The Situation in Mali and Pakistan’s Position

NORTH EAST ASIA MODEL UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 2013 THE SITUATION IN MALI AND PAKISTAN’S POSITION P akistan joined the United Nations (UN) on 30 September 1947 just over a month after its independence. It has been actively involved in various UN conferences and its specialized agencies. It has been elected seven times (1952 to 2013) in the UN Security Council (SC). Pakistan is the largest troop contributor to UN Peacekeeping missions. Since 1960, it has contributed 150,000 troops and its 135 peacekeepers have lost their lives in service of peace. This is its most tangible assistance to the UN efforts to maintain international peace and security. Islamic Republic of Pakistan expresses its concern about the security and humanitarian issues in Mali. Mali has been mired in overlapping political, security and humanitarian crises since January 2012. Extremist groups expanded their presence in the country’s vast, Saharan north following a coup d’état that overthrew Mali’s democratically elected government and led the military chain of command to collapse. Insecurity in northern Mali has displaced over half a million people and exacerbated regional food insecurity and humanitarian conditions. The situation in Mali challenges international goals of promoting stability, democracy, civilian control of the military and effectively countering terrorist threats in Africa [1-3]. Pakistan believes that transformation of Mali from an oasis of moderate Islam and good governance to a Mali divided along ethnic and religious fault lines is not sudden. Mali has been viewed as a poster child of good governance, secularism and tolerance but in 2012 it turned into the “Afghanistan of West Africa” [4]. Multiple factors caused the crisis in Mali: Tuareg nationalism, the corruption of Mali’s previous governments and the rise of extremism [5-7]. The call for a separate Tuareg homeland: Azawad, as the Tuaregs identify northern Mali – is not new. They have rebelled four times since Mali achieved independence – 1962-64, 1990-1995, 2007-09 and since January 2012. Although every rebellion ended in a cease-fire, the Malian government never succeeded in instituting longer term peace [8, 9]. On 22 March 2012, Malian president was ousted in a coup d’état over his handling of the Taureg rebellion. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) immediately condemned it. The series of defeats by a poorly equipped army fighting a heavily armed Tuareg insurgency led the military to stage a takeover. Political corruption contributed to public distaste for the former Bamako government. While Malian democracy was much applauded by Western donors, the average Malian saw a little improvement in his life [10-12]. Anyhow excuses for the coup do not warrant the overthrow of a democratically elected government [13, 14]. Since early 1990s, negotiated settlements laid the groundwork for peace in Mali by promising greater regional autonomy, the integration of Tuareg fighters into the military and more financial aid for the impoverished north. The government never fully implemented these agreements, and non-implementation became a grievance unto itself. Tuareg’s grievances over cultural rights, political autonomy and a historic lack of government investment in the north remain relevant for many northern Malians [15]. The role of extremists in Mali is linked with the extent of Libya’s involvement in West African politics over the past four decades. There was no single conflict in Africa in which Libya did not participate overtly. Tuaregs occupied key positions within Gaddafi’s military and were battle-hardened veterans of his “Islamic Legion”. In 2011, after collapse of his government, Tuaregs returned to Mali with sophisticated weaponry [16, 17]. The Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) was formed in October 2011 as the political-military platform to continue their fight for self-government. But the Tuareg nationalist MNLA was soon displaced by militant groups: Ansar Din (Supporters of the Faith), Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA, a.k.a MUJAO) [18, 19]. They have organized sophisticated criminal enterprises that included human and drugs trafficking, arms smuggling and kidnapping of Western nationals for ransom [20-22]. The imminent attack on Bamako and the potential consequences for Mali, its neighbors and the whole region, led to the French intervention in Mali on 11 January 2013 [23]. This intervention, supported by Malian army, the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) forces and other Western countries, ended the Tuareg rebellion and recaptured all the major cities in northern Mali. The conflict