Trajectories and Accommodations of Democracy and Islam. (c2022)

LEBANESE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY Trajectories and Accommodations of Democracy and Islam: The Case Study of Turkey and Iran By Adnan Mohamad Shamas A thesis Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs School of Arts and Sciences July 2022 2022 Adnan Shamas All Rights Reserved Dedication This thesis is dedicated to the people who have supported me throughout this journey. To Iman Shaaban, my parents, and my beloved friends, thank you for all what you did. I would have not it if it weren’t for you. v Acknowledgment I would like to thank God for helping me through all the difficulties throughout this long journey. I would like to also acknowledge and give my warmest thanks to my advisor Dr. Joseph Helou who made this work possible after numerous revisions. Also, I would like to thank my committee members Dr. Sami Baroudi and Dr. Jennifer Skulte-Ouaiss for your comments and guidance. vi Trajectories and Accommodations of Democracy and Islam: The Case Study of Turkey and Iran Adnan Shamas Abstract The Middle East has been going through various changes in the last decade with many parties and regimes identifying as Islamic. While the world is shifting focus to the importance of democracy, this thesis aims to better understand Islam and Democracy's accommodation. It elaborates on the reasons the trajectories adopted by different actors can be dissimilar. In doing so, the thesis examines the different democratic practices embraced by Islamist parties. It tackles the case studies of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Iran’s Al Khomeini regime after the revolution of 1979. It examines the political, social, and economic pathways of each party. It finds that the different accommodations of democratic practices are directly related to the benefits that these parties receive. It also finds that the Islamic identity of the AKP and Al Khomeini are associated with the support they need in order to maintain the legitimacy of their governments and achieve the hegemony they strive for. Also, it explains how those adopted trajectories differ based on the historical, cultural, and political realities which lead to the accommodation of different practices to attain the actors’ intended objectives. Keywords: Turkey, Iran, The Justice and Development Party (AKP), Al Khomeini, democracy, Islam, democratic practices, Islamic identity, hegemony, legitimacy, theocracy, secularism. vii Table of Contents Chapter Pages 1. Introduction 1 1.1. Background 1 1.2. Aims 3 1.3. Research Questions 5 1.4. General Hypotheses 6 1.5. Concepts & Theoretical Framework 7 1.6. Research Methodology 10 1.7. Gaps and Limitations 11 1.8. Chapter Outline 11 2. Literature Review & Framework 13 2.1. Literature Review 13 2.1.1. Democracy and Islam 14 2.1.2. The Case of Turkey 16 2.1.3. The Case of Iran 21 2.1.4. Overview & Conclusion 23 2.2. Framework – Islamic Identification 25 2.2.1. The Case Study of Turkey and the AKP 26 2.2.2. The Case Study of Iran and Khomeinism 31 2.2.3. Conclusion 35 3. The Case Study of Turkey 37 3.1. Introduction 37 viii 3.2. The Political Pathways 39 3.3. The Social Pathways 47 3.4. The Economic Pathways 52 3.5. Conclusion 58 4. The Case Study of Iran 60 4.1. Introduction 60 4.2. The Political Pathways 61 4.3. The Social Pathways 69 4.4. The Economic Pathways 76 4.5. Conclusion 80 5. Conclusion 82 6. Bibliography 88 ix Chapter One Introduction 1.1. Background: There has been an increasing interest in the role that Islam plays in the politics and policies of modern countries. With the emergence of so-called Islamist groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda, the definition of Islamic political ideologies, Islam’s impact on democracies, and its role in spawning liberation struggles became a subject of heated debate (Voll, 2007). Thus, it became crucial to better understand the role of Islam in shaping the politics of a state, while analyzing the reasons certain states drift away from the political-economic model established by Islamic ideologies. The 20th century came with an enormous wave of democratization in the whole world. Although the Middle East and Muslim majority countries were generally late in following the wave, democracy is still considered by a growing number of people as a desired system of government (Mork, 2019). Therefore, the compatibility of Islam and democracy is an important subject to tackle. However, it is important to note that, even though many Muslim majority countries did not follow democratic systems, the influence of the colonial powers in the systems and governments was clear. For instance, some countries followed a flawed democratic systems such as Egypt and Syria. Others followed a secular authoritarian system such as Iran before the so-called Islamic revolution of 1979. Also, some kept their Muslim identity while assuming some secular forms of governance (Bermek, 2019), while others pursued a full-scale secularization by eliminating their connection to any Muslim heritage, such as Turkey (Cagaptay, 2014). On that note, the importance of understanding the different types of governments that Muslim majority states accommodate and the reasons they 1 accommodate them differently is critical. It leads to a better understanding of the current politics in the Middle East and in Muslim majority states. While there are more than 1.8 billion Muslims and 50 Muslim-majority countries (The Changing Global Religious Landscape, 2017), some play a more crucial role in today’s politics than others. Iran, for instance, is a leading economic power that can pose a challenge to western interests in the Middle East. Additionally, Turkey has had a growing economy with its geographical location serving as a crossover between Europe and Asia. Also, both countries were once huge empires that shared adherence to Islam. Their shared borders have been an important cultural exchange, which made them have many interesting points of similarities. Therefore, studying their political systems and comparing them to each other while looking at the impact of Islam, the level of liberties, political economy, citizens’ representation, and democracy can help in better understanding the role of Islam in politics and its level of influence. In the case of Turkey, it is a successor to the Ottoman Empire that rules modern-day Turkey, Eastern Europe, and an enormous part of the Middle East for multiple centuries. The Ottoman Empire was dissolved in 1922 after the Allies won World War I. The fall of the Ottoman Empire marked the end of the Islamic Caliphate which played an important role in shaping the present world of the Middle East. The formation of the Republic of Turkey came with a full-scale secularization of the country. Mustafa Kemal, known as Ataturk, tried to disconnect the Turkish Republic from its Islamic history by eliminating the connection of the Turks with their Islamic heritage (Cagaptay, 2014). He managed to translate the Quran and the call to prayer to Turkish. he changed the alphabet of the Turkish language from Arabic to Latin and 2 removed any form of Islamic religiosity from the public spaces. However, this did not stop the re-emergence of political Islam in different forms (Espocito J. L., 2000). Although many different political parties tried to reestablish themselves in an effective way in Turkish politics, the Justice and Development Party – which was founded in 2001 – (AKP) was the most successful. For Instance, this can be seen in them being the biggest party in the Turkish parliament. On that basis, it is important to understand the accommodations of Islam in secular Turkey and the form it established. On another note, Modern Iran – known as The Islamic Republic of Iran – is a result of a successful revolution in 1979 that is characterized by its Islamic vision. Before the theocratic system of government that is used today in Iran, a secular authoritarian system was present. After the dissolution of the Qajar Empire in 1925, The Imperial State of Iran was established under the direct governance of Mohammad Reza Shah. The Shah’s monarchy was based on a secular system. He focused on the secularization and the liberalization of his country while minimizing the role of Islam in the state (Olsen, 2019). the Shah’s monarchy came to an end after the successful revolution of 1979 that replaced the old system with an Islamic theocracy that displays certain democratic practices. Although Iran today is not considered a democracy, it does follow some aspects of democracy. For instance, regular elections in which women and men vote happen. Based on that, the Iranian adaption of political Islam is an interesting subject that studying can help in understanding how Islam can be accommodated in a democratic system. 1.2. Aims: As stated, Turkey and Iran are both the successors of the Ottoman Empire and the Qajar Empire respectively. Turkey’s a secular country, while Iran was a secular 3 monarchy. Both countries have shifted from Islam after World War I while both had a resurgence of Islam as an important player in politics. Different aspects play a role in building a political system and the revival of political Islam. For instance, society, economic, and political interests have a role in shaping countries. Thus, this paper aims to better understand the role Islam plays in each countries’ political systems while taking into consideration their relatively similar history and how each shifted into a different political system. Additionally, it focuses on the different social, political, and economic paths that might shape political systems in Iran and Turkey. Turkey and Iran are important players in today’s international politics. While Turkey is a secular country, the main political party is an Islamist party with clear Islamic beliefs. On the other hand, Iran is a theocracy in which a religious leader has one of the biggest roles in the politics of the country’s domestic and international politics. However, both countries have a type of representation and share some aspects of democracy. Therefore, this research aims to better explain each state’s system and the accommodation of Islam in their respective systems. Moreover, both countries share a historical association with Islam, geographical borders, and power. Hence, understanding the cultural, economic, and political paths each country has pursued while looking at how they affect the accommodation of Islam in democracy is crucial for this research. This thesis also aims to understand the resurgence of political Islam in both countries after they were secular while noting the different paths each country took. On that basis, this thesis tackles the case of Turkey by focusing on the AKP party’s political choices and agendas. Therefore, it focuses on societies and how they might have changed with the emergence of AKP as the leading party in Turkish 4 politics. It also emphasizes the economic choices of the majority party in Turkey while looking at what they adopted from Islam which is needed to understand the relationship between democracy and Islam in that era. This thesis aims to understand the political, economic, and social realms of Turkey under the AKP’s rule. The choice of the era is based on the consideration of the AKP rule as a political Islamist party which helps in explaining the trajectories the party took to accommodate Islam in the democratic secular system of Turkey. Regarding the case of Iran, the aim of this thesis in comprehending the accommodation of Islam in democracy will be by focusing on the Iranian case after the revolution of 1979, which was defined by Islam. Accordingly, it focuses on the ascension of Khomeini into power and the shift that happened in the political system of the country from an autocratic secular monarchy into an autocratic theocracy. An emphasis on the importance of representation is given. It is crucial to acknowledge its importance in a theocracy because of the role it plays in giving the state legitimacy. Moreover, this thesis focuses on the economic, social, and political trajectories used in order to examine the relationship between Islam and democracy in Iran. Therefore, this thesis wishes to examine the trajectory of accommodating Islam and democracy by comparing the main cases of resurgence of Islamism in Iran and Turkey. 1.3. Research Question: How have Turkey and Iran adapted political, social, and economic pathways to a dissimilar interpretation and accommodation of Islam and democracy? 5 To answer the above research question, the thesis focuses on the compatibility of democracy and Islam in terms of theory. This thesis tackles the extent to which Islam plays a role in shaping the politics of Turkey and Iran. Accordingly, it takes into consideration the history of each country and the changes that happened in giving importance to Islam in building the political systems of both countries. In addition to that, it tackles the factors that made the integration of Islam in Turkey and Iran different. It focuses on the social, political, and economic factors that created a different resurgence of political Islam between Turkey and Iran. 1.4. Hypotheses: This thesis examines the following general hypotheses: The different political systems that existed before the resurgence of political Islam play an important role in the accommodation of Islam and democracy. The societies in different countries have a direct role in the trajectories used for the accommodation of Islam and democracy. The various economic interests in Turkey and Iran have a distinct role in shaping the different accommodations of Islam and democracy. Based on the hypothesis, this research argues that different political, social, and economic factors play a significant role in forming the Islamic accommodation of democracy. Accordingly, Iran’s geographical location and its historical monarchical 6 system had a direct impact on the form of Islamic accommodation of democracy. On the other hand, the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the replacement of an Islamic Caliphate with a secular democratic system played a direct role in the ascension of Political Islam in the form of democratic parties rather than a reevaluation of the system. Additionally, the difference in each economy’s potential has an important role in building the Islamic accommodation. Also, the evolvement of each country’s culture and population took different paths in each country after World War II. Different economic, social, and politic pathways have a role in the accommodation of democracy and Islam. Thus, this thesis studies these pathways and the trajectories used to in that accommodation. 1.5. Concepts & Theoretical Framework: This thesis examines the research question based on the Realist theory. While it explores the different factors of liberal markets and economics, democratic settings, and the Islamic identity, it tackles the subject based on the assumption that regimes are motivated towards their own nationalistic interests. Classical realism is focused on the assumption that political parties and states follow their natural human behavior in making decisions. States are founded based on anarchy and seek hegemony while trying to maintain the legitimacy of their power, by prioritizing their own interests. Additionally, states are in a continuous struggle for maintaining power and increasing their internal and international strength (Orsi, Avgustin, & Nursus, 2018). On that basis, this thesis explores the cases of Turkey and Iran while elaborating on the role the Islamic identity plays in maintaining the 7 legitimacy of their respective leaders. It also studies the democratic practices used that sometimes differ between states based on their historical, cultural, and political realities. By investigating the role of the Islamic identity and the different democratic practices, it connects the various accommodation that happen in political, social, and economic pathways and finds on that basis how the different trajectories used are chosen with the intend of maintaining the legitimacy of the leaders, achieving hegemony, and securing the role of those in charge. While this thesis focuses on the democratic accommodation in the cases of Turkey and Iran, it does take into consideration that the democratic definition varies with the presence of different sub-categories of democracy. It also acknowledges that Iran and Turkey do not have an effective democratic system. Thus, this thesis engages with various democratic practices that the case studies are involved with. It mainly focuses on representation and elections by examining the accommodation of representation in both countries while exploring the role of elections and how the AKP and Al Khomeini are involved with the representative systems. It also examines the freedom and equality in each of the cases by focusing on minorities, the opposition, and the role of women. Additionally, it tackles the existence of the free market and liberal economic practices as an integral part of democratic systems. By examining the availability of the free market and how much importance is given to the liberalization of the economy, it explains the democratic accommodation in the economic sector. In its focus on political pathways, this thesis engages with the electoral results and the representation system. Also, it focuses on the laws and regulations implemented in each country and relates them to the Islamic identity. Additionally, it explores the 8 secular system of Turkey and the theocratic system of Iran to establish a connection between them and the different trajectories used by the AKP and the Iranian regime. With regards to the social pathways, this thesis explores the interests of the citizens of each case study while also examining their identification with Islam. It also inspects the various demands of the citizens in the hope of understanding the reaction of the parties towards them. Also, it examines the treatment of minority groups in Turkey and Iran while also studying the status of women and the role that the Islamic identity plays in that matter. In studying the economic pathways, the main focus is on the accommodation of the liberal economic systems. This thesis examines the relationship of the AKP and the Iranian regime with liberal economies and explains the different trajectories used by each party. It also elaborates on whether free markets exist in each country and the realities that affect the decisions taken by the ruling parties in Iran and Turkey. Additionally, it explores the integration of the Islamic identity and the role it plays in decisions while also examining the different trajectories used in economic dilemmas such as poverty, debt, and inflation. While this thesis examines both cases of Turkey and Iran, it is important to note that the case of Turkey requires more in-depth exploration. This is a result of the AKP’s presence in a secular country which makes its accommodation of both democratic practices and the Islamic identity more challenging. The aspects visible in the interpretation of Turkey’s case study make it more complex and require focus on additional trajectories and examples. On the other hand, the case of Iran does not include the same challenges since the Republic of Iran has been created under Al Khomeini’s system. Therefore, the challenges that the Iranian regime goes through are 9 directly related to the society, the economy, and international politics while there are no challenges in terms of inclusion in the system. 1.6. Research Methods: This study is based on a comparative analysis. This thesis will examine the relationship between democracy and Islam by comparing both theories and their applicability. The comparison would help in better understanding the types of accommodation that can or are used by countries. With regards to Islam, the focus is on the doctrinal relationship of it as a religion with democracy. The main jurisprudence used is the one interpreted by Abu Hanifah because of its historical importance in the precedent Caliphates and Empires. An emphasis will be given to the Shi’i jurisprudence when needed in order to be able to understand the case of Iran. On the other hand, the democratic settings will be taken from a theoretical perspective. The second type of comparative analysis will take the form of a case study. Extensive research about the cases of Iran and Turkey is to be included in order to better understand the accommodation of Islam in both. The choice of countries has been made based on their importance in global politics, their shared history and borders, and the different nature each had before the resurgence of Islamism. Additionally, the case study focuses on the AKP party in Turkey and Iran after the revolution of 1979. The importance of those cases is found in their role in the resurgence of so-called Islamism in both countries. The case studies help in achieving the main goal of having a better understanding of the accommodation of Islam in democracy and the different choices countries make which can be based on social, economic, and political objectives. 