Can military service bridge social schisms: the case of Israel

Israel Affairs ISSN: 1353-7121 (Print) 1743-9086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fisa20 Can military service bridge social schisms: the case of Israel Elisheva Rosman To cite this article: Elisheva Rosman (2020) Can military service bridge social schisms: the case of Israel, Israel Affairs, 26:3, 348-370, DOI: 10.1080/13537121.2020.1754578 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2020.1754578 Published online: 27 Apr 2020. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 28 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fisa20 ISRAEL AFFAIRS 2020, VOL. 26, NO. 3, 348–370 https://doi.org/10.1080/13537121.2020.1754578 Can military service bridge social schisms: the case of Israel Elisheva Rosman Department of Political Studies, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel ABSTRACT Can the military bridge social schisms? Conventional wisdom supports this assumption. However, it seems that, at best, the effect of military service on bridging social schisms and promoting social cohesion is limited. This article examines the extended effect of contact hypothesis in the military, both in practice and as an element capable of bringing about a change in veterans’ thinking. It asks: are veterans who had diverse friendships during their service more likely to have diverse friendships in the future? If so, do they attribute their ability and willingness to include others within their ingroup to their military service? Based on findings from a study of Israeli college and university students, the article demonstrates that while indeed service friendships may be short lived, service alongside members of outgroups has certain longer-term effects and influences the social perception of veterans. Social messages can be both positive and negative and teach veterans the limits of redrawing social boundaries. KEYWORDS Contact hypothesis; military socialisation; Israel defence forces; IDF; social identity; military veterans; civil-military relations Viewing the military as a social experience is not unusual. Conventional wisdom sees the military as a socialisation tool, able to bridge social gaps and contribute to social and national resilience; an important component in modern conflict.1 Some Western countries are considering reinstating conscription with this idea in mind. Others utilise military service overtly when seeking social means. For example, Norway’s attempt to bridge gender issues through joint dorms in its armed forces.2 However, it seems that, at best, the effect of military service on bridging social schisms and promoting social cohesion is limited. After discharge, veterans return to their pervious preconceptions of social groups.3 It is also possible that not only is the military unable to heal social rifts, but that at times it even exacerbates them.4 Why then do societies continue to attempt to utilise military service for social ends? Can it be that despite evidence to the contrary, societies prefer to believe the military is able to serve as a long-term socialising agent? In other CONTACT Elisheva Rosman elisheva.rosman-stollman@biu.ac.il Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan 52900, Israel © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group Department of Political Studies, ISRAEL AFFAIRS 349 words, is the theory so appealing, that it lives on despite evidence to the contrary? Conversely, perhaps some form of extended social effect does exist concerning veterans, and this may justify the idea that the military can serve as a ‘school for the nation’? If this is so, to what extent? The following article seeks to test this idea through the possibility of longterm social effects of service. It asks: are veterans who had diverse friendships during their service more likely to have diverse friendships in the future? If so, do they attribute their ability and willingness to include others within their ingroup to their military service? This would indicate an extended social impact on veterans and at least a willingness to see an integrated collective, based on military service; a factor contributing to social cohesion and resilience. If there is some form of extended effect, this can contribute to the understanding of the persistence of the theory of the military as a social tool. While an extended effect will not explain the theory in its entirety or prove it, it can contribute to our understanding of the continued use of the military as a ‘school for the nation’ and what military service can and cannot do socially. After briefly discussing contact hypothesis and social identity in the context of military service and conscription, the article will present the case study of Israel, including findings from a study of Israeli undergraduate students. The findings demonstrate that while service friendships may not extend past service, service alongside members of outgroups has certain longer-term effects and influences the social perception of veterans. These effects are complex and have numerous implications. Veterans learn to live with members of outgroups, but this experience teaches a range of social lessons; not all of which are positive. Military service as a social laboratory In the field of civil-military relations and military psychology, research asks how can the military as an organisation (or units within it) cause members to perform well as a group, even die for each other, despite differences.5 Where social psychologists discuss why people choose to belong to a group or choose to stay within it, military-related research focuses on how to encourage members to feel a deep and meaningful connection to a collective they didn’t necessarily choose. One of the ways to do this is through socialisation and bridging social rifts and therefore civil-military relations has focused on contact hypothesis as the accepted tool in achieving this. According to this perception, the military plays an active role in trying to form the social identity soldiers bring with them from civilian life. It