(PDF) The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea

This article will analyze the evolution of the relationship between the Roman Republic and the Hasmonean state from its earliest beginnings, somewhere between 174 B.C.E. and 161 B.C.E. The main purpose of this article is to follow the development of the relationship between the two states from the Roman perspective; the Hasmonean point of view, which is no less important, will be discussed elsewhere. The article is divided into two main parts. The first, introductory section will analyze the current state of research on Roman Imperialism in the East, on the main discussing the theories postulated by Badian, developed further by Harris and Sherwin-White, and of course the position of Gruen, arguing that the main thrust of Roman foreign policy in the Hellenistic East was to weaken the larger states in the East, which were perceived as a threat to the security of Rome. The second and main part of the article will follow the development of the relationship between the Roman Republic and the Hasmoneans chronologically over four main periods: from that of Judah Maccabeus till that of the first Hasmonean rulers, Simon and John Hyrcanus; and those of Alexander Jannaeus and Salome Alexandra, respectively, ending with the fall of the Hasmonean state by the hands of Pompey. This section will analyze first how and why the Roman Republic decided to support the rebellion of the Maccabees against the Seleucid overlords. Then this section also discusses the evolution of the relationship between the Roman Republic and the Hasmonean state during a period that has not been so well documented, when Judaea was ruled first by King Alexander Jannaeus and then by his wife Salome Alexandra, either from the Roman or Hasmonean point of view. The main question, discussed by various scholars such as Rappaport and Pucci Ben Zeev, is whether or not the Hasmonean state shifted its foreign policy in the direction of an alliance and friendship with the Roman Republic, or whether it chose instead the friendship of geographically closer powers, such as Parthia as well as Pontus, under the rule of Mithridates VI. It seems to me—through a careful reading of Josephus’s Antiquities, Strabo, Plutarch, and the Book of Judith—that Hasmonean Judaea did not commit any hostile acts towards the Roman Republic, such as siding with her enemies, but, on the contrary, that the Roman Republic and the Hasmonean kingdom shared the same adversaries as the Roman Republic, such as Mithridates VI of Pontus and Tigranes II of Armenia. I shall conclude with an analysis of Pompey’s conquest of the Hasmonean state. By then Hasmonean Judaea had become a local power that was possibly perceived as a veiled threat by the Roman Republic, just as the Seleucid kingdom had once been. Besides, Pompey had good personal reasons for acting as he did against a state that was still officially socius et amicus populi Romani.

THE LATE ROMAN REPUBLIC AND HASMONEAN JUDAEA ABSTRACT. Abstract. This article will analyze the evolution of the relationship between the Roman Republic and the Hasmonean state from its earliest beginnings, somewhere between 174 B.C.E. and 161 B.C.E. The main purpose of this article is to follow the development of the relationship between the two states from the Roman perspective; the Hasmonean point of view, which is no less important, will be discussed elsewhere. The article is divided into two main parts. The first, introductory section will analyze the current state of research on Roman Imperialism in the East, on the main discussing the theories postulated by Badian, developed further by Harris and Sherwin-White, and of course the position of Gruen, arguing that the main thrust of Roman foreign policy in the Hellenistic East was to weaken the larger states in the East, which were perceived as a threat to the security of Rome. The second and main part of the article will follow the development of the relationship between the Roman Republic and the Hasmoneans chronologically over four main periods: from that of Judah Maccabeus till that of the first Hasmonean rulers, Simon and John Hyrcanus; and those of Alexander Jannaeus and Salome Alexandra, respectively, ending with the fall of the Hasmonean state by the hands of Pompey. This section will analyze first how and why the Roman Republic decided to support the rebellion of the Maccabees against the Seleucid overlords. Then this section also discusses the evolution of the relationship between the Roman Republic and the Hasmonean state during a period that has not been so well documented, when Judaea was ruled first by King Alexander Jannaeus and then by his wife Salome Alexandra, either from the Roman or Hasmonean point of view. The main question, discussed by various scholars such as Rappaport and Pucci Ben Zeev, is whether or not the Hasmonean state shifted its foreign policy in the direction of an alliance and friendship with the Roman Republic, or whether it chose instead the friendship of geographically closer powers, such as Parthia as well as Pontus, under the rule of Mithridates VI. It seems to me – through a careful reading of Josephus’s Antiquities, Strabo, Plutarch, and the Book of Judith – that Hasmonean Judaea did not commit any hostile acts towards the Roman Republic, such as siding with her enemies, but, on the contrary, that the Roman Republic and the Hasmonean kingdom shared the same adversaries as the Roman Republic, such as Mithridates VI of Pontus and Tigranes II of Armenia. 1 I shall conclude with an analysis of Pompey’s conquest of the Hasmonean state. By then Hasmonean Judaea had become a local power that was possibly perceived as a veiled threat by the Roman Republic, just as the Seleucid kingdom had once been. Besides, Pompey had good personal reasons for acting as he did against a state that was still officially socius et amicus populi Romani. 1. Roman Imperialism in the East: The Current State of Research First of all I would like to thank the two anonymous readers that allowed me to enter in depth in this topic. I own to their precious suggestions the present form of the article. Besides, my thanks to Professor A.I. Baumgarten, E. Gruen and of 1 See S. Rocca, The Book of Judith and Queen Shlomzion, «Materia giudaica» 10/1 (2005), pp. 85-98. Athenaeum 102/1 (2014), pp. 47-78 48 S. Rocca, The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea course M. Goodman for their precious suggestions. We will begin with an analysis of Roman foreign policy during the Middle and the Late Republic and how it is reflected in modern scholarship. Badian was the first historian over the last few decades who attempted to understand how Roman foreign policy was conceived during the period under consideration. According to him, in order to understand the development of Rome’s foreign policy it is important to understand the development of a cliens-patronus relationship and what it entailed. 2 Thus Badian analyzes in depth the foreign clientelae of individual Roman families and Roman leaders. These foreign clientelae, which could be either kings or cities, entered the political arena with the Gracchan reforms. Only with the advent of the Principate were the foreign clientelae of the principes, the most important members of the Senate, absorbed into that of the princeps, Augustus. Badian clearly identifies a trend which was the main thrust of Roman foreign policy in the East, namely the weakening of the larger states – such as Macedonia, Pergamum, the Seleucids, and the Ptolemies – who were regarded as a threat to the security of Rome. All of the Eastern Hellenistic kings and cities – including Macedonia, Pergamum, Rhodes, the Seleucids or the Ptolemies – became Rome’s allies, whether or not through a treaty. In every case, the Roman Senate exerted wide powers over them, forcing them to accept its arbitration, and in fact their rulers’ very title to their respective thrones came to depend on recognition by the Roman Senate. Moreover, these kings and cities were expected to fight against Rome’s enemies at her command. Yet Rome gave little in exchange, and these kings and cities could not hope for any real protection by Rome. At most, Rome’s other allies were merely encouraged to support them. The treaty between Rome and Judah Maccabeus is in fact a good example of that. All of these Hellenistic kings were safe against pretenders only as long as they were reasonably successful against them, yet not so strong as to threaten Rome’s balance of power. The Seleucid kingdom is a good example of this situation. In fact, the Senate was on the watch for chances of weakening the kingdoms of even its most faithful allies, such as Pergamum, and was ready to transfer its support, even without provocation, to the enemies of their ostensible allies as soon as it suspected them of excessive power. Yet the Roman Senate was not willing to risk armed conflict in order to achieve this aim, since it is known that none of the larger Hellenistic states posed a real danger to Rome, and in any case, the Roman Republic needed only to wait for the inevitable problem of succession to weaken its troublesome allies. 3 Badian concludes that this policy was achieved by Rome helping the claims, independence, and expansion of the smaller states – in our case, Hasmonean Judaea. 2 See E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae, 264-70 BC, Oxford 1958. Badian defines the position of the cliens as an inferior entrusted by custom or by himself to the protection of a more powerful stranger, pp. 1-14. 3 See Badian, Foreign Clientelae cit., pp. 110-111. Athenaeum 102/1 (2014) 49 In the context of my essay, it is important to understand Badian’s arguments regarding Rome’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Seleucids. Badian points out that the Roman Senate as a corporate body did its best to further the disintegration of the Seleucid state, refusing Demetrius I Soter’s claim to the throne, holding him hostage in Rome, forbidding him to occupy his throne, and preferring to support the claim of Antiochus V. However, Badian points out that at least one powerful family, the Aemilii, supported Demetrius I Soter’s claims, since he was probably their cliens. The latter was a mere child, and obviously, his weakness could be exploited profitably. Another example cited by Badian is that of the commission led by Cn. Octavius to Syria. Its purpose was to destroy the Syrian navy and to sabotage the elephants of the Seleucid army on the pretext that the treaty of Apamea had been transgressed. Badian points out that the claim was weak, since Antiochus IV was an obedient ally. When Octavius was murdered and Demetrius I Soter escaped, the Senate accepted neither an apology nor compensation. Thus the Senate’s foreign policy towards the Seleucids was characterized by the former fomenting trouble, making treaties with the Seleucids’ rebellious subjects, giving them moral support, and, moreover, supporting the claims and attempts of pretenders. The example cited by Badian of help given to the Maccabean rebellion is particularly apt, for once the Seleucid kingdom was weakened by prolonged civil strife and war with the Parthians, Rome’s intervention ceased, and there is no recorded intervention occurring between the accession of Alexander Balas and the Parthian wars. 4 Badian concludes that it was not the defeat of Antiochus the Great, but rather the victory of Pydna which reduced these kings to true dependence on Rome, as Polybius well knew. Harris has also analyzed the development of Roman imperialism in Republican Rome as a consciously expansionist policy. The Roman political system, which was based on patronage as well as the intrinsic values of Roman society – which was overtly disposed to war – brought on a dominant inclination to aggressive wars as a means of furthering its foreign policy. Thus the Roman Senate was consistently belligerent, and wars were fought, in the main, to further the careers of the Roman ruling class and to enrich them. Harris concludes that if the Romans sometimes failed to annex territory, it was not for lack of interest or will, but because their aims could be achieved through other means. 5 Pitted against Harris’s thesis stand the arguments of Sherwin-White, whose book is dedicated to Roman foreign policy in the East and analyzes the spread of 4 See Badian, Foreign Clientelae cit., pp. 107-108. See note 2, p. 108 regarding the support given by Rome to the Maccabees as a typical example of this policy. On Ptolemaic Egypt, see pp. 108-110. 5 See W.V. Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, Oxford 1979. 50 S. Rocca, The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea Roman power in the Eastern Mediterranean, mainly in Asia Minor and Syria, from the battle of Pydna until the early years of Augustus’s principate. Sherwin-White analyzes Roman warfare and diplomacy, with an emphasis on «physical factors, logistics, and the nature of war itself» and how this was reflected in the subsequent relationship between the Romans and their defeated enemies. The development of Roman policy is discussed through an in-depth analysis of the strategy of each Roman commander. 