Papers by Michele Palmira
Erkenntnis, 2021
Permissivism is the view that, sometimes, there is more than one doxastic attitude that is perfec... more Permissivism is the view that, sometimes, there is more than one doxastic attitude that is perfectly rationalised by the evidence. Impermissivism is the denial of Permissivism. Several philosophers, with the aim to defend either Impermissivism or Permissivism, have recently discussed the value of (im)permissive rationality. This paper focuses on one kind of value-conferring considerations, stemming from the so-called "truth-connection" enjoyed by rational doxastic attitudes. The paper vindicates the truth-connected value of permissive rationality by pursuing a novel strategy which rests on two main planks: first, there is a distinction between a fine-grained and a coarse-grained type-individuation of belief-forming methods. Secondly, different kinds of decision-theoretic reasoning, i.e. expected-accuracy reasoning and accuracy-domination reasoning, must be paired with a fine-grained and a coarse-grained type-individuation of methods, respectively. I argue that while the first pair is wholly irrelevant to the question of the truth-connection, the second affords the means to a permissivist explanation of the truth-connected value of rationality.
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Metaphilosophy, 2021
Hinge epistemology maintains that that our justification and knowledge of empirical propositions ... more Hinge epistemology maintains that that our justification and knowledge of empirical propositions always take place within a system of hinge propositions, such as that there exists an external world. Hinge epistemology has to dispel the worry that disagreeing over hinges is rationally inert. In a companion piece (Coliva and Palmira 2020), we offer a constitutivist solution to the problem of rational inertia by maintaining that a Humean sceptic and a hinge epistemologist disagree over the correct explication of the concept of epistemic rationality. In this paper we explore the implications of such a solution. First, we clarify in what sense a disagreement over genuine hinges would be a conceptual disagreement. Secondly, we use considerations about the (alleged) rational inertia of hinge disagreement to offer a test whereby to demarcate genuine hinges from merely entrenched beliefs. Thirdly, we offer a response to the shm-challenge, that is, the challenge of explaining why we have reason to engage in the epistemic practices hinges are constitutive of in the first place. Fourthly, we argue that the constitutivist approach to hinge disagreement does not result in a relativist view.
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Philosophical Studies, 2020
In this paper I aim to illuminate the significance of thought insertion for debates about the fir... more In this paper I aim to illuminate the significance of thought insertion for debates about the first-person concept. My starting point is the often-voiced contention that thought insertion might challenge the thesis that introspection-based self-ascriptions of psychological properties are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person concept. In the first part of the paper I explain what a thought insertion-based counterexample to this immunity thesis should be like. I then argue that various thought insertion-involving scenarios do not give rise to successful counterexamples to the immunity of the target class of self-ascriptions. In the second part of the paper I turn to defend a Metasemantic Explanation of why the immunity thesis holds. The Metasemantic Explanation rests on a reference-fixing story about the mental 'I' whose key contention is that introspective impressions play an essential role in fixing its reference. It is part of my argument in favour of the proposed reference-fixing story, as well as of the Metasemantic Explanation, that they respect the paradigmatic features of self-ascriptions of inserted thoughts.
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Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2020
The paper focuses on the phenomenon of forming one's judgement about epistemic matters, such as w... more The paper focuses on the phenomenon of forming one's judgement about epistemic matters, such as whether one has some reason not to believe false propositions, on the basis of the opinion of somebody one takes to be an expert about them. The paper pursues three aims. First, it argues that some cases of expert deference about epistemic matters are suspicious. Secondly, it provides an explanation of such a suspiciousness. Thirdly, it draws the metaepistemological implications of the proposed explanation.
