The aim of this article is to analyze the role of sub-Saharan Africa plays in Iran’s calculations... more The aim of this article is to analyze the role of sub-Saharan Africa plays in Iran’s calculations and foreign and security policy. In turn, several aspects will be analyzed, including the evolution of Iran’s approach towards this sub-region, its significance in Tehran’s geostrategic calculations, and a comparison of assumptions and actual accomplishments. The research hypothesis is that, in recent years, the importance of sub-Saharan Africa has grown in Iranian policymaking (during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency), but the political and economic weakness of this country, as well as the deliberate actions of Saudi Arabia, has drastically limited Iran’s penetration capabilities on the African continent and set the boundaries of African-Iranian rapprochement, especially at the political and military level. As part of the analysis, the following questions are relevant: to what extent and why does sub-Saharan Africa appear from the perspective of some Iranian decision makers as an attractive sub-region?; to what extent and why do particular Iranian policy makers (presidents) differ in assessing the importance of Africa?; to what extent does Iranian-Saudi competition impact the effectiveness of Tehran’s policy?
NATO at 70: Outline of the Alliance Today and Tommorow, 2019
From the Western perspective it might seem that a political and military situation in Central and... more From the Western perspective it might seem that a political and military situation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is now stable and secure. A war in Ukraine’s Donbas is no longer a hot topic in mainstream media. Western public opinion is now concentrated on issues such as an emerging (once again) crisis in the Persian Gulf and a confrontation (verbal so far) between Iran and the United States. Another hot topics are Venezuela or a new war in Libya. However one shall not be fooled. Current Russia is the same Russia which in 2008 attacked Georgia and in 2014 sent its troops – including those without insignias – into Ukraine. A threat posed by the Russian Federation still is relatively high and remains a challenge to NATO and its member states, particularly those located on its Eastern Flank. This urges NATO allies to act both multilaterally – within NATO framework – and unilaterally since all member states have to modernize their armed forces.
Obecne tarcia na Bliskim Wschodzie stanowią „mikrokosmos” power politics, bliski wizji Thomasa Ho... more Obecne tarcia na Bliskim Wschodzie stanowią „mikrokosmos” power politics, bliski wizji Thomasa Hobbesa i jego i jego bellum omnium contra omnes. Stwierdzenie to bardzo dobrze oddaje specyfikę Bliskiego Wschodu, ale także percepcję bezpieczeństwa Islamskiej Republiki Iranu, której decydenci stoją niezmiennie na stanowisku, że niemal cały region, a nawet duża część świata, sprzysiągł się przeciwko ich państwu. Z perspektywy irańskiej Teheran jest uczestnikiem wojny wszystkich z jednym – z Republiką Islamską. Celem artykułu jest zaprezentowanie jak Iran podchodzi do współczesnego systemu międzynarodowego i jak próbuje realizować swoje interesy w świecie narastającej rywalizacji i wykuwania się bloków przy jednoczesnej postępującej destabilizacji Bliskiego Wschodu, gdzie napięcia wyraźnie wzrastają. Artykuł stara się również odpowiedzieć na pytanie, na ile Iran świadomie wchodzi w tę geopolityczną rozgrywkę, a na ile jest mu ona narzucana.
Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, proxy war, Middle Eastern conflicts
One of the reasons for regional i... more Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, proxy war, Middle Eastern conflicts
One of the reasons for regional instability is an ongoing division between Shias and Sunnis. This division is fuelled both by external actors, including the United States and Russia, and regional powers, including Saudi Arabia and Iran. For ideological, religious, geopolitical and military reasons, those two states have been providing support to opposing sides in almost all regional conflicts, including in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. One of them, although relatively unknown (particularly compared to the struggles in Syria and Iraq) is an ongoing struggle in Yemen, which had for years been considered a sphere of influence of Riyadh. By supporting Houthi insurgency, Iran not only tries to increase its own national power and influence, but at the same time Tehran’s goal is to decrease the position of its rival – Saudi Arabia. This chapter presents and analyses Iran’s activities and approach towards Yemen vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia.
Katar zwykło się postrzegać przez pryzmat jego zasobów surowców energetycznychpodobnie jak inne ... more Katar zwykło się postrzegać przez pryzmat jego zasobów surowców energetycznychpodobnie jak inne państwa arabskie leżące nad Zatoką Perską (Arabską): Arabię Saudyjską, Bahrajn, Kuwejt, Oman i Zjednoczone Emiraty Arabskie. Na ich bogactwo (trzy ...
Lithuania has officially stated that its national security is a constituent part of the indivisib... more Lithuania has officially stated that its national security is a constituent part of the indivisible security policy of NATO and the EU. Collective deterrence ensured by NATO is the main principle of defense strategy of Lithuania. Since 2004 reliance on NATO’s Article 5 assurances became the modus operandi of developing Lithuania’s national defense capacity. At the same time Lithuania’s military spending remains among the lowest in NATO. In 2013 Lithuanian defense budget declined to 0.78 percent of its GDP. Only Luxemburg is spending less among all NATO members. Such situation provides an intriguing research question: why being entirely dependent on NATO’s collective defense guarantees, Lithuania is still so unwilling to meet NATO requirements on its own defense spending? One possible explanation could be found in the economic theory of alliances which explains rational choices of burden sharing behavior among allies. There is a lot of academic attention towards burden sharing and collective action issues within NATO. This discussion serves as a theoretical background in search for answers why NATO members, especially small countries like Lithuania, try to minimize their burden for collective defense. The main theoretical premises could be formulated as follows: members of NATO seek to maximize their benefits inside the alliance (for example, by attracting attention and resources of the alliance towards specific regions or security issues) at the lowest possible cost. They are reluctant to increase their own expenses as long as there is no risk to loose collective security assurances. A rational calculation leads to a behavior when contribution to the alliance is expected not to exceed the benefits of membership. In this research paper a special index of NATO burden sharing is proposed. It allows to measure the investment (input) in a common defense against security gains (output). This index, based on the assumptions developed by T. Sandler and K. Hartley , gives an opportunity to evaluate the “gains and expenses” of every NATO country thus identifying who is overpaying and who is underpaying for collective security. Such approach is valuable for testing the economic theory of alliances and explaining the variation of free riding behavior inside NATO.