10 The data includes e-journals, books, and historical Islamic writings. 1.7. Gaps and Limitations: This thesis includes a comparative analysis of the literature regarding Islam, democracy, and more specifically, the case studies of Turkey and Iran. One of the main ethical considerations is related to the translation of Islamic religious texts. The Islamic religious texts that would be used in order to draw correlations between Islam and democracy are mostly written in Arabic while some of them would be manuscripts. To avoid any misinformation, the objectivity of the translation is an important point that will be focused on. Additionally, in order to avoid plagiarism and to keep this thesis reliable, it uses proper citation. On the other hand, one of the limitations that can be found regarding the research is related to the authenticity of the secondary data that is used constantly to assess the topic. Moreover, the limited availability of research that tackles the comparison between Iran and Turkey can be considered as a gap in this research. This thesis will tackle both topics individually and then assess them and compare them in order to answer the research questions. In addition, the lack of literature about Iran from a democratic perspective is a limitation in this research. The basis of that limitation is that Iran is seen as an authoritarian system. 1.8. Chapter Breakdown: This thesis is divided to five chapters, including the introduction: · Chapter Two: The Literature Review and a look at the Islamic definition of the Case Studies. It includes an examination of the literature on the topic of Islamic 11 representation and democracy and the case studies of Turkey and Iran. Also, it tackles how the case studies of Turkey and Iran define Islam and builds a framework for the so-called Islamic approaches. · Chapter Three: The Case of Turkey. It tackles the history of the Republic of Turkey and the fall of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, it is comprised of the political, social, and economic pathways that Turkey pursued to interpret its accommodations of Islam and democracy. · Chapter Four: “The Case of Iran”. It contains the history of the Islamic Republic of Iran while tackling the history of the Persian Empires and the Iranian Revolution that overthrew the Imperial State of Persia. It also tackles the political, social, and economic pathways followed to understand its accommodation of Islam and democracy. · Chapter Five: Conclusion. It explains the different accommodation of Islam and democracy in each state and compares the different case studies. A focus on the political agenda of each state explains the difference in accommodation. It also includes the lessons learned and re-assesses the answer while highlighting what is important for subsequent research. 12 Chapter Two Literature Review & Framework For an overview of Turkey and Iran and a comprehension of the topic, this chapter examines the literature on the history of the case studies, political Islam, the systems of the countries, and the different arguments regarding the resurgence of Islam in Iran and Turkey through a critical analysis of the empirical cases of Turkey and Iran. Since this thesis emphasizes the accommodation of Islam and democracy, it needs a presentation on the general framework regarding how Islam is defined by different parties of this studies is crucial. The literature review examines the relationship between democracy, Islam, and each of the case study. This chapter finds that there is limited research about the accommodation of different democratic practices under an Islamic identity while it also builds-on the literature to better answer the research questions of this thesis. Also, this literature review shows that it is necessary to examine how each of the case studies defines Islam in order to build a framework for this thesis from which this thesis argues that there is no clear identification of Islam in the AKP case study that is different than the Islamic identity of Turkey while it also finds that the Iranian Islamic identity is well shaped in Khomeinism and the Twelver Shia doctrine. 2.1. Literature Review: The intention of including this literature review is to have a better depiction of the cases of Turkey and Iran and how Islamism is integrated with both states. In order 13 to achieve that connection, this thesis reviews literature that has been written on the connection and the relationship of Islam, liberalism, and democracy. Analyzing the correlations between Islam and democracy can help explain the different scenarios for their accommodation in the states of Iran and Turkey. This literature review focuses on the cases of AKP and the Iranian Republic after the revolution of 1979. As studied below, different scholars have conflicting understandings of the topic. On the other hand, looking at the literature already written about the resurgence of Islam in the political frame of Iran and Turkey can be considered as a starting point for the research. Understanding the different points of view and arguments that scholars have discussed regarding that accommodation explains the importance and significance of the topic that is being discussed. Additionally, it can positively reflect the hypothesis that is being discussed. 2.1.1. Democracy and Islam: According to Sheikh Zahra, Islam is a universal religion (Baroudi, 2018). Simbar explains how there is no separation of politics and religion in Islam (2008). Moreover, Hashemi considers that the universalism of Islam is inexistent in Muslim politics (2014). Hegel agrees and argues that this universalism has been introduced to dehumanize Muslims only to believers (Lynch, 2020). Accordingly, the democratization of Muslims, as stated by Simbar, is not impossible and, Muslims are not an exception among different cultures (2008). Furthermore, as democracy is an aspect of liberalism (Ganti, 2014), Pasha considers that liberalism is Eurocentric rather than universal (2017). Lynch, on the other hand, considers that the supremacy of liberalism cannot be accomplished without Christianity (2020). 14 Nevertheless, democracy is desired by many Muslims in the modern days even though authoritarianism is hugely existent in Muslim-majority countries. Espocito cites that a common description of the prevalence of authoritarianism can be explained by the incompatibility of democracy and Islam (2018). Some literature concludes that, from a Western perspective, there is a contrast between them and the Islamic other in seeing themselves as liberal while defining the Islamic other by despotism (Lynch, 2020). On that basis, the gap between the liberal West and the Islamic other exists in the form of a downgrading view towards the latter which has played a role in the consideration of Islam and democracy as incompatible. On the other hand, Espocito argues that some similarities between Islam and democracy can be seen in the essence of Islam which includes principles of consultations and liberties (2018). Moreover, the integration of parties defining themselves by political Islam in democratic systems while running for elections can be explained by “the inclusionmoderation hypothesis” (Yildirim, 2015). Cavatorta & Resta explain it as a progressive moderation of these parties by their inclusion in politics (2020). On the other hand, the rise of political Islam is sometimes explained as a reaction of “defiance and self-victimization” over the Western agenda of democracy (Berger, 2010). Therefore, political Islam can be seen as a defense mechanism against democracy, and as stated above, it has the potential to modernize and democratize as a result of the inclusion in that same democratic system they once despised. Additionally, scholars’ arguments about the compatibility of democracy and Islam varies greatly. According to Pasha, the reason Muslim majority countries are not following the liberal democratic school at the same pace as other cultures is because of liberalism that failed to resolve sovereignty and citizenship. Also, he argues that the liberal secular West is not actually secular since it reflects a “Protestant Westphalian Settlement” (2017). On 15 the other hand, as democracy includes secularization, and since Islam is a religion that defies the meaning of secularization, Hashemi considers that the road to liberalism needs to pass by religious politics (2014). Additionally, he argues that democratic development does not require the privatization of religion, it requires “a reinterpretation of religious ideas” (2014). Therefore, he believes that Islam and democracy can be harmonious. 2.1.2. The Case of Turkey: In 1997, Heper explained the integration of Islam in Turkey in numerous ways, however, it was not included in the constitutional and legal secularism (1997). According to Karasipahi, liberal policies towards Islam existed since the start of the “multiparty era” which started after the 1960s (2009). Accordingly, Political Islam has been existing since the mid-20st century. However, the revival of Islam in Turkey started in the 1980s (Karasipahi, 2009). They consider that modernization played a key role in contributing to the “politicization of Islam” (2009). Nevertheless, Islam did not successfully resurge into the political realm of Turkey except with the AKP’s ascending to the parliament and the presidency. As explained by Bermek, the AKP won the elections with more than 30% of the vote in 2002 (2019). Bermek considers that the ascension of AKP to the majority in the parliament was not because of it being Islamist, its success is based on its emphasis on market-oriented economy and social justice. Therefore, it attracted the masses and the businesses that are looking for that market stability (2019). 16 In order to understand the resurgence of Islam in Turkey and the accommodation of Islam in its democratic and secular system, it is crucial to study AKP’s policies and governance. According to Bermek, the Ottoman legacy in AKP’s views is hybrid. The AKP earned the votes of both nationalists and conservatives. This has been the result of their mixed agenda including reforms in the political and welfare fields and political stability. Therefore, what made AKP succeed is its distinct policy agenda (2019). Accordingly, they argue that Turkish citizens vote on the basis of their self-interests mainly (Bermek, 2019). On the other hand, Barbosa & Gantigo consider that the AKP shaped their political figure by linking themselves to the Ottoman Empire’s traditions and values rather than only focusing on Islam (2020). Therefore, they were able to secure the nationalists’ votes also (Bermek, 2019). On that basis, the AKP reshaped Turkey by reforming Kemalism and linking nationalism into their Islamist point of view (Alam, 2009). Accordingly, Barbosa & Gantigo argue that the AKP redirected the Turkish national identity (Gontijo & Barbosa, 2020). Nevertheless, White believes that, even with the existence of AKP, religion did pass through a secularization phase while integrating Islam into the secular system (2013). Even though the AKP reshaped the Turkish identity in the last decades, an enormous economic change occurred in the last decade. According to White, Turkey’s focused on political liberalization and maintaining a good relationship with the European Union while aiming to be part of the union (2013). Additionally, as explained by Bermek, the AKP focused on economic liberation and capitalistic economic policies (2019). Therefore, the political agenda of the AKP has links with democratic settings of economy and policymaking. In Addition to that, Aykaç & Durgun argue that Islamists main goal is to be integrated into the modern world (2021). With AKP’s political agenda and reforms, this has been formed in the last 17 decade. However, it is important to note that Aydın-Düzgit argues that Turkey’s freedom level has decreased from “Partially free” to “not free” in 2018 (2019). Nevertheless, Turkey still has a “consolidated democratic status” (White, 2013). However, it is not to be denied that the democratic setting includes an Islamic Idiom (White, 2013). According to Celep, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is defined by its so-called pro-Islamist anti-secular ideologies (2021). It is the successor of different Islamist parties and has combined religious right politics with center-right politics from secular traditions (Celep, 2021). However, the National Movement Party (MHP) followed a similar path. Although the support of the AKP party is larger than the one the MHP party gets, both parties share their Islamic Turkish Sunni identity politics (Celep, 2021). Therefore, the author explains how the AKP party ascended to its role in Turkish politics in comparison to the MHP (2021). To comprehend how the AKP rose to power in Turkey while having accommodated Islamic tradition in a secular system, Jacoby explains the identity politics of Turkey and how AKP benefitted from them (2010). According to Tansel, the macroeconomics politics, international politics, and the remarkable achievements carry out a crucial role in the success of AKP (2015). With regards to the economic accomplishments under the AKP rule in Turkey, it was a result of resurgence and reexplanation of capitalism. It also removed capital accumulation in the favor of social equality and removing any relation to that accumulation to the basis of society, economic, and government costs (Tansel, 2015). They added that the AKP worked on the institutionalization of the prioritization of society over the government in economics (Tansel, 2015). Therefore, focusing on the reinstitution of capitalism and helped in increasing the support of AKP. Also, scholars have argued that the support 18 for AKP was a result of electoral programs rather than their Islamist identity (Bermek, 2019). However, their Islamist identity cannot be ignored while studying the party. Therefore, it is important to understand the accommodation of Islam and democracy that has been obvious after the AKP. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the declaration of the Turkish republic, Mustafa Kamal – known by Ataturk – tried to cause some changes into the identity of the Turks in modern Turkey. According to Aytürk, Ataturk tried to remove the Islamic identity of the population of Turkey (2014). Madrasahs and tekkes played a role in minimizing the Islamic identity of the Turkish population and had a negative impact on science and knowledge (Aykaç & Durgun, 2021). Other significant changes can be seen in altering the language of the recitation of the call to prayer from Arabic to Turkish and closing religious schools that were an important pillar of the education system in the Ottoman empire. Aytürk considers that these changes are considered as a source of humiliation for emerging Turkish generations. He on tops adds that the rejection of the Islamic identity of the Turks in Turkey is exceptional to Kemalists – those who follow the teaching of Ataturk – and Turanism (Aytürk, 2014). However, he also argues that the Turkish case study is an exception in the Muslim population. He considers that this goes back to Turks converting to Islam before the Islamic conquests rather than after (Aytürk, 2014). On the oher hand, Alemdar argues that the fall of the Ottoman empire had a different impact on Muslims outside the Turkish realm. He explains that a new identification of the Ummah has been established which constituted the separation of Islamism from Western powers (Alemdar, 2014). According to Aykaç & Durgun, colonialism remains the chief factor behind the rise of Islamism in the Muslim communities while it was political colonialism in most of the Islamic world, cultural colonialism had the same result in Turkey (2021). 19 The role of AKP in Turkey has been discussed thoroughly. Jacoby explains how republican elites accused the AKP of aiming to Islamize the Turkish republic (2010). As already stated, others have argued that the AKP won the elections because of their electoral program rather than their Islamist identity (Bermek, 2019). Moreover, the AKP has been studied from the perspective of the integration of Turkey in the European Union excessively. According to Jacoby, Turkey will not be part of the EU because of the internal conservative forces that are stopping democratic reforms. These forces have a relationship with the AKP (Jacoby, 2010). Kubicek, on the other hand, considers that AKP and Turkey are turning towards the Middle East, the East, and Russia rather than the West (2011). The discussion about the Turkey and the EU is directly related to the case of the Islamic identity of Turkey, the status of democracy, and liberties. For instance, the treatment of women in turkey is considered by some as an important reason behind Turkey not entering the EU (Rumelili, 2011). Furthermore, Tansel explains the status of democracy in Turkey while connecting it to the main leading party of AKP. As previously stated, AKP has focused on the re-integration of capitalism in the economics of Turkey (Tansel, 2015). He argues that Turkey is a delegative democracy in which the emphasis is on one ruling party. It is explanatory in the presidential system present today in Turkey (Tansel, 2015). Accordingly, the accommodation of Islam in democracy in Turkey can be studied based on that delegative democracy. Other scholars agree on the democratic status of Turkey. As per Özdalga, the Western conceptualization of democracy and human rights exists in Turkey and the role of Islam in its existence is not direct (2006). 20 2.1.3. The Case of Iran: In the case of Iran, the resurgence of Islamism is attributed to the so-called Islamic revolution in 1979. The new Iranian Republic transformed Iran into an Islamic state following the Islamist ideologies of Khomeini. Khomeini considers that the reinvented theocracy includes that the spiritual and political powers are mutually exclusive (Rahimi, 2012). The reasons behind that resurgence can be seen in the effectiveness of the religious leaders in mobilizing the masses against the Shah (Karasipahi, 2009). Additionally, the resurgence had an intellectual form. The increase in interest in Islamic studies, old philosophy, and historical studies played a role in this resurgence. Therefore, the oppression has been interpreted by a resurgence in Islamism (Karasipahi, 2009). On another note, Modern Iran includes forms of democracy that can be seen in the elections that happen regularly. However, the authenticity of these democratic forms and whether they can be sufficient are debatable. As per Mirzanejad et al, the theoretical framework of democracy in Iran has been a demand of the people. Furthermore, they argue that there’s a lack of professional political parties and that it is one of the main issues standing between Iran and democracy (2021). Moreover, there are no active dialogues between religious intellectuals and secular intellectuals which increases the gap in Iran and takes it further away from democracy (Mirsepassi, 2010). However, it is important to note that Islamic groups in Iran are not similar (Karasipahi, 2009). Moreover, even though Iran is based on a theocratic system that is defined by Islam, according to Harris, the political field since 2005 is more focused on nationalism than Islamism (2010). Additionally, Rivetti considers a secular and liberal civil society exists in Iran (2013). Thus, it focuses on the lack of representation that results from the theocratic system that Iran post-1979 is based on. Moreover, 21 Rivetti argues that democracy is symbolic in Iran rather than existing (2013). Additionally, they argue that there’s a high chance of a shift into liberal democracy (2013). Therefore, many scholars don’t consider the accommodation of democracy in the existing system of Iran. Ayatollahi argues that different forms of protest were intended to shift the revolution of 1979 from a leftist one to a so-called Islamist one. He considers this happened for political interests (Ayatollahi, 2018). In this manner, it is substantial to consider the fundamental reasons behind the protests of 1979. According to Olsen, it was a result of an economic and political crisis, similar to the revolution of 1905. Both revolutions used the Shia signs in these protests, however, it is argued that the revolutions were unrooted in Islam but were rather expressed using Islam (Olsen, 2019). Gheissari & Nasr agree and argue that Islam, Marxism, and nationalism remain the leading players in Iran’s politics during and after the revolution (2006). In addition, departing from faith in politics assisted the Iranians in the foundations of the Shia branch of Islam. However, since there is a struggle for democracy in Iran as per the argument of Mirsepassi, global discussions about Islam and democracy and their future in politics in the Muslim world are increasing especially in the Iranian context (Mirsepassi, 2010). To interpret the accommodation of democracy and Islam in Iran, it is significant to understand the Islamisation of Iran. According to Olsen, some scholars have connected the Islamic identity of Iran with the revolution and the Iraq-Iran war. He adds the main reason behind it is the shadowing of the leftist by Khomeini in the revolution (Olsen, 2019). Additionally, he argues that the Islamic identity of the revolution came as a result of the secular identity of the Shah’s regime (Olsen, 2019). The accommodation of Islam in the republic system of Iran after the revolution came 22 with the incorporation of Islamic values into the modern state (Gheissari & Nasr, 2006). However, the requests for democratization in Iran have been increasing. According to Gheissari & Nasr, the demand for democracy is for a simple republic rather than a complicated theocracy (2006). On that basis, Benjamin explains that the theocratic dictatorship sometimes is seen as worse than the Shah’s regime, however, it is significant not to forget his brutality (2018). Additionally, the theocratic system based on a Shia interpretation of Islamism has a lack of democracy, a lack of relationship between democracy and culture, and vice versa (Mirsepassi, 2010). 