- Department of Philosophy
University of California, Irvine
75 Humanities Instructional Building
Irvine, CA 92679
Anna Boncompagni
University of California, Irvine, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Wittgenstein, Pragmatism, Phenomenology, Epistemology, William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and 40 moreFrank Ramsey, Ernesto de Martino, Stream of Consciousness, Feminist Epistemology, Knowledge Of Other Minds, Ethics, Analytic Philosophy, Philosophy Of Language, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy, Hermeneutics, Enactivism, Philosophy of Science, Existentialism, American Pragmatism, Philosophy and Literature, Charles S. Peirce, Ordinary Language Philosophy, Later Wittgenstein, Philosophy of Psychology, Truth, John Dewey, Stanley Cavell, Pragmatism (Philosophy), History of Analytic Philosophy, Early Wittgenstein, Existential Phenomenological Psychotherapy, Schizophrenia, Philosophy of Psychiatry, Psychopathology, Common Sense, Wittgenstein's On Certainty, Philosophical Psychology, Skepticism, Cavell, Epistemic Injustice, hinge epistemology, Social Epistemology, Wittgenstein' Middle Period, and Moral Epistemologyedit
The question of what Wittgenstein meant by 'forms of life' has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature, yet it is an expression that Wittgenstein himself employs on only a relatively small number of occasions, and that he... more
The question of what Wittgenstein meant by 'forms of life' has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature, yet it is an expression that Wittgenstein himself employs on only a relatively small number of occasions, and that he does not explicitly define. This Element gives a description of this concept that also explains Wittgenstein's reluctance to say much about it. A short historical introduction examines the origins and uses of the term in Wittgenstein's time. The Element then presents a survey of Wittgenstein's employment of it, and an overview of the literature. Finally, the Element offers a methodological reading of this notion, interpreting it as a conceptual tool in Wittgenstein's wider inquiries into the workings of our language.
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The volume uncovers the most pragmatic and pragmatist aspects of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy, particularly of On Certainty, through a comparison with the pragmatist tradition as expressed by Charles S. Peirce and William James. On... more
The volume uncovers the most pragmatic and pragmatist aspects of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy, particularly of On Certainty, through a comparison with the pragmatist tradition as expressed by Charles S. Peirce and William James. On Certainty is often described as 'pragmatic' in literature and this pragmatic aspect is said to characterize a new turn in its author’s thought. Yet, what is still missing is a study of what specifically are the features which make these writings 'sound like pragmatism', as Wittgenstein himself put it (OC 422). The book therefore aims to verify if and to what extent it is possible to sustain that there is an objective convergence between his thought and pragmatism. In doing so, the volume also proposes a clarification of the main differences between Peirce’s and James’ vision of some key ideas of classical pragmatism like doubt and certainty, common sense, the pragmatic maxim, action. Among the achievements of the work are: an analysis of Wittgenstein’s first mention of pragmatism; some pieces of evidence in favour of the hypothesis that Wittgenstein did read some works by Peirce; a documented investigation on the relevance of Frank Ramsey for the development of Wittgenstein’s idea of pragmatism. The volume does not sustain the thesis that Wittgenstein was a pragmatist (nor the opposing thesis that he was not), but highlights the objective convergences and the divergences between his perspective and pragmatism through a balanced analysis running both on an exegetical and on a theoretical level.
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"«Non pensare, guarda!» è il richiamo esplicito delle Ricerche filosofiche di Ludwig Wittgenstein. L’attenzione al vedere, declinata in diverse prospettive, è però un elemento ricorrente nell’intera opera del filosofo viennese, un... more
"«Non pensare, guarda!» è il richiamo esplicito delle Ricerche filosofiche di Ludwig Wittgenstein. L’attenzione al vedere, declinata in diverse prospettive, è però un elemento ricorrente nell’intera opera del filosofo viennese, un aspetto non sistematicamente indagato dalla critica, che in questo studio viene esaminato da ogni angolatura. La teoria raffigurativa del linguaggio e l’opposizione dire/mostrare, che caratterizzano il Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, sono così messe a confronto con l’ottica fenomenologica degli anni successivi, con il metodo della rappresentazione sinottica, con il tema del vedere-come. Ne
risulta un quadro complessivo che permette di leggere l’evoluzione del pensiero di Wittgenstein secondo un punto di vista particolare, cogliendo somiglianze impreviste, ma anche smascherando analogie solo apparenti. Proprio in quanto sguardo, la filosofia si rivela così un esercizio volto all’esplorazione dei limiti del linguaggio, del senso, della forma di vita."
risulta un quadro complessivo che permette di leggere l’evoluzione del pensiero di Wittgenstein secondo un punto di vista particolare, cogliendo somiglianze impreviste, ma anche smascherando analogie solo apparenti. Proprio in quanto sguardo, la filosofia si rivela così un esercizio volto all’esplorazione dei limiti del linguaggio, del senso, della forma di vita."
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Recently, hinge epistemologists have applied Wittgenstein's metaphor of hinges to religious belief. The most prominent proposal in this context is Pritchard's "quasi-fideism". This paper examines some historical precursors of the notion... more
Recently, hinge epistemologists have applied Wittgenstein's metaphor of hinges to religious belief. The most prominent proposal in this context is Pritchard's "quasi-fideism". This paper examines some historical precursors of the notion of religious hinges, with the aim of shedding more light on it. After outlining the framework of hinge epistemology and its application to religious belief, I briefly examine the views of Thomas Reid and John Henry Newman as acknowledged forerunners of this framework (or cognate views). Next, I turn to two hitherto unacknowledged forerunners, the pragmatists William James and Charles S. Peirce. I then focus on some insights that the pragmatists offer. On this basis, I conclude that religious beliefs are a special class of hinges. As such, while they can be defended through hinge epistemology, they cannot constitute a model through which we can interpret the nature of hinges in general.