Do niedawna Katar pozostawał państwem mało rozpoznawalnym na świecie. W wyniku przemyślanej, wiel... more Do niedawna Katar pozostawał państwem mało rozpoznawalnym na świecie. W wyniku przemyślanej, wieloletniej strategii budowy marki, powiązanej ściśle z polityką zagraniczną i bezpieczeństwa, Katar stał się nie tylko rozpoznawalnym w skali globu państwem, ale za sprawą nieproporcjonalnej do swego geograficznego rozmiaru aktywności międzynarodowej godną zaufania marką, znaną i szanowaną na najważniejszych salonach politycznych i w kręgach dużego biznesu. Celem głównym niniejszego artykułu jest zanalizowanie jednego z elementów strategii budowania międzynarodowej marki Kataru, jaką jest wykorzystanie sportu w celach politycznych oraz odpowiedzenia na pytanie, na ile sport w niniejszym przypadku pozwala zrealizować zakładane cele strategiczne. By to zrobić, w pracy zanalizowano wymiar wewnętrzny i zewnętrzny (międzynarodowy) polityki sportowej Kataru.
Despite his promises, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has so far not succeeded in bringing a rap... more Despite his promises, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has so far not succeeded in bringing a rapprochement in relations with the strongest Arab state in the Persian Gulf – Saudi Arabia. It is the opposite. Both states are struggling fiercely for influence and power in the region, particularly at “the nexus of Shiite and Sunni worlds” (Henderson 2014), i.e. Iraq, currently immersed in a highly brutal civil war, but also and most recently, Yemen, where both states are involved in a “proxy war”. Although the scale of Iranian involvement in Iraq in unknown, it is believed that Iran trains and controls local armed groups, sends military advisors as well as provides military hardware. Saudi Arabia is trying to seize the bridgeheads and neutralize Iran’s influence. Such rivalry is no surprise as strategic aims are at stake. This is not only a struggle for a control over Iraq between Saudi Arabia and Iran but also a quest for hegemony over the Middle East.
The International Relations Research Institute in Warsaw and Faculty of International and Politic... more The International Relations Research Institute in Warsaw and Faculty of International and Political Studies (University of Lodz, Poland) in cooperation with Institute of Political Studies (Charles University, Czech Republic) have a pleasure to invite you to participate in the international conference “NATO Towards the Challenges of a Contemporary World – After the Warsaw 2016 Summit”.
The conference will be held by the University of Lodz in Poland from 15 to 16 November 2016. The invitation is addressed to scholars, researchers, experts and professionals who are interested in NATO issues and the transatlantic security.
The conference will address all major issues related to NATO and the Warsaw Summit 2016, including:
NATO’s “Eastern Flank” (including VJTF) NATO’s “Southern Flank” (including migration crisis and the Islamic State) NATO’s “Northern Flank” (including cooperation with Sweden and Finland) Current and future NATO Strategic Concept Air and missile defense (including EPAA) The transatlantic defense and security relations Regional dimensions of NATO (including the V4 cooperation) “Out of area” (including the Middle East and Afghanistan) Psychological/Information warfare NATO towards new and potential partners (inluding Ukraine, Georgia, and others) “Open door policy” NATO and Russia NATO – European Union NATO and cyber-security NATO and energy security Smart defense and capability building Nuclear detterence (both tactical and strategic) Other issues related to current NATO’s agenda and the Warsaw Summit 2016
Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has no longer been an important ally of the United Sta... more Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has no longer been an important ally of the United States, but is considered as a hostile state declaring full political and military independence and self-reliance. Although it is very often blamed for adopting an aggressive posture, Iran constantly states that it has never been an aggressor in any modern war and has peaceful policies. The main assumption of this paper is that the Iranian armed forces — both conventional (the Artesh) and famous Revolutionary Guards (the Sepah) — are preparing themselves for a mainly defensive war. Therefore, the main goal of this paper is to present and analyse Iran’s defence doctrine and to answer the research question of whether or not Iran has the ability to defend itself from an armed attack.
Defeating the IS is not the main aim of the Russian armed involvement in Syria. Moscow is focused... more Defeating the IS is not the main aim of the Russian armed involvement in Syria. Moscow is focused on its strategic goals, namely getting out of the political trap by re-establishing cooperation with the Western Europe and the United States. Secondly, the Kremlin would like to get back its influence in the Middle East. At the moment, Russia seems to consequently realize its goals, which is even easier in the light of the fact that the Western-European politicians are completely lost, since they are not in possession of skill, nor will, to start a decisive game.
Almost throughout the Cold War (1945-1991) Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) had been one of the pi... more Almost throughout the Cold War (1945-1991) Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) had been one of the pillars of NATO’s doctrine of nuclear deterrence. These weapons were supposed to be used as an alternative for conventional weapons and forces, and in case of Soviet invasion against the Western Europe, to be used by NATO to counterattack and destroy military armored units and forces of WARSAW Pact. At the present, after many years passed since the end of the Cold War, the number of opposing groups to the maintenance of TNWs in NATO’s bases in Europe has increased as many experts believe that these weapons have little combat value from a military perspective. Despite this NATO’s member states have not taken any binding decisions for the future of their TNWs. The objective of this research work is to analyze and examine the attitude of NATO’s member states towards TNWs, their developing and changing trend and possible future scenarios. The basic question of this article is that: should NATO go for modernization of its TNWs, or it must try to eliminate them?
