Obesity has been pointed out as one of the main current health risks leading to calls for a so-ca... more Obesity has been pointed out as one of the main current health risks leading to calls for a so-called "war on obesity". As we show in this paper, activities that attempt to counter obesity by persuading people to adjust a specific behavior often employ a pedagogy of regret and disgust. Nowadays, however, public healthcare campaigns that aim to tackle obesity have often replaced or augmented the explicit negative depictions of obesity and/or excessive food intake with the positive promotion of healthy food items. In this paper, we draw on a phenomenological perspective on disgust to highlight that food-related disgust is connected to the character and behavior of a perceived individual even in the context of promoting healthy food items. We argue that the focus on "making the healthy food choice the easy choice" might be an important step towards the de-stigmatization of people that are affected by obesity. However, so we suggest, this focus threatens to bring back an image of individuals affected by obesity as disgusting "through the backdoor". It does so not by portraying bodies with overweight as disgusting, but instead by implying that lifestyle choices, character and habits of people that are affected by obesity are markers of a lack of control. We argue that the close relationship between disgust and the perception of self-control in the context of obesity should be taken into consideration in the context of assessing the implications of new health promotion strategies to minimize the risk of stigmatizing people.
Brain imaging technologies are increasingly used to find networks and brain regions that are spec... more Brain imaging technologies are increasingly used to find networks and brain regions that are specific to the functional realization of particular aspects of the self. In this paper, we aim to show how neuroscientific research and techniques could be used in the context of self- formation without treating them as representations of an inner realm. To do so, we show first how a Cartesian framework underlies the interpretation and usage of brain imaging tech- nologies as functional evidence. To illustrate how material-technological inventions and developments can have a significant and lasting impact on views of the self, we show how this framework was influenced by another technology: the camera obscura. Subsequently, we show that brain imaging technologies challenge the idea that privileged access to the self can be obtained merely through introspection, indicating a strong discontinuity between the Cartesian and the current neuroscientific framework. Building on these insights, we reframe the self in terms of self-formation. This view neither regards the brain as an independent realizer of aspects of the self, nor assumes that self-knowledge can be obtained through introspection. From this perspective, self-formation is realized through critical self-identifi- cation: instead of offering representational knowledge of an ‘inner self,’ the potential use of brain imaging technologies within this framework lies in their capacity to offer what we call ‘extrospective knowledge’ that pragmatically can contribute to self-formation. Brain imag- ing technologies contribute to this process because they foreground our neurophysiology, which helps to critically integrate biological aspects into self-formation.
Rationale: This paper aims to show how the focus on eradicating bias from Machine Learning decisi... more Rationale: This paper aims to show how the focus on eradicating bias from Machine Learning decision-support systems in medical diagnosis diverts attention from the hermeneutic nature of medical decision-making and the productive role of bias. We want to show how an introduction of Machine Learning systems alters the diagnostic process. Reviewing the negative conception of bias and incorporating the mediating role of Machine Learning systems in the medical diagnosis are essential for an encompassing, critical and informed medical decision-making.
Methods: This paper presents a philosophical analysis, employing the conceptual frameworks of hermeneutics and technological mediation, while drawing on the case of Machine Learning algorithms assisting doctors in diagnosis. This paper unravels the non-neutral role of algorithms in the doctor's decision-making and points to the dialogical nature of interaction not only with the patients but also with the technologies that co-shape the diagnosis.
Findings: Following the hermeneutical model of medical diagnosis, we review the notion of bias to show how it is an inalienable and productive part of diagnosis. We show how Machine Learning biases join the human ones to actively shape the diagnostic process, simultaneously expanding and narrowing medical attention, highlighting certain aspects, while disclosing others, thus mediating medical perceptions and actions. Based on that, we demonstrate how doctors can take Machine Learning systems on board for an enhanced medical diagnosis, while being aware of their non-neutral role.
Conclusions: We show that Machine Learning systems join doctors and patients in co-designing a triad of medical diagnosis. We highlight that it is imperative to examine the hermeneutic role of the Machine Learning systems. Additionally, we suggest including not only the patient, but also colleagues to ensure an encompassing diagnostic process, to respect its inherently hermeneutic nature and to work productively with the existing human and machine biases.