attempts to cause soldiers to adopt an alternate or substantiating interpretation of their pre-service social identity in order to feel part of the group (military unit).6 As part of this process, the military system wants its soldiers to accept as equals members of social groups and sectors they did not view as 350 E. ROSMAN belonging to their ingroup before enlistment.7 To change their original conception of what ‘we’ means.8 For the military organisation, this is important internally (in order to foster unit cohesion and loyalty) and allows it to receive legitimisation from society (by being seen not only as a wielder of violence but a promoter of positive values). Allport9 demonstrated that when individuals from different social groups come into contact, there is a genuine possibility for social acceptance. This process is not necessarily irreversible and is sometimes painfully slow, but it does and can happen.10 Change occurs, according to Allport, when members of the majority group view members of the minority as equals and notes that ‘contact must reach below the surface in order to be effective in altering prejudice’.11 In this respect, Allport supports the idea that having a common goal that brings people together is significant and encourages them to cooperate.12 When this happens, true contact occurs and undermines prejudice.13 These ideas are a prism through which to view the military as a tool for socialisation. Further to Allport’s ideas, contact hypothesis was used in connection with the US military to advance two more agendas: accepting gays openly into the military (specifically abolishing ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ – DADT) and the integration of women in the ranks. MacCoun et. al. explain that contact hypothesis has been proven to a large extent in armed forces and that ‘research indicates that mere group membership–e.g. randomly assigning individuals to ad-hoc groups–is sufficient to create an ingroup bias’.14 In other words, a military unit is favourably predisposed towards its members (those considered part of the group), more than towards members of other units, even if its members are of heterogeneous socio-ethnic or racial backgrounds. The integration of women in the military has raised the issue of professionalism as a prerequisite for task cohesion: a unit is cohesive if its members perceive each other as military professionals.15 In all of these cases, research does not include the effect of contact hypothesis on feelings towards all members of a minority, but on the feelings towards the members of the specific military unit at hand. It also does not ask what happens to these feelings after discharge. Obviously, individuals do not always identify with the wish to include Others in their ingroup16; particularly in a conscript-based force where soldiers do not choose to enlist. The current discussion concerning contact hypothesis in the military and its ability or inability to bridge social rifts does not address the effect of military service on social identity. This is puzzling. If the military can serve as a ‘school for the nation’, it serves to follow that this role includes impact on social identity after the return to civilian society. Consequently, scholarship should focus on veterans. Once they return to civilian life, do veterans continue to adhere by the new social boundaries set by service, or do they return to their original perception of these boundaries? At the same time, do ISRAEL AFFAIRS 351 they think that in practice they are upholding the new boundaries introduced to them during service, regardless of what is happening in practice? This would indicate that they are aware of the social messages the military instilled in them and internalised them, even if in practice they do not always adhere to them. These questions can be answered in part by using the concept of social perceptions. The idea that the perceptions are an important variable in actual behaviour towards outgroups has been examined in the context of social psychology.17 It seems that even imagining positive interaction with members of minorities is enough to influence social perceptions: if we believe interaction with a minority member will be favourable, this belief will influence the way we relate to members of that minority in reality. While these studies deal only with civilians, their findings might indicate that positive interaction with minority members during military service (‘I served with someone gay in the army and she was a great person’) will influence future interactions and cause majority members to respond positively towards minority members.18 Testing this idea through a conscription-based military allows for the examination of social attitudes of majority and minority groups that did not choose to serve together. At the same time, using a military that considers itself a social tool,19 actively attempting to influence social boundaries, is also important in this context. Therefore using the Israeli example is helpful when exploring questions regarding contact hypothesis and the military’s effect on veterans. It also enables an examination of a theory perceived to be true by large segments of the population, regardless of proof that it does not achieve what it sets out to do. Veterans, belief in contact hypothesis and the Israel defence forces (IDF) The IDF was constructed as a people’s army and still sees itself as such. This was due to the social makeup of Israel at its establishment when it grew from a population of approximately 800,000 in 1948 to over 1 million in 1949 and to over 2 million in 1958.20 Absorbing immigrants from many different countries over such a short time created social schisms the military was supposed to ease. Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion thought that conscription would be the last opportunity for young Israelis from all walks of life to meet on equal ground. Military service has the ability to provide a meaningful experience that causes them to come to know each other and bridge social schisms. While he did not call it this, clearly Ben-Gurion was a firm believer in contact hypothesis. In his mind, the IDF would be a true ‘school for the nation’, not only in the sense of education or indoctrination per-se, but first 352 E. ROSMAN and foremost as an element capable of changing social conceptions and building a shared, collective, social identity. The IDF itself seems to still firmly believe that bridging social rifts, as well as other social missions, are part of its mandate.21 It would like its members to see themselves as part of one collective, and, as a result, behave according to the code of conduct becoming an IDF soldier. Since the IDF sees itself as a people’s army, soldiers are supposed to treat each other as members of the same collective.22 It is worth noting that many Israelis feel a connection to a single collective and feel social gaps should be bridged23 and that an armed force that attempts to do this is doing society a service.24 One of the more heated debates in Israeli society beginning at the end of the 20th century (and continuing into the 21st) is whether or not it is time for the IDF to become an all-volunteer force (AVF) and abandon conscription. Israelis are apprehensive of a volunteer-based military. The reasons for this are many. The greatest fear is that – should conscription be abolished – the IDF will not have enough recruits to sustain it. Likewise, even if there would be enough volunteers for service, conventional wisdom doubts that the IDF will be able get the quality manpower it now has. Should conscription be abolished, the best and the brightest will not consider the option of service, and manpower quality will diminish accordingly, with only the poorer and less educated social strata enlisting.25 Further to this, if the stronger segments of society will not enlist and the IDF will no longer fill a social role, as it does now, social gaps will be exacerbated with no possibility for change. Clearly this last thought stems from the belief that the IDF fulfils an important social role and that service within it allows for social mobility,26 among other things. While not all sectors in Israeli society believe the IDF should engage in nation-building tasks, such as education, most still do. Israeli society still expects the IDF to fill the lacuna left by the state in dealing with disadvantaged youth and new immigrants. It also, to a large extent, still expects the IDF to serve as a social melting pot and heal its social rifts.27 This feeling is echoed by a substantial portion of the individuals themselves. Many conscripts believe they will leave its ranks as improved versions of themselves: physically, better prepared for the job market, and also more socially integrated.28 Israelis find it difficult to imagine their military as an all-volunteer force. It is still, in their eyes, an important part of Israeli society and plays a central role in the shaping of a collective identity, even if much research points to the contrary. As a result, they perceive military service through a social prism – again indicating that belief in the effects of military service results in behaviour even if there is little practical basis for this belief.29 Despite this, very little research has been done on the long-term effects of military service in Israel (Dar and Kimhi, 2001; Wald and Feinstein, 2010). As stated above, the present study examines the willingness of veterans to replicate their social ISRAEL AFFAIRS 353 experience in the military and the extent to which they believe this was influenced by their service. Methodology Since it is impossible to encompass all of Israel’s social schisms in a single research project, this project accepts Horowitz and Lissak’s classic description of Israel’s social gaps as a starting point. Of the social schisms Horowitz and Lissak detected, this study focused on the secular-religious gap.30 Israeli society includes a range of religious categories (for Jews), ranging from ultraorthodox (Haredi) to secular (Hiloni), with many nuances in-between. The main categories usually presented are ultra-orthodox, religious (dati), traditional (mesorati),31 and secular. The actual division by percentages is a topic for extensive discussion.32 The secular-religious social division is seen a problematic one in Israel, and it is widely believed that it is only deepening. This schism has been discussed at length in many studies.33 Due to the nature of religious observance in Orthodox Judaism (the majority religion in Israel) – encompassing all aspects of life – it has the potential to complicate any kind of interaction between religious and secular individuals (the opposites ends of the continuum). Religious individuals have dietary and clothing restrictions. They are limited in their options for recreational activities on the Sabbath, as well as general behaviour. More stringent observant individuals are also limited in their interaction with the opposite sex, in their dress code and so on. Even just going out together for coffee or drinks or having a joint study group at a non-observant home, requires both sides to accommodate each other. Joint living conditions introduce an entire new set of problems to be grappled with. Romantic relationships and marriages across the secular-religious divide (which do exist) are even more complicated in this respect. In general, education and youth groups are separate and due to the differences in life-style and beliefs, secular and religious Israelis do not have many opportunities to meet each other while growing up. Since this is a central social rift which is also influenced by military service, it is a good case study. Most of Israel’s Religious-Zionist sector serve in the IDF, especially men. Women, who do not serve in the IDF, predominantly serve in national service. On the other hand, most members of the ultraorthodox (haredi) sector, do not serve, but are exempted on religious grounds. This generates much tension within Israeli society as it is deemed unfair that some religious sectors do not contribute at all towards national security, whereas