If I died and was offered to be born again as an insect or cease to exist, I would definitely cho... more If I died and was offered to be born again as an insect or cease to exist, I would definitely choose not to exist. This essay focuses on the quality of life of honey bees because they are well-studied, and on what have been suggested to be the most numerous insects: springtails, ants, termites, and aquatic insects such as mayflies and midges (although some sources no longer classify springtails as insects). There is enormous inequality among the fates of insects. Some die very young, either as larvae, pupae, or just after having emerged from the pupa stage as adults, and it is difficult to see how most such lives can be good on balance. Death often seems very painful so, because their lives are so short, they do not include enough positive wellbeing to compensate their suffering. On the other hand, successful honey bee queens can live for years while being fed, protected, and taken care of by others. In general, though, honey bees live short lives. The vast majority of them are workers who live on average only about 15–38 days as adults during summer. Mayflies and some midges have even shorter adult lives—they never eat, and they die within a few days. Ants and other kinds of insects live longer. This is probably fortunate from a population perspective, since it means fewer deaths per unit of time, although it may not be better for any individual to live longer.
Is the balance of happiness versus suffering in the future net positive or net negative (in expec... more Is the balance of happiness versus suffering in the future net positive or net negative (in expectation)? Is the aggregate happiness and suffering in a group of wild or domesticated non-human animals positive or negative?1 For such questions to have factual answers that are free from value judgements, happiness and suffering would need to be objectively measurable to a very high degree. That is to say, they would need to be objectively measurable on a specific kind of scale.2 In principle, we would need to establish a plausible way to add and subtract magnitudes of happiness and suffering across individuals and get a sum; a way that does not involve a value judgement on the part of the person doing the arithmetic.3 However, such a degree of measurability is widely (although not universally) rejected.
Weak negative views in ethics are concerned with both reducing suffering and promoting happiness,... more Weak negative views in ethics are concerned with both reducing suffering and promoting happiness, but are commonly said to give more weight to suffering than to happiness. Such views include weak negative utilitarianism (also called negativeleaning utilitarianism), and other views. In contrast, non-negative views, including traditional utilitarianism, are typically said to give equal weight to happiness and suffering. However, it is not obvious how weak negative and non-negative views differ, and what it means to give happiness and suffering equal weight, or to give suffering more weight.
Some find it plausible that a sufficiently long duration of torture is worse than any duration of... more Some find it plausible that a sufficiently long duration of torture is worse than any duration of mild headaches. Similarly, it has been claimed that a million humans living great lives is better than any number of worm-like creatures feeling a few seconds of pleasure each. Some have related bad things to good things along the same lines. For example, one may hold that a future in which a sufficient number of beings experience a lifetime of torture is bad, regardless of what else that future contains, while minor bad things, such as slight unpleasantness, can always be counterbalanced by enough good things. Among the most common objections to such ideas are sequence arguments. But sequence arguments are usually formulated in classical logic. One might therefore wonder if they work if we instead adopt many-valued logic. I show that, in a common many-valued logical framework, the answer depends on which versions of transitivity are used as premises. We get valid sequence arguments if ...
We address the moral importance of fish, invertebrates such as crustaceans, snails and insects, a... more We address the moral importance of fish, invertebrates such as crustaceans, snails and insects, and other animals about which there is qualified scientific uncertainty about their sentience. We argue that, on a sentientist basis, one can at least say that how such animals fare make ethically significant claims on our character. It is a requirement of a morally decent (or virtuous) person that she at least pays attention to and is cautious regarding the possibly morally relevant aspects of such animals. This involves having a moral stance, in the sense of patterns of perception, such that one notices such animals as being morally relevant in various situations. For the person who does not already consider these animals in this way, this could be a big change in moral psychology, and can be assumed to have behavioural consequences, albeit indeterminate. Character has been largely neglected in the literature, which focuses on act-centred approaches (i.e. that the evidence on sentience supports, or does not support, taking some specific action). We see our character-centred approach as complementary to, not superior to, act-centred approaches. Our approach has the advantage of allowing us to make ethically interesting and practically relevant claims about a wider range of cases, but it has the drawback of providing less specific action guidance.
