Working Paper: Cleggmania

“I went with what I always do…”: A qualitative analysis of ‘Cleggmania’ and vote choice in the 2010 British General Election Working Paper – Do Not Cite or Quote without Author’s Permission Abstract Using post-election focus group transcripts we provide new insights as to why ‘Cleggmania’, a highlight of the 2010 British general election, failed to translate into electoral success for the Liberal Democrats. Narrative and discourse analysis conducted on participants’ vote choice stories reveals a complicated choice calculus. Conservative and Labour voters’ narratives and those who leaned Liberal Democrats but ultimately remained true to their previous party cited values or identity. Liberal Democrat voters cited tactical and satisficing reasons or support for a principle or a policy. For Qualitative Election Study of Britain participants the effect of ‘Cleggmania’ was limited to strengthening the resolve of wavering or leaning Liberal Democrat voters. We also draw attention to the important role of constituency dynamics in decisions and conclude that qualitative research can provide insights into vote choice that cannot be realised either through existing survey data or lab based experimentation. Corresponding authors: Dr. Edzia Carvalho, Postdoctoral Researcher, Department of Political Science, University of Amsterdam, O.Z. Achterburgwal 237, 1012 DL Amsterdam, The Netherlands edziacarvalho@gmail.com Co-author: Dr. Kristi Winters, Datenarchiv für Sozialwissenschaften, GESIS Leibniz Institutes for the Social Sciences, Unter Sachsenhausen 6-8, 50667 Köln, Germany Kristi.Winters@gesis.org Introduction In early 2010 Nick Clegg was the relatively-unknown leader of the Liberal-Democrats. However, after his first debate performance the UK media was dominated by the neologism ‘Cleggmania’ (inter alia: Hasan, 2010; Mayer, 2010; Sabloff, 2010). Clegg’s rhetoric of ‘change’ was aimed at a populace disenchanted with British politics and politicians (BBC 2010a; Blitz 2010; Greenslade 2010; The Telegraph 2010). Yet on Election Day the Liberal Democrats failed to increase either their electoral vote share or their seats in Westminster substantively (BBC 2010b). We contextualise the rise and fall in Liberal Democrat support using qualitative data from focus groups conducted in England, Scotland and Wales during and after the 2010 campaign. The first section provides the background to the 2010 British General Election, the first-ever Leaders’ Debates broadcasts, and its ultimate outcome. We review the media phenomenon of ‘Cleggmania’, contextualise Clegg’s performance with Qualitative Election Study Britain (QESB) transcripts, and examine the divergence between the Liberal Democrats’ supposed popularity and their electoral results. Finally, we review current explanations for the gap in the party’s performance. The second section reviews the QESB and our methods of analysis. We identify four typologies of voting narratives. Our findings highlight the values- and identity-based accounts of stable voters, and the psychological obstacle people faced voting for another party in light of their prior party identification. We identify strategic voters who sought to maximize the utility of their vote in various ways and review the narratives of undecided voters won over to the Liberal Democrats. This research also brings to the fore the importance of constituency dynamics in participants’ vote choice narratives. We conclude that qualitative research can provide insights into vote choice that cannot be realised either through surveys or lab-based experimentation. The rise and fall of Cleggmania The Liberal Democrats began the 2010 general election with 62 Parliamentary seats having gained 22 percent of votes cast in the 2005 general election, its strongest Parliamentary presence since 1923 (Mellows-Facer 2006, 13). Nick Clegg was elected party leader in a close contest in 2007 on a ‘change’ agenda directed at the two-party system. He aimed to widen the party’s appeal to voters with ‘liberal values’ but who did not vote Liberal Democrat (BBC 2007). The party’s response to the 2008 financial crisis and its lack of involvement in the Parliamentary expenses scandal shored up its credibility (BBC 2010c). When the election campaign was launched on 6 April 2010, 17 to 21 percent of respondents polled expressed a Liberal Democrat vote preference (Populus 2010; YouGov 2010). There was significant anticipation for the first-ever nationally televised ‘Prime Ministerial’ debates between the leaders of the three largest parties, one per week for three weeks before polling day. Each debate focussed on specific themes in the first half – domestic affairs, foreign policy and the economy – and general issues in the second. The three participants could respond to questions and also to each other, and a moderator chaired the proceedings (Allen et al 2011, 181-2). The first debate was held one week into the campaign and drew an audience of approximately 9.7 million people. David Cameron was expected to win given his background in public relations and greater ease in front of the camera in comparison with Gordon Brown. Nick Clegg had everything to play for without the burden of the high expectations shouldered by Cameron or the anti-incumbency factor faced by Brown (Allen et al 2011, 179-185). His ‘polished performance’ (Wring 2011, 2) helped him connect with voters unfamiliar with the Liberal Democrats and he positioned his party as a ‘viable alternative to the “old parties”’ (Quinn and Clements 2011, 82). Clegg’s manner was relaxed yet engaging, unscripted yet direct. His criticisms of the two parties struck a positive chord with the respondents polled by Ipsos MORI during the debate (Allen et al 2011, 189). All post-debate opinion polls reported that Clegg had won the first round (Lawes and Hawkins 2011, 62). The QESB recorded participants’ reactions following the First Leaders’ Debate. To prevent media effects, the