- Dept. of Philosophy
Western Washington University
Bellingham, WA 98225 - 360-650-7767
Daniel Howard-Snyder
Western Washington University, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Epistemology, Philosophical Theology, Analytic Theology, Christian Philosophy, and 39 moreAnalytic Philosophy of Religion, Faith, Atheism, Theodicy, Theism, Trinity, Problem of Evil, Christian Theology, Foundationalism & Antifoundationalism, Trust, Theology, Virtues and Vices, Virtue Epistemology, Analytic Philosophy, Moral Psychology, Virtue Ethics, Epistemic Justification, Testimony, Normative Ethics, Empathy (Philosophy), Virtue theory, Naturalism, Internalism/Externalism, Social Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, Philosophy Of Language, Donald Davidson, Metaethics, Ethics, Kantian ethics, Christian Mysticism, Religious Experience, Understanding, Skepticism, Martin Luther, Philosophy of perception, Apophatic theology, and Beliefsedit
- I am Professor of Philosophy at Western Washington University. I have a PhD from Syracuse University and a BA from Se... moreI am Professor of Philosophy at Western Washington University. I have a PhD from Syracuse University and a BA from Seattle Pacific University. My primary research interests are in philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, epistemology, and moral psychology. I am the editor or co-editor of The Evidential Argument from Evil (Indiana 1996), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality (Rowman & Littlefield 1996), Divine Hiddenness: New Essays (Cambridge 2002), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil (Wiley-Blackwell 2013), a special issue of Religious Studies entitled J.L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion (2013), and Approaches to Faith (2017), a special double issue of International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. I have published articles, chapters, entries, and critical reviews in a variety of venues; see CV for details. My main current project is a book (or two or three) on the nature, value, rationality, and virtue of faith thought of as a psychological attitude or trait, with Dan McKaughan.edit
Many theistic religions place a high value on faith in God and some traditions regard it as a virtue. However, philosophers commonly assign either very little value to faith in God or significant negative value, or even view it as a vice.... more
Many theistic religions place a high value on faith in God and some traditions regard it as a virtue. However, philosophers commonly assign either very little value to faith in God or significant negative value, or even view it as a vice. Progress in assessing whether and when faith in God can be valuable or disvaluable, virtuous or vicious, rational or irrational, or otherwise apt or inapt requires understanding what faith in God is. This Special Issue on the normative appraisal of faith in God for Religious Studies includes nine articles, from a diverse range of perspectives, which explore issues related to the core questions 'What is faith in God?' and 'What normative questions about faith in God need to be addressed?' In this Introduction, we briefly introduce each article.
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We assess John Bishop’s theory of the nature of Christian faith in God, as most recently expressed in ‘Reasonable Faith and Reasonable Fideism’, although we dip into other writings as well. We explain several concerns we have about it.... more
We assess John Bishop’s theory of the nature of Christian faith in God, as most recently expressed in ‘Reasonable Faith and Reasonable Fideism’, although we dip into other writings as well. We explain several concerns we have about it. However, in the end, our reflections lead us to propose a modified theory, one that avoids our concerns while remaining consonant with some of his guiding thoughts about the nature of Christian faith in God. We also briefly examine three normative issues Bishop’s views present.
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How does trust relate to faith? We do not know of a theory-neutral way to answer our question. So, we begin with what we regard as a plausible theory of faith according to which, in slogan form, faith is resilient reliance. Next, we turn... more
How does trust relate to faith? We do not know of a theory-neutral way to answer our question. So, we begin with what we regard as a plausible theory of faith according to which, in slogan form, faith is resilient reliance. Next, we turn to contemporary theories of trust. They are not of one voice. Still, we can use them to indicate ways in which trust and faith might both differ from and resemble each other. This is what we do. Along the way, we evaluate substantive issues related to these possible differences and similarities.
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Faith in God conflicts with reason—or so we’re told. We focus on two arguments for this conclusion. After evaluating three criticisms of them, we identify an assumption they share, namely that faith in God requires belief that God exists.... more
Faith in God conflicts with reason—or so we’re told. We focus on two arguments for this conclusion. After evaluating three criticisms of them, we identify an assumption they share, namely that faith in God requires belief that God exists. Whether the assumption is true depends on what faith is. We sketch a theory of faith that allows for both faith in God without belief that God exists, and faith in God while in belief-cancelling doubt God’s existence. We then argue that our theory, unlike the theory of Thomas Aquinas, makes sense of four central items of faith-data: (i) pístis in the Synoptics, (ii) ʾemunāh in the Hebrew scriptures, (iii) exemplars of faith in God, including Abraham, Jesus, and Mother Teresa, and (iv) the widespread experience of people of faith today. We close by assessing revisions of the two arguments we began with, revisions that align with our theory of faith, and find them dubious, at best.
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Can faith be valuable and, if so, under what conditions? We know of no theory-neutral way to address this question. So, we offer a theory of relational faith, and we supplement it with a complementary theory of relational faithfulness. We... more
Can faith be valuable and, if so, under what conditions? We know of no theory-neutral way to address this question. So, we offer a theory of relational faith, and we supplement it with a complementary theory of relational faithfulness. We then turn to relationships of mutual faith and faithfulness with an eye toward exhibiting some of the ways in which, on our theory, faith and faithfulness can be valuable and disvaluable. We then extend the theory to other manifestations of faith and faithfulness, propose a way to unify them under a theory of faith and faithfulness simpliciter, and sketch how they can be neo-Aristotelian virtues and vices. We close with our solution to the value problem and avenues for further research.
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In this short essay, we sketch a theory of faith that features resilience in the face of challenges to relying on those in whom you have faith. We argue that it handles a variety of both religious and secular faith-data, e.g., the value... more
In this short essay, we sketch a theory of faith that features resilience in the face of challenges to relying on those in whom you have faith. We argue that it handles a variety of both religious and secular faith-data, e.g., the value of faith in relationships of mutual faith and faithfulness, how the Christian and Hebrew scriptures portray pístis and ʾĕmûnāh, and the character of faith as it is often expressed in popular secular venues.
Research Interests: Religion, Psychology, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Moral Psychology, and 15 moreNew Testament, Philosophical Theology, Trust, Hebrew Bible, Psychology of Religion, Old Testament Theology, Biblical Studies, Old Testament, Faith, Analytic Theology, Old Testament Studies, Reliability, Hebrew Bible/Old Testament, Faithfulness, and Resiliance
What are faith and faithfulness, and how are they related? We consider two views that express very different answers to these questions. On our view, faith and faithfulness are distinct and yet complement each other. Faith is resilient... more
What are faith and faithfulness, and how are they related? We consider two views that express very different answers to these questions. On our view, faith and faithfulness are distinct and yet complement each other. Faith is resilient reliance and faithfulness is resilient reliability, both of which involve conative and/or affective elements. In contrast, while Jonathan Kvanvig also holds that faith involves conative and/or affective elements, he identifies faith with a disposition to act in service of an ideal in the face of difficulty. However, this view of faith leads to some puzzling claims about how faith relates to faithfulness. We evaluate several claims suggested by what Kvanvig says, arguing both that his view loses sight of the distinctness of faith and faithfulness and that the inferences he wants to draw from faithfulness or faithful behaviour to faith are unjustified. Instead, we aim to show how the insights he calls to our attention can be better accommodated and explained by a more comprehensive, unified theory of faith and faithfulness and their relations.
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What is faith? This question is especially important for Christians since the New Testament is stuffed with the idea that God prizes faith as a human response to God, an idea affirmed by other religious traditions as well. Moreover, this... more
What is faith? This question is especially important for Christians since the New Testament is stuffed with the idea that God prizes faith as a human response to God, an idea affirmed by other religious traditions as well. Moreover, this question is important for all of us because faith plays a defining role in relationships we all value highly, namely relationships of mutual faith and faithfulness, which permeate society and even extend into the grand project of human inquiry, the project of understanding ourselves, our world, and our place in the world. It behooves us, therefore, to get clear on what faith is. Lara Buchak has done as much as anyone recently to answer our question in a sensible and instructive fashion. As it turns out, her writings reveal two theories of faith, an early one and a later one (or, if you like, two versions of the same theory). In what follows, we aim to do three things. First, we will state and assess Buchak's early theory, highlighting both its good-making and bad-making features. Second, we will do the same for her later theory, noting improvements on the early one. Third, we will mark various choice points in theorizing about faith, and we will argue for specific choices at those points, culminating in what we regard as a better, alternative theory of faith. Our critical aims, therefore, are ultimately constructive. By theorizing about faith with Lara Buchak, we aim to contribute to our common understanding of what faith is.
