Oszmán-magyar viszony a 16-18. században: Tanulmányok a Magyar Királyság és az Oszmán Birodalom népeinek – magyarok, törökök, rácok, tatárok, zsidók, görögök és egyéb népek – hétköznapjairól; egyén és közösség viszonya, szerk. J. Újváry Zsuzsanna, 2020
Private, Public, and State Interest
The Role of the Peace Treaty of Gyarmat
during the Franco–Tra... more Private, Public, and State Interest
The Role of the Peace Treaty of Gyarmat
during the Franco–Transylvanian Negotiations in 1625–1626
In 1625 the emissaries of the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires negotiated the renewal of the Zsitvatorok peace treaty of 1606 near Gyarmat. Gábor Bethlen, Prince of Transylvania was also represented at the treaty by his envoys. Members of the Hungarian aristocracy accused Bethlen of being conducted by his selfish interests when hindering the conclusion of a peace settlement. However, it was the prince’s negotiations with the anti-Habsburg powers including France that contributed to his diplomatic move in Constantinople asking the sultan not to approve of the peace treaty. The article describes the cooperation of the Transylvanian, French, English, Venetian, and Dutch resident ambassadors at the Porte in order that the Ottoman Empire do not make peace with the Holy Roman Emperor and Hungarian King Ferdinand II, and to negotiate an alliance between Transylvania and France. While the efforts of the European ambassadors duly contributed to the sultan’s reluctance to ratify the peace treaty of Gyarmat, the Franco–Transylvanian alliance was finally not concluded due to the reasons mentioned in the article.
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and Jagiellonian political entities, the case study of French contacts shows that the shrinking country in Ottoman orbit lost its attractiveness for the European society of princes.
Keywords: Transylvania, dynastic relations, Szapolyai, Báthory, Jagiellon.
The Role of the Peace Treaty of Gyarmat
during the Franco–Transylvanian Negotiations in 1625–1626
In 1625 the emissaries of the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires negotiated the renewal of the Zsitvatorok peace treaty of 1606 near Gyarmat. Gábor Bethlen, Prince of Transylvania was also represented at the treaty by his envoys. Members of the Hungarian aristocracy accused Bethlen of being conducted by his selfish interests when hindering the conclusion of a peace settlement. However, it was the prince’s negotiations with the anti-Habsburg powers including France that contributed to his diplomatic move in Constantinople asking the sultan not to approve of the peace treaty. The article describes the cooperation of the Transylvanian, French, English, Venetian, and Dutch resident ambassadors at the Porte in order that the Ottoman Empire do not make peace with the Holy Roman Emperor and Hungarian King Ferdinand II, and to negotiate an alliance between Transylvania and France. While the efforts of the European ambassadors duly contributed to the sultan’s reluctance to ratify the peace treaty of Gyarmat, the Franco–Transylvanian alliance was finally not concluded due to the reasons mentioned in the article.
On the basis of the documents of the French delegation in Vienna published in 1667, the article examines the opinion of French ambassadors about Gábor Bethlen, Prince of Transylvania and elected king of Hungary, in 1620–1621. The analysis begins with the investigation of the efforts of the French ambassadors to negotiate a peace treaty between Emperor Ferdinand II and Frederick of Pfalz, elected king of Bohemia, and between the Emperor and Gábor Bethlen. At first, both Frederick and Gábor Bethlen were unwilling to accept French mediation on the basis of the Emperor’s terms to dissolve their confederation and alliance in order to start negotiations. Finally, Gábor Bethlen agreed to meet the French delegation in Pressburg in October 1620, and after the battle of the White Mountain in November, he decided to leave the confederation in winter 1620/1621. Still, hostilities did not cease with the peace negotiations between him and the Emperor with French mediation in Hainburg in spring 1621. Due to the concurrent conflict between France and Spain in Valtellina, French diplomacy finally chose to withdraw the ambassadors originally sent to represent the Emperor’s case in a treaty with his rebel subjects.
