Magna Inacio

A chegada de um novo presidente, após uma alternância de poder, alimenta as expectativas de reorientação das políticas do governo que se foi e de que novas agendas políticas sinalizem os tempos futuros. A posse do presidente Lula, 9.° presidente do Brasil eleito pelo voto popular e direto desde a redemocratização, mostrou, mais vez, que a alternância democrática é uma força motriz do presidencialismo brasileiro.

Mas essa foi uma transição presidencial singular e sem precedentes. A eleição polarizada, por margem estreita de votos, e a contestação da vitória do presidente deu sinais de que a transição presidencial estaria longe de ser pacífica. Resistências do então presidente Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022) e de seus assessores em conduzir a transferência de poder, inclusive a recusa de passar a faixa presidencial, tornaram transição presidencial ainda mais custosa.

A despeito das regras disciplinando esse processo, o acesso às estruturas da administração federal pelas equipes de transição foi constrangido, elevando os custos de informação e de definição das prioridades para a agenda inaugural do novo governo. O dia 8 de janeiro de 2023, com os ataques violentos às sedes dos três Poderes da República, mostrou a disposição dos derrotados de ir além, de interromper inconstitucionalmente, o governo em seus primeiros dias. Como já observado em outros países, esse cenário não deixou dúvidas sobre a gravidade e os desafios colocados à transição presidencial após um governo radicalizado e extremista.

Mas a transição presidencial e as expectativas em relação ao novo governo foram ainda temperadas pela situação sem precedentes de um  terceiro mandato, não consecutivo, do presidente eleito. De um lado, a experiência e expertise do presidente e dos assessores nas administrações anteriores foram vistos como ativos importantes diante do esforço de revisão de políticas e realinhamento das estruturas governamentais após a gestão Bolsonaro. De outro, indagações sobre quão novo e capaz o governo irá se revelar diante de desafios políticos e administrativos muito  distintos daqueles vivenciados na era PT na presidência (2003-2016).

O livro Democracia e Eleições no Brasil: para onde vamos?  reúne um diversos especialistas que buscam interpretar o cenário político e social das eleições brasileiras de 2022. Mais do que uma análise da dinâmica eleitoral, o livro explora os sentidos das eleições de 2022 para a demo- cracia brasileira. Para tanto, explora os três principais componentes da política brasileira no cenário eleitoral: o contexto político-institucional das eleições; os atores do processo eleitoral e a agenda de políticas relevantes no pós-eleitoral.

Download gratuito no link https://lojahucitec.com.br/produto/democracia-e-eleicoes-no-brasil-para-onde-vamos-magna-inacio-vanessa-elias-de-oliveira-orgs/

This article analyzes the redesign and the dynamics of the presidential center in Brazil since the democratic transition (1986-2014). This analysis is undertaken in light of the coordination challenges problems of coordinating multi-party enclosures in a context of strong party fragmentation, the different reform agendas undertaken by the presidents and the leadership style that they exercise in the office. The main argument is that the design of this center, despite the growing strength of its structures, is swinging and responding to Presidents’ strategies to coordinate their cabinets. The sharing of resources and responsibilities between presidents and coalition members is selective and organizationally differentiated.  I built a typology of the Presidential centers differencing four models: cabinet; presidency-centered cabinet; hypertrophied presidency; and ministerial dominance. Presidents’ coordination strategies vary from the centralization of the priority tasks of governments within the presidency to delegation of these tasks to strategic ministries. The centrality of the coordinating ministries has been persistent, but with variation in the degree of autonomy of these ministries vis-à-vis Presidency agencies. This study of the presidential center in Brazil presents the oscillating process of the centralization of government coordination tasks along eight (08) presidential terms and under the coordination of 07 (seven) presidents.

In this chapter, I analyze the portfolio allocation decisions in Brazilian politics, mostly known by its fertile soil for coalitional presidentialism. The multiparty coalition has been associated with political stability after redemocratization, despite notable ministerial turnover and cabinet reshuffles. I seek to illuminate how these apparently opposite outcomes can be understood in light of the presidents’ decisions on cabinet politics. Considering their institutional and partisan strength and the political environment, I look at how Brazilian presidents avoid or maneuver around some crossroads through portfolio allocation strategies.