Artykuł przedstawia politykę zagraniczną i bezpieczeństwa Iranu w roku 2014. Składa się z następu... more Artykuł przedstawia politykę zagraniczną i bezpieczeństwa Iranu w roku 2014. Składa się z następujących części:
- Wymiar bliskowschodni polityki Iranu (Państwo Islamskie, relacje z państwami arabskimi, polityka wobec Syrii, Iraku, Izraela) - Wymiar wschodni polityki Iranu (relacje z Afganistanem, Pakistanem, polityka wobec Dżaisz ul-Adl) - Relacje ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi - Iran wobec kryzysu jądrowego
Hasan Rouhani’s victory in the nationwide elections in June 2013 brought high hopes both in Iran ... more Hasan Rouhani’s victory in the nationwide elections in June 2013 brought high hopes both in Iran and internationally. Many believed that Rouhani’s success would lead to a breakthrough in relations between Iran and the world, and introduce economic, political and social reforms. Rouhani was labelled as a moderate candidate, avoiding radical views, always seeking a peaceful solution. In the past he expressed some sympathies with the “Green Movement,” and criticized media censorship and government lies. Many commentators have forgotten, however, that in 2004, Rouhani was labelled by the Iranian media as a rising star of the conservative camp. Thus it is not surprising at all that no breakthrough can be noticed so far.
Wybranie w wyborach powszechnych w 2013 r. na prezydenta Iranu Hasana Rouhaniego wiązało się z wy... more Wybranie w wyborach powszechnych w 2013 r. na prezydenta Iranu Hasana Rouhaniego wiązało się z wyraźnymi nadziejami, nie tylko w samym Iranie, ale również w wielu państwach zachodnich. Liczono, że nowy prezydent doprowadzi do przełomu w relacjach tego kraju ze światem zewnętrznym oraz wprowadzi gospodarcze, polityczne i społeczne reformy. H. Rouhani został określony jako umiarkowany kandydat, unikający radykalnych postaw, szukający rozwiązań pokojowych. W przeszłości wyrażał sympatie wobec „zielonego ruchu”, krytykował cenzurę. Będąc głównym negocjatorem spraw programu atomowego w latach 2003–2005, został zapamiętany jako osoba rozsądna, która pomogła osiągnąć pewien kompromis. Iran zgodził się wówczas zawiesić znaczną część najbardziej kontrowersyjnych elementów swojego programu jądrowego.
Doktryna wojskowa Islamskiej Republiki Iranu zakłada wykorzystanie sił zbrojnych – tych konwencjo... more Doktryna wojskowa Islamskiej Republiki Iranu zakłada wykorzystanie sił zbrojnych – tych konwencjonalnych (Artesz), jak również strażników rewolucji (Sepah) – przede wszystkim do wojny obronnej, która opierałaby się na zmasowanych, nieregularnych działaniach zaczepnych i partyzanckich setek tysięcy gotowych na śmierć szahidów – świętych męczenników. Elementem ofensywnym byłby atak rakietowy na wojskowe i cywilne obiekty w regionie, a także wojna minowa i wykorzystanie organizacji sojuszniczych celem destabilizacji regionu i blokady Cieśniny Ormuz.
The main purpose of this book is to look thoroughly at these simultaneous transformations of “new... more The main purpose of this book is to look thoroughly at these simultaneous transformations of “newcomers” and the Alliance as such, which were the results of enlargement. We wish to present a variety of views on NATO from member states “formerly known as new”, and to assess in this context the prospects for NATO enlargement. The idea was to show the diversity of strategies of function-ing within the Alliance, which were adopted by “newcomers” after their acces-sions.
Z prof. Uzim Rabim o nieudanych próbach porozumienia i o tym,
czy są szanse, że konflikt palestyń... more Z prof. Uzim Rabim o nieudanych próbach porozumienia i o tym, czy są szanse, że konflikt palestyńsko-izraelski kiedykolwiek się zakończy, rozmawia Robert Czulda
The aim of this article is to analyze the role of sub-Saharan Africa plays in Iran’s calculations... more The aim of this article is to analyze the role of sub-Saharan Africa plays in Iran’s calculations and foreign and security policy. In turn, several aspects will be analyzed, including the evolution of Iran’s approach towards this sub-region, its significance in Tehran’s geostrategic calculations, and a comparison of assumptions and actual accomplishments. The research hypothesis is that, in recent years, the importance of sub-Saharan Africa has grown in Iranian policymaking (during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency), but the political and economic weakness of this country, as well as the deliberate actions of Saudi Arabia, has drastically limited Iran’s penetration capabilities on the African continent and set the boundaries of African-Iranian rapprochement, especially at the political and military level. As part of the analysis, the following questions are relevant: to what extent and why does sub-Saharan Africa appear from the perspective of some Iranian decision makers as an attractive sub-region?; to what extent and why do particular Iranian policy makers (presidents) differ in assessing the importance of Africa?; to what extent does Iranian-Saudi competition impact the effectiveness of Tehran’s policy?
NATO at 70: Outline of the Alliance Today and Tommorow, 2019
From the Western perspective it might seem that a political and military situation in Central and... more From the Western perspective it might seem that a political and military situation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is now stable and secure. A war in Ukraine’s Donbas is no longer a hot topic in mainstream media. Western public opinion is now concentrated on issues such as an emerging (once again) crisis in the Persian Gulf and a confrontation (verbal so far) between Iran and the United States. Another hot topics are Venezuela or a new war in Libya. However one shall not be fooled. Current Russia is the same Russia which in 2008 attacked Georgia and in 2014 sent its troops – including those without insignias – into Ukraine. A threat posed by the Russian Federation still is relatively high and remains a challenge to NATO and its member states, particularly those located on its Eastern Flank. This urges NATO allies to act both multilaterally – within NATO framework – and unilaterally since all member states have to modernize their armed forces.