As for the French attitude towards Gábor Bethlen during the period of negotiations, some differences appear when considering him and Frederick. Although neither of them was recognised by the French diplomacy as titular king of Hungary and Bohemia, respectively, Gábor Bethlen could and did take advantage of the fact that he had not been crowned. This enabled him to meet the French ambassadors in person, who, on the other hand, were not allowed to get in touch personally with Frederick, elected and already crowned king of Bohemia. While the French delegation considered Friderick of Pfalz as too vain to accept the mediation of Louis XIII, their attitude towards Gábor Bethlen was less harsh. Their personal encounter convinced the ambassadors that there was nothing barbarous or uncivilised (“rien de barbare”) in his and his subjects’ conduct, while Gábor Bethlen, emphasising elements of representation, could avoid making political concessions. Furthermore, he was also able to convince the French mediators of his inclination to peace during the Hainburg treaties, despite the fact that he was constantly negotiating Ottoman military aid against Ferdinand II through his ambassadors at the Porte. On the whole, it can be said that both the good impressions made by Gábor Bethlen’s personality on the French mediators as well as his skilful tactics contributed to their attitude of moderation concerning the Emperor’s harsh terms against his opponent, the Prince of Transylvania.
1. the attitude of French diplomacy towards the Austrian Habsburgs during the Thirty Years War, with special regard to the peace of Westphalia
2. territorial expansion of France in the 17th century in Alsace and Lorraine
3. French eff orts to hinder the election of the members of the House of Habsburg as King of the Romans.
The article examines the reception of the Peace of Westphalia from the point of view of the difference between its role in European cultural remembrance and its oblivion in Hungarian historiography. First, it is possible that negative judgements concerning the historical role of the Principality of Transylvania as well as of Prince George Rákóczi I contribute to the phenomenon of oblivion. Second, the influence of the perspective of the age-old French-German rivalry can be traced even in modern historiography of the second half of the 20th century. Finally, it is worth considering the myths of the Peace of Westphalia as common European lieu de mémoire in the history of international relations. On the whole, changes and differences in cultural remembrance highlight the lack of mutual recognition: while the Peace of Westphalia does not appear in Hungarian cultural and historical remembrance, European historiography does not concern the role of the Principality of Transylvania either.
The paper is about the travel of Sebastien de Breyant de Montalto/Mostespin to Transylvania in January 1625, which still has obscure details. The published sources: two documents from Cracow and the others from Paris supplement the incomplete infromation of the Hungarian historiography. Due to the variants of his name, the diplomat Montalto can be identified as the French cavalry colonel Montespin, who fought as a mercenary in the army of the grand hetman, Samuel Korecki on the side of his brother-in-law, Alexander Movilă, in 1615 during the Moldavian Magnate Wars. Montalto, who was consistently referred to by the later French and Italian sources as Montespin, travelled the France-Transylvania-Poland round several times during the mid-1620s, while he transferred the written versions of the terms of an unrealized alliance between Louis XIII and Gábor Bethlen. The newly published letters also prove that he was a dual ambassador in French and Transylvanian service.
Un diplomate français en Transylvanie en 1625
L’étude porte sur la mission de Sebastien de Breyant de Montalto/Mostespin en Transylvanie en janvier 1625 dont les traces sont sporadiques et l’identité est encore presque inconnue dans l’historiographie hongroise. Elle complète les sources contemporaines qui étaient connues jusque-là par deux lettres trouvées dans la Bibliothèque Czartoryski à Cracovie et quelques autres dans les Archives nationales de Paris. Grace aux variations de son nom, le diplomate français appelé Montalto par rapport à sa mission auprès de Gabriel Bethlen, prince de Transylvanie, peut être identifié comme le capitaine Montespin de l’escadron de cavalerie français recruté par le prince polonais Samuel Korecki sur le front de Moldavie en 1615. Les sources ultérieures écrites en français et en italien continuent à le désigner comme Montespin et confirment que l’ancien mercenaire circulait entre la France, la Transylvanie et la Pologne dans les années 1625-1626 portant les articles d’une alliance qui n’a jamais été conclue entre Louis XIII et Gabriel Bethlen.