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The relationship between pragmatism and common sense is more complex and nuanced than it might seem at first sight. A double-sided attitude toward common sense is patently present in William James, and especially evident in lecture V of... more
The relationship between pragmatism and common sense is more complex and nuanced than it might seem at first sight. A double-sided attitude toward common sense is patently present in William James, and especially evident in lecture V of Pragmatism, titled “Pragmatism and Common Sense”. The premises for the lecture, in the context of Pragmatism, are set in lecture II, where James tackles the issue of how knowledge grows. Common sense, therefore, which in practical talk means good judgment, under the lens of philosophy means “the use of certain intellectual forms or categories of thought”. A good starting point for understanding James’s psychology of concepts is “The Sentiment of Rationality”, a paper in which he offers a broadly aesthetic description of the rationality of philosophical conceptions. An act of conception, James claims, is the result of an act of attention, by which people identify and single out something in the stream of thought.
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Although research on epistemic injustice has focused on the effects of prejudice in epistemic exchanges, the account of prejudice that emerges in Fricker's (2007) view is not completely clear. In particular, I claim that the epistemic... more
Although research on epistemic injustice has focused on the effects of prejudice in epistemic exchanges, the account of prejudice that emerges in Fricker's (2007) view is not completely clear. In particular, I claim that the epistemic role of prejudice in the structure of testimonial justification is still in need of a satisfactory explanation. What special epistemic power does prejudice exercise that prevents the speaker's words from constituting evidence for the hearer's belief? By clarifying this point, it will be possible to address two more general issues concerning the nature of prejudice: its resistance to counterevidence and the steps involved in overcoming prejudice. I propose a hinge account of prejudice, based on the recent perspective of hinge epistemology, to help clarify these aspects. According to the hinge account, prejudices share a fundamental feature with hinges: they work as norms of evidential significance, and as such, they determine what can and cannot count as evidence for belief.
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This paper applies the framework of epistemic injustice to the context of the asylum process, arguing that asylum seekers are typically at risk of this kind of injustice, which consists in their not being considered credible and not being... more
This paper applies the framework of epistemic injustice to the context of the asylum process, arguing that asylum seekers are typically at risk of this kind of injustice, which consists in their not being considered credible and not being listened to due to prejudices toward their social identity. More specifically, I address hermeneutical injustice in the adjudication of LGBTQ asylum claims, as well as the possibility of developing practices of hermeneutical justice in this context. I start with a general analysis of epistemic injustice in the asylum process, examining the different ways in which stereotypes and prejudices hinder the process (section 1). Next, I focus on hermeneutical injustice in LGBTQ cases (section 2). In section 3, I expand on the possibility of developing hermeneutical justice. Finally, I conclude by hinting at hinge epistemology as a feasible framework for research on hermeneutical injustice and justice, and at broader theoretical themes stimulated by this reflection.
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In this commentary on Nuno Venturinha's Description of Situations, after highlighting what in my view are the most significant and innovative features of his work, I focus on Venturinha's infallibilist approach to knowledge. This topic... more
In this commentary on Nuno Venturinha's Description of Situations, after highlighting what in my view are the most significant and innovative features of his work, I focus on Venturinha's infallibilist approach to knowledge. This topic allows for a wider discussion concerning the pragmatist aspects of the later Wittgenstein's philosophy. I discuss this in three steps: first, by describing the general similarity between Wittgenstein and the pragmatists with respect to the emphasis on contexts; second, by focusing on the kind of fallibilism endorsed by the pragmatists and its compatibility with Charles S. Peirce's concept of the "indubitables," which I take as a precursor of Wittgenstein's concept of hinges; and, finally, by advancing the hypothesis that it is possible to find a form of fallibilism in the later Wittgenstein too, notwithstanding his insistence on the impossibility of mistakes. My conclusion is that while Venturinha's contextualism finds support in the later Wittgenstein's writings, his infallibilism does not.
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Enactivist approaches claim that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. An ongoing challenge for these approaches is the problem of accounting for normativity while avoiding overly... more
Enactivist approaches claim that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. An ongoing challenge for these approaches is the problem of accounting for normativity while avoiding overly reductionist outcomes. This article examines a few proposed solutions, including agent-environment dynamics, participatory sense-making, radical enactivism, the skillful intentionality framework, and enactivist cultural psychology. It argues that good examples of enacted normativity are gestures of appreciation/disapproval performed in the aesthetic domain. Both Wittgenstein and Dewey explore this issue and their ideas could be productively worked upon in an enactive account.