Proceedings: Publication of The Society for Phenomenology and Media Vol. 6, 2019, 2019
In this paper, I will critically discuss the validity of the assumption that the simple presence ... more In this paper, I will critically discuss the validity of the assumption that the simple presence of brain scans leads to an uncritical acceptance of neuroscientific explanations of human behavior, and to what extent developing a critical stance towards brain scans is necessary to create neuroscience literacy among citizens. More specifically, I attempt, inspired by postphenomenology and the epistemology of Gaston Bachelard, to explore what a neuroscience literacy might encompass. As will become clear, this requires not to develop a critical stance towards brain scans per se, but more generally to the concepts used in the neurosciences and their relation to everyday life. Firstly, I give an overview of sociological and social psychological studies addressing how an uncritical stance towards neuroscientific explanations among 'the' lay public comes into being, and how brain scans function within this process. Secondly, I will give a postphenomenological explanation for the potential suggestiveness of brain scans. Thirdly, I turn to the epistemology of Gaston Bachelard in order to analyze how brain imaging technologies shape-and change-neuroscientific concepts and their relation to the lifeworld. Fourthly, I show how understanding the processes through which neuroscientific concepts are constituted creates a starting-point for understanding how neuroscientific explanations can be interpreted in a coherent (i.e., literate) manner. To conclude with, I suggest that neuroscience literacy suggests to become critically aware of the hermeneutic processes through which the unproblematic transfer from the concepts within neuroscientific practices to the domain of everyday life is made.
In current phenomenology of medicine, health is often understood as a state of transparency in wh... more In current phenomenology of medicine, health is often understood as a state of transparency in which our body refrains from being an object of explicit attention. In this paper, I argue that such an understanding of health unnecessarily presupposes an overly harmonious alignment between subjective and objective body, resulting in the idea that our health remains phenomenologically inaccessible. Alternatively, I suggest that there are many occasions in which one's body in health does become an object of attention, and that technologies mediate how a relation with one's body is formed. First, I show prominent accounts in current phenomenology of medicine understand health in terms of a harmonious alignment between objective and subjective body. Second, I argue that there are many occasions in which there is a disharmony between objective and subjective body, and suggest that also in health, we cannot escape being an object that we often relate to. Then, I draw on postphenomenology to show how technologies such as digital self-tracking applications and digital twins can be understood as mediating the relationship with one's own body in a specific way. In conclusion, I argue that both technologies make present the objective body as a site for hermeneutic inquiry such that it can be interacted with in terms of health parameters. Furthermore, I point to some relevant differences in how different technologies make aspects of our own body phenomenologically present.
Brain imaging technologies are increasingly used to find networks and brain regions that are spec... more Brain imaging technologies are increasingly used to find networks and brain regions that are specific to the functional realization of particular aspects of the self. In this paper, we aim to show how neuroscientific research and techniques could be used in the context of self-formation without treating them as representations of an inner realm. To do so, we show first how a Cartesian framework underlies the interpretation and usage of brain imaging technologies as functional evidence. To illustrate how material-technological inventions and developments can have a significant and lasting impact on views of the self, we show how this framework was influenced by another technology: the camera obscura. Subsequently, we show that brain imaging technologies challenge the idea that privileged access to the self can be obtained merely through introspection, indicating a strong discontinuity between the Cartesian and the current neuroscientific framework. Building on these insights, we reframe the self in terms of self-formation. This view neither regards the brain as an independent realizer of aspects of the self, nor assumes that self-knowledge can be obtained through introspection. From this perspective, self-formation is realized through critical self-identification: instead of offering representational knowledge of an 'inner self,' the potential use of brain imaging technologies within this framework lies in their capacity to offer what we call 'extrospective knowledge' that pragmatically can contribute to self-formation. Brain imaging technologies contribute to this process because they foreground our neurophysiology, which helps to critically integrate biological aspects into self-formation.
Two of the main approaches of what is often referred to as the ‘empirical philosophy of technolog... more Two of the main approaches of what is often referred to as the ‘empirical philosophy of technology’ are postphenomenology and critical constructivism. Critical constructivists charge postphenomenologists for paying too little attention to the fact that our society is co-constituted not only by technologies, but also by forms of rationality exercised on a political level. Postphenomenologists, then, charge critical constructivism for insufficiently recognizing that the way technologies are appropriated in the lifeworld often evades forms of institutionalized rationality. The goal of this paper is to show how these different approaches should not be juxtaposed, but can better be seen as complementary in the development of a political philosophy of technology. This will be made clear through a discussion of the role of STS in the work of Peter-Paul Verbeek, and in the work of Andrew Feenberg. I suggest that developing an ‘empirically informed’ political philosophy of technology requires to both recognize how technologies constitute particular forms of subjectivity and to understand the rational processes through which particular technologies are designed. When combining both of these insights, it becomes possible to articulate a normative position with regard to technological developments.