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As philosophers, the four of us were delighted to participate in the aforementioned projects on intellectual humility. Those projects have helped us think through some of the issues surrounding the topic. Perhaps more importantly, they... more
As philosophers, the four of us were delighted to participate in the aforementioned projects on intellectual humility. Those projects have helped us think through some of the issues surrounding the topic. Perhaps more importantly, they enabled us to establish lasting professional relationships with one another, and with several of our collaborators in psychology. It is uncommon for philosophers to work and write together; most philosophical work is single-authored. As a team of four, we were able to generate a view that none of us could have generated alone, and that even the sum of us working independently could not have generated. We are grateful to the visionaries, team leaders, PI's, and the John Templeton Foundation for making these projects possible. Below, we address what we see as our four main philosophical contributions to the interdisciplinary work of the overall team. First, we argued for a definition of intellectual humility via the method of philosophical analysis. Second, our analysis of the virtue of intellectual humility allows us to distinguish it from the closely related virtue of open-mindedness. Third, our analysis of the virtue of intellectual humility drew a contrast between it and two different vices-the 'go-to' vice of arrogance and the overlooked vice of servility. Fourth, in addition to collaborating with the overall team of psychologists, we worked on a specific project with Wade Rowatt, Megan Haggard, and their group of psychologists to develop a measure of intellectual humility.
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In some circles, faith is said to be one of three theological virtues, along with hope and agape. But not everyone thinks faith is a virtue, theological or otherwise. Indeed, depending on how we understand it, faith may well conflict with... more
In some circles, faith is said to be one of three theological virtues, along with hope and agape. But not everyone thinks faith is a virtue, theological or otherwise. Indeed, depending on how we understand it, faith may well conflict with the virtues. In this chapter we will focus on the virtue of humility. Does faith conflict with humility, or are they in concord? In what follows, we will do five things. First, we will sketch a theory of the virtue of humility. Second, we will summarize a common view of faith, arguably held by Thomas Aquinas among others, and we will argue that Thomistic faith is not an intellectual virtue and that it conflicts with humility in the domain of inquiry. Third, we will plump for an older view of faith, one that predates Aquinas by at least 1500 years, Markan faith. Fourth, we will argue that Markan faith is an intellectual virtue and it is in concord with humility in the domain of inquiry. Fifth, we will argue that Markan faith, unlike Thomistic faith, is a personal virtue and that it is in concord with humility in the domain of personal relationships, both human-human and human-divine.
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Christians in the West struggle with intellectual doubt more than they used to, especially university-educated Christians. It is common for young Christians to go off to college assured in their beliefs but, in the course of their first... more
Christians in the West struggle with intellectual doubt more than they used to, especially university-educated Christians. It is common for young Christians to go off to college assured in their beliefs but, in the course of their first year, they meet powerful defenses of scientific naturalism and the basic Christian story (BCS, for short) in particular. What they learned at home or church seems much less plausible to them, and many are thrown into doubt. They think to themselves something like this: "To be honest, I am troubled about the BCS. While the problem of evil, the apparent cultural basis for the diversity of religions, the explanatory breadth of contemporary science, naturalistic explanations of religious experience and miracle reports, and textual and historical criticism of the Bible, among other things, don't make me believe the BCS is false, I am in serious doubt about it, so much so that I lack belief of it. In that case, how can I have Christian faith? And if I don't have faith, how can I keep on praying, attending church, affirming the creed, confessing my sins, taking the sacraments, singing the hymns and songs, and so on? I can't, unless I'm a hypocrite. So integrity requires me to drop the whole thing and get out." Of course, our student is not alone. Many Christians find themselves for some portion of their lives somewhere on the trajectory from doubt to getting out. What should we say to them? Some will say "Get out!", welcoming the development as a path to liberation. We'd like to explore a different response. We begin by affirming the integrity these Christians display by aiming to live in accordance with their best judgment. Further, we can address the basis of their doubt. But we suspect that many of them-perhaps quite rightly-will still be in enough doubt to cancel belief. They have a problem, a practical problem: should I sacrifice my integrity to stay in, or should I preserve my integrity and get out? Call this the problem of the trajectory from doubt to getting out. Christians in the West generally have an interest in responding to this problem, not least because of the plummeting population of youth in the Church, many of whom leave precisely because of their doubt. For those of us who are not in doubt and who deem the grounds for the BCS adequate for belief, there is still the matter of relating well to those who think otherwise. We suspect that a satisfying response will require Christian communities to rethink what authentic participation requires cognitively, and to find ways to encourage doubters-young and old-to participate with integrity despite their doubt. Notice that the problem presupposes that if you have enough doubt to cancel belief, then you can't have faith. We propose to examine this presupposition. Toward that end, we will assess three theories of faith, plump for one of them, and then apply it to the problem of the trajectory.
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True story: when the female members of a colleague’s research lab learned of his plans to study humility, they remarked: “Humility is exactly what you need more of, if you’re a white male!” Subtext: humility is uncalled for when you’re... more
True story: when the female members of a colleague’s research lab learned of his plans to study humility, they remarked: “Humility is exactly what you need more of, if you’re a white male!” Subtext: humility is uncalled for when you’re oppressed. Frederick Douglass observed something similar with respect to the horrific source of oppression that was American slavery:
With a book in my hand so redolent of the principles of liberty, and with a perception of my own human nature and of the facts of my past and present experience, I was equal to a contest with the religious advocates of slavery, whether white or black; for blindness in this matter was not confined to the white people. I have met, at the south, many good, religious colored people who were under the delusion that God required them to submit to slavery and to wear their chains with meekness and humility. I could entertain no such nonsense as this…. (Douglass 1892, 104-105)
Humility seems the last thing the enslaved need. More generally, and to put it mildly, humility seems to be an inappropriate response for the oppressed toward their oppressors. It seems inappropriate elsewhere too. If you find yourself accosted by a neo-Nazi who advocates reinstating the Final Solution, humility seems like the wrong response, just as it does when you’re evangelized by a flat-earther. In sum, humility seems inappropriate as a response in a variety of contexts. But how can this be? If humility is a virtue, and if to act virtuously is to act well, how can it ever be inappropriate to act humbly?
To sharpen this puzzle, we’ll use the phrase “contexts of disparity” to capture interactions in which people differ dramatically along a normative dimension, where some are in the right and others are in the wrong. If you’re an oppressed person interacting with your oppressor, or if you’re buttonholed by neo-Nazis or flat-earthers, you are in a context of disparity. In each case, you differ dramatically from others along a normative dimension—social power in the case of oppression, moral credentials in the case of neo-Nazism, and epistemic credentials in the case of flat-earthism—and you are in the right and they are in the wrong. To be sure, there are important differences across different “contexts of disparity”. For instance, the oppressed are harmed systematically (and often horrifically) whereas those who face wielders of heinous or ridiculous views may be harmed in one-off ways or even not harmed at all. In terms of harm, then, some contexts of disparity are utterly unimportant compared to others. Nonetheless, the concept of “contexts of disparity” captures something important these interactions all share: due to a dramatic normative difference, humility seems to misadvise those who are in the right about how to respond to those who are in the wrong.
Again we wonder: how can this be? Is it because humility is not a virtue, as Hume (1751/1975) argued? Or is it instead that genuine virtues sometimes misadvise us? Or, if they never misadvise us, are they nonetheless sometimes unimportant or irrelevant or silent? Or might it so happen that humility gives us correct advice after all, even when we are in the right in contexts of disparity? This thicket of questions entangles us; what follows is our attempt to work through it.