2.1.4. Overview & Conclusion: Karasipahi examined the resurgence of Islamic movements in Iran and Turkey in 2004. According to them, the resurgence of Islam in Iran had a direct way and was the only “legitimate” form of political protest against the Shah’s autocratic rule. On the other hand, Turkey had different ways of protesting, however, the AKP’s great political agenda played a big role in the resurgence of Islam. Additionally, they differentiate between the reasons for the political protest. Accordingly, they argue that the Iranian revolution was a result of a deficiency in political freedom while it is misleading to consider that Islam is the sole reason behind the revolt. Nevertheless, the role of Islam in Turkey increased constantly while keeping a liberal and secular identity. Also, liberties played a major role in the resurgence of Islam. For instance, the privatization and deregulation of the media opened the space for Islamic televisions and newspapers to open which played a positive role in that resurgence. On that basis, Karasipahi argues that there are similarities in Islamic movements in both countries, however, the Kemalist principles in Turkey play an important role in differentiating in the level of resurgence between the two countries (Karasipahi, 2009). 23 Therefore, the diverse nature of each country plays a vital element in shaping the different inclusion of Islam in each state. Examining another case of comparison between Turkey and Iran, the case of women is high-profile to tackle. According to Tajali, most Islamist parties are patriarchal and do not favor women holding important roles (2015). The dominant relationship of Islamist parties with women and politics can be seen as negative as the AKP and the conservative forces in Iran both oppose the role of women in decision-making (Tajali, 2015). This performs a significant role in the level of liberalization and equality in a said country which can help in explaining the accommodation of Islamism and democracy. According to Rumelili, the role of women in Turkey portrays a negative role in the integration of Turkey into the European Union (2011). Also, Tajali considers the Iranian Republic considers that the place of women is in the domestic sphere rather than in the national one (2015). Furthermore, the studied literature helps in understanding the relationship between the states of Turkey and Iran and the differences that affect the implementation of Islamist ideologies in their systems. Additionally, it gives a general understanding of the historical paths that contributed to the present existence of an Islamic resurgence. It also shows the importance of the topic that is meant to be discussed. This significance can be seen in the differences between the two countries, the different objectives that the people and the state have that affect the relationship of Islam with their state. However, it shows that there’s a lack of literature on the topic that we are discussing. Scholars have not tackled the accommodation of Islam in democracy in a direct way, the focus is rather on the integration of Islam in the politics of the country. Moreover, there’s a lack of literature on the accommodation of Islam in democracy in Iran. More literature about the topic can be found on Turkey especially 24 since Turkey is a democratic republic by its constitution. However, Iran is still considered as a theocracy in which the Supreme Leader has a high level of influence in which the democratic system is considered by some scholars, as seen before, as non-existent. Therefore, the case of Iran is not studied sufficiently from a democratic setting rather than an authoritarian one. Nevertheless, the issue is not to be found in the case of Turkey because of its secular identity and the Kemalist principles. 2.2. Framework: People identifying as Muslims have different ideologies and doctrines. According to Lugo, between 80 and 90% of them consider themselves as part of Sunni sector while the remaining are part of different sects considering the Shia population close to 10% (2009). The Shia population are concentrated mostly around Iran and Iraq while Iran consists of close to 70 million Shiite (Lugo, 2009). On the other hand, Turkey consists of a majority of Sunni Muslims following the jurisprudence of Abu Hanifah with a population also close to 70 million Sunnis. Therefore, the two populations follow different sects from which it is concluded that they have differences in doctrines and ideologies. The objective of this framework is to examine the Islamic identification of each of the case studies with the purpose of understanding the effects of that identification on the accommodation of Islamic and democratic practices. While there are similarities in terms of identification, it is clear that the Islamic identity in Iran is more centered on Khomeinism and Twelver Shia doctrine while in Turkey, the Islamic identity is not linked to the AKP specifically. On that basis, this part starts by exploring the role of religion in Turkey and understanding the connection between the Islamic identity and the AKP while elaborating on the importance of Islam in the country. The 25 same procedure is followed for the case of Iran with the examination of Khomeinism and his doctrines and beliefs. 2.2.1. The Case Study of Turkey and the AKP: The AKP in Turkey is an Islamist party that can be generally associated with Abi Hanifa’s Sunni doctrine as it is Turkey’s mainstream jurisprudence school (Öztürk, 2016). Additionally, the AKP links itself in some circumstances as the successors of the Ottomans. However, since AKP is present in a secular country, the literature about the religious doctrine of AKP is minimal; the literature focuses mostly on their political and economic agenda. In order to define Islam from the perspective of AKP, this thesis takes into consideration the doctrine of Abu Hanifah and the beliefs of the Ottomans while focusing on the changes that occurred in the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey (Diyanet) which can explain the beliefs AKP has on Islam. On the other hand, The Iranian Revolution resulted in the governance of Khomeini in Iran. Since Khomeini is considered as the most important Muslim cleric in Iran, exploring his beliefs and doctrine helps in explaining the definition of Islam in Iran post-1979. Although Turkey has been established as a secular country under the direct influence of nationalists and secularists, the Cold War opened the door for Islamists and Muslim conservatives to integrate in the political scene of Turkey (Aytürk, 2014). Furthermore, the power of the Islamists increased in Turkey with the AKP ascend to power. In the 21st century, there has been an increase in the support of Islamic rule by the Turkish population. According to Dixon, in 2009, more than 50% of the Turkish population believed in the importance of religion (2009). However, the majority still 26 wanted the preservation of the civil code in Turkey (Çarkoğlu, 2010). Therefore, even with the ruling of AKP, many still believe in the importance of secularity in Turkey. Thus, the Islamic framework of AKP can be mainly studied from the perspective of the integration of some Islamic aspects into politics rather than changing the whole system into an Islamist one. Therefore, the case of Turkey differs greatly from the case of Iran because of the different goals that they might believe in. According to Aytürk, the relationship between Islam and Turkey is significantly linked to the attachment of the Turks on culture and tradition rather than only the religious perspective. (2014). The AKP has benefited from that perspective by connecting their identity to the Ottoman identity. Likewise, the last 20 years included important changes in relation to the indirect institutionalization of Islam in Turkey. The AKP in 2010 played an important role in removing the ban on Hijab in public spaces in Turkey (Gontijo & Barbosa, 2020). Yilmaz & Bachirov also explain how the AKP had a direct role in removing the oppression of the Kemalist regime by establishing an inclusion of practicing Muslims in bureaucratic positions and giving Hijabi Muslims equal opportunities that non-Hijabis have (2018). Therefore, it can be argued that the Islamic rhetoric that the AKP has can be mainly seen in the changes it made in order to include and normalize Islam in the country rather than the Islamisation of the country. Also, it can also be argued that the AKP focused on the Turkish population that is highly influenced by Islam which makes it essential for them to have an Islamic rhetoric in order to preserve their support. Thus, the AKP can use their Islamist ideology to achieve their political goals. Moreover, the changes that occurred in the Diyanet in the last 20 years can explain the definition of Islam that is recurrent in AKP. Since Erdogan is not a Muslim cleric and the main actors in the AKP party are mostly economists, elites, and 27 politicians rather than clerics, focusing on the changes occurring in the Diyanet under the influence of AKP while exploring the ideology and beliefs of Ali Erbaş, the last president of the Diyanet, can help in understanding the prespective of AKP on Islam. The Diyanet has been founded by Ataturk as an ideological device for the Turkish state (Öztürk, 2016). Öztürk considers that it had an important role in the formation of secularity in Turkey. This can be mainly seen in its replacement of the old system of religious authority that was found in the Ottoman Era. Accordingly, the Diyanet, the religious authority, had the main role in ensuring secularism in the early times of the republic. For instance, the Diyanet used to regulate the religious information received by Sunni Muslims while eliminating threats of religious affiliated ideologies that were undesirable (Öztürk, 2016). As previously stated, the Diyanet passed through important changes under the AKP rule. The changes have been mainly seen in the role it plays in influencing the population, the ideologies that have become more aligned with Islam than secularism, and many more. In 2003, the Turkish cabinet redefined the Diyanet’s role as to primary preserve the Turkish culture inland and aborad (Mutluer, 2018). Its role unofficially has changed into including a more precise agenda in promoting the ideology of the ruling party, aka AKP (Öztürk, 2016). Its responsibility over the religious affairs of Turkey and the Islamist ideology of AKP shows its importance for the ruling party and the crucial role it has in preserving the popularity of the AKP. Although the Diyanet is officially a secular organization, its role as a religious institution can easily be used in order to focus on non-secular religious affairs. Moreover, the Diyanet stabilizes the influence of religion in the public sphere (Öztürk, 2016), thus, the stabilization benefits the AKP as an Islamist party. The Diyanet has also been focusing on ethics, human rights, and the expectations of the individual with regards to the state. 28 Although that role has been similar even before the AKP, it has been shifted into a more Islamized technique under its rule. The syncronization of its activities with AKP policies has been increasing since the start of the 21st century. It has been increasingly present in political and social affairs in what is similar to the AKP’s ideologies. Additionally, the Diyanet’s role has been upgraded from being a state institution under state regulations into a more privatized organization with more freedom (Öztürk, 2016). According to Adak, the Diyanet has been taking new approaches including a new approach in targeting women. They explain how the Diyanet has been hiring women in their goal of preaching women by women. The number of women employees in the Diyanet is close to 40,000, as stated by the Diyanet’s President Ali Erbaş (Adak, 2021). However, Adak argues that role of women in Diyanet is not equal to the role of men. For instance, women do not have a major role in writing Friday sermons which can be considered as the main source of spreading information (2021). The Diyanet has also been working on the influence of the family and its issues lately. Adak explains how the Diyanet established “The Diyanet’s Family and Religious Guidance Bureaus” in order to influence decisions regarding the family and base them on Islam. Additionally, new protocols have been signed in order for the Diyanet to be able to preach in ministries, summer camps, and sport facilities (Adak, 2021). As previously stated, the influence of the Diyanet has been changing and its role has been increasing since the start of the 21st century. It is playing a direct role in influencing Turkish citizens into following the agendas of the AKP (Öztürk, 2016). However, it is important to note that the people that care about religion in general are mostly followers of the AKP, which makes it a double edged relationship. For instance, the AKP is benefitting from the Diyanet while the Diyanet is being a 29 representative for the religious Muslim citizens of Turkey. In addition to that, Öztürk argues that the Diyanet is taking on the role of legitimizing the authoritarianism and domination of AKP by using religious tools. This can explain the way the AKP is benefitting from Islam in order to expand their power (Öztürk, 2016). Also, Yilmaz argues that the Diyanet is being selective about what it answers and what it stays silent for, which can prove that it is taking the role of a legitimizor for AKP (2014). Additionally, some claim that the Diyanet is launching a war against secularism (Bellut, 2021). Since the AKP does not have any official clerics that specify its definition of Islam, therefore, looking at the ideologies and beliefs of Ali Erbaş. Since Ali Erbaş, the president of the Diyanet since 2017, is known to be affiliated with the AKP, exploring his actions and speeches help in understanding the goals of the AKP. According to Mutluer, Ali Bardakoğlu, the president of the Diyanet from 2003 to 2010, used to believe that the Diyanet is a democratic institution (2018). Although Bardakoğlu has been the president of the Diyanet in the time of AKP rule, he is not as close to the AKP as Erbaş. Erbaş has a conservative interpretation of Islam, as stated by Bellut (2021). Bellut considers that Erbaş has a high influence on society and believes that Islam should be the main guider of all aspects of life – which is against basic democracy, however, closer to mainstream Islam – (2021). Erbaş has also shown different signs of conservatism; he held a sword while giving a speech during the opening of Hagia Sofia as a mosque again, which has been translated to conservatism by the opposition in Turkey (Butler, 2021). Butler also states that Erbaş is present frequently next to Erdogan which means that there’s an elevation of the status of Sunni Islam in Turkey. Erbaş also stated on many occasions that Turkey is a Muslim country which goes against the secularist state (Butler, 2021). On that basis, it is important to 30 note that Erbaş has been assigned to run the Diyanet for an additional 5 years from which Bellut argues that Islam will have an increasing role in Turkey for the next 5 years (Bellut, 2021). On these grounds, it can be argued that the AKP has been using Islam and the related institution of the Diyanet in Turkey in order to keep their power. The relationship of Islam and AKP can be seen from a perspective of electoral needs and audience. Although the AKP might have some ideologies to implement, it seems unreasonable to argue that their main goal is to fully change the political system of Turkey and implement an Islamist system. However, it can be also argued that their Islamist role can help in achieving some changes into the political system as it can be seen in the last referendum. The AKP can use Islam in order to grow their audience from which they can achieve their goals. On the other hand, it can be also clear that the AKP do share many traditional beliefs with other parties from all over the world identified by Islamist. For example, the AKP believes in the superiority of Islam, the important role of Islam in society, and the crucial role of perceiving culture in maintaining a stable country. However, some changes that the AKP has implemented can be seen from both an Islamic approach and a democratic liberal one. For instance, the AKP’s fight for giving women their right to wear a Hijab in public can be seen as a step in achieving equality. Thus, when trying to explore the definition of Islam by the AKP, the findings lead to a basic idea of Islam not far away from mainstream Islam. 2.2.2. The Case of Iran & Khomeinism: Iran has been a theocratic presidential republic in which the citizens vote for a president under a so-called Islamic umbrella, thus, it is clearer to understand the 31 definition of Islam claimed by the republic than in the case of Turkey. Al Khomeini was the religious leader of the revolution and later, the supreme leader of Iran. In order to define what is considered Islamic in Iran post-1979, this part focuses mainly on the doctrine of Al Khomeini. Hence, it focuses on Khomeinism which includes the ideologies of Khomeini and the formation of the new republic. This part also emphasizes on the society that welcomed Khomeinism and how homogenous it is. Religion in Iran plays a crucial role in politics, economics, and the society. Although the Republic of Iran can be considered as a basis of so-called Islamic fundamentalism, Arjomand states that the main ruling party of Iran do not consider themselves as fundamentalists, are anti-fundamentalists, and believe in their goal of intellectual reformation while embracing the Western definition of Human rights (Arjomand, 1980). While this might be debatable, the belief the republic has about its stances are important in studying the framework. Furthermore, the revolution in 1979 took the form of an Islamic resurgence. The dissatisfaction with the Shah’s regime and the emotional and psychological factors that merged into that form (Karasipahi, 2009). Karasipahi also explains the historical factor that plays a role in shaping these factors into a so-called Islamic resurgence rather than a democratic one. For instance, the mass conversion to Shiism that happened in the 16th century and Iran being historically the only Shia majority nation in the world had a direct effect on the way the revolution took place (Karasipahi, 2009). On the other hand, it is crucial to note that the Iranian Shia ideology that emerged in the 1979 have been overlooked for a long time in comparison to other kinds of fundamentalism that identify by Sunnism because of the political importance of Taliban, ISIS, and other organizations and parties in Western politics (Aarabi, 2019). However, the human rights issue and other important factors regarding international politics have given an emphasis on Iran in the last century. 