An important development within cognitive neuroscience is the use of Non-Invasive Brain Stimulati... more An important development within cognitive neuroscience is the use of Non-Invasive Brain Stimulation (NIBS), a technique which holds the promise of establishing causal relationships between brain processes and cognitive processes. However, NIBS does not allow researchers to observe neurophysiological processes, and must be coupled with imaging technologies such as Electroencephalography (EEG) for the visualization of neurophysiological change. Technologies such as NIBS and EEG are not neutral intermediaries between scientists and the world, but actively mediate the reality that scientists investigate. How these technologies shape the objects of neuroscientific study becomes clear when analyzing real-life conversations between neuroscientists researching visual attention. During the constitution of visual attention, neuroscientists need to manage a tension between the epistemic norms of ‘causality’ and ‘reality’, and how this tension is managed differs when different technologies are used. In the case of NIBS, the tension between reality and causality is managed in terms of the relation between experimental results obtained within the laboratory and the ‘real’ world outside of the laboratory. When NIBS and EEG are combined, neuroscientist orient to the norms of causality and reality in a different way: now, the reality of the causality obtained within scientific experiments needs to managed. This indicates that neuroscientists cannot straightforwardly assume the causal efficacy of the brain on human behavior. Instead, the coming into being of neuroscientific objects such as visual attention is both dependent on technological mediations and on how the tension between the norms of ‘causality’ and ‘reality’ is managed.
Death determination has since long been a topic of intensive technoscientific and medical involve... more Death determination has since long been a topic of intensive technoscientific and medical involvement. Due to advances in 20th century medical technology, the distinction between life and death has become less evident. Ambiguities appear when we start to use life-support technologies in order to save lives, bringing about ‘tragic artifacts’ such as brain death and persistent vegetative state. In this paper we ask how this technoscientific and medical involvement shapes our understanding of death. We provide an overview of medical literature that has appeared on (brain) death determination, highlighting thereby the role that technologies played in its establishment. Subsequently, we develop three philosophical interpretations of technological death determination: With Agamben and Marcuse as the installation of political power; with Don Ihde as an existential choice for the inevitable; and with Jacques Derrida as an encounter with the ineradicable mystery of death. To conclude with, we argue that technological death determination reveals an intrinsic, paradoxical connection between human’s technicity and its ignorance of death.
In this paper, I will explore the relation between science as a rational project and scientific r... more In this paper, I will explore the relation between science as a rational project and scientific research as a human practice. More precisely, I try to answer the question how the ‘rational’ and the ‘practical’ are integrated in scientific practices. The French epistemologist Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) was concerned with a similar question. Bachelard was among the first philosophers that argued that the objects of science are not discovered in an external nature, but are humanly constructed within scientific practices. Yet, rather than reducing the existence of these constructions to practical activities, he was interested if and how we can still understand them in terms of a scientific rationality. The paper is structured as follows: In the introduction, I briefly relate Bachelard’s epistemology to current science studies, and propose to use it as an entry-point to the question how ‘scientific’ and ‘practice’ are interrelated such that something as ‘scientific practice’ is constituted. To answer this question, I firstly show why, according to Bachelard, science can only be realized through an epistemological rupture with our ordinary experience. Secondly, it will be shown how this break is realized in scientific practice by introducing Bachelard’s notion ‘phenomenotechnique’. Thirdly, I show why Bachelard holds that a scientific rationality remains to be assumed within phenomenotechnical constructions. Fourthly, I use Bachelard’s epistemology to show how the scientific object of ‘cognition’ is realized within the cognitive neurosciences. To conclude with, I offer some thoughts of how Bachelard’s epistemology can be of ongoing relevance by showing how it allows to evaluate the different socio-material environments in which science takes place in terms of the interrelation of the practical and the rational within the phenomenotechnique.
The technological mediation approach aspires to complement current Technology Assessment (TA) pra... more The technological mediation approach aspires to complement current Technology Assessment (TA) practices. It aims to do so by addressing ethical concerns from ‘within’ human-technology relations leading to ethical Constructive Technology Assessment (eCTA), as articulated by Kiran, Asle H., Nelly Oudshoorn, and Peter-Paul Verbeek in their 2015 article. In this paper, we problematize this ambition. Firstly, we situate the technological mediation approach in the history of TA. Secondly, as a study into the normativity from ‘within’ human-technology relations, we reveal the phenomenological and existential origins of Verbeek's technological mediation approach. Thirdly, we show that there are two possible readings of this approach: a strong and a weak one. The weak reading can augment current TA practices but is eventually uncommitted to the idea of technological mediation. The strong reading defines a wholly new scope for our engagement with (emerging) technologies but is incompatible with existing TA approaches.