Obecne tarcia na Bliskim Wschodzie stanowią „mikrokosmos” power politics, bliski wizji Thomasa Ho... more Obecne tarcia na Bliskim Wschodzie stanowią „mikrokosmos” power politics, bliski wizji Thomasa Hobbesa i jego i jego bellum omnium contra omnes. Stwierdzenie to bardzo dobrze oddaje specyfikę Bliskiego Wschodu, ale także percepcję bezpieczeństwa Islamskiej Republiki Iranu, której decydenci stoją niezmiennie na stanowisku, że niemal cały region, a nawet duża część świata, sprzysiągł się przeciwko ich państwu. Z perspektywy irańskiej Teheran jest uczestnikiem wojny wszystkich z jednym – z Republiką Islamską. Celem artykułu jest zaprezentowanie jak Iran podchodzi do współczesnego systemu międzynarodowego i jak próbuje realizować swoje interesy w świecie narastającej rywalizacji i wykuwania się bloków przy jednoczesnej postępującej destabilizacji Bliskiego Wschodu, gdzie napięcia wyraźnie wzrastają. Artykuł stara się również odpowiedzieć na pytanie, na ile Iran świadomie wchodzi w tę geopolityczną rozgrywkę, a na ile jest mu ona narzucana.
Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, proxy war, Middle Eastern conflicts
One of the reasons for regional i... more Iran, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, proxy war, Middle Eastern conflicts
One of the reasons for regional instability is an ongoing division between Shias and Sunnis. This division is fuelled both by external actors, including the United States and Russia, and regional powers, including Saudi Arabia and Iran. For ideological, religious, geopolitical and military reasons, those two states have been providing support to opposing sides in almost all regional conflicts, including in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. One of them, although relatively unknown (particularly compared to the struggles in Syria and Iraq) is an ongoing struggle in Yemen, which had for years been considered a sphere of influence of Riyadh. By supporting Houthi insurgency, Iran not only tries to increase its own national power and influence, but at the same time Tehran’s goal is to decrease the position of its rival – Saudi Arabia. This chapter presents and analyses Iran’s activities and approach towards Yemen vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia.
Katar zwykło się postrzegać przez pryzmat jego zasobów surowców energetycznychpodobnie jak inne ... more Katar zwykło się postrzegać przez pryzmat jego zasobów surowców energetycznychpodobnie jak inne państwa arabskie leżące nad Zatoką Perską (Arabską): Arabię Saudyjską, Bahrajn, Kuwejt, Oman i Zjednoczone Emiraty Arabskie. Na ich bogactwo (trzy ...
Lithuania has officially stated that its national security is a constituent part of the indivisib... more Lithuania has officially stated that its national security is a constituent part of the indivisible security policy of NATO and the EU. Collective deterrence ensured by NATO is the main principle of defense strategy of Lithuania. Since 2004 reliance on NATO’s Article 5 assurances became the modus operandi of developing Lithuania’s national defense capacity. At the same time Lithuania’s military spending remains among the lowest in NATO. In 2013 Lithuanian defense budget declined to 0.78 percent of its GDP. Only Luxemburg is spending less among all NATO members. Such situation provides an intriguing research question: why being entirely dependent on NATO’s collective defense guarantees, Lithuania is still so unwilling to meet NATO requirements on its own defense spending? One possible explanation could be found in the economic theory of alliances which explains rational choices of burden sharing behavior among allies. There is a lot of academic attention towards burden sharing and collective action issues within NATO. This discussion serves as a theoretical background in search for answers why NATO members, especially small countries like Lithuania, try to minimize their burden for collective defense. The main theoretical premises could be formulated as follows: members of NATO seek to maximize their benefits inside the alliance (for example, by attracting attention and resources of the alliance towards specific regions or security issues) at the lowest possible cost. They are reluctant to increase their own expenses as long as there is no risk to loose collective security assurances. A rational calculation leads to a behavior when contribution to the alliance is expected not to exceed the benefits of membership. In this research paper a special index of NATO burden sharing is proposed. It allows to measure the investment (input) in a common defense against security gains (output). This index, based on the assumptions developed by T. Sandler and K. Hartley , gives an opportunity to evaluate the “gains and expenses” of every NATO country thus identifying who is overpaying and who is underpaying for collective security. Such approach is valuable for testing the economic theory of alliances and explaining the variation of free riding behavior inside NATO.
Do niedawna Katar pozostawał państwem mało rozpoznawalnym na świecie. W wyniku przemyślanej, wiel... more Do niedawna Katar pozostawał państwem mało rozpoznawalnym na świecie. W wyniku przemyślanej, wieloletniej strategii budowy marki, powiązanej ściśle z polityką zagraniczną i bezpieczeństwa, Katar stał się nie tylko rozpoznawalnym w skali globu państwem, ale za sprawą nieproporcjonalnej do swego geograficznego rozmiaru aktywności międzynarodowej godną zaufania marką, znaną i szanowaną na najważniejszych salonach politycznych i w kręgach dużego biznesu. Celem głównym niniejszego artykułu jest zanalizowanie jednego z elementów strategii budowania międzynarodowej marki Kataru, jaką jest wykorzystanie sportu w celach politycznych oraz odpowiedzenia na pytanie, na ile sport w niniejszym przypadku pozwala zrealizować zakładane cele strategiczne. By to zrobić, w pracy zanalizowano wymiar wewnętrzny i zewnętrzny (międzynarodowy) polityki sportowej Kataru.
