Gabriela Rossi
Profesora en el Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad de los Andes (Chile).
Mis intereses en investigación se concentran primariamente en el área de la Filosofía Antigua (especialmente Aristóteles), y, como segunda línea, en el área de la filosofía práctica (en especial ética y racionalidad práctica).
Address: Universidad de los Andes
Instituto de Filosofía
Av. Mons. Álvaro del Portillo 12455
Las Condes, Santiago
Chile
Mis intereses en investigación se concentran primariamente en el área de la Filosofía Antigua (especialmente Aristóteles), y, como segunda línea, en el área de la filosofía práctica (en especial ética y racionalidad práctica).
Address: Universidad de los Andes
Instituto de Filosofía
Av. Mons. Álvaro del Portillo 12455
Las Condes, Santiago
Chile
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The article proposes a practical normative reading of the thesis about the final end of human actions in NE I 2. Under this reading, Aristotle avoids the fallacy accusation (Anscombe), and it is also consistent with other passages in which a final end is considered. Finally, I propose a rather programmatic speculative consequence about the possibility of construing the foundation of Aristotelian ethics entirely on the ground of practical rationality, leaving aside naturalistic premises as unnecessary for the argument.
Abstract: I take as a starting point the distinction made by Aristotle in NE I 13 between two functions of the soul that take part in reason, and I argue that both are proper of the human soul (i.e. not shared as such with other non-rational animals). My further aim is to emphasize the integration of emotions and reason in Aristotle's practical rationality, against dualistic readings of the Aristotelian ethical virtue, that segregate the functions of reason and sensibility. Thus, I defend that reason has a direct influence on emotions, although this influence is not to be understood, as some authors suggest, as a rhetorical persuasion. Instead, the goal of early ethical education would be to make the non-rational part receptive to the mandates of reason.
Resumen: Recientes intentos por conectar la ética y la biología aristotélicas marcan una suerte de continuidad entre el carácter de los animales no-racionales y de los seres humanos, de modo tal que en la descripción de los caracteres de los animales no racionales puede identificarse el punto de partida biológico del propio ser humano en el desarrollo de su carácter moral. En este artículo, propongo señalar los límites de este tipo de lectura, ya que, entendida de cierto modo, ella implica una continuidad entre la normatividad natural y la normatividad práctica propia de un naturalismo fundacionalista que no puede atribuirse a Aristóteles. En conexión con ello, sostengo que el concepto de virtud natural no es un concepto natural, sino ético, tal que sólo cobra sentido en el marco de la normatividad práctica; la virtud natural, en este sentido, no forma parte de una explicación genética de la virtud sino de un análisis que va del todo a las partes, de acuerdo al cual ella no es anterior sino posterior a la virtud ética.
The text of Physics 2.8 has been recently interpreted so as to restore the reading that Aristotle holds an external, and even an anthropocentric, natural teleology. This reading has been defended by D. Furley, and especially by D. Sedley. In this paper I present several arguments against this interpretation of the text. Thus, I argue that Aristotle does not claim, in this chapter, that it rains for the sake of the growing of the crop, against an opinion which is currently somewhat extended among interpreters.
The article proposes a practical normative reading of the thesis about the final end of human actions in NE I 2. Under this reading, Aristotle avoids the fallacy accusation (Anscombe), and it is also consistent with other passages in which a final end is considered. Finally, I propose a rather programmatic speculative consequence about the possibility of construing the foundation of Aristotelian ethics entirely on the ground of practical rationality, leaving aside naturalistic premises as unnecessary for the argument.
Abstract: I take as a starting point the distinction made by Aristotle in NE I 13 between two functions of the soul that take part in reason, and I argue that both are proper of the human soul (i.e. not shared as such with other non-rational animals). My further aim is to emphasize the integration of emotions and reason in Aristotle's practical rationality, against dualistic readings of the Aristotelian ethical virtue, that segregate the functions of reason and sensibility. Thus, I defend that reason has a direct influence on emotions, although this influence is not to be understood, as some authors suggest, as a rhetorical persuasion. Instead, the goal of early ethical education would be to make the non-rational part receptive to the mandates of reason.
Resumen: Recientes intentos por conectar la ética y la biología aristotélicas marcan una suerte de continuidad entre el carácter de los animales no-racionales y de los seres humanos, de modo tal que en la descripción de los caracteres de los animales no racionales puede identificarse el punto de partida biológico del propio ser humano en el desarrollo de su carácter moral. En este artículo, propongo señalar los límites de este tipo de lectura, ya que, entendida de cierto modo, ella implica una continuidad entre la normatividad natural y la normatividad práctica propia de un naturalismo fundacionalista que no puede atribuirse a Aristóteles. En conexión con ello, sostengo que el concepto de virtud natural no es un concepto natural, sino ético, tal que sólo cobra sentido en el marco de la normatividad práctica; la virtud natural, en este sentido, no forma parte de una explicación genética de la virtud sino de un análisis que va del todo a las partes, de acuerdo al cual ella no es anterior sino posterior a la virtud ética.
The text of Physics 2.8 has been recently interpreted so as to restore the reading that Aristotle holds an external, and even an anthropocentric, natural teleology. This reading has been defended by D. Furley, and especially by D. Sedley. In this paper I present several arguments against this interpretation of the text. Thus, I argue that Aristotle does not claim, in this chapter, that it rains for the sake of the growing of the crop, against an opinion which is currently somewhat extended among interpreters.
Más allá de las cuestiones puramente exegéticas, el estudio considera que la concepción de Phys. II 4-6 es portadora de genuino interés filosófico, en la medida en que Aristóteles intenta dar cuenta del azar tomándolo como un fenómeno irreductible cuyas condiciones de posibilidad procura esclarecer, antes que como una mera apariencia que deba ser eliminada por la reflexión filosófica. En tal medida, su concepción de la fortuna (týche) puede ser puesta en diálogo fructífero, todavía hoy, con aproximaciones de corte eliminativo a este mismo fenómeno.
This work delves into Aristotle’s theory of chance in Phys. II 4-6, a text found within the discussion about the principles and causes of natural philosophy. Always having this context in view, the author offers an interpretation of the generic definition of chance as a certain kind of accidental causal relation, and shows later how both species of chance distinguished by Aristotle in Phys. II 6 (týche and autómaton) share that common structure. On this reading, it becomes relevant to clarify at the same time the specific mode that this kind of causality adopts in nature and in human agency.
Outside merely exegetical questions, the book considers that the account of chance in Phys. II 4-6 bears philosophical interest, for Aristotle sets out to explain chance taking it as an irreducible phenomenon whose conditions of possibility he tries to clarify, rather than taking it as a deceptive appearance which should be eliminated by philosophical reflection. To that extent, Aristotle’s account of luck (týche) is shown to be worth considering, even today, as a genuine philosophical alternative to eliminative accounts of this phenomenon."