- cloos@ucsb.edu
Christopher M Cloos
University of California, Santa Barbara, Philosophy, Department Member
- Ethics, Metaethics, Epistemology, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Mind, Free Will and Moral Responsibility, and 15 morePhilosophy of Agency, Political Philosophy, Philosophy Of Law, Practical Reasons and Rationality, Skepticism, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Norms, Epistemic Value, Internalism/Externalism, Normativity, Evidentialism, Ethics of Belief, Knowledge, Epistemic Normativity, and Evidenceedit
- A philosopher helping people learn philosophy and think critically about life's ultimate questions.edit
Research Interests:
One strategy for dealing with apparent cases of knowledge from falsehood is to deny that the knowledge actually is from a falsehood. Those endorsing such a move have suggested that cases of knowledge from falsehood are instead cases of... more
One strategy for dealing with apparent cases of knowledge from falsehood is to deny that the knowledge actually is from a falsehood. Those endorsing such a move have suggested that cases of knowledge from falsehood are instead cases of knowledge despite falsehood. We here provide a dilemma for those wanting to reject the possibility of knowledge from falsehood. The dilemma is explained in part by examining recent attempts to deny that knowledge can be inferentially derived from falsehood.
Research Interests:
When is a person justified in believing a proposition? In this paper, I defend a view according to which a person is justified in believing a proposition just in case the person’s evidence sufficiently supports the proposition and the... more
When is a person justified in believing a proposition? In this paper, I defend a view according to which a person is justified in believing a proposition just in case the person’s evidence sufficiently supports the proposition and the person responsibly acquired and sustained the evidence that supports the proposition. This view overcomes a deficiency in a prominent theory of epistemic justification. As championed by Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, Evidentialism is a theory subject to counterexamples at the hands of cases involving epistemic irresponsibility. I critically discuss such a case as put forward by Jason Baehr. After providing an argument that clarifies why the case is problematic for Evidentialism, I defend my argument from a response by Earl Conee. Then I develop a theory of epistemic justification capable of handling cases involving epistemic irresponsibility, and I defend this theory from evidentialist objections.