Despite his promises, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has so far not succeeded in bringing a rap... more Despite his promises, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has so far not succeeded in bringing a rapprochement in relations with the strongest Arab state in the Persian Gulf – Saudi Arabia. It is the opposite. Both states are struggling fiercely for influence and power in the region, particularly at “the nexus of Shiite and Sunni worlds” (Henderson 2014), i.e. Iraq, currently immersed in a highly brutal civil war, but also and most recently, Yemen, where both states are involved in a “proxy war”. Although the scale of Iranian involvement in Iraq in unknown, it is believed that Iran trains and controls local armed groups, sends military advisors as well as provides military hardware. Saudi Arabia is trying to seize the bridgeheads and neutralize Iran’s influence. Such rivalry is no surprise as strategic aims are at stake. This is not only a struggle for a control over Iraq between Saudi Arabia and Iran but also a quest for hegemony over the Middle East.
The International Relations Research Institute in Warsaw and Faculty of International and Politic... more The International Relations Research Institute in Warsaw and Faculty of International and Political Studies (University of Lodz, Poland) in cooperation with Institute of Political Studies (Charles University, Czech Republic) have a pleasure to invite you to participate in the international conference “NATO Towards the Challenges of a Contemporary World – After the Warsaw 2016 Summit”.
The conference will be held by the University of Lodz in Poland from 15 to 16 November 2016. The invitation is addressed to scholars, researchers, experts and professionals who are interested in NATO issues and the transatlantic security.
The conference will address all major issues related to NATO and the Warsaw Summit 2016, including:
NATO’s “Eastern Flank” (including VJTF) NATO’s “Southern Flank” (including migration crisis and the Islamic State) NATO’s “Northern Flank” (including cooperation with Sweden and Finland) Current and future NATO Strategic Concept Air and missile defense (including EPAA) The transatlantic defense and security relations Regional dimensions of NATO (including the V4 cooperation) “Out of area” (including the Middle East and Afghanistan) Psychological/Information warfare NATO towards new and potential partners (inluding Ukraine, Georgia, and others) “Open door policy” NATO and Russia NATO – European Union NATO and cyber-security NATO and energy security Smart defense and capability building Nuclear detterence (both tactical and strategic) Other issues related to current NATO’s agenda and the Warsaw Summit 2016
Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has no longer been an important ally of the United Sta... more Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has no longer been an important ally of the United States, but is considered as a hostile state declaring full political and military independence and self-reliance. Although it is very often blamed for adopting an aggressive posture, Iran constantly states that it has never been an aggressor in any modern war and has peaceful policies. The main assumption of this paper is that the Iranian armed forces — both conventional (the Artesh) and famous Revolutionary Guards (the Sepah) — are preparing themselves for a mainly defensive war. Therefore, the main goal of this paper is to present and analyse Iran’s defence doctrine and to answer the research question of whether or not Iran has the ability to defend itself from an armed attack.
Defeating the IS is not the main aim of the Russian armed involvement in Syria. Moscow is focused... more Defeating the IS is not the main aim of the Russian armed involvement in Syria. Moscow is focused on its strategic goals, namely getting out of the political trap by re-establishing cooperation with the Western Europe and the United States. Secondly, the Kremlin would like to get back its influence in the Middle East. At the moment, Russia seems to consequently realize its goals, which is even easier in the light of the fact that the Western-European politicians are completely lost, since they are not in possession of skill, nor will, to start a decisive game.
Almost throughout the Cold War (1945-1991) Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) had been one of the pi... more Almost throughout the Cold War (1945-1991) Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) had been one of the pillars of NATO’s doctrine of nuclear deterrence. These weapons were supposed to be used as an alternative for conventional weapons and forces, and in case of Soviet invasion against the Western Europe, to be used by NATO to counterattack and destroy military armored units and forces of WARSAW Pact. At the present, after many years passed since the end of the Cold War, the number of opposing groups to the maintenance of TNWs in NATO’s bases in Europe has increased as many experts believe that these weapons have little combat value from a military perspective. Despite this NATO’s member states have not taken any binding decisions for the future of their TNWs. The objective of this research work is to analyze and examine the attitude of NATO’s member states towards TNWs, their developing and changing trend and possible future scenarios. The basic question of this article is that: should NATO go for modernization of its TNWs, or it must try to eliminate them?
Artykuł przedstawia politykę zagraniczną i bezpieczeństwa Iranu w roku 2014. Składa się z następu... more Artykuł przedstawia politykę zagraniczną i bezpieczeństwa Iranu w roku 2014. Składa się z następujących części:
- Wymiar bliskowschodni polityki Iranu (Państwo Islamskie, relacje z państwami arabskimi, polityka wobec Syrii, Iraku, Izraela) - Wymiar wschodni polityki Iranu (relacje z Afganistanem, Pakistanem, polityka wobec Dżaisz ul-Adl) - Relacje ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi - Iran wobec kryzysu jądrowego
Hasan Rouhani’s victory in the nationwide elections in June 2013 brought high hopes both in Iran ... more Hasan Rouhani’s victory in the nationwide elections in June 2013 brought high hopes both in Iran and internationally. Many believed that Rouhani’s success would lead to a breakthrough in relations between Iran and the world, and introduce economic, political and social reforms. Rouhani was labelled as a moderate candidate, avoiding radical views, always seeking a peaceful solution. In the past he expressed some sympathies with the “Green Movement,” and criticized media censorship and government lies. Many commentators have forgotten, however, that in 2004, Rouhani was labelled by the Iranian media as a rising star of the conservative camp. Thus it is not surprising at all that no breakthrough can be noticed so far.