Numerous studies in the fields of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and philosophy of technolo... more Numerous studies in the fields of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and philosophy of technology have repeatedly stressed that scientific practices are collective practices that crucially depend on the presence of scientific technologies. Postphenomenology is one of the movements that aims to draw philosophical conclusions from these observations through an analysis of human–technology interactions in scientific practice. Two other attempts that try to integrate these insights into philosophy of science are Ronald Giere’s Scientific Perspectivism (2006) and Davis Baird’s Thing Knowledge (2004). In this paper, these two approaches will be critically discussed from the perspective of postphenomenology. We will argue that Giere and Baird problematically assume that scientific instruments (a) have a determined function, and (b) that all human members of a scientific collective have immediate access to this function. However, these assumptions also allow them to offer a clear answer to the question how scientists can collectively relate to scientific phenomena. Such an answer is not yet (explicitly) formulated within the postphenomenological perspective. By adding a postphenomenological touch to the semiotic approach in Actor-Network Theory, we offer an account of how different individual human–technology relations are integrated into larger scientific collectives. We do so by showing that scientific instruments not only help constitute scientific phenomena, but also the intersubjectivity within such collectives.
At the beginning of the 20th century, social sciences were institutionalized for the first time. ... more At the beginning of the 20th century, social sciences were institutionalized for the first time. While initially being a part of philosophical thinking, the promise of a scientific, objective interpretation of social phenomena granted social scientists a distinguished place within universities in Germany as well as in the USA. A larger focus on empirical research should guarantee that social science was indeed an independent endeavor, instead of a new form of social philosophy under another name. However, when analyzing the research of social scientists in the early 20th century, it is clear that ideological biases still prevailed and heavily influenced the interpretation of the collected empirical data. In this thesis, the problem of objectivity in social science and its relation to both theory and empirical research is addressed. As a case study, I have used the development of the social research of the members of the Frankfurt School in the period 1923-1950. Starting with a clear call for objectivity, over years it became clear that ideological bias was not easily removed from social science, especially at the background of the emergence and fall of the Weimar Republic and the establishment of the Nazi Regime. In my thesis, I argue that ideologically biased social science is not less empirically or more theoretically orientated than attempts to conduct objective social research, but have different interpretations of what it means to be empirical.
Obesity has been pointed out as one of the main current health risks leading to calls for a so-ca... more Obesity has been pointed out as one of the main current health risks leading to calls for a so-called "war on obesity". As we show in this paper, activities that attempt to counter obesity by persuading people to adjust a specific behavior often employ a pedagogy of regret and disgust. Nowadays, however, public healthcare campaigns that aim to tackle obesity have often replaced or augmented the explicit negative depictions of obesity and/or excessive food intake with the positive promotion of healthy food items. In this paper, we draw on a phenomenological perspective on disgust to highlight that food-related disgust is connected to the character and behavior of a perceived individual even in the context of promoting healthy food items. We argue that the focus on "making the healthy food choice the easy choice" might be an important step towards the de-stigmatization of people that are affected by obesity. However, so we suggest, this focus threatens to bring back an image of individuals affected by obesity as disgusting "through the backdoor". It does so not by portraying bodies with overweight as disgusting, but instead by implying that lifestyle choices, character and habits of people that are affected by obesity are markers of a lack of control. We argue that the close relationship between disgust and the perception of self-control in the context of obesity should be taken into consideration in the context of assessing the implications of new health promotion strategies to minimize the risk of stigmatizing people.
Brain imaging technologies are increasingly used to find networks and brain regions that are spec... more Brain imaging technologies are increasingly used to find networks and brain regions that are specific to the functional realization of particular aspects of the self. In this paper, we aim to show how neuroscientific research and techniques could be used in the context of self- formation without treating them as representations of an inner realm. To do so, we show first how a Cartesian framework underlies the interpretation and usage of brain imaging tech- nologies as functional evidence. To illustrate how material-technological inventions and developments can have a significant and lasting impact on views of the self, we show how this framework was influenced by another technology: the camera obscura. Subsequently, we show that brain imaging technologies challenge the idea that privileged access to the self can be obtained merely through introspection, indicating a strong discontinuity between the Cartesian and the current neuroscientific framework. Building on these insights, we reframe the self in terms of self-formation. This view neither regards the brain as an independent realizer of aspects of the self, nor assumes that self-knowledge can be obtained through introspection. From this perspective, self-formation is realized through critical self-identifi- cation: instead of offering representational knowledge of an ‘inner self,’ the potential use of brain imaging technologies within this framework lies in their capacity to offer what we call ‘extrospective knowledge’ that pragmatically can contribute to self-formation. Brain imag- ing technologies contribute to this process because they foreground our neurophysiology, which helps to critically integrate biological aspects into self-formation.