6 In contrast to Harris, Sherwin-White argues that the Roman Senate was not comprised only of Patricians, whose purpose was to further their careers, but that most of the Senators consisted of non-nobles and senior consulares, who did not profit from aggressive wars, which neither enriched them nor furthered their careers. Thus the Senate’s relationship with foreign powers was far from being single-minded in the pursuit of a well-determined aggressive policy, but was, more often than not, badly informed regarding the real intentions of the Eastern potentates towards Rome and hence lacking in foresight. A good example of this blind policy is the fact that in supporting the disintegration of the Seleucid kingdom, the Roman Senate was not just unable to neutralize the threat posed by the Parthians, but even failed to recognize the threat itself. Another reaction to Harris’s thesis can be found in Gruen’s book, which is dedicated to the relationship between the Hellenistic world and Rome. 7 Gruen’s main argument is that Greek concerns brought the Romans into the Hellenistic East, rather than the reverse, and thus the Romans entered the East at the Greeks’ invitation. Later on, once they were involved in control of the East, the Romans made use of strategic and diplomatic methods that had already been developed by the Greeks during the Classical and earlier Hellenistic periods. As such, Roman imperialism in the East was the result of the adoption of Hellenistic diplomacy by the Roman themselves and hence, in the first volume of his book, Gruen discusses the instruments of Roman diplomacy, such as philia-amicitia, or informal connections; the use of adjudication and arbitration, which were so characteristic of the Greek world; the use of slogans and propaganda, such as the ’Freedom of the Greeks’; and Roman patronage as well as clientelae. In the main, Roman policy vis à vis the Greek world was dictated by a matter of pride and a strong sensitivity to its public image and reputation. On the other hand, Rome, which was not interested in achieving any hegemony, tried to avoid unnecessary entanglements, leaving 6 See A.N. Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign Policy in the East, 168 B.C. to A.D. 1, Norman 1984. See E.S. Gruen, The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome I, Berkeley, Ca. 1986. On philia-amicitia, see pp. 54-96, on the use of adjudication and arbitration, see pp. 96-132, on the use of slogans and propaganda, see pp. 132-158, and on Roman patronage as well as clientelae, see pp. 158-203. See also R. Morstein Kallet-Marx, who develops Gruen’s thesis in his R. Morstein Kallet-Marx, Hegemony to Empire. The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C. (Hellenistic Culture and Society 15), Berkeley 1995. 7 Athenaeum 102/1 (2014) 51 to its allies the task of policing the area. The best example is the situation created by the Peace of Apamea. The Roman Republic’s main policy was to reduce the risk of larger conflicts between Hellenistic powers such as Seleucid Syria and Ptolemaic Egypt, and it was not interested in achieving any hegemony in the area, leaving to other states, such as Pergamum and Rhodes, the responsibility of maintaining a stable order in that region of the world. Gruen demonstrates his thesis – which stands in contradistinction from those of previous scholars – in his analysis and interpretation of Roman foreign policy throughout the second century B.C.E. The First Macedonian War, which ended in 205 B.C.E. with the treaty of Phoenice, pitted Rome, the Aetolian League, and Attalus I of Pergamum against Philip V of Macedonia, and Gruen argues that at that point in time Rome still lacked aspirations in Greece. 8 Rome’s strong sensitivity to its public image can be seen as the main cause for the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War (200-196 B.C.E.), which pitted Rome, Pergamum, and Rhodes against Philip V of Macedonia. Thus Gruen argues that the Senate was willing to make demands on Philip V simply as a matter of pride. The resulting peace treaty between Philip V and the Romans confined Philip to Macedonia and required him to pay 1000 talents indemnity, to surrender most of its fleet, and to provide a number of hostages, including his younger son Demetrius. The war ended Macedonia’s role as a major player and preserved Rhodian independence. Moreover, Gruen argues, it is already possible to distinguish the patterns of Pergamum and Rhodes’ policy towards Rome. While Pergamum tried consistently to engage Rome’s support, Rhodes’ primary aim was to cling to prosperity and prestige. Thus, it is wrong to consider Attalus I and Rhodes as lackeys of Rome, although the two Greek powers were interested – and succeeded – in maneuvering the western power into a situation from which they could reap benefits. 9 The Syrian War (192-188 B.C.E.), Gruen argues, was made inevitable by Antiochus III’s insatiable imperialistic appetite, which endangered the political balance of East. Yet until 195 B.C.E., Seleucid imperialism was of no concern to 8 The First Macedonian War pitted Rome, the Aetolian League, and Attalus I of Pergamum against Philip V of Macedonia. On the causes of the war, see Plb. 4.65. On the treaty between Rome and the Aetolian League, see Liv. 26.24 and 39.12 on the treaty of Phoenice. The war ended in 205 B.C.E. with the treaty of Phoenice. See Gruen, The Hellenistic World cit. I, pp. 29-30. Gruen argues that the settlement was amicable. See also É. Will, Histoire politique du monde helle´nistique, 323-30 av. J.-C. II, Paris 2003, pp. 69-94. 9 On Attalus I and Rhodes embassies to Rome, to register their complaints against Philip, see Plb. 16.1 and Liv. 31.2. On Rome’s declaration of war to Macedonia, see Liv. 31.5-8. On the negotiations of Locris, see Plb. 18.1-12. See also Liv. 32.32.7-37. See also Plu. Flam. 5.6; 7.1-2. On the peace with Philip, see Plb. 18.33-34,36-39,42 and 44. See also Liv. 33.11-13. See also Plu. Flam. 9. On the successive RomanMacedonian alliance, see Plb. 18.48.4-5. See also Liv. 33.33-35. See Gruen, The Hellenistic World cit. I, pp. 397-398 on Macedonia, and pp. 530-538 on the attitude of Pergamum and Rhodes to Rome. See also Will, Histoire politique du monde helle´nistique cit. II, pp. 102-176, esp. 135-148. 52 S. Rocca, The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea Rome, which endeavored to keep faith with Ptolemy and reconcile the two warring amici, or allies. Only in 195 B.C.E., when Antiochus III Megas sent envoys to Rome, did Roman sensitivity to its public image demand that a step be taken. Yet even in 194 B.C.E., the Roman Senate ordered the evacuation of Greece. Still then, the Seleucid advances in Asia and Thrace were not seen as a menace. War arrived only in 191 B.C.E., and once more saw Eumenes II of Pergamum, Rhodes, and – this time – Philip V of Macedonia as well, allied to the Roman Republic in the war against Antiochus III. The war resulted in the elimination of any Seleucid threats to Asia Minor and West. Among the terms of the Treaty of Apamea, Antiochus had to pay 15,000 talents of silver as a war indemnity, and was forced to abandon Europe altogether and all of Asia west of the Taurus Mountains. Eumenes II received the regions of Phrygia, Lydia, Pisidia, Pamphylia, and parts of Lycia, while Rhodes gained control over Caria and Lycia. According to Gruen, the treaty of Apamea clearly demonstrated that Rome wished to keep Asia Minor at distance and to leave to Pergamum and Rhodes the responsibility of maintaining a stable order there. The Roman thus did not achieve any hegemony: what was achieved was power for Pergamum and Rhodes. Vis à vis the Seleucids, on the one hand, it is clear that Apamea was a peace treaty imposed by victors upon the vanquished. Yet Gruen argues that although the indemnity was larger, Antiochus III’ kingdom possessed huge resources, and he could well afford to pay that. Besides, afterwards, the Seleucids were associated with Rome in maintaining peace in the Mediterranean. 10 Once more, Gruen argues that the main cause of the Third Macedonian War (171-168 B.C.E.) was that the Rome was sensitive about her reputation and had a need to demonstrate her majesty and show that she was not a «helpless pitiful giant». Indeed the Roman Senate had little reason to fear Perseus. Although the result of the war was that Macedonia was divided into four republics, it would be both hasty and incorrect to conclude that Macedonia had become a tributary vassal state of Rome. First, the latter did not occupy nor administer any lands. Second, the fact that Rome imposed requisition and payments does not change the situation for the worse, as this always happened to the vanquished. Last, but not least, although Rome did indeed disband old governments, she did foster new ones. Besides, Gruen argues once more, Eumenes II’s policy was not one of unwavering loyalty to Rome, but rather of consistent efforts to engage Rome in support of Pergamum, exploiting his connec10 On the first diplomatic clash between the Seleucids and Rome, see Plb. 18.47.1-4,49-52. See also Liv. 33.34; 38-41. See also App. Syr. 2.6-4.14,16-17. On the aborted negotiations in 190 B.C.E., see Plb. 21.6-8,10-11. See also Liv. 36.1-3,8-33; 55; 38.38. See also App. Syr. 21-29 (97-142; 200-204). On the preliminary of peace at Sardis and on the Treaty of Apamea, see Plb. 21.16-17; 24.1-2,42-43. See also Liv. 37.45.4-21. See also on the text of the treaty App. Syr. 38-39(4-21). On the Syrian War see Gruen, The Hellenistic World cit. I, pp. 548-550, 611-619 on Antiochus III’s imperialism, 627-645 on Rome’s sensitivity to its public image. See also Will, Histoire politique du monde helle´nistique cit. II, pp. 178-240, esp. 221-240. Athenaeum 102/1 (2014) 53 tions with Rome to his advantage and thus keeping its old paths. And yet, the reaction of Rome to Pergamum was minimalist and resulted only in coolness towards the king of Pergamum. From now on, Rome would make it more difficult for Eumenes to make use of her name and authority to advance his influence in Asia Minor. With respect to Rhodes, however, things were slightly different. Did Rhodes veer away from Rome and link her fortune to anti-Roman powers as most scholars contend? Gruen argues that the primary aim of Rhodian policy was to cling to the prosperity and prestige that had accrued over the past two decades. It did not imply any treason whatsoever towards Rome. However, in contrast to Pergamum, Rhodes felt the heavy hand of Rome. There was no anger at Rhodes’ disloyalty but merely a display of power and a way to administer a lesson to a city which had grown too big after Apamea. Once more, after the war, Rome retreated into indifference. 11 The main dictates of Roman foreign policy vis à vis the Seleucids and the Ptolemies, in the aftermath of the Peace of Apamea, were to end the Syrian wars and to reduce the risk of larger conflicts. In 166 B.C.E., the purpose of Rome’s diplomacy was still to assure the integrity of Egypt and the stability of the region. Both the Ptolemies and the Seleucids were seen as amici, or allies, of Rome, as before. After that, Roman involvement with Seleucids was sporadic, erratic, and largely ineffectual. On the other hand, the Roman Republic rarely took account of the Land of the Nile and even more rarely affected events that took place there. 12 This is the framework for understanding the development of the diplomatic relationship between Rome and Hasmonean Judaea from the end of the first quarter of the second century B.C.E. until Pompey’s invasion and conquest of Hasmonean Judaea, which was already in the throes of civil wars. 2. Rome and the Early Hasmoneans According to Zollschan it is possible that by 174-173 B.C.E. the Jews had al11 The Romans made an abortive attempt to suborn Eumenes’ brother Attalus II, as a pretender to the Pergamene throne, but he declined. Besides, they refused Eumenes entry into Italy to plead his case. In 164 B.C.E., Rhodes became a permanent ally of Rome. On the dismemberment of Macedonia, see Liv. 45.17-18; 29-30. See also D.S. 31.8. See also Iust. Epit. 33.2,7. On Pergamum and Rome, see Plb. 29.22.4; 30.1-3; 19,1-14; 31.1.6. See also Liv. 45.19-20; 55.34.10; See also D.S. 31.13-16. On Rhodes and Rome, see Plb. 30.4-5; 21; 23.4; 31. See also Liv. 45.10. See also D.S. 31.5. See also D.C. 20.68.1. On the causes of the war, see Gruen, The Hellenistic World cit. I, pp. 418-419. On Pergamum’s policy, see pp. 551-563, 573. On Rhodes, see pp. 563-566 and 569-574. See also Will, Histoire politique du monde helle´nistique cit. II, pp. 241-300, esp. 279-292 on Macedonia, 285-292 on Pergamum, and 292-300 on Rhodes. 12 On Roman involvement with the Seleucids after the Peace of Apamea, Gruen, The Hellenistic World cit. I, pp. 644-671 and on the relationship between Rome and Ptolemaic Egypt, see pp. 672-719. See also Will, Histoire politique du monde helle´nistique cit. II, pp. 301-359. 