32 Additionally, the Iranian society has not been homogenous in terms of Islamic groups (Karasipahi, 2009). However, that does not change the fact that the Khomeini ideology has been dominant as a result of their ruling. According to Yazdi, the revolution had the slogan of freedom, independence, and Islam (2016). Since Khomeini is considered as the leader of the revolution, he constructed a religious, political, and social system which this thesis focuses on in order to understand the so-called Islamic framework used. Khomeini introduced a new political system in which he focused on internal governance and international hegemony. He represented in his opinion freedom and independence. Khomeini built a system calling it the Islamic Republic which he considers does not fall in the hands of Eastern or Western power, a new system in which he believes can maintain independence and freedom. Additionally, Khomeini based his system on Islam (Yazdi, 2016). Yazdi argues that this system had established a model which can be used worldwide in order to achieve the goals Khomeini emphasized on (2016). Khomeini built that framework with the focus on history as a base in understanding the present. He received support from most of the political parties at his time except for Marxist groups and the National Democratic Front, therefore, he had the audience in his time to be able to achieve his goals (Yazdi, 2016). Also, Yazdi argues that the support has been maintained under the basis of opposing Western hegemony. Moreover, he kept all political links except with the apartheid “fake” state of Israel, and at that time, the apartheid regime of South Africa (2016). Khomeinism has been established based on giving authority to Islamic clerics while maintaining an elective system done by the citizens in order to keep his authority solid (Yazdi, 2016). Additionally, Khomeini’s doctrine is grounded on finding the ultimate Truth by using Islam (Akhavi, 1988), accordingly his given authority to the 33 clerics relies on the belief of reaching the ultimate truth. Also, Khomeini considers that this world reflects the doctrine he believes in. Akhavi adds that the Khomeini doctrine is found in the Shia doctrine that has similarities with the Muzatilite school of thought (1988). In addition to that, Khomeini considers that the nation should not be built on the ego of a human, but the benefit to humankind (Akhavi, 1988). Furthermore, Khomeinism is based on the importance of the scholars of jurisprudence, the Prophet, and the Imams which led him to build the system of the republic with the supremacy of the religious clerics (Akhavi, 1988). Thus, the Iranian case study is well rooted under doctrinal and sectoral religious grounds. The future, in accordance with the Khomeini thought is based on answering important questions that are not easily answered (Yazdi, 2016). The most important answer is the relationship between religion and state. Khomeini criticized the revolution that led to the Shah’s regime while also promoting a republic based on his vision of Islam. The answer was found, in his opinion, b by establishing a supreme leadership based on religion similarly the one in the Vatican (Yazdi, 2016). He believed in the impossibility of accomplishing independence, freedom, rights, and reforms without the coordination of religion and politics. This has been made by the creation of the concept of Vilayet Faqih in which a Shia cleric is the guardian of all religious matters; he appointed himself as that leader (Yazdi, 2016). Furthermore, Khomeini has emphasized on his belief that Islam is constituted on the basis of a democratic nature (Akhavi, 1988). This can be seen in his focus on making representation and elections part of the system of governance of the Republic. However, the emphasis on an Islamic claimed identity of the republic is also found and is part of the constitution. It also includes the importance of devotion to God while also stating that the main source of law is religion (Aarabi, 2019). Aarabi argues on 34 that basis that Iran has been established as a starting point for a pan-Shiite broad order in which it connects all the Shia of the world. Moreover, he explains how Rouhani, the president of the Republic between 2014 and 2018, included the pan-Shiite and panIslamic rhetoric in more than 50% of his speeches while also helping militias around the region in achieving the goal of the Vilayet Faqih (Aarabi, 2019). Although this has been refuted by different sources, it can be seen in many examples during the last decade. 2.2.3. Conclusion: The AKP in Turkey and Iran after the revolution differed in their definition of Islam. The difference is mainly seen in the forms of governance and political structures of each country. The AKP has been elected to rule Turkey. While their main target was conservative Muslims, they used different approaches in order to achieve their goals. Their Islamist identity is used mostly to keep their audience; the preservation of the support is achieved using different political, societal, and economic promises. Although the AKP has made important changes to the Diyanet, they did not change secularism in Turkey. Some of their tactics have led to the opposition accusing them of affecting secularism. However, these claims can be countered. On the other hand, the Iranian case differs greatly from the Turkish case. The main differences can be found in how they attained power. Khomeini changed the system of Iran by introducing a Shia Republic defined by Islam, therefore, the Islamic part plays a crucial role in maintaining power. Additionally, Khomeini’s doctrine is a renewed interpretation of Shiism which he used in shaping the Republic. On the other hand, the AKP do not have many differences in terms of approaching religion than the 35 mainstream Abi Hanifah jurisprudence of Sunni Islam that in Turkey. Therefore, both cases differ in terms of defining Islam. It can be argued that, in the case of AKP, the use of religion is found in achieving normal power rather than changing the system of the country which is not what happened in Iran. 36 Chapter Three The Case Study of Turkey and the AKP 3.1. Introduction: The Justice & Development Party (AKP) exploited unique trajectories in attaining power while merging liberalism, capitalism, Islam, and authoritarianism. The inclusion of Islam in different aspects of their political campaigns while maintaining the focus on other issues that can mobilize societies to provide them with their vote is clear. However, the visible authoritarian trait that can be found in AKP adds to the emphasis on understanding the reason for the growth that is accompanied by authoritarianism. Exploring the trajectories used by the AKP leads to an understanding of the models followed in order to attain the support needed. This chapter finds that the AKP uses the Islamic identity to maintain legitimacy and achieve the support needed to attain hegemony in the country. It argues that the democratic practices used are intended to achieve the goals that the AKP has. This chapter includes three main parts, examining the political, social, and economic pathways. First, it focuses on the different political trajectories used by AKP in emphasizing Islam while maintaining a democratic setting in Turkey. The political changes that have been made in the last two decades of AKP power can assist in explaining the integration of Islam in a secular country. For instance, it explores the conflicting political agendas, laws, and choices that the AKP took in order to better explain how they are connecting their Islamist identity with the democratic and secular identity of Turkey. Moreover, it aims on understanding the accommodation of Islam in a secular system and how it was assessed by the AKP while taking if democracy 37 has been maintained in Turkey. The political pathway used in this chapter can be defined in the connection between authoritarianism, democracy, secularism, and Islam. On the other hand, this chapter also explores the societal aspect of accommodation of Islam and democracy in Turkey. For instance, it focuses on the different trajectories used by AKP in order to influence the Turks to vote for them while also tackling the relationship between the people and the AKP and exploring the relationship between AKP and women, minorities, and LGBTQ+ members. On that basis, this chapter aims on understanding the correlation between society and Islam and how much it has influenced the population. Additionally, the exploration of the different priorities directly manipulates the mobilization. On the other hand, it also discovers the various modes used by the AKP in maintaining a balance between secularism and Islam. Additionally, this chapter includes an exploration of the economic reforms and decisions made by the AKP starting in the 21st century. It elaborates on the neoliberal approach that has been widely established in Turkey by the AKP. Accordingly, it links that approach into the Islamist identity used by AKP and the authoritarian style of governance. Also, it tackles the integration of Islam into its economy by focusing on the Vakif whose role has increased drastically since the AKP gained governance. The economic pathway used by the AKP can help in explaining the accommodation of Islam in presence of neoliberal economies which helps in explaining the connection that has been made by the AKP in connecting the dots between Islam and democracy. Although the AKP is known for using authoritarianism in governance, the freedom that has been established with neo-liberalism in the presence of a secular system and a drafted democratic one can help in answering the research questions. 38 3.2. The Political Pathways: The political trajectories followed by the AKP include a variety of pathways that explains the relationship between the AKP, the Islamic identity, and the democratic practices that are implemented in the political scheme. This part examines how the AKP uses the Islamic identity in order to maintain the support they need to achieve the legitimacy and hegemony needed. It also explores how the political system of Turkey has a role in shaping the democratic practices that the AKP follow to maintain the status-quo. It also explains how the AKP’s focus is on finding the needed practices to be able to achieve their goals. According to Jacoby, AKP has not been following its previous history of reforms as a result of pragmatism and external influence (2010). However, that did not stop AKP and its allies from gaining majority electoral support for more than 20 consecutive years in which AKP has been gaining the largest electoral support as an individual party (Çarkoğlu, 2010). The AKP had and still has an enormous role in shifting the reality of Turkey. Since the AKP has gained power in Turkey, the political identity of Turkey has shifted in different places from a secularist nationalist country into a more conservative one while maintaining its secular system and retaining nationalism in its people’s identity. However, the chief changes that have been performed by the AKP is in its Islamic identity. Although Turkey is still a secular country, the AKP carried out an enormous role in giving it an Islamist identity. For instance, the personal religiosity of Erdogan and his frankness about it, the increasing importance given to the religious affairs of Turkey, international stances that portray the support of AKP to Islam and Muslims worldwide, and the policies that have been made or altered in order to de-secularize Turkey have been obvious in recent years. 39 Secularism in Turkey has been based on its Kemalist approach of diminishing and ignoring the Islamic and Ottoman history while it sometimes discriminated against the religious population of Turkey, especially women. According to Jacoby, AKP has been reidentifying secularism by “de-Kemalizing” it while giving more space for “religious based political arguments” (2010). Although this can be countered, it has been clear that AKP has been focusing on increasing the presence of Islamic rhetoric in Turkey. Moreover, the AKP used a democratic setting in order to achieve its changes in the political and social spheres. By winning majority seats in consecutive elections, doing a referendum in which the governance system has been completely shifted, and changing policies using the same system that was previously created by secularist Kemalists, it introduced the changes in a theoretically democratic setting while preserving the importance of representation. Even though have used many different tactics in order to preserve the support of the majority, it cannot be denied that the inclusion of Islam into Turkey has followed an accommodation of different pathways while maintaining a generally democratic image. Although the prevalence of democracy has been an important issue in discussing Turkey’s internal and international politics, the AKP has preserved important aspects of democracy in Turkey. However, it is important to note that some scholars portray the AKP as an authoritarian entity and argue that it did actually change the democratic setting of Turkey (İmren Borsuk, 2022). The Gezi protests that took place in 2013 and the Turkish stance on the Arab Spring have played an important role in that claim. These events led to a conservative and less tolerant portrayal of the AKP (Yavuz & Öztürk, 2019). Additionally, İmren Borsuk has argued that the AKP has established a “New Turkey” in which an authoritarian change of Turkey’s identity and a transformation of the citizens lives have been followed. The authoritarianism 40 can also be seen in emergency decrees in which the freedom of journalism have been affected (İmren Borsuk, 2022). That authoritarian identity that has been increasingly linked to the AKP plays an important role in the relationship between AKP and democracy. For instance, stances similar to that can lead to a disconnection of AKP with democracy in which the relationship between AKP, Islam, and democracy can be shifted into a reestablishment of a “New Turkey” in which the role of democracy is minimized, and representation is used as a cover up for an authoritarian system. However, this claim cannot be easily confirmed as the presence of the opposition is still clear and the AKP is still following a secular-democratic system in order to attain its goals. Discussing the democratic setting of Turkey under the governance of AKP has many different layers. Adar argues that the AKP is selective in its practice of democracy (2013). Accordingly, the AKP’s establishment of a non-corrupt democratic setting in Turkey has failed in many trajectories such as decreasing political polarization. However, failures that have been attributed to the AKP cannot dismiss a general democratic trajectory in politics. Turkey can be seen in a position between democracy and authoritarian system. Tansel, for instance, argues that Turkey is a delegative democracy that is defined by a strong leader (2015). Accordingly, the president – present day Ergodan – has an enormous power while other factors of democracy are still preserved mainly seen in representation and opposition. However, the power of the military in Turkey plays an important role in distancing Turkey from democracy. Although the Turkish military kept its secular identity (Cagaptay, 2014), the power of the military that is arguably greater than the citizens’ power places Turkey more distant from democracy. Therefore, the relationship between Turkey, 41 AKP, and democracy is not straightforward, it can be established that is a rather complicated one. Nevertheless, AKP’s Islamist identity did not worsen Turkey’s relationship with Europe initially. On the contrary, it can be argued that AKP politicians have focused on the integration of Turkey in the European Union more than their predecessors. That identity increased Turkey’s politicians’ hope in benefitting from integration in the EU. Although the integration process has slowed down in the last decade, the AKP’s focus on the matter in its early times can have an important incentive in showing the accommodation of the Islamist identity in a democracy, which can be visible in the persistence of the AKP on joining the EU even with their emphasis on Islam. Nevertheless, the international politics and choices taken by the AKP’s government did change in the last decade, the past attempts that did not completely stop help in explaining the political agenda of the AKP, especially that one of the main requirements of joining the EU is following a democratic setting. According to White, Turkey was following a classical populist model in which an emphasis on the people is clear until the AKP which transformed into a neoliberal populist system (2013). This system is recognized for its emphasis on neoliberalism, addressing poverty, and addressing economic strategies while maintaining an “Islamist ethos”. However, that populist system merges with a generally democratic system in which some authoritarian traits can be visible. Also, the AKP has focused on a revival of centralism in which conservatism in social matters, liberalism in economic matters, and Islamism in religious ones is clear. This is mixed with a representative system in order to maintain that proclaimed centralism. Moreover, the AKP has been criticized for its maintained central power in which Erdogan is the main leader, in that case of the country and the party, and has been the longest raining leader 42 – prime minister or president – of the country since its formation. Therefore, the weak institutionalization of AKP (Celep, 2021) shows a form of disconnection with democracy. Although the general ethos of democracy is still highly present, it can be argued that the accommodation of the Islamist identity of AKP into the Turkish politics has increased the gap between achieving a full democracy in Turkey. Nevertheless, the political agenda of AKP has shown compromises in both democracy and the implementation of Islam. The pathway used can clarify a picture of the re-institution of the country in a form that can maximize the leadership the AKP has over Turkey while focusing on maintaining general support. The political pathway presented by the AKP has been an important indicator of the huge margins that can be followed in order to achieve dominance. For instance, various economic and political forms have been utilized to institutionalize the leadership of Erdogan in Turkey. While Erdogan has been maintaining the general image of secularity and democracy in Turkey, it can be argued that the trajectories he took included great compromises in the political field. The democratic setting in Turkey has been generally infected by minimal keys that shift it from being a full democracy while keeping its basic democratic requirements. The tainting that happened can be mainly seen in the rule of law, control of politics, and the aspect of vertical legitimacy (White, 2013). Accordingly, the lack of separation of power that has been followed by the AKP results in a problematic execution of full democracy. Although the AKP has succeeded in democratically shifting the country’s power dynamics into a centralized one, the result is arguably a non-democratic one. However, this raises the question of the role of Islam and the Islamist identity of AKP in that shift. It can be speculated that the centralist political system of Islam in which the main supreme leader has the main power in the country has played a role in the shift that happened in turkey; yet 43 55it cannot be proved that this shift is linked to Islam or the Islamist identity of the AKP in any way. In the opposite, the AKP’s shift can be a mere exercise of gaining power rather than a representation of Islamic political systems. On the other hand, it can be argued that the AKP used Islam and democracy when feasible in order to achieve the political gains that they aspired to have. The link between Islam and AKP cannot show any plan on achieving an Islamic caliphate, it can only explain the way a party is going in different trajectories to achieve the hegemony and power needed. While White argues that the AKP has transformed the political sphere in Turkey in a way that makes it mandatory for