Papers in Dutch by Woudenberg, R. van
Opiniestuk in NRC
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In dit artikel betogen we dat ook atheïsten geloven. Hiermee nemen we stelling tegenover denkers ... more In dit artikel betogen we dat ook atheïsten geloven. Hiermee nemen we stelling tegenover denkers die dit een bevreemdende gedachte vinden en die beweren dat wie zoiets betoogt het begrip ‘geloof’ op ongeoorloofde wijze oprekt en dat het verkeerd, ongepast, misleidend of anderszins deplorabel is om te zeggen dat ook de ongelovige gelooft.
Teneinde aannemelijk te maken dat atheïsten en ongelovigen inderdaad geloven analyseren we de noties ‘geloven’ en ‘ongeloof’, waarbij ‘een analyse van een notie’ een specificatie is van de betekenis van die notie. Gebruikmakend van deze analyses betogen we tenslotte dat ook een ongelovige een gelovige is. We gaan daarbij in op een aantal uitingen van geloof gedaan door ongelovigen, zoals die te vinden zijn in het boek Leven zonder God. Elf interviews over ongeloof (Visser 2003).
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In dit artikel geven wij een reactie op het artikel van Herman Philipse "Godsgeloof in het tijdpe... more In dit artikel geven wij een reactie op het artikel van Herman Philipse "Godsgeloof in het tijdperk van wetenschap: Een
epistemologisch drama", dat een reactie is op ons eerdere artikel "Het disjunctieve atheïsme van Herman Philipse". We gaan onder anderen in op zijn bezwaar dat het niet fair is zijn argumenten aan academische criteria te onderwerpen.
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Papers by Woudenberg, R. van
F1000Research, 2019
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This paper deals with Dooyeweerd&... more This paper deals with Dooyeweerd's radical thesis, i.e., his thesis that reason necessarily has a 'religious root' (radix = root). This thesis was Dooyeweerd's main justification for his own religious philosophy. First I argue that the arguments Dooyeweerd puts forward do not warrant his radical thesis. Secondly, I argue that Dooyeweerd's thesis itself is ambivalent between the theses (i) that
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The Review of Metaphysics, Sep 1, 2014
This PAPER AIMS TO THROW LIGHT on what predicative expressions like "is a(n)--truth," w... more This PAPER AIMS TO THROW LIGHT on what predicative expressions like "is a(n)--truth," where an adjective is inserted on the line, mean. It aims to do so by unearthing a framework that specifies (i) various items that can be qualified by the adjectives, as well as (ii) various ways in which the adjectives perform their qualifying function. This framework forms the background against which, in the second half of this paper, the meaning of "is a relative truth" and "is an absolute truth" are studied. This paper, then, studies what alethic adjectives mean and how they work. I We use numerous alethic adjectives, that is, adjectives to fill the slot in the predicative expression "is a(n)--truth." Here is a sampling that includes some of the philosophically more interesting ones: "psychological," "historical," "logical"; "necessary," "contingent"; "a priori," "empirical," "revealed," "self-evident"; "literal," "metaphorical"; "objective," and "subjective"; "exclusive," "inclusive"; "relative," "absolute." Some of the philosophically less interesting ones are "important," "trivial," "shocking." Predicative expressions with alethic adjectives are often transformable or translatable into expressions with alethic adverbs, without change of meaning. "P is psychologically true," for instance, seems just another way of saying that "P is a psychological truth." For convenience's sake I will refer to both types of expressions as "AT-expressions" ("A" for adjective/adverb and "T" for truth/true). In the main, however, I will conduct the discussion in terms of alethic adjectives. The questions to be explored in this paper are what AT-expressions mean and how their meaning is to be understood. Since the meaning of an expression can be approached in terms of its intension as well as its extension, I should indicate that my question regards the intension of AT-expressions. (1) In the next section I shall develop a list that specifies a number of different items that alethic adjectives (and adverbs) are capable of qualifying. This list forms the backdrop against which next an illumination of the meaning of "is a relative truth" and "is an absolute truth" is attempted. For their widespread use notwithstanding, these expressions are dark and badly in need of either illumination or elimination. First, however, I will have to deal with some preliminaries and assumptions. AT-expressions contain the notion of "a truth." But what is a truth? I will follow G. E. Moore's lead and take a truth to be a proposition that is true. (2) I am going to use the plausible distinction between a proposition and a sentence that expresses that proposition. A proposition is a nonlinguistic entity that is distinct from but capable of being expressed by a sentence (which is a linguistic entity, that is, an item belonging to a language). (3) This distinction is closely related to another plausible distinction, namely, between what is said and the manner of saying it. (4) Connected with this plausible distinction is the idea that propositions, and not sentences, are the primary bearers of truth value. My interest in this paper concerns AT-expressions as used in everyday life as well as in science. A number of philosophers have argued, there are good reasons to consider, in those contexts, propositions and not sentences as the primary bearers of truth value. (5) It is not meaningless, however, to say that sentences have truth value. On the approach premised by the assumption now under discussion, however, sentences can only be considered true or false derivatively: their truth value derives from the truth value of the propositions they express. For present purposes we need not take a stance as to the ontological status of propositions. (6) What I am going to say in this paper is compatible with any of these views, provided they allow for the plausible distinction referred to earlier on. "A truth," then, is a proposition that is true. …
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... The author of several articles on Reid's moral philosophy and in contemporary me... more ... The author of several articles on Reid's moral philosophy and in contemporary metaethics, he is also the editor of Religion in the Liberal Polity ... arti-cles in epistemology, he is the author of Putting Skeptics in Their Place (2000) and the editor of Reading Sosa (forthcoming) and ...