54 S. Rocca, The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea ready established diplomatic contacts with Rome. According to the Second Book of Maccabees, the Jews sent an embassy, under the leadership of John, father of Eupolemus, to «establish a friendly relationship with the Romans» and had met the Romans either on their way to or in Antioch. 13 Gruen argues that the memory of the first diplomatic encounter between the Romans and the Maccabees is preserved in the Second Book of Maccabees. It consists of a letter from Roman envoys to the Jews in 164 B.C.E, when, according to Gruen, Jewish representatives had contacted Roman envoys to Antioch, asking them to support their cause with the Seleucid ruler, possibly Antiochus IV or perhaps Antiochus V, in presenting their case to the king. The letter is more of a gesture on the part of the Roman envoys than an actual statement of policy on the part of the Roman Senate itself. The Roman delegation had recently endorsed the agreement between the Jews and Lysias, and thus the message conveyed a cordial response, not an offer to change political arrangements to the advantage of the Jewish rebels: in other words, the Roman mission had no actual pragmatic intention or purpose. Were the Romans corresponding with the Maccabees or with the Hellenizing leadership? Antiochus V’s letter to Lysias, though granting various concessions to the Jews, does not hint at Roman intervention. In any event, Gruen points out that the accords between Lysias and the Maccabees broke down immediately, and warfare resumed. 14 Josephus, in addition to the First Book of Maccabees, reports that Rome made a treaty of friendship with Judah Maccabeus in 161 B.C.E., which placed the Hasmonean family on an equal standing with Rome as socius et amicus populi Romani, in an accord that clearly can only be categorized as foedus aequus. Josephus quotes the text of the treaty, in which Rome, like Judaea, was bound by obligations to help its new ally and its confederates in the event of a defensive or offensive war. 15 This treaty, however, quoted in the First Book of Maccabees and in Josephus, is quite problematic. 13 On the possibility of an early contact between the Jews in Rome already in 174 B.C.E., see L. Zollschan, The Earliest Jewish Embassy to the Romans: 2 Macc. 4.11?, «Journal of Jewish Studies» 55 (2004), pp. 37-44. This embassy is mentioned in the 2 Macc. 4:11, in the middle of the account of the reforms of the high priest Jason. According to Zollschan, the Jews met a Roman diplomatic mission sent to Syria, in the wake of the previous embassy sent by Antiochus IV to Rome in 174 B.C.E. 14 See 2 Macc. 11:34-38. See Gruen, The Hellenistic World cit. II, Appendix II: «The First Encounter of Rome and the Jews», pp. 745-748. 15 On foedera with allies see M. Cary - H.H. Scullard, A History of Rome, London 1986, pp. 169-171. See J. AJ 12.417-419. Josephus’s version of the treaty is the preferred one. The version found in the First Book of Maccabees is in fact a Greek translation of the original Hebrew text. Josephus possibly handled the actual document itself while he was in Rome. See also 1 Macc. 23-29. This document, similar to other contemporary treaties from the second century B.C.E. between Rome and other peoples, appears also in the Epitome of Justin. See M. Stern, The Treaty between Judaea and Rome in 161 BCE (Hebrew), «Zion» 51 (1986), pp. 3-28. See also Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign Policy in the East cit., passim. See also Will, Histoire politique du monde helle´nistique cit. II, pp. 366-367 on the revolt of Timarch. Athenaeum 102/1 (2014) 55 First of all, was the treaty authentic? According to Stern, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the treaty. In fact, Stern connects this episode to the rebellion of Timarch in the eastern part of the Seleucid Empire. It seems that Timarch and Heracleides, leaders of the rebels, influenced the Roman Senate in aiding Judah Maccabeus to conclude the treaty. On the other hand, in contrast to Stern, SherwinWhite argues that the document was a forgery intended to justify the Maccabees, since the treaty is not mentioned in non-Jewish sources. According to Zollschan, it is highly doubtful that the Hasmoneans concluded a treaty in 161 B.C.E. 16 Besides, as Mendlessohn has already argued, the Jewish ambassadors were successful only in obtaining amicitia from the Roman senate in 161 B.C.E., since the Romans were not keen to give a foedus to states that were not free. This status was not achieved by the Jews until the time of Simon. 17 Gruen makes a case that this treaty was the result of a Jewish request, not a Roman impulse. For the Maccabees this treaty did indeed amount to some international recognition which could have constituted a valuable element in their struggle. On the other hand, this alliance was carried out by the Romans with no concrete implications involved. No one dreamed of enforcing this treaty, and the Jews were left to their own devices. Indeed, Gruen points out that this treaty, like the various successive treaties reported in the First Book of Maccabees and Josephus, does indeed reflect the main tenets of Roman foreign policy, as already noted and analyzed by Badian. Thus the Roman affirmations of support, on the one hand, and the lack of implementation of this support, on the other, evince a remarkable regularity. While the Senate sent pro forma messages, in this case to the Maccabees and later to the Hasmoneans, the recipients had in fact already worked matters out for themselves. 18 According to Josephus, both Jonathan and Simon renewed this treaty, although this is not confirmed in any other source. 19 John Hyrcanus I likewise renewed the treaty at the beginning of his reign in 132 B.C.E. By that time, the Roman Republic had recognized the Hasmoneans as the legal rulers of an independent 16 See L. Zollschan, The Senate and the Jewish Embassy of 161 BCE (Hebrew), in D. Gera et al. (eds.), The Path of Peace. Studies in Honor of Israel Friedman Ben-Shalom, Beersheva 2005, pp. 1-37. See also L. Zollschan, Orality and the Politics of Roman Peacemaking, in C. Cooper (ed.), Politics of Orality, Leiden 2007, pp. 171-190; See also L. Zollschan, Justinus 36.3.9 and Roman-Judaean Diplomatic Relations in 161 BCE, «Athenaeum» 96 (2008), pp. 153-171. 17 See L. Mendlessohn, Senati Consulta Romanorum quae sunt in Josephi Antiquitatibus, «ASPL» 5 (1875), pp. 83-288. 18 See Gruen, The Hellenistic World cit. I, pp. 45-46 and II, Appendix III: «Effects of the Roman-Jewish Treaty», pp. 748-753. 19 According to Josephus, Jonathan sent two envoys to Rome, Numenius, son of Antiochus, and Antipater, son of Jason, and he renewed the treaty with Rome. See J. AJ 13.164-170. See 1 Macc. 12:1-23. Simon sent an embassy to Rome to renew the treaty, under the leadership of Numenius. See J. AJ 13.227. See also 1 Macc. 14:24. 56 S. Rocca, The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea state, with the titles of ethnarch and High Priest. In the last known treaty, whose text is quoted by Josephus, and which is dated 132 B.C.E., the Roman Republic recognized the territorial acquisitions of Simon the Maccabee, which continued to remain the borders of the kingdom during the early years of rule of John Hyrcanus. Josephus quotes the text of this treaty in its entirety. 20 Once more, it is important to note that all of these treaties are known only from the First Book of Maccabees and from Josephus, who used the First Book of Maccabees as source for the first two treaties, and they are not mentioned in any other Greek or Roman source. According to an interpolation added to one of Josippon’s manuscripts, moreover, John Hyrcanus I also established a secret agreement with the Parthian king Phraates II against the Seleucid King Antiochus VII Sidetes, which can be dated to 130-129 B.C.E., when John Hyrcanus was following Antiochus VII in his expedition against Parthia. This treaty has been viewed by Pucci Ben Zeev as an early example of a policy which did not conform to the interests of the Roman Republic. 21 It is important, however, to consider the timing. First of all, at this juncture, the Parthians were a geographically distant power with which Rome still had no diplomatic contact. Besides, during this period the Roman Republic had no expansionistic aims in the Near East, and in fact, during this period, its imperialistic aims were directed towards the West, mainly towards Spain. Rome did not demonstrate any military commitment towards the Hellenistic East following either the annexation of Asia as a new province in 133 B.C.E. or the successive rebellion of Aristonicus, which was crushed in 129 B.C.E. Moreover, the unrest in Rome itself, during the tribunates of the Gracchi, effectively prevented Rome from taking any interest in the Near East. 22 Furthermore, the Seleucid kingdom, a traditional enemy of the Roman Republic, was still strong, and thus the distant Parthian kingdom could only have been regarded as a tool in further weakening the Seleucid kingdom. It was only more than thirty years later, in 96 B.C.E., that the Roman Republic established a direct diplomatic relationship with the Parthian kingdom, and it is probable that both Rome and the Parthians still had a common enemy, namely the Seleucid kingdom. Thus it is important to point out that only with the definitive fall of the Seleucid kingdom would Rome have had to face Parthia as an adver20 See J. AJ 13.259-266. G. Fannius - G. Sempronius were praetores in 132 B.C.E. See J. AJ 13.250-253. It seems that Josippon used as source Diodorus or Poseidonius, but not Nicolaus. The original text of Josippon appears in an interpolation added to the third version, the long one, which is dated before 1160-1161. See M. Pucci Ben Zeev, On the Tendentiousness of Josephus’ Historical Writing, in U. Rappaport (ed.): Josephus Flavius, Historian of Eretz-Israel in the Hellenistic-Roman Period, Jerusalem 1982 (Hebrew), pp. 117-130. See also M. Pucci Ben Zeev, Jewish-Parthian Relations in Josephus, «The Jerusalem Cathedra» 3 (1983), pp. 13-14. See Hominer, History cit., 1957, p. 28. 22 See Cary-Scullard, History of Rome cit., pp. 165-167, re. Rome’s foreign policy in Asia and in the Near East from 188 until 129 B.C.E., and pp. 203-210 re. the tribunate of the Gracchi. 21 Athenaeum 102/1 (2014) 57 sary, and, in any case, during the earlier days of Pompey in the East, the Parthian kingdom was not regarded as an enemy. The days of Carrhae were clearly still far away. 23 Hence, it seems to me that this treaty between John Hyrcanus I and the Parthians was in no way intended to affect the contemporary foreign policy of the Roman Republic in a negative way. Therefore, although the possibility that a Jewish-Parthian treaty would have been welcomed by Rome is questionable, on the other hand, the Roman Republic was too far away to be affected in any way by such a treaty. 3. The Late Roman Republic and the Late Hasmoneans A. Rome and King Alexander Jannaeus The following questions may now be dealt with: What kind of relationship and what attitude did Rome have towards the late Hasmonean rulers of Judaea, namely King Alexander Jannaeus and his wife Queen Salome Alexandra? Did the Roman Republic renew the treaty of friendship with John Hyrcanus’ successors, Judas Aristobulus I and Alexander Jannaeus? Did the Hasmonean state take a stand during the Mithridatic wars for or against the Roman Republic? These questions are significant since a possible treaty between the Roman Republic and King Jannaeus is nowhere mentioned by any source, including Josephus or any Greek or Roman authors. Indeed with respect to whether or not Rome renewed the treaty of friendship with Aristobulus I and King Alexander Jannaeus after him – a treaty that had last been renewed during the reign of John Hyrcanus – Rappaport believes that this was not the case and that the reign of Alexander Jannaeus was characterized by a change in the foreign policy of the young and militaristic Hasmonean State. Thus, according to Rappaport, Pompey’s accusations that the Hasmonean kingdom was no longer an ally of Rome were justified. In fact, Rappaport argues that the Hasmoneans had made a treaty of friendship with Mithridates VI of Pontus and that the Hasmonean fleet acted as pirates, or at least supported them. According to Rappaport, Alexander Jannaeus had new interests, and he preferred newer and geographically closer allies – such as Mithridates VI, King of Pontus; Tigranes of Armenia; the Parthians; and last but not least, the Cilician pirates – rather than the distant Roman Republic, which was mired in civil strife which weakened its power and influence. Thus, according to Rappaport, Alexander Jannaeus completely changed the attitude of the Hasmonean kingdom towards Rome and decided that it was no 23 In 96 B.C.E. Sulla, then propraetor in Cilicia, made friendly diplomatic overtures to the Parthians. See Cary-Scullard, History of Rome cit., p. 230. See also Will, Histoire politique du monde helle´nistique cit. II, pp. 379-396, 416-419. 