This chapter analyzes the presidential leadership in an institutionally robust presidency. Leadership effectiveness depends on the president’s ability to anticipate, within a given conflict structure, rules and available resources, those actions that might promote certain goals and achievements. I analyze three dimensions involved in presidential leadership: social background, personal attributes, and institutional factors. By exploring the overlaps of these dimensions, I sought to identify the variants of leadership immersed in an institutional arrangement that places the chief executive at the center of the decision-making process. The wide array of presidential powers might incentive unilateral actions from presidents in a strongly fragmented multiparty democracy. However, the analysis indicated how this robustness of the Brazilian presidency was fine-tuned by the institutional arrangement that places limits and reshapes presidents’ possible actions. The analysis focused on the experience of two Brazilian presidents, Cardoso and Lula, for 16 years during the post-redemocratization period.

This chapter brings together different strands of literature to, first, analyse the procedures and pathways followed for the selection of chief executives in democratic regimes with directly elected presidents; and, second, the attributes of those who are elected. Presidential elections are an electorally challenging and politically strategic contest shaped by different institutional, partisan, and contextual factors. We show that the parties’ and candidates’ moves in the selection process particularly depend on whether it occurs in one or in several stages and on which selection method is used. We identify candidate-centered and party-centered nominations as well as situations of self-recruitment. We analyse how the interaction of legal and party variables explain different outcomes in terms of candidate profile. Three distinctive aspects are highlighted in the literature when we come to presidential profiles: the extent to which the candidate is a party-loyal person; what kind of previous political experience he or she has; and what his or her typical social background is.

This article focuses on the evolution of the institutional presidency in six Latin American presidential democracies since the last wave of redemocratization. Institutional presidency refers to the bulk of agencies that operate under direct presidential authority and are in charge of supporting the presidential leadership. We document all structural changes occurring under the umbrella of the president for the period of analysis. We find that the expansion in the number of presidential agencies is a deliberate response to situations of conflict or weakness. It is more likely under coalitional presidentialism—when presidents must share cabinet positions and manage relationships with coalition partners—as well as when presidents implement structural reform policies to face critical economic circumstances.

Decretos administrativos são emitidos pelo Poder Executivo com o objetivo de controlar despesas, agências, ministérios e planos do governo. Apesar de serem textos de importância estratégica, no Brasil não existem classificações agregadas que explicitam as áreas de influência de cada um desses documentos. Sendo assim, neste trabalho apresentamos duas metodologias de classificação e sua automatização através de algoritmos clássicos e do estado da arte em aprendizado de máquina para modelagem textual. Nossos resultados explicitam desempenho de cerca de 80% de F1-score para alguns desses modelos, além de apresentarem uma visão geral desse tipo de dado e suas possibilidades e culminarem com a ampliação da transparência das ações e decisões do Poder Executivo Federal.

The recently established presidents in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru are seeking to implement governmental agendas that represent a policy shift with respect to previous administrations. However, in doing so, they face political and social constraints. Executive politics – that is, the presidential approach to the design of the highest executive agencies and appointment strategies – stands out as a tool to improve presidential leeway and coordination capacity.

This paper dissects the potential of state-of-the-art computational analysis to promote the investigation of government’s administrative decisions and politics. The Executive Branch generates massive amounts of textual data comprising daily decisions in several levels and stages of the law and decree-making processes. The use of automated text analysis to explore this data based on the substantive interests of scholars runs into computational challenges. Computational methods have been applied to texts from the Legislative and Judicial Branches; however, there barely are suitable taxonomies to automate the classification and analysis of the Executive’s administrative decrees. To solve this problem, we put forward a computational framework to analyze the Brazilian administrative decrees from 2000 to 2019. Our strategy to uncover the contents and patterns of the presidential decree-making is developed in three main steps. First, we conduct an unsupervised text analysis through the LDA...

This paper dissects the potential of state-of-the-art computational analysis to promote the investigation of government's administrative decisions and politics. The Executive Branch generates massive amounts of textual data comprising daily decisions in several levels and stages of the law and decree-making processes. The use of automated text analysis to explore this data based on the substantive interests of scholars runs into computational challenges. Computational methods have been applied to texts from the Legislative and Judicial Branches; however, there barely are suitable taxonomies to automate the classification and analysis of the Executive's administrative decrees. To solve this problem, we put forward a computational framework to analyze the Brazilian administrative decrees from 2000 to 2019. Our strategy to uncover the contents and patterns of the presidential decreemaking is developed in three main steps. First, we conduct an unsupervised text analysis through the LDA algorithm for topic modeling. Second, building upon the LDA results, we propose two taxonomies for the classification of decrees: (a) the ministerial coauthorship of the decrees to map policy areas and (b) the decrees' fields of law based on a tagging system provided by the Brazilian Senate. Using these taxonomies, we compare the performance of three supervised text classification algorithms: SVM, Convolutional Neural Network, and Hierarchical Attention Network, achieving F1-scores of up to 80% when automatically classifying decrees. Third, we analyze the network generated by links between decrees through centrality and clustering approaches, distinguishing a set of administrative decisions related to the president's priorities in the economic policy area. Our findings confirm the potential of our computational framework to explore N-large datasets, advance exploratory studies, and generate testable propositions in different research areas. They advance the monitoring of Brazil's administrative decree-making process that is shaped by the president's priorities and by the interplay among cabinet members.