all secular Israelis must serve and exemptions on grounds of conscientious objection are difficult to obtain. Most religious women are also exempt from military service, although the majority serve in national service instead.34 At the same time, since some religious sectors do serve, for 354 E. ROSMAN many Israelis (religious and secular), military service is the first real opportunity to meet members of other sectors. According to Israel’s Council for Higher Education (2013), almost 50% of Israelis in an average age cohort begin academic studies every given year in universities and colleges. This includes Israelis who served in the IDF as well as those who served in national service or did no service at all, religious and secular, Jews and members of non-Jewish minorities. During their academic studies, Israeli students are again in a position where they are in contact with others who are not part of their social group. While not together 24 hours a day, as they were during their military service,35 they study together and forge new friendships with people who are not part of their original social group. Examining their current friendships, when they are in a somewhat similar situation, enables us to observe the effects of service on veterans and non-veterans, and can test if they are willing to replicate their past experiences when faced with a similar situation. Additionally, it is possible to detect differences and similarities between veterans and non-veterans regarding general social attitudes.36 For these reasons, the current project used academic institutions as a hub and focused on second and third year undergraduate students. To the best of my knowledge, no such study has been attempted before. Most Israeli undergraduate studies are three-year programmes. After their first year, students have usually adapted to their environment, made friendships, know which courses they are taking and with whom. They have established study groups, and the process of making new friends has plateaued. This is therefore a good time to test their current friendships, openness towards making friends from outgroups, and general attitudes towards outgroup members. It is important to note that since the IDF is a conscription-based military and since military assignments are decided by and large the system,37 soldiers are forced to form friendships they might not have made if given a choice. Previous studies such as Rosman-Stollman, 2014) indicate that many soldiers entering the IDF suffer various forms of culture shock, regardless of their background. In this respect, it is safe to assume that even more introverted individuals resort to forming uncharacteristic friendships while in uniform. While the same cannot be said as uniformly for national service, where individuals usually serve with ingroup members to a great extent, they are still put in contact with outgroup members and must forge relationships as part of their jobs. If they choose to refrain from close relationships and friendships, this would be a conscious decision. The project presented here consisted of a three-part survey.38 The first section focused on service and heterogeneous friendships during service (if the respondent served), and on the extent these friendships lasted until the present day (most respondents were 2–5 years post-service). The second ISRAEL AFFAIRS 355 section then asked about current diverse friendships during undergraduate studies. The third section asked more general questions regarding willingness to include outgroup members within the respondents’ ingroup: would you be willing to rent an apartment with someone who was not a member of your ingroup religiously (for example, secular for religious respondents or religious for secular respondents)? Would you be willing to be involved romantically with a member of a religious outgroup? Lastly, respondents were asked about their perception of the impact of their service (or lack of service) on their un/willingness to rent an apartment or be in a relationship with a member of outgroups: did their service (military/national) or lack thereof have an effect on them in this respect?39 Questionnaires were in Hebrew. Hypotheses were: H1 = Religiously diverse friendships during service (military or national) predict religiously diverse friendships during undergraduate studies. H2 = Officership predicts more religiously diverse friendships than standing troops (during service and after it). H3 = Combat postings predict more religiously diverse friendships than noncombat postings (during service and after it). H4 = Respondents with religiously diverse friendships, attribute these to their service experiences. Findings Respondents (N = 777) were male and female 2nd and 3rd year undergraduate students from 4 universities and 4 colleges in Israel (47% university students, 53% college students, see Appendix, Figure 1). Other than choosing campuses so as to represent universities and colleges geographically, the sample was random. Of the respondents, 82% served in the IDF, 7% served in national service (one to two years), and 11% did no service.40 70.6% completed their service 2–5 years previously and 82.7% were between the ages of 23–27. Most were native-born Israelis (87.9%), unmarried (91.5%), and Jewish (89.4%) (see Appendix A, Figures 2–7). The sample included more women (63%) than men (37%). These numbers roughly match the corresponding percentages in general Israeli society. Although in general society the percentage of veterans, women and of Jews is somewhat lower. As seen in Table 1, findings indicate that religiously diverse friendships during service (military or national), predict current religiously diverse 356 E. ROSMAN IDF National Serivice No service 4 2 0 Friendships Friendships during service today Rent a flat? Be in a Did service relationship? affect your views? Figure 1. Comparison of means for selected variables: service impact on religiously diverse friendships and general attitudes. a Respondents who did no service were instructed to skip the section containing this question, as questions concerning service were irrelevant.