58 S. Rocca, The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea longer necessary to renew a treaty which was now regarded as useless and impractical: there were new local powers whose friendship was far more useful to the expansionistic policy of the Hasmonean state. In addition, the all-powerful and menacing Seleucid kingdom, now just a shadow of itself, was no longer a threat to Rome or to Hasmonean Judaea. The foreign interests of the Hasmoneans had indeed changed. Rappaport concludes his article by pointing out that by the end of the period under consideration, Rome was interested in actually dominating the Hellenistic East, not just in controlling it though a series of treaties with local powers. The outcome of this disastrous foreign policy, begun by Alexander Jannaeus, was that Pompey divided the Hasmonean State in 63 B.C.E. 24 In contrast to Rappaport, the main point of Pucci Ben Zeev’s article is not so much the relationship between the Late Roman Republic and the Hasmonean state, but the attitude of Josephus towards Rome. Thus Pucci Ben Zeev argues that one of the aims of Josephus was to prove his personal loyalty to Rome, as well as the loyalty of the greater part of his people, the Jews. Generally speaking, Josephus justified the loyalty of the Jews implicitly, and thus, whenever Josephus could choose between two sources, he chose the source that was closer to and supported the interests of Rome. 25 Like Rappaport, Pucci Ben Zeev has also argued for the existence of a treaty between Aristobulus II and Mithridates. However, since no treaty between Alexander Jannaeus and Mithridates is mentioned anywhere in Josephus’ writings, she does not support the possibility of an alliance between the Hasmonean ruler and the King of Pontus. Therefore, as we shall see, in this framework, Josephus’ attitude towards Rome is irrelevant concerning Jannaeus’ policy vis à vis Rome. 26 It is important to note that Rappaport and Pucci Ben Zeev made use of Josippon, a Jewish historian who lived in tenth century Byzantine Southern Italy, to argue that the last Hasmoneans adopted a new foreign policy that was hostile to Rome. 27 24 See U. Rappaport, La Jude´e et Rome pendant le re`gne d’Alexandre Janne´e, «Revue des études juives. Historia Judaica» 78 (1968), pp. 329-342. 25 See Pucci Ben Zeev, On the Tendentiousness of Josephus’ Historical Writing cit., pp. 117-130. 26 See Pucci Ben Zeev, On the Tendentiousness of Josephus’ Historical Writing cit., pp. 117-130. See also Pucci Ben Zeev, Jewish-Parthian Relations in Josephus cit., pp. 13-14. 27 Josippon, or Joseph ben Gorion, was the author of a popular chronicle of Jewish history from Adam until the destruction of the Second Temple in 70 C.E., and as the historian’s moniker implies, the main source of his name is, of course, Josephus. It seems that the chronicle was written in Biblical Hebrew, in the tenth century C.E., possibly in 953, by a Jew who lived in Southern Italy. The first edition was printed in Mantua in 1476. See Basnage, Histoire des Juifs, Paris 1710, vii. 89. See also R. Gottheil - M. Schloessinger, s.v. Joseph ben Gorion, in Jewish Encyclopedia, New York 1901-1906. See also F. Delitzsch, Zur Gesch. der Jüdischen Poesie, luogo data, pp. 39 ff. See also F. Vogel, De Hegesippo Qui Dicitur Josephi Interprete, Erlangen 1881 and J. Wellhausen, Der Arabische Josippus, in Abhandlungen der Ko¨niglichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaft zu Go¨ttingen I, Berlin 1897. See also L. Zunz, «Zeitschrift für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums», pp. 304 ff. The most important edition is that of D. Flusser, The Josippon (Josephus Gorionides), ed. with an Intr. Comm. and Notes, Vols. I-II, Jerusalem 1978-1980. See also D. Flusser, Josippon: The Original Version MS Jerusalem Athenaeum 102/1 (2014) 59 Thus it is Josippon, as mentioned earlier, who reports the alliance between John Hyrcanus I and Phraates of Parthia, as well as the alliance between Mithridates VI of Pontus and Aristobulus II, which are not mentioned by Josephus. 28 Josephus does not cite any friendly contact between the Pontic ruler and Alexander Jannaeus, and Josippon’s statement is not corroborated by any other ancient source, either Greek or Latin. It seems to me that there is no reason to discard Josippon as a further relevant source, since he probably utilized an ancient source that has been lost to us. I argue, however, for a different interpretation of the information given by Josippon, since I believe that Josippon’s data has not been interpreted in the right context and that there exists a possibility that the last Hasmonean rulers did indeed renew their treaty with Rome, for reasons which will be detailed below. First, it seems clear that Judas Aristobulus I, who reigned for only a year, did not renew the treaty with Rome; his reign was simply too short. 29 In addition, the political situation during this period was quite troubled for the Roman Republic and was characterized by instability, with social struggles that began with the tribunate of Glaucia and Saturninus, followed by the Social War and ending in the civil war between Marius and Sulla. Moreover, in the West, the power of Rome was threatened twice, first during the Jugurthine War and later when Rome was involved in conflict with the Cimbri and Teutoni. 30 It was in the East, however, where Rome faced the greatest threat to its rule in the person of Mithridates VI, King of Pontus, and in fact, during Alexander Jannaeus’ reign, Rome fought two wars against the Pontic king. Did all of these troubled circumstances influence the attitude of the Roman Republic towards the Hasmonean kingdom of Judaea at this time? It seems to me that it is slightly easier to address the issue from the opposing perspective, since Roman sources are silent regarding the attitude of King Alexander Jannaeus towards Rome during the Mithridatic wars. Did Hasmonean Judaea continue a favorable policy towards the now embattled Roman Republic, which was a former ally? Did Alexander Jannaeus take a hostile stand, as Rappaport and Pucci Ben Zeev suggest, using Josippon as source? Or was Hasmonean Judaea simply neutral, waiting for further developments? It is important to note, at this juncture, that just as Mithridates VI had his own military and political aims, so did Alexander Jannaeus, and thus a further question arises, namely, were the political aims of Alexander Jannaeus opposed to those of the Roman Republic? 8 41280 and Supplements, Jerusalem 1978. See Rappaport, La Jude´e et Rome pendant le re`gne d’Alexandre Janne´e cit., pp. 329-342. 28 For the text of Josippon, see Flusser, Josippon: The Original Version MS Jerusalem 8 41280 and Supplements cit., p. 488, 1, 45. See also Hominer, History cit., 1957, c. 28. 29 Re. Judah Aristobulus I, see J. AJ 13.301-319; BJ 1.70-84. See also E. Schürer, History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ I, Edinburgh 1987, pp. 216-218. 30 See Cary-Scullard, History of Rome cit., pp. 214-226. 60 S. Rocca, The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea Thus in the first eight years of his reign, from 101 until 94 B.C.E., still before the Mithridatic Wars, Alexander Jannaeus begin a war of conquest of the coastal littoral that brought him into military conflict first against Ptolemais and then, as a consequence, into confrontation with the Ptolemaic kingdom of Egypt, in the person of King Ptolemy IX Lathyrus. 31 Did the war against Ptolemy IX Lathyrus disturb the Roman Republic interests in the East? The question is quite legitimate, since there was a treaty of friendship and alliance between Rome and Ptolemaic Egypt, exactly as was the case with Hasmonean Judaea. Yet, the answer appears to be no. In fact, Ptolemy IX Lathyrus had a problem of legitimacy, since the true legitimate ruler of Egypt was his mother Cleopatra III, who was, in contrast, quite friendly to the Hasmonean kingdom, 32 and since the Roman Republic was always interested in backing the legitimate ruler, it seems to me that the Roman Republic probably supported Cleopatra III, and not her son. Moreover, as we shall see, some years later the Ptolemaic ruler IX Lathyrus did not support Rome against Mithridates VI. Besides, in the period from 103 until 89 B.C.E., when the Roman Republic was seriously entangled in the West, first in the Jugurthine War and then in the Social War, Rome probably had no real interest in what was going on in the distant East, so far away from her direct sphere of influence. Before discussing the main issue regarding the relationship between the Roman Republic and Alexander Jannaeus, later on, during the Mithridatic Wars, it is important to ask if Alexander Jannaeus renewed his treaty with Rome, and if so, when this took place. The topic is quite problematic. If Alexander Jannaeus did in fact renew a treaty with Rome, we would expect Josephus to mention it, since in his writings, as Pucci Ben Zeev has argued, he always stresses each sign of good will and cooperation between the Jews and Rome. And yet, as I wrote earlier, Josephus does not write anything about this treaty. Indeed it is possible to argue that even if the alliance and friendship between the Hasmonean state and Rome were not renewed, the previous treaty would have remained valid. Indeed Gruen argues that in the previous treaties, Rome framed the official compact with the Jewish people, rather than with an individual leader and hence there was no real necessity for a formal renewal of the treaty. 33 And yet, if Alexander Jannaeus renewed the treaty with Rome before 89 B.C.E. – at the beginning of his rule, he would have done so in Rome, in an official ceremony in front of the entire Senate. But, did he? And if not, what ensued later? From 89 B.C.E. until 82 B.C.E., Rome was involved in a vicious civil war 31 Ptolemy IX Lathyrus intervened in favor of Ptolemais, and Alexander Jannaeus was defeated by the Egyptian general Philostephanus. See J. AJ 13.285-287,324-347,353-359,370 and BJ 1.86. See also Schürer, History of the Jewish People cit. I, pp. 219-228. 32 See J. AJ 13.334-336,348,351-358, and BJ 1.86. 33 See Gruen, The Hellenistic World cit. I, pp. 45-46. Athenaeum 102/1 (2014) 61 between Marius and Cinna, on the one hand, and with Sulla on the other. 34 With whom could Alexander Jannaeus have renewed the treaty of friendship – with Marius or Cinna in Rome, or with Sulla in the East? It is important to point out that a treaty was legitimate only if signed in the presence of the Senate; otherwise it was considered to be no more than a personal agreement between a Roman warlord and a private cliens. Thus, in order for Alexander Jannaeus to have his conquests – or at least his aims – legitimized, he had need of a formal treaty, not just with the representatives of Rome, but with the Roman Senate itself. 35 In fact, to renew a treaty with the representative of one of the factions could have been problematic in the extreme, especially if the opposing faction were to win the civil war and take a hostile stance against the treaty, possibly to the extent of repudiating it. Although I must admit that this discussion of the possibility of a treaty between Jannaeus and Rome is very speculative, it seems to me that there are various reasons to assume that the previous treaty between Rome and the Hasmonean State was still in effect. First of all, both Rome and Hasmonean Judaea had common enemies, including various Hellenistic kings who wished to expand their territories and Greek cities that had a desire for independence. There is no hint that the Greek cities conquered by John Hyrcanus I, and later by Alexander Jannaeus, had any treaty of friendship with Rome during this period, even if, afterwards, first Pompey and then Gabinius gave back their freedom and restored their independence. Yet the relationship between these cities and Rome was quite volatile even afterwards, when Augustus returned most of these cities to Herod in 30 B.C.E. Thus, when Gadara complained of Herod, Augustus stood by Herod. 36 The only possible exception could have been Ptolemais, a city which traditionally maintained an alliance 34 See Cary-Scullard, History of Rome cit., pp. 227-229 and 233-234. Re. Sulla’s early years, see A. Keaveney, Sulla, the Last Republican, London 1982, pp. 5-44. 35 I wish to thank Professor Gruen for this insight. 