participants did not watch any post-debate coverage or analysis during the session. The participants in this excerpt were undecided at the time of the debate. Excerpt 1 reports the perceptions underlying Cleggmania. These were the real-time reactions before participants were exposed to media analysis or media coverage. They expressed positive views about Clegg’s precision in answering questions, his polished debate performance and evaluated the exchanges in light of a possible hung Parliament. Excerpt 1: Participant details were anonymised. Conventions used: ** inaudible words, italic font word guessed at, curly brackets {} sounds (e.g. laughter), and parentheses () breaks in time. Excerpt 1 is taken from the Leaders’ Debate 1 Focus Group (QESB 2010). David I felt the two people who had more gravitas were Gordon Brown and Cameron yet Nick Clegg seemed to have all the answers. He knew how he was going to pay things off. You know they were talking about deficits, this, that, and the other. They seemed to have worked out the budget, how they were going to afford this whereas Labour and Conservative weren’t disclosing that. Moderator: Yeah I saw heads nodding. Could you just put your hand up if you agree with that comment? {Ian’s, Cathy’s, Keith’s, Jane’s and Peter’s hands go up.} So, quite a lot of other people. Jane: Largely. Peter: It appears it has also to do with their manifestoes as well. Ian: It looked like they were both point scoring, not even giving proper answers, so. Jane: I thought what was interesting in general was that you had Cameron and Brown going at each other and I wonder if it’s just this prospect of a hung Parliament or because they don’t take him seriously that neither of them were attacking Clegg as much and he was sort of agreeing with them and I don’t know if that’s just kind of manoeuvring or trying to say – (Later) Cathy: I thought yeah, you can see they’re sort of – Jane: They’re manoeuvering. {laughs} Cathy: – the hung Parliament – they’re manoeuvring towards that**. But did you think that Clegg did a little bit of devil’s advocate….‘Cause every time they were going at each other he was straight in there with the easy option and ‘what about this, what about that’ because he knows that he doesn’t have anything to lose, as such. (Later) Patricia: Actually I was really surprised about Nick Clegg. I thought he was the one who actually answered the questions more than anyone else did. He actually positively came out with what he was going to do, the numbers etc, whereas Cameron, really I was really looking forward to hearing him and he really disappointed me. I was very surprised. Jane: I’m glad you said that ‘cause that was something I had forgotten but yes, he was definitely much more focused on the person who had asked the question and the question they had actually asked rather than just using it as an excuse to kind of say ‘ah, this is lovely but let me talk about health reform.’ Patricia: Yes, that’s right. He actually answered the question and didn’t really just throw in just what he wanted to say about what he had previously prepared. …Moderator: Stacey, your impressions yeah? Stacey: Yeah, I was quite surprised by Nick Clegg actually. I hadn’t expected, um I suppose the other two spent a lot of time, somebody else already said - I can’t remember - just kind of attacking each other and until this point I considered Nick Clegg just sort of bland, yeah I agree he did have answers to questions and, yeah. Following the debate Liberal Democrat support in the polls rose from 17 to 31 percent (Lawes and Hawkins 2011, 68). This unprecedented boost was described as the ‘Clegg effect’ or ‘Cleggmania’. In the media comparisons were made between Clegg and Che Guevara, Sir Winston Churchill, and Barack Obama (Burkeman 2010; Oliver and Smith 2010). There was speculation the Liberal Democrats might overtake Labour to become the main opposition party (Deacon and Wring 2011, 287). This boost to the Liberal Democrats’ electoral prospects changed Conservative and Labour’s strategy in the subsequent debates. Although previously the men seemed hesitant to criticise the Liberal Democrats (either viewing the Liberal Democrats as irrelevant and/or potential coalition partners), Cameron became more critical of Liberal Democrat policies while Brown employed a two-pronged approach: being complimentary while arguing that Liberal Democrat supporters should vote tactically for Labour (Allen et al 2011, 189-93). By the third debate Clegg’s performance was seen as repetitive and ‘tired’. Cameron was judged the winner by a small but distinct margin (Allen et al 2011, 195). Clegg’s first Leaders’ Debate performance transformed the Liberal Democrats into a serious contender in the eyes of the major parties, the media, and potential voters. Clegg came across as trustworthy and the one who gave the least evasive answers (Lawes and Hawkins 2011, 68-70). These factors increased expectations for the Liberal Democrats’ electoral performance presuming sections of the electorate enthused by the campaign voted in unexpectedly large numbers (Allen et al 2011, 197). By the end of the campaign nine British Polling Council (BPC) polls reported 26 to 29 percent of respondents reported a Liberal Democrats vote preference (Atkinson and Mortimore 2011, 78). The puzzle The results of the 2010 general election were disappointing for the party; it won 23 percent of the vote (Atkinson and Mortimore 2011, 78). The six BPC polls had overestimated the party’s vote share by an average of 3.6 percentage points (Kellner et al 2011, 95). This excludes three internet surveys. Bartle et al (2011, 148) observed the three parties ended up where they began the campaign. This puzzling result led to introspection and soul-searching on the part of the pollsters and academics. Two accounts have been provided to explain why Cleggmania failed to live up to its expected results. The first posits ‘the polls got it wrong’, either because they measured