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In "Esperienza, contingenza, valori. Saggi in onore di Rosa M. Calcaterra", a cura di Guido Baggio, Michela Bella, Giovanni Maddalena, Matteo Santarelli, Quodlibet, 2020
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This paper does not take for granted, and indeed questions, the common assumption that pragmatist philosophers endorse some form of relativism, and examines the issue in more detail with reference to both the classical pragmatists-Charles... more
This paper does not take for granted, and indeed questions, the common assumption that pragmatist philosophers endorse some form of relativism, and examines the issue in more detail with reference to both the classical pragmatists-Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey-and more contemporary thinkers such as Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam. The article calls for a more nuanced characterization of the relationship between pragmatism and relativism, which in turn results in a more nuanced characterization of the pragmatist tradition itself, one opposed to the easy dichotomy between the Peircean anti-relativist legacy on the one hand, and the Jamesian-Deweyan relativist strand on the other.
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This is the introduction of the chapter on James and Wittgenstein in the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of William James. The online version is already available at https://bit.ly/2DwDv0y
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This paper makes use of the Wittgenstein-inspired perspective of hinge epistemology in connection with research on epistemic injustice. Its aim is to shed light on the neglected relationship between hinges and prejudices, by focusing on... more
This paper makes use of the Wittgenstein-inspired perspective of hinge epistemology in connection with research on epistemic injustice. Its aim is to shed light on the neglected relationship between hinges and prejudices, by focusing on the role of the “radical doubter” in epistemic practices.
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Commentary on Misak's volume "Cambridge Pragmatism"
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The subject of this paper is the notion of 'imponderable evidence', employed on a few occasions by the later Wittgenstein. Our perception of others' feelings, thoughts and emotions, Wittgenstein observes, is ordinarily guided by an... more
The subject of this paper is the notion of 'imponderable evidence', employed on a few occasions by the later Wittgenstein. Our perception of others' feelings, thoughts and emotions, Wittgenstein observes, is ordinarily guided by an imponderable evidence, which, while remaining unmeasurable and ultimately ungraspable, gives us access to an immediate-yet fallible-form of understanding. This understanding, I will argue, is essentially qualitative. Section 1 of the paper introduces the issue through the examination of some remarks on how our attitude towards living beings differs from our attitude towards objects. Sections 2 and 3 present the notion of imponderable evidence in the framework of Wittgenstein's approach to the philosophy of psychology and his remarks on aesthetic judgment. In section 4, I will turn to Dewey's conception of 'qualitative thought' as an aid to clarify further the sense of Wittgenstein's terminology. The final section concludes on why philosophers should care about the qualitative dimension of human existence.
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Introduction to the Special Issue, co-edited with Roberta Dreon
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In David G. Stern, ed., "Wittgenstein in the 1930s: Between the Tractatus and the Investigations", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Wittgenstein likens philosophy both to an illness and to a therapy. The reflections he dedicates to mental disturbance in On Certainty shed some light on this ambivalence, by pointing at the intertwined themes of common sense, doubt,... more
Wittgenstein likens philosophy both to an illness and to a therapy. The reflections he dedicates to mental disturbance in On Certainty shed some light on this ambivalence, by pointing at the intertwined themes of common sense, doubt, mistake, reasonableness, and normality. Wittgenstein’s remarks have sometimes been compared to the description of the symptoms of what psychopathologists have called the loss of natural self-evidence, or the loss of common sense. Besides briefly recalling some of the outcomes of this debate in literature, I focus on Wittgenstein’s conception of “hinges”, the basic practical certainties which patients suffering from the loss of common sense seem to lack. By working on this comparison, I offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s idea of philosophy that clarifies both its insane and its therapeutic side.
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This paper focuses on the first reference to pragmatism in Ludwig Wittgenstein's manuscripts, dating back to the beginning of 1930. The remark, still largely ignored by literature, refers to the pragmatist conception of truth.
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In Cheryl Misak and Huw Price, eds., "The Practical Turn. Pragmatism in Britain in the Long Twentieth Century", Oxford: Oxford University Press / Proceedings of the British Academy Series, October 2017
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Introduction to the Focus “Practicing William James”
Philosophical Inquiries, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2017
Philosophical Inquiries, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2017
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The paper compares the way in which Ludwig Wittgenstein and Charles S. Peirce deal with 'facts of life', or the ordinary. Starting from the former's well-known remark on forms of life as 'the given', it shows its proximity to some themes... more
The paper compares the way in which Ludwig Wittgenstein and Charles S. Peirce deal with 'facts of life', or the ordinary. Starting from the former's well-known remark on forms of life as 'the given', it shows its proximity to some themes also explored by Peirce. This leads to examine in more detail the Peircean notion of habit and its connection with the everyday, an aspect on which the two philosophers bear interesting similarities. The examination of the only remark Wittgenstein expressed on Peirce, still largely neglected in literature, also highlights relevant differences. The paper concludes on how, differences notwithstanding, both thinkers consider 'facts of life' as the proper terrain of philosophical activity.
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A cavallo tra il 1929 e il 1930, da poco tornato a Cambridge, Wittgenstein riflette sulla prospettiva di un linguaggio puramente fenomenologico, che riesca a cogliere l’immediatezza del flusso esperienziale . Questo tipo di approccio,... more
A cavallo tra il 1929 e il 1930, da poco tornato a Cambridge, Wittgenstein riflette sulla prospettiva di un linguaggio puramente fenomenologico, che riesca a cogliere l’immediatezza del flusso esperienziale . Questo tipo di approccio, affermerà, non è in grado di dar conto dell’uso effettivo che facciamo del linguaggio. Un’immagine che Wittgenstein esplora in questo contesto è l’idea che le parole e le credenze hanno significato solo se “ingranano” tra loro e con le nostre azioni. Una parola che ingrana è utile in quanto ha presa e comporta conseguenze. Una delle origini di quest’idea, a mio parere, è rintracciabile nelle riflessioni di Wittgenstein sulla concezione pragmatista (jamesiana) della verità come utile. Prendendo in esame da un lato la critica wittgensteiniana all’utile come concetto onnicomprensivo, dall’altro lato la sua parziale adesione a quest’idea, è possibile offrire una lettura particolare del concetto pragmatista di utile, inteso come una modalità dell’“ingranare” delle parole e delle credenze nella nostra vita.