The thesis is about the moral importance of ‘small animals,’ by which I mean invertebrates such a... more The thesis is about the moral importance of ‘small animals,’ by which I mean invertebrates such as insects, spiders, earthworms, and snails, but not micro-organisms, such as amoebas or bacteria. I focus on the sentientist approach to moral importance and investigate the moral importance of small animals on the basis of that they may be able to have morally relevant negative mental states. I argue that, on such an assumption, one can at least say that small animals have a claim to virtue ethical significance. At least, it is a requirement of a morally decent (or virtuous) person that she pays attention to and is cautious regarding small animals in a morally relevant way, that she allows them to affect her moral-psychological life. For the person who does not already consider small animals in this way, this could plausibly be a big change in her moral psychology.
Leslie (1998) writes that when “discussing whether the universe was created by a benevolent deity... more Leslie (1998) writes that when “discussing whether the universe was created by a benevolent deity, philosophers regularly point out that our world might be considered an ethical disaster, something of negative value, because of all the misery it contains.” 1 In addition, “scores of [professional philosophers] recognize no moral call to keep the human race in existence.” 2 Related ideas have been discussed extensively in philosophy, sometimes for millennia, as in the case of the value of existence versus non-existence. But the ideas in this cluster are very different from one another; for example, the idea that horrors in the past have not been counterbalanced by good things in the past, and the related but very different idea that nothing could possibly be better than an empty world. It is important to keep such ideas apart, partly because some are much less controversial than others. This essay briefly surveys the different ideas.
This is a text on axiology, on which outcomes or states of affairs are better or worse than others. It does not make normative claims about what should be done. In particular, even if an empty world would be better, it does not claim that one should try to bring about an empty world. Rather, the topic of this essay is important as one consideration out of many when prioritizing limited altruistic efforts and resources; for example when asking, should we worry about the future having no sentient life, and if so how much compared to other things we have to worry about, such as preventing extreme suffering?
The purpose of this essay is to present to a general audience ideas from the philosophical literature that are important for altruism and policymaking. Such ideas unfortunately tend to stay hidden in niche books and articles behind paywalls, and oftentimes they are unnoticed and forgotten as only a few specialists are aware of them.
If I died and was offered to be born again as an insect or cease to exist, I would definitely cho... more If I died and was offered to be born again as an insect or cease to exist, I would definitely choose not to exist. This essay focuses on the quality of life of honey bees because they are well-studied, and on what have been suggested to be the most numerous insects: springtails, ants, termites, and aquatic insects such as mayflies and midges (although some sources no longer classify springtails as insects). There is enormous inequality among the fates of insects. Some die very young, either as larvae, pupae, or just after having emerged from the pupa stage as adults, and it is difficult to see how most such lives can be good on balance. Death often seems very painful so, because their lives are so short, they do not include enough positive wellbeing to compensate their suffering. On the other hand, successful honey bee queens can live for years while being fed, protected, and taken care of by others. In general, though, honey bees live short lives. The vast majority of them are workers who live on average only about 15–38 days as adults during summer. Mayflies and some midges have even shorter adult lives—they never eat, and they die within a few days. Ants and other kinds of insects live longer. This is probably fortunate from a population perspective, since it means fewer deaths per unit of time, although it may not be better for any individual to live longer.
If I died and was offered to be born again as an insect or cease to exist, I would definitely cho... more If I died and was offered to be born again as an insect or cease to exist, I would definitely choose not to exist. This essay focuses on the quality of life of honey bees because they are well-studied, and on what have been suggested to be the most numerous insects: springtails, ants, termites, and aquatic insects such as mayflies and midges (although some sources no longer classify springtails as insects). There is enormous inequality among the fates of insects. Some die very young, either as larvae, pupae, or just after having emerged from the pupa stage as adults, and it is difficult to see how most such lives can be good on balance. Death often seems very painful so, because their lives are so short, they do not include enough positive wellbeing to compensate their suffering. On the other hand, successful honey bee queens can live for years while being fed, protected, and taken care of by others. In general, though, honey bees live short lives. The vast majority of them are workers who live on average only about 15–38 days as adults during summer. Mayflies and some midges have even shorter adult lives—they never eat, and they die within a few days. Ants and other kinds of insects live longer. This is probably fortunate from a population perspective, since it means fewer deaths per unit of time, although it may not be better for any individual to live longer.