With a book in my hand so redolent of the principles of liberty, and with a perception of my own human nature and of the facts of my past and present experience, I was equal to a contest with the religious advocates of slavery, whether white or black; for blindness in this matter was not confined to the white people. I have met, at the south, many good, religious colored people who were under the delusion that God required them to submit to slavery and to wear their chains with meekness and humility. I could entertain no such nonsense as this…. (Douglass 1892, 104-105)
Humility seems the last thing the enslaved need. More generally, and to put it mildly, humility seems to be an inappropriate response for the oppressed toward their oppressors. It seems inappropriate elsewhere too. If you find yourself accosted by a neo-Nazi who advocates reinstating the Final Solution, humility seems like the wrong response, just as it does when you’re evangelized by a flat-earther. In sum, humility seems inappropriate as a response in a variety of contexts. But how can this be? If humility is a virtue, and if to act virtuously is to act well, how can it ever be inappropriate to act humbly?
To sharpen this puzzle, we’ll use the phrase “contexts of disparity” to capture interactions in which people differ dramatically along a normative dimension, where some are in the right and others are in the wrong. If you’re an oppressed person interacting with your oppressor, or if you’re buttonholed by neo-Nazis or flat-earthers, you are in a context of disparity. In each case, you differ dramatically from others along a normative dimension—social power in the case of oppression, moral credentials in the case of neo-Nazism, and epistemic credentials in the case of flat-earthism—and you are in the right and they are in the wrong. To be sure, there are important differences across different “contexts of disparity”. For instance, the oppressed are harmed systematically (and often horrifically) whereas those who face wielders of heinous or ridiculous views may be harmed in one-off ways or even not harmed at all. In terms of harm, then, some contexts of disparity are utterly unimportant compared to others. Nonetheless, the concept of “contexts of disparity” captures something important these interactions all share: due to a dramatic normative difference, humility seems to misadvise those who are in the right about how to respond to those who are in the wrong.
Again we wonder: how can this be? Is it because humility is not a virtue, as Hume (1751/1975) argued? Or is it instead that genuine virtues sometimes misadvise us? Or, if they never misadvise us, are they nonetheless sometimes unimportant or irrelevant or silent? Or might it so happen that humility gives us correct advice after all, even when we are in the right in contexts of disparity? This thicket of questions entangles us; what follows is our attempt to work through it.
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A 10k word entry focused on the nature, value, and rationality of relational faith.
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On doxastic theories of propositional faith, necessarily, S has faith that p only if S believes that p. On nondoxastic theories of propositional faith, it’s false that, necessarily, S has faith that p only if S believes that p. In this... more
On doxastic theories of propositional faith, necessarily, S has faith that p only if S believes that p. On nondoxastic theories of propositional faith, it’s false that, necessarily, S has faith that p only if S believes that p. In this essay, I state three arguments for nondoxastic theories of faith and I respond to criticism of them.
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Springer. We find in contemporary culture starkly contrasting estimates of the value of faith. On the one hand, for many people, faith is a virtue or positive human value, something associated with understanding, hope, and love,... more
Springer. We find in contemporary culture starkly contrasting estimates of the value of faith. On the one hand, for many people, faith is a virtue or positive human value, something associated with understanding, hope, and love, something to be inculcated, maintained, and cherished. On the other hand, for many people, faith is a vice, something associated with dogmatism, arrogance, and close-mindedness, something to be avoided at all costs. The papers included in this special (double) issue on approaches to faith explore questions about faith in a variety of settings through a diverse range of examples, both secular and religious. The attempt to deepen our understanding of faith in the context of ordinary human relationships (e.g., between parents and children, friends, generals and their armies, business partners, citizens and the state), a commitment to ideals, or the pursuit of significant goals is clearly of general philosophical interest, as is the examination of potential connections between faith and topics such as trust or reliance.
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Can fictionalists have faith? It all depends on how we disambiguate 'fictionalists' and on what faith is. I consider the matter in light of my own theory. After clarifying its central terms, I distinguish two fictionalists— atheistic and... more
Can fictionalists have faith? It all depends on how we disambiguate 'fictionalists' and on what faith is. I consider the matter in light of my own theory. After clarifying its central terms, I distinguish two fictionalists— atheistic and agnostic—and I argue that, even though no atheistic fictionalist can have faith on my theory, agnostic fictionalists arguably can. After rejecting Finlay Malcolm's reasons for thinking this is a problem, I use his paradigmatic agnostic fictionalist as a foil to explore a variety of ways in which to describe agnostic fictionalists, none of whom pose a problem for my theory.
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Part of an author-meets-critics symposium on Teresa Morgan's Roman Faith and Christian Faith: Pistis and Fides in the Early Roman Empire and Early Churches (Oxford 2015). I survey Morgan's thoughts about the relationship between... more
Part of an author-meets-critics symposium on Teresa Morgan's Roman Faith and Christian Faith: Pistis and Fides in the Early Roman Empire and Early Churches (Oxford 2015). I survey Morgan's thoughts about the relationship between pistis/fides, on the one hand, and propositional belief, on the other hand. Published in Religious Studies (2018).
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I defend Epistemological Foundationalism. Intended audience: early undergraduates. Published in: Steven B. Cowan (editor), Problems in Philosophy: An Introduction to the Major Debates on Knowledge, Reality, Values and Government... more
I defend Epistemological Foundationalism. Intended audience: early undergraduates. Published in: Steven B. Cowan (editor), Problems in Philosophy: An Introduction to the Major Debates on Knowledge, Reality, Values and Government (Bloomsbury 2018).
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I critique Kevin McCain's and Ted Poston's "Beliefs Are Justified by Coherence". Intended audience: early undergraduates. Published in Steven B. Cowan (ed), Problems in Philosophy: An Introduction to the Major Debates on Knowledge,... more
I critique Kevin McCain's and Ted Poston's "Beliefs Are Justified by Coherence". Intended audience: early undergraduates. Published in Steven B. Cowan (ed), Problems in Philosophy: An Introduction to the Major Debates on Knowledge, Reality, Values and Government (Bloomsbury 2018)
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What is intellectual humility? In this essay, we aim to answer this question by (i) assessing several contemporary accounts of intellectual humility, (ii) developing our own account, (iii) offering two reasons for our account, and (iv)... more
What is intellectual humility? In this essay, we aim to answer this question by (i) assessing several contemporary accounts of intellectual humility, (ii) developing our own account, (iii) offering two reasons for our account, and (iv) meeting two objections and solving one puzzle. (This paper is co-authored with Dennis Whitcomb as first author, Heather Battaly as second, Jason Baehr as third, and Dan Howard-Snyder as fourth.)
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Recent scholarship in intellectual humility (IH) has attempted to provide deeper understanding of the virtue as personality trait and its impact on an individual's thoughts, beliefs, and actions. A limitations-owning perspective of IH... more
Recent scholarship in intellectual humility (IH) has attempted to provide deeper understanding of the virtue as personality trait and its impact on an individual's thoughts, beliefs, and actions. A limitations-owning perspective of IH focuses on a proper recognition of the impact of intellectual limitations and a motivation to overcome them, placing it as the mean between intellectual arrogance and intellectual servility. We developed the Limitations-Owning Intellectual Humility Scale to assess this conception of IH with related personality constructs. In Studies 1 (n = 386) and 2 (n = 296), principal factor and confirmatory factor analyses revealed a three-factor model – owning one's intellectual limitations, appropriate discomfort with intellectual limitations, and love of learning. Study 3 (n = 322) demonstrated strong test-retest reliability of the measure over 5 months, while Study 4 (n = 612) revealed limitations-owning IH correlated negatively with dogmatism, closed-mind-edness, and hubristic pride and positively with openness, assertiveness, authentic pride. It also predicted openness and closed-mindedness over and above education, social desirability, and other measures of IH. The limitations-owning understanding of IH and scale allow for a more nuanced, spectrum interpretation and measurement of the virtue, which directs future study inside and outside of psychology.
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It is commonly said that Darwinian evolution conflicts with theistic religion. Those who say such things often have in mind claims that are peripheral to theistic religion, for example, the claim that God created the earth about 6,000... more
It is commonly said that Darwinian evolution conflicts with theistic religion. Those who say such things often have in mind claims that are peripheral to theistic religion, for example, the claim that God created the earth about 6,000 years ago or the claim that God directly created each species. I have no interest in the thesis that Darwinian evolution conflicts with these peripheral claims. I do have an interest, however, in the thesis that Darwinian evolution conflicts with claims that are central to theistic religion. Among those who say that Darwinian evolution conflicts with claims central to theistic religion, we find those who say that it is incompatible with them and those who say that, although there is no incompatibility, evolution nevertheless provides significant evidence against them. In this essay, I will focus on the second group. More narrowly, I will focus on Paul Draper’s argument for this conclusion.