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Although the expression “form of life” and its plural “forms of life” occur only five times in Philosophical Investigations, and generally few times in his works, it is commonly agreed that this is one of the most important issues in... more
Although the expression “form of life” and its plural “forms of life” occur only five times in Philosophical Investigations, and generally few times in his works, it is commonly agreed that this is one of the most important issues in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Starting from the analysis of the contexts in which Wittgenstein makes use of this concept, the paper focuses on the different interpretations that have been given in the secondary literature, and proposes a classification based on two axes of debate: the monistic versus pluralistic interpretation, and the empirical versus transcendental interpretation. After placing some well-known readings in the resulting scheme, an attempt will be made to offer an evolutionary reading of Wittgenstein’s own ideas about forms of life. It will be argued that the empirical and plural view that seems characteristic of his writings in the 1930s, slowly appears to turn towards a monistic view, sometimes with transcendental tones, although within a pragmatic perspective. This turn nevertheless remains rooted in Wittgenstein’s general attitude towards philosophy intended as a conceptual inquiry with clarifying and therapeutic aims.
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This paper focuses on the origins of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein’s emphasis on meaning as use, which at least partly can be traced back to his reflections on what he called the “Eingreifen” (engaging, meshing) of words and beliefs. I... more
This paper focuses on the origins of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein’s emphasis on meaning as use, which at least partly can be traced back to his reflections on what he called the “Eingreifen” (engaging, meshing) of words and beliefs. I argue that one of the roots of this reflection is the pragmatist conception of truth as usefulness, which was most likely debated between Wittgenstein and Frank Ramsey in 1929. After introducing Wittgenstein’s (temporary) perspective of a phenomenological language, I will show its shortcomings and the philosopher’s need to give account of the working of words in ordinary language. I will then examine Wittgenstein’s remarks about the pragmatist conception of truth and more generally about usefulness, and conclude that, although he usually expressed doubts about pragmatism, the “middle” Wittgenstein presented pragmatist tendencies which were pivotal in the development of his thought.
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in "Pragmatismo. Dalle origini agli sviluppi contemporanei", a cura di Rosa M. Calcaterra, Giovanni Maddalena, Giancarlo Marchetti, Carocci, 2015
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This paper offers a philosophical outlook on the subject of the communication of certainty and uncertainty, by focusing on the later Ludwig Wittgenstein’s image of “hinges”. Hinges are basic common sense certainties which ordinarily “go... more
This paper offers a philosophical outlook on the subject of the communication of certainty and uncertainty, by focusing on the later Ludwig Wittgenstein’s image of “hinges”. Hinges are basic common sense certainties which ordinarily “go without saying”. In a sense, they even require not to be said. Lingering over the debate on the ineffability of hinges which is at the core of the Wittgensteinian secondary literature, but also hinting at some studies in psychopathology, the paper argues that in extraordinary contexts to assert explicitly a hinge-certainty is possible and may be important, while in ordinary contexts certainty can only be communicated through silence: when a certainty which “goes without saying” is explicitly said, the situation paradoxically results in uncertainty.
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The pragmatic character of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty is often underlined in literature. What is still missing, however, is a more direct comparison with the pragmatist tradition. This paper focuses on a striking similarity... more
The pragmatic character of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty is often underlined in literature. What is still missing, however, is a more direct comparison with the pragmatist tradition. This paper focuses on a striking similarity between Wittgenstein and Charles S. Peirce, namely, their respective way of connecting knowledge meaning and practical consequences. In the pragmatist tradition, this connection is known as “the pragmatic maxim”. Many remarks in On Certainty are surprisingly in tune with the maxim. I propose an analysis of this attunement as a contribution to the characterization of the so-called “Third Wittgenstein”.
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"This paper explores the enactive approach in cognitive science with an eye on the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The aim is not that of answering the question: was Wittgenstein an ante litteram enactivist? He was not, because he was... more
"This paper explores the enactive approach in cognitive science with an eye on the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy. The aim is not that of answering the question: was Wittgenstein an ante litteram enactivist? He was not, because he was not an ante litteram (cognitive) scientist of any kind. The aim, conversely, is that of answering the question: can enactivism be Wittgensteinian? In answering positively, it will be argued that a Wittgensteinian framework can help enactive cognitive scientists in dissolving certain old problems which they sometimes seem not to be able to get rid of. After the Introduction, the first two sections of the paper
concern the Wittgensteinian standpoint on psychological oncepts (Section 2) and the enactivist approach in its general terms (Section 3). Section 4 attempts a closer examination of
some key concepts – chiefly representations, the inner, the “explanatory gap”, the “hard problem” of consciousness – considering both the enactivists’ and Wittgenstein’s attitude towards them. The Conclusion surmises the benefits of a Wittgensteinian perspective also hinting at some other problems which it can help to clarify."
concern the Wittgensteinian standpoint on psychological oncepts (Section 2) and the enactivist approach in its general terms (Section 3). Section 4 attempts a closer examination of
some key concepts – chiefly representations, the inner, the “explanatory gap”, the “hard problem” of consciousness – considering both the enactivists’ and Wittgenstein’s attitude towards them. The Conclusion surmises the benefits of a Wittgensteinian perspective also hinting at some other problems which it can help to clarify."