* Respondents were asked to rank the volume of diverse friendships on a Likart scale of 1–5.** Respondents were asked to rank their willingness to share an apartment or be in a romantic relationship with religiously diverse individuals (including an example to clarify the question) using a Likart scale of 1–6 (t-tests were used to assess significance. All results presented were significant at p < .05) Officer Non-officer 4 2 0 Friendships during service Friendships today Be in a relationship? Did service affect your views? Figure 2. Comparison of means for selected variables – Officership impact on religiously diverse friendships and general attitudes. friendships (p = 0.462).41 In other words, respondents who befriended members of outgroups during service (secular respondents who befriended religious individuals and vise-versa), were more likely to have religiously heterogeneous friends during their undergraduate studies. They were also open to the idea of renting an apartment together (p = 0.227), and to be in a heterogeneous romantic relationship (p = 0.218). Furthermore, respondents who had diverse friendships during service were more convinced of the impact their service had on them in this respect (p = 0.368); meaning that there is significant (although not strong) correlation between their service friendships and their belief that 357 ISRAEL AFFAIRS Combat Non-Combat 4 2 0 Frienships during Friendships today Did service affect your views? service Figure 3. Comparison of means for selected variables – combat service impact on religiously diverse friendships and general attitudes. Table 1. Inter correlations (Pearson’s r) – service friendships’ effect on current friendships and general attitudes. 1. Heterogeneous current friendships 2. Willing to rent a flat? 3. Willing to be in a relationship? 4. Feel service influenced your attitude? 5. Heterogeneous service friendships 1 2 3 4 .227** .292** .165** .462** .512** .129** .227** .142** .218** .368** *p <.05; **p < .01; *** p < .001. service impacted their willingness to accept outgroups members as part of the collective and proving H1 and H4. These findings demonstrate that having previous social experiences at the very least predispose veterans towards recreating the same social experience post-service. However, while these results seem to uphold contact hypothesis, additional results bring other points into focus. When breaking down results by service venue, it seems that the difference between military and national service is minimal. As seen in Figure 1, the main difference between veterans and national service graduates is in their willingness to broaden current friendships: those who served in national service tend to have fewer diverse friendships during their undergraduate studies than veterans, but would agree to diverse flatmates and relationships. Those who did not serve at all, made fewer diverse friendships than national service graduates as well as veterans, but are also more open to these options. Both these findings make sense when noting that most national service graduates are religious women and that most of those who did not serve are minority members (non-Jews). Since they are studying with majority-group members, their possibilities for friendships from their ingroup and more limited, 358 E. ROSMAN and therefore it is more feasible their friendships will agree to include outgroup members. This explanation fits in well with previsions studies indicating that when the distinctive identity is strong and members originate from a more segregated environment, minorities are more open to integration with majority members.42 In other words, when minority members feel their distinctive identity is under attack, they are less open to the effects of contact hypothesis, and vise versa. In this case, it may be that after their positive service experience, where their distinctive identity was accepted, minority members who served in national service are more willing to expand their social boundaries. An unexpected finding indicates that those who served in national service are more open to the option of religiously diverse flat-mates. This is surprising, again due to the fact that most of those who serve in national service in Israel are religious women who did not serve in the IDF due to religious restrictions. This finding will be examined further in the follow-up research to the present study. However it is possible to speculate that these young women – who did not live 24 hours a day with religiously diverse friends43 – had positive friendship experiences during their service, have a strong distinctive identity44 and may think that it is possible to broaden their social boundaries even further, while those who served in the IDF and experienced first-hand what living in a religiously diverse atmosphere continuously implies, may be more cautious about repeating the experience. These findings indicate that the critics of the military as a school for the nation make some valid points. Veterans are not eager to recreate all aspects of their outgroup service friendships. They have learned which boundaries they are willing to redraw and which they do not feel are possible to cross. The social lessons learned during service taught them that joint living conditions entail many problems, and now their unwillingness to do so is based on experience. However, despite the fact that it seems that – at least subconsciously – they are aware of this, the majority are still willing to attempt joint living conditions, despite difficulties. In addition, veterans tend to attribute their attitudes to service, with not much of a difference between those who served in the military and those who served in national service. In other words, it seems that veterans indeed believe in contact hypothesis; even if in practice, those who did not serve had higher rates of willingness to engage with outgroup members.45 Other intriguing findings concerned officership and combat service (Figures 2–4). H2 was based on the assumption that since officers in the IDF rise through the ranks and are selected for their skills and aptitude, it serves to follow that officers would be more open to the effects of military socialisation and more ready to internalise the values the IDF tries to instil in ISRAEL AFFAIRS Command Post 359 non-command post 5 4 3 2 1 0 Sevice Friendships Current friendships Rent a flat? be in a relationship? Figure 4. Comparison of means for selected variables – service in a command position service impact on religiously diverse friendships and general attitudes. * Respondents were asked to rank the volume of diverse friendships on a Likart scale of 1–5.