Marc Ereshefsky
University of Calgary, Philosophy, Faculty Member
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How should we define 'health' and 'disease'? There are three main positions in the literature. Naturalists desire value-free definitions based on scientific theories. Normativists believe that our uses of 'health'... more
How should we define 'health' and 'disease'? There are three main positions in the literature. Naturalists desire value-free definitions based on scientific theories. Normativists believe that our uses of 'health' and 'disease' reflect value judgments. Hybrid theorists offer definitions containing both normativist and naturalist elements. This paper discusses the problems with these views and offers an alternative approach to the debate over 'health' and 'disease'. Instead of trying to find the correct definitions of 'health' and 'disease' we should explicitly talk about the considerations that are central in medical discussions, namely state descriptions (descriptions of physiological or psychological states) and normative claims (claims about what states we value or disvalue). This distinction avoids the problems facing the major approaches to defining 'health' and 'disease', and it more clearly captur...
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In a series of articles, Rieppel (2005, Biol. Philos. 20:465-487; 2006a, Cladistics 22:186-197; 2006b, Systematist 26:5-9), Keller et al. (2003, Bot. Rev. 69:93-110), and Nixon and Carpenter (2000, Cladistics 16:298-318) criticize the... more
In a series of articles, Rieppel (2005, Biol. Philos. 20:465-487; 2006a, Cladistics 22:186-197; 2006b, Systematist 26:5-9), Keller et al. (2003, Bot. Rev. 69:93-110), and Nixon and Carpenter (2000, Cladistics 16:298-318) criticize the philosophical foundations of the PhyloCode. They argue that species and higher taxa are not individuals, and they reject the view that taxon names are rigid designators. Furthermore, they charge supporters of the individuality thesis and rigid designator theory with assuming essentialism, committing logical inconsistencies, and offering proposals that render taxonomy untestable. These charges are unsound. Such charges turn on confusions over rigid designator theory and the distinction between kinds and individuals. In addition, Rieppel's, Keller et al.'s, and Nixon and Carpenter's proposed alternatives are no better and have their own problems. The individuality thesis and rigid designator theory should not be quickly abandoned.
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Research Interests: Philosophy and Synthese
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1. Introduction. The species category plays two intimately connected roles in biology. The first occurs in biological systematics. Systematists attempt to provide a taxonomy of life using, for the most part, the Linnaean framework.... more
1. Introduction. The species category plays two intimately connected roles in biology. The first occurs in biological systematics. Systematists attempt to provide a taxonomy of life using, for the most part, the Linnaean framework. Species taxa are the basal units in that taxonomy, ...
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Mary Williams has recently entered the fray among philosophers of biology concerning the ontological status of species. In her "Species Are Individuals" (1985), she sketches a proof which allegedly shows that spe-cies are... more
Mary Williams has recently entered the fray among philosophers of biology concerning the ontological status of species. In her "Species Are Individuals" (1985), she sketches a proof which allegedly shows that spe-cies are individuals. While I am not unsympathetic to the view that spe- ...
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Abstract: The received view in philosophy of biology is that biological taxa (species and higher taxa) do not have essences. Recently some philosophers (Boyd, Devitt, Griffiths, LaPorte, Okasha, and Wilson) have suggested new forms of... more
Abstract: The received view in philosophy of biology is that biological taxa (species and higher taxa) do not have essences. Recently some philosophers (Boyd, Devitt, Griffiths, LaPorte, Okasha, and Wilson) have suggested new forms of biological essentialism. They argue ...
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A number of authors argue that while species are evolutionary units, individ-uals and real entities, higher taxa are not. I argue that drawing the divide be-tween species and higher taxa along such lines has not been successful. Common... more
A number of authors argue that while species are evolutionary units, individ-uals and real entities, higher taxa are not. I argue that drawing the divide be-tween species and higher taxa along such lines has not been successful. Common conceptions of evolutionary units ...
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Many writers claim that human kinds are significantly different from biological and natural kinds. Some suggest that humans kinds are unique because social structures are essential for the etiology of human kinds. Others argue that human... more
Many writers claim that human kinds are significantly different from biological and natural kinds. Some suggest that humans kinds are unique because social structures are essential for the etiology of human kinds. Others argue that human cultural evo-lution is decidedly ...