36 John Hyrcanus I conquered Samaria (J. AJ 13.275-282), and Scythopolis (AJ 13.280). Alexander Jannaeus conquered Strato’s Tower and Dora (AJ 13.324), Gadara, Amathus, Raphia, Anthedon, Gaza (AJ 13.356-364). Josephus gives a list of Greek cities conquered by the Hasmoneans, see AJ 13.395-397. The list includes Strato’s Tower, Apollonia, Joppa, Jamnia, Ashdod, Gaza, Anthedon, Raphia, Rhinocolura, Adorn, Marissa, Scythopolis and Gadara, Selucia and Gabala, Heshbon, Medaba, Lemba, Oronas, Gelithon, Zara, Pella. First Pompey and then Gabinius freed most, although by no means not all of these cities. Thus Pompey took away cities of Coele-Syria which Jews had subdued, rebuilt Gadara, restored and gave freedom to Hippos, Scythopolis, Pella, Dios, Samaria, Marissa, Ashdod, Jamnia, Arethusa, Gaza Joppa, Dora, Straton’s Tower (AJ 14.74-76). Gabinius rebuilt Samaria, Ashdod, Scythopolis, Anthedon, Raphia, Dora, Marissa, Gaza (AJ 14.88). However, Herod was given back most of the cities on the coast and all the cities of the Decapolis by Augustus in 30 BCE (AJ 15.215-217 and BJ 1.396-397). On Herod and Gadara, see also A. Kasher, Jews and Hellenistic Cities in Eretz-Israel. Relations of the Jews with the Hellenistic Cities during the Second Temple Period (Texte und Studien zum Antiken Judentum 21), Tübingen 1990, pp. 195-197. Kasher rightly argues that Herod policy towards these cities, exemplified in the episode of Gadara, was not different from the policy of Alexander Jannaeus. 62 S. Rocca, The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea with the Ptolemies, which were also allies of Rome. Thus, the siege of Ptolemais by Alexander Jannaeus could have had negative consequences for his relationship with Rome. However, things were not so simple. Josephus clearly states that part of the population, under the leadership of Demeneteus, preferred the rule of the Jewish king to that of Ptolemy X Lathyrus. Moreover, Ptolemais did not have any special affection for his mother and rival, Cleopatra III, since she had to besiege the city. Thus Ptolemais tried not to be entangled in the internecine strife between the two Ptolemies. It is interesting to note that, a decade later, Ptolemais, besieged by Tigranes II, evidently had a good relationship with Queen Salome Alexandra, who was trying to help Cleopatra Selene, who had taken refuge there. Never part of the Herodian kingdom, during the rule of Claudius, Ptolemais became a Roman colony, Colonia Claudia Felix Ptolemais Germanica Stabilis. 37 Thus the Roman Republic faced the enmity of Mithridates VI King of Pontus and the ever-present Seleucids – the traditional enemy of both the Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea – as well as the various Greek cities of Achaia and Asia, including Athens itself, which took an active part on the side of Mithridates against Rome during this period. On the other hand, King Alexander Jannaeus was faced with the enmity of the Greek cities of the Decapolis, on the coast, and of course the Seleucids. 38 Three instances or episodes can be analyzed to support the validity of the treaty of friendship between the Roman Republic and Judaea, during the rule of King Alexander Jannaeus. First, during this period Mithridates VI, King of Pontus and enemy of Rome, was hostile – to say the very least – towards the Hasmonean Kingdom. According to Josephus, sometime around 88 B.C.E. Mithridates confiscated no fewer than 800 talents of gold left on the Island of Cos by Jews of Caria and Ionia that had been intended to be forwarded to the Temple. This event could only have occurred during the First Mithridatic War, since it refers to the period of time when the Province of Asia was overwhelmed by Mithridates’ mercenaries. If, as Rappaport and Pucci Ben Zeev suggest, Mithridates and Alexander Jannaeus were allies, why did the king of Pontus confiscate money from the Jews of Asia that was intended to be transferred to his ally? Indeed the episode may be related to Mithridates’ economic needs during his struggle against Rome, and not necessarily as evidence of any hostility towards the Hasmonean state. However, Josephus states clearly that the Jews of Asia removed their money «out of fear of Mithridates». 39 But why did the 37 On Alexander Jannaeus’ siege of Ptolemais see Josephus, AJ 13.324-334. On Demeneteus see AJ 13.330. On Cleopatra III’s siege see AJ 13.350. On Tigranes II’s siege of Ptolemais, see AJ 13.419-420. 38 See Gruen, The Hellenistic World cit. I-II, passim. See also P. Green, Alexander to Actium. The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age, Berkeley, Ca. 1993, pp. 547-565; Will, Histoire politique du monde helle´nistique cit., pp. 462-485; and P. Matyszak, Mithridates the Great, Rome’s Indomitable Enemy, Barnsley 2008. 39 See Josephus, AJ 14.112-113, originally from the History of Strabo. See also See Matyszak, Mithridates the Great cit., p. 57. Athenaeum 102/1 (2014) 63 Jews of Asia fear Mithridates? Were they perceived by the King of Pontus as enemies? It seems to me that we can explain the entire episode only if we postulate that the Jews of Asia sent their ’sacred’ money to Cos, which looked like a safe place far away from the reach of Mithridates, since they feared that the King of Pontus would confiscate it, which in fact he eventually did, possibly because he perceived the Jews as enemies rather than allies. Otherwise the Jews of Asia would not have had anything to fear from Mithridates, and indeed Josephus clearly states later on that the Jews living in Judaea, «who had a strong city and a Temple», as well as the Jews of Alexandria, who lived far away from his reach, would not have sent their sacred money to Cos, since they had nothing to fear from Mithridates. The only possible reason why the Jews were perceived as hostile is probably because of their attitude towards Rome, or more probably because of that of the ruler of Judaea, to whom this money was directed. In fact, although the money belonged to the Jews of Asia, it was directed to the Temple in Jerusalem, and thus the Temple – and not the Jews of Asia – was the ultimate victim of this act of confiscation. Since Alexander Jannaeus was perceived as an enemy, and not as an ally, it seems clear that Mithridates did not take the money as a loan but actually appropriated it, specifically because it was intended for the coffers of an enemy state, Judaea, which was the ally of Rome. Otherwise the episode would have been presented differently by Josephus or by his source, Strabo. This money could in fact have indirectly helped the Roman war effort. If Alexander Jannaeus had been neutral during the conflict between Rome and Mithridates, Mithridates would not have confiscated the 800 talents, since to confiscate the property of a neutral state would have been tantamount to an undeclared act of war. In fact, his action can be explained only if there did indeed exist an a priori treaty between Republican Rome and Hasmonean Judaea, and thus Hasmonean Judaea was regarded by Mithridates as a potential or even active enemy. Second, it is important to analyze the relationship between the Roman Republic, Parthia, and Hasmonean Judaea during this period. Did Parthia, menaced by Mithridates, have a treaty of friendship during this time with the Roman Republic and the Hasmonean kingdom? It is important to note that Pontus, as well as Armenia, its main ally, threatened the interests of Parthia. On the other hand, neither Rome nor Hasmonean Judaea in any way threatened the Parthian Kingdom. Did Alexander Jannaeus make a treaty of alliance with Parthia? Indeed, whether Parthia had a treaty of friendship with Jannaeus at the time is uncertain and cannot be regarded as an indisputable fact. According to Neusner, it is possible to trace a treaty of alliance between King Alexander Jannaeus and the Parthians in Rabbinic literature. The Parthian kings who were possible candidates for this treaty were Mithridates II (123-88 B.C.E.), Gotarzes (91-80 B.C.E.), or Orodes I (80-76 B.C.E.). 40 40 See JT, Berachot 7.2 and JT, Nazir 5.3. See also I. Neusner, A History of the Jews in Babylonia. The Parthian Period (Studia Post-Biblica), Leiden 1995, pp. 25-26. 64 S. Rocca, The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea However, the argument made by Neusner has an insubstantial foundation. First of all, the Rabbinic sources used by Neusner, from the Amoraic period, postdate the events by at least three centuries and are manifestly legendary in character. Goodblatt argues, through a deconstruction of the Talmudic source, that the treaty of alliance between King Alexander Jannaeus and the Parthians is based on events during the reign of Agrippa I and that the hypothesis regarding the relationship between the Hasmonean kingdom and Parthia, as suggested by Neusner and Rappaport, is highly problematic. 41 Thus it is indeed possible that no treaty of alliance was signed between Alexander Jannaeus and Parthia. And yet, even if there is no conclusive proof that Hasmonean Judaea and Parthia forged a formal alliance that had a clearly antiSeleucid impulse or motivation, in any event the two countries were by no means hostile to each other. Moreover, even if we accept at face value the interpolation added to one of Josippon’s manuscripts, there is no reason to believe that that the secret agreement established by John Hyrcanus I with the Parthian king Phraates II against the Seleucid was by then valueless. But then again, the Parthians were ‘informal’ allies of Rome. As I have mentioned earlier, no less than Sulla himself negotiated a treaty with the Parthians in 96 B.C.E., when, as propraetor, he was the governor of Cilicia. According to Plutarch, Sulla met, on the banks of the Euphrates, the Persian ambassador Orobazus, envoy of Arsaces, who requested an alliance and friendship. Plutarch clearly states that «Sulla was the first Roman with whom the Parthians held conference when they wanted alliance and friendship». Thus it appears that Sulla concluded an agreement, somewhat short of a formal treaty, in which the Euphrates was recognized as the border between the territories of the Roman Republic and those of the Parthian kingdom. 42 Sulla had good reasons for establishing diplomatic relations with Parthia. Rome’s ally, Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia, had been exiled by the invasion of Tigranes II of Armenia, father-in-law and ally of Mithridates, and obviously both Pontus and Armenia challenged not only Rome’s interests, but also the interests of Parthia. However, since the sources are silent on the subject, we do not know if the treaty was later legitimized by the Roman Senate. In any event, this episode shows us that Rome was by then aware of Parthian interests in the region, that these interests did not clash with those of Rome, at least for the 41 See Appendix to D. Goodblatt, Agrippa I and Palestinian Judaism in the First Century, «Jewish History» 2 (1987), pp. 16-22. 42 It seems, however, that the agreement was not especially popular either in Rome or in Parthia. Orobazus was executed on his return to Parthia, while Sulla came under criticism. See Plu. Sull. 5.7-10. See also J. Carcopino, Silla, o la monarchia mancata, Milano 1981, p. 40. Carcopino stresses that Sulla’s main purpose as governor of Cilicia was to reintegrate Ariobarzanes philoromaios as King of Cappadocia. Ariobarzanes fled to Rome in 94 B.C.E., when Tigranes II of Armenia, father-in-law of Mithridates, invaded his kingdom. See also Keaveney, Sulla cit., pp. 32-33, 38. Keaveney points that although no treaty was signed, Sulla and the Parthian ambassador reached an agreement by fixing the Euphrates as the boundary between Rome and Parthia. Athenaeum 102/1 (2014) 65 time being, and that there were some points of commonality. Was there an informal agreement, or at least a convergence of interests, between Rome, Judaea and Parthia against Mithridates, Tigranes II, and the Seleucids? Third, it is important to stress the attitude of the Seleucids and the Ptolemies towards Mithridates. Although the Seleucids were neither the allies of Rome or of the Hasmoneans, the Ptolemies were. However, during this period the Ptolemies were divided by internecine strife. It seems that this civil strife resulted in a loosening of the ties between Ptolemaic Egypt and the Roman Republic and in the formation of pro-Roman and anti-Roman factions. But did it result in the Ptolemies’ support for Mithridates? In fact, there some hints that the Ptolemies actually supported Mithridates. According to Appian, in 88 B.C.E., Mithridates was well received in Cos by its inhabitants, who give him the money that Cleopatra had deposited there, and while there he met on friendly terms with the Ptolemaic ruler, the grandson of Queen Cleopatra III. Josephus confirms this piece of information. Thus, in the same passage in which he states that, while in Cos, Mithridates confiscated the money which belonged to the Jews, Josephus also writes that the King of Pontus confiscated the money which belonged to Cleopatra III. 43 Thus it is clear that, on the one hand, Mithridates confiscated the treasure deposited by Cleopatra III, while, on the other hand, he entertained a friendly relationship with the Ptolemaic ruler there, possibly a son of Ptolemy IX Lathyrus. As I mentioned earlier, Josephus also states that Cleopatra III entered into a league with Alexander Jannaeus at Skythopolis, through his Jewish general Ananias. 