Economics

Most of the economic models on basic income account just for pecuniary forms of work, i. e. “time spent making money”, in employment. This restriction is a drawback of these analyses and of the standard economic labor supply model itself. If one wants to understand the potential effects of basic income on individual and social welfare, one should not restrict observation to the pecuniary uses of time. The objective of this contribution is to rethink the meaning of work usually applied in economic models, based on contributions of other social scientists. This reassessment is undertaken through the development of a microeconomic model, which discusses the effects of basic income on time use and interprets work not just as a source of income, but also of non-pecuniary benefits. Further, we disentangle the usual work-leisure dichotomy in two other ones (paid and unpaid time/unpaid work and leisure).

Most of the economic models on basic income account just for pecuniary forms of work, i. e. “time spent making money”, in employment. This restriction is a drawback of these analyses and of the standard economic labor supply model itself. If one wants to understand the potential effects of basic income on individual and social welfare, one should not restrict observation to the pecuniary uses of time. The objective of this contribution is to rethink the meaning of work usually applied in economic models, based on contributions of other social scientists. This reassessment is undertaken through the development of a microeconomic model, which discusses the effects of basic income on time use and interprets work not just as a source of income, but also of non-pecuniary benefits. Further, we disentangle the usual work-leisure dichotomy in two other ones (paid and unpaid time/unpaid work and leisure).

Abstract This paper deals with problems economists face in formulating a pure economic theory of justice. It is shown that constitutional economics as an approach giving opportunity to endogenize equity in an economic calculus, is only of limited use. It is criticized furthermore that economists neglect the basic problern of universalistic versus local justice. They have not contributed much to the problems of (equitable) implementation and enforcement of norms of justice either. Yet some applications cover the full range of social relations (altruistic preferences, faimess of contracts, political fairness, intergenerational equity), and Iead to an interdisciplinary design of research where the findings of other disciplines are integrated in economic research and methodological advantages of economic theory contribute to noneconomic disciplines

What sets a consolidated democracy apart? We argue that the expectation that under the rule of law a law-abiding government will not enforce the unlawful acts of its predecessor creates incentives for agents - such as members of the civil service or law enforcement agencies - not to comply with such acts. Thus, even an opportunistic government may find it in its best interest to abide by constitutional rules or, once it has been in violation, to reinstate the legal order. If so, the government contributes to its own punishment and agents’ expectations are self-fulfilling. Thus the rule of law has instrumental value in stabilizing the constitutional order. We also provide a theoretical explanation of the empirical distinction between consolidated and transitory liberal democracies and we explain why consolidated democracies are likely to stave off populist challenges.

The authors characterize equilibria of an income reporting game with bounded returns and no commitment where detected tax evaders are charged the maximally feasible amount. Introducing partial commitment to punishment relief eliminates multiplicity of equilibria. The authors identify a unique limit equilibrium where the poorest citizens evade, intermediate citizens are honest, and the richest citizens are indifferent between evading and truth telling. For small tax rates and auditing cost, committing to a discretionary punishment relief scheme increases expected tax revenue.

Adaptation to the consequences of climate change has attracted increasing interest as a necessary complement to greenhouse gas mitigation. Economic approaches to climate adaptation are rarely articulated and discussed explicitly despite many benefits of such a framework-level discourse. Therefore, this article investigates how climate adaptation is framed and approached in economics and attempts to contribute to the development of economic frameworks of climate adaptation. First, the paper identifies and critically reviews four major strands of current adaptation economics: estimation of adaptation benefits and costs, strategies for adaptation, the role of markets and governments, and policy instruments for adaptation. While having their merits, serious methodical difficulties prevail. Moreover, the applied neoclassical framing seems too narrow to capture the plethora of governance challenges and normative criteria revealed in adaptation policy discourses and in the multidisciplinar...

We show when and how the principles of efficiency and equality might come together and develop a fairness compensation test. A simple graphical analysis is applied. If the faimess compensation test fails, efficiency and justice cannot be fully connected and a wedge between econornic and faimess principles remains. We discuss how important this wedge might be and argue that there does not exist a principle of systematic antinomy between efficiency and faimess.

Recent neuroeconomic studies challenge the conventional economic logic of behavior. After an introduction to some starting points of brain research in ‘classical’ economics we discuss the final and contingent causes of rational and irrational behavior in neuroeconomics and standard economics and present the concept of expanded rationality models (ERM) which imports neuroeconomic elements like emotions, beliefs and neuroscientific constraints and exports improved testable predictions. The typical structure of neuroeconomic proof of economic models and the imprecise neuroscientific measurement let us suggest a feed-back structure of economic research. We apply Hirshleifer’s conception of macro-/micro-technology and contrast it to the neuroeconomic black box critique on economic theory. Furthermore, instead of direct adjustment of preference structures we propose the auxiliary creation of neuroeconomic constraints like action-dependent or outcome-dependent neuroeconomic belief constrai...

We show when and how the principles of efficiency and equality might come together and develop a fairness compensation test. A simple graphical analysis is applied. If the faimess compensation test fails, efficiency and justice cannot be fully connected and a wedge between econornic and faimess principles remains. We discuss how important this wedge might be and argue that there does not exist a principle of systematic antinomy between efficiency and faimess.

The rapidly spreading COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 not only brought many countries in the world to a state of health crisis, but also increasingly drove economic and social crisis. The roots of these crises, however, run far deeper and can be traced to decades of neoliberal political and economic actions and driving forces of globalization. Increasing globalization and liberalization of markets led to the increasing privatization of many public goods while collectivizing risks such as environmental disasters, pandemics and economic crises. This paper presents the context and emergence of these crisis states and derives public policy implications in the areas of externalities management, digitalization, and basic income based on a broad literature review. These key issues need to be addressed both during and after the crisis in order to address the problems of environmental quality and climate change mitigation, as well as rising inequality and injustice for current and future generations.

Recent neuroeconomic studies challenge the conventional economic logic of behavior. After an introduction to some starting points of brain research in ‘classical’ economics we discuss the final and contingent causes of rational and irrational behavior in neuroeconomics and standard economics and present the concept of expanded rationality models (ERM) which imports neuroeconomic elements like emotions, beliefs and neuroscientific constraints and exports improved testable predictions. The typical structure of neuroeconomic proof of economic models and the imprecise neuroscientific measurement let us suggest a feed-back structure of economic research. We apply Hirshleifer’s conception of macro-/micro-technology and contrast it to the neuroeconomic black box critique on economic theory. Furthermore, instead of direct adjustment of preference structures we propose the auxiliary creation of neuroeconomic constraints like action-dependent or outcome-dependent neuroeconomic belief constrai...