This article discusses the international law implications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The 2014 Russian military intervention in Ukraine raised significant concerns regarding sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the use of force in international relations. This article examined the applicable international law, treaties, and customary laws. The activities of Russia have an impact on international law, government accountability, and global peace and security. This normative legal study employed the theory of aggressiveness. Literature investigation provides data. This study utilises secondary data extracted from primary, secondary, and non-legal sources. Followed the qualitative analysis with a descriptive presentation. According to the research, Russia's actions violate international law, violate human rights, and destabilise the region. For this transgression to be adequately addressed, a robust international response and international law enforcement are required.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine which commenced on 24 February 2022 represented just the latest, albeit most devastating, intervention in a neighbouring former Soviet state. This article considers the legal justifications for Russia’s actions and finds them to be far from satisfactory. The claims advanced by Russia closely mirror those made in respect of its prior interventions in the former Soviet space, underlining an attempt to distort some of the most fundamental norms of international law in order to afford an air of legitimacy to its actions. Although it is too soon to conclude with any certainty what the longer term implications of the recent conflict will be, both politically and legally, it is apparent that it can be seen as part of a wider policy objective on Russia’s part to maintain and/or reassert influence over its ‘near abroad’. While in some respects indicative of the possible emergence of a new ‘Cold War’, the international reaction to its intervention in Ukraine sugge...

According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a long-standing desire to resuscitate the Soviet empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other countries in eastern Europe. In this view, the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 merely provided a pretext for Putin’s decision to order Russian forces to seize part of Ukraine. But this account is wrong: the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for the crisis. The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU’s expansion eastward and the West’s backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine -- beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004 -- were critical elements, too. Since the mid-1990s, Russian leaders have adamantly opposed NATO enlargement, and in recent years, they have made it clear that they would not stand by while their strategically important neighbor turned into a Western bastion. For Putin, the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president -- which he rightly labeled a “coup” -- was the final straw. He responded by taking Crimea, a peninsula he feared would host a NATO naval base, and working to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West. Putin’s pushback should have come as no surprise. After all, the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly. Elites in the United States and Europe have been blindsided by events only because they subscribe to a flawed view of international politics. They tend to believe that the logic of realism holds little relevance in the twenty-first century and that Europe can be kept whole and free on the basis of such liberal principles as the rule of law, economic interdependence, and democracy. But this grand scheme went awry in Ukraine. The crisis there shows that realpolitik remains relevant -- and states that ignore it do so at their own peril. U.S. and European leaders blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s border. Now that the consequences have been laid bare, it would be an even greater mistake to continue this misbegotten policy.

The main objective of this study is to debunk some common misconceptions against Russia and its contentious military intervention in Ukraine. If we look at the coverage and reporting of mainstream media outlets of the West, we can see that the majority of myths were created to suit them. The majority of misunderstandings have been built on the foundations of outright lies and fantasy. The US and European Union created misleading narratives about Russian military intervention in Ukraine aiming to destabilising Russia and countering Russian influence in Asia and Europe. This research exhibit that continuing to believe in the character and implementation of Western policies toward Russia and Ukraine will be detrimental to India and other Asian countries too. Before drawing any conclusions or passing any judgment against Russia in the ongoing Ukraine crisis, the US posture toward Russia and Ukraine must be critically examined. Every move taken by the US since NATO's inception in Eastern Europe demonstrates how the US and other Western cultures have expanded their influence in order to trap the political leadership of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) states. The entire experiment is meant to destabilise Russia. It is vital to evaluate Russia's reason for using force against Ukraine as a foundation for the study. Also, what choices did Russia have before launching a military operation? Before bringing up the issues of war crimes, human rights, and international law, it is desirable to comprehend Russia's security concerns and strategic threats

The Aggression Against Ukraine and the Effectiveness of Interstate Cases in Case of War 1 The Return of Dark Times This is the second time in the short life of the echr Law Review that unforeseen and calamitous events compel us to (partially, this time) rewrite our editorial note. In issue 2/2020, it was the global pandemic; now it is the criminal aggression against Ukraine by the illiberal regime that rules the Russian Federation. We wish to use this medium to join our voice with that of the countless authorities and people who unconditionally condemn in the strongest possible terms this unprovoked, cynical, and wholly illegitimate armed attack that is deprived of any grounds in law, in fact, and in morality. This is not the only war or instance of unlawful use of force since the establishment of the UN Charter. It is time we openly admit that the Charter system of collective security is largely unsuccessful in terms of effectiveness, representativeness, impartiality, and accountability. Nor is this the first time that the autocratic Russian regime unlawfully employs military force on the territory of and against another state. The detailed elaboration on the reasons for the forceful reaction (arguably amounting to Russia's excommunication) of the majority of states and of various non-state actors exceeds the limited confines of this note. Suffice it to name here just a few of these reasons: what is currently happening in Ukraine is shockingly revisionist and anachronistic; it awakes memories and a collective trauma that Europe has tried so hard to overcome and heal. The very essence, the very purpose of the European Convention on Human Rights (echr, the Convention) system and of the Council of Europe (CoE) itself are to fight what Putin's regime (and other modern-day dictatorships currently ruling certain-European-states) represents, namely a threat to our