political actors to use an Islamic realm (2013), there are no substantial examples that can argue of the requirement of use of Islam in order to enter the political realm in Turkey. The numbers that the opposing parties are captivating in elections, their presence in the political realm as an opposition that plays a serious role in what gets achieved, and the shifts that are present in electoral results help in answering that question. The existence of the opposition in its own can show the White’s claim is hardly supported and can be easily refuted. The use of Islam is mainly a tactic that the AKP use in order to achieve power. However, it is significant to note that the above claim does not refute the AKP’s belief in Islam or its importance in their agenda, but it can show that it is not the main player in the politics of Islam. Also, the fall of full democracy in Turkey cannot be attributed to the Islamist identity of the AKP. Additionally, The AKP has greatly accommodated democracy in its international affairs. According to Aydın-Düzgit, the party showed enormous support to the persistence of democracy in the Arab world, specifically Sub-Saharan and North-African countries (2019). Although this can show the accommodations that can 44 and were undergone by the AKP in its political scheme, its international aspect is always unreflected in its domestic realm. Also, Aydın-Düzgit suggests that the democratic support in international affairs has been generally a trajectory used in order to preserve party interests (2019). The Islamist identity of the AKP is a main player in understanding the political agenda of the party. Also, understanding the role of the caliphate, the Ottoman Empire, and Islam for the AKP can help in explaining the trajectories that had been followed in order for the AKP to maintain power in Turkey. Alemdar elaborates on the concept of Islamic caliphate and state in the Islamist point of you. According to them, Islamists have turned down the concept of establishing a caliphate and replaced it with an “Ummah” – a big boundaryless society for all Muslims – in which the colonial powers have limited influence on the culture and politics (Alemdar, 2014). Accordingly, the Islamist rhetoric has been focused on the importance and representation of Islam in society and politics rather than on changing the whole societal and political structure. In the case of AKP, it is crucial to elaborate on that Islamist rhetoric in the presence of a democratic secularist style of governance. It can be argued that the AKP has not been following a plan to establish a caliphate in Turkey or abroad, however, they have been focusing on the increase in power and independency in governance. Although Erdogan has been a constant actor in worldwide problems that affect Muslims, the Islamist and Muslim part played cannot be considered as the main player. For instance, the AKP has decreased or eliminated the restrictions that Muslims had in Turkey that can vary from day-to-day religious activities into the restrictions that were present on women wearing the hijab in the government (Butler, 2021). An additional example can be seen in the increase that Turkey lived through in religious schools which can be considered by some as a means to integrate Islam in place of 45 secularism in Turkey. However, religious schools have been available all over the world including countries with secular systems like France and democratic systems like Germany and England. The relationship with Islam in Turkey can arguably be considered a mean to power. Moreover, it has been argued that the AKP directly integrated Islam in Turkey in a sense that makes it hard for secularism to exist without Islam and vice versa (Yavuz & Öztürk, 2019). Although this thesis stresses on the accommodation of democracy and Islam at the same time, secularism plays a critical role in understanding that accommodation. It can be argued that Islamism and secularism tend to be opposites while democracy is well represented in a secular system. Thus, the divergence of Turkey from secularism can establish a divergence from democracy. Furthermore, elaborating on secularism in modern-day Turkey helps in understanding how the AKP is integrating Islam in a democratic system. Turkey has been founded on the concepts of secularism, republicanism, and equal treatment toward all religions. Moreover, Turkey has also been an enriched country with secularism and a majority of Sunni Muslims (Phillips, 2017). The relationship between religion and government in Turkey before the emergence of the AKP party can be compared to the French example. Although different parties since the foundation of Turkey gave importance to Islam against the Kemalist school of thought that focus on what can be called ultra-secularism, no party had enough influence and power in Turkey since its foundation than the AKP. The AKP gave importance to Islam in a way that can be arguably considered as changing the identity of the Turkish Republic. Under the AKP, Turkey had also lost some of its democratic identity while maintaining a general democratic image. Yavuz & Öztürk consider that Turkey became a kleptocracy rather than a democracy or a sharia-built state (2019). 46 Although the AKP couldn’t satisfy the ultra-conservatives that identify with Islam worldwide, it made a huge change in Turkey by removing the taboo over the hijab, giving religious Muslims more rights, re-establishing the consciousness over what can be considered as the Ottoman legacy, and re-establish Turkey in the eyes of nonnationals as a Muslim country. Nevertheless, the AKP has used different techniques in order to establish their position in power in Turkey. The political trajectories used on a domestic and international level show their emphasis on portraying themselves as Islamists while normalizing the increase of the role of religion in politics. They used general democratic trajectories to attain power while diminishing the importance of other hidden democratic factors. Their emphasis on representation is obvious in order to legitimize their presence in governance. Although the AKP might have shifted the Turkish political scene, they have generally used democratic settings. Additionally, it can be argued that, from a political perspective, the AKP has used a hybrid model of integrating their Islamic identity with the secular and democratic system that is present in power. Moreover, their shift from democratic settings in some respects can be related to hegemony. The role of hegemony is clearer than the role of Islam in the shift that took place in Turkey. Furthermore, the AKP has accommodated Islam in Turkey while addressing democracy using different trajectories that can also be seen in social and economic pathways. 3.3. The Social Pathways: The Turkish predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, was established on the grounds of the Byzantine Empire. Accordingly, the citizens of these areas underwent significant changes, which resulted in a majority Sunni Turkish population in the 19th 47 century. Moreover, the Turkish empires that were present in the area had a direct role in maintaining the Turkish ethnic identity (Aytürk, 2014). Therefore, the Turkish identity underwent a mixture with Islam which led to an intersection between their ethnic and religious identity. Thus, in the era of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Republic, the Turkish people went into a clash between secularism and religion (Findley, 2010). However, this clash did not stop the establishment of the republic under secularist institutions in a multi-party-based democracy. The Turkish Republic underwent extreme restrictions on Islam under Kemalist power which had been extended to a system of discrimination against women wearing Hijab, banning the call to prayer, limiting the use of Arabic in any of its forms religious or not, and going through heavy supervision over religious figures. The Kemalist changes were indented to limit the importance of Islam and shift the general population into a closer identity with the west. However, this did not stop the Turkish population from being segregated into two main parties, the Muslim conservatives, and the secularists. This part examines the different trajectories followed by the AKP in order to achieve the support needed. It explores how the AKP have used the discrimination that was happening against religious Muslim groups to be able to achieve the support needed in order to attain the power, legitimacy, and hegemony. The Muslim religious citizens have been trying for over 50 years to establish equal rights in Turkey while maintaining their social needs which led into a creation of variant political parties that mostly failed to govern in Turkey. Until the AKP won the elections and changed that narrative, Turkey wasn’t connected to Islam in any official way. The methods used by AKP in order to gain the support of the society is a chief aspect in understanding how the AKP has accommodated Islam in a democratic setting in Turkey. However, it is important to note that, in order for Islamist groups 48 like the AKP to be able to expand, an increase in liberal policies and democracy had to take place (Karasipahi, 2009). Therefore, there was an accommodation of Islam on the grounds of democratic values. According to Yilmaz and Bashirov, the AKP’s strategy is a mixture of populism, Islamism, and electoral authoritarianism (2018). The grounds of the popularity of the AKP is an important aspect to be studied in order to understand the realm of the AKP’s influence. Nevertheless, and as previously discussed, the population of the Turkish republic is divided into two main groups. The conservative population in Turkey are the majority (Yavuz & Öztürk, 2019), however, they still are promoters of secularism. On that note, the society in which the AKP was trying to increase its power is unique. Erdogan had to acquire the support of the religious communities while trying to keep the secularity of the state intact. Therefore, the AKP’s focus on religion existed as the haven to the religious people that were unequally supported in the country while preserving the secularity that they had been living with for decades. Thus, Erdogan’s strategy was rather a way to promote its party using Islam as a link between the Ottoman Islamic legacy and the present while maintaining secularism and promising the citizens what has been absent in the other eras of the republic’s time. The AKP has been arguably affecting the society’s culture by politically following different discourses. According to İmren Borsuk, the AKP used a conservative, gendered, and patriarchal discourse in the new political reality of Turkey (2022). However, it is important to note that the relationship between AKP and women is deeper than the patriarchal system assumed by some scholars. The AKP has worked on changing the reality of women in the government by giving women freedom to wear the hijab in government and educational institutions. The step taken by AKP had 49 been a necessity in returning the freedom to women that was taken away by the nationalist Kemalist parties. However, it is also true that the AKP has focused on the importance of the so-called traditional role of women, but that did not change the fact that there were no decisions that were taken in order to minimize the role of the women in the society or to deprive them from the option to work or study. In contrast, the AKP gave the right to women wearing the hijab to study in universities which was an issue before their governance. Moreover, the AKP has shown that their goal is to achieve the hegemony and maintain the majority they have which has been implemented in societal terms also. The AKP has worked on growing the support by leading the change that their supporters want and need. This can be seen in the changes of regulations varying between the re-institution of Hagia Sophia to a mosque, removing the ban on the hijab in government institutions and universities, increasing the number of Islamic schools, and following economic changes that benefit the portion of the population that has an enormous amount of support for AKP. It can be argued that the AKP used Islam as a way to maintain the good relationship they had with those who elected them and the party. Also, the Muslim conservatives that support AKP would not prevail if what they were promised is unestablished. Also, it can be argued that the AKP has followed generally democratic trajectories in order to maintain their electoral power while integrating the role of Islam in achieving that power. With regards to education, the trajectories that the AKP undertook can also show the society’s role in shaping AKP’s strategy. According to İmren Borsuk, the education system has been compromised by extensive regulations that even includes changes in the curriculum while also positively boosts the system that he considers as authoritarian. He argues that education is being used in order to promote the neoliberal 50 system which would serve the purpose of domination and power (2022). However, the intervention has also been visible from a religious perspective. The AKP has increased the presence of religious studies in schools while also opening the opportunity for privatization of the educational system. This has led into opportunities of promoting the same stances that the AKP stands for. Therefore, it can be argued that the AKP has been using the educational system in order to influence the children and the parents into becoming closer to their beliefs and stances. Thus, the AKP has been using Islam to implement their domination by shaping a new society that have higher likelihoods of supporting them. In addition to that, the AKP’s influence on universities has also increased. The educational system like other parts of the government in which there is a direct interaction between the people and the regime is a significant place to be able to achieve a long-term accommodation of the regime’s stances. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the relationship between the AKP and minorities in order to understand the role of society, and democracy. The AKP has undergone serious political decisions against the Kurdish parties in recent years. Before that, the relationship between the AKP and the Kurds and the Alevi’s was better. However, Cagaptay argues that their support has been increasingly going to the CHP, the main opposition party, while the number of people that support the AKP has been falling (2014). On that note, the AKP has been focusing on increasing the support of the majority while not taking into consideration how they can influence the minorities. The AKP has also increased the gap in society. There is a major gap that has been created between the religious Sunni Turks that support the AKP and the other opposition groups that include Kurds, Alevis, and the secularist nationalists. It failed in maintaining a uniform society because of its increasing emphasis on maintaining the support of religious groups. On that note, the AKP has used Islam to maintain a 51 part of the society’s support to be able to keep the majority vote in which they can democratically preserve dominance over the country. 3.4. The Economic Pathways: The AKP has focused on different pathways in order to be able to achieve a majority in Turkey. One of the most important ones is the economic path. The AKP has shifted the economy of Turkey into a neoliberal capitalistic system from which Turkey’s role in the global economy has increased. The economic case has been increasingly studied in the hope of being able to understand the consolidation of authoritarianism and neoliberal capitalism. Moreover, since capitalism can be considered as a main aspect of the liberal democratic school, it is crucial to build on the relationship between the AKP and the economy to be able to tackle the different accommodations taken by the AKP in the economy in order to consolidate Islam and democratic values. Therefore, the AKP incorporates the liberal economic system as a way to attain the needed support. According to Cagaptay, the Turkish economy has been growing for the last two decades with Turkey trying to break into different markets worldwide (2014). However, they argue that Turkey needs stability in order to achieve its economic goals (Cagaptay, 2014). This is crucial especially while focusing on the electoral gains the AKP won by achieving its economic promises (Bermek, 2019). Although the AKP’s focus is not only on the economy, it is still an important aspect in shaping the hegemony of the AKP in Turkey which is mainly seen in the results that the AKP achieved by keeping up to their promises of economic stability. Nevertheless, that economic stability has been decreased in the last couple of years which has been mainly seen in the devaluation of Turkey’s lira. Whether this will hugely impact the 52 political support of the AKP or not, this cannot be answered before the elections of 2023. On the other hand, the trajectories used by the AKP in economics to be able to accommodate Islam in the neoliberal democratic setting vary, This part of the chapter discusses some of these trajectories. With regards to corruption, the AKP has repeatedly promised fighting against corruption and had a goal of minimizing its presence, however, according to Tezcür, the party was unserious in its stances and kept on benefitting from the corruption (2010). The economic changes that have been made by the AKP in Turkey did not include a believable plan to fight corruption. The AKP has benefited from corruption in different ministries. For instance, the Ministries of Transport and Communications have been an important cash source to the AKP and Erdogan (Phillips, 2017). However, Erdogan insists there is not corruption in Turkey. On that note, it becomes important to link the corruption to the Islamist stances of the AKP, the democratic setting of Turkey, and the neoliberal capitalistic economic system that the AKP built. With regards to the Islamist stances of AKP, if the party did not conduct any activity against corruption, it is not following up with the Islamic stances on corruption that are well known. However, the AKP is arguably a party with an Islamist ideology rather than a follower of Islamic tradition and economics to the fullest, therefore, it is unexpected from Erdogan’s policies to be fully compatible with Islam. On the other hand, although the AKP has been focusing on Islamic traits in the economy, charity, and other institutions, that does not change the fact that the mere goal that is clear in AKP’s actions is gaining hegemony and support. Nevertheless, with regards to the democratic setting and the neoliberal capitalistic system, it is crucial to note the connection of both notions and how inter-related they are. Even though capitalism might arguably exist without democracy and liberalism, the theoretical aspect focuses 53 on their relationship and the cruciality of both. Therefore, the accommodation of democracy can also be seen in the accommodation of capitalism. This is based on globalization’s presentation of democracy and market economies as a related models of success (Kantarci & Karaca, 2013). Nonetheless, the AKP’s continued corruption, as per Philips, drives the AKP away from the democratic system. On that basis, it can be noticed that the AKP follows its personal benefits even if, sometimes, these benefits are not directly acceptable to the notions it claims it believes in. Nevertheless, the economic decisions that have been taken by the AKP did decrease the debts that occurred as a result of the 2001 financial crisis from 62% in 2003 to 37% in 2013 (Cagaptay, 2014). Additionally, the AKP focused on building careers from which the people benefitted of the AKP’s presence in the government (Tezcür, 2010). It also has increased its world trade of 82billion $ in 2000 to more than 389billion $ in 2013 which is a huge increase that shows the shift in the economic situation in Turkey. Also, the number of tourists hugely increased in the last decade while it is important to note that an enormous increase in visitors from Muslim countries has been seen in Turkey (Cagaptay, 2014); which can be a result of the AKP’s Islamist identity. This can help in shaping an important image of how the AKP has used Islam in different communication methods ranging from movies to speeches by official figures to show Turkey as the leading Muslim country in the Middle East which might have resulted in that shift in the touristic numbers. The accommodation of Islam can be seen in