability of the Georgian government to create a better living conditions standards for its people as years passed by resulted into a regime change that at a minimum favored cooperation with Russia and discussions for a common future with NATO were brought to a complete hold. REFERENCES 1. Balmforth R., "Kiev protesters gather, EU dangles aid promise", in: reuters.com, 12th of December 2013. 2. Dalaklis D., “Geopolitics of Energy: The Case of Southeastern Europe” (in Greek), Hellenic Navy Review vol. 588, August 2014. 3. Dalaklis D., “Energy Resources at the Eastern Mediterranean Basin: A solution for the EU's Debt Crisis or a Point of Friction?”, Revista Geopolitica, nr. 49-50, 2013. 19 The Syrian on-going civil conflict and the Russian support for Assad’s regime indicate that there is a high interest to preserve Russian access into the Med. 7 4. Flint C., Introduction to Geopolitics, Routledge, New York, 2006. 5. Kirby P., "Ukraine crisis: Leaders agree peace roadmap", in: www.bbc.com, 12th of February 2015. 6. Mackinder Η. J., «The Geographical Pivot of History», Geographical Journal, vol. 23, 1904. 7. Mackinder Η. J., Britain and the British Seas, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1902. 8. Mackinder Η. J., Democratic Ideals and Reality, Νοrton, New York, 1962. 9. Mahan A. T., The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1890. 10. Mearsheimer J. J., “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin”, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2014 Issue. 11. Petersen A., «Regions in Between: Europe, NATO and the Geopolitics of Shifting Frontiers», Turkish Policy Quarterly, volume 7-number 2, 2008. 12. Sokov N., “How the Ukrainian crisis is like three-dimensional chess”, The Washington Post, in: http://www.washingtonpost.com, 15th of March 2015. 13. Chaliand G. & Rageau J. P., Strategic Atlas, Penguin Books Ltd, Harmondsworth -UK, 1985. 14. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (Press release): "OSCE Chairperson-in-Office gives full backing to Minsk package", 12th of February 2015. 15. "Ukraine crisis fuels secession calls in pro-Russian south", The Guardian, 24th of February 2014. 16. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31435812, accessed April 2015. 17. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook, accessed April 2015. 18. http://countryeconomy.com/demography/population/ukraine, accessed May 2015. 8