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Abstract. Panmetaphoricism is the view that our speech about God can only be metaphorical. In this essay, I do not assess the reasons that have been given for it; rather, I aim to understand what it says and, thereby, to gain a clearer... more
Abstract. Panmetaphoricism is the view that our speech about God can only be metaphorical. In this essay, I do not assess the reasons that have been given for it; rather, I aim to understand what it says and, thereby, to gain a clearer view of the God it offers.
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I summarize John Hick’s pluralistic theory of the world’s great religions, largely in his own voice. I then focus on the core posit of his theory, what he calls ‘‘the Real,’’ but which I less tendentiously call ‘‘Godhick’’. Godhick is... more
I summarize John Hick’s pluralistic theory of the world’s great religions, largely in his own voice. I then focus on the core posit of his theory, what he calls ‘‘the Real,’’ but which I less tendentiously call ‘‘Godhick’’. Godhick is supposed to be the ultimate religious reality. As such, it must be both possible and capable of explanatory and religious significance. Unfortunately, Godhick is, by definition, transcategorial, i.e. necessarily, for any creaturely conceivable substantial property F, it is neither an F nor a non-F. As a result, Godhick is impossible, as shown by the Self-Identity Problem, the Number Problem, and the Pairing Problem. Moreover, even if Godhick is possible, it faces the Insignificance Problem. The upshot is that, so far as I can see, John Hick’s God is unworthy of any further interest.
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“Divine hiddenness,” as the phrase suggests, refers, most fundamentally, to the hiddenness of God, i.e. the alleged fact that God is hidden, absent, silent. In religious literature, there is a long history of expressions of annoyance,... more
“Divine hiddenness,” as the phrase suggests, refers, most fundamentally, to the hiddenness of God, i.e. the alleged fact that God is hidden, absent, silent. In religious literature, there is a long history of expressions of annoyance, anxiety, and despair over divine hiddenness, so understood. Understood in this way, divine hiddenness poses an existential problem for those who have such experiences. However, “divine hiddenness” refers to something else in recent philosophical literature, especially since the publication of J.L. Schellenberg’s landmark book, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993). In this context, it refers to alleged facts about the absence of belief of God, on the basis of which one might think there is no God. For example, Schellenberg argues that, since there are nonbelievers who are capable of a personal relationship with God and who do not resist it, there is no perfectly loving God, while Stephen Maitzen argues that naturalism better explains the “demographics” of nonbelief than theism and Jason Marsh argues that naturalism better explains “natural nonbelief” than theism. Understood in this way, divine hiddenness constitutes putative evidence for atheism. We leave divine hiddenness understood in the first way to those fit to address it—rabbis, imams, priests, pastors, ministers, therapists, spiritual directors and the like—although some of the recent philosophical literature addresses it (e.g. DeWeese-Boyd 2016; Garcia 2002). This entry focuses on divine hiddenness understood in the second way.
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We might be tempted to think that, necessarily, if God unsurpassably loves such created persons as there may be, then for any capable created person S and time t, God is at t open to being in a positively meaningful and reciprocal... more
We might be tempted to think that, necessarily, if God unsurpassably loves such created persons as there may be, then for any capable created person S and time t, God is at t open to being in a positively meaningful and reciprocal conscious relationship with S at t, where one is open to relationship with another only if one never does anything (by commission or omission) that would have the result that the other was prevented from being able, just by trying, to participate in that relationship. I argue that we should resist the temptation.
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This is a dynamic bibliography on the hiddenness of God. There is a link to it from the article "Hiddenness of God" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The authors would be grateful for suggested additions from the philosophical... more
This is a dynamic bibliography on the hiddenness of God. There is a link to it from the article "Hiddenness of God" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The authors would be grateful for suggested additions from the philosophical and theological literature.
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According to many accounts of faith—where faith is thought of as something psychological, e.g., an attitude, state, or trait—one cannot have faith without belief of the relevant propositions. According to other accounts of faith, one can... more
According to many accounts of faith—where faith is thought of as something psychological, e.g., an attitude, state, or trait—one cannot have faith without belief of the relevant propositions. According to other accounts of faith, one can have faith without belief of the relevant propositions. Call the first sort of account doxasticism since it insists that faith requires belief; call the second nondoxasticism since it allows
faith without belief. The New Testament (NT) may seem to favor doxasticism over nondoxasticism. For it may seem that, according to the NT authors, one can have faith in God, as providential, or faith that Jesus is the Messiah, or be a person of Christian faith, and the like only if one believes the relevant propositions. In this essay, I propose to assess this tension, as it pertains to the Gospel of Mark. The upshot of my assessment is that, while it may well appear that, according to Mark, one can have faith only if one believes the relevant propositions, appearances are deceiving. Mark said no such thing. Rather, what Mark said—by way of story—about faith fits nondoxasticism at least as well as doxasticism, arguably better. More importantly, the account of faith that emerges is that faith consists in resilience in the face of challenges to living in light of the overall positive stance to the object of faith, where that stance consists in certain conative, cognitive, and behavioral elements.
faith without belief. The New Testament (NT) may seem to favor doxasticism over nondoxasticism. For it may seem that, according to the NT authors, one can have faith in God, as providential, or faith that Jesus is the Messiah, or be a person of Christian faith, and the like only if one believes the relevant propositions. In this essay, I propose to assess this tension, as it pertains to the Gospel of Mark. The upshot of my assessment is that, while it may well appear that, according to Mark, one can have faith only if one believes the relevant propositions, appearances are deceiving. Mark said no such thing. Rather, what Mark said—by way of story—about faith fits nondoxasticism at least as well as doxasticism, arguably better. More importantly, the account of faith that emerges is that faith consists in resilience in the face of challenges to living in light of the overall positive stance to the object of faith, where that stance consists in certain conative, cognitive, and behavioral elements.
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This essay is a detailed study of William P. Alston’s view on the nature of Christian faith, which I assess in the context of three problems: the problem of the skeptical Christian, the problem of faith and reason, and the problem of the... more
This essay is a detailed study of William P. Alston’s view on the nature of Christian faith, which I assess in the context of three problems: the problem of the skeptical Christian, the problem of faith and reason, and the problem of the trajectory. Although Alston intended a view that would solve these problems, it does so only superficially. Fortunately, we can distinguish Alston’s view, on the one hand, from his illustrations of his view, on the other hand. I argue that, although Alston’s view only superficially solves these problems, his illustrations of his view suggest a substantive way to solve them, a way that I spell out in some detail.
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Does faith that p entail belief that p? If faith that p is identical with belief that p, it does. But it isn’t. Even so, faith that p might be necessarily partly constituted by belief that p, or at least entail it. Of course, even if... more
Does faith that p entail belief that p? If faith that p is identical with belief that p, it does. But it isn’t. Even so, faith that p might be necessarily partly constituted by belief that p, or at least entail it. Of course, even if faith that p entails belief that p, it does not follow that faith that p is necessarily partly constituted by belief that p. Still, showing that faith that p entails belief that p would be a significant step in that direction. Can we take that step? In this essay, I assess, and reject, seven reasons to think we can. Along the way, I discuss having faith in a person, being a person of faith, believing something by faith, and believing a person.
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300 word entry on faith
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What is propositional faith? At a first approximation, we might answer that it is the psychological attitude picked out by standard uses of the English locution “S has faith that p,” where p takes declarative sentences as instances, as in... more
What is propositional faith? At a first approximation, we might answer that it is the psychological attitude picked out by standard uses of the English locution “S has faith that p,” where p takes declarative sentences as instances, as in “He has faith that they’ll win”. Although correct, this answer is not nearly as informative as we might like. Many people say that there is a more informative answer. They say that, at the very least, propositional faith requires propositional belief. More precisely, they say that faith that p requires belief that p or that it must be partly constituted by belief that p. This view is common enough; call it the Common View. I have two main aims in this paper: (i) to exhibit the falsity of the Common View and (ii) to sketch a more accurate and comprehensive account of what propositional faith is.