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M Kusch (ed.) Social epistemology and epistemic relativism, Routledge, 2020, 2020
The aim of this chapter is to take up two problems that supporters of hinge epistemology have to ... more The aim of this chapter is to take up two problems that supporters of hinge epistemology have to face: the lost hinge disagreement problem and the problem of rational inertia. The lost hinge disagreement problem challenges the very possibility of disagreeing over hinges. The problem of rational inertia is, in a nutshell, the problem that we can never rationally resolve our hinge disagreements. We first argue that we can make sense of genuine hinge disagreement in a limited but epistemologically significant number of cases by deploying the notion of deflationary truth. Focusing on such cases, we then turn to the problem of rational inertia. We begin with critically examining an attempt at solving the problem that rests on an entitlement version of hinge epistemology championed by Crispin Wright. We then develop a solution to the problem of rational inertia which deploys the resources of the constitutivist version of hinge epistemology. The key contention of the constitutivist-based solution is that a disagreement between a hinge epistemologist and a sceptic concerns the correct explication of the concept of epistemic rationality. Interpreted this way, the disagreement between a constitutivist and a sceptic is not rationally inert: first, a constitutivist offers a reason why we should take her explication of the concept of rationality to be superior to the sceptic's; and second, a sceptic cannot simply dismiss the constitutivist's stance as merely dogmatic or ad hoc, but must engage with the constitutivist pattern of reasoning head on.
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Thought
In this note I defend nonreductionism about understanding by arguing that knowledge is neither n... more In this note I defend nonreductionism about understanding by arguing that knowledge is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding. To do so, I examine Paulina Sliwa’s recent (Sliwa 2015, 2017) defence of knowledge-based Reductionism (Reductionism for short). Sliwa claims that one understands why p if and only if one has a sufficient amount of knowledge why p. Sliwa also contends that Reductionism is supported by intuitive verdicts about our uses of ‘understanding why’ and ‘knowing why’. In reply, I first argue that Sliwa’s Reductionism leads to a vicious infinite regress. Secondly, I defuse the motivation in favour of Reductionism by showing how the linguistic data can be accommodated within a Nonreductionist framework.
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In this paper I take up the question of the nature of the doxastic attitudes we entertain while i... more In this paper I take up the question of the nature of the doxastic attitudes we entertain while inquiring into some matter. Relying on a distinction between two stages of open inquiry, I urge to acknowledge the existence of a distinctive attitude of cognitive inclination towards a proposition qua answer to the question one is inquiring into. I call this attitude “hypothesis”. Hypothesis, I argue, is a sui generis doxastic attitude which differs, both functionally and normatively, from suspended judgement, full belief, credences, and acceptance. In closing, I point to the epistemological significance of hypothesis. More specifically, I contend that holding an attitude of hypothesis enables us to respond rationally to peer disagreement, and I suggest that such an attitude offers a suitable articulation of the view, originally put forward by Philip Kitcher, that cognitive diversity in inquiry has epistemic benefits.
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Helen Beebee (2018) defends a view of the aims of philosophy she calls ‘equilibrism’. Equilibrism... more Helen Beebee (2018) defends a view of the aims of philosophy she calls ‘equilibrism’. Equilibrism denies that philosophy aims at knowledge and maintains that the collective aim of philosophy is ‘to find what equilibria there are that can withstand examination’ (Beebee 2018, p. 3). In this note, I probe equilibrism by focusing on how disagreement challenges our doxastic commitment to our own philosophical theories. Call this the Commitment Challenge. I argue that the Commitment Challenge comes in three varieties and that endorsing equilibrism provides us with an answer to one of them only.
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The paper explores the idea that some singular judgements about the natural numbers are immune to... more The paper explores the idea that some singular judgements about the natural numbers are immune to error through misidentification by pursuing a comparison between arithmetic judgements and first-person judgements. By doing so, the first part of the paper offers a conciliatory resolution of the Coliva-Pryor dispute about so-called " de re " and " which-object " misidentification. The second part of the paper draws some lessons about what it takes to explain immunity to error through misidentification. The lessons are: First, the so-called Simple Account (see Wright 2012) of which-object immunity to error through misidentification to the effect that a judgement is immune to this kind of error just in case its grounds do not feature any identification component fails. Secondly, wh-immunity can be explained by a Reference-Fixing Account to the effect that a judgement is immune to this kind of error just in case its grounds are constituted by the facts whereby the reference of the concept of the object which the judgement concerns is fixed. Thirdly, a suitable revision of the Simple Account explains the de re immunity of those arithmetic judgements which are not wh-immune. These three lessons point towards the general conclusion that there is no unifying explanation of de re and wh-immunity.