support that did not exist or they failed to measure a decline in support (Atkinson and Mortimore 2011, 78). The first surge in Liberal Democrat support across all polls emerged as a plausible explanation for the gap between the expected and actual election results. Systematic measurement error in all the polls was also cited as to why a supposed surge in Liberal Democrat support did not materialize at the ballot box (Atkinson and Mortimore 2011, 81-91). The second account points to the over-emphasis by the media on the effect of the Leaders’ Debates (Allen et al 2011) while ignoring the constraining factors, such as the limited number of viable seats Liberal Democrats could win, which prevented any bounce from translating into seats (Lawes and Hawkins 2011; Johnston and Pattie 2011). Atkinson and Mortimore (2011, 78) write ‘Liberal Democrat success is much more locally concentrated than that of the two larger parties, their national vote share is a relatively poor predictor of the number of seats the party will win….’ Johnson and Pattie (2011) showed the Liberal Democrats had a constituency disadvantage. They had fewer marginal seats ‘in play’ and fewer resources to retain the marginal seats they had won. Plausibly the party could win only sixteen additional seats previously lost by less than five percent. This was not widespread enough to make them contenders in national politics. They conclude that Cleggmania did not help the party win marginal seats because its pre-election focus and planning was on retaining the marginal seats won in the previous election. Local ‘long campaigns’ had been financed accordingly (Johnson and Pattie 2011, 224-5, 232). After Cleggmania the Liberal Democrats did not have the accompanying apparatus on the ground to translate support into votes. Allen et al (2011, 198) note that most voters would have decided on their vote choice before watching the debates and Cleggmania would have plausibly affected a small section of voters. In 2010, 43 percent of respondents reported making up their minds during the election campaign, according to an Ipsos MORI poll (Allen et al 2011, 198). This was higher than the reported figure for the 2005 election. For voters interested in the debates, Allen et al claim, the leaders did not offer clear substantive policy messages that simplified vote choice. Moreover, barring the first debate, there were ‘no knockout blows’ that produced a clear winner. They suggest the apparent First Debate surge could ‘well have been an artefact of media-priming effects and the tendency for people to say they would vote for the party whose leader they had been told had won the debate’ (Allen et al 2011, 198). Lawes and Hawkins (2011, 66-8) further argue that the initial Liberal Democrats surge was rooted in an unstable coalition of respondents whose allegiance the party was unable to widen or consolidate. ComRes polls tracked party support and voter preferences and showed that although expressed voting intention for the Liberal Democrats rose from 21 percent before the First Leaders’ Debate to 27 percent before the third one, the party was not able to capture increasing bastions of support or retain this after the first debate. Analysis of party support by pre-debate voting intention showed that over three-fourths of sample respondents who expressed allegiance to specific parties continued to support these parties after each debate. The additional support for the Liberal Democrats came largely from the remaining one-fourth of supporters of each of the two major parties and a third of supporters from smaller parties. Data and methodology Previous research relied upon the inferences of experts and academics’ assumptions of what voters perceived or intended when responding to surveys. The explanations either assumed the debates did not affect voters enough to persuade them to vote Liberal Democrat or that survey respondents were wily, ignorant, and/or provided misleading answers that skewed the polling data. Our approach to the Cleggmania puzzle focuses on an aspect the above accounts cannot incorporate: the perceptions and self-reported actions of voters themselves. Qualitative analysis allows us to examine the election as self-reflexively understood by the participants and the QESB provides high-quality textual data to analyze, ‘how people use language in their everyday interactions, their ‘discourses’ with each other, and how they…put their linguistic skills to use in building specific accounts of events,’ (Burr 2003, 17). This research was funded by the British Academy, grant number SG090860. We analysed five post-election focus group transcripts conducted in England (Essex and London), Scotland (Glasgow) and Wales (Aberystwyth). In total fourteen pre- and post-election focus groups were conducted with 76 participants. Participants were recruited through email advertising and snowballing referrals. They were screened by age, gender and voting intention to ensure that the sample was representative on these criteria. Most pre-election participants were undecided voters. Pre-election participants were invited to post-election focus groups to provide a qualitative panel dataset and forty people participated in the post-election groups. During the post-election sessions, participants were invited to recount what happened leading up to Election Day and if, and for whom they voted. Description of vote choice was voluntarily as ethical principles preclude requiring someone to reveal the contents of their secret ballots. Narrative analysis is a holistic approach to discourse analysis that preserves the context and particularity of the data (Riessman 1993). Narratives have an ordering that describe some kind of tension or reveal an unexpected action that requires reaction and/or adjustment (Riessman 2008). ‘The temporal ordering of events in a story is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of a story. The events in the sequence must be bound together by