Papers by Sebastian Stein
Part one examines some of the main arguments made by naturalist inter- preters of Hegel against K... more Part one examines some of the main arguments made by naturalist inter- preters of Hegel against Kant’s notion of a supernatural noumenon. Following a Fichte-inspired, Kantian response to naturalist critics, part two analyses how and why Fichte rejects Kant’s notion of two distinct realms when he integrates Kant’s notions of a supernatural, independent and spontaneous subjectivity within a subjectivity-prioritizing, supernaturalist framework. This leads into part three’s discussion of how Hegel goes beyond naturalism by following Fichte in rejecting Kant’s notion of the noumenon whilst still integrating the notion of a supernatural, independent and self-referential subjectivity into an account of mind (Geist).
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Kants Noumenon als unbestimmbare Quelle der Spontaneität des Subjekts und der Realität des Objekts, 2025
Im ersten Teil des papers werden konkurrierende Kant-Deutungen mit Blick auf die Unterscheidung v... more Im ersten Teil des papers werden konkurrierende Kant-Deutungen mit Blick auf die Unterscheidung von phänomenaler und noumenaler Sphäre verglichen. Im zweiten Teil wird dafür argumentiert, dass und warum sich die hier vorgeschlagene Lesart dem Lager jener Interpreten zuordnen lässt, die Kant eine ausgewogene Verbindung von Realismus und Idealismus attestieren und die erkenntnistheoretische Funktion des ‚Ding an sich‘ als vollgültige Realitätsgarantie auffassen. In diesem Teil wird gezeigt, wie sich Kant mittels der transzendentalphilosophischen Verschränkung von Subjekt und Objekt von seinen einseitig subjektivistischen und objektivistischen Vorgängern abhebt. Schließlich wird im dritten Teil dargestellt, inwiefern sich die nähere Charakterisierung von spontanem Subjekt und realem Objekt aus Kants Konzeption einer wechselseitigen, jede Priorisierung vermeidenden Verschränkung phänomenaler und noumenaler Sphäre ergibt. Der Beitrag schließt mit einigen Bemerkungen zur Rolle philosophischen Wissens angesichts der Unterscheidung der beiden Sphären.
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Hegel Bulletin, 2016
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Hegel Bulletin, 2014
Hegel’s account of rational willing has recently been misrepresented by both critics and supporte... more Hegel’s account of rational willing has recently been misrepresented by both critics and supporters who argue that the content of willing is externally received from history, social context, practices of recognition, etc. This contradicts the conceptual structure of Hegel’s notion of rational action as free individuality, according to which the difference between the willing subject and the content of willing is an internal relation of identity. Since this ‘difference within identity’ can only be grasped by speculative thinking and not through understanding and reflection, the interpreters can be charged with employing the wrong method. Although reliance on the speculative method opens Hegel to the charge of unintelligibility, it helps explain the frequent misrepresentations of his account of freedom and why methodologically uninformed comparisons between Hegel and other thinkers run the risk of being counterproductive.
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: Hegel’s seemingly contradictory assessment of empiricism can be rendered consistent if one dist... more : Hegel’s seemingly contradictory assessment of empiricism can be rendered consistent if one distinguishes between two ways in which he interprets it: Firstly, as a theory of cognition and secondly, as a theory of ontological truth. While Hegel argues that the former undermines itself due to its inability to establish the universal and necessary validity of its own perspective, he praises the latter for defending the irreducibility of particularity. Still, from Hegel’s own stance, a successful notion of ontological truth must accommodate what empiricism lacks: A dynamic notion of universality that forms a negative unity with particularity, in which both moments are acknowledged but neither is prioritised. Hegel calls this unity ‘the concept’ and deduces his own notion of cognition from it, thus equipping it with the universal and necessary status that he finds empiricism’s notion of cognition unable to account for.
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European Journal of Philosophy, 2020
The review focuses on four themes of JF Kervegan's book 'The Rational and the Actual'. These are ... more The review focuses on four themes of JF Kervegan's book 'The Rational and the Actual'. These are (a) the structure of ethical life; (b) system and concept; (c) philosophy and reconciliation; and (d) the concept and theodicy.