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The biological literature does not suffer from a lack of definitions con-cerning the nature of species. Quite the opposite. A plethora of defi-nitions, or what biologists call "species concept," exist. Not merely one or two... more
The biological literature does not suffer from a lack of definitions con-cerning the nature of species. Quite the opposite. A plethora of defi-nitions, or what biologists call "species concept," exist. Not merely one or two prominent definitions, but at least seven ...
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1. Introduction. The two most fundamental problems in biological tax-onomy are how to sort organisms into species and how to sort species into higher taxa (Hull 1988, 82). Each of us is a part of the species Homo sapiens. That species is... more
1. Introduction. The two most fundamental problems in biological tax-onomy are how to sort organisms into species and how to sort species into higher taxa (Hull 1988, 82). Each of us is a part of the species Homo sapiens. That species is a part of the genus Homo, which in ...
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1. Introduction. Something potentially revolutionary is brewing in bio-logical taxonomy. For hundreds of years biologists have used the Lin-naean system for representing the organic world's diversity. Organisms are sorted into... more
1. Introduction. Something potentially revolutionary is brewing in bio-logical taxonomy. For hundreds of years biologists have used the Lin-naean system for representing the organic world's diversity. Organisms are sorted into species, species into genera, genera into families, ...
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Research Interests: Philosophy and Dialogue
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For those with little or no background in evolutionary biology, the suggestion of taxonomic pluralism might seem odd. Don't introductory biology texts as well as television nature shows suggest that there is a single correct way to... more
For those with little or no background in evolutionary biology, the suggestion of taxonomic pluralism might seem odd. Don't introductory biology texts as well as television nature shows suggest that there is a single correct way to sort the world's organisms? They do, but that advertised ...
Abstract. The Linnaean system of classification is a threefold system of theoretical assump-tions, sorting rules, and rules of nomenclature. Over time, that system has lost its theoretical assumptions as well as its sorting rules.... more
Abstract. The Linnaean system of classification is a threefold system of theoretical assump-tions, sorting rules, and rules of nomenclature. Over time, that system has lost its theoretical assumptions as well as its sorting rules. Cladistic revisions have left it less and less Linnaean. And ...
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This paper examines David Hull’s and Peter Godfrey-Smith’s accounts of biological individuality using the case of biofilms. Biofilms fail standard criteria for individuality, such as having reproductive bottlenecks and forming... more
This paper examines David Hull’s and Peter Godfrey-Smith’s accounts of biological individuality using the case of biofilms. Biofilms fail standard criteria for individuality, such as having reproductive bottlenecks and forming parent-offspring lineages. Nevertheless, biofilms are good candidates for individuals. The nature of biofilms shows that Godfrey-Smith’s account of individuality, with its reliance on reproduction, is too restrictive. Hull’s interactor notion of individuality better captures biofilms, and we argue that it offers a better account of biological individuality. However, Hull’s notion of interactor needs more precision. We suggest some ways to make Hull’s notion of interactor and his account of individuality more precise. Generally, we maintain that biofilms are a good test case for theories of individuality, and a careful examination of biofilms furthers our understanding of biological individuality.
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Most philosophical theories of natural kinds fail to reflect successful classificatory practice in science. Some are developed from a priori considerations and are too detached from actual classificatory practice. Other theories of... more
Most philosophical theories of natural kinds fail to reflect successful classificatory practice in science. Some are developed from a priori considerations and are too detached from actual classificatory practice. Other theories of natural kinds are more naturalistic, but they posit overarching criteria for natural kinds that fail to capture the diversity of reasons scientists have for positing natural kinds. This paper highlights these problems and offers an account of natural kinds that better reflects actual classificatory practice in science. The account offered has two normative components. First, natural kind classifications should achieve the functions they are posited to attain, whether those functions are epistemic or non-epistemic. Second, how natural kind classifications achieve those functions should be grounded in the world and not merely in our thoughts about the world. The resultant account of natural kinds, the Grounded Functionality Account, is properly attuned to scientific practice and at the same time has a significant normative component.