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While it seems hard to deny the epistemic significance of a disagreement with our acknowledged ep... more While it seems hard to deny the epistemic significance of a disagreement with our acknowledged epistemic peers, there are certain disagreements, such as philosophical disagreements, which appear to be permissibly sustainable. These two claims, each independently plausible, are jointly puzzling. This paper argues for a solution to this puzzle. The main tenets of the solution are two. First, the peers ought to engage into a deliberative activity of discovering more about their epistemic position vis-à-vis the issue at stake. Secondly, the peers are permitted to do so while entertaining a sui generis doxastic attitude of hypothesis.
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There has been little focus on what it means for disagreement to manifest itself in a variety of ... more There has been little focus on what it means for disagreement to manifest itself in a variety of ways, and how these various forms of disagreement might relate to each other. In this chapter, I focus on doxastic disagreements. I examine four different ways that doxastic disagreement can present itself: descriptive disagreement, conceptual disagreement, full disagreement and credal disagreement. Pluralism is one way to resolve issues concerning doxastic disagreement. One such pluralist account, developed out of John MacFarlane’s work, is disjunctive pluralism. I criticise Disjunctive Pluralism and argue for an alternative pluralist theory of disagreement that I call kinship pluralism. Moreover, I argue that kinship pluralism can be adequately extended to other varieties of disagreement, namely group and agnostic disagreement.
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This paper investigates the question of how to correctly capture the scope of singular thinking. ... more This paper investigates the question of how to correctly capture the scope of singular thinking. The first part of the paper identifies a scope problem for the dominant view of singular thought maintaining that, in order for a thinker to have a singular thought about an object o, the thinker has to bear a special epistemic relation to o. The scope problem is that this view cannot make sense of the singularity of our thoughts about objects to which we do not or cannot bear any special epistemic relation. The paper focuses on a specific instance of the scope problem by addressing the case of thoughts about the natural numbers. Various possible solutions to the scope problem within the dominant framework are assessed and rejected.
The second part of the paper develops a new theory of singular thought which hinges on the contention that the constraints that need to be met in order to think singularly vary depending on the kind of object we are thinking about. This idea is developed in detail by discussing the difference between the somewhat standard case of thoughts about spatio-temporal medium-sized inanimate objects and the case of thoughts about the natural numbers. It is contended that this new Pluralist theory of singular thought can successfully solve the scope problem.
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This paper addresses a largely neglected question in ongoing debates over disagreement: what is t... more This paper addresses a largely neglected question in ongoing debates over disagreement: what is the relation, if any, between disagreements involving credences (call them credal disagreements) and disagreements involving outright beliefs (call them full disagreements)?
The first part of the paper offers some desiderata for an adequate account of credal and full disagreement. The second part of the paper argues that both phenomena can be subsumed under a schematic definition which goes as follows: A and B disagree if and only if the accuracy conditions of A’s doxastic attitude are such that, if they were fulfilled, this would ipso facto make B’s doxastic attitude inaccurate, or vice-versa.
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65 (261) 605-625, Oct 2015
Deference to experts is normal in many areas of inquiry, but suspicious in morality. This is puzz... more Deference to experts is normal in many areas of inquiry, but suspicious in morality. This is puzzling if one thinks that morality is relevantly like those other areas of inquiry. We argue that this suspiciousness can be explained in terms of the suspiciousness of deferring to an epistemic peer. We then argue that this explanation is preferable to others in the literature, and explore some metaethical implications of this result.
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The Philosophical Quarterly, 2015
Deference to experts is normal in many areas of inquiry, but suspicious in morality. This is puzz... more Deference to experts is normal in many areas of inquiry, but suspicious in morality. This is puzzling if one thinks that morality is relevantly like those other areas of inquiry. We argue that this suspiciousness can be explained in terms of the suspiciousness of deferring to an epistemic peer. We then argue that this explanation is preferable to others in the literature, and explore some metaethical implications of this result.
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In his 2010 paper “Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology”, Alvin Goldman invokes t... more In his 2010 paper “Philosophical Naturalism and Intuitional Methodology”, Alvin Goldman invokes the Condorcet Jury Theorem in order to defend the reliability of intuitions. The present note argues that the original conditions of the theorem are all unrealistic when analysed in connection to the case of intuitions. Alternative conditions are discussed.