Rationale: This paper aims to show how the focus on eradicating bias from Machine Learning decisi... more Rationale: This paper aims to show how the focus on eradicating bias from Machine Learning decision-support systems in medical diagnosis diverts attention from the hermeneutic nature of medical decision-making and the productive role of bias. We want to show how an introduction of Machine Learning systems alters the diagnostic process. Reviewing the negative conception of bias and incorporating the mediating role of Machine Learning systems in the medical diagnosis are essential for an encompassing, critical and informed medical decision-making.
Methods: This paper presents a philosophical analysis, employing the conceptual frameworks of hermeneutics and technological mediation, while drawing on the case of Machine Learning algorithms assisting doctors in diagnosis. This paper unravels the non-neutral role of algorithms in the doctor's decision-making and points to the dialogical nature of interaction not only with the patients but also with the technologies that co-shape the diagnosis.
Findings: Following the hermeneutical model of medical diagnosis, we review the notion of bias to show how it is an inalienable and productive part of diagnosis. We show how Machine Learning biases join the human ones to actively shape the diagnostic process, simultaneously expanding and narrowing medical attention, highlighting certain aspects, while disclosing others, thus mediating medical perceptions and actions. Based on that, we demonstrate how doctors can take Machine Learning systems on board for an enhanced medical diagnosis, while being aware of their non-neutral role.
Conclusions: We show that Machine Learning systems join doctors and patients in co-designing a triad of medical diagnosis. We highlight that it is imperative to examine the hermeneutic role of the Machine Learning systems. Additionally, we suggest including not only the patient, but also colleagues to ensure an encompassing diagnostic process, to respect its inherently hermeneutic nature and to work productively with the existing human and machine biases.
Proceedings: Publication of The Society for Phenomenology and Media Vol. 6, 2019, 2019
In this paper, I will critically discuss the validity of the assumption that the simple presence ... more In this paper, I will critically discuss the validity of the assumption that the simple presence of brain scans leads to an uncritical acceptance of neuroscientific explanations of human behavior, and to what extent developing a critical stance towards brain scans is necessary to create neuroscience literacy among citizens. More specifically, I attempt, inspired by postphenomenology and the epistemology of Gaston Bachelard, to explore what a neuroscience literacy might encompass. As will become clear, this requires not to develop a critical stance towards brain scans per se, but more generally to the concepts used in the neurosciences and their relation to everyday life. Firstly, I give an overview of sociological and social psychological studies addressing how an uncritical stance towards neuroscientific explanations among 'the' lay public comes into being, and how brain scans function within this process. Secondly, I will give a postphenomenological explanation for the potential suggestiveness of brain scans. Thirdly, I turn to the epistemology of Gaston Bachelard in order to analyze how brain imaging technologies shape-and change-neuroscientific concepts and their relation to the lifeworld. Fourthly, I show how understanding the processes through which neuroscientific concepts are constituted creates a starting-point for understanding how neuroscientific explanations can be interpreted in a coherent (i.e., literate) manner. To conclude with, I suggest that neuroscience literacy suggests to become critically aware of the hermeneutic processes through which the unproblematic transfer from the concepts within neuroscientific practices to the domain of everyday life is made.
In current phenomenology of medicine, health is often understood as a state of transparency in wh... more In current phenomenology of medicine, health is often understood as a state of transparency in which our body refrains from being an object of explicit attention. In this paper, I argue that such an understanding of health unnecessarily presupposes an overly harmonious alignment between subjective and objective body, resulting in the idea that our health remains phenomenologically inaccessible. Alternatively, I suggest that there are many occasions in which one's body in health does become an object of attention, and that technologies mediate how a relation with one's body is formed. First, I show prominent accounts in current phenomenology of medicine understand health in terms of a harmonious alignment between objective and subjective body. Second, I argue that there are many occasions in which there is a disharmony between objective and subjective body, and suggest that also in health, we cannot escape being an object that we often relate to. Then, I draw on postphenomenology to show how technologies such as digital self-tracking applications and digital twins can be understood as mediating the relationship with one's own body in a specific way. In conclusion, I argue that both technologies make present the objective body as a site for hermeneutic inquiry such that it can be interacted with in terms of health parameters. Furthermore, I point to some relevant differences in how different technologies make aspects of our own body phenomenologically present.