When he took office in early 2009, President Barack Obama made improvement of the United States’ relations with Russia – the so-called “reset” policy – one of his signature foreign policy initiatives. That hope lies now in tatters, shattered by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and destabilisation of south-eastern Ukraine. The goal of turning US-Russia cooperation – and, by extension, West-Russia cooperation – into a building block of international governance looks now as distant as it was during the Cold War. The best one can hope instead is that relations between Moscow and Western capitals do not further deteriorate to the point of a complete breakdown. The rationale for the “reset” policy was the pragmatic recognition that the recurring tensions with Russia – prompted by issues ranging from Kosovo’s independence to the US plan to install a ballistic missile defence system in Eastern Europe and Georgia’s and Ukraine’s prospective membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – were thwarting US and Western interests in Afghanistan and the management of Iran’s nuclear issue as well as creating new fault lines on the European continent. Tellingly, after reaching a low point in relations in the wake of Russia’s short and victorious war against Georgia in August 2008, both Russia and Western powers took steps to avoid a scenario of full confrontation. Several member states of the European Union (EU), particularly Western European countries with little memory of recent Soviet domination, viewed the new US course as being more in keeping with their interest in establishing a constructive relationship with Russia, a key player on the European stage and the Union’s main energy provider. While some EU member states, particularly in Eastern Europe, felt the United States was too prone to seek cooperation with an unreliable Russian government, the whole European Union eventually signed WEST-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS 12 off on Obama’s policy. The election of Dmitry Medvedev as Russia’s president, who depicted himself as more liberal-minded than his patron and predecessor, Vladimir Putin, had in fact helped create an atmosphere more forthcoming for dialogue and cooperation. The “reset” policy did produce some important results, most notably the US-Russian agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons known as the New START (the only relevant nuclear disarmament agreement struck in twenty years); Russia’s greater cooperation on curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, particularly thanks to its agreeing to tough sanctions against Tehran in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in June 2010; and Russia’s agreement to let key military supplies for the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan transit its airspace, an important development given the growing difficulty NATO was experiencing in keeping open its supply lines through Pakistan. While significant, these achievements did not pave the way for what many had hoped the “reset” policy would eventually produce: a renewed West-Russia relationship based on mutual respect and cooperation on issues of common concern. In fact, relations between the West and Russia continued to be fraught with problems of mistrust, rhetorical competition, and fundamentally different views of how security issues should be managed internationally. In hindsight, the “reset” policy seems to have been just a lull in a process started in the early 2000s which has seen West-Russia relations steadily deteriorate. While none of the “reset” policy achievements has thus far been reversed, a succession of events, including the re-election of Putin as Russia’s president in 2012 and culminating in Russia’s forced takeover of Crimea and destabilisation of Ukraine, have plunged the West-Russia relationship to its lowest point in twenty-five years. For many in the West, the crisis over Ukraine has laid bare the most unsettling features of President Putin’s government: lack of any appreciation for political pluralism; readiness to dispense with opposition forces by de-legitimisation through state-controlled propaganda and possibly forceful repression; and resolve to defend what Putin perceives as Russia’s vital interests with any means, including the use of force, land grabs, and destabilising practices such as fomenting and directing pro-Russian nationalist protests in other countries. INTRODUCTION 13 Ukraine is a special case because influence over Kiev is of paramount importance to Russia’s security strategy and national pride. However, it should not be seen in isolation. It is part of a broader design by President Putin to re-establish as much influence as possible over the former Soviet space. Central to this objective is Putin’s plan for a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) including most of the former republics of the Soviet Union, be them in East Europe, the Caucasus or Central Asia. The problem with the Eurasian Economic Union is that the Russian president sees it as incompatible with any significant form of integration of its members into Euro-Atlantic frameworks, notably NATO but also the European Union. The crisis in Ukraine has also made it clear that the West is now confronted with the problem of handling the revanchist instincts of a former superpower. The West faces an intractable regime centred on the personal power of President Putin, who has increasingly tied his legitimacy to a pledge to embody and defend an exceptionalist Russian identity, mostly defined in opposition to Western values and norms. In other words, the conflict between the West and Russia is framed by Putin himself not only as a conflict of interests, but of identity too. This narrative has been used by Putin to rebut any sort of criticism coming from the West, be it directed at Russia’s takeover of Crimea or at Putin’s increasingly strict control over Russia’s media and marginalisation and repression of political dissent. Signs of growing competition between the West and Russia were visible long before unrest in Ukraine escalated into a full-blown crisis. The Arab uprisings are a case in point. From the start, Russia and the West have held different views of the cycle of revolutions and counterrevolutions which has engulfed the most part of the Arab world. While the United States and the European Union initially insisted on the antiauthoritarian and pro-democracy nature of popular protests, Russia has consistently seen the so-called Arab Spring as a bearer of instability and, more worryingly, as an opportunity for Islamic fundamentalism to find new ways to gain influence. Moscow opted for a cautious approach in the beginning, even letting the Security Council authorise the use of force to protect endangered civilians in the prolonged conflict between Libya’s longstanding ruler, Muammar Qaddafi, and a West-backed rebel WEST-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS 14 coalition. Russia came to regret its choice in a matter of months if not weeks, as it became clear that NATO’s intervention in defence of civilians rapidly “crept” into what the Russians perceived as an open policy of regime change by force. Bruised by the Libya case, Russia has ever since been adamant in refusing any form of UNSC support for rebels fighting against established rulers in the Arab world, irrespective of how brutal such rulers could be. This has been most evident in Syria, where Russia has steadfastly protected its ally Bashar al-Assad from any form of UN action. West-Russia relations have so dramatically deteriorated that talk of a new Cold War has become routine. NATO’s role in Europe is again in the spotlight, with experts and policymakers alike pondering whether the Alliance needs to go back to its historical roots, re-calibrating itself as an instrument of defence from and containment of Russia. However, it is important to notice that cooperation has not collapsed altogether. Russia has continued to be a committed member of the P5+1, the group of nations (including also the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and China plus the European Union) dealing with Iran’s nuclear dispute. It has also continued to assist NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan. And it has agreed with the United States upon a plan for the removal of all chemical weapons from Syria, forcing the Assad regime to deliver. Thus, while competition has increased in strategic areas – most notably in the former Soviet space and the Middle East – the need for cooperation has not vanished. Clearly, this is far from an ideal scenario. Tensions over Ukraine are so strong that the risk of a breakdown in relations is certainly present. Yet neither party would benefit from it. It was with the goal of exploring ways by which Russia and the West can contain tensions, manage competition, and keep cooperating on issues of mutual concern, that the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome and the Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE) at the Brookings Institution of Washington co-organised an international conference on West-Russia relations. The conference was the seventh edition of the Transatlantic Security Symposium, the IAI-run annual forum in which experts from America, Europe and other countries convene to discuss the main topics in the transatlantic security agenda. The event, sponsored by Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and InternaINTRODUCTION 15 tional Development, NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, the Compagnia di San Paolo, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Rome Office) and Unicredit Bank, saw the participation of over forty senior experts from think tanks and other institutions from a number of EU member states (France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland and Bulgaria), the United States, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey and Russia took part. This volume collects a revised version of the papers that were presented at the event as well as a summary of the main points that were discussed. (R.A.)