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Articles
Avram HILLER, Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief
Jimmy Alfonso LICON, The C... more Articles
Avram HILLER, Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief
Jimmy Alfonso LICON, The Counterpart Argument for Modal Scepticism
Dinu MOSCAL, Logique et grammaire dans la définition du verbe copulatif
Michael J. RAVEN, Subjectivism is Pointless
Shin SAKURAGI, Propositional Memory and Knowledge
Travis TIMMERMAN, The Persistent Problem of the Lottery Paradox: And its Unwelcome Consequences for Contextualism
Debate
Thomas KROEDEL, The Permissibility Solution to the Lottery Paradox – Reply to Littlejohn
Michele PALMIRA, On the Necessity of the Evidential Equality Condition for Epistemic Peerage
Joshua A. SMITH, Adam C. PODLASKOWSKI, Infinitism and Agents Like Us: Reply to Turri
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Papers by Michele Palmira
The second part of the paper develops a new theory of singular thought which hinges on the contention that the constraints that need to be met in order to think singularly vary depending on the kind of object we are thinking about. This idea is developed in detail by discussing the difference between the somewhat standard case of thoughts about spatio-temporal medium-sized inanimate objects and the case of thoughts about the natural numbers. It is contended that this new Pluralist theory of singular thought can successfully solve the scope problem.
The first part of the paper offers some desiderata for an adequate account of credal and full disagreement. The second part of the paper argues that both phenomena can be subsumed under a schematic definition which goes as follows: A and B disagree if and only if the accuracy conditions of A’s doxastic attitude are such that, if they were fulfilled, this would ipso facto make B’s doxastic attitude inaccurate, or vice-versa.
Avram HILLER, Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief
Jimmy Alfonso LICON, The Counterpart Argument for Modal Scepticism
Dinu MOSCAL, Logique et grammaire dans la définition du verbe copulatif
Michael J. RAVEN, Subjectivism is Pointless
Shin SAKURAGI, Propositional Memory and Knowledge
Travis TIMMERMAN, The Persistent Problem of the Lottery Paradox: And its Unwelcome Consequences for Contextualism
Debate
Thomas KROEDEL, The Permissibility Solution to the Lottery Paradox – Reply to Littlejohn
Michele PALMIRA, On the Necessity of the Evidential Equality Condition for Epistemic Peerage
Joshua A. SMITH, Adam C. PODLASKOWSKI, Infinitism and Agents Like Us: Reply to Turri
The second part of the paper develops a new theory of singular thought which hinges on the contention that the constraints that need to be met in order to think singularly vary depending on the kind of object we are thinking about. This idea is developed in detail by discussing the difference between the somewhat standard case of thoughts about spatio-temporal medium-sized inanimate objects and the case of thoughts about the natural numbers. It is contended that this new Pluralist theory of singular thought can successfully solve the scope problem.
The first part of the paper offers some desiderata for an adequate account of credal and full disagreement. The second part of the paper argues that both phenomena can be subsumed under a schematic definition which goes as follows: A and B disagree if and only if the accuracy conditions of A’s doxastic attitude are such that, if they were fulfilled, this would ipso facto make B’s doxastic attitude inaccurate, or vice-versa.
Avram HILLER, Knowledge Essentially Based Upon False Belief
Jimmy Alfonso LICON, The Counterpart Argument for Modal Scepticism
Dinu MOSCAL, Logique et grammaire dans la définition du verbe copulatif
Michael J. RAVEN, Subjectivism is Pointless
Shin SAKURAGI, Propositional Memory and Knowledge
Travis TIMMERMAN, The Persistent Problem of the Lottery Paradox: And its Unwelcome Consequences for Contextualism
Debate
Thomas KROEDEL, The Permissibility Solution to the Lottery Paradox – Reply to Littlejohn
Michele PALMIRA, On the Necessity of the Evidential Equality Condition for Epistemic Peerage
Joshua A. SMITH, Adam C. PODLASKOWSKI, Infinitism and Agents Like Us: Reply to Turri