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This article assesses J. L. Schellenberg’s account of propositional faith and, in light of that assessment, sketches an alternative that avoids certain objections and coheres better with Schellenberg’s aims.
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A descriptive polytheist thinks there are at least two gods. John Hick and Richard Swinburne are descriptive polytheists. In this respect, they are like Thomas Aquinas and many other theists. What sets Swinburne and Hick apart from... more
A descriptive polytheist thinks there are at least two gods. John Hick and Richard Swinburne are descriptive polytheists. In this respect, they are like Thomas Aquinas and many other theists. What sets Swinburne and Hick apart from Aquinas, however, is that unlike him they are normative polytheists. That is, Swinburne and Hick think that it is right that we, or at least some of us, worship more than one god. However, the evidence available to me shows that only Swinburne, and not Hick, is a cultic polytheist: he actually worships more than one god. I conclude that, among these three, only Swinburne is a polytheist par excellence.
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"Who or what is God?," asks John Hick. A theist might answer: God is an infinite person, or at least an infinite personal being. Hick disagrees: "God cannot be both a person and infinite." Moreover, he says, the distinction between being... more
"Who or what is God?," asks John Hick. A theist might answer: God is an infinite person, or at least an infinite personal being. Hick disagrees: "God cannot be both a person and infinite." Moreover, he says, the distinction between being a person and being a personal being "is a distinction without a difference." Thus, God cannot be an infinite personal being either. In this essay, I assess Hick's reasons for drawing these conclusions.
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According to Agnosticism with a capital A, even if one doesn’t see how any known reason would justify God in permitting all the evil in the world and even if one lacks warrant for theism, one should not infer that there probably is no... more
According to Agnosticism with a capital A, even if one doesn’t see how any known reason would justify God in permitting all the evil in the world and even if one lacks warrant for theism, one should not infer that there probably is no reason that would justify God. After all, even under those conditions, one should be in doubt about whether or not known goods constitute a representative sample of all goods. According to the Moral Skepticism Objection, Agnosticism leaves one in doubt about whether or not one is obligated to intervene to prevent horrific suffering that can be prevented at no risk. In this essay, I explain why this objection is a failure.
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According to Agnosticism with a capital A, even if one doesn’t see how any known reason would justify God in permitting all the evil in the world and even if one lacks warrant for theism, one should not infer that there probably is no... more
According to Agnosticism with a capital A, even if one doesn’t see how any known reason would justify God in permitting all the evil in the world and even if one lacks warrant for theism, one should not infer that there probably is no reason that would justify God. After all, even under those conditions, one should be in doubt about whether or not known goods constitute a representative sample of all goods. Agnosticism has previously been defended against the charge that it leaves one in doubt about whether or not one is obligated to intervene to prevent horrific suffering that can be prevented at no risk (Howard-Snyder, 2009). In light of this defense, Steve Maitzen argued that Agnosticism is at odds with common-sense morality’s insistence that one has an obligation to intervene in such cases. This chapter argues that the moral principle Maitzen imputes to common sense is false and that a moral principle much more in keeping with common sense is compatible with Agnosticism and this chapter’s defense of it.
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A 4500 word critical review of Hasker's Oxford UP 2013 book.
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9.300 word entry summarizing and assessing models of the developed doctrine of the Trinity from six contemporary analytic theologians: Swinburne, Craig, Leftow, Brower, Rea, and van Inwagen.
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Among the things that students of the problem of evil think about is whether explanatory versions of the evidential argument from evil are better than others, better than William Rowe’s famous versions of the evidential argument, for... more
Among the things that students of the problem of evil think about is whether explanatory versions of the evidential argument from evil are better than others, better than William Rowe’s famous versions of the evidential argument, for example. Some of these students claim that the former are better than the latter in no small part because the former, unlike the latter, avoid the sorts of worries raised by so-called “skeptical theists”. Indeed, Trent Dougherty claims to have constructed an explanatory version that is “fundamentally immune to considerations pertaining to skeptical theism”. I argue that he has done no such thing.
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J.L. Mackie’s version of the logical problem of evil is a failure, as even he came to recognize. Contrary to current mythology, however, its failure was not established by Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense. That’s because a defense is... more
J.L. Mackie’s version of the logical problem of evil is a failure, as even he came to recognize. Contrary to current mythology, however, its failure was not established by Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defense. That’s because a defense is successful only if it is not reasonable to refrain from believing any of the claims that constitute it, but it is reasonable to refrain from believing the central claim of Plantinga’s Free Will Defense, namely the claim that, possibly, every essence suffers from transworld depravity. I develop this objection, first published in IJPR 1998, by way of the notion of transworld sanctity, interworld plenitude, and intraworld plenitude. I then respond to Rowe (IJPR 1998) and Plantinga (PPR 2009).
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Dennis Whitcomb argues that there is no God on the grounds that (i) God is supposed to be omniscient, yet (ii) nothing could be omniscient due to the nature of grounding. We give a formally identical argument that concludes that one of... more
Dennis Whitcomb argues that there is no God on the grounds that (i) God is supposed to be omniscient, yet (ii) nothing could be omniscient due to the nature of grounding. We give a formally identical argument that concludes that one of the present co-authors does not exist. Since he does exist, Whitcomb’s argument is unsound. But why is it unsound? That is a difficult question. We venture two answers. First, one of the grounding principles that the argument relies on is false. Second, the argument equivocates between two kinds of grounding: instance-grounding and quasi-mereological grounding. Happily, the equivocation can be avoided; unhappily, avoidance comes at the price of a false premise.
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Foundationalists distinguish basic from nonbasic beliefs. At a first approximation, to say that a belief of a person is basic is to say that it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other... more
Foundationalists distinguish basic from nonbasic beliefs. At a first approximation, to say that a belief of a person is basic is to say that it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs, where “belief” refers to the mental state that goes by that name. To say that a belief of a person is nonbasic is to say that it is epistemically justified and not basic. In this essay I aim to characterize the notion of a basic belief more precisely and to assess some arguments for and against Foundationalism. In the process, I hope to exhibit the resilience and attractiveness of Foundationalism.
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The fact that our asking God to do something can make a difference to what he does underwrites the point of petitionary prayer. Here, however, a puzzle arises: Either doing what we ask is the best God can do or it is not. If it is, then... more
The fact that our asking God to do something can make a difference to what he does underwrites the point of petitionary prayer. Here, however, a puzzle arises: Either doing what we ask is the best God can do or it is not. If it is, then our asking won’t make any difference to whether he does it. If it is not,
then our asking won’t make any difference to whether he does it. So, our asking won’t make any difference to whether God does it. Our asking is therefore pointless. In this paper, we try to solve this puzzle without denying either that God must do the best he can or that petitioning God can make a difference to
what he does.
then our asking won’t make any difference to whether he does it. So, our asking won’t make any difference to whether God does it. Our asking is therefore pointless. In this paper, we try to solve this puzzle without denying either that God must do the best he can or that petitioning God can make a difference to
what he does.
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The fact that God is worthy of thanks and praise for his good acts underwrites the rationality of our practice of offering prayers of thanksgiving and praise for those acts. Here, however, a puzzle arises: If God is essentially... more
The fact that God is worthy of thanks and praise for his good acts underwrites the rationality of our practice of offering prayers of thanksgiving and praise for those acts. Here, however, a puzzle arises: If God is essentially unsurpassably good, then he is unable to do something worse in place of his good acts, and if God is unable to do something worse in place of them, then he is not worthy of thanks and praise for performing them. So, if God is essentially unsurpassably good, then he is not worthy of praise and thanks for his good acts. In this paper, I argue that, given mundane incompatibilist assumptions, there is no solution to this puzzle. Thus,
on those assumptions, our practice of offering prayers of thanksgiving and praise is rational only if God is not essentially unsurpassably good.
on those assumptions, our practice of offering prayers of thanksgiving and praise is rational only if God is not essentially unsurpassably good.