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Hegel Bulletin, 2020
Hegel's account of ethical life can be shown to contradict Aristotle's in two main ways: first, H... more Hegel's account of ethical life can be shown to contradict Aristotle's in two main ways: first, Hegel follows Kant in emancipating virtue/duty from the particularity associated with the content of motivational drives and with Aristotle's eudaimonia. Hegel thus rejects Aristotelian happiness as the final end of rational action and prioritises duty. However, against Kant, Hegel unites (1) abstract duty and (2) determined drives within a speculative notion of ethical duty: rational agents find happiness in heeding duty's call. Second, Hegel follows Kant in emancipating agency's subjective dimension from the all-encompassing determinacy of Aristotelian substance metaphysics. At the same time and against Kant, Hegel unifies agency's undetermined, subjective dimension with the determinacy of objective norms and habitual praxis: ethical praxis must be animated by undetermined subjectivity whilst being determined. In both cases, Hegel goes beyond Aristotle by resting his argument on the speculative structure of ‘the concept of the will’.
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Hegel and contemporary practical philosophy: Beyond Kantian Constructivism, 2020
Hegel's approach to sociopolitical normativity can be understood as a response to problems that a... more Hegel's approach to sociopolitical normativity can be understood as a response to problems that are also faced by contemporary constructivists and realists. From Hegel's perspective, realists may be able to account for the nonrelative status of norms' content. But they undermine the notion of individual freedom. Meanwhile, constructivists' ability to defend individual freedom comes at the cost of rendering normative content contingent. To avoid these problems, both Aristotle and Kant devise hybrid accounts. However, Aristotle's fundamental commitment to objectivist substance-metaphysics undermines individual choice. Meanwhile, Kant's prioritization of unconditioned individual subjectivity over normative content renders norms subjective. In order to retain both choice-guaranteeing subjectivity and content-defining objectivity, Hegel bases his argument on the metaphysics of "the concept of the will." Within its
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Hegel and contemporary practical philosophy: Beyond Kantian Constructivism, 2020
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A Companion to Nineteenth Century Philosophy, 2019
A systematic summary of Hegel's encyclopaedic philosophy with a general introduction to his metho... more A systematic summary of Hegel's encyclopaedic philosophy with a general introduction to his method and discussions of the Logic, Philosophy of Nature, Philosophy of Geist and concluding remarks about Hegel's non-systematic works.
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Idealismus und Romantik in Jena, 2018
In diesem Kapitel wird argumentiert, dass Hegel als ‚absoluter Idealist‘ zu verstehen ist. Dies b... more In diesem Kapitel wird argumentiert, dass Hegel als ‚absoluter Idealist‘ zu verstehen ist. Dies bedeutet, dass für ihn Philosophie als Wissenschaft der unbedingt-metaphysischen Idee zu verstehen ist. Diese Idee hat drei Formen, nämlich als (1) absolut-logische Idee, (2) Natur und (3) Geist. Dabei wird das Verhältnis der drei Formen der Idee nur in Auseinandersetzung mit Hegels philosophischem Begriff der Philosophie selbst einsichtig: Philosophie bedeutet, dass sich die Idee in Form des Geistes als Idee in Geist und Natur begreift beziehungsweise sich weiß. Dies macht Hegels Idealismus ‚absolut‘ im Sinne von ‚selbstbezüglich‘, da laut seinem Philosophiebegriff (1) die Idee um sich selbst weiß und (2) die Philosophie sich als Selbstwissen der Idee selbst beweisen muss. Philosophie muss also eine ‚Philosophie der Philosophie‘ artikulieren.
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Is Hegel best understood as a distinctly post-Kantian thinker or as an Aristotelian realist/natur... more Is Hegel best understood as a distinctly post-Kantian thinker or as an Aristotelian realist/naturalist? In this chapter, I argue that despite Hegel’s methodological proximity to Aristotle that motivates both thinkers to reject the consciousness-based perspective characteristic of Kant’s transcendental idealism, Hegel’s practical philosophy is distinctly post- Kantian. This is evidenced by (1) Hegel’s concern with the irreducibility of individual agency, (2) his commitment to the Kant-inspired “metaphysics of the concept,” (3) his definition of ethical duty as the highest end and (4) his defence of the irreducible status of the metaphysical realms of nature and Geist.
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Hegels spekulative Beschreibung des vernünftigen Wollens wird von reflexionslogischen und verstan... more Hegels spekulative Beschreibung des vernünftigen Wollens wird von reflexionslogischen und verstandesbasierten Interpretationen unterschieden und mögliche Kritik an seiner Methode beantwortet.