Brain imaging technologies are increasingly used to find networks and brain regions that are spec... more Brain imaging technologies are increasingly used to find networks and brain regions that are specific to the functional realization of particular aspects of the self. In this paper, we aim to show how neuroscientific research and techniques could be used in the context of self-formation without treating them as representations of an inner realm. To do so, we show first how a Cartesian framework underlies the interpretation and usage of brain imaging technologies as functional evidence. To illustrate how material-technological inventions and developments can have a significant and lasting impact on views of the self, we show how this framework was influenced by another technology: the camera obscura. Subsequently, we show that brain imaging technologies challenge the idea that privileged access to the self can be obtained merely through introspection, indicating a strong discontinuity between the Cartesian and the current neuroscientific framework. Building on these insights, we reframe the self in terms of self-formation. This view neither regards the brain as an independent realizer of aspects of the self, nor assumes that self-knowledge can be obtained through introspection. From this perspective, self-formation is realized through critical self-identification: instead of offering representational knowledge of an 'inner self,' the potential use of brain imaging technologies within this framework lies in their capacity to offer what we call 'extrospective knowledge' that pragmatically can contribute to self-formation. Brain imaging technologies contribute to this process because they foreground our neurophysiology, which helps to critically integrate biological aspects into self-formation.
Two of the main approaches of what is often referred to as the ‘empirical philosophy of technolog... more Two of the main approaches of what is often referred to as the ‘empirical philosophy of technology’ are postphenomenology and critical constructivism. Critical constructivists charge postphenomenologists for paying too little attention to the fact that our society is co-constituted not only by technologies, but also by forms of rationality exercised on a political level. Postphenomenologists, then, charge critical constructivism for insufficiently recognizing that the way technologies are appropriated in the lifeworld often evades forms of institutionalized rationality. The goal of this paper is to show how these different approaches should not be juxtaposed, but can better be seen as complementary in the development of a political philosophy of technology. This will be made clear through a discussion of the role of STS in the work of Peter-Paul Verbeek, and in the work of Andrew Feenberg. I suggest that developing an ‘empirically informed’ political philosophy of technology requires to both recognize how technologies constitute particular forms of subjectivity and to understand the rational processes through which particular technologies are designed. When combining both of these insights, it becomes possible to articulate a normative position with regard to technological developments.
An important development within cognitive neuroscience is the use of Non-Invasive Brain Stimulati... more An important development within cognitive neuroscience is the use of Non-Invasive Brain Stimulation (NIBS), a technique which holds the promise of establishing causal relationships between brain processes and cognitive processes. However, NIBS does not allow researchers to observe neurophysiological processes, and must be coupled with imaging technologies such as Electroencephalography (EEG) for the visualization of neurophysiological change. Technologies such as NIBS and EEG are not neutral intermediaries between scientists and the world, but actively mediate the reality that scientists investigate. How these technologies shape the objects of neuroscientific study becomes clear when analyzing real-life conversations between neuroscientists researching visual attention. During the constitution of visual attention, neuroscientists need to manage a tension between the epistemic norms of ‘causality’ and ‘reality’, and how this tension is managed differs when different technologies are used. In the case of NIBS, the tension between reality and causality is managed in terms of the relation between experimental results obtained within the laboratory and the ‘real’ world outside of the laboratory. When NIBS and EEG are combined, neuroscientist orient to the norms of causality and reality in a different way: now, the reality of the causality obtained within scientific experiments needs to managed. This indicates that neuroscientists cannot straightforwardly assume the causal efficacy of the brain on human behavior. Instead, the coming into being of neuroscientific objects such as visual attention is both dependent on technological mediations and on how the tension between the norms of ‘causality’ and ‘reality’ is managed.
Death determination has since long been a topic of intensive technoscientific and medical involve... more Death determination has since long been a topic of intensive technoscientific and medical involvement. Due to advances in 20th century medical technology, the distinction between life and death has become less evident. Ambiguities appear when we start to use life-support technologies in order to save lives, bringing about ‘tragic artifacts’ such as brain death and persistent vegetative state. In this paper we ask how this technoscientific and medical involvement shapes our understanding of death. We provide an overview of medical literature that has appeared on (brain) death determination, highlighting thereby the role that technologies played in its establishment. Subsequently, we develop three philosophical interpretations of technological death determination: With Agamben and Marcuse as the installation of political power; with Don Ihde as an existential choice for the inevitable; and with Jacques Derrida as an encounter with the ineradicable mystery of death. To conclude with, we argue that technological death determination reveals an intrinsic, paradoxical connection between human’s technicity and its ignorance of death.