In this article we propose an innovative comparative analysis of cabinet reshuffles in Latin American presidential systems, focusing on personal incentives as drivers of ministerial turnover. We analyse when and why risks of reputational damage to a president drive cabinet changes. These risks are contingent and dependent upon the interaction between a president's reputational assets, on the one hand, and the high ‘walk-away value’ of the minister, on the other. We argue that ministerial turnover is a function of presidents' political and reputational resources as well as of exogenous factors. However, who is fired from the cabinet depends on the ministers' walk-away values and how threatened the president feels by them. We analyse cabinet changes in single-party and multiparty presidential governments in Latin America. Our results confirm the explanatory power of personal incentives to better understand the mechanisms that drive cabinet reshuffles.

Este livro oferece ao leitor um estudo sobre a percepcao e a compreensao que os parlamentares tem de seu papel, suas obrigacoes, suas funcoes e suas expectativas como representantes eleitos. O livro inclui analises sobre o impacto do perfil socio- economico dos legisladores sobre a qualidade da democracia; as formas como os deputados avaliam os arranjos politicos em vigor e como se posicionam diante da tematica do desenvolvimento e do papel do estado.

El artículo examina la elección de los ministros y estima las posibilidades de selección de los políticos profesionales vis-à-vis la selección de técnicos o políticos novatos en gabinetes multipartidistas. La selección ministerial es analizada como un cálculo partidario para convertir la designación ministerial en un recurso para la retención y/o proyección de sus cuadros partidarios. Se testearon dos hipótesis: a) la lealtad, los vínculos partidarios y la pertenencia a partidos competitivos aumentan las chances de selección de políticos profesionales para el cargo de ministro; b) las probabilidades de selección de políticos novatos o tecnócratas aumentan con la expertise o la pertenencia a partidos en fase de expansión organizacional. El análisis se concentra en los gobiernos multipartidistas formados en Brasil (1995-2010). Los resultados muestran que la trayectoria dentro del partido es decisiva para la selección de políticos profesionales, mientras que la pertenencia al partido d...

This article analyzes the microfoundations of support for governors in Brazil based on a decision model in which deputies attempt to reduce their electoral risks. This model considers the effects of the individual backgrounds of legislators, party strength, and the dynamics of political competition in states. We used ordinary least square regression models to estimate the chances of a legislator to adopt an oppositional stance. The results confirm the multidimensional nature of the government-building process in Brazil. Adhesion is not only coordinated on a partisan basis, but it is also shaped by perceptions of electoral risks, as well as by expected rewards that different political careers and partisan linkages shape.