Louis Gédoyn, known by the name ‘Turk’ due to his previous journey to the Holy Land, was appointed consul of Alep in 1623. He wrote a diary during his travel to his new post in 1623/24 that was published along with his letters in 1909. On the basis of this journal, the article highlights the events of his winter journey from Venice to Beograd, during which he travelled in the company of the Transylvanian ambassador, István Hatvany. Although Gédoyn owed his life to Hatvany who once saved him from freezing to death alone in the Bosnian woods, the Transylvanian ambassador many times proved to be a rather unpleasant company for the French, as he continuously tried to convince him to go to Transylvania with him, and if not, to promote the alliance of the two countries at the French court. Beside describing their difficult and sometimes dangerous journey together, the article reflects on the Transylvanian ambassador’s commercial activity in Venice as well as on the main elements of his argumentation that derived from the Transylvanian prince’s, Gábor Behlen’s political and diplomatic activity.
The objective of the dissertation is to place Gábor Bethlen’s intervention in the Thirty Years War into a European context and provide its thorough analysis from the perspective of the diplomatic relations between France and Transylvania. It is exactly these connections and the analysis of new diplomatic sources that makes it possible to identify the aim of Gábor Bethlen’s foreign policy in his strife for the international recognition of his state and his person. Furthermore, contrary to his well-known image in Hungarian historiography, his foreign policy was not bound exclusively and mainly to his Ottoman overlord but he sought the protection of his state and his personal recognition outside the bonds of vassalage, by the involvement of Western partners.
The dissertation aims at presenting that the recognition of the Principality of Transylvania had to be achieved through its inclusion in an international treaty, which was the main criterion of the era: Gábor Bethlen demanded that France and England guarantee the protection of his state, mainly in the form of an asylum against the Emperor. The international recognition of his person as a ruler is taken into account by the dissertation as his entering the society of princes („société des princes”). This could be achieved through the obtaining of titles such as elected king (of Bohemia, Hungary, Poland) or prince of the Holy Roman Empire, as well as through the establishment of kinship (matrimony, god-parentage, wardship). The rhetoric used by Gábor Bethlen in his diplomacy also underlines his efforts to enter the society of princes: he referred to himself as prince of the Holy Roman Empire several times, as most probably he intended to lessen the significance of his being an Ottoman vassal and descendant of a non-princely family. The results of the inquiry of the dissertation prove that Gábor Bethlen’s foreign political goals were only partially reached. He did not manage to guarantee the protection of Louis XIII for his state, nor conclude an alliance with the French king. On the other hand, he achieved the recognition of his person and family by the public audience of his nephew Péter Bethlen in Paris in 1628.
and Jagiellonian political entities, the case study of French contacts shows that the shrinking country in Ottoman orbit lost its attractiveness for the European society of princes.
Keywords: Transylvania, dynastic relations, Szapolyai, Báthory, Jagiellon.
The Role of the Peace Treaty of Gyarmat
during the Franco–Transylvanian Negotiations in 1625–1626
In 1625 the emissaries of the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires negotiated the renewal of the Zsitvatorok peace treaty of 1606 near Gyarmat. Gábor Bethlen, Prince of Transylvania was also represented at the treaty by his envoys. Members of the Hungarian aristocracy accused Bethlen of being conducted by his selfish interests when hindering the conclusion of a peace settlement. However, it was the prince’s negotiations with the anti-Habsburg powers including France that contributed to his diplomatic move in Constantinople asking the sultan not to approve of the peace treaty. The article describes the cooperation of the Transylvanian, French, English, Venetian, and Dutch resident ambassadors at the Porte in order that the Ottoman Empire do not make peace with the Holy Roman Emperor and Hungarian King Ferdinand II, and to negotiate an alliance between Transylvania and France. While the efforts of the European ambassadors duly contributed to the sultan’s reluctance to ratify the peace treaty of Gyarmat, the Franco–Transylvanian alliance was finally not concluded due to the reasons mentioned in the article.