in Northern Mali caused a humanitarian crisis of significant size and scope. Nearly half a million people were displaced as of the end of April 2013, including 301,027 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 185,144 refugees in neighboring countries. IDPs have had restricted access to humanitarian assistance and services. Refugees require urgent support and assistance too. The whole region is experiencing a continuing food crisis and the impact on children and women has been particularly acute [24, 25]. Delegate Pakistan 1 NORTH EAST ASIA MODEL UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 2013 THE SITUATION IN MALI AND PAKISTAN’S POSITION Mali has one of the largest mineral deposits of gold; it is the third largest producer of gold in the Africa yet it is one of the poorest nations of the world. While the average poverty rate in Mali in 2004 was 64%, this was much higher (77-92%) in the northern Mali [9, 22]. Thus radical ideologies can find fertile ground in conditions of poverty and despair. Pakistan appreciates the mobilization of the international community, the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS, which averted a major catastrophe in Mali and the region. UN has been playing active role to resolve this issue. SC passed resolutions 2056, 2071 and 2085 to counter the terrorist threat in Mali. On 25 April 2013, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established by resolution 2100 to support political process, ameliorate humanitarian situation and to accomplish security-related tasks. Major challenges remain for the country to consolidate the political gains and continue the installation of democratic institutions. However, durable peace and stability can be achieved only through dialogue. Grievances cannot be addressed through violence. This crisis constitutes a challenge, but it is also a window of opportunity that can help Mali break from its troubled past. This window of opportunity will only emerge if our response to the challenge is based on an understanding of the relationships between corruption, collusion and resistance. Pakistan suggests that Mali’s instability originated from factors including poor governance, the corrosive impact of drug trafficking and other illicit commerce, military fragmentation and collapse, limited implementation of previous peace accords with Tuareg people and an increase in regional arms and combatant flows from Libya since 2011. Pakistan is fully committed to countering terrorism and is a party to the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. On 10 May 2013, Ambassador Masood Khan presented Pakistan’s stance in the UN as: “Pakistan’s comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism is based on Three D’s: deterrence, development and dialogue. We should address the root causes of terrorism. Deprivation, marginalization, exclusion, and stereotyping often create conditions for a drift to terrorism. Our collective measures to counter all forms of financing of terrorism, including through the proceeds of organized crime and illicit narcotics, should be made more effective” [26]. On 27 September 2013, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, addressed the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly [27]: “As a country that has suffered grievously for the past many years, we condemn terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations. For last 12 years, we have given huge sacrifices, in blood and resources. We have lost 40,000 precious lives of men, women and children, which include 8,000 defense and security personnel. We are resolved to oppose the forces of terrorism, at our disposal. At the same time, we have offered dialogue to end violence. Winning hearts and minds, of the people is as important as using guns to deter terrorism. But dialogue should not be seen as a sign of weakness or a tool of appeasement”. Islam does not promote extremism and terrorism, he elaborated: “Terrorism knows no borders. It has no religion or creed that is why maligning people or a religion on this account is unfair and unwise. Islam is a religion of peace, compassion and brotherhood and yet most insidious form of contemporary racism in the name of religion is on the rise. Peaceful Muslim communities are profiled and subjected to discriminatory practices. Their faith, culture, Holy personalities and scriptures are under attack. Stereotyping of Muslims as extremists and terrorists must stop. We must all use the influence and reach of the UN to avert a clash of civilizations and promote harmony among followers of diverse religions, all around the world. Terrorism negates Islam’s humanistic outlook and noble values. Those who perpetrate terrorism are enemies