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This is a 5000 word entry on the philosophy of religion of William P. Alston
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In this essay designed for university students, I state and evaluate several theodicies in the context of a version of the evidential argument for atheism
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Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist without other (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some... more
Foundationalism is false; after all, foundational beliefs are arbitrary, they do not solve the epistemic regress problem, and they cannot exist without other (justified) beliefs. Or so some people say. In this essay, we assess some arguments based on such claims, arguments suggested in recent work by Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
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This is a 5000 word encyclopedia article on divine hiddenness.
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Nonskeptical foundationalists say that there are basic beliefs. But, one might object, either there is a reason why basic beliefs are likely to be true or there is not. If there is, then they are not basic; if there is not, then they are... more
Nonskeptical foundationalists say that there are basic beliefs. But, one might object, either there is a reason why basic beliefs are likely to be true or there is not. If there is, then they are not basic; if there is not, then they are arbitrary. I argue that this dilemma is not nearly as
decisive as its author, Peter Klein, would have us believe.
decisive as its author, Peter Klein, would have us believe.
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The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil presents a collection of original essays providing both overview and insight, clarifying and evaluating the philosophical and theological “problem of evil” in its various contexts and... more
The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil presents a collection of original essays providing both overview and insight, clarifying and evaluating the philosophical and theological “problem of evil” in its various contexts and manifestations.
Features all original essays that explore the various forms of the problems of evil, offering theistic responses that attempt to explain evil as well as discussion of the challenges facing such explanations.
Includes section introductions with a historical essay that traces the developments of the issues explored.
Acknowledges the fact that there are many problems of evil, some of which apply only to those who believe in concepts such as hell and some of which apply to non-theists.
Represents views from the various religious traditions, including Hindu, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim.
Table of Contents
Notes on contributors ix
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xiv
Part I Problems of Evil 1
1 A brief history of problems of evil 3
Michael W. Hickson
2 The logical problem of evil: mackie and plantinga 19
Daniel Howard-Snyder
3 A new logical problem of evil 34
J.L. Schellenberg
4 Rowe’s evidential arguments from evil 49
Graham Oppy
5 Explanation and the problem of evil 67
Paul Draper and Trent Dougherty
6 A carnapian argument from evil 83
Richard Otte
7 The experience of evil and support for atheism 98
Jerome Gellman
8 The problem of animal pain and suffering 113
Robert Francescotti
9 Hell and the problem of evil 128
Andrei A. Buckareff and Allen Plug
10 The problem of apparently morally abhorrent divine commands 144
Wesley Morriston
11 God because of evil: An ad hominem argument from evil for belief in God 160
Marilyn McCord Adams
Part II Theodicies 175
12 A brief history of theodicy 177
René van Woudenberg
13 Counterpart and appreciation theodicies 192
Justin P. McBrayer
14 Free will and soul-making theodicies 205
Daniel Speak
15 The connection-building theodicy 222
Robin Collins
16 Best possible world theodicy 236
Hud Hudson
17 Providence and theodicy 251
Thomas P. Flint
18 A christian theodicy 266
Laura W. Ekstrom
19 Toward an Indian theodicy 281
Purushottama Bilimoria
20 Earth’s epistemic fruits for harmony with God: an Islamic theodicy 296
Mohammad Ali Mobini
21 On constructing a Jewish theodicy 309
David Shatz
22 Feminism and the problem of evil 326
Beverley Clack
23 Process theism and theodicies for problems of evil 340
James A. Keller
24 Theodicy in a vale of tears 349
Evan Fales
25 Antitheodicy 363
N.N. Trakakis
Part III Skeptical Responses 377
26 A brief history of skeptical responses to evil 379
T.M. Rudavsky
27 Peter van Inwagen’s defense 396
Meghan Sullivan
28 A defense without free will 411
Derk Pereboom
29 Skeptical theism, CORNEA, and common sense epistemology 426
Thomas D. Senor
30 The moral skepticism objection to skeptical theism 444
Stephen Maitzen
31 The global skepticism objection to skeptical theism 458
Ian Wilks
32 Theistic objections to skeptical theism 468
David O’Connor
33 Skeptical theism and the “too much skepticism” objection 482
Michael C. Rea
Index 507
Author Information
Justin P. McBrayer is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Fort Lewis College, Colorado. He has authored numerous papers in philosophy of religion and ethics, including “CORNEA and Inductive Skepticism” (2009), “Skeptical Theism” (2010), “A Limited Defense of Moral Perception” (2010), “Skepticism about the Argument from Divine Hiddenness” (2011), and “Christianity, Homosexual Sex, and Sexism” (2012).
Daniel Howard-Snyder is Professor of Philosophy at Western Washington University. He is co-author of The Power of Logic (2013, 5th Ed.), and editor or co-editor of various publications including The Evidential Argument from Evil (1996), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality (1996), and Divine Hiddenness: New Essays (2002).
Reviews
“This volume is an outstanding and comprehensive collection of essays of high quality on aspects of one of the greatest problems in intellectual history: The Problem of Evil. The editors have covered the usual territory well, and they have also included essays that broaden the scope of the book considerably. Highly recommended.”
—John Martin Fischer, University of California, Riverside
"An impressive list of contributors, writing from a variety of perspectives. The volume nicely summarizes the history of the field and advances the discussion with some superb, groundbreaking work."
—Thomas M. Crisp, Biola University
“The editors, Justin McBrayer and Daniel Howard-Snyder, are to be congratulated on this stimulating, balanced and comprehensive collection. It is a first-rate resource both for students and for researchers.”
—Peter Forrest, University of New England
"This splendid collection of essays both represents important recent developments and breaks new ground. Theologians as well as philosophers will appreciate this resource for what it is: the best one available."
—Thomas H. McCall, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School
Features all original essays that explore the various forms of the problems of evil, offering theistic responses that attempt to explain evil as well as discussion of the challenges facing such explanations.
Includes section introductions with a historical essay that traces the developments of the issues explored.
Acknowledges the fact that there are many problems of evil, some of which apply only to those who believe in concepts such as hell and some of which apply to non-theists.
Represents views from the various religious traditions, including Hindu, Jewish, Christian, and Muslim.
Table of Contents
Notes on contributors ix
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xiv
Part I Problems of Evil 1
1 A brief history of problems of evil 3
Michael W. Hickson
2 The logical problem of evil: mackie and plantinga 19
Daniel Howard-Snyder
3 A new logical problem of evil 34
J.L. Schellenberg
4 Rowe’s evidential arguments from evil 49
Graham Oppy
5 Explanation and the problem of evil 67
Paul Draper and Trent Dougherty
6 A carnapian argument from evil 83
Richard Otte
7 The experience of evil and support for atheism 98
Jerome Gellman
8 The problem of animal pain and suffering 113
Robert Francescotti
9 Hell and the problem of evil 128
Andrei A. Buckareff and Allen Plug
10 The problem of apparently morally abhorrent divine commands 144
Wesley Morriston
11 God because of evil: An ad hominem argument from evil for belief in God 160
Marilyn McCord Adams
Part II Theodicies 175
12 A brief history of theodicy 177
René van Woudenberg
13 Counterpart and appreciation theodicies 192
Justin P. McBrayer
14 Free will and soul-making theodicies 205
Daniel Speak
15 The connection-building theodicy 222
Robin Collins
16 Best possible world theodicy 236
Hud Hudson
17 Providence and theodicy 251
Thomas P. Flint
18 A christian theodicy 266
Laura W. Ekstrom
19 Toward an Indian theodicy 281
Purushottama Bilimoria
20 Earth’s epistemic fruits for harmony with God: an Islamic theodicy 296
Mohammad Ali Mobini
21 On constructing a Jewish theodicy 309
David Shatz
22 Feminism and the problem of evil 326
Beverley Clack
23 Process theism and theodicies for problems of evil 340
James A. Keller
24 Theodicy in a vale of tears 349
Evan Fales
25 Antitheodicy 363
N.N. Trakakis
Part III Skeptical Responses 377
26 A brief history of skeptical responses to evil 379
T.M. Rudavsky
27 Peter van Inwagen’s defense 396
Meghan Sullivan
28 A defense without free will 411
Derk Pereboom
29 Skeptical theism, CORNEA, and common sense epistemology 426
Thomas D. Senor
30 The moral skepticism objection to skeptical theism 444
Stephen Maitzen
31 The global skepticism objection to skeptical theism 458
Ian Wilks
32 Theistic objections to skeptical theism 468
David O’Connor
33 Skeptical theism and the “too much skepticism” objection 482
Michael C. Rea
Index 507
Author Information
Justin P. McBrayer is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Fort Lewis College, Colorado. He has authored numerous papers in philosophy of religion and ethics, including “CORNEA and Inductive Skepticism” (2009), “Skeptical Theism” (2010), “A Limited Defense of Moral Perception” (2010), “Skepticism about the Argument from Divine Hiddenness” (2011), and “Christianity, Homosexual Sex, and Sexism” (2012).
