<p>The notion that human thought is structured like a language, with a precise syntax and s... more <p>The notion that human thought is structured like a language, with a precise syntax and semantics, has been pivotal in recent philosophy of mind. Yet it is not a new idea: it was systematically explored in the fourteenth century by William of Ockham and became central in late medieval philosophy. This book examines the background of Ockham's innovation by tracing the history of the mental language theme in ancient and medieval thought. It shows the various contexts in which the idea was developed, the different uses it was put to, and the networks through which it was transmitted. Two ancient traditions are identified as relevant: one philosophical, stemming from Plato and Aristotle, which led to the emergence of a technical notion of 'internal discourse' in later Greek philosophy; and the other theological, rooted in the Fathers of the Christian Church and reaching its apogee in Augustine in the fifth century A.D. The study then focuses on the merging of the two traditions in the Middle Ages, as they gave rise to detailed discussions over the structure of human thought and its relations with signs and language. And it finally stresses the originality and significance of Ockham's doctrine of the '<italic>oratio mentalis</italic>' (mental discourse) and the strong impression it made upon his immediate successors.</p>
This chapter is dedicated to William of Ockham’s full-fledged theory of mental language. It shows... more This chapter is dedicated to William of Ockham’s full-fledged theory of mental language. It shows how it was first developed on the basis of a reflection on what the objects of knowledge are, Ockham’s answer being that they are mental propositions composed of concepts. The ontological status of concepts is then examined—a question over which Ockham importantly changed his mind over the years. It is then shown how the technical apparatus of grammar and semantics was systematically transposed by Ockham to the fine-grained analysis of thought, with the result that thought itself could now be seen as a compositional semantic system. And finally the Ockhamistic idea that concepts are natural signs is discussed.
This chapter focuses on the use of the idea of mental discourse in Latin medieval philosophy from... more This chapter focuses on the use of the idea of mental discourse in Latin medieval philosophy from the late `eleventh to the mid-thirteenth century. A crucial passage from Anselm of Canterbury is first examined in some details. It is then shown how the idea occurred within a surprising variety of threefold distinctions in quite a number of authors. The notion that the object of grammar as a science is some sort of ‘language in the mind’ (sermo in mente) is also discussed. What comes out is that the Ancient philosophical tradition of the logos endiathetosand the Augustinian tradition of the verbum in mente are now being brought together in various ways and that an important Augustinian distinction between internal discourse properly speaking and the mental representation of spoken words and sentences has become commonly accepted.
Admettons comme hypothèse de travail pour les besoins de la discussion qui va suivre que les juge... more Admettons comme hypothèse de travail pour les besoins de la discussion qui va suivre que les jugements moraux ne sont pas fondés sur des valeurs objectives, sur des propriétés naturelles des choses, des actes ou des hommes, ni sur les volontés d'un Etre supréme quelconque; admettons qu'ils relevènt ultimement de decisions individuelles, que chaque homme est sur le plan logique (mais pas nécessairement au plan des faits) libre de décider des principes en vertu desquels il entend guider sa vie. La question qui se pose est la suivante: ces jugements concernant ma propre vie sont-ils logiquement universalisables? Le sont-ils nécessairement? Le sont-ils parfois et à quelles conditions? En d'autres termes, le fait qu'au plan moral je valorise tel type d'action doit-il m'amener à poser que les autres “devraient” également valoriser le même type d'action? La logique du discours moral me permet-elle de poser des valeurs uniquement pour moi-méme?Ou au contraire le jugement (moral): “je devrais agir de telle façon” entraîne-t-il le locuteur à adhérer à cet autre jugement: “X (ou toute personne), dans des circonstances semblables, devrait (moralement) agir de la même façon”?
Early Christian theologians such as Justin Martyr and Theophilus of Antioch borrowed the philosop... more Early Christian theologians such as Justin Martyr and Theophilus of Antioch borrowed the philosophical idea of internal discourse as a useful wordly comparison for understanding the engendering of the Son by the Father in the divine Trinity. Occurring first in apologetic and polemical writings, this recourse to philosophy became controversial among theologians themselves. Augustine, however, systematically developed the concept of ‘mental word’ in the context of Trinitarian theology and promoted the notion that human thought is a kind of internal speech underlying natural languages and prior to them.