Introduction The assessment of presidential power has been a central object of analysis in studies on Latin American presidentialism. The initial focus on the personal attributes of the leadership later moved on to approaches centered on institutional features. Many studies have examined the use of vetoes and agenda-setting powers to explain the different dynamics and performance of the executive powers of the region (among others, Shugart and Carey 1992; Carey and Shugart 1998; Figueiredo and Limongi 1999; Tsebelis and Aleman 2005). Despite significant progress in this literature, the organizational conditions on which presidents rely to exert their institutional prerogative remain under-researched. Most importantly, there has been no analysis of whether presidents have needed to modify such conditions in order to maintain control of or improve their ability to coordinate the governments over which they preside. This study sheds light on these questions by undertaking the first steps for a comparative study of Latin American institutional presidencies after re-democratization. (1) Our research concentrates on the cluster of agencies that form the "core executive" (Peters et al 2000) or the "institutional presidency" (Moe 1993, 2000). These agencies are part of the bureaucracy of the executive branch, but they are not located within the executive cabinet; their defining characteristic is that they operate under the direct authority of the president and are responsible for supporting the presidential leadership (Dickinson 2005). To enable the study of these agencies, we have created an original dataset that documents all structural changes that have occurred under the umbrella of the president in six countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay) since the beginning of re-democratization. We observe that presidents have deliberately changed the structures supporting them over the years. The institutional presidency has at times been expanded and at other times reduced, and we inquire as to the causes of such evolutions. In particular, we are interested in exploring under what conditions the institutional presidencies have evolved throughout the last two to three decades of democratic rule. In general terms, our study follows the specialized literature, according to which changes in the institutional design of the presidency are associated with political and governmental challenges occurring in the broader political system. Presidents respond to situations of conflict or weakness by strengthening the structures that directly support them. However, we adjust this approach to Latin American realities by introducing an explanatory factor--the type of government--that has not been dealt with in the abovementioned literature. Thus, we assess whether there are differences in the evolution of the institutional presidency according to the number of political parties that form the government. We assume that single-party and coalition governments pose different challenges for the president. Similarly, we expect that the resources available to presidents and the liberty with which presidents move to respond to emerging problems vary according to the number of parties that make up the government. Of the many changes that have affected presidential support structures over the years, this article particularly analyzes the evolution of the units or agencies of support. Following Moe (1985, 1993, 2000), an increase in the number of presidential agencies can be regarded as "centralization"--that is, a shifting of the functions of the wider executive branch to the core executive; while, conversely, "decentralization" occurs when presidents remove agencies from their direct authority and place them under the authority of a cabinet minister instead. Although investigating the movement of agencies provides only a partial picture of the many changes occurring under the presidential umbrella, it still adds to our current knowledge on the strategic behavior of presidents. …

ResumoEste artigo investiga a dinâmica de controle político entre Executivo e Legislativo sob o presidencialismo de coalizão no Brasil, com foco nos efeitos da delegação das tarefas de governo para o gabinete multipartidário. Argumentamos que as chances de controle horizontal, relativo ao monitoramento mútuo entre os partidos da coalizão, variam de acordo com o partido, o gabinete ministerial e as características das comissões parlamentares. O referente empírico da análise corresponde aos gabinetes presidenciais no Brasil no período de 1995 a 2010. Os resultados demonstram que a capacidade de controle horizontal de uma área de política pelo partido ministerial está relacionada à área temática considerada, às características da coalizão governante e aos partidos que ocupam os ministérios.

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This section analyzes government responses to the COVID-19 pandemic in five Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Mexico, and Uruguay. The articles address the pandemic's evolution and emergency policy construction in these countries, emphasizing the dynamics of cooperation and conflict between presidents, congresses, bureaucracies, and subnational governments. The articles point to factors that contributed to varying degrees of governance of the crisis, from presidential leadership to government action's structural limits. In particular, studies allow for a more exhaustive assessment of presidents' responses, ranging from presidential inaction, populist rhetoric, and politically costly decision-making.

O livro Legislativo brasileiro em perspectiva comparada, organizado pelos cientistas políticos Magna Inácio (UFMG) e Lúcio Rennó (UnB), oferece ao leitor um painel das principais tendências dos estudos sobre o Poder Legislativo no Brasil e na América Latina. A obra foi lançada pela Editora UFMG.

This paper focuses on the evolution of the institutional presidency – meaning the cluster of agencies that directly support the chief of the executive – in Argentina and Brazil since their redemocratization in the 1980s. It investigates what explains the changes that have come about regarding the size of the institutional presidency and the types of agency that form it. Following the specialized literature, we argue that the growth of the institutional presidency is connected to developments occurring in the larger political system – that is, to the political challenges that the various presidents of the two countries have faced. Presidents adjust the format and mandate of the different agencies under their authority so as to better manage their relations with the political environment. In particular, we argue that the type of government (coalition or single-party) has had consequences for the structure of the presidency or, in other words, that different cabinet structures pose different challenges to presidents. This factor has not played a significant role in presidency-related studies until now, which have hitherto mostly been based on the case of the United States. Our empirical references, the presidencies of Argentina and Brazil, typical cases of coalitional as well as single-party presidentialism respectively allow us to show the impact of the type of government on the number and type of presidential agencies.

O livro Legislativo brasileiro em perspectiva comparada, organizado pelos cientistas políticos Magna Inácio (UFMG) e Lúcio Rennó (UnB), oferece ao leitor um painel das principais tendências dos estudos sobre o Poder Legislativo no Brasil e na América Latina. A obra foi lançada pela Editora UFMG.