some principles of logical coherence’ (Franzosi 1998, 521). They draw upon subjective experiences and provide insights into concepts of identity and self (Smith 2000). Narrative analysis examines how the story-teller interprets things (Bruner 1990). Our investigation was also informed by discourse analysis. We analysed the ways participants used language to make things significant (or not), how they used language to enact identities, the social goods they communicated in their stories, and how they connected or disconnected things in their descriptions to make them relevant or irrelevant to each another (Gee 2008, 9-13). As to the validity of our findings we conclude our research meets the criteria set out by Riessman (1993, 65-68) in terms of persuasiveness - the data and our analysis are persuasive; correspondence - the theories we produce match the data; and usefulness - our findings can be useful to future research. The complicated calculus of vote choice The 2010 British Election Study asked post-election respondents to select one reason for their vote choice. People give different reasons for why they vote for one party rather than another. Which of the following best describes your reasons? 1 The party has the best policies. 2 The party has the best leader. 3 I really prefer another party but it stands no chance of winning in my constituency. 4 I vote tactically (volunteered). 5 Other reasons. 6 Don't know. (Clarke et al 2010a). For the three main parties most respondents reported they had selected ‘The party had the best policies’ (in percentages: Labour 63.7, Conservatives 60.1 and Liberal Democrats 51.2). The next most cited reason was ‘The party had the best leader’ (Labour 14.5, Conservatives 19.5 and Liberal Democrats 11.8). 2010 British Election Study post-election face to face data. N = 2280. Unweighted data (Clarke et al 2010b). Given this, one would assume voters were aware of each party’s policies and/or leader attributes, had contrasted them, and voted based upon the information. This result does not match our analysis of people’s accounts of voting. When participants explained their vote choices they revealed a range of complex voting factors unaccounted for in the quantitative results. Our analysis suggests that participants were affected by Clegg’s performance and Cleggmania, leading us to question previous accounts of misleading survey responses and mere media hype. We also find that constituency dynamics played an important role in people’s decision, however not in the ways Lawes and Hawkins (2011) or Johnston and Pattie (2011) suggest. In addition, our findings raise questions about the validity of responses that ask people to cite a single factor as being the most decisive explanation of how they voted. We used narrative analysis to first structure the accounts of vote choice and then Gee’s (2008) principles to identify the common and unique narrative structures and content. Our working presumption was this: participants knew how they had voted and therefore they constructed their story both to recount and to explain or legitimize their actions. The vote choice narratives contained elements of the dramatic arc and some additional elements. Introduction/Exposition - the main characters and the scene are set; Inciting incident - the problem or conflict is introduced; Rising Action - intensity of the event increases; Climax - Turning point where the situations changes; Falling action - difficulties are confronted and overcome; Resolution/Denouement - remaining issues are reconciled (MacEwan 1900; Ohler 2008). We identified the following components: i) Scene setting (Scene): Introduction and/or background for the narrative; ii) Dilemma: a dilemma or complicating factor; iii) Turning point: event(s) important to heighten or resolve the dilemma(s); iv) Resolution: A resolution to the dilemma; v) Justification: explanations or rationalization; vi) Outcome: the outcome of their narrative; vii) Reflections: further thoughts on the outcome viii) Coda: a short restatement, may include a verbal link to the beginning or to the present. Not all narratives contain all elements, and some included the same element multiple times. Once the stories had been organized, the content which characterised the different stages could be ordered and analysed. From this we identified four typologies of vote narratives: the ‘started loyal, stayed loyal’, ‘dated Nick but it didn’t stick’, The ‘dated Nick’ category pays homage to the 2004 Democratic primary’s ‘Dated HYPERLINK "http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/howard-dean/"Dean, Married Kerry’. ‘strategic voters’ and ‘won-over’ voters. Not all narratives were used in this analysis. Individuals who reported not voting were excluded as was the one undecided participant who voted Conservative for policy reasons, although he would fit the ‘principle/policy’ typology. One participant who reported voting Liberal Democrat because ‘everyone else was doing it’ was also excluded. Started loyal, stayed loyal Some participants knew how they would vote before the election started. The QESB had nine voters who were decided before the election began (two Labour, three Conservative, three Liberal Democratic, one Green and one Plaid Cymru). These narratives generally lack dilemmas. Instead the ‘started loyal, stayed loyal’ voters’ provide justifications for their choices often grounded in notions of personal values that are then linked to their chosen party as best mapping onto those values (‘influenced through a trade unionist father’, ‘support my country’, ‘a more positive vote’). The three Liberal Democrat voters all cited constituency dynamics in their accounts. We excerpt the relevant content, full transcripts are available online. Text in bold refers to our coding of the narratives according to the eight components of narratives highlighted earlier. John (Labour) Essex Post 1 (QESB 2010). [Outcome: knew who to vote for] Yes, slightly different