In this paper, I will explore the relation between science as a rational project and scientific r... more In this paper, I will explore the relation between science as a rational project and scientific research as a human practice. More precisely, I try to answer the question how the ‘rational’ and the ‘practical’ are integrated in scientific practices. The French epistemologist Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) was concerned with a similar question. Bachelard was among the first philosophers that argued that the objects of science are not discovered in an external nature, but are humanly constructed within scientific practices. Yet, rather than reducing the existence of these constructions to practical activities, he was interested if and how we can still understand them in terms of a scientific rationality. The paper is structured as follows: In the introduction, I briefly relate Bachelard’s epistemology to current science studies, and propose to use it as an entry-point to the question how ‘scientific’ and ‘practice’ are interrelated such that something as ‘scientific practice’ is constituted. To answer this question, I firstly show why, according to Bachelard, science can only be realized through an epistemological rupture with our ordinary experience. Secondly, it will be shown how this break is realized in scientific practice by introducing Bachelard’s notion ‘phenomenotechnique’. Thirdly, I show why Bachelard holds that a scientific rationality remains to be assumed within phenomenotechnical constructions. Fourthly, I use Bachelard’s epistemology to show how the scientific object of ‘cognition’ is realized within the cognitive neurosciences. To conclude with, I offer some thoughts of how Bachelard’s epistemology can be of ongoing relevance by showing how it allows to evaluate the different socio-material environments in which science takes place in terms of the interrelation of the practical and the rational within the phenomenotechnique.
The technological mediation approach aspires to complement current Technology Assessment (TA) pra... more The technological mediation approach aspires to complement current Technology Assessment (TA) practices. It aims to do so by addressing ethical concerns from ‘within’ human-technology relations leading to ethical Constructive Technology Assessment (eCTA), as articulated by Kiran, Asle H., Nelly Oudshoorn, and Peter-Paul Verbeek in their 2015 article. In this paper, we problematize this ambition. Firstly, we situate the technological mediation approach in the history of TA. Secondly, as a study into the normativity from ‘within’ human-technology relations, we reveal the phenomenological and existential origins of Verbeek's technological mediation approach. Thirdly, we show that there are two possible readings of this approach: a strong and a weak one. The weak reading can augment current TA practices but is eventually uncommitted to the idea of technological mediation. The strong reading defines a wholly new scope for our engagement with (emerging) technologies but is incompatible with existing TA approaches.
Numerous studies in the fields of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and philosophy of technolo... more Numerous studies in the fields of Science and Technology Studies (STS) and philosophy of technology have repeatedly stressed that scientific practices are collective practices that crucially depend on the presence of scientific technologies. Postphenomenology is one of the movements that aims to draw philosophical conclusions from these observations through an analysis of human–technology interactions in scientific practice. Two other attempts that try to integrate these insights into philosophy of science are Ronald Giere’s Scientific Perspectivism (2006) and Davis Baird’s Thing Knowledge (2004). In this paper, these two approaches will be critically discussed from the perspective of postphenomenology. We will argue that Giere and Baird problematically assume that scientific instruments (a) have a determined function, and (b) that all human members of a scientific collective have immediate access to this function. However, these assumptions also allow them to offer a clear answer to the question how scientists can collectively relate to scientific phenomena. Such an answer is not yet (explicitly) formulated within the postphenomenological perspective. By adding a postphenomenological touch to the semiotic approach in Actor-Network Theory, we offer an account of how different individual human–technology relations are integrated into larger scientific collectives. We do so by showing that scientific instruments not only help constitute scientific phenomena, but also the intersubjectivity within such collectives.
At the beginning of the 20th century, social sciences were institutionalized for the first time. ... more At the beginning of the 20th century, social sciences were institutionalized for the first time. While initially being a part of philosophical thinking, the promise of a scientific, objective interpretation of social phenomena granted social scientists a distinguished place within universities in Germany as well as in the USA. A larger focus on empirical research should guarantee that social science was indeed an independent endeavor, instead of a new form of social philosophy under another name. However, when analyzing the research of social scientists in the early 20th century, it is clear that ideological biases still prevailed and heavily influenced the interpretation of the collected empirical data. In this thesis, the problem of objectivity in social science and its relation to both theory and empirical research is addressed. As a case study, I have used the development of the social research of the members of the Frankfurt School in the period 1923-1950. Starting with a clear call for objectivity, over years it became clear that ideological bias was not easily removed from social science, especially at the background of the emergence and fall of the Weimar Republic and the establishment of the Nazi Regime. In my thesis, I argue that ideologically biased social science is not less empirically or more theoretically orientated than attempts to conduct objective social research, but have different interpretations of what it means to be empirical.