<p>The notion that human thought is structured like a language, with a precise syntax and s... more <p>The notion that human thought is structured like a language, with a precise syntax and semantics, has been pivotal in recent philosophy of mind. Yet it is not a new idea: it was systematically explored in the fourteenth century by William of Ockham and became central in late medieval philosophy. This book examines the background of Ockham's innovation by tracing the history of the mental language theme in ancient and medieval thought. It shows the various contexts in which the idea was developed, the different uses it was put to, and the networks through which it was transmitted. Two ancient traditions are identified as relevant: one philosophical, stemming from Plato and Aristotle, which led to the emergence of a technical notion of 'internal discourse' in later Greek philosophy; and the other theological, rooted in the Fathers of the Christian Church and reaching its apogee in Augustine in the fifth century A.D. The study then focuses on the merging of the two traditions in the Middle Ages, as they gave rise to detailed discussions over the structure of human thought and its relations with signs and language. And it finally stresses the originality and significance of Ockham's doctrine of the '<italic>oratio mentalis</italic>' (mental discourse) and the strong impression it made upon his immediate successors.</p>
This chapter is dedicated to William of Ockham’s full-fledged theory of mental language. It shows... more This chapter is dedicated to William of Ockham’s full-fledged theory of mental language. It shows how it was first developed on the basis of a reflection on what the objects of knowledge are, Ockham’s answer being that they are mental propositions composed of concepts. The ontological status of concepts is then examined—a question over which Ockham importantly changed his mind over the years. It is then shown how the technical apparatus of grammar and semantics was systematically transposed by Ockham to the fine-grained analysis of thought, with the result that thought itself could now be seen as a compositional semantic system. And finally the Ockhamistic idea that concepts are natural signs is discussed.
This chapter focuses on the use of the idea of mental discourse in Latin medieval philosophy from... more This chapter focuses on the use of the idea of mental discourse in Latin medieval philosophy from the late `eleventh to the mid-thirteenth century. A crucial passage from Anselm of Canterbury is first examined in some details. It is then shown how the idea occurred within a surprising variety of threefold distinctions in quite a number of authors. The notion that the object of grammar as a science is some sort of ‘language in the mind’ (sermo in mente) is also discussed. What comes out is that the Ancient philosophical tradition of the logos endiathetosand the Augustinian tradition of the verbum in mente are now being brought together in various ways and that an important Augustinian distinction between internal discourse properly speaking and the mental representation of spoken words and sentences has become commonly accepted.
Admettons comme hypothèse de travail pour les besoins de la discussion qui va suivre que les juge... more Admettons comme hypothèse de travail pour les besoins de la discussion qui va suivre que les jugements moraux ne sont pas fondés sur des valeurs objectives, sur des propriétés naturelles des choses, des actes ou des hommes, ni sur les volontés d'un Etre supréme quelconque; admettons qu'ils relevènt ultimement de decisions individuelles, que chaque homme est sur le plan logique (mais pas nécessairement au plan des faits) libre de décider des principes en vertu desquels il entend guider sa vie. La question qui se pose est la suivante: ces jugements concernant ma propre vie sont-ils logiquement universalisables? Le sont-ils nécessairement? Le sont-ils parfois et à quelles conditions? En d'autres termes, le fait qu'au plan moral je valorise tel type d'action doit-il m'amener à poser que les autres “devraient” également valoriser le même type d'action? La logique du discours moral me permet-elle de poser des valeurs uniquement pour moi-méme?Ou au contraire le jugement (moral): “je devrais agir de telle façon” entraîne-t-il le locuteur à adhérer à cet autre jugement: “X (ou toute personne), dans des circonstances semblables, devrait (moralement) agir de la même façon”?
Early Christian theologians such as Justin Martyr and Theophilus of Antioch borrowed the philosop... more Early Christian theologians such as Justin Martyr and Theophilus of Antioch borrowed the philosophical idea of internal discourse as a useful wordly comparison for understanding the engendering of the Son by the Father in the divine Trinity. Occurring first in apologetic and polemical writings, this recourse to philosophy became controversial among theologians themselves. Augustine, however, systematically developed the concept of ‘mental word’ in the context of Trinitarian theology and promoted the notion that human thought is a kind of internal speech underlying natural languages and prior to them.
by Claude Panaccio, translated by Joshua P. Hochschild and Meredith K. Ziebart (Fordham Universit... more by Claude Panaccio, translated by Joshua P. Hochschild and Meredith K. Ziebart (Fordham University Press, 2017)
Titolo del volume: L'impegno ontologico nella logica medievale / Ontological Commitment in Mediev... more Titolo del volume: L'impegno ontologico nella logica medievale / Ontological Commitment in Medieval Logic, a cura di / edited by Laurent Cesalli, Parwana Emamzadah, Frédéric Goubier. Articoli di: Laurent Cesalli, Ana María Mora-Márquez, Danya Maslov, Claude Panaccio, Ernesto Perini-Santos, Joël Biard, Graziana Ciola, Magali Roques, Davide Riserbato, Gregorio Piaia, Andrea Aldo Robiglio.
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