because I went in knowing full well who I was going to vote for, have done for the past however many years. [Scene: personal history] And, sort of talk about going back in history, it’s going back probably a little further than you meant. I voted first in ’79 which was Labour, [Justification: trade unionist family] which was influenced through a trade unionist father really [Justification: Thatcher] and then there was Thatcher of course {laughing} which can only strengthen my convictions [Reflections: Labour ever since] and that’s the way it’s been ever since. [Coda: walked in knowing] So I walked in knowing full well where I was going. Jody (Conservative) Essex Post 2 (QESB 2010). [Justification: Brown’s failings] I was in the +branch of the military + for 20 years, went to Iraq under Gordon Brown with only 75% of my staff because 25% were fighting fires because he couldn’t sort out his union disagreements. [Justification: waste in the public sector] I subsequently left the +branch of the military + for work in the private sector but very closely aligned with the government and the public sector and see the waste that goes on in the public sector. [Scene: not vote Labour] And there was absolutely no way I was going to vote Labour [Outcome: voted Conservative] and so I voted Conservative. [Justification: always going to] that was the party I was going to vote for, always, you know. George (Plaid Cymru) Wales Post (QESB 2010). [Justification: support country] I’m supporting my country. [Justification: support policies] I’m supporting policies that I agree with more -I’m not a socialist - but the policies of New Labour, and [Justification: the vulnerable] looking after the vulnerable in our society especially during the current economic crisis [Reflections: unfortunately Tory] but unfortunately it didn’t go our way and we have a Tory government again.’ Rita (Green) Scotland Post (QESB 2010). [Scene: Green involvement]…coming back into politics I got involved with the Green party and [Outcome: vote Green] I decided I would vote Green [Justification: shift in politics] and that was because I think we need a more fundamental shift in how we organise and manage the system of politics between the main parties. And I decided to vote for Green, [Justification: more positive] it just seems a more positive vote than the left which I find often quite a politics of envy almost, over agreement of analysis over the far-left. Helen (Liberal Democrat) London Post (QESB 2010). [Scene: easy] Well it was kind of easy for me [Scene: LD Majority] because in my constituency we’ve had a Lib-Dem majority for years and years [Scene: MP did good work] - it’s Ed Davey and he won again and he’s done some good work in our constituency [Coda: easy] so it was easy for me. Dated Nick but it didn’t stick Several respondents indicated they were initially undecided and had considered voting Liberal Democrat but ultimately voted for their usual party. This group contained two Labour voters and three Conservative voters. Their narratives generally start with setting the scene by presenting the dilemma of being undecided and possibly voting Liberal Democrat. A few people reported being undecided even as they walked into the voting booth. These narratives often involve emotional, rather than tactical, elements (‘they were the party I preferred,’ ‘How will I feel when I see the results come in?’ ‘just something in me was just like ‘‘I’ve always voted that way’’, ‘My family have always been Tory and I’ve always gone with what they were’). This suggests that for some participants, their sense of identity as a member of another party overrode their tactical or expressive considerations to vote Liberal Democrat. Ida (Labour) London Post (QESB 2010). [Dilemma: torn] I guess, kind of similarly really, at the last focus group I was a bit torn between Labour or maybe voting Lib-Dems, you know… [Outcome: voted Labour] but in the end I voted Labour [Justification: preferred party] because, well because they were the party I preferred… Roger (Labour) London Post (QESB 2010). [Scene: Labour / LibDems] There’s elements of my situation which mirror the same sort of pattern in that it was a decision between Labour and the Liberal Party [Dilemma: not used to decisions] and as a long-term Labour voter I wasn’t used to having to face a decision on that course so much…. [Outcome: voted Labour] I ended up choosing Labour… [Turning point: how will I feel] And it really came down to, literally, the ballot box and it came to the point of ‘How will I feel when I see the results come in’? Cathy (Conservative) Essex Post 1 (QESB 2010). [Dilemma: Undecided] Just probably the same as everyone else really. Although I was undecided when it came to the focus group, [Scene: always voted Conservative] I had thought possibly, I’d always voted Conservative and I thought probably would do that again [Dilemma: Could have been swayed] but I could have been swayed…. [Turning point: liked Clegg] I liked Nick Clegg on all of the debates, I watched all of them, [Scene: strong Conservative constituency] and I live in a really strong Conservative constituency and I knew they’d get in again [Dilemma: had to decide] and when it came down to it and I went to put my cross in the box I looked at Lib-Dem and I looked at Conservative [Outcome: voted Conservative] and I went with what I always do which is Conservative [Justification: always voted that way] because I just couldn’t, I don’t know, just something in me was just like ‘I’ve always voted that way’ and probably will always continue to. Patricia (Conservative) Essex Post 1 QESB 2010). [Scene: open-minded] I was very much open-minded with the first debate [Scene: Clegg good in debate] and I thought Nick Clegg did a really good job [Scene: open-minded] and I was really thinking -ok, you know, I’m going to be as open-minded as I possibly can about this…. [Dilemma: lost confidence] and then I started digging a little bit and I sort of lost