Wybranie w wyborach powszechnych w 2013 r. na prezydenta Iranu Hasana Rouhaniego wiązało się z wy... more Wybranie w wyborach powszechnych w 2013 r. na prezydenta Iranu Hasana Rouhaniego wiązało się z wyraźnymi nadziejami, nie tylko w samym Iranie, ale również w wielu państwach zachodnich. Liczono, że nowy prezydent doprowadzi do przełomu w relacjach tego kraju ze światem zewnętrznym oraz wprowadzi gospodarcze, polityczne i społeczne reformy. H. Rouhani został określony jako umiarkowany kandydat, unikający radykalnych postaw, szukający rozwiązań pokojowych. W przeszłości wyrażał sympatie wobec „zielonego ruchu”, krytykował cenzurę. Będąc głównym negocjatorem spraw programu atomowego w latach 2003–2005, został zapamiętany jako osoba rozsądna, która pomogła osiągnąć pewien kompromis. Iran zgodził się wówczas zawiesić znaczną część najbardziej kontrowersyjnych elementów swojego programu jądrowego.
Doktryna wojskowa Islamskiej Republiki Iranu zakłada wykorzystanie sił zbrojnych – tych konwencjo... more Doktryna wojskowa Islamskiej Republiki Iranu zakłada wykorzystanie sił zbrojnych – tych konwencjonalnych (Artesz), jak również strażników rewolucji (Sepah) – przede wszystkim do wojny obronnej, która opierałaby się na zmasowanych, nieregularnych działaniach zaczepnych i partyzanckich setek tysięcy gotowych na śmierć szahidów – świętych męczenników. Elementem ofensywnym byłby atak rakietowy na wojskowe i cywilne obiekty w regionie, a także wojna minowa i wykorzystanie organizacji sojuszniczych celem destabilizacji regionu i blokady Cieśniny Ormuz.
The main purpose of this book is to look thoroughly at these simultaneous transformations of “new... more The main purpose of this book is to look thoroughly at these simultaneous transformations of “newcomers” and the Alliance as such, which were the results of enlargement. We wish to present a variety of views on NATO from member states “formerly known as new”, and to assess in this context the prospects for NATO enlargement. The idea was to show the diversity of strategies of function-ing within the Alliance, which were adopted by “newcomers” after their acces-sions.
Z prof. Uzim Rabim o nieudanych próbach porozumienia i o tym,
czy są szanse, że konflikt palestyń... more Z prof. Uzim Rabim o nieudanych próbach porozumienia i o tym, czy są szanse, że konflikt palestyńsko-izraelski kiedykolwiek się zakończy, rozmawia Robert Czulda
The main goal of this international seminar is to analyze Iran’s policy after the withdrawal of t... more The main goal of this international seminar is to analyze Iran’s policy after the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and the beginning of a “maximum pressure” policy against the Islamic Republic carried out by President Donald Trump.
Participants are kindly asked to submit their proposals by submitting a participation form. They should address, however they are not limited to, the following topics: • All aspects and directions of foreign and security policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran • Tehran’s strategic perception – goals, aspirations, limitations • Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the European Union • Tehran vis-à-vis global and regional powers • Dynamics in the Persian Gulf – politics, security, energy • GCC and the Islamic Republic of Iran • Domestic dynamics of the Islamic Republic of Iran • Energy factor in Iran and the region (also vis-a-vis Asia and Europe)
The International Relations Research Institute in Warsaw and Faculty of International and Politic... more The International Relations Research Institute in Warsaw and Faculty of International and Political Studies (University of Lodz, Poland) in cooperation with Institute of Political Studies (Charles University, Czech Republic) have a pleasure to invite you to participate in the international conference “NATO Towards the Challenges of a Contemporary World – After the Warsaw 2016 Summit”.
The conference will be held by the University of Lodz in Poland from 15 to 16 November 2016. The invitation is addressed to scholars, researchers, experts and professionals who are interested in NATO issues and the transatlantic security.
The conference will address all major issues related to NATO and the Warsaw Summit 2016, including:
NATO’s “Eastern Flank” (including VJTF) NATO’s “Southern Flank” (including migration crisis and the Islamic State) NATO’s “Northern Flank” (including cooperation with Sweden and Finland) Current and future NATO Strategic Concept Air and missile defense (including EPAA) The transatlantic defense and security relations Regional dimensions of NATO (including the V4 cooperation) “Out of area” (including the Middle East and Afghanistan) Psychological/Information warfare NATO towards new and potential partners (inluding Ukraine, Georgia, and others) “Open door policy” NATO and Russia NATO – European Union NATO and cyber-security NATO and energy security Smart defense and capability building Nuclear detterence (both tactical and strategic) Other issues related to current NATO’s agenda and the Warsaw Summit 2016
Książka analizuje politykę bezpieczeństwa Islamskiej Republiki Iranu w jej dwóch wymiarach, to je... more Książka analizuje politykę bezpieczeństwa Islamskiej Republiki Iranu w jej dwóch wymiarach, to jest w aspekcie wewnętrznych jak i zewnętrznych uwarunkowań. Jakie są cele tego państwa? Czego chcą jego władze? Czy faktycznie – jak przekonują niektóre alarmistyczne głosy – chce on zdominować cały Bliski Wschód? Czego obawia się Republika Islamska? Czy jest ona bezpieczna? Analizowane zagadnienia postrzegane są z perspektywy Republiki Islamskiej, a cezurą zamykającą jest koniec prezydentury Hasana Ruhāniego (2021).
The book analyzes a security policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in its two dimensions What are the goals of this state? What do Iranian authorities want? Does Iran - as some alarmist voices argue - really want to dominate the entire Middle East? What is the Islamic Republic afraid of? Is it safe? Analyzed issues are perceived from the perspective of the Islamic Republic, and the ending caesura is the end of Hasan Rouhāni's presidency (2021).