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The relationship between empirical cognition and philosophical knowing in the context of Hegel's ... more The relationship between empirical cognition and philosophical knowing in the context of Hegel's practical philosophy can be elucidated by distinguishing between empirical knowledge (EK), potentially conditioned knowledge (PCPK) and philosophical knowledge (PK). Since PK is ontologically prior to both EK and PCPK, these two do not contradict PK on the same conceptual level: Unlike EK, PK is always already known and the possibilities of doubt and error are confined to " our " , empirically informed and thus potentially conditioned, PCPK-style perspective. This enables an explanation of how to engage with Hegel's claims in the Philosophy of Right: From " our " , PCPK-style perspective, Hegel's PK-claims might have failed to express the unconditioned knowledge actual PK represents. For " us " they are open for potential revision by the always already present standard of PK. Insofar as Hegel failed to express PK and we succeed, true thought is manifest and recognises itself in " our " thinking. When this happens, PK replaces PCPK and the contradiction between PK and PCPK is avoided.
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Hegel's seemingly contradictory assessment of empiricism can be rendered consistent if one distin... more Hegel's seemingly contradictory assessment of empiricism can be rendered consistent if one distinguishes between two ways in which he interprets it: Firstly, as a theory of cognition and secondly, as a theory of ontological truth. While Hegel argues that the former undermines itself due to its inability to establish the universal and necessary validity of its own perspective, he praises the latter for defending the irreducibility of particularity. Still, from Hegel's own stance, a successful account of ontological truth must accommodate what empiricism lacks: A dynamic notion of universality that forms a negative unity with particularity, in which both moments are acknowledged but neither is prioritised. Hegel calls this unity 'the concept' and deduces his own notion of cognition from it, thus equipping it with the universal and necessary status that he finds empiricism's notion of cognition unable to account for.
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In this review of Klaus Vieweg's recent book 'Das Denken der Freiheit' on Hegel's Philosophy of R... more In this review of Klaus Vieweg's recent book 'Das Denken der Freiheit' on Hegel's Philosophy of Right, I argue that although Vieweg impressively illustrates what it means to engage with Hegel's philosophy at methodological eye level, Vieweg's reliance on the structure of syllogistic rather than conceptual reasoning might prove fatal for his attempt to correct the claims Hegel makes about monarchy in the 'Philosophy of Right'.
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Hegel’s Philosophical Psychology, Routledge, 2015
According to Kant, Fichte and Hegel, theoretical reason (cognition) fundamentally differs from pr... more According to Kant, Fichte and Hegel, theoretical reason (cognition) fundamentally differs from practical reason (willing). While the former implies that objectivity is discovered by the subject, the latter suggests that the subject posits objectivity. To render the rational subject’s ability to both know and act intelligible, the two must be united within the same category. In opposition to Damion Buterin’s recent interpretation, I will argue that unlike Fichte, Hegel does not claim that praxis trumps theory in the sense that willing is logically prior to cognition so that cognition can be explained in terms of willing. Instead, Hegel’s category of ‘free mind’ is designed to avoid cognition’s prioritisation of the subject-object difference and willing’s preference for their identity. It suggests that subject and object are both, identical and different, at the same logical time. This inherently speculative notion is not available to either Kant or Fichte because they rely on the method of reflection and its prioritisation requirement.
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The Hegel Bulletin / Volume 35 / Special Issue 02 / October 2014, pp 273 - 291., Oct 2014
Hegel’s account of rational willing has recently been misrepresented by both critics and supporte... more Hegel’s account of rational willing has recently been misrepresented by both critics and supporters who argue that the content of willing is externally received from history, social context, practices of recognition, etc. This contra- dicts the conceptual structure of Hegel’s notion of rational action as free indi- viduality, according to which the difference between the willing subject and the content of willing is an internal relation of identity. Since this ‘difference within identity’ can only be grasped by speculative thinking and not through under- standing and reflection, the interpreters can be charged with employing the wrong method. Although reliance on the speculative method opens Hegel to the charge of unintelligibility, it helps explain the frequent misrepresentations of his account of freedom and why methodologically uninformed comparisons between Hegel and other thinkers run the risk of being counterproductive.
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Papers by Sebastian Stein
INTERPRETING HEGEL'S
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT
EXPOSITIONS AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY
READINGS
Edited by
Ivan Boldyrev and Sebastian Stein
1) Hannes Kuch. Herr und Knecht. Anerkennung und symbolische Macht im Anschluss an Hegel. Frankfurt a. M. und New York: Campus, 2013. 327 S.
und
2) Folko Zander. Herrschaft und Knechtschaft. Die Genese des Selbstbewusstseins in Hegels ‚Phä- nomenologie des Geistes‘. Ein Kommentar. Paderborn: Fink, 2014. 237 S.