The political turmoil and the president's response to the Covid-19 pandemic demonstrate how quickly the political environment in Brazil is deteriorating.  institutional checks and defeats of the Executive show the vigilance of the Congress and Judiciary, on the one hand, over the inaction of the Executive branch and, on the other hand, the president’s power-grab attempts during the emergency. All in all, the mechanisms of checks and balances are still working, although under increasingly high costs. However, the battles are becoming steadily more pitched between institutional branches of government.

Desde el inicio de su mandato, Jair Bolsonaro no dejó ninguna duda sobre su voluntad de gobernar unilateralmente. Bolsonaro parece haber aprendido rápidamente cómo usar el unilateralismo administrativo. Si el unilateralismo presidencial de Bolsonaro ha tenido menos éxito en el ámbito legislativo, en el administrativo ha aumentado la capacidad del Gobierno para reorientar las políticas y aplicar su programa. Para que el Congreso contenga el unilateralismo presidencial, debería ocuparse de la dimensión administrativa de las políticas públicas.

A eleição de pessoas com pouca ou nenhuma experiência política e partidária é conhecida como 'outsiderism', mas nem sempre isso significa correr por fora da política 23 OUT 2018-23:56 CEST A face mais visível da eleição no Brasil em 2018 é o grande número de novatos e outsiders. Para muitos, renovação política e punição à elite política imersa em escândalos de corrupção. Os discursos anti-Brasília e antissistema ungiram Jair Bolsonaro como seu porta-voz, a despeito de seus quase trinta anos em que fez parte do jogo como legislador. A renovação tsunami de 52% na Câmara dos Deputados e 85% no Senado abalou partidos e bancadas parlamentares. Além disso, alimentaram o sprint final dos outsiders competindo nos Estados.

This paper addresses the use of unilateral actions, executed through executive decrees, from a comparative perspective. We have developed a model of presidential unilateral action centered on three dimensions: legislative powers, inter-branch conflicts and cabinet divisiveness. Does the use of these administrative actions vary according to the level of partisan and intra-cabinet conflicts? How does the congress prevent the president from using administrative powers that surpass the limits of delegated powers? Our hypothesis is: the use of unilateral administrative initiatives (regulatory decrees, presidential directives) is conditioned upon their legislative regulation, presidents’ party strength and intra-cabinet divisiveness. We find that presidents who have broader discretion, backed by political majorities and large EOPs, tend to issue larger numbers of decrees. However, these trends are tempered by political dynamics that work to restrain unilateral politics. First, the effect of greater legislative power is not the same when the presidents bring other parties to the cabinet table. Second, if majority status implies that presidents will face parties more powerful than their own at this table, they probably will be more cautious about using decrees. The empirical analysis focuses on the use of administrative powers by the presidents of the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Colombia since 1990.

This paper addresses the use of unilateral actions, executed through executive decrees, from a comparative perspective. We have developed a model of presidential unilateral action centered on three dimensions: legislative powers, inter-branch conflicts and cabinet divisiveness. Does the use of these administrative actions vary according to the level of partisan and intra-cabinet conflicts? How does the congress prevent the president from using administrative powers that surpass the limits of delegated powers? Our hypothesis is: the use of unilateral administrative initiatives (regulatory decrees, presidential directives) is conditioned upon their legislative regulation, presidents’ party strength and intra-cabinet divisiveness. We find that presidents who have broader discretion, backed by political majorities and large EOPs, tend to issue larger numbers of decrees. However, these trends are tempered by political dynamics that work to restrain unilateral politics. First, the effect of greater legislative power is not the same when the presidents bring other parties to the cabinet table. Second, if majority status implies that presidents will face parties more powerful than their own at this table, they probably will be more cautious about using decrees. The empirical analysis focuses on the use of administrative powers by the presidents of the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Colombia since 1990.

In this presentation, I analyze the Presidential Center in Brazil since the re-democratization process. I argue that the geometry of the Presidential Center contains two vectors of Presidential choices, the degree of centralization of coordination of the cabinet in the Presidential Office and the degree of sharing or withholding the policy-making processes between the Presidency and the ministries. Based on these vectors, I built a typology of presidential Center: (a) Cabinet; (b)Ministerial Dominance; (c) Presidency-centered cabinet; and (d) Hypertrophied presidency.

Is the coalitional presidentialism a power-sharing structure, that is, how constrained are the presidents to share their power with cabinet parties? Or, alternately, can presidents implement strategies to delegate decision-making powers among cabinet members in a selective way? In this presentation, I argue that the redesign of the Presidency in Brazil is a president’s strategy for selectively sharing the power with coalition partners.