Jakie są aspiracje Iranu? Co chce osiągnąć Republika Islamska w regionie? Jakie są wyzwania, szan... more Jakie są aspiracje Iranu? Co chce osiągnąć Republika Islamska w regionie? Jakie są wyzwania, szanse i oczekiwania? Skąd wynika często diametralnie odmienna ocena zasadniczych kwestii pomiędzy irańskimi decydentami a Zachodem? Próba odpowiedzi na przynajmniej część z tych pytań stanowi aspirację niniejszej książki. W tym celu zebrano grupę wybitnych ekspertów od Iranu, których następnie poproszono, by zmierzyli się z najbardziej palącymi tematami
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Celem artykułu jest zaprezentowanie jak Iran podchodzi do współczesnego systemu międzynarodowego i jak próbuje realizować swoje interesy w świecie narastającej rywalizacji i wykuwania się bloków przy jednoczesnej postępującej destabilizacji Bliskiego Wschodu, gdzie napięcia wyraźnie wzrastają. Artykuł stara się również odpowiedzieć na pytanie, na ile Iran świadomie wchodzi w tę geopolityczną rozgrywkę, a na ile jest mu ona narzucana.
One of the reasons for regional instability is an ongoing division between Shias and Sunnis. This division is fuelled both by external actors, including the United States and Russia, and regional powers, including Saudi Arabia and Iran. For ideological, religious, geopolitical and military reasons, those two states have been providing support to opposing sides in almost all regional conflicts, including in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. One of them, although relatively unknown (particularly compared to the struggles in Syria and Iraq) is an ongoing struggle in Yemen, which had for years been considered a sphere of influence of Riyadh. By supporting Houthi insurgency, Iran not only tries to increase its own national power and influence, but at the same time Tehran’s goal is to decrease the position of its rival – Saudi Arabia. This chapter presents and analyses Iran’s activities and approach towards Yemen vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia.
At the same time Lithuania’s military spending remains among the lowest in NATO. In 2013 Lithuanian defense budget declined to 0.78 percent of its GDP. Only Luxemburg is spending less among all NATO members. Such situation provides an intriguing research question: why being entirely dependent on NATO’s collective defense guarantees, Lithuania is still so unwilling to meet NATO requirements on its own defense spending?
One possible explanation could be found in the economic theory of alliances which explains rational choices of burden sharing behavior among allies. There is a lot of academic attention towards burden sharing and collective action issues within NATO. This discussion serves as a theoretical background in search for answers why NATO members, especially small countries like Lithuania, try to minimize their burden for collective defense. The main theoretical premises could be formulated as follows: members of NATO seek to maximize their benefits inside the alliance (for example, by attracting attention and resources of the alliance towards specific regions or security issues) at the lowest possible cost. They are reluctant to increase their own expenses as long as there is no risk to loose collective security assurances. A rational calculation leads to a behavior when contribution to the alliance is expected not to exceed the benefits of membership.
In this research paper a special index of NATO burden sharing is proposed. It allows to measure the investment (input) in a common defense against security gains (output). This index, based on the assumptions developed by T. Sandler and K. Hartley , gives an opportunity to evaluate the “gains and expenses” of every NATO country thus identifying who is overpaying and who is underpaying for collective security. Such approach is valuable for testing the economic theory of alliances and explaining the variation of free riding behavior inside NATO.
Celem głównym niniejszego artykułu jest zanalizowanie jednego z elementów strategii budowania międzynarodowej marki Kataru, jaką jest wykorzystanie sportu w celach politycznych oraz odpowiedzenia na pytanie, na ile sport w niniejszym przypadku pozwala zrealizować zakładane cele strategiczne. By to zrobić, w pracy zanalizowano wymiar wewnętrzny i zewnętrzny (międzynarodowy) polityki sportowej Kataru.
The conference will be held by the University of Lodz in Poland from 15 to 16 November 2016. The invitation is addressed to scholars, researchers, experts and professionals who are interested in NATO issues and the transatlantic security.
The conference will address all major issues related to NATO and the Warsaw Summit 2016, including:
NATO’s “Eastern Flank” (including VJTF)
NATO’s “Southern Flank” (including migration crisis and the Islamic State)
NATO’s “Northern Flank” (including cooperation with Sweden and Finland)
Current and future NATO Strategic Concept
Air and missile defense (including EPAA)
The transatlantic defense and security relations
Regional dimensions of NATO (including the V4 cooperation)
“Out of area” (including the Middle East and Afghanistan)
Psychological/Information warfare
NATO towards new and potential partners (inluding Ukraine, Georgia, and others)
“Open door policy”
NATO and Russia
NATO – European Union
NATO and cyber-security
NATO and energy security
Smart defense and capability building
Nuclear detterence (both tactical and strategic)
Other issues related to current NATO’s agenda and the Warsaw Summit 2016
- Wymiar bliskowschodni polityki Iranu (Państwo Islamskie, relacje z państwami arabskimi, polityka wobec Syrii, Iraku, Izraela)
- Wymiar wschodni polityki Iranu (relacje z Afganistanem, Pakistanem, polityka wobec Dżaisz ul-Adl)
- Relacje ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi
- Iran wobec kryzysu jądrowego
czy są szanse, że konflikt palestyńsko-izraelski kiedykolwiek się
zakończy, rozmawia Robert Czulda
Celem artykułu jest zaprezentowanie jak Iran podchodzi do współczesnego systemu międzynarodowego i jak próbuje realizować swoje interesy w świecie narastającej rywalizacji i wykuwania się bloków przy jednoczesnej postępującej destabilizacji Bliskiego Wschodu, gdzie napięcia wyraźnie wzrastają. Artykuł stara się również odpowiedzieć na pytanie, na ile Iran świadomie wchodzi w tę geopolityczną rozgrywkę, a na ile jest mu ona narzucana.