that part of economic growth. On the other hand, the accommodation of capitalism has resulted in economic growth and the increasing support of the AKP. Therefore, the continued inclusion of Islam and the shift in economic system to a market based capitalistic one has both played a role in the story of success of the AKP. 54 With regards to capitalism, different scholars have emphasized on the inclusion of neoliberalism and global capitalism into the economic structure of Turkey (White, 2013). However, there has also been an integration of neopatrimonialism in which there’s an existent of a social hierarchy to preserve the capitalistic system (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018). Although the integration of neoliberalism is clear in Turkey, this did not stop Turkey from going into the verge of authoritarianism while maintaining the neoliberal policies. While Turkey has not always been a full democracy, the integration of both neoliberalism and authoritarianism has existed as a result of AKP’s dominance (İmren Borsuk, 2022). The consolidation of both systems has been benefitting the AKP by maintaining the general economic stability while also maintaining the power and hegemony. The accommodation of the economic part of democracy which is mainly seen in the liberation of the market has been a great achievement of AKP’s dominance. Furthermore, the AKP has resulted in making Turkey a global economic powerhouse. However, there are speculations on how long this would prevail in the pathways the AKP are taking towards democracy. The AKP has been trying to maintain a general picture of democracy in Turkey, however, there are still risks with regards to that matter since the relationship that the AKP has been having with authoritarianism is rising some insecurities worldwide which leads to outcomes that would hurt the economic situation of Turkey. On that note, the AKP have been introducing some democratic settings into the economic system of Turkey while maintaining a glance of authoritarianism to preserve their hegemony and dominance. Nevertheless, there has been an integration of Islam in the economic pathway too. As precedent, it is important to understand that Islam has been seen by many western scholars as the cause of underdevelopment in all modern pathways while 55 others have believed that Islam has inspired capitalism (Sisman, 2017). Although there are points of similarity between capitalism and Islam, it cannot be ignored that there are differences in the level of freedom and the emphasis on doing what is right rather than the maximization of profit. The AKP has used these points of similarities to form a capitalistic power in the Middle East in which Muslims have new opportunities of growth and wealth. Its focus on building opportunity has caused a shift in support from Kemalism that had failed in opposition to the neo-Islamist economic relations with capitalism (Sisman, 2017). On that note, it can be argued that the AKP’s economic strategies led into a re-identification of Islamism in Turkey which played a role in the accommodation of Islam in Turkey. Furthermore, the economic reforms have been beneficial for an increasing number of middle-class opportunity seekers in which neoIslamism gave them a prospect of development. Also, the AKP played a crucial role in the formation of a Muslim capitalistic class and an increasing entrepreneur Muslim class. For instance, Turkey had increasingly been receiving investments from different Middle Eastern countries because of its neoliberal economic systems. The AKP has also worked on increasing Islamic capital. It gave the Muslim bourgeoisie an environment that they needed to increase their economic and political capital. On that basis, the AKP found the right opportunities and markets to benefit from the needed environments in the Middle East and Turkey specifically to increase economic gains which leads into better dominance and power. The AKP’s Islamist identity has helped in shaping the economic gains that happened in the last decades because it had achieved the needed environment for the different parties that engage in the economy. Moreover, even before the rise of AKP’s power, the first Islamic financial institution has been established in the 1980s (Sisman, 2017). Other institutions have also followed with the AKP’s support, which led to an increasing in Islamic capital in 56 the country. On that note, the Islamist identity of AKP had been beneficial in building the capitalistic systems that worked well in Turkey. the Islamic capital – in which economic capital follows the rules of Islam – has emerged as a result of the changing policies on Islam and the emergence of these Islamic institutions that made Turkey a haven for religious investors (Sisman, 2017). On the other hand, different grounds have been explored in building economic success while maintaining an Islamic acculturation. According to Sisman, the increase in Islamic media outlets, the creation of Islamic actors, which shaped new Islamic practices, and Islamic charity organizations have also played a crucial role under AKP’s government (2017). The AKP has focused since its electoral wins on rehabilitating the Vakif in Turkey while increasing the role it plays. As previously stated, the Vakif is a foundation intended to govern Islamic charity which can range between being an act of generosity and an obligation under Islamic rule (Isik, 2014). The AKP has separated between the government’s role in providing for the less fortunate in Turkey and the Islamic obligation in helping the needy. This has been established by maintaining a neoliberal capitalistic economic system and increasing the importance of the Vakif in Turkey in its role in connecting the needy to the rich who want to help them. In that way, it can be argued that the AKP have been increasing the role of Islam without officially including Islam in the economy. The Vakif had played a crucial role in providing resources to the people that would support the capitalistic liberal system (Isik, 2014). In that way, the AKP built a better relationship between the donors, receivers, and Islam while helping with economic strategy. Therefore, they also worked on increasing the support to the AKP as the main Islamist party in Turkey. 57 On that basis, the trajectories used in the economic pathways vary under a capitalistic umbrella. The AKP has worked on achieving a neoliberal capitalistic system that has ameliorated the support of the investors and had a positive impact on the increase in Islamic support. This increase is a result of Islamic investors finding their haven in Turkey’s economic setting. Therefore, the AKP has accommodated different Islamic patterns to benefit from economic support and also benefit economically from Islamic support. Additionally, the democratic accommodation has been present in the economic setting on the basis of support of capitalism. 3.5. Conclusion: Nevertheless, this chapter showed that the main reasons behind the AKP’s adoption of democratic practices, despite its status as an Islamic party, are the need to achieve power, increase electoral support and consolidate a hegemonic role. The Islamist identity has been beneficial for the AKP in achieving an electoral majority which made them use social and educational aspects to maintain support. On the other hand, capitalism has played the role of economic stabilizer in Turkey which led into the support of Muslim investors and has had a crucial role in the general support of the compatibility between Islam and capitalism. The AKP has used different trajectories that accommodated both Islamic and democratic setting to build a hybrid system in which the party can achieve the most support in order to prevail. There are no substantial examples to illustrate the AKP’s intentions of changing the Turkish political system to an Islamic system. However, we can argue that the party has the goal of integrating Islam and normalizing its presence in the system while maintaining secularity which ultimately would lead to the most benefit for the party. 58 The following chapter examines the case study of Iran and how the Iranian regime has integrated democratic practices and the Islamic identity in order to attain the needed support and to be able to achieve power. 59 Chapter Four The Case Study of Iran – Post-Revolution 4.1. Introduction: With regards to the case of Iran, a lot of discrepancies can be found. Studying the Iran case cannot be done from the same perspective as the Turkish one, as Iran has a specific system that differs widely from the status-quo of the modern world. Iran stands in a firm position between autocracies and democracies, monarchies, and republics. While Iran has been known for its Islamic republic definition after the revolution, the theocratic system that stands there can be easily compared to a monarchist one, as the Supreme Leader possesses a huge role in governance. Although elections happen in a timely manner and the leadership greatly emphasizes on the role of representation in the country, the state is known for the various steps taken by the government to ensure maintaining the status-quo. On that basis, this chapter finds that Al Khomeini had created a new system when he was able to do in result of the distress happening in the Shah’s regime. He integrated the Islamic identity within the framework of the system while creating a theocratic system that ensures the preservation of power. The choice of system and the emphasis on the Islamic identity while maintaining some democratic practices shows how the Iranian regime’s goal is to maintain the support established in the revolution, achieve the hegemony needed, maintain the legitimacy of the Supreme Leader, and attain the securitization against the Western hegemony In order to do so, this chapter emphasizes the role of the government in maintaining a general democratic image that prevails through elections, while taking significant steps to minimize some of the freedoms of the Iranian people. While this 60 can be refuted by some, it is important to note that this thesis examines the role of Islam in shaping the current status-quo in Iran while maintaining the legitimacy of the Supreme Leader and Khomeinism in Iran. This chapter tackles the subject by focusing on the various political, social, and economic pathways taken by the government to maintain the hegemonic status in Iran. From a political perspective, it focuses on the Islamic definition of politics while looking at the democratic situation in Iran and connecting the dots in order to understand how both play a role in legitimizing the government’s hegemony in Iran. It also tackles the foreign affairs that have an integral role in shaping Iran’s political system, especially in accordance with the modern sanctions imposed on Iran and its allies. Moreover, it also emphasizes the role of elections and the level of freedom that can be found in Iran and that can help in placing Iran on the democratic map. On the other hand, the social perspective mainly focuses on women and minorities in Iran while tackling the democratic role of representation that the society plays which can maintain the status-quo. The religious aspect in society also plays an important role in maintaining support while avoiding any coup d’etat that could alter the reality of the present in Iran. Moreover, the last part of this chapter explores the economic challenges and regulations that have shaped modern Iran. To better understand how the Iranian regime combines Islam, capitalism, and democracy, the economic pathway can be linked to the Islamic identity. 4.2.The Political Pathways: Iran is a theocratic republic in which the Supreme Leader has the greatest powers on their system. Although the republic has timely elections in which the president and the parliament are elected, this does not minimize the power of the 61 Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader has the power to make economics, social, and political grand decisions. Although other elected personnel in the state have also a crucial role in the decisions that build the state. Different political regimes since after the revolution have had different political ideas, which shows the crucial role of the electoral and representative systems in Iran. On that basis, it is important to understand the level representation played in Iran. The representative system in Iran is intended to portray the Republic of Iran as a legitimate state that is supported by its citizens. However, these democratic practices have been arguably considered as false by many scholars. The level of democracy in Iran cannot define Iran as a democratic country. Nevertheless, Al Khomeini’s system has been implemented based on showing a representative system in Iran from which it can be argued that Khomeinism uses representation as a way to keep the hegemony. On the other hand, Khomeinism entails a connectivity between the representative identity of democracy and the so-called Islamic identity of the republic. Al Khomeini introduced the Islamic identity as a mechanism that has helped in eliminating any connection with the Shah’s dynasty while ensuring that the representative system is applicable in Islam. Therefore, he adjusted the state by legitimizing the republican identity and the supremacy and power of the Supreme leader with Islam while introducing some democratic practices. In that way, he ensured that his regime maintained legitimacy and minimized the risks of exterior powers and internal opposition. Whether the system that Al Khomeini created tackles these issues correctly or not, this part of the chapter elaborates on that topic. According to Tezcür, democracy includes a variety of aspects linked to freedom of speech, equality, mandatory education, and separation of powers (2010). In the case of Iran, some of these aspects are not all existent. Although there is a focus 62 on the importance of education and the inclusion of women in the education system, there is not enough equality in terms of treatment with regards to gender. Women and men have different opportunities in terms of jobs and being part of the government. However, that does not change the fact that women have the right to vote and can be part of the government, although their role is still minimal in that aspect. On the other hand, the power of the Supreme Leader exceeds the limit of separation of powers. This can be seen in his dominant role in foreign and internal affairs while this role being protected by the constitution of the republic. The constitution of Iran protects the power of the Supreme Leader making Iran the only theocratic country in the world other than the Vatican. The theocratic identity of Iran pushes for the importance of Islam in Iran after the revolution. The role of Islam can be studied from different perspectives in Iran. It is very different from its role in Turkey. while Islam is defined differently by the Shia perspective, the main difference can be seen in the accommodation of Islam in the government rather than the different perspectives or doctrines. Moreover, this can be obvious in the theocratic system that Iran endorses. The accommodation of Islam is as necessary as other factors that build governments. Furthermore, it can be argued that the legitimacy of Khomeinism in Iran is taken from the Shia Islamic interpretation that sets the Supreme Leader above the other governing parties. In addition to that, the Islamic narrative is the main source of power that Al Khomeini has used in order to achieve the revolution and create a new identity of Iran. Therefore, the revolution has been mainly categorized by Islamic, although it had many other demands. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the republic system that has been created in Iran is hidden under the Islamic identity of the government. The accommodation of Islam in democracy has happened in a way that connects the Supreme Leader to the 63 government and to representation while keeping a main figure as the sole player in the politics of Iran. The Republic of Iran has been created on the basis of the beliefs of Al Khomeini which includes a systematic importance to sovereignty. According to Akhavi, the sovereignty of Iran is constituted in the Islamic beliefs of Al Khomeini in which sovereignty comes from God and is attached to the Islamic notion (1988). Therefore, the relationship between religion and state in Iran is well based in the systematic creation of Iran. The system that is derived from certain beliefs in Islam is the source of foreign affairs, at least in the theoretic perspective. Diving into the political affairs can help in understanding the actual goals of that integration of religion, however, it is important to note that the objective definition of the state is based on Islam whether the real reason behind it is religious or not. Moreover, Arjomand argues that Iran has constituted an integration of religious authority into the state by also emphasizing on the superiority of religion over other governing things, therefore, giving the power to Islam (1980). On that basis, the Iranian Republic is created in a form that preserves the importance of religion and religious figures; therefore, maintaining the supreme leader’s tremendous power. Thus, it can be argued that the so-called Islamic integration of religion in the political sphere of Iran serves to preserve hegemony and power in Iran while minimizing the importance of democracy and representation. The democratic setting of representation can be considered as a supporting mechanism to the legitimacy of the government. Although this argument can be easily validated, it is out of the scope of this thesis to examine whether this is the main goal of Al Khomeini or not, this thesis only establishes the cause-effect relationship between religion and the role it played. 64 Moreover, the relationship between democracy and Islam in Iran is rather weak in comparison to its neighbors in Turkey. According to Gheissari and Vali, there are no problems in the compatibility of Islam and democracy in Iran, on the other hand, it is a problem between modern ideological thinking and state institutions (2006). On that basis, it is argued that the compatibility issue is not on a religious or democratic level, but rather the way the government is formed. State institutions in Iran are formed in a way that emphasizes a centralized government in which an authoritarian form can be seen. Although this government way is preserved on the basis of the religious identity the revolution has shaped the Republic Iran, the problem is not on the religious level, it is on the way Islam is accommodated in order to preserve the authoritarian system. This can be mainly seen in the different ways it is accommodated in different countries as this thesis has explored also the case study of Turkey. According to Gheissari and Vali, studying the politics of the Iranian republic cannot be separated from the Shah’s previous reign (2006). Also, Benjamin considers that the Shah’s period was brutal and authoritarian even if it had some western based government styles (2018). On that basis, the Iranian people did not move from a utopian democratic system to an authoritarian one after the revolution, although the revolution has taken on an Islamic identity, it had righteous causes. However, it did result in an accommodative formula of integration of an Islamic identity, authoritarian system, and democratic setting. It can be argued that this form of governance is a result of the years of authoritarian and anti-religious rules in the Pahlavi period. The Pahlavi period’s authoritarianism has resulted in a negative representation of the West and secularization which led into a formation of a system based on religion in which representation exists, however, under the rules of God as believed by the Supreme Leader who is responsible for keeping it that way. Therefore, the system in Iran can 65 be seen as a hybrid democratic system under the rulings of Shiism which is preserved by the Supreme Leader. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that this system has led into a competitive setting between the democratic setting and the ideologic one (Gheissari & Nasr, 2006). In Iran, there’s an ongoing dilemma about preserving democracy and freedom. According to Gheissari and Vali, preserving democracy and freedom in Iran comes on the expense of preserving stability (2006). On that basis, the political dilemma in Iran is a continuous fight between achieving full democracy and maintaining the stability and legitimacy of the Iranian Republic. In the recent years of the Republic, the Supreme Leader, the president, and the general parliament have been following the policy of survival. This means that the focus has been on keeping the legitimacy of the theocratic system in Iran by using different political, economic, and social trajectories in order to legitimize the so-called Islamic identity of the Republic while fighting the sanctions imposed by the West. However, some elections have shown an increase in the pro-democratic voting turnover, from which it can be argued that the Iranian Republic does include efficient forms of democracy. Nevertheless, the democratic setting in Iran has many limitations. According to Mirsepassi, Iran is unable to show any meaningful hope for the actual democratization of the country. Also, they argue that there are international and global requirements that the Iranian Republic do not adhere to which minimizes the trend towards achieving democracy (Mirsepassi, 2010). Therefore, the Iranian case of democratization is directly related to its place in international affairs. For instance, its international stances on the United States hegemony, the Israeli occupation, and the Western sphere in general tends to place between the anti-democratic countries. Whether Iran is actually working on its democracy or not, therefore a question that is 66 hard to answer. Furthermore, the political situation of Iran places it in a defense system against Western powers, therefore, it considers itself in a continuous danger to preserve its power and security. On that basis, it can be argued that it the government finds itself obligated to stop any opposition group of gaining additional support in order to preserve the security of the country. Moreover, the government tends to have enormous efforts to show its legitimacy. It mainly supports its legitimacy by marketing its Islamic identity. By marketing the Vilayet-el Fakih and increasing the support for the theocratic system of Iran, it works on legitimizing the position of the Supreme Leader, therefore, legitimizing the role of the whole government. The trajectories used in that matter can vary between authoritarian and democratic settings. The legitimization of the Supreme Leader can be seen in the support religious groups get in elections while it can also be imposed by taking decisions that are related to Islam i.e., making the Hijab mandatory for women. On that basis, the Republic can create a common identity directly linked to the theocratic system. Therefore, the trajectories taken in accommodating democracy are interrelated with the goal of preserving the legitimacy of the theocratic Shia identity of the Republic. On the other hand, many scholars have suggested the resistance made by the government against pro-democracy support (Gheissari & Nasr, 2006). The power acquired by the Republic, however, is considered as a result of the authoritarianism of the Shah’s regime. The revolution was a result of the authoritarianism which led into what might be identified by democratic settings, however, it resulted later in a redefinition of democracy with an inclusion of an authoritarian identity that is intended to preserve the theocratic conservative regime. The prevalence of conservatism can directly be linked to the Islamic identity of the Republic. However, questions arise on 67 whether the Islamic identity is the reason behind the continuity of the authoritarian system in Iran. This topic needs further studying. However, this thesis has examined the different trajectories used in the political scene in order to preserve the status-quo in Iran. Whether the relationship between Islam and the existence of democracy in Iran is related to the prevalence of the power of the Supreme Leader. In Iran, the representative system is a way used in order to legitimize the theocratic system. this thesis cannot answer whether an actual democracy might lead to a removal of the Islamic identity from Iran. Based on the sources provided, there is a direct relationship between that identity and the theocratic system, which is indirectly affecting the democratization of Iran in favor of the theocracy. Moreover, Al Khomeini has taken many political stances that show the position of Iran with regards to its Islamic identity and democracy. Accordingly, he introduced right before his death a revision of the constitution which created the Expediency Council (Gheissari, 2011). The council had the power to guard the constitution while being in power to accept candidates for elections and supervise the parliament and the presidency. While this council is not elected from the people and is directly related to the religious identity of Iran, this council has an important role in shaping the identity of Iran. Therefore, it decreases its connection to democracy because of its vast power without any representative link and increases its connection to the Islamic claimed identity of Iran. On the other hand, it is important to note that there is a relationship between the Islamic identity and other factors of sovereignty and the rule of law in Iran. According to Tezcür, the revolution has showed a link between the political identity of Iran and Islam. The Republic uses the sovereignity and the rule of law in connection with Islam which has led into a general belief in the impossibility of achieving either 68 without the other (Tezcür, 2010). Therefore, Islam is used in Iran in order to preserve what might be considered as the right of securitization and sovereignty, it is used as an identification system similar to ethnicity in other countries. Accordingly, the representative system in Iran is used as a way to legitimize that sovereignty which cannot happen without the Islamic identity. Therefore, it can be argued that Islamic figures and democratic settings are used collectively to achieve legitimacy and hegemony by the Republic of Iran. Furthermore, after exploring the political pathways that the government of Iran has taken in order to accommodate the Islamic identity while maintaining a setting of democracy, it can be argued that the Republic of Iran has followed the trajectories that would best maintain the legitimacy of the government while keeping an Islamic identity in order to be able to securitize and maintain sovereignty. Although the Iranian case differs from the Turkish one, it has been noted that both governments follow different trajectories in order to legitimize their power. The Iranian case has placed the government under the rules of maintaining the legitimacy of the Supreme Leader by keeping the country connected to the revolution that created the theocracy. Whether a different system can help in that case needs further study. 4.3. The Social Pathways: Iran’s society is comprised of a predominantly Shia population with a minority of several other ethnic and religious groups. These minorities include Azerbaijanis, Arabs with varying religious groups including Sunnis, Zoroastrians, Christians, Jews, and Baha’is. Accordingly, the social setting in Iran tends to be complicated and the minorities tend to be ignored in studying the social aspects. Therefore, this part of the chapter tackles the issue of women in Iran while also focusing on minorities. It 69 elaborates on the different relationship between these groups and democracy while also emphasizing on the Islamic identity’s relationships with these groups. Moreover, it is also important to tackle the social setting in Iran by exploring the opposition to the government, which can include the liberal and secular society. In Iran, society is mainly constituted from citizens identified as Shia Muslims. Shiism emerged in Iran in the 15th century under the rule of the Safavid Empire (Benjamin, 2018). This has been followed by centuries of self-identification with Shiism in Iran which got endangered after the Shah’s dynasty in the mid-20st century. Understanding the relationship between Iranians and Islam is crucial in order to understand how the Republic the relationship between the Islamic identity, the democratic setting, and the Republic. According to Benjamin, the people of Iran have been oppressed before the revolution in 1979. The secularist identity that the Shah was trying to impose with the ongoing brutalism of his authoritarianism has resulted in the citizens to re-identify with their Shia ideology. For instance, the Shah’s brutalism has been a played an important role in shaping a new identity for the citizens. Accordingly, they found the Shia ideology as the main power that connected them before the Shah’s regime which led to them re-identifying with what the Shah’s monarchy opposed, Shiism. Thus, it became clear in the late 70s that this identity has been increasingly present. For example, the books of Al Khomeini were circulating even after they were banned, while the support towards him was increasing (Benjamin, 2018). Therefore, the Islamic identity of the Iranian people has been built even before the revolution which helped Al Khomeini to build the republic on the basis of that identity. Thus, this identity is highly linked to preserving the Republic. This part will also examine this statement more thoroughly. 70 The relationship between Iran and the Islamic identity also had international support. According to Yazdi, the influence of the revolution had an impact on Muslims all over the world which can be mainly seen in the opposition of the West and the oppression of the US (2016). Therefore, the Islamic identity of the Republic has a great impact on its people especially those adhering to the Shia jurisprudence. Additionally, it can be obvious that the link has exceeded its religious boundaries into becoming an ideology of existence; this means that the Islamic identity has played a role in preserving the sovereignty of the people, their culture, and even giving them the comfort against the globalization of the West. Although this identity has led to different outcomes sometimes linked to oppression or conservatism, its role in preserving the society’s identity cannot be ignored. However, it is important to note that although there was a direct link between Islam and the revolution that led to the creation of the Republic of Iran; the choices were not limited to the form of government that we see today. The minimal democratic setting that is available today in Iran has been chosen by Al Khomeini from different alternatives including an Islamic Democratic Republic (Benjamin, 2018). Focusing on that matter, this choice can be directly linked to the goals of Al Khomeini which can best be explained in terms of preserving hegemony and legitimacy. Accordingly, it can be argued that the system that has been found for the people is rather an alternative of democracy in order to preserve the existential ideology outlined earlier. The relationship between democracy and the Republic has been kept to a minimum, which has played a crucial role in preserving Iran from westernization and eliminating the chances of the opposition to gain power. While the relationship between the religiosity of the Iranian citizens and the support of the government today is not direct, as per Karasipahi, the case has not been 71 the same since the early years of the Republic (2009). According to them, the number of citizens interested in studying the Shia sect in Qom, the religious capital of Iran, has increased drastically in the years before the revolution which led to it serving as “the headquarters of Republic” (Karasipahi, 2009). On that basis, it is clear that the inclusion of the Islamic identity in the Republic started even before the revolution. The citizens of Iran were showing positive feedback towards that changed and towards adhering to that identity which have obviously played an important role in shaping the Republic after the revolution. Therefore, it can be argued that Al Khomeini has seen the positive outcome he can come out of by integrating that identity in the Republic. Thus, shaping the country in a way that can involve the population by giving them the right to elect the president and the parliament while keeping the Islamic identity of the country unchanged. The environment of Iran before and during the revolution was a great place to harvest the support needed in order to achieve the hegemony while keeping the role of the democratic setting of representation as the antidote of keeping the country together. However, religion’s role in Iran during the last decades has been different. While the Republic has been created on the basis of the Islamic identity, the role of Islam might have became quite more political in the last decades than before. The opposition, a part of the female population, and minorities can give important information on the topic. Although in the government, the role of religion is still as important with the hijab being mandatory, many religious groups facing what might be considered as oppression, minorities including the LGBTQ+ communities facing deaths sentences, and the opposition facing life in jail especially when it comes to opposing the religious identity of the country; it can be argued that the population of Iran has become generally less interested in religion than before. While the role of the 72 Shia identity linked to the Republic is still prominently important, the religiosity level is not directly related to that (Karasipahi, 2009). This part also explores in depth the case of women, the cases of the opposition, and the cases related to minorities in order to better understanding the linkage between Islam and these groups while examining the democratic setting that is persistence now in Iran. According to Benjamin, the Iranian government is not discriminatory against some minorities including Jews, Christians, Armenians, and Zoroastrians, however, they do “crack down” on other minorities including specifically Baha’is. The Iranian Republic also cracks down on Sunni Muslims (Benjamin, 2018). While examining the reason behind the different treatment of different minorities needs additional research, it is important to note that a trend can be seen regarding the discrimination. While the Iranian government might not see any threat from minorities such as the Christians and Zoroastrians, the Sunni minority and the Baha’i one can have a higher influence on the majority Shia population. With Baha’ism being a new religion relatively while getting converters from different people in Iran including mainly Shia born citizens, the Baha’i faith can be considered as a threat on the support the government needs. The same case can be applied on Sunni Muslims, with Sunnism being the largest sect of Muslims in the modern world with big influencers in different countries and a rich history, they can act as a threat on the safety of the theocratic system of the country. Therefore, it can be argued that the Iranian Republic follows the path towards keeping the legitimacy of their country while cracking down on any threat that might cause a growing oppression. Also, according to Gheissari, ethnic and religious minorities, including Christians and Sunni Muslims make up an important part of Iran’s society economically and socio-politically (2011). Therefore, the role they play is not 73 minimal. Thus, the Iranian regime considers them as a threat whenever it comes to cracking down on the government. As already stated, while Christians might not be considered as a big threat as the Sunni Muslims because of the long sectarian divide between the Sunni and Shia. On that basis, it can be argued that the country’s Islamic identity is protected on the basis of Shiism rather than the Islamic one; this means that it can be argued that the Shia identity plays a crucial role in maintaining the legitimacy of the country. A Sunni uprising, even though it is unexpected, can lead to cracking down on the government which might lead to diminishing the role of the theocracy in the country. Therefore, the Iranian government finds it important to maintain the status-quo of the theocracy in modern-Iran. The above can be mainly seen in the exclusion of Christians, secular Shia citizens, and Sunni ones from acquiring any important role in the government (Gheissari, 2011). Thus, the relationship between the Islamic identity and democracy in Iran is complex in the way it keeps out any democratic setting from unfolding an uprising against the theocracy. The accommodation of democracy has a different form in which it is only needed when the status-quo of the country is maintained. According to Rivetti, a secular liberal opposition exists in Iran and it became visible after the uprising of 2009 (2013). It is important to note that the Iranian government tends to be oppressive against the opposition, as explained by Benjamin. He also argues that the government tends to judge and label the oppressed as terrorists quickly (Benjamin, 2018). This leads to cracking down on the opposition and the linkage of liberalism and secularism with terrorism. Therefore, the Iran government follows un-democratic trajectories with opposition in order to preserve the securitization of the country. Also, it fears an outcome in which it loses its legitimacy with an increase in opposition. Therefore, this also can be used in favor of the 74 argument already raised regarding the different trajectories used by the Iranian government with the final goal of preserving the legitimacy and hegemony of the regime. In addition to that, the constitution of the Republic, although it includes equal rights for race and ethnicity, it does not tackle religion, sex, and gender (Gheissari, 2011). Amirpur argues that women have protested against the non-equal treatment they receive (2013). Therefore, a non-democratic setting can be seen in the treatment against women which is sometimes linked to the Islamic identity. Women have been fighting in different forms against their mistreatment especially when it comes to education. Although the Islamic doctrine does specify the importance of education for both genders, the Islamic identity used by the regime is not supposed to depict the Islamic doctrine, this thesis argues that the Iranian regime uses whatever it finds needed from the Islamic identity in order to preserve the status-quo. After studying the social pathways used by the Iranian Republic, it becomes clear that the regime uses different trajectories in order to preserve the legitimacy of the government. Different pathways are used to maintain the hegemony of the theocratic system. Al Khomeini has included different trajectories in order to maintain power. While the democratic setting is used in order to maintain a general picture of support in the country, democracy is not as present as it might be considered. In Iran, the representation system is only approved whenever it benefits the regime. The main goal of the regime is to maintain the power it acquired after the revolution. It cracks down on all forms of opposition that can become a threat which shows that the accommodation of democracy is basically linked to the needs of the regime. There is no actual democracy in the country. Democracy is accommodated in order to preserve the Islamic identity by using the representation system from which the main role is to 75 preserve power in the country. Moreover, the social pathways used are made in order to maintain support which has been happening since the revolution. Different pathways have been used with regards to different groups in order to maintain that status-quo. 4.4. The Economic Pathways: Iran is a country rich with resources, especially gas and oil, with about 1.7 billion barrels of oil equivalent per year being extracted (Gheissari, 2011). While it also has a big labor market and an enormous local market, the Iranian economy has great potential. Some of the main reasons behind the revolution were related to economic prospect and western influence. Accordingly, Al Khomeini has been interested in the economic matter since the early days of the Republic. The relationship between economy and the Islamic identity, however, are not as clear as in the social and political forms. The Iranian economy does not work in a very different way than major economies internationally. Therefore, this part will examine the economic pathway by focusing on the decisions taken by the government, as a country identified by Shia Islam, and taking into consideration the liberal identity of Iran and whether it exists or not. On that basis, it tackles the different factors the Islamic identity have played on the country especially from the economic perspective while also examining its relationship