The article deals with the relationship between international law and power politics in the light of the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The relationship between international law and politics is very close, even natural, since the principles and rules of international law primarily act in international relations, that is in a political reality. It is the problem of observance and violations of the legal principles and rules on the use of force that is the key point of reference for the discussion of this issue. The serious breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter by Russia, the crime of aggression and other alleged crimes committed during this international armed conflict incline the author to address some questions on the power and weakness of international law. The power of international law is severely tested when it comes to the unilateral use of force by states. The Russian aggression against Ukraine is arguably the most important such test since the end of World War II, a...

Book review: The Use of Force against Ukraine and International Law. Jus Ad Bellum, Jus In Bello, Jus Post Bellum by Sergey Sayapin, Evhen Tsybulenko (eds.)

On the 24 th of February, 2022, the world learned of Russia's full-scale military assault on Ukraine, which included bombing key cities such as Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa. The casualties of the war in Ukraine have received less attention in favor of a more important debate over the war's impact on world order and peace. The latter, like Diamond, has taken the former's lustre. Rumors have swept the internet like a deadly corona virus, claiming that the invasion is aimed at burying Ukraine's desire to join NATO, the Western defense alliance. Pro-invasion and anti-invasion elites have also engaged in heated disputes. Many people believe that Russia's invasion of Ukraine's sovereign territory was unjustified. Others maintained that Russia was correct to act as it had and that the US had done so many times before with no repercussions. These contradicting assertions have been broadcast through the media and have spread around the globe. It is vital to remember that, regardless of how the issue is resolved, it will set a precedent in the international system, with substantial implications for international law and politics. The situation represented above has necessitated the need for academic legal discourse on the impact of international law and international politics averting similar occurrences in the future.