** Respondents were asked to rank their willingness to share an apartment or be in a romantic relationship with religiously diverse individuals (including an example to clarify the question) using a Likart scale of 1–6*** Respondents were asked to attribute their attitude towards heterogeneous friendships to their (non)service using a Likart scale of 1–6 (t-tests were used to assess significance. All tests presented were significant at p < .05). them. Therefore, since the IDF actively tries to promote social integration, officers would conform and respond actively to these messages. Similarly, combat soldiers are more likely to serve with religiously diverse cohorts than other postings. Due to the large volume of religious soldiers in combat postings,46 it is very likely that combat soldiers (both religious and non-religious) will serve with outgroup members and therefore H3 is based on the assumption they would have more opportunities to develop heterogeneous relationships. Indeed, findings indicate that officers and combat soldiers tend to have more religiously diverse friendships during service as well as after it, and also attribute their change in perception of outgroup members to service. Officers were more open to the possibility of religiously diverse partners in a relationship than standing troops.47 While H2 and H3 posited that there would be marked differences between these groups, in practice this was not as pronounced as expected. The most noticeable difference was in belief in contact hypothesis: officers and combat soldiers tend to believe in the effect of contact hypothesis more than standing troops and non-combat soldiers. Further research is needed in order to understand this finding, and perhaps a better way to understand them in-depth will be to utilise qualitative methods. However, holding a command position had more of an effect on perceptions and practices. Respondents who held any sort of command position (officers as well as NCOs), had more diverse friendships both during service and during academic studies, and were more open to shared living conditions than standing troops with no command position. They also were more likely to attribute their attitude towards outgroups to their service. This trend may be due to the fact that those who serve in command positions in 360 E. ROSMAN general (not only officers) are more likely to internalise values and mores that the military system tries to instil in its members. Since, like officers, NCOs rise through the ranks, command courses are more diverse in their make-up than officer courses, this might also contribute to understanding this finding. Most respondents did not tend to keep up friendships forged during service. When asked about their service friendships, most did not maintain these friendships currently (2–5 years post service, 26.4% maintained no contact, 22.4% maintained very little contact, 22.6% maintained some contact). Maintaining service friendships did not predict willingness to forge new diverse friendships and no correlation was found between the two variables. This seems to mean that the quality of service friendships does not impact future diverse friendship. The predictor of future diverse friendships is merely the existence of such friendships during service, not the upkeep of these friendships after service. This implies that in order to understand the effect of service friendships on social perceptions, more research is needed into the manner in which veterans experienced diverse service friendships: in what way were these friendships seen as meaningful? How do veterans interpret them in retrospect and see them as affecting perceptions of outgroups? Perhaps surprisingly, gender, income and place of residence did not influence any of the variables. No substantial difference was detected between native-born Israelis and immigrants. No correlation was detected between these variables and service/post service friendships and more general attitudes. Discussion: believing in collective identity Clearly the picture painted by these findings is complex. Findings indicate that as far as the secular-religious gap in Israel is concerned, military service can influence the long-term acceptance of outgroup members by the majority group. Employing contact hypothesis in the military can cause veterans to replicate diverse friendships after service, in the civilian sphere. But the military is not a melting pot and does not cause veterans to become completely open to redrawing social boundaries. Service demonstrates that differences pose challenges to shared living conditions (both as flat-mates and maintaining a personal relationship). It teaches conscripts that life together is complicated. However, this understanding does not prevent diverse friendships. It does cause veterans to understand the limits of such friendships, but does not create alienation. Far from giving clear-cut answers, the present study illustrates that veterans learn multifaceted social lessons, but nevertheless, service does not discourage them from attempting to reach again beyond the divide. At the same time, it seems that the key to this change is not contact hypothesis itself, but the way veterans interpret it and ISRAEL AFFAIRS 361 internalise it. They do not necessarily redraw social boundaries, but rather think that they should broaden these boundaries due to their joint service. This seems to indicate that the real power of contact hypothesis in