confidence down his route [Scene: policies and leaders] and I then looked more of the policies but I also looked as who we have as our leaders [Justification: Gordon had his chance] and I felt that Gordon had had his chance and I then felt that perhaps it was time to move on. [Justification: best leader] So I went for a person who I thought would be the best leader for the way things are today. Shirley (Conservative) Essex Post 2 (QESB 2010). [Scene: vote Lib Dem]Yeah, I was going to go with the Lib-Dems actually. [Scene: family Tory] My family have always been Tory [Scene: always voted Tory] and I’ve always gone with what they were, [Scene: give LD a chance] and I thought I’d go for the Lib-Dems, give them a chance sort of thing…. [Dilemma: LD won’t get in] but on the day I thought- they’re never going to get in. [Dilemma: unsure] So I waited for my husband to get home, we both went and I still wasn’t sure, [Turning point: Tory guys] and we got there and the Tory guys were outside, [Resolution: voted Conservative] so I walked up and put my cross straight away, and - Tories. [Coda: won’t do it, vote Tory] In the end, yeah I thought I don’t think they’re going to do it so I’ll just vote Tory. We cannot transfer the rationales from these participants to survey respondents; however these narratives provide an additional account for the over-estimation of Liberal Democrat support. People may have sincerely thought they would vote Liberal Democrats, but faced with the reality of the ballot box they could not bring themselves to vote against their party. Shirley is an example of a person who would have reported a Liberal Democrat voting intention until the day before the election, but on the day she cast her vote as she always had. Who voted for the Liberal Democrats, and why? Thus far we have examined stable voters and those who considered voting Liberal Democrat but changed their minds at the last minute. Values and perceptions of identity played a major role in justifying these vote choices. Narrative and discourse analysis facilitated the identification of two other types of vote choice narratives for those who were undecided or uncommitted before the election. We have labelled them strategic and won-over voters. Strategic voters Several participants reported voting for the Liberal Democrats for strategic reasons. We differentiate between three types of strategic voters: 1) tactical voters: voted Liberal Democrats to stop another party from winning, 2) satisficing voters: preferred a marginal party, but voted Liberal Democrats to support a party political proximal, and 3) principle/policy voters: voted as an expression of support for electoral reform or a policy (usually proportional representation). The Liberal Democrats’ popular surge is mentioned in some of these narratives (Nathan, David, Heather and Peter). Tactical voters Kevin Essex Post 2 (QESB 2010). [Outcome: Voted Lib Dem] I voted Lib-Dem [Justification: Tories out] to keep the Tories out. [Reflections: Never again] Never again in my life-time, I’ll never vote Lib-Dem again. I’ve cut off my nose to spite my face; they’ll never get my vote ever again. Nathan Wales Post (QESB 2010). [Outcome: voted Lib Dem] Yeah, for me, I voted Lib-Dem [Scene: happy about debates] and like I was really happy that the TV debates happened. [Justification: disillusioned] I was disillusioned, [Justification: not Labour or Tories] like I didn’t like Labour, and the Tories - [Justification: Lib Dem hype] no, so because of all the hype the Lib-Dems actually got a bit of a following. [Turning point: could vote, not wasted] I could actually vote for them and feel I wasn’t wasting my vote. David Essex Post 2 (QESB 2010). [Outcome: Voted Lib Dem] I, too, voted Lib-Dem [Justification: Lib Dem landslide] in very much the same way as Kevin did thinking there would be a landslide. [Reflections: don’t know why] I don’t know why I had that in mind [Reflections: Regret] but for them now to have a coalition with the Conservatives I really don’t know why I did what I did. [Reflections: tactical vote misjudged] So my tactical vote was misjudged. [Justification: not Labour] Then again, at the same time I didn’t want Labour to get in either [Justification: but not Conservative majority] but I definitely didn’t want the Conservatives to get the majority. Satisficing voters Harry Essex Post 2 (QESB 2010). [Scene: maybe Lib Dem] Well, I was thinking of voting Lib-Dem [Justification: manifesto agreed] and then because mainly I think their manifesto agreed with my ideals most [Dilemma: best for Scotland] and then there was some thoughts of you know, who would be best for Scotland, possibly the SNP would be [Turning point: Labour stronghold] but I think after looking at the statistics for our constituency, it’s a Labour stronghold and pretty much Labour are going to get it [Justification: Lib Dems fitted more] and I thought the Lib-Dems, overall, fitted me more. [Reflections: won’count] Then I thought, you know it’s not going to count in my constituency [Justification: PR] but they’re going for PR. Matthew Scotland Post (QESB 2010). [Outcome: voted Lib Dem] No, but I did [vote Lib Dem -Author] [Justification: process of elimination] not for it being the first choice but by deciding the others I didn’t want - [Scene: wanted Green] given the choice I’d have voted Green [Justification: but a wasted vote] but that was a wasted vote because that wasn’t going to get me anywhere. [Justification: Thatcher, so not Tories] I grew up under Thatcher so I’ve never voted Conservative [Justification: not Brown] and I didn’t want Gordon Brown in again, [Justification: left with Lib Dems] so I was left with the Lib-Dems. [Outcome: the closest] They were the closest I would have got to some of the Green views. Arthur Scotland Post (QESB 2010). [Outcome: voted Lib Dem] I did vote for Lib-Dems [Justification: Policy satisficing] because again I think I did agree with their policies most [Justification: leftish and PR] and I thought they were the kind of most left-ish type party and I also agree with proportional representation. Heather Scotland Post (QESB 2010). [Scene: set on voting Lib Dem] I was pretty set on voting Lib-Dem; [Scene: had voted SNP] I’d always voted SNP in the past [Dilemma: couldn’t see the point] but I just really didn’t consider voting for them this time because I couldn’t see the point. [Turning point: Lib Dem moment] And I was kind of quite caught up in the whole Lib Dem moment and I thought ‘maybe’? {laughs} [Justification: polls] The polls said they were doing ok so you never know [Scene: Internet research] and the day of the election I’d done quite a lot of research on the internet and there was these questions that you could do, I think it was on the politics.co.uk - Who Will you Vote For and they ask you all these questions and then you say and then it doesn’t tell you whose policies they are but you just tick what you agree with, [Dilemma: should vote Green] and it turned out it should have been the Greens I was voting for [Dilemma: no Green or Socialist candidates] but we don’t have a Green candidate or a Socialist candidate or anything [Coda: stuck with Lib Dems] so I stuck with Lib-Dems. Principle/policy voters Peter Essex Post 1 (QESB 2010). [Dilemma: vote or not?] Well my big dilemma was not so much over who to vote for but whether or not to vote at all. [Justification: unfair system] And I think that that was really in my mind because what concerned me and had concerned me for a long time is, the unfairness of the system, we have this two-party system, and the poor Liberal Democrats never mind the Green Party and smaller parties get no say. [Turning point: might happen] And I thought this was a chance that something might happen and I thought, I’m going to vote for this- look, if it does happen -good - and if it doesn’t happen I’ll never vote again - just give up on it until the system does change. So I think that that was really the main thing on my mind, [Resolution: vote Lib Dem] once that decision was made I was quite happy to live with the Liberal Democrats [Justification: Good MP] because Bob Russell I think has done quite a good job, he’s quite a nice guy so therefore I had various reasons going on there [Justification: political proximity] and it’s probably the closest to my politics [Justification: change unfair system] and at the same time there was the potential in this vote for bringing about some kind of electoral reform. [Coda: pushed me to vote] So that pushed me to the ballot box. Lyle Wales Post (QESB 2010). [Justification: strategic voter] Yeah. I voted for kind of the same reason as Alice like I was a more a strategic voter, [Justification: long-term impact] because I knew like, I thought the Lib-Dems would have a better chance of having a long-term impact. [Justification: more for PR] And I mean like they’re more for proportional representation I’m trying, [Justification: Long term impact] so I’m basically looking at the long term to see where my vote is going. Keith Essex Post 2 (QESB 2010). [Outcome: Voted Lib Dem] Yeah, I voted Lib-Dem.... [Reflections: Strategic alliance] I’m not surprised that Lib-Dems are in alliance with the Tories. From a strategic way of thinking it’s the thing for them to do. It can go the other way. [Justification: Lib Dem want 3 party system] They want to get a 3-party system going, not a 2-party system going [Justification: voted for 3 party system] and in the end that’s what I voted for. [Justification: voted for an ideal] I didn’t vote for a short-term government I voted for a chance of some sort of ideal- Won over Finally, there were undecided voters who voted for the Liberal Democrats because they were won over to them. These voters’ accounts cite agreement with their principles and being impressed with Clegg. Two participants mention the debates as helpful in their decision-making process. Nicole Essex Post 2 (QESB 2010). [Dilemma: Undecided] I still hadn’t really decided until I turned up at the polling station, [Outcome: Voted Lib Dem] but I voted for the Liberal Democrats [Scene: safe Tory seat] and I live in a very, very safe Tory seat. [Dilemma: vote won’t mean much] So I really knew my vote wasn’t going to mean very much [Justification: agreed with LD principles] but I agree with their principles, [Justification: Liked Clegg] I like the candidate [Justification: Show of support] I just wanted to show my support and just place the vote where I wanted it even though I knew it wouldn’t do anything. Diane Essex Post 1 (QESB 2010). [Dilemma: Undecided] I didn’t know who I was going to vote for. [Dilemma: wasted vote?] I liked the Lib-Dems and thought -is it going to be a wasted vote? [Turning point: debate] Then I saw the debate, which was here, [Resolution: decided Lib Dem] and that made up my mind really who I did want to vote for which was Lib-Dem. Stacey Essex Post 1 (QESB 2010). [Dilemma: Undecided] Yeah. I didn’t really know who I was going to vote for when it came to this first vote [Scene: not the Tories] I knew it wasn’t going to be the Tories - I’m just about old enough to remember the last Tory government. [Turning point: debate] And I did find that watching the debate kind of helped to make my decision. I watched the second one as well but I couldn’t watch the third one as I was working [Turning point: Impressed with Clegg] and I was really impressed with Nick Clegg, [Scene: considered Labour] I hadn’t really known much about him or his policies beforehand um, so um I had kind of been thinking of voting Labour [Justification: Constituency dynamics] simply because we live in a constituency where the Tories have a very strong majority and the Labour candidate at the last election had come second [Resolution: voted Lib Dem] but in the end I did vote Lib-Dem. [Reflections: didn’t make a difference] It didn’t actually make a difference… Ian Essex Post 2 (QESB 2010). [Outcome: voted Lib Dem] I voted Lib-Dem [Justification: agreed with them] just because I agreed with what they said [Justification: not Brown] and I didn’t want to see Gordon Brown- 14 years of doing whatever. [Justification: dad’s influence dad] I got influenced by my dad really – ‘cause it’s the first time I’ve voted. That was it really. [Justification: not Cameron] Cameron, I just don’t really like so I weren’t going to vote for him. The hidden factor: constituency dynamics Our analysis allowed us to examine the inter-related and complex reasons people gave for the vote decisions they made. In our view a surprising outcome was, what we considered, the large number of respondents who explained their vote choice in terms of the constraints of their constituency’s political dynamics. These dynamics are often reported prior to vote choice; respondents used them to set the scene, describing how their choices were limited due to the dynamic of their constituencies. In all seventeen of the forty post-election participants, nearly half, specifically mentioned constituency constraints in their vote choice narratives and/or making decisions in light of those constraints. See also above the narratives of Helen, Cathy, Harry, Nicole, and Stacey. In the QESB transcripts, see also Matthew (Scotland Post), Ida (London Post), Iris (London Post), Anthony (Wales Post), Anna (Wales Post), Natalie (Wales Post), Arthur (Scotland Post), Andrea (Scotland Post) Roger (London Post). In addition to the mentions made above, we include three additional excerpts of other respondents’ descriptions as to how their constituency dynamics factored into their decisions. Considering these individuals had a history of voting it is perhaps not surprising so many knew the political dynamics of their constituency, yet it would be difficult to find this aspect of vote choice with existing survey data. Carole (Green) London Post (QESB 2010). [Dilemma: Conservative stronghold] -I live in a large Conservative stronghold- and the difference was astronomical. [Turning point: no point tactical voting] I just think there is no point in me voting Labour under this current system. Liz (Conservative) Essex Post 2 (QESB 2010). [Justification: safe seat] and I also live in a very safe Conservative seat. [Justification: vote went there] So that’s where my vote went….[Reflection: safe seat] but ultimately I knew I was in a safe Conservative seat anyway and the majority in my area were probably going to vote that - that wasn’t what made me vote that but it was a consideration of course Rita (Green) Scotland Post (QESB 2010). [Dilemma: Lib Dems campaigned] Lib-Dems actually mounted quite a campaign in my constituency. Nick Clegg was up a couple of days before the election and they just bombarded people with information and you know, [Dilemma: Labour may lose] rumours began that there’s a shift and maybe the Labour MP will lose the seat and I became quite anxious that, [Justification: Labour returned] to some extent in going with the Greens, it was partly in the secure knowledge that there would still be a Labour MP that would be returned. Given the important framing role constituency dynamics played in so many narratives, this finding raises concerns as to the usefulness of the ‘why vote for one party rather than another’ question currently asked in the British Election Study questionnaire. Conclusion The televised Leaders’ Debates made their debut to much fanfare and by most accounts, provided a public platform for the ‘third party’ to introduce its policies and leader to the British public. The hype surrounding Cleggmania reached unprecedented heights. Its failure to transform the electoral prospects of the Liberal Democrats left many people befuddled. The QESB focus group transcripts shed some light on this puzzle and its participants revealed a range of factors unaccounted for in the quantitative results. We identified four typologies of vote narratives: the ‘started loyal, stayed loyal’, ‘dated Nick but it didn’t stick’, ‘strategic voters’ and ‘won-over’ voters. The ‘started loyal, stayed loyal’ voters’ narratives provide justifications often grounded in notions of personal values linked to their chosen party. Our findings highlight the psychological obstacle of voting for another party in light of strong personal party identification. There was a segment of previous Labour and Conservative voters in the focus groups who sincerely considered voting for the Liberal Democrats until Election Day. However, when confronted with the ballot, their latent party identification made the act of voting for a different party uncomfortable. Rather than go against their identification, these voters stayed with their prior party of choice. Those who did vote strategically did so with the motivation of keeping a rival party out, voting Liberal Democrat to maximise the efficacy their own political views, or to express support for a principle or policy. We reviewed the stories of voters who were won over to the Liberal Democrats. Finally, our findings brought to the fore the importance of constituency dynamics in vote choice decisions. However it did so in a way that is different from what Lawes and Hawkins (2011) or Johnston and Pattie (2011) suggest. In our view these findings raises many issues that offer fertile ground for future research. Qualitative research provides the space and human interactions that enable, we argue, more complete and accurate insights into people’s complicated vote choice calculations. As observed, several potential Liberal Democrat voters could not follow through and vote against their party identification. Their thought processes cannot be captured in survey data, or through the artificial setting of a laboratory where simulated voting does not carry the same commitment as an actual vote in a real election. We recommend qualitative electoral research continue to be used to complement quantitative and experimental research. 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