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Methods: This paper presents a philosophical analysis, employing the conceptual frameworks of hermeneutics and technological mediation, while drawing on the case of Machine Learning algorithms assisting doctors in diagnosis. This paper unravels the non-neutral role of algorithms in the doctor's decision-making and points to the dialogical nature of interaction not only with the patients but also with the technologies that co-shape the diagnosis.
Findings: Following the hermeneutical model of medical diagnosis, we review the notion of bias to show how it is an inalienable and productive part of diagnosis. We show how Machine Learning biases join the human ones to actively shape the diagnostic process, simultaneously expanding and narrowing medical attention, highlighting certain aspects, while disclosing others, thus mediating medical perceptions and actions. Based on that, we demonstrate how doctors can take Machine Learning systems on board for an enhanced medical diagnosis, while being aware of their non-neutral role.
Conclusions: We show that Machine Learning systems join doctors and patients in co-designing a triad of medical diagnosis. We highlight that it is imperative to examine the hermeneutic role of the Machine Learning systems. Additionally, we suggest including not only the patient, but also colleagues to ensure an encompassing diagnostic process, to respect its inherently hermeneutic nature and to work productively with the existing human and machine biases.
The paper is structured as follows: In the introduction, I briefly relate Bachelard’s epistemology to current science studies, and propose to use it as an entry-point to the question how ‘scientific’ and ‘practice’ are interrelated such that something as ‘scientific practice’ is constituted. To answer this question, I firstly show why, according to Bachelard, science can only be realized through an epistemological rupture with our ordinary experience. Secondly, it will be shown how this break is realized in scientific practice by introducing Bachelard’s notion ‘phenomenotechnique’. Thirdly, I show why Bachelard holds that a scientific rationality remains to be assumed within phenomenotechnical constructions. Fourthly, I use Bachelard’s epistemology to show how the scientific object of ‘cognition’ is realized within the cognitive neurosciences. To conclude with, I offer some thoughts of how Bachelard’s epistemology can be of ongoing relevance by showing how it allows to evaluate the different socio-material environments in which science takes place in terms of the interrelation of the practical and the rational within the phenomenotechnique.
Methods: This paper presents a philosophical analysis, employing the conceptual frameworks of hermeneutics and technological mediation, while drawing on the case of Machine Learning algorithms assisting doctors in diagnosis. This paper unravels the non-neutral role of algorithms in the doctor's decision-making and points to the dialogical nature of interaction not only with the patients but also with the technologies that co-shape the diagnosis.
Findings: Following the hermeneutical model of medical diagnosis, we review the notion of bias to show how it is an inalienable and productive part of diagnosis. We show how Machine Learning biases join the human ones to actively shape the diagnostic process, simultaneously expanding and narrowing medical attention, highlighting certain aspects, while disclosing others, thus mediating medical perceptions and actions. Based on that, we demonstrate how doctors can take Machine Learning systems on board for an enhanced medical diagnosis, while being aware of their non-neutral role.
Conclusions: We show that Machine Learning systems join doctors and patients in co-designing a triad of medical diagnosis. We highlight that it is imperative to examine the hermeneutic role of the Machine Learning systems. Additionally, we suggest including not only the patient, but also colleagues to ensure an encompassing diagnostic process, to respect its inherently hermeneutic nature and to work productively with the existing human and machine biases.
The paper is structured as follows: In the introduction, I briefly relate Bachelard’s epistemology to current science studies, and propose to use it as an entry-point to the question how ‘scientific’ and ‘practice’ are interrelated such that something as ‘scientific practice’ is constituted. To answer this question, I firstly show why, according to Bachelard, science can only be realized through an epistemological rupture with our ordinary experience. Secondly, it will be shown how this break is realized in scientific practice by introducing Bachelard’s notion ‘phenomenotechnique’. Thirdly, I show why Bachelard holds that a scientific rationality remains to be assumed within phenomenotechnical constructions. Fourthly, I use Bachelard’s epistemology to show how the scientific object of ‘cognition’ is realized within the cognitive neurosciences. To conclude with, I offer some thoughts of how Bachelard’s epistemology can be of ongoing relevance by showing how it allows to evaluate the different socio-material environments in which science takes place in terms of the interrelation of the practical and the rational within the phenomenotechnique.