One of the reasons for regional instability is an ongoing division between Shias and Sunnis. This division is fuelled both by external actors, including the United States and Russia, and regional powers, including Saudi Arabia and Iran. For ideological, religious, geopolitical and military reasons, those two states have been providing support to opposing sides in almost all regional conflicts, including in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. One of them, although relatively unknown (particularly compared to the struggles in Syria and Iraq) is an ongoing struggle in Yemen, which had for years been considered a sphere of influence of Riyadh. By supporting Houthi insurgency, Iran not only tries to increase its own national power and influence, but at the same time Tehran’s goal is to decrease the position of its rival – Saudi Arabia. This chapter presents and analyses Iran’s activities and approach towards Yemen vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia.
At the same time Lithuania’s military spending remains among the lowest in NATO. In 2013 Lithuanian defense budget declined to 0.78 percent of its GDP. Only Luxemburg is spending less among all NATO members. Such situation provides an intriguing research question: why being entirely dependent on NATO’s collective defense guarantees, Lithuania is still so unwilling to meet NATO requirements on its own defense spending?
One possible explanation could be found in the economic theory of alliances which explains rational choices of burden sharing behavior among allies. There is a lot of academic attention towards burden sharing and collective action issues within NATO. This discussion serves as a theoretical background in search for answers why NATO members, especially small countries like Lithuania, try to minimize their burden for collective defense. The main theoretical premises could be formulated as follows: members of NATO seek to maximize their benefits inside the alliance (for example, by attracting attention and resources of the alliance towards specific regions or security issues) at the lowest possible cost. They are reluctant to increase their own expenses as long as there is no risk to loose collective security assurances. A rational calculation leads to a behavior when contribution to the alliance is expected not to exceed the benefits of membership.
In this research paper a special index of NATO burden sharing is proposed. It allows to measure the investment (input) in a common defense against security gains (output). This index, based on the assumptions developed by T. Sandler and K. Hartley , gives an opportunity to evaluate the “gains and expenses” of every NATO country thus identifying who is overpaying and who is underpaying for collective security. Such approach is valuable for testing the economic theory of alliances and explaining the variation of free riding behavior inside NATO.
Celem głównym niniejszego artykułu jest zanalizowanie jednego z elementów strategii budowania międzynarodowej marki Kataru, jaką jest wykorzystanie sportu w celach politycznych oraz odpowiedzenia na pytanie, na ile sport w niniejszym przypadku pozwala zrealizować zakładane cele strategiczne. By to zrobić, w pracy zanalizowano wymiar wewnętrzny i zewnętrzny (międzynarodowy) polityki sportowej Kataru.
The conference will be held by the University of Lodz in Poland from 15 to 16 November 2016. The invitation is addressed to scholars, researchers, experts and professionals who are interested in NATO issues and the transatlantic security.
The conference will address all major issues related to NATO and the Warsaw Summit 2016, including:
NATO’s “Eastern Flank” (including VJTF)
NATO’s “Southern Flank” (including migration crisis and the Islamic State)
NATO’s “Northern Flank” (including cooperation with Sweden and Finland)
Current and future NATO Strategic Concept
Air and missile defense (including EPAA)
The transatlantic defense and security relations
Regional dimensions of NATO (including the V4 cooperation)
“Out of area” (including the Middle East and Afghanistan)
Psychological/Information warfare
NATO towards new and potential partners (inluding Ukraine, Georgia, and others)
“Open door policy”
NATO and Russia
NATO – European Union
NATO and cyber-security
NATO and energy security
Smart defense and capability building
Nuclear detterence (both tactical and strategic)
Other issues related to current NATO’s agenda and the Warsaw Summit 2016
- Wymiar bliskowschodni polityki Iranu (Państwo Islamskie, relacje z państwami arabskimi, polityka wobec Syrii, Iraku, Izraela)
- Wymiar wschodni polityki Iranu (relacje z Afganistanem, Pakistanem, polityka wobec Dżaisz ul-Adl)
- Relacje ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi
- Iran wobec kryzysu jądrowego
czy są szanse, że konflikt palestyńsko-izraelski kiedykolwiek się
zakończy, rozmawia Robert Czulda
Participants are kindly asked to submit their proposals by submitting a participation form. They should address, however they are not limited to, the following topics:
• All aspects and directions of foreign and security policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran
• Tehran’s strategic perception – goals, aspirations, limitations
• Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the European Union
• Tehran vis-à-vis global and regional powers
• Dynamics in the Persian Gulf – politics, security, energy
• GCC and the Islamic Republic of Iran
• Domestic dynamics of the Islamic Republic of Iran
• Energy factor in Iran and the region (also vis-a-vis Asia and Europe)
The conference will be held by the University of Lodz in Poland from 15 to 16 November 2016. The invitation is addressed to scholars, researchers, experts and professionals who are interested in NATO issues and the transatlantic security.
The conference will address all major issues related to NATO and the Warsaw Summit 2016, including:
NATO’s “Eastern Flank” (including VJTF)
NATO’s “Southern Flank” (including migration crisis and the Islamic State)
NATO’s “Northern Flank” (including cooperation with Sweden and Finland)
Current and future NATO Strategic Concept
Air and missile defense (including EPAA)
The transatlantic defense and security relations
Regional dimensions of NATO (including the V4 cooperation)
“Out of area” (including the Middle East and Afghanistan)
Psychological/Information warfare
NATO towards new and potential partners (inluding Ukraine, Georgia, and others)
“Open door policy”
NATO and Russia
NATO – European Union
NATO and cyber-security
NATO and energy security
Smart defense and capability building
Nuclear detterence (both tactical and strategic)
Other issues related to current NATO’s agenda and the Warsaw Summit 2016
The book analyzes a security policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in its two dimensions What are the goals of this state? What do Iranian authorities want? Does Iran - as some alarmist voices argue - really want to dominate the entire Middle East? What is the Islamic Republic afraid of? Is it safe? Analyzed issues are perceived from the perspective of the Islamic Republic, and the ending caesura is the end of Hasan Rouhāni's presidency (2021).