44 On the other hand, there is no source which records any help that some of the Ptolemies might have given to Rome against Mithridates. Their mighty fleet, for example, could have made a difference. Indeed Ptolemy IX Lathyrus, then ruler of Egypt, stepped away from his alliance with Rome in 86 B.C.E. As Plutarch writes in the Life of Lucullus, «Ptolemy of Egypt (evidently Ptolemy IX Soter-Lathyrus) abandoned his alliance with Rome out of fear for the outcome of war, but furnished Lucullus with ships to convoy him as far as Cyprus». 45 Although Egypt was too geographically distant from Pontus to fear retaliation by Mithridates, the Ptolemaic ruler did not comply with his military obligations as socius et amicus Romani and decided to side with 43 See App. Mith. 23.115. See J. AJ 14.112-113. See Matyszak, Mithridates the Great cit., p. 47. See J. AJ 14.355. 45 See Plu. Luc. 3.1. See also Matyszak, Mithridates the Great cit., p. 86. See also G. Höbl, A History of the Ptolemaic Empire, London 2001, pp. 212-213. Höbl also notes Ptolemy IX’s refusal of help to Lucullus. Before reaching Alexandria, Lucullus went to Cyrene, already annexed to Rome in 94 B.C.E. There according to Plutarch, Lucullus’ arrival seems to have put a belated end to a civil war, which lasted from the departure of the proconsul Caius Claudius Pulcher and which had already raged for seven years. See Plu. Luc. 2.3-4. Josephus, quoting Strabo, narrates an uprising of the Jews in Cyrene during the period, which was quelled by Lucullus. However Plutarch does not mention it. Probably the Jews represented just one side during the civil war in Cyrene. See J. AJ 14.114-118. 44 66 S. Rocca, The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea Mithridates, albeit not in an active way. Moreover it seems that the Ptolemies established familiar ties with the royal family of Pontus. Thus, upon the demise of Ptolemy XI, who died without a male heir, the only available male descendents of the Ptolemy I lineage were the illegitimate sons of Ptolemy IX Lathyrus by an unknown Greek concubine, who were living at Sinope, at the court of Mithridates. Appian also states that the daughter of Mithridates was betrothed to Ptolemy XII Auletes. 46 Thus it seems that Cleopatra III, who established an alliance with Alexander Jannaeus and possibly supported the alliance with Rome, had his treasure confiscated by Mithridates at Cos. On the other hand, her son and adversary, Ptolemy IX Lathyrus entered into very friendly ties with Mithridates and ceased to support Rome. Incidentally, Ptolemy IX Lathyrus was also the enemy of Alexander Jannaeus. A possible hint that the Romans did not appreciate the Ptolemies’ foreign policy is given in the statement of Strabo, found also in Appian, that Ptolemy, ruler of Cyprus and younger brother of Ptolemy XII Auletes, was deposed by M. Cato and committed suicide when the island was annexed by the Romans in 58 B.C.E. 47 There is no hint that the Seleucid kingdom, subject to civil wars between various pretenders, actively supported Mithridates VI against Rome, but as I have demonstrated earlier, King Alexander Jannaeus fought twice against Seleucid rulers, namely Demetrius III Eucaeros and Antiochus XII, as well as against Ptolemy IX Soter. It is possible then, that at the very least, Seleucid Syria hoped to gain a free hand from Mithridates in its campaign against Judaea, which was mired in a state of civil strife and was thus quite vulnerable. On the other hand, the fact that King Alexander Jannaeus fought against two powers whose ‘neutrality’ favored Mithridates over Rome can be interpreted as being a pro-Roman stand. In concluding this part, I would like to note a similar attitude evinced by Sulla as well as King Alexander Jannaeus towards the Greek world, an attitude that fluctuated between moments of enmity and friendship. On the one hand, both leaders had a special cultural affinity with the Hellenistic world. Sulla, for instance, amassed the greatest Greek library in Rome, which included the complete works of Aristotle, while Alexander Jannaeus had Graeco-Jewish philoi at his court and built his Jericho palace in a Hellenistic style. Thus, in practice, the Hasmonean rulers incorporated Greek culture into their lives on various levels. Moreover, there is no evidence of anti-Greek propaganda coloring the relationship between the Hasmoneans and the Greeks, and thus Alexander Jannaeus’ brother, Aristobulus I, is referred to as philellenos. 48 On the other hand, both leaders continued their political repression 46 On the family of Ptolemy IX Lathyrus, see Str. 17.1.11. See also on Ptolemy IX Lathyrus: Just. Epit. 39.4-5 and Paus. 1.9.1-3. On Ptolemy XII Auletes, see Str. 12.3.34, and 17.1.11. On the daughter of Mithridates betrothed to Ptolemy XII Auletes, see App. Mith. 111. 47 See Str. 14.67.6. See also App. BC 2.23. 48 On Aristobulus I as philellenos, see J. AJ 13.318. Yohanan Levy was the first historian who dealt Athenaeum 102/1 (2014) 67 of the Greek cities desire for independence and fought against the Hellenistic kingdoms. Alexander Jannaeus’ wars against the various Graeco-Phoenician and wholly Greek cities in the Land of Israel are well known, and, to cite some examples, he conquered, among others, the cities of Dora, Straton’s Tower, Gaza, and Gadara, depriving them of their independence, which of course resulted in strong resentment on the part of the Greek elites. Rajak points out that it is interesting that although the Greek cities do emerge as victims of greater hostility and wanton brutality, Strabo or Timagenes, as quoted by Josephus, do not suggest any noteworthy enmity on the part of the Hasmoneans towards the Greek cities. Kasher argues that Jewish barbarism in the stories narrating Jewish cruelty have been played up and exaggerated in the historical record. It is not credible that numerous cities were reduced to rubble, only to flourish a generation later. This distortion probably originated in the Greek sources utilized by Josephus. We ought to remember that the use of rhetoric led the Greek historians to exaggerate the catastrophes of war. Besides, Kasher suggests further reasons for conflict and rivalry between the Greek cities and the Jews: first, the natural rivalry between the Greek urban population and the Jewish rural population; second, a mutual economic rivalry; third, the ordinary quarrels occurring between neighbors; and finally such demographic factors as the growth of the Jewish population. 49 In addition, less known is that Sulla himself orwith Greek influence on the Hasmoneans. See Yohanan (Hans) Levy, Worlds Meet, Researches on the Condition of the Jews in the Graeco-Roman World, Jerusalem 1960 (Hebrew). See also J. Gutman - M. Schwabe (eds.), Book Yohanan Levy. Researches on Jewish Hellenism Dedicated to Yohanan Levy, Jerusalem 1949 (Hebrew). The book includes a bibliography of Lewy’s contribution to the research edited by M.M. Plessner (Olamot Nifgashim / Sefer Yoh. anan Lewy. Meh. karim be-Helenismus Yehudi). On the Hasmonean palaces of Jericho see E. Netzer, The Palaces of the Hasmoneans and Herod the Great, Jerusalem 2001, pp. 14-39. On the Hasmonean coins Hellenistic iconography, see Y. Meshorer, Ancient Jewish Coinage, I. Persian Period through Hasmoneans, New York 1982, pp. 61-76. See also U. Rappaport, The Hasmonean State and Hellenism, «Tarbitz» 60 (1991) (Hebrew), pp. 481-490. See also U. Rappaport, The Hellenization of the Hasmoneans, in M. Mor (ed.), Jewish Assimilation, Acculturation and Accommodation: Past Traditions, Current Issues and Future Prospects (Studies in Jewish Civilization) II, New York - London 1991, pp. 2-13. See also T. Rajak, The Hasmoneans and the Uses of Hellenism, in P.R. Davies - R.T. White (eds.), A Tribute to Geza Vermes: Essays in Jewish and Christian Literature and History, Sheffield 1990, pp. 265-271. Rajak argues for the adoption of Greek trappings, already from Judah. Besides she claim as good examples of Greek influence the family tomb erected by the Maccabees in Modi’in, the Greek features that can be noticed in Simon public life, and of course the coinage. 49 See J. AJ 13.356,396 re. Gadara and 358-360,362,365 re. Gaza. See also Rajak, The Hasmoneans and the Uses of Hellenism cit., pp. 271-278. See also Kasher, Jews and Hellenistic Cities in Eretz-Israel cit. On the relationship between the Greek cities and the Jews, see pp. 14-54 on the early Hellenistic period; see pp. 55-115 on the early Hasmoneans till Simon; and pp. 116-192 for the period from the accession of John Hyrcanus I till 37 B.C.E. Kasher argues that although the Hasmonean success fostered anti-Jewish sentiments, this hatred was present before. Indeed Antiochus IV’s persecution was supported by the Greek cities. Kasher also add that the Hellenistic cities relied for support on foreign power, such as the Ptolemies, the Seleucids, and the Romans. This resulted in mistrust between the Jews and the ruling foreign powers. 68 S. Rocca, The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea dered the sack of Athens, which had been the cradle of Graeco-Roman culture. That the Sullan sack was a serious setback for the Attic city is clear. After Xerxes’ destruction of the city in 480 B.C.E., Sulla’s series of destructive military forays are next in the history of Athens. 50 B. Rome and Queen Salome Alexandra Sulla and King Alexander Jannaeus disappeared from the political scene more or less at the same time. Sulla died in 78 B.C.E. and Alexander Jannaeus in 76 B.C.E. For the Roman Republic, the years which followed the death of Sulla until Pompey took command in the East in 66 B.C.E. were years of relative peace, notwithstanding the revolts of Lepidus and of Sertorius in Spain and the Servile War. 51 During this time frame, however, policy in the Roman Republic changed in the Hellenistic East. As consequence of the two Mithridatic Wars, Rome began to take control of various peripheral small Hellenistic states – annexing Bithynia in 75-74 B.C.E., conquering Crete in 69 B.C.E., and having Cyrenaica bequeathed to the Roman Republic in 96 B.C.E. 52 The annexation of Bithynia resulted in a further war, the Third Mithridatic War with Mithridates VI of Pontus, who felt threatened and once more declared war on Rome. In 74 B.C.E. Lucullus was elected consul and was given command of the army against Mithridates, defeating him in 72 B.C.E. in Pontus and expelling him from his own country the following year; in 71 B.C.E. Mithridates escaped to the protection of his son-in-law, Tigranes II King of Armenia; and Lucullus subsequently invaded Armenia in 69 B.C.E., defeating Tigranes and conquering Tigranocerta, his capital. 53 Besides, it is interesting that the Parthians still viewed Rome as a friendly power. 54 How did these events, especially Lucullus’s campaign against Tigranes, and the new policy of annexations that were carried out by the Roman Republic influence the relationship between the Roman Republic and the Hasmonean State? If Republican Rome and Hasmonean Judaea were still allies, is there any hint that this 50 On Sulla’s Greek Library, which included the works of Aristotle, see Plu. Sull. 26.1-2. Re. Sulla and Athens, see C. Habicht, Athens from Alexander to Antony, Cambridge, Mass. 1999, pp. 297-314. For Sulla’s dictatorship in Rome, see Keaveney, Sulla cit., pp. 124-176. See also Green, Alexander to Actium cit., pp. 563564, 569, and 571. 51 See Cary-Scullard, History of Rome cit., pp. 239-242. 52 See Gruen, The Hellenistic World cit. I, p. 12 nt. 38. See also Will, Histoire politique du monde helle´nistique cit., pp. 517-526. 53 On the campaign of Lucullus against Tigranes II, see Plu. Luc. 9.3; 14.5-6; 19.1; 21.2-29.8; 31.132.5. See Matyszak, Mithridates the Great cit., pp. 101-145. 