of Muslims and Islam itself. He concluded his speech by emphasizing the importance of diplomacy and the role of UN: “As a non-permanent member of the SC, Pakistan has been making every effort to strengthen the role of diplomacy to resolve conflicts and to help build states in post-conflict situations. We need multilateral diplomacy so that we continue to respect diversity while reaching decisions that impact our fate as members of the international community. Towards this end, the UN– the virtual world parliament– is our best hope”. Pakistan enjoys close relations with all the countries of the Sahel and thus has an interest in their sustained well-being and calls for integrated international efforts to address the development and security challenges in Mali and in the Sahel region. Delegate Pakistan 2 NORTH EAST ASIA MODEL UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 2013 THE SITUATION IN MALI AND PAKISTAN’S POSITION REFERENCES [1] 杨. 张正达, 潘一菲, "The Situation in Mali," in North East Asia Model United Nations 2013. Harbin, 2013, pp. 16. [2] A. Arieff and K. Johnson, "Crisis in Mali," Washington DC, 2013. [3] W. Lacher, "The Malian Crisis and the Challenge of Regional Cooperation," Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, vol. 2, pp. Art. 18, 2013. [4] C. Mills, A. Lang, and J. Lunn, "The crisis in Mali: current military action and upholding humanitarian law," 2013. [5] H. Solomon, "Mali: West Africa's Afghanistan," The RUSI Journal, vol. 158, pp. 12-19, 2013. [6] M. Coulibaly and M. Bratton, "Crisis in Mali: ambivalent popular attitudes on the way forward," Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, vol. 2, pp. Art. 31, 2013. [7] R. Marchal, "Mali: Visions of War," Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, vol. 2, pp. Art. 17, 2013. [8] L. A. Ammour, "Algeria's Role in the Sahelian Security Crisis," Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, vol. 2, pp. Art. 28, 2013. [9] A. O. Shuriye and D. S. Ibrahim, "The Role of Islam and Natural Resources in Current Mali Political Turmoil," Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences, vol. 4, pp. 507, 2013. [10] R. Marchal, "MILITARY (MIS) ADVENTURES IN MALI," African Affairs, 2013. [11] M. Boas and L. E. Torheim, "The Trouble in Mali - Corruption, collusion, resistance," Third World Quarterly, vol. 34, pp. 1279-1292, 2013. [12] A. Vines, "A decade of african peace and security architecture," International Affairs, vol. 89, pp. 89-109, 2013 [13] A. De Waal, "African roles in the Libyan conflict of 2011," International Affairs, vol. 89, pp. 365-379, 2013. [14] L. E. Cline, "Nomads, Islamists, and Soldiers: The Struggles for Northern Mali," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, pp. 1-41, 2013. [15] J. M. Sears, "Seeking sustainable legitimacy: Existential challenges for Mali," International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis, pp. 18, 2013. [16] S. S. A. Aiyar, "Nato's Libya War Causes Mali Crisis," 2012. [17] S. Shaw, "Fallout in the Sahel: the geographic spread of conflict from Libya to Mali," Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, vol. 19, pp. 199-210, 2013. [18] D. Zounmenou, "The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad factor in the Mali crisis," African Security Review, pp. 1-8, 2013. [19] H. J. Cohen, "Al Qaeda in Africa: The Creeping Menace to Sub-Sahara's 500 Million Muslims," American Foreign Policy Interests, vol. 35, pp. 63-69, 2013. [20] D. Cristiani and R. Fabiani, "The Malian Crisis and its Actors," The International Spectator, vol. 48, pp. 78-97, 2013. [21] P. Ahluwalia, "The Mali crisis," African Identities, vol. 11, pp. 1-2, 2013. [22] C. Dowd and C. Raleigh, "THE MYTH OF GLOBAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM AND LOCAL CONFLICT IN MALI AND THE SAHEL," African Affairs, 2013. [23] N. D. F. Allen, "MISREADING MALI'S COLLAPSE: GOVERNANCE, FOREIGN AID, AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES," JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, pp. 8-29, 2013. [24] UNHCR, "UNHCR country operations profile - Mali situation (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso)," 07 October 2013. [25] UNICEF, "Nutrition security in Gao: An Alarming Situation ", 07 October 2013. [26] M. Khan, "Statement by Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN," Joint Briefing by the Chairmen of the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, Counter Terrorism Committee and the 1540 Committee, New York 10 May 2013. [27] "Address by Mr. Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan to the 68th Session of the General Assembly.," 27 September 2013. Sajid Iqbal sajid.iqbal@uog.edu.pk, Delegate Pakistan Danish Hussain danishasefi@gmail.com 3