with liberal economies in order to draw conclusions regarding the accommodation of democracy – since liberal economies form an important part of a democracy – and also considering the Islamic factors that have had an outcome on the economy in Iran. With regards to resources, the main plan that constituted the economics of resources in Iran dates to 50 years (Gheissari, 2011). The initial plan was meant to 76 focus on exporting and investing rather than internal consumption (Gheissari, 2011). Therefore, there are internal factors that play a role in the investments happening with regards to resources. External factors also have a direct effect on that matter especially with regards to sanctions imposed by the US on Iran. Thus, Iran has an economic challenge rising from different prospects. The oil exports have been declining in the last decade as a result of the increase in internal consumptions and the embargos that the US are imposing on Iran (Gheissari, 2011). On that basis, the Iranian economic challenge also affects the society and politics. Nevertheless, the citizens of Iran have had the economic matter as an important factor in revolutionizing in the 1979. Therefore, the rise in oil revenues that they might encounter which is not leading to an increase in their salaries and well-being affects negatively the support they have towards the Republic (Gheissari, 2011). While the external factors related to the sanctions also play a role in that matter, it is important to note that the initial challenges that the Iranian citizens had regarding the external policies of the Shah’s regime minimizes the effect of the sanctions on the support they have to the republic. Thus, the Iranian Regime is fighting on both sides in order to minimize the damage from the economic decline Iran is passing through. On that basis, the societal and political factors that try to maintain the support of the citizens can arguably minimize the effect of the economy on the support. In addition to that, the growing labor market is affecting the sufficiency of the oil investments in Iran (Gheissari, 2011). Based on that, the role of the sanctions on Iran’s prosperity is increasing which is leading to a higher challenge that is forcing the Iranian regime to try to fix their international problems. On the other hand, it is important to note that the Iranian active participation in different wars in the area also have an impact on the economy. The Iranian’s 77 constant cold-war with the Israeli regime, its war with Iraq in the early years of the century, and its presence indirectly in different conflicts happening in the Middle East all had and still have an impact. While the role it plays in Syria, Yemen, and the Palestinian has led partially to the sanctions, the major outcomes of the Iran-Iraq war are clear. According to Pesaran, the Iranian citizens have tolerated the war with Iraq and the hardships it lead to, however, they would be expecting a positive outcome after the war (Pesaran, 2013). Although the economy in Iran did partially heal after this war, the following years had a very hard outcome on the people of Iran especially with regards to inflation and in result of the sanctions imposed. On that basis, it can be argued that the Iranian regime is encountering many challenges from an economic perspective which is leading them to follow social and political pathways that ensure the maintenance of the support. Therefore, it can be argued that the accommodation of the Islamic identity and democracy is mainly seen in other pathways while the Iranian regime is fighting for survival in the economic scheme. Nevertheless, the Iranian economy can sometimes be considered rich and poor at the same time. This is a result of the different factors that play a role in making the case of economics in Iran challenging. Additionally, it is important to note that there is a shift happening in Iran towards increasing the capacity of the service sector which is directly related to the increase in educated labor forces (Gheissari, 2011). This has been after the Iranian regime has worked hard on prioritizing education for both women and men. While it can be considered as a benefit, it is causing a hard time for all the unemployed people because of the mismatching that is happening with regards to jobs. Women, specifically, are finding themselves in a hard position. Although there is an increase in the number of women in the workforce (Gheissari, 2011); unemployment is still a huge problem in Iran especially for women. Therefore, the 78 case of women in the workforce in Iran is complex; while women are encouraged to follow their education, they still find it harder to find jobs in comparison to male workers. On that basis, it is important to explore more the relationship of women and the economics of Iran. However, it is also crucial for our study to link that gap between male and female workers to the Islamic identity perceived by Al Khomeini. This can be mainly seen from a social perspective, in which woman and men do not share the same rights. On the other hand, the role of the state also plays an important role in examining the case of Iran and its association with liberal democracies. As it has been already discussed, Iran is far from being a democratic country. However, it is important to note that the stance of Iran on liberal economies is still a subject of debate. According to Gheissari, the state’s role in the economics of the country has been increasing since the start of the revolution (2011). While this does not place Iran outside the liberal realm, it does minimize the free market’s role in the economy. Additionally, Iran has been working on increasing their devotion to trade liberalization, however, many different factors play a role in making the case more complicated. Iran has been limiting the freedom of trade with regards to products that Islam is against consuming as for alcohol, pork, and a variety of services, Iran has also been subsidizing many of its products which makes the economy far from achieving the liberal status. Also, Iran engages in anti-trust legislation which has limited its opportunities to the World Trade Organization (Gheissari, 2011). On that basis, it can be obvious that different decisions taken by the Iranian regime have made the gap between Iran and liberalization larger, which makes it less accommodating towards democracy than other countries in the region. 79 On the other hand, it is important to note that economic decisions in Iran are not always regulated by religion. Iran has been taking part in the debt crisis while also using interest in some its banks without regulations to stop so (Gheissari, 2011). Therefore, it can be argued that the Iranian regime does not follow the religious doctrine fully and considers the importance of safety, securitization, and sovereignty before other factors, including religion. On that basis, it can be argued that Islam is sometimes used as a cover to maintain the legitimacy of the country while the government does take anti-Islamic decisions whenever they see that it benefits them. However, it is important to examine the different legal decisions that have been taken by the regime with regard to economy. According to Tamafondar, the country uses a lot of the religious hodoud “punishment according to the Islamic doctrine” with regards to criminal affairs that can vary between being a traitor and stealing; one of the examples examined are how, in economic scarcity, a father stealing from his children is not punishable by one of those punishments. The legal system also preserves rules regarding economic integrity and and fair compensation (Tamadonfar, 2015). Examples as these explain how the Islamic identity has been integrated into the economic systems. However, it is important to note that the regime sometimes drifts from religious rules with what they find suitable for the economy. On that basis, it can be argued that the Iranian regime does not tackle the economic pathways in the same way it does for other political and social ones. The Iranian regime focuses in general on the benefits that it can receive in order to preserve its legitimacy. 4.5. Conclusion: After examining the different pathways of the Iranian regimes in which they accommodate the Islamic identity while also incorporating some of the factors of 80 democracy, it can be noticed that the case differs widely from the one in Turkey. However, it is clear that the Iranian regime accommodates democratic settings such as representation as it finds suitable while eliminating any danger coming from the opposition. On that basis, it can be argued that the Republic of Iran cannot be considered as a democracy even if they have elections and an elected government and president. In addition to that, the Iranian regime does incorporate an Islamic identity in much of the social and political trajectories used. This helps in understanding how Iran uses the Islamic identity in order to eliminate threats, maintain sovereignty, and maintain support of the theocracy. Furthermore, the Iranian case is different than most cases of religious accommodation in the state which can be mainly seen in their theocratic system which they do not share with any other country in the world except the Vatican City. After examining the case studies of both Turkey and Iran, this thesis finds important discoveries that are explored in the following chapter. 81 Chapter Five Conclusion After exploring the different literature written about the topic and discussing the different Islamic definitions of both cases, this thesis focused on both case studies of Turkey and Iran and examined the different trajectories that have been implemented by the AKP and the Iranian regime after the revolution. This research started by examining the history and background of the case studies of Turkey and Iran followed by an exploration of the aims of this thesis. It also studied briefly how different scholars have dealt with the relationship between Islam and Iran. This thesis explains how the literature have tackled the compatibility of democracy and Islam. Based on that, it drew a framework on how democracy and Islam can complement each other to better understand how the different case studies have accommodated both. In addition, the literature review has also focused thoroughly on the history of both Turkey and Iran. On that basis, it explored how the history of both countries can play a role in shaping the politics of the country. Also, it examines how the society has a role in the choices the governing parties take. Followed by the literature review, this thesis explored how Islam is identified in the cases of the AKP and the Iranian regime. It explains how the AKP does have a specific identification of Islam that is different from the one found in Turkey. Their emphasis is focused mainly on connecting the Islamic identity they built with the Ottoman empire and the Turkish tradition. On the other hand, Al Khomeini has created a specific system in which he clearly identifies what he means by Islam. He built the Republic of Iran on that basis while building its identity on his beliefs. 82 Additionally, this thesis tackles the case study of Turkey and the case study of Iran separately. In each chapter, it explores the different accommodations of the Islamic identity and democratic practices in political, social, and economic trajectories. Chapter 3 and 4 also explains the findings related to each case. On that basis, this chapter builds on these findings to answer the research question and reexamine the findings related to both case studies. While it has become clear that Islamic identity does have an important role in both cases, the democratic accommodation is not very clear in both the cases. However, the cases of Iran and Turkey do entail a certain level of democratic accommodation, which can be seen in the different trajectories used in political, social, and economic pathways. This thesis is concluded by this chapter, in which a comparative analysis of the different arguments found during the research takes place. It also ameliorates on all the links that can be found in each case while taking into consideration the main research question and the hypothesis. In general, it has become clear that both case studies do integrate Islamic identity in their governments and politics. While the integration is different in each case, it can lead to the same result with regards of maintaining support, legitimacy, and sovereignty. Focusing on the Turkish case, this thesis argues that the Islamist identity used by the AKP has been the main attraction point towards the AKP. While Turkish citizens have other requests and interests, we argue that the AKP have used the democratic and secular setting in the country in order to gain support by introducing the Islamist identity in a time in which religious Muslims have been facing discrimination. On that basis, the Turkish case is a great example on the accommodation of Islam in modern internal politics since the AKP grew to become the biggest political party in Iran without removing its Islamist identity. in the 83 contrary, it can be argued that the Islamist identity had played an important role in helping the AKP get the support it needed. Nevertheless, the Iranian case differs in terms of time and context. While Al Khomeini has also used the historic significance of the Shia sect in the Persian realm and accommodated the Islamic identity in the revolution against the Shah, the democratic accommodation took a different turn. The democratic setting in Iran is precisely limited to the representation system that can be easily overturned by the Supreme Leader’s power. It is also crucial to note that Iran’s place as a theocratic country makes the Islamic identity central in terms of politics which is not the case in Turkey. Although the Islamic identity in Iran has also been used on the basis of the historic factors, discrimination that happened under the Shah’s reign, and the significance of religion for the Iranian citizens, the accommodation of that identity has been under the form of a theocratic system in which democracy has limited place in the country. Nevertheless, the democratic setting cannot be fully neglected. This thesis argues that the Iranian regime uses the democratic form of representation in order to maintain the support which leads to a maintenance of the legitimacy of the regime. However, it is important to note that some of the findings lead to the claim that the democratic setting is rather used to preserve the Islamic identity while not being fully effective. For instance, the opposition in Iran face different forms of oppression from which the regime arguably tries to maintain securitization. In Turkey, on the other hand, the AKP has integrated Islam and accommodated it in the democratic setting that has been already present which varies drastically from the case of Iran. The integration of the Islamic identity by the AKP has also been used in a form of achieving support, which is pretty similar to the case of Iran. However, democratic 84 accommodation varies mainly on the basis of the historical factor that plays a grand role in shaping the needs of the political forces in each country. Nevertheless, this thesis argues that both countries have followed different trajectories in the accommodation of both the Islamic identity and democracy in order to preserve the legitimacy, the hegemony, and the support needed to maintain power. On that basis, this thesis examined the different trajectories used in terms of social, political, and economic pathways. Thus, it became clear that the level of accommodation differs in each case. While the AKP have been increasingly using democratic settings and the Islamic identity in the political pathway, the case of Iran shows that the regime has mainly focused on the Islamic identity rather than focusing on the democratic setting. Although both regimes have integrated both factors, it is clear that the AKP have integrated the democratic setting more than the Iranian regime. We can argue that this is a result of the environment that each regime goes through. While in Turkey, the main trajectory for accomplishing hegemony and legitimacy passes through the democratic setting of the country, this is not the case of Iran. The regime in Iran is a result of a revolution against an autocratic monarchy; thus, accomplishing the power needed is not directly related to democracy. Nevertheless, the social pathways show major similarities between the cases of Turkey and Iran. It is clear that both the AKP and Al Khomeini’s regime understand the importance of the citizens support in order to maintain power. While the AKP had to deal with electoral gains and losses in order to achieve the power it thrived to have, the Iranian regime passed through a different form of growing support by being the main part of the revolution in the 1979. Moreover, both cases included the Islamic identity as one of the main factors in achieving the support they needed. Although the trajectories used by each differ slightly, they generally have followed the same 85 pathways. In Iran and Turkey before Al Khomeini’s regime and the AKP rose to power respectively, discrimination against religious citizens was present. Therefore, they worked on gaining their support by emphasizing on their Islamic identity. Thus, this thesis argues that each regime integrates the Islamic identity in the goal of increasing their support. Furthermore, the AKP have integrated themselves into the democratic setting that existed in Turkey. on that basis, they established support using democratic settings while maintaining the support and promises given to the people. Therefore, they accommodated both Islam and democracy into their political and social pathways. On the other hand, the Iranian regime’s main focus was on maintaining the legitimacy needed by incorporating the democratic setting of representation in their newly created theocratic system. they maintained the support needed by the inclusion of the electoral system while cracking down on the opposition in order to control that democratic setting under their power. Furthermore, looking into the economic pathways. It can be clear that the AKP have focused more on integrating the liberal system in the country. On the other hand, the economic challenges that the Iranian passed through made them shift their focus on maintaining power and legitimacy towards the social and political pathways. However, the AKP have seen the importance of achieving a better economy in Turkey which made them use the economic pathway in order to achieve their goals. They also included forms of Islamic economy in their goal to integrating Islamic identity and liberalism at the same time. To conclude, this thesis has examined how the AKP and the Iranian regime have sometimes used different interpretations and accommodation of Islam and democracy. While there have been similarities in the forms of accommodations, the different factors including historical, social, and cultural ones play a role in the 86 dissimilarity that have been found in the forms of accommodation. Nevertheless, we argue that different trajectories, whether social, political, or economic are used by both regimes with the goal of maintaining the support needed by the people, increasing the influence and hegemony, maintaining power, and legitimizing their power. Thus, the different social, political, and economic realities have distinct roles in shaping the way Islam is accommodated and the level of democracy to be implemented. While this thesis has been able to answer the research question raised and support the hypothesis claimed, it is important to note that future research can focus more on the Islamic identity and whether the different regimes goals is to implement that identity or if their main goal is to use that identity in order to achieve the legitimacy and hegemony needed. This thesis has explored some signs that show a tendency towards that above hypothesis. However, further research is needed in order to confirm these claims. Moreover, this thesis has also been able to examine the similarity that these self-claimed Islamic regimes are similar to other powers in their goal towards achieving hegemony and maintaining power. 87 Bibliography Aarabi, K. (2019). The Fundamentals of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. Adak, S. (2021). Expansion of the Diyanet and the Politics of Family in Turkey under AKP Rule. Turkish Studies, 200-221. Adar, S. (2013). 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