54 Plutarch mentions that Lucullus received an embassy from the king of the Parthians inviting him into friendly alliance. Thus Lucullus in his turn sent an embassy to the Parthian. However as Lucullus learns of the Parthians’ double dealings, as they secretly asked for Mesopotamia, he wish to march against them, but his army refuses. See Plu. Luc. 30.1-4. Athenaeum 102/1 (2014) 69 alliance continued during Salome Alexandra’s reign? Although Josephus does not mention a renewal of the treaty with Rome during Salome Alexandra’s reign, it seems to me that a careful reading of Josephus’ Antiquities and War shows that, at the very least, during this period Rome and Judaea faced the same enemy, Tigranes II, King of Armenia. In Judaea, Salome Alexandra, the wife of both King Judah Aristobulus I and of King Alexander Jannaeus became queen in 76 B.C.E., ruling peacefully for ten years, until 66 B.C.E. 55 However, the peaceful foreign policy of the queen was put under strain when she was faced with the enmity of Tigranes of Armenia, ally and father-in-law of Mithridates VI of Pontus, during the Third Mithridatic War. Although Roman sources are silent on the subject, according to Josephus, Queen Salome Alexandra had to face the entire army of Tigranes II of Armenia, who coveted the remnants of Seleucid Syria. The Seleucid dynasty was foundering in civil wars, and it was already clear that Syria, the only remaining Seleucid territory, was ripe for annexation by a bigger power. But by whom – Armenia, Judaea, or Egypt? Although still a local power, Hasmonean Judaea was too small a state, and Queen Salome Alexandra probably disdained territorial expansion. Egypt was also in the midst of civil strife, and thus only Tigranes II of Armenia was ready for the conquest of Seleucid Syria. Tigranes, however, did not stop at Syria and soon readied himself to move against Judaea. According to Josephus’ Antiquities, Hasmonean Judaea was not militarily prepared to face the Armenians, and Queen Salome Alexandra allied herself with the Seleucid Queen Cleopatra Selene, who was now besieged in Ptolemais by Tigranes. Salome Alexandra sent ambassadors to Tigranes, persuading him not to fight against Judaea. However, as soon as Ptolemais fell to the Armenians, Tigranes received the news that Lucullus, pursuing Mithridates, was laying waste to Armenia. Tigranes had to retreat, and Judaea was now definitively free from the Armenian threat. In War, Josephus presents a different version of the episode, writing that Queen Salome Alexandra sent her army against Damascus, under the pretense that a certain Ptolemy was oppressing it, and took possession of the city. Salome Alexandra also convinced Tigranes King of Armenia with agreements and presents to withdraw, while he was besieging Cleopatra Selene in Ptolemais. However, Tigranes left in hurry because Lucullus was in Armenia. 56 55 Re. Queen Salome Alexandra, see J. AJ 13.405-432; BJ 1.107-119. See also Schürer, History of the Jewish People cit. I, pp. 229-323. On the reign of Salome Alexandra, see also K. Atkinson, The Salome No One Knows: Long-Time Ruler of a Prosperous and Peaceful Judea Mentioned in Dead Sea Scrolls, «Biblical Archaeology Review» 34 (2008), pp. 60-65 and 72-73. 56 Josephus writes in Antiquities that Tigranes invaded Seleucid Syria with no fewer than 500,000 soldiers. See J. AJ 13.419-421. See also Josephus, BJ 1.115-116. According to Shatzman, Queen Alexandra Salome raised for the occasion an army of no fewer than 40,000 men. See I. Shatzman, The Armies of the Hasmonaeans and Herod (Texte und Studien zum antiken Judentum 25), Tübingen 1991, pp. 34-35, 135, 313, and 314. 70 S. Rocca, The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea I would argue that to Josephus, we can add the Book of Judith as a further source on the conflict between Salome Alexandra and Tigranes II. Some years ago, I published an article, in which I argued that Judith may be identified with Queen Salome Alexandra. It seems that the story narrated in the Book of Judith relates the war between the powerful King Tigranes II of Armenia and Queen Salome Alexandra. Boccaccini arrived exactly at the same conclusions. 57 In concluding, it seems to me that the two versions of Josephus do not really contradict one another, since it is likely that the purpose of Queen Salome Alexandra was not really to fight against Tigranes – though she was prepared for this possibility – but that she was resisting Tigranes with the knowledge that Lucullus was organizing a military strike in Armenia, and thus Tigranes had no choice but to retreat from the borders of Judaea to face the Roman army of Lucullus, which was making a swift advance in enemy territory. Although there is no firm proof that Lucullus and Salome Alexandra may have collaborated against Mithridates and Tigranes, nor of course that the two coordinated their military operations, it seems important to point to the fact that during this period Republican Rome and Hasmonean Judaea had the same enemies. 4. Pompey and the End of the Hasmonean Kingdom We might rightly wonder why Pompey waged war against the Hasmonean kingdom in 63 B.C.E., if the Hasmonean rulers of Judaea had been friendly, until that juncture, towards the Roman Republic and had honored the treaty of friendship, or at least did not take any hostile action towards Rome or towards any of her allies. Besides, in any case, there is no source that can suggest that the treaty of friendship between the Hasmoneans and Rome was not in effect in 63 B.C.E., on the eve of Pompey’s conquest of Judaea. But, did Pompey actually wage war against a friendly state, and did he have any personal motivations for doing so? The Roman policy of annexations in the Hellenistic East, which began in the early seventies, continued. In 67 B.C.E. Pompey was given a special command against the Pirates in Cilicia, in agreement with the Lex Gabinia, 58 defeating the 57 It seems to me that the author of the Book of Judith was probably a Sadducee, and the book was a vehicle for criticizing contemporary Pharisee leadership, which was then in power. See Rocca, The Book of Judith and Queen Shlomzion cit., pp. 85-98. See also G. Boccaccini, Tigranes the Great as ‘Nebuchadnezzar’ in the Book of Judith, in G.G. Xeravitz (ed.), A Pious Seductress (Studies in the Book of Judith, Deuterocanonical and Cognate Lecture Studies 14), Berlin - New York 2012, pp. 55-69. 58 See Plu. Pomp. 30.1. Because of the growing power of the populares, Pompey was given the absolute command against the Cilician Pirates. On the Lex Gabinia see P. Southern, Pompey the Great, Briscombe Port Stroud 2002, pp. 59-62. See Cary-Scullard, History of Rome cit., p. 244. Athenaeum 102/1 (2014) 71 pirates in less than six months. In 66 B.C.E. he took over from Lucullus’ command of the army that was fighting against Mithridates, under pressure from the populares, under the Lex Manilia, 59 and Mithridates was once more defeated. 60 Pompey then moved against Tigranes of Armenia, whose son deserted to the Romans, and Tigranes eventually surrendered to Pompey. In 64 B.C.E., Pompey marched into Syria, deposed its last Seleucid ruler and reconstituted it as the Roman province of Syria. Then he moved southwards and established Roman supremacy in Phoenicia. Does the active interference of the Roman warlord in the affairs of Syria foreshadow the coming invasion of the Hasmonean kingdom? By now the territories of the Roman Republic bordered with Hasmonean Judaea, which was possibly perceived as a threat by the Roman Republic, just as the Seleucid kingdom had once been. Since the whole of the coastal strip was considered by all ancient conquerors, the Romans included, to be a single geopolitical area, the conquest of the Hasmonean kingdom and the fight against Aristobulus II which ensued could appear to be a completely logical political move that does not entail special explanations. But what if the Hasmonean state was still an ally and friend – at least officially – of the Roman Republic? By this time, however, the situation of Hasmonean Judaea had changed dramatically. If, to the eyes of an outsider such as Pompey, Hasmonean Judaea possibly appeared to be a strong local power that needed to be coped with, in fact by then Judaea had been greatly weakened by three years of civil war. After the death of Queen Salome Alexandra, Judaea was prey to civil strife between the queen’s heirs, Hyrcanus II and Aristobulus II. 61 Scaurus, Pompey’s envoy to Syria, was approached by envoys of both Hyrcanus II and Aristobulus II, who offered bribes, and since the envoys of Aristobulus II offered a larger bribe, Scaurus sided with Aristobulus II. 62 Pompey, however, situated in Damascus, did not confirm his envoy’s choice but received three delegations, the first headed by Hyrcanus II, the second by Aristobulus II, and the third one headed by various Jewish leaders who complained that they did not want to be under the rule of kings, but only under that of priests, because «this was the form of government they received from their forefathers». 63 It is important to point out that Josephus writes in Antiquities that 59 See, of course, Cic. Leg. Man. Re. the Lex Manilia, see Southern, Pompey the Great cit., p. 66. See Cary-Scullard, History of Rome cit., p. 244. 60 See Cary-Scullard, History of Rome cit., pp. 253-254. See Matyszak, Mithridates the Great cit., pp. 145-162. See Will, Histoire politique du monde helle´nistique cit., pp. 499-504. 61 See J. AJ 14.1-22 and BJ 1.120-126. See also Schürer, History of the Jewish People cit. I, pp. 233-242 and 267-269. 62 See J. AJ 14.29-32 and BJ 1.128-130. 63 See J. AJ 14.33-46 and BJ 1.131-132. Aristobulus II certainly did not endear himself to Scaurus and Gabinius, Pompey’s two lieutenants, Scaurus and Gabinius, by revealing that they had taken bribes and were clearly corrupt. 72 S. Rocca, The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea the enemies of Aristobulus II accused him of piracy, 64 and hence it is important to clarify whether or not Aristobulus II collaborated with the Cilician pirates as well as with Mithridates or whether these accusations were merely a slander. Rappaport argues in his article that Alexander Jannaeus could have collaborated with the Cilician pirates. Undeniably, Josephus mentions both Cilicians and Pisidians serving in the king’s army as mercenaries. However, a careful reading of Josephus indicates that the Cilicians employed by Alexander Jannaeus were probably soldiers, not sailors. Thus if Pompey were referring to these mercenaries when he leveled a charged against Aristobulus II, he would have charged Aristobulus II with banditry by land and not piracy by sea, as Josephus clearly states. Besides, there is no motivation for thinking that the enrollment of foreign mercenaries in Alexander Jannaeus’ army did in any way disturb the Romans. Last but not least, Josephus clearly states that Alexander Jannaeus enrolled Pisidians and Cilicians in his armed forces, since he did not wish to enroll Syrians because of their innate hostility towards Jews. We must keep in mind also that these Cilicians, while serving as regular soldiers with Alexander Jannaeus in Judaea, could not have committed any acts of piracy far away in Cilicia, at least during the time of their employment by the Hasmonean army. 65 Besides, both Rappaport and Pucci point out that Josippon mentions that the arrest of Aristobulus II was attributed to his contact with Mithridates, which had to be dated before 68 B.C.E. However, as I have argued before, while Rappaport contends that Alexander Jannaeus had already established a friendly relationship with Mithridates, Pucci Ben Zeev argues that it was through the initiative of Aristobulus II that an alliance with Pontus was established. 66 Thus, this last possibility, that Pompey’s accusations were merely a slander, seems to me to be the most probable situation, since in 66 B.C.E. the pirates’ menace had ceased in consequence of Pompey’s steady and quick campaign the previous year, in 67 B.C.E. On the other hand, it is quite possible, as Pucci Ben Zeev argues, that Aristobulus II established a formal alliance with Mithridates. According to Josephus, Pompey decided against Aristobulus II. He had three good reasons: first, because Hyrcanus accused Aristobulus of having deprived him of his rights as first-born; second, because Aristobulus had taken most of the country by force; and third, because Aristobulus was accused of having instigated the raids against neighboring peoples and acts of piracy at sea. 67 Yet, it seems that Pompey, for the time being at least, recognized the status of king conferred upon him by the Jews, even if it was contested by Hyrcanus II and by the Jewish delegation. In64 See J. AJ 14.43. See J. BJ 1.88 on Pisidians and Cilicians mercenaries. See also Rappaport, La Jude´e et Rome pendant le re`gne d’Alexandre Janne´e cit., pp. 329-342. 66 See Pucci Ben Zeev, Jewish-Parthian Relations in Josephus cit., pp. 13-14. 67 See J. AJ 14.42-46. 65 Athenaeum 102/1 (2014) 73 deed, in the eyes of Pompey, after the settlement of 67 B.C.E., when Hyrcanus II abdicated, Aristobulus appeared to be the legitimate ruler and holder of the title ‘king’. It was the Jews who had bestowed the title on him four years before Pompey arrived in Syria, and, actually, Josephus records that both Aristobulus II and Hyrcanus II were regarded as kings by their Jewish subjects, even when Rome denied them that title and considered them to be merely ethnarchs. 