On the basis of the documents of the French delegation in Vienna published in 1667, the article examines the opinion of French ambassadors about Gábor Bethlen, Prince of Transylvania and elected king of Hungary, in 1620–1621. The analysis begins with the investigation of the efforts of the French ambassadors to negotiate a peace treaty between Emperor Ferdinand II and Frederick of Pfalz, elected king of Bohemia, and between the Emperor and Gábor Bethlen. At first, both Frederick and Gábor Bethlen were unwilling to accept French mediation on the basis of the Emperor’s terms to dissolve their confederation and alliance in order to start negotiations. Finally, Gábor Bethlen agreed to meet the French delegation in Pressburg in October 1620, and after the battle of the White Mountain in November, he decided to leave the confederation in winter 1620/1621. Still, hostilities did not cease with the peace negotiations between him and the Emperor with French mediation in Hainburg in spring 1621. Due to the concurrent conflict between France and Spain in Valtellina, French diplomacy finally chose to withdraw the ambassadors originally sent to represent the Emperor’s case in a treaty with his rebel subjects.
As for the French attitude towards Gábor Bethlen during the period of negotiations, some differences appear when considering him and Frederick. Although neither of them was recognised by the French diplomacy as titular king of Hungary and Bohemia, respectively, Gábor Bethlen could and did take advantage of the fact that he had not been crowned. This enabled him to meet the French ambassadors in person, who, on the other hand, were not allowed to get in touch personally with Frederick, elected and already crowned king of Bohemia. While the French delegation considered Friderick of Pfalz as too vain to accept the mediation of Louis XIII, their attitude towards Gábor Bethlen was less harsh. Their personal encounter convinced the ambassadors that there was nothing barbarous or uncivilised (“rien de barbare”) in his and his subjects’ conduct, while Gábor Bethlen, emphasising elements of representation, could avoid making political concessions. Furthermore, he was also able to convince the French mediators of his inclination to peace during the Hainburg treaties, despite the fact that he was constantly negotiating Ottoman military aid against Ferdinand II through his ambassadors at the Porte. On the whole, it can be said that both the good impressions made by Gábor Bethlen’s personality on the French mediators as well as his skilful tactics contributed to their attitude of moderation concerning the Emperor’s harsh terms against his opponent, the Prince of Transylvania.
1. the attitude of French diplomacy towards the Austrian Habsburgs during the Thirty Years War, with special regard to the peace of Westphalia
2. territorial expansion of France in the 17th century in Alsace and Lorraine
3. French eff orts to hinder the election of the members of the House of Habsburg as King of the Romans.
The article examines the reception of the Peace of Westphalia from the point of view of the difference between its role in European cultural remembrance and its oblivion in Hungarian historiography. First, it is possible that negative judgements concerning the historical role of the Principality of Transylvania as well as of Prince George Rákóczi I contribute to the phenomenon of oblivion. Second, the influence of the perspective of the age-old French-German rivalry can be traced even in modern historiography of the second half of the 20th century. Finally, it is worth considering the myths of the Peace of Westphalia as common European lieu de mémoire in the history of international relations. On the whole, changes and differences in cultural remembrance highlight the lack of mutual recognition: while the Peace of Westphalia does not appear in Hungarian cultural and historical remembrance, European historiography does not concern the role of the Principality of Transylvania either.
The paper is about the travel of Sebastien de Breyant de Montalto/Mostespin to Transylvania in January 1625, which still has obscure details. The published sources: two documents from Cracow and the others from Paris supplement the incomplete infromation of the Hungarian historiography. Due to the variants of his name, the diplomat Montalto can be identified as the French cavalry colonel Montespin, who fought as a mercenary in the army of the grand hetman, Samuel Korecki on the side of his brother-in-law, Alexander Movilă, in 1615 during the Moldavian Magnate Wars. Montalto, who was consistently referred to by the later French and Italian sources as Montespin, travelled the France-Transylvania-Poland round several times during the mid-1620s, while he transferred the written versions of the terms of an unrealized alliance between Louis XIII and Gábor Bethlen. The newly published letters also prove that he was a dual ambassador in French and Transylvanian service.