Daniel Howard-Snyder is Professor of Philosophy at Western Washington University. He is co-author of The Power of Logic (2013, 5th Ed.), and editor or co-editor of various publications including The Evidential Argument from Evil (1996), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality (1996), and Divine Hiddenness: New Essays (2002).
Reviews
“This volume is an outstanding and comprehensive collection of essays of high quality on aspects of one of the greatest problems in intellectual history: The Problem of Evil. The editors have covered the usual territory well, and they have also included essays that broaden the scope of the book considerably. Highly recommended.”
—John Martin Fischer, University of California, Riverside
"An impressive list of contributors, writing from a variety of perspectives. The volume nicely summarizes the history of the field and advances the discussion with some superb, groundbreaking work."
—Thomas M. Crisp, Biola University
“The editors, Justin McBrayer and Daniel Howard-Snyder, are to be congratulated on this stimulating, balanced and comprehensive collection. It is a first-rate resource both for students and for researchers.”
—Peter Forrest, University of New England
"This splendid collection of essays both represents important recent developments and breaks new ground. Theologians as well as philosophers will appreciate this resource for what it is: the best one available."
—Thomas H. McCall, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School
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This fifth edition of The Power of Logic offers an introduction to informal logic, traditional categorical logic, and modern symbolic logic. The authors’ direct and accessible writing style, along with a wealth of engaging examples and... more
This fifth edition of The Power of Logic offers an introduction to informal logic, traditional categorical logic, and modern symbolic logic. The authors’ direct and accessible writing style, along with a wealth of engaging examples and challenging exercises, makes this an ideal text for today’s logic classes. Accompanying the POL is the Power of Logic Web Tutor, a free internet-based study guide that provides you with numerous ways to check your understanding of logic and to independently check your work and receive feedback. Visit: http://www.poweroflogic.com/cgi/menu.cgi
In this new collection of essays, a distinguished group of philosophers of religion explore the question of divine hiddenness in considerable detail. The issue is approached from several perspectives including Jewish, Christian, atheist,... more
In this new collection of essays, a distinguished group of philosophers of religion explore the question of divine hiddenness in considerable detail. The issue is approached from several perspectives including Jewish, Christian, atheist, and agnostic. There is coverage of the historical treatment of divine hiddenness as found in the work of Maimonides, St. John of the Cross, Jonathan Edwards, Kierkegaard, and various Biblical writers. A substantial introduction clarifies the main problems of and leading solutions to divine hiddenness.
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This collection of essays is dedicated to William Rowe, with great affection, respect, and admiration. The philosophy of religion, once considered a deviation from an otherwise analytically rigorous discipline, has flourished over the... more
This collection of essays is dedicated to William Rowe, with great affection, respect, and admiration. The philosophy of religion, once considered a deviation from an otherwise analytically rigorous discipline, has flourished over the past two decades. This collection of new essays by twelve distinguished philosophers of religion explores three broad themes: religious attitudes of faith, belief, acceptance, and love; human and divine freedom; and the rationality of religious belief. Contributors include: William Alston, Robert Audi, Jan Cover, Martin Curd, Peter van Inwagen, Norman Kretzmann, George Nakhnikian, John Hawthorne, Philip Quinn, James Ross, Eleonore Stump, and William Wainwright.
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Is evil evidence against the existence of God? Even if God and evil are compatible, it remains hotly contested whether evil renders belief in God unreasonable. The Evidential Argument from Evil presents five classic statements on this... more
Is evil evidence against the existence of God? Even if God and evil are compatible, it remains hotly contested whether evil renders belief in God unreasonable. The Evidential Argument from Evil presents five classic statements on this issue by eminent philosophers and theologians and places them in dialogue with eleven original essays reflecting new thinking by these and other scholars. The volume focuses on two versions of the argument. The first affirms that there is no reason for God to permit either certain specific horrors or the variety and profusion of undeserved suffering. The second asserts that pleasure and pain, given their biological role, are better explained by hypotheses other than theism.
Contributors include William P. Alston, Paul Draper, Richard M. Gale, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Alvin Plantinga, William L. Rowe, Bruce Russell, Eleonore Stump, Richard G. Swinburne, Peter van Inwagen, and Stephen John Wykstra.
Contributors include William P. Alston, Paul Draper, Richard M. Gale, Daniel Howard-Snyder, Alvin Plantinga, William L. Rowe, Bruce Russell, Eleonore Stump, Richard G. Swinburne, Peter van Inwagen, and Stephen John Wykstra.
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A descriptive polytheist thinks there are at least two gods. John Hick and Richard Swinburne are descriptive polytheists. In this respect, they are like Thomas Aquinas and many other theists. What sets Swinburne and Hick apart from... more
A descriptive polytheist thinks there are at least two gods. John Hick and Richard Swinburne are descriptive polytheists. In this respect, they are like Thomas Aquinas and many other theists. What sets Swinburne and Hick apart from Aquinas, however, is that unlike him they are normative polytheists. That is, Swinburne and Hick think that it is right that we, or at least some of us, worship more than one god. However, the evidence available to me shows that only Swinburne, and not Hick, is a cultic polytheist: he actually worships more than one god. I conclude that only Swinburne is a polytheist par excellence.
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... Kretzmann suggests, however, that the following vol-umes of the Summa Contra Gentiles supply the identifying link between something being the single universal and ultimate explanation of what exists and ... Jane: Go out and see... more
... Kretzmann suggests, however, that the following vol-umes of the Summa Contra Gentiles supply the identifying link between something being the single universal and ultimate explanation of what exists and ... Jane: Go out and see what's making that noise in the kitchen. ...
Research Interests: Philosophy, Epistemology, Materialism, Faith, Rationality, and 4 moreFreedom, Theism, existence of God, and Rowe
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It is commonly said that Darwinian evolution conflicts with theistic religion. Those who say such things often have in mind claims that are peripheral to theistic religion, for example, the claim that God created the earth about 6,000... more
It is commonly said that Darwinian evolution conflicts with theistic religion. Those who say such things often have in mind claims that are peripheral to theistic religion, for example, the claim that God created the earth about 6,000 years ago or the claim that God directly created each species. I have no interest in the thesis that Darwinian evolution conflicts with these peripheral claims. I do have an interest, however, in the thesis that Darwinian evolution conflicts with claims that are central to theistic religion. Among those who say that Darwinian evolution conflicts with claims central to theistic religion, we find those who say that it is incompatible with them and those who say that, although there is no incompatibility, evolution nevertheless provides significant evidence against them. In this essay, I will focus on the second group.1 More narrowly, I will focus on Paul Draper’s argument for this conclusion.2
Can fictionalists have faith? It all depends on how we disambiguate ‘fictionalists’ and on what faith is. I consider the matter in light of my own theory. After clarifying its central terms, I distinguish two fictionalists – atheistic and... more
Can fictionalists have faith? It all depends on how we disambiguate ‘fictionalists’ and on what faith is. I consider the matter in light of my own theory. After clarifying its central terms, I distinguish two fictionalists – atheistic and agnostic – and I argue that, even though no atheistic fictionalist can have faith on my theory, agnostic fictionalists arguably can. After rejecting Finlay Malcolm's reasons for thinking this is a problem, I use his paradigmatic agnostic fictionalist as a foil to explore a variety of ways in which to describe agnostic fictionalists, none of whom pose a problem for my theory.