68 Moreover, both Plutarch and Appian refer to Aristobulus II by the title of ‘king’. Perhaps neither Plutarch nor Appian had any knowledge of the dispute between Hyrcanus II and Aristobulus II, of their meeting with Pompey, and of Pompey’s decision. However, since they were aware that Aristobulus II was later the leader of the resistance against Rome, they may have inferred that he was the King of the Jews. 69 Until that point in his text, Josephus does not emphasize in any way that Pompey was moving against a hostile state. On the contrary, both Hyrcanus II and Aristobulus II tried to gain first Scaurus’ support and then Pompey’s support for their respective factions. Thus it seems to me that if the treaty of friendship was no longer valid, neither Hyrcanus II nor Aristobulus II would have appealed to Pompey and submitted to his judgment. In any event, Aristobulus II did not wait for Pompey’s decision, but prepared to resist the Romans by force, sequestering himself with his supporters in Jerusalem, the capital of the kingdom, and beginning preparations to withstand the Roman siege. The Roman army of Pompey besieged and ultimately conquered Jerusalem, making Aristobulus II a prisoner. It is possible that at this juncture Aristobulus II made a treaty with Mithridates, as Josippon reports, to make the point that he was taking a stand against Rome. The significance of this treaty would have been merely symbolic, however, and could not have occurred before 66 B.C.E., at which time Mithridates was no longer a powerful figure, but merely a symbol of the Hellenistic world. It is important to point out that during the siege of Jerusalem Pompey’s army fought against the supporters of Aristobulus II, but not against the regular Hasmonean army. Thus there was no war between Hyrcanus II, and the Romans. 70 Why did Pompey act in this fashion? The answer appears to lie in the details of his military and political career, which were replete with anomalies. 71 As the son 68 See J. AJ 14.4-6,97,157,163,165 and 172. See also, BT, Rosh. Hash. 18b. See also Marcus’ note in the LCL translation, vol. VII, p. 523, n.f. On Aristobulus II see also J.A. Goldstein, The Hasmonean Revolt and the Hasmonean Dynasty, in W.D. Davies - L. Finkelstein (eds.), The Cambridge History of Judaism, II. The Hellenistic Age, Cambridge 1989, p. 350. 69 See Plu. Pomp. 45. See also App. BC 12.117. 70 See J. AJ 14.46-73 and BJ 1.133-158. For the exact chronology of events regarding Aristobulus, see Southern, Pompey the Great cit., p. 163 ntt. 52 and 53. See also J. Bellemore, Josephus, Pompey and the Jews, «Historia» 48 (1999), pp. 95-118. According to Bellemore, the sources used by Josephus in Antiquities are Roman, or pro-Roman, while the sources used in War stem from a Jewish bias. 71 Re. the irregularities of Pompey’s career see R. Seager, Pompey: A Political Biography, Oxford 1979, 74 S. Rocca, The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea of Pompeius Strabo, a Picentine who was perhaps of Celtic stock, Pompey began his career as a mere eques, 72 who, during the Civil War, enrolled in a private army, fought on the side of Sulla, and was awarded two triumphs. Yet Pompey needed true prestige through a triumph that showcased a foreign king. The Roman elite during Sulla’s tenure and afterwards was Senatorial only. In 70 B.C.E. he was elected consul together with Crassus, without even being a Senator, and without a regular cursus honorum. 73 The Lex Gabinia and later on the Lex Manilia undoubtedly were a much needed help in promoting Pompey’s political career. Pompey’s sole military victory was that against the Cilician pirates, who were not really such difficult adversaries or even a sovereign state. Moreover, until then, Pompey’s victories had been against other Romans, such as Sertorius, or against slaves or pirates, or against gladiators such as Spartacus. All of these victories surely did not enhance the reputation of Pompey, but only served to tarnish it. Pompey could not aspire to a triumph or even to an ovation with any of these victories and thus needed true military glory, which could only be brought about by fighting against a king. Indeed Plutarch includes among the nations vanquished by Pompey – together with Judaea – also Pontus, Armenia, Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, Media, Colchis, Iberia, Albania, Syria, Cilicia, Mesopotamia, Phoenicia, Palestine, and Arabia. 74 Besides, Aristobulus II was not the only defeated leader led in the triumph. Although Mithridates – who was already dead by the time – and Tigranes were not be led in triumph, huge pictures of them were carried along. Moreover, five of Mithridates’s sons, as well as Tigranes, the son of Tigranes the Great, were carried in the triumphal procession, together with Olthaces, chief of the Colchians; the tyrants of the Cilicians; the female rulers of the Scythians; three chiefs of the Iberians; and two of the Albanians. 75 The truth, however, was that Mithridates, King of Pontus, and Tigranes II, King of Armenia, had been actually defeated by Lucullus, and not by Pompey. Plutarch twice states that Pompey superseded Lucullus, since «the latter was robbed of the glory of his achievements». Moreover, he «had been forced to relinquish and turn over to others, not his campaign, but the prizes of victory in his campaign». All of Rome knew that Lucullus was prevented from attaining his final p. 188. Seager sums up these anomalies, noting that Pompey held two triumphs as an equestrian, entered the Senate as Consul, and was awarded military commands while a private citizen. 72 According to Plu. Pomp. 22.3-6, Pompey was transferred once more to the equestrian order after his huge triumph, only to be accepted some time later as a promoted member of the Senatorial Order. Thus, in the front of the censor, Pompey showed that he performed his military service with himself as imperator. See also Southern, Pompey the Great cit., p. 37 on Pompey’s first triumph as eques somewhere between 82 and 79 B.C.E. See p. 53 re. Pompey’s second triumph as eques in 71 B.C.E. 73 Re. Pompey’s consulate in 70 B.C.E., see Southern, Pompey the Great cit., pp. 53-56. See also E. Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic, Berkeley, Ca. 1974, passim, re. Pompey’s anomalous position in the Roman Republic. 74 See Plu. Pomp. 45. 75 See App. Mith. 12.116-117. Athenaeum 102/1 (2014) 75 victory only because of political reasons. 76 Thus in the eyes of the Roman elite and populace, the only two rulers mentioned as kings, together with Aristobulus II – namely Mithridates and Tigranes, who were indeed the most important foes defeated by Pompey – had already been defeated by Lucullus. Besides the other rulers mentioned by Appian, Olthaces, chief of the Colchians, the tyrants of the Cilicians, and the female rulers of the Scythians, three chiefs of the Iberians, and two of the Albanians did not bear the title of king. Thus even if Judaea was by no means the most important of Pompey’s conquests, Aristobulus II was the only king who had not been previously defeated by a Roman leader, as was the case with Mithridates and Tigranes. Besides, as both Plutarch and Appian report, Aristobulus II was the only living king who adorned Pompey’s triumph, and thus could be displayed to the Roman populace as a tangible sign of his triumph. 77 Thus Pompey could only gain from recognizing the title of king that Aristobulus II had had bestowed upon him by the Jews and thus, even if at Damascus Pompey had decided against Aristobulus II, and deprived Hyrcanus II of his right as first-born and thus of his legitimate rights as heir to the throne, in the events that ensued he dealt with Aristobulus as a king and not a mere usurper. As soon as Pompey recognized Aristobulus II as king of Judaea, thus denying the title to its rightful bearer – Hyrcanus II, his ally – Pompey had an excuse to act harshly towards Judaea, since its ostensible king, Aristobulus II, had acted in an unfriendly way. The title of King, assumed by Aristobulus, was ultimately helpful in inflating the significance of Pompey’s campaign. Thus the conquest of Jerusalem won him the immortal glory that had not been attained through his campaigns against Mithridates and Tigranes, who had already defeated by Lucullus, and thus Pompey’s struggle for power in Rome and his somewhat anomalous position there was what brought about the end of the Hasmonean kingdom and not any real or imagined wrong perpetrated by the Hasmonean rulers against Rome. Conclusion In conclusion, the Hasmonean state met its end at the hands of Pompey, not 76 Plu. Pomp. 30.3 and 35.7. See also Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic cit., pp. 148, 266-267. 77 See Plu. Pomp. 45. In the description of the Triumph of Pompey, Aristobulus King of the Jews is the only king. Appianus wrote that King Aristobulus revolted against Rome, and thus Pompey captured Jerusalem. See App. BC 12.117. Later on, in the triumphal procession of Pompey, the only king mentioned is Aristobulus King of Jews (App. BC 12.106). Once more, like Plutarch, Appian emphasizes a triumph over a king. See also Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic cit., on Pompey’s triumph, pp. 80, 86-87, and 267. 76 S. Rocca, The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea because, between the years 103-63 B.C.E., it had supported the enemies of the Roman Republic, but because Pompey wished to advance his political career. As I have argued, it is quite possible that Hasmonean Judaea supported Rome twice during the Mithridatic wars, first when King Alexander Jannaeus supported Rome during the First Mithridatic War, and second, when Queen Salome Alexandra supported Lucullus during the Third Mithridatic War. During the Civil War against Pompey, Iulius Caesar immediately understood that for the sake of balance in the Hellenistic East, there was need for a strong hand in Judaea. By now the predominance of the Roman Republic was indeed threatened in the East by Parthians, in consequence of the defeat of Crassus at Carrhae in 54 B.C.E. At the beginning, Iulius Caesar wished for a complete restoration of Aristobulus’ branch of the Hasmonean dynasty, but Aristobulus was poisoned by Pompey’s friends. However, as Hyrcanus II actively supported Iulius Caesar during the Alexandrian War, Iulius Caesar, like Pompey before him, turned to Hyrcanus II, who by now had been ruler of Judaea for more than fifteen years. 78 However, Iulius Caesar found in Antipater, epitropos of Judaea – rather than in Hyrcanus II – a strong figure and having found this strong figure, Caesar immediately began to restore Hasmonean Judaea, partially, to its former status of pre-63 B.C.E. Yet the differences between the situation before 63 B.C.E. and that of 46 B.C.E. were enormous: before 63 B.C.E. Judaea was an independent kingdom, while in 46 B.C.E., Judea was completely under Roman jurisdiction from the political, economic, social and military points of view. 79 Some years later, Anthony as well as Augustus, continued Iulius Caesar’s policy. They promoted Herod, the son of Antipater, although this resulted in the creation of a new dynasty in Judaea, the Herodians, and in the end of the Hasmonean monarchy of Kings and High Priests. Once more, under Herod, the destinies of Rome and Judaea were conjoined. Herodian Judaea, which showed itself to be a faithful ally of Rome, soon enjoyed the same borders that it had had during the reign of King Alexander Jannaeus. BIBLIOGRAPHY Atkinson, K., The Salome No One Knows: Long-Time Ruler of a Prosperous and Peaceful Judea Mentioned in Dead Sea Scrolls, «Biblical Archaeology Review» 34 (2008), pp. 60-65 and 72-73. Badian, E., Foreign Clientelae, 264-70 BC, Oxford 1958. 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I-II, Jerusalem 1978-1980. Flusser, D. (ed.), Josippon: The Original Version MS Jerusalem 8 41280 and Supplements, Jerusalem 1978. Goldstein, J.A., The Hasmonean Revolt and the Hasmonean Dynasty, in W.D. Davies - L. Finkelstein (eds.), The Cambridge History of Judaism, II. The Hellenistic Age, Cambridge 1989, pp. 292-351. Goodblatt, D., Agrippa I and Palestinian Judaism in the First Century, «Jewish History» 2 (1987), pp. 16-22. Green, P., Alexander to Actium. The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age, Berkeley, Ca. 1993. Gruen, E.S., The Last Generation of the Roman Republic, Berkeley, Ca. 1974. Gruen, E.S., The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome, Berkeley, Ca. 1986. Gutman, J. - Schwabe, M. (eds.), Book Yohanan Levy. Researches on Jewish Hellenism Dedicated to Yohanan Levy, Jerusalem 1949 (Hebrew). Habicht, C., Athens from Alexander to Antony, Cambridge, Mass. 1999. Harris, W.V., War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, Oxford 1979. 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Persian Period through Hasmoneans, New York 1982. Morstein Kallet-Marx, R., Hegemony to Empire. The Development of the Roman Imperium in the East from 148 to 62 B.C. (Hellenistic Culture and Society 15), Berkeley 1995. Netzer, E., The Palaces of the Hasmonaeans and Herod the Great, Jerusalem 2001. Neusner, I., A History of the Jews in Babylonia. The Parthian Period (Studia Post-Biblica), Leiden 1995. Pucci Ben Zeev, M., On the Tendentiousness of Josephus’ Historical Writing, in U. Rappaport (ed.): Josephus Flavius, Historian of Eretz-Israel in the Hellenistic-Roman Period, Jerusalem 1982, pp. 117-130. Pucci Ben Zeev, M., Jewish-Parthian Relations in Josephus, «The Jerusalem Cathedra» 3 (1983), pp. 13-25. Pucci Ben Zeev, M., Caesar’s Decrees in the ‘Antiquities’: Josephus’ Forgeries or Authentic Roman ‘senatus consulta’?, «Athenaeum» 84/1 (1996), pp. 71-91. Rajak, T., The Hasmoneans and the Uses of Hellenism, in P.R. Davies - R.T. 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The Late Roman Republic and Hasmonean Judaea

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