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The influence of William James on Ludwig Wittgenstein has been widely studied, as well as the criticism that the latter addresses to the former, but one aspect that has only rarely been focused on is the two philosophers’ use of the image... more
The influence of William James on Ludwig Wittgenstein has been widely studied, as well as the criticism that the latter addresses to the former, but one aspect that has only rarely been focused on is the two philosophers’ use of the image of the flux, stream, or river. The analysis of some notes belonging to Wittgenstein’s Nachlass support the possibility of a comparison between James’ stream of thought, as outlined in the Principles of Psychology, and Wittgenstein’s river-bed of thoughts, presented in On Certainty.
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“Our later and more critical philosophies are mere fads and fancies compared with this natural mother-tongue of thought”, says William James in his lecture on common sense. The deep bond connecting language, common sense and nature is... more
“Our later and more critical philosophies are mere fads and fancies compared with this natural mother-tongue of thought”, says William James in his lecture on common sense. The deep bond connecting language, common sense and nature is also one of the main concerns of the later Wittgenstein. The aim of this paper is to compare the two philosophers in this respect, particularly focusing on James’ Pragmatism and on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. Similarities, but also differences, will be highlighted. A further element will be offered by the analysis of a fragment of Wittgenstein’s Nachlass, which anticipates his image of the river-bed of thought through the critique of James’ stream of thought. By means of this comparison, I will question Wittgenstein’s explicit refusal of pragmatism. I will argue that his late philosophy can be said to be even more pragmatist than James’, in that it delineates a conception of the common sense certainties which shape our Weltbild (world-picture) as practically, and not merely epistemically, connected to our life.
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“What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life”. Starting from this remark by Wittgenstein, we can sketch an idea of knowledge that overcomes the dichotomy between subject and object, posing forms of life at... more
“What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life”. Starting from this remark by Wittgenstein, we can sketch an idea of knowledge that overcomes the dichotomy between subject and object, posing forms of life at the basis of the cognitive look and implying a starting point which is constitutively articulated. The price to pay is the apparent vagueness of such conception. Yet, vagueness is not a weak point, rather a strong point of this change of perspective, as it underlines a crucial shift of mean-ing: the given is not to be conceived as a ground, but as a background of knowledge. Interesting consequences can be drawn for social and cognitive sciences.
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La prospettiva wittgensteiniana del linguaggio ordinario mette fuori gioco molti dei dilemmi e dei paradossi più classici della storia della filosofia. Uno di questi è il problema dello scetticismo sulle menti altrui, di derivazione... more
La prospettiva wittgensteiniana del linguaggio ordinario mette fuori gioco molti dei dilemmi e dei paradossi più classici della storia della filosofia. Uno di questi è il problema dello scetticismo sulle menti altrui, di derivazione cartesiana. La certezza del cogito ergo sum si traduce nell’impossibilità di conoscere il cogito altrui e nel dubbio radicale sulla sua effettiva esistenza. Una riflessione filosofica che abbia al suo centro l’uso ordinario delle parole, e che del linguaggio metta in evidenza il carattere attivo e sociale, quindi la sua appartenenza ad una forma di vita, permette non solo e non tanto di risolvere il problema, ma più drasticamente di capovolgerlo, in modo tale che l’alterità stessa diventa il luogo della conoscenza, mentre al cogito viene tolta ogni pretesa di fondazione epistemica. I concetti di gioco e di regola sono i punti di partenza per riconciliare la filosofia con la quotidiana e normalmente aproblematica conoscibilità delle sensazioni altrui.
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Co-edited with Roberta Dreon
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Edited by Anna Boncompagni, articles by Cheryl Misak, Paolo Tripodi, Stéphane Madelrieux, Harry Heft, and Shannon Sullivan
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This interview is part of the project "Strengthening the relevance of the American Philosophy to Contemporary Philosophy in Europe and America", sponsored by the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy and University of Molise.
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A connection between pragmatism and relativism is often taken for granted in the philosophical debate on relativism, although classical pragmatists – Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey – were not particularly concerned with... more
A connection between pragmatism and relativism is often taken for granted in the philosophical debate on relativism, although classical pragmatists – Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey – were not particularly concerned with the issue. In order to assess whether such a connection is justified and in what terms, I examine the controversial pragmatist conception of truth, as it emerges from the writings of Peirce, James and Dewey, and compare it with alethic relativism. I will argue that, besides there being relevant differences
between the three approaches, their relationship with relativism is more
articulated than it usually appears, even in the case of James’ often criticized definition of truth as usefulness. Finally, I will extend the discussion to the broader themes of moral and cultural relativism.
between the three approaches, their relationship with relativism is more
articulated than it usually appears, even in the case of James’ often criticized definition of truth as usefulness. Finally, I will extend the discussion to the broader themes of moral and cultural relativism.
