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Journal of American Studies
The Role of Eastern Europe in America's Containment Policy, 1945–19481979 •
Perhaps the greatest irony in the formative period of the Cold War is that the United States had to resign itself to the Soviets' domination of the very area in which it had at first chosen to challenge them, namely Eastern Europe. Yet America's ultimate acceptance of a Soviet hegemony in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary did not mean, as some histories of the Cold War imply in their omissions, that the status of these countries no longer concerned Washington. In the three years following World War II, American policy makers recognized that while they could not secure democracy or the “ open door ” in Eastern Europe, they could still develop policies for the area that could prove challenging to the Soviet hegemony. Their assumptions and expectations will be the subject of this article. It will show that the Truman administration believed that on developments in Eastern Europe depended the ultimate stability of the Soviet State itself. If the United States...
World War II left a great deal of destruction and widespread poverty in Europe. Infrastructure, industrial facilities, agricultural production, international trade and transportation in Europe’s major cities was heavily destroyed. This disruption led to severe food shortages, hunger and human desperation. Against this background, the United States of America ran an economic recovery program for Western Europe spearheaded by George Marshal . The program came to be known as the Marshall Plan. There is some debate among historians over how much Western Europe post-war economic recovery owes to the success of the plan. Many historians support the idea that it alone spectacularly revived Europe, whilst others reject it as their evidence shows that a general recovery was already underway before the plan. Some are of the view that the plan fast-tracked the recovery, but did not initiate it. Others argue that the reforms introduced by the plan were fundamentally stirring. This essay argues that the recovery of Western Europe economies was the result of a plethora of factors which complement each other. It buttresses that US money did bail out Western Europe from widespread poverty, but it was not a “magic button’’. Marshall Dollars alone could not have been sufficient to single-handedly revive Europe. It was the combination of a number of factors that bargained palpably; the cooperation among NATO , post-war reforms; growth in world trade; the development of new technologies, regional economic cooperation, and the Marshall Plan as well that together helped to bring back Europe to life. Like Bradford puts it ‘’NATO would put the defence burden on America, the EEC would stimulate trade and provide terms for progressive economic cooperation, and the Marshall Plan would give a massive injection of capital at exactly the time when it was most needed’’ .
Middle East Journal of Scientific Research
Forming of the new system of international relations: The Marshall plan and republican party of the USA (1947-1948)2013 •
Arheološki radovi i rasprave
Bilješke o legijskim veteranima u rimskoj Dalmaciji tijekom 1. stoljeća2023 •
2019 •
Phenomenon of witch hunting in North-East: a major challenge to women
Witch hunting and the role of media2014 •
2023 •
The Japanese journal of medical instrumentation
25.ポータブル血液ガス・電解質分析装置の基礎的検討(第77回日本医科器械学会大会一般演題講演集)2002 •
Fish & Shellfish Immunology
A comparative study on intestinal immune cells in two elasmobranchs species2019 •
Composites Part B: Engineering
Thermo-mechanical modelling of FRP cross-ply composite laminates drilling: Delamination damage analysis2017 •
2024 •