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Understanding Religion and Science : Introducing the Debate
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Ratio, 1995
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Faith and Philosophy, 2014
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Le pluralisme religieux pose des problemes aux chretiens. Dans la premiere partie, l'A. montr... more Le pluralisme religieux pose des problemes aux chretiens. Dans la premiere partie, l'A. montre que ce probleme trouve sa source dans les verites affirmees par les chretiens. La seconde partie critique la proposition de J. Hick qui consiste a interpreter les verites religieuses d'une maniere kantienne. La troisieme tente de savoir si l'exclusivisme chretien doit etre rejete a partir de fondements moraux. L'A. affirme qu'il ne peut en etre question. La derniere partie propose une interpretation de la theologie calvinienne de J. H. Bavink et J. Verkuyl. Ontologiquement, cette theologie est exclusiviste, mais inclusiviste du point de vue soteriologique
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Rene van Woudenberg Engagement with skeptical problems, as a means of resisting skepticism, may t... more Rene van Woudenberg Engagement with skeptical problems, as a means of resisting skepticism, may take various forms. First, one may try to convince skeptics that their skeptical conclusion is false. Second, one may try to identify certain assumptions underlying the skeptical argument that may initially seem unobjectionable but that cannot withstand close scrutiny. Third, one may try to take up the skeptical challenge and offer an argument for the denial of the skeptical conclusion, or for the weaker thesis that it is not irresponsible or irrational to accept the denial of the skeptical conclusion. I call these engagements convincing the skeptic, exposing the skeptical argument, and countervailing the skeptical conclusion, respectively. In this chapter, I will review Thomas Reid’s engagement with skeptics and skepticism under these three headings. Before starting out, I first provide some basic information about Reid, and next reflect on the interrelations between the three forms of...
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Papers in Dutch by Woudenberg, R. van
Teneinde aannemelijk te maken dat atheïsten en ongelovigen inderdaad geloven analyseren we de noties ‘geloven’ en ‘ongeloof’, waarbij ‘een analyse van een notie’ een specificatie is van de betekenis van die notie. Gebruikmakend van deze analyses betogen we tenslotte dat ook een ongelovige een gelovige is. We gaan daarbij in op een aantal uitingen van geloof gedaan door ongelovigen, zoals die te vinden zijn in het boek Leven zonder God. Elf interviews over ongeloof (Visser 2003).
epistemologisch drama", dat een reactie is op ons eerdere artikel "Het disjunctieve atheïsme van Herman Philipse". We gaan onder anderen in op zijn bezwaar dat het niet fair is zijn argumenten aan academische criteria te onderwerpen.
Papers by Woudenberg, R. van
Teneinde aannemelijk te maken dat atheïsten en ongelovigen inderdaad geloven analyseren we de noties ‘geloven’ en ‘ongeloof’, waarbij ‘een analyse van een notie’ een specificatie is van de betekenis van die notie. Gebruikmakend van deze analyses betogen we tenslotte dat ook een ongelovige een gelovige is. We gaan daarbij in op een aantal uitingen van geloof gedaan door ongelovigen, zoals die te vinden zijn in het boek Leven zonder God. Elf interviews over ongeloof (Visser 2003).
epistemologisch drama", dat een reactie is op ons eerdere artikel "Het disjunctieve atheïsme van Herman Philipse". We gaan onder anderen in op zijn bezwaar dat het niet fair is zijn argumenten aan academische criteria te onderwerpen.
This collection of essays debates the tenability of common sense in the face of recent challenges from the empirical sciences. It explores to what extent scientific considerations—rather than philosophical considerations—put pressure on common sense philosophy. The book is structured in a way that promotes dialogue between philosophers and scientists. Noah Lemos, one of the most influential contemporary advocates of the common sense tradition, begins with an overview of the nature and scope of common sense beliefs, and examines philosophical objections to common sense and its relationship to scientific beliefs. Then, the volume features essays by scientists and philosophers of science who discuss various proposed conflicts between commonsensical and scientific beliefs: the reality of space and time, about the nature of human beings, about free will and identity, about rationality, about morality, and about religious belief. Notable philosophers who embrace the common sense tradition respond to these essays to explore the connection between common sense philosophy and contemporary debates in evolutionary biology, neuroscience, physics, and psychology.