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Colloquium - California State University of Long Beach
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Paper presented at the V Middle Wittgenstein Symposium, UFMG, Belo Horizonte, 23 May 2018
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The recent perspective of “hinge epistemology” builds on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty an on his conception of hinges, in order to put forth a system of epistemology based on a novel account of the background assumptions underlying... more
The recent perspective of “hinge epistemology” builds on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty an on his conception of hinges, in order to put forth a system of epistemology based on a novel account of the background assumptions underlying judgments. I will argue that this kind of perspective was anticipated by Charles S. Peirce’s critical common-sensism, although with some differences. This will offer the occasion for a wider comparison concerning epistemological themes in Peirce and the later Wittgenstein.
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Commentary on Misak's volume "Cambridge Pragmatism", presented at the APA Pacific Division Meeting in March 2018
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Paper presented at the “Hinge Epistemology Conference”, UCI, Sept. 2017
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This paper makes use of the later Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘hinges’ within social epistemology. Its aim is to shed light on the neglected relationship between hinges, prejudice and injustice, thus also combining the perspectives of... more
This paper makes use of the later Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘hinges’ within social epistemology. Its aim is to shed light on the neglected relationship between hinges, prejudice and injustice, thus also combining the perspectives of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2007) and hinge epistemology (Coliva and Moyal-Sharrock 2016).
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Paper presented at the International Conference “The Pragmatist Turn and Embodied Cognition: Habit and Experience at the Crossroads between Pragmatism, Neurosciences, and Social Ontology”, University of Parma, 5-7 April 2017
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Il concetto wittgensteiniano di evidenza imponderabile letto attraverso il "pensiero qualitativo" di John Dewey. Presentazione preparata per il secondo panel dell'unità di ricerca sull'ontologia del qualitativo, Università di Firenze,... more
Il concetto wittgensteiniano di evidenza imponderabile letto attraverso il "pensiero qualitativo" di John Dewey. Presentazione preparata per il secondo panel dell'unità di ricerca sull'ontologia del qualitativo, Università di Firenze, gennaio 2017
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In her volume "Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology" (2015), Annalisa Coliva builds on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty an on his conception of hinges, in order to put forth a system of epistemology based on a novel account of the... more
In her volume "Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology" (2015), Annalisa Coliva builds on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty an on his conception of hinges, in order to put forth a system of epistemology based on a novel account of the background assumptions underlying perceptual judgments. In a few paragraphs of her work, she affirms that pragmatism, although being a form of ‘hinge epistemology’, is unsatisfactory. By working on Charles S. Peirce and on secondary literature on Peirce and Wittgenstein, I argue that Coliva’s position is much closer to pragmatism than she seems disposed to acknowledge.
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Success semantics is usually traced back to Frank Ramsey’s work. After a brief summary of Ramsey’s proposal as inspired by his pragmatist predecessors, I will describe the key tenets of success semantics as articulated by Whyte (1990),... more
Success semantics is usually traced back to Frank Ramsey’s work. After a brief summary of Ramsey’s proposal as inspired by his pragmatist predecessors, I will describe the key tenets of success semantics as articulated by Whyte (1990), criticised by Brandom (1994) and others, and defended and further developed by Dokic and Engel (2002). I will then focus on the recent positions expressed by Nanay (2013), who sides with an amended version of success semantics, and by Methven (2015), who defends Ramsey but argues against success semantics. Both Nanay and Methven work by restricting the field of applicability of Ramsey’s approach, in respect of his own words. While agreeing with their interpretation of Ramsey’s intentions, I will argue that it is actually by going beyond his intentions, yet not in the direction proposed by success semantics, that it is possible to develop most fruitfully some aspects of the pragmatist theme of usefulness.
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This paper focuses on the origins of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein’s emphasis on meaning as use, which at least partly can be traced back to his reflections on what he called the “Eingreifen” (engaging, meshing) of words and beliefs. I... more
This paper focuses on the origins of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein’s emphasis on meaning as use, which at least partly can be traced back to his reflections on what he called the “Eingreifen” (engaging, meshing) of words and beliefs. I argue that one of the roots of this reflection is the pragmatist conception of truth as usefulness, which was most likely debated between Wittgenstein and Frank Ramsey in 1929. After introducing Wittgenstein’s (temporary) perspective of a phenomenological language, I will show its shortcomings and the philosopher’s need to give account of the working of words in ordinary language. I will then examine Wittgenstein’s remarks about the pragmatist conception of truth and more generally about usefulness, and conclude that, although he usually expressed doubts about pragmatism, the “middle” Wittgenstein presented pragmatist tendencies which were pivotal in the development of his thought.
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This paper focuses on the origins of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein’s emphasis on meaning as use, which at least partly can be traced back to his reflections about what he called the “Eingreifen” (engaging, meshing) of words and beliefs.... more
This paper focuses on the origins of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein’s emphasis on meaning as use, which at least partly can be traced back to his reflections about what he called the “Eingreifen” (engaging, meshing) of words and beliefs. One of the roots of this reflection is the pragmatist conception of truth as usefulness, which was probably debated between Wittgenstein and Frank Ramsey in 1929.
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After a first paragraph on Wittgenstein’s attitude towards psychopathology and the relationship between philosophy and insanity, I will examine Wittgenstein’s remarks on mental disturbance in OC. Hence I will present some narratives of... more
After a first paragraph on Wittgenstein’s attitude towards psychopathology and the relationship between philosophy and insanity, I will examine Wittgenstein’s remarks on mental disturbance in OC. Hence I will present some narratives of patients who use very similar words to describe their state. This will offer concreteness to the subsequent discussion of Wittgenstein’s conception of hinges, which is at the core of the debate on OC. Finally, this discussion will be embedded within social considerations and some consequences will be drawn regarding the task of philosophy.