Un diplomate français en Transylvanie en 1625
L’étude porte sur la mission de Sebastien de Breyant de Montalto/Mostespin en Transylvanie en janvier 1625 dont les traces sont sporadiques et l’identité est encore presque inconnue dans l’historiographie hongroise. Elle complète les sources contemporaines qui étaient connues jusque-là par deux lettres trouvées dans la Bibliothèque Czartoryski à Cracovie et quelques autres dans les Archives nationales de Paris. Grace aux variations de son nom, le diplomate français appelé Montalto par rapport à sa mission auprès de Gabriel Bethlen, prince de Transylvanie, peut être identifié comme le capitaine Montespin de l’escadron de cavalerie français recruté par le prince polonais Samuel Korecki sur le front de Moldavie en 1615. Les sources ultérieures écrites en français et en italien continuent à le désigner comme Montespin et confirment que l’ancien mercenaire circulait entre la France, la Transylvanie et la Pologne dans les années 1625-1626 portant les articles d’une alliance qui n’a jamais été conclue entre Louis XIII et Gabriel Bethlen.
Louis Gédoyn, known by the name ‘Turk’ due to his previous journey to the Holy Land, was appointed consul of Alep in 1623. He wrote a diary during his travel to his new post in 1623/24 that was published along with his letters in 1909. On the basis of this journal, the article highlights the events of his winter journey from Venice to Beograd, during which he travelled in the company of the Transylvanian ambassador, István Hatvany. Although Gédoyn owed his life to Hatvany who once saved him from freezing to death alone in the Bosnian woods, the Transylvanian ambassador many times proved to be a rather unpleasant company for the French, as he continuously tried to convince him to go to Transylvania with him, and if not, to promote the alliance of the two countries at the French court. Beside describing their difficult and sometimes dangerous journey together, the article reflects on the Transylvanian ambassador’s commercial activity in Venice as well as on the main elements of his argumentation that derived from the Transylvanian prince’s, Gábor Behlen’s political and diplomatic activity.
The objective of the dissertation is to place Gábor Bethlen’s intervention in the Thirty Years War into a European context and provide its thorough analysis from the perspective of the diplomatic relations between France and Transylvania. It is exactly these connections and the analysis of new diplomatic sources that makes it possible to identify the aim of Gábor Bethlen’s foreign policy in his strife for the international recognition of his state and his person. Furthermore, contrary to his well-known image in Hungarian historiography, his foreign policy was not bound exclusively and mainly to his Ottoman overlord but he sought the protection of his state and his personal recognition outside the bonds of vassalage, by the involvement of Western partners.
The dissertation aims at presenting that the recognition of the Principality of Transylvania had to be achieved through its inclusion in an international treaty, which was the main criterion of the era: Gábor Bethlen demanded that France and England guarantee the protection of his state, mainly in the form of an asylum against the Emperor. The international recognition of his person as a ruler is taken into account by the dissertation as his entering the society of princes („société des princes”). This could be achieved through the obtaining of titles such as elected king (of Bohemia, Hungary, Poland) or prince of the Holy Roman Empire, as well as through the establishment of kinship (matrimony, god-parentage, wardship). The rhetoric used by Gábor Bethlen in his diplomacy also underlines his efforts to enter the society of princes: he referred to himself as prince of the Holy Roman Empire several times, as most probably he intended to lessen the significance of his being an Ottoman vassal and descendant of a non-princely family. The results of the inquiry of the dissertation prove that Gábor Bethlen’s foreign political goals were only partially reached. He did not manage to guarantee the protection of Louis XIII for his state, nor conclude an alliance with the French king. On the other hand, he achieved the recognition of his person and family by the public audience of his nephew Péter Bethlen in Paris in 1628.