shelep mangs

It has been a privilege to have been asked to edit this series of papers on education and epistemology. While philosophy of education is often considered an applied discipline, it has made contributions across the philosophical spectrum. For example, there has been a significant body of work on aesthetics and education. There have been occasional incursions into debates about ontology and even, albeit rarely, metaphysics. However, the majority of work has always been concerned with epistemology (questions of knowing) and ethics (questions of right action). Traditionally, much of this work, particularly in epistemology, has had a highly individualistic tendency. The assumption of the knowing mind as key characteristic of the rational autonomous agent is at the heart of the liberal educational tradition and takes root in Descartes' cogito: even if I doubt who I am, there is an 'I' that doubts, and this 'I' is the fundamental characteristic of the autonomous rational agent, the fully human being. Of course, heirs to this Cartesian legacy need not be solipsists: it is easy to argue that the individual has duties towards, and needs relating to others, and it is in consideration of such issues that ethics takes its place in the modern philosophical canon. In terms of social policy, the liberal tradition tends to think in terms of various construals of the social contract, whereby, at least in its early forms, the individual trades in certain aspects of his or her freedom in return for the benefits and security afforded by an ordered society. For many educationalists, at least, the key thinkers at the start of this tradition are those who conceived of the human as potentially dwelling in one of two states, that of nature or that of society. To Hobbes, the state of nature was competitive and dangerous, so only rule by a benevolent sovereign could stop people effectively tearing each other apart; to Locke, the state of nature was more benevolent, but social training, in tune with natural inclinations, would produce the best outcomes in terms of human flourishing; to Rousseau, nature was essentially good and society (in all its existing forms) was not to be trusted, even though ultimately human growth depends on social action. The Lockean view provides the perfect justification for educational intervention, insofar as the child benefits from training that builds on her natural inclinations; the Rousseauian view provides the perfect justification for delaying formal schooling and allowing children to learn through play so that they can develop healthy self-confidence before entering the bitter and competitive social world. Both these views are more empirical than idealist, in the sense that mind and knowledge are construed as developing through direct sensory experience rather than the exercise of pure reason. Nevertheless, there remains a strong sense of dualism in many of these accounts: between nature and society, between self and others, and between mind and body. Philosophers of education—indeed, philosophers generally—have found many grounds for wishing to depart from the individualistic and dualistic tendencies of modern epistemology. At the same time, questions of professional identity and genuine scepticism have combined to make many philosophers of education wary of embracing theoretical perspectives that seem radically anti-rationalist, relativist, sociological or collectivist. Thus much of the work done on the social nature of mind has been conducted outside mainstream Western philosophy, as practised in university