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Il paper mette a confronto il modo in cui Ludwig Wittgenstein e Charles S. Peirce parlano dei “fatti della vita”. Il punto di partenza è l’osservazione wittgensteiniana secondo cui il “dato” per il filosofo sono le forme di vita, come... more
Il paper mette a confronto il modo in cui Ludwig Wittgenstein e Charles S. Peirce parlano dei “fatti della vita”. Il punto di partenza è l’osservazione wittgensteiniana secondo cui il “dato” per il filosofo sono le forme di vita, come l’agire in un certo modo, il dare ordini, il descrivere colori, l’interessarsi ai sentimenti altrui. Analizzando la genesi e le diverse formulazioni di questa osservazione, se ne noteranno i legami con alcune tematiche affrontate sia da Peirce che da William James. Questo consentirà di prendere in esame il concetto peirceano di habit e la sua connessione con la quotidianità, un aspetto rispetto al quale le riflessioni di Peirce e Wittgenstein presentano notevoli somiglianze. Per entrambi infatti è proprio sul terreno delle pratiche abitudinarie che l’indagine filosofica trova il suo naturale punto di arresto. Le ovvietà non dette, ma praticate nella vita di tutti i giorni, costituiscono lo sfondo sfuggente eppure onnipresente che il filosofo cerca di vedere e di ritrarre, come per la prima volta, alla ricerca di una grammatica dell’umano, delle sue regole e delle sue prassi.
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Research Interests: Wittgenstein and Metafora
In this two-part paper I offer a survey of Wittgenstein’s (few) remarks about pragmatism, from 1930 to the later Forties. The aim of the paper is to present Wittgenstein’s own words in order to see 1) what he thought of pragmatism when... more
In this two-part paper I offer a survey of Wittgenstein’s (few) remarks about pragmatism, from 1930 to the later Forties.
The aim of the paper is to present Wittgenstein’s own words in order to see 1) what he thought of pragmatism when he first met it; 2) if and how his views about pragmatism changed through time; 3) which aspects of pragmatism he liked (if any) and disliked. It will be argued that 1) he identified pragmatism primarily with the Jamesian conception of truth and was partly influenced by Ramsey’s opinion about it; 2) his views did change through time as he enlarged his perspective; and 3) this enlargement brought an appraisal of pragmatism as a method, while pragmatism as a Weltanschauung hinged on its alleged conception of truth was always refused. This work helps to provide a proper understanding of Wittgenstein’s attitude before On Certainty, the most “pragmatist” on his works.
The aim of the paper is to present Wittgenstein’s own words in order to see 1) what he thought of pragmatism when he first met it; 2) if and how his views about pragmatism changed through time; 3) which aspects of pragmatism he liked (if any) and disliked. It will be argued that 1) he identified pragmatism primarily with the Jamesian conception of truth and was partly influenced by Ramsey’s opinion about it; 2) his views did change through time as he enlarged his perspective; and 3) this enlargement brought an appraisal of pragmatism as a method, while pragmatism as a Weltanschauung hinged on its alleged conception of truth was always refused. This work helps to provide a proper understanding of Wittgenstein’s attitude before On Certainty, the most “pragmatist” on his works.
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In un passaggio di Della Certezza Wittgenstein afferma, con una certa preoccupazione: “Dunque voglio dire qualcosa che suona come pragmatismo. Qui mi capita tra i piedi una specie di Weltanschauung”. Anche se Della Certezza è spesso... more
In un passaggio di Della Certezza Wittgenstein afferma, con una certa preoccupazione: “Dunque voglio dire qualcosa che suona come pragmatismo. Qui mi capita tra i piedi una specie di Weltanschauung”. Anche se Della Certezza è spesso descritto in letteratura come un lavoro in cui emergono temi particolarmente pragmatici, al punto che si parla a questo proposito di un “terzo Wittgenstein”, non ci sono analisi approfondite sulle effettive, possibili parentele con la tradizione pragmatista. Prendendo sul serio l’osservazione di Wittgenstein, cercheremo di capire che cosa egli intendesse con ‘pragmatismo’, esaminando anche le altre occorrenze di questo termine nei suoi scritti. In rapporto ad alcuni temi-chiave di Della Certezza, quali dubbio e indubitabilità, senso comune, conoscenza e conseguenze pratiche, vedremo in particolare alcune sorprendenti somiglianze con i testi di Charles S. Peirce e di William James. Analizzeremo infine la metafora dell’ “alveo del fiume dei pensieri”, proposta da Wittgenstein, come commento all’immagine dello stream of thought di James. L’obiettivo è mostrare come un esame delle assonanze e delle divergenze rispetto al pragmatismo possa contribuire ad una caratterizzazione più accurata del cosiddetto “terzo Wittgenstein”.