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In my contribution to the symposium on Teresa Morgan's Roman Faith and Christian Faith, I set the stage for three questions. First, in the Graeco-Roman view, when you put/maintain faith in someone, is the cognitive aspect of your... more
In my contribution to the symposium on Teresa Morgan's Roman Faith and Christian Faith, I set the stage for three questions. First, in the Graeco-Roman view, when you put/maintain faith in someone, is the cognitive aspect of your faith compatible with scepticism about the relevant propositions? Second, did some of the New Testament authors think that one could put/maintain faith in God while being sceptical about the relevant propositions? Third, in her private writings, Saint Teresa of Calcutta described herself as living by faith and yet not believing; even so, by all appearances, she was an exemplar of faith in God. Would people during the period of your study tend to see her as an exemplar of faith in God?
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A particular belief of a person is basic just in case it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs or the interrelations of their contents; a person's belief is nonbasic just in... more
A particular belief of a person is basic just in case it is epistemically justified and it owes its justification to something other than her other beliefs or the interrelations of their contents; a person's belief is nonbasic just in case it is epistemically justified but not basic. Traditional Foundationalism says that, first, if a human being has a nonbasic belief, then, at bottom, it owes its justification to at least one basic belief, and second, there are basic beliefs. Call the second thesis Minimal Foundationalism. In this essay, we assess three arguments against Minimal Foundationalism which we find in recent work of Peter Klein and Ernest Sosa.
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The fact that God is worthy of thanks and praise for his good acts underwrites the rationality of our practice of offering prayers of thanksgiving and praise for those acts. Here, however, a puzzle arises: If God is essentially... more
The fact that God is worthy of thanks and praise for his good acts underwrites the rationality of our practice of offering prayers of thanksgiving and praise for those acts. Here, however, a puzzle arises: If God is essentially unsurpassably good, then he is unable to do something worse in place of his good acts, and if God is unable
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Can faith be valuable and, if so, under what conditions? We know of no theory-neutral way to address this question. So, we offer a theory of relational faith, and we supplement it with a complementary theory of relational faithfulness. We... more
Can faith be valuable and, if so, under what conditions? We know of no theory-neutral way to address this question. So, we offer a theory of relational faith, and we supplement it with a complementary theory of relational faithfulness. We then turn to relationships of mutual faith and faithfulness with an eye toward exhibiting some of the ways in which, on our theory, faith and faithfulness can be valuable and disvaluable. We then extend the theory to other manifestations of faith and faithfulness, propose a way to unify them under a theory of faith and faithfulness simpliciter, and sketch how they can be neo-Aristotelian virtues and vices. We close with our solution to the value problem and avenues for further research.
Research Interests: Religion, Psychology, Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophy Of Religion, and 13 moreTheology, New Testament, Systematic Theology, Trust, Psychology of Religion, Biblical Theology, Analytic Philosophy of Religion, Faith, Analytic Theology, Hebrew Bible/Old Testament, Trustworthiness, Faithfulness, and Philosophy of Religion
Abstract: A descriptive polytheist thinks there are at least two gods. John Hick and Richard Swinburne are descriptive polytheists. In this respect, they are like Thomas Aquinas and many other theists. What sets Swinburne and Hick apart... more
Abstract: A descriptive polytheist thinks there are at least two gods. John Hick and Richard Swinburne are descriptive polytheists. In this respect, they are like Thomas Aquinas and many other theists. What sets Swinburne and Hick apart from Aquinas, however, is that unlike him they are normative polytheists. That is, Swinburne and Hick think that it is right that we, or at least some of us, worship more than one god. However, the evidence available to me shows that only Swinburne, and not Hick, is a cultic polytheist: he actually worships more than one god. I conclude that only Swinburne is a polytheist par excellence.
Research Interests: Christianity, Religious Pluralism, Trinity, God, Richard Swinburne, and 7 morePolytheism, John Hick, Key words, Monotheism, Theism, The Real, and Gods
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Do we rightly expect a perfectly loving God to bring it about that, right now, we reasonably believe that He exists? It seems so. For love at its best desires the well-being of the beloved, not from a distance, but up close, explicitly... more
Do we rightly expect a perfectly loving God to bring it about that, right now, we reasonably believe that He exists? It seems so. For love at its best desires the well-being of the beloved, not from a distance, but up close, explicitly participating in her life in a personal fashion, allowing her to draw from that relationship what she may need to flourish. But why suppose that we would be significantly better off were God to engage in an explicit, personal relationship with us? Well, first, there would be broadly moral benefits. We would be able to draw on the resources of that relationship to overcome seemingly ever present flaws in our character. And we would be more likely to emulate the self-giving love with which we were loved. So loved, we would be more likely to flourish as human beings. Second, there would be experiential benefits. We would be, for example, more likely to experience peace and joy stemming from the strong conviction that we were properly related to our Maker...
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Panmetaphoricism is the view that our speech about God can only be metaphorical. In this article, I do not assess the reasons that have been given for it; rather, I aim to understand what it says and, thereby, to gain a clearer view of... more
Panmetaphoricism is the view that our speech about God can only be metaphorical. In this article, I do not assess the reasons that have been given for it; rather, I aim to understand what it says and, thereby, to gain a clearer view of the God it offers.
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Research Interests: Psychology and Humility
Many theistic religions place a high value on faith in God and some traditions regard it as a virtue. However, philosophers commonly assign either very little value to faith in God or significant negative value, or even view it as a vice.... more
Many theistic religions place a high value on faith in God and some traditions regard it as a virtue. However, philosophers commonly assign either very little value to faith in God or significant negative value, or even view it as a vice. Progress in assessing whether and when faith in God can be valuable or disvaluable, virtuous or vicious, rational or irrational, or otherwise apt or inapt requires understanding what faith in God is. This Special Issue on the normative appraisal of faith in God for Religious Studies includes nine articles, from a diverse range of perspectives, which explore issues related to the core questions 'What is faith in God?' and 'What normative questions about faith in God need to be addressed?' In this Introduction, we briefly introduce each article.
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We assess John Bishop's theory of the nature of Christian faith in God, as most recently expressed in ‘Reasonable Faith and Reasonable Fideism’, although we dip into other writings as well. We explain several concerns we have about... more
We assess John Bishop's theory of the nature of Christian faith in God, as most recently expressed in ‘Reasonable Faith and Reasonable Fideism’, although we dip into other writings as well. We explain several concerns we have about it. However, in the end, our reflections lead us to propose a modified theory, one that avoids our concerns while remaining consonant with some of his guiding thoughts about the nature of Christian faith in God. We also briefly examine three normative issues Bishop's views present.
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Many people deny that evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. After all, they say, the grounds for belief in God are much better than the evidence for atheism, including the evidence provided by evil. We... more
Many people deny that evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. After all, they say, the grounds for belief in God are much better than the evidence for atheism, including the evidence provided by evil. We will not join their ranks on this occasion. Rather, we wish to consider the proposition that, setting aside grounds for belief in God and relying only on the background knowledge shared in common by nontheists and theists, evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. Our aim is to argue against this proposition. We recognize that in doing so, we face a formidable challenge. It’s one thing to say that evil presents a reason for atheism that is, ultimately, overridden by arguments for theism. It’s another to say that it doesn’t so much as provide us with a reason for atheism in the first place. In order to make this latter claim seem initially more plausible, consider the apparent design of the mammalian eye or the apparent fine-tuning of the universe to support life. These are often proposed as reasons to believe in theism. Critics commonly argue not merely that these supposed reasons for theism are overridden by arguments for atheism but rather that they aren’t good reasons for theism in the first place. Our parallel proposal with respect to evil and atheism is, initially at least, no less plausible than this proposal with respect to apparent design and theism. We begin by laying out what we will refer to as ‘the basic argument’ for the conclusion that grounds for belief in God aside, evil does not make belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism: I. Grounds for belief in God aside, evil makes belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism only if somebody has a good argument that displays how evil makes atheism more likely than theism. II. Nobody has a good argument that displays how evil makes atheism more likely than theism. III. So, grounds for belief in God aside, evil does not make belief in atheism more reasonable for us than belief in theism. (from I & II) Before we get down to work, we need to address several preliminary questions.
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How not to render an explanatory version of the evidential argument from evil immune to skeptical theism