the military lies where a given military is able to instil in its members the belief that the theory is valid. It may be this belief that plays a central role in encouraging individuals to enlist. Believing that military service will change and educate them, cause them to have a better understanding of the society they live in, and will also help them achieve more in the future. This finding seems clearer than others: veterans seem convinced that their service influences their social perspectives and identity. Even if they are not always open to redrawing social boundaries completely, they feel their military service changed them. This point seems most important when examining contact hypothesis, since the present findings indicate that belief in contact hypothesis may be pivotal in the willingness to construct future diverse friendships and replicate service experiences with outgroup members. This is also an optimistic finding. If many Israelis are apprehensive regarding the secular-religious gap, it seems that veterans might be able to serve as a bridge between social groups. This may also explain the difference between the present findings and those cited at the beginning of this article. It is possible that the key to social change via veterans can only happen if the veterans want to believe that their service changed their social identity and are willing to act accordingly in the civilian sphere. Without this component, military service may not be as potent a social tool. An additional conclusion from the present findings concerns national service in Israel. Social effects of national service may not differ that greatly from those of military service. This implies that if one of the objectives of a given society is to use military service as a ‘school for the nation’, national service may be equally effective, although further research on this topic is certainly needed. In Israel, this point holds immense social potential. Particularly when considering other social schisms such as Jews and nonJews in Israel. These conclusions also have broader implications, on both a practical and a theoretical level. On a practical level, countries considering reinstating a form of conscription for social reasons, should be asking how veterans – who are products of such conscription – view their service. Do they view it as a social experience, and if so – a positive one? It seems that this question is pivotal in understanding the possible social effects of conscription. If past veterans have positive views of their service, particularly from a social perspective, this may predict how successful this aspect of conscription might be. Naturally, mapping and understanding country-specific social schisms in this context is vital. If the Israeli case can be used as a departure point for this discussion, it may also indicate that the idea that conscription promotes social cohesion holds merit. France, Germany and Sweden have all begun to E. ROSMAN 362 reconsider conscription, not only for reasons of security, but also as a social tool. The Israeli example highlights that this might be a plausible effect. On a theoretical level, it seems that social theories do not need to be proven in order to work. In order to have some sort of impact, they need only to make sense on some level (as contact hypothesis does) and to be implemented within a framework that encourages individuals to adopt them as true. Belief is stronger than the effectiveness of the theory itself, and can motivate individuals to actual activity. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Coaffee and Wood, “Security is coming home.” Rones, “Gender-Mixed Army Dorms.” Krebs, “A School for The Nation?” Cohen, Stuart, Israel and Its Army; and Cohen, “Religion as Nation-Binder”. For a layman’s perspective see an op-ed by an Israeli veteran: Hadad, “In Civilian Life.” For example, Whitehouse, McQuinn, Buhrmester, and Swann, “Brothers in arms.” Guimond, “Group socialization and prejudice.” Krebs, “A School for the Nation”; and Matthews, Headstrong. Tajfel, “Introduction.” Allport, The Nature of Prejudice. For a comprehensive explanation of Allport’s thesis, see: Krebs, “A School for the Nation”; Everett and Onu, “Intergroup Contact Theory,” 17. For studies proving contact hypothesis clinically, see, for example: Pettigrew and Tropp. ‘A Meta-Analytic Test,” 751; and Landis, Hope, and Day, Training for Desegregation. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, 264. While the scope of this article does not allow for an examination of unit cohesion, it is worth noting that this topic is widely researched. One aspect of this field is the dispute between social cohesion (where personal friendships are seen as important to the cohesion of a unit) and task cohesion (where the importance of the completing a joint goal well is considered most important to the cohesion of a unit). While this is certainly not the topic of the present article, it is worth noting that both positions agree that soldiers are taught and believe that social cohesion is important and that soldiers themselves believe their social cohesion to be central, even if this is not true in practice. See: MacCoun et. al., “What is Known”; MacCoun et. al., “Does Social Cohesion”; MacCaoun and Hix, “Unit Cohesion”; Wong et. al., Why they fight; and Wong, “Combat Motivation.” Allport, The Nature, 264–67. Allport does not discuss the way minority groups relate to the majority group, but some of his observations might hold true in this case as well. Subsequent studies have examined this aspect. See for example: Guimond, “Group Socialization.” MacCoun et. al., “What is Known,” 300. King, “The Female Soldier”; MacKenzie, Beyond the Band, 134–54. Contact hypothesis is not without critics; some claiming that it can even produce the ISRAEL AFFAIRS 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 363 opposite effect. See for example: Dixon and Tredoux, “Beyond the optimal,” 697. As demonstrated in many recent works such as Belkin’s work on masculinity in the military (Belkin), Bring Me Men; and Basham’s work on gender and race (Basham), War, Identity and the Liberal State. Turner et. al., “A Test of the Extended Intergroup Contact Hypothesis”; and Crisp and Turner, “Can Imagined Interactions Produce Positive Perceptions?” The idea of “perceived cohesion” has been examined in the past by Bollen and Hoyle. While not exactly the same context or comparable social groups, the idea is – at its root – similar. See: Bollen and Hoyle, “Perceived Cohesion.” Rivnai Bahir and Avidar, “Alternative vs. Canonical.” Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, Israeli’s Population. Much has been written on this point. See for example: Nevo and Shor, The Contract; Harel, Teda Kol Em; and Hadad, “In Civilian Life.” This does not mean that in practice all soldiers act in such a way, only that this is what the military system expects. Most Jewish Israelis see themselves as part of a single national (and sometimes religious) collective. See: Yuchtman-Yaar, “Continuity and Change”; and from another vantage point: Sandler and Rynhold, 2007. Azulai and Kotick, “Integrating Unique Social Group”; Lebel and Orkibi, “‘The New Sensitivity’.” See for example: Gordon, “In Praise”; Nevo and Shor, The Contract; and Stern, Navigations. These perceptions do not look at other western examples, such as the US military, as comparable. Even if this belief is not substantiated by supportive evidence. See for example, Harel, 2013, chapters 3 and 5. Harel, Teda Kol Em. Avidar, Motivatzyia Le-Giyus. It can be argued that regardless of the ability or inability of the IDF to bridge social schisms, it fulfils an important social role merely in its existence. Its social roles are important in and of themselves, and it doesn’t really matter whether or not military service has long-term social effects. While it is important to consider, the present article does not address this thought. With hope that in the future other schisms will be examined. Not strictly observing religious commandments, but picking and choosing which religious elements to adopt. Arian and Keissar-Sugarmen, A Portrait of Israeli Jews. For some examples, see Hermann et al., The National Religious Sector; Arian and Keissar-Sugarmen, A Portrait of Israeli Jews; Yadgar and Liebman, “Beyond the Religious-secular Dichotomy”; A Cohen, “An Old-New Schism.” During the past decade, there has been a noticeable increase in Religious Zionist women who serve in the IDF, but they are still not the majority. Provided their service venue required them to live on base. Future projects should address the issue of reserve service and its possibility to affect society. Sadly, this is beyond the scope of the present article. While personal preferences for military postings are given consideration, the final word is the IDF’s and many individuals find themselves in postings not to their liking. 364 E. ROSMAN 38. The project itself is a two-phased one. The second phase will begin in 2017 and be based on the findings of the phase presented here. 39. A demographic section was also included in order to gauge gender, age, religious classification and so on. 40. These included both Jews and members of other religions. 41. Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed). 42. It is worth noting that other studies indicate that when in a majority-dominated environment, minorities tend to have fewer outgroup friendships (such as: Feddes, Noack and Rutland, “Direct and Extended”; Barlow, “The Wallpaper Effect”) and this issue is far from clear in current research. I hope that the next stage of this project might shed more light on the topic. 43. During national service – as opposed to military service – individuals live in their own living quarters with other national service members. This means the religious women serving together live together, and not with members of outgroups. The idea being that national service does not detach members from their social context and is a more “protected” environment. 44. Bisin et. al., Bend it like Beckham. 45. This finding is problematic in many ways. Since the majority of Jewish Israelis serve in some venue, and the majority of those who do no service are nonJewish Israelis/Palestinians who hold Israeli citizenship, it is difficult to compare these groups. Specifically since non-Jewish respondents may have understood the questionnaire differently than Jewish respondents. Qualitative research is needed in order to understand these findings better. 46. Rosman-Stollman, For God. 47. No significance was found in the willingness to share an apartment or be romantically involved with outgroup members in the results focusing on combat vs. non-combat soldiers. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s). Notes on contributor Elisheva Rosman is a senior lecturer in political studies at Bar-Ilan Univeristy. The author wishes to thank Zipi Israeli, Ronald R. Krebs, Eyal Ben-Ari and Jonathan Rynhold for their helpful remarks on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks also to Shani Dayan, Moria Greenboim, and Dafna Sofrin for Research assistance and to Shmuel Even-Zohar for statistical support. Research for this article was supported by the Israel Science Foundation, grant number 137/15. Bibliography Allport, G. W. The Nature of Prejudice. New York, NY: Doubleday, Anchor Edition, 1958, 1958. Arian, A., and A. Keissar-Sugarmen. A Portrait of Israeli Jews: Beliefs, Observances and Values of Israeli Jews, 2009. Jerusalem: Israeli Democracy Institute, 2011. ISRAEL AFFAIRS 365 Avidar, M. 2013. Motivatzyia Le-Giyus le-TZAHAL Be-Rei Ha-Zman: Mimtzei MAMDA [Motivation to Serve in the IDF Over Time: Findings of the Behavioral Sciences Center [MAMDA] of the IDF]. 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Age distribution. 1998 1997 1996 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 1985 1984 1983 1982 1981 1978 1976 1971 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 370 E. ROSMAN Year of discharge from service 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 1992 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Figure 7. Years post service.