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Is it possible to meaningfully say what ordinarily ‘goes without saying’, and, if so, what happens in a conversation when a person expresses such an utterance? The framework for our reflections on these questions is provided by... more
Is it possible to meaningfully say what ordinarily ‘goes without saying’, and, if so, what happens in a conversation when a person expresses such an utterance? The framework for our reflections on these questions is provided by Wittgenstein’s Über Gewissheit. After an introduction on Wittgenstein’s attitude towards certainty and knowledge, the paper will offer a brief survey of the secondary literature on hinge propositions. It will then be argued that there are some peculiar circumstances and general contexts in which to explicitly communicate a truism is possible and even important: in these cases what is at stake is the possibility of a change in the background certainties which shape a person’s or a community’s Weltbild. In ordinary contexts, conversely, hinges must work tacitly. If a certainty which goes without saying is explicitly said, the situation paradoxically results in uncertainty. But doubts, typically, would not regard the content of the proposition, rather, the mental health of the speaker. In connection with Wittgenstein’s remarks about mental disturbance, some hints will be made to the psychopathologic studies on common sense and the loss of natural evidence. The paper will conclude that, except for limited, though relevant, contexts, hinge certainty is not explicitly but implicitly communicated, or, using the early Wittgenstein’s words, it is not said but shown; and only by not being said, it can be shown.
Although the expression “form of life” and its plural “forms of life” occur only five times in Philosophical Investigations, and generally few times in his works, it is commonly agreed that this is one of the most relevant issues in... more
Although the expression “form of life” and its plural “forms of life” occur only five times in Philosophical Investigations, and generally few times in his works, it is commonly agreed that this is one of the most relevant issues in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Starting from the analysis of the contexts in which Wittgenstein makes use of this concept, the paper focuses on the different interpretations that have been given in secondary literature, and proposes a classification based on two axes of debate: the monistic versus pluralistic interpretation, and the empirical versus transcendental interpretation. After placing some well-known readings in the resulting scheme, such as those offered by Bernard Williams, Stanley Cavell, Newton Garver, Max Black, Naomi Scheman, John Hunter, Norman Malcom, Jonathan Lear, Daniéle Moyal-Sharrock and others, an attempt will be made to offer an evolutionary reading of Wittgenstein’s own ideas about forms of life. It will be argued that the empirical and plural view that seems characteristic of his writings in the Thirties, slowly turns towards a monistic view, that in On Certainty can be read as evoking the transcendental flavor of the Tractatus, but from within a deeply different, pragmatic perspective.
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“Our later and more critical philosophies are mere fads and fancies compared with this natural mother-tongue of thought”, says William James in his lecture on common sense (Pragmatism, 1907). The deep bond connecting language and common... more
“Our later and more critical philosophies are mere fads and fancies compared with this natural mother-tongue of thought”, says William James in his lecture on common sense (Pragmatism, 1907). The deep bond connecting language and common sense is also one of the main concerns of the later Wittgenstein. A comparison between the two philosophers will show affinities and differences in their respective conceptions of common sense and will ultimately highlight that, in spite of his explicit refusal of pragmatism as a Weltanschauung, Wittgenstein is even more pragmatist than James in this respect.
«Ciò che dev’essere accettato, il dato, è, potremmo dire, forme di vita». A partire da questa affermazione di Wittgenstein, contenuta nella seconda parte delle Ricerche filosofiche, è possibile intravedere un’idea di conoscenza nella... more
«Ciò che dev’essere accettato, il dato, è, potremmo dire, forme di vita». A partire da questa affermazione di Wittgenstein, contenuta nella seconda parte delle Ricerche filosofiche, è possibile intravedere un’idea di conoscenza nella quale la dicotomia tra il soggettivo e l’oggettivo, ed il problema tradizionale del passaggio dalla percezione soggettiva dei dati sensoriali alla conoscenza oggettiva delle leggi scientifiche, si stempera in una concezione al contempo più semplice e più complessa. Più semplice in quanto permette di superare elegantemente tale dicotomia; più complessa perché ponendo la forma di vita alla base dello sguardo conoscitivo, richiede un punto di partenza che è già costitutivamente articolato. In questo paper mi propongo di analizzare il concetto di forma di vita in Wittgenstein e di delinearne alcune implicazioni per la filosofia della scienza. Nella prima parte traccerò una panoramica degli usi wittgensteiniani di questa espressione, e quindi delle diverse interpretazioni che si possono trovare nella letteratura secondaria. Mi concentrerò poi su come la concezione delle forma di vita come «il dato» può trovare un fertile campo di applicazione nella filosofia della scienza. Distinguerò a questo proposito tre ambiti: le scienze sociali, le scienze matematiche e naturali, le scienze cognitive. Concluderò con alcune considerazioni sul riavvicinamento della tradizionale dicotomia tra scienze dello spirito e scienze della natura.
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There are two main influences that can be identified in Naomi Scheman’s work: Wittgenstein and feminism. Both of them are well recognizable in the collection of her articles and contributions that Oxford University Press has recently... more
There are two main influences that can be identified in Naomi Scheman’s work: Wittgenstein and feminism. Both of them are well recognizable in the collection of her articles and contributions that Oxford University Press has recently published, Shifting Ground. Knowledge and Reality, Transgression and Trustworthiness (2011, pp. 251). The book contains eleven essays that originally appeared between 1995 and 2008, organized around three themes: epistemological considerations (part I: Knowledge), ontological considerations (part II: Reality) and social and political issues (part III: Transgression and trustworthiness). These three parts, as we shall see, are kept together by the general aim of the book: to show the worth of «theorizing from explicitly transgressive social locations».
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Università di Firenze, Dipartimento di lettere e filosofia, 28-29 settembre 2017
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University of Florence, 30 May 2016
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University of Roma Tre, 30 April to 18 June 2013
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Schema dei contenuti e bibliografia di riferimento