Is the balance of happiness versus suffering in the future net positive or net negative (in expec... more Is the balance of happiness versus suffering in the future net positive or net negative (in expectation)? Is the aggregate happiness and suffering in a group of wild or domesticated non-human animals positive or negative?1 For such questions to have factual answers that are free from value judgements, happiness and suffering would need to be objectively measurable to a very high degree. That is to say, they would need to be objectively measurable on a specific kind of scale.2 In principle, we would need to establish a plausible way to add and subtract magnitudes of happiness and suffering across individuals and get a sum; a way that does not involve a value judgement on the part of the person doing the arithmetic.3 However, such a degree of measurability is widely (although not universally) rejected.
Weak negative views in ethics are concerned with both reducing suffering and promoting happiness,... more Weak negative views in ethics are concerned with both reducing suffering and promoting happiness, but are commonly said to give more weight to suffering than to happiness. Such views include weak negative utilitarianism (also called negativeleaning utilitarianism), and other views. In contrast, non-negative views, including traditional utilitarianism, are typically said to give equal weight to happiness and suffering. However, it is not obvious how weak negative and non-negative views differ, and what it means to give happiness and suffering equal weight, or to give suffering more weight.
Some find it plausible that a sufficiently long duration of torture is worse than any duration of... more Some find it plausible that a sufficiently long duration of torture is worse than any duration of mild headaches. Similarly, it has been claimed that a million humans living great lives is better than any number of worm-like creatures feeling a few seconds of pleasure each. Some have related bad things to good things along the same lines. For example, one may hold that a future in which a sufficient number of beings experience a lifetime of torture is bad, regardless of what else that future contains, while minor bad things, such as slight unpleasantness, can always be counterbalanced by enough good things. Among the most common objections to such ideas are sequence arguments. But sequence arguments are usually formulated in classical logic. One might therefore wonder if they work if we instead adopt many-valued logic. I show that, in a common many-valued logical framework, the answer depends on which versions of transitivity are used as premises. We get valid sequence arguments if ...
We address the moral importance of fish, invertebrates such as crustaceans, snails and insects, a... more We address the moral importance of fish, invertebrates such as crustaceans, snails and insects, and other animals about which there is qualified scientific uncertainty about their sentience. We argue that, on a sentientist basis, one can at least say that how such animals fare make ethically significant claims on our character. It is a requirement of a morally decent (or virtuous) person that she at least pays attention to and is cautious regarding the possibly morally relevant aspects of such animals. This involves having a moral stance, in the sense of patterns of perception, such that one notices such animals as being morally relevant in various situations. For the person who does not already consider these animals in this way, this could be a big change in moral psychology, and can be assumed to have behavioural consequences, albeit indeterminate. Character has been largely neglected in the literature, which focuses on act-centred approaches (i.e. that the evidence on sentience supports, or does not support, taking some specific action). We see our character-centred approach as complementary to, not superior to, act-centred approaches. Our approach has the advantage of allowing us to make ethically interesting and practically relevant claims about a wider range of cases, but it has the drawback of providing less specific action guidance.
The thesis is about the moral importance of ‘small animals,’ by which I mean invertebrates such a... more The thesis is about the moral importance of ‘small animals,’ by which I mean invertebrates such as insects, spiders, earthworms, and snails, but not micro-organisms, such as amoebas or bacteria. I focus on the sentientist approach to moral importance and investigate the moral importance of small animals on the basis of that they may be able to have morally relevant negative mental states. I argue that, on such an assumption, one can at least say that small animals have a claim to virtue ethical significance. At least, it is a requirement of a morally decent (or virtuous) person that she pays attention to and is cautious regarding small animals in a morally relevant way, that she allows them to affect her moral-psychological life. For the person who does not already consider small animals in this way, this could plausibly be a big change in her moral psychology.
Leslie (1998) writes that when “discussing whether the universe was created by a benevolent deity... more Leslie (1998) writes that when “discussing whether the universe was created by a benevolent deity, philosophers regularly point out that our world might be considered an ethical disaster, something of negative value, because of all the misery it contains.” 1 In addition, “scores of [professional philosophers] recognize no moral call to keep the human race in existence.” 2 Related ideas have been discussed extensively in philosophy, sometimes for millennia, as in the case of the value of existence versus non-existence. But the ideas in this cluster are very different from one another; for example, the idea that horrors in the past have not been counterbalanced by good things in the past, and the related but very different idea that nothing could possibly be better than an empty world. It is important to keep such ideas apart, partly because some are much less controversial than others. This essay briefly surveys the different ideas.
This is a text on axiology, on which outcomes or states of affairs are better or worse than others. It does not make normative claims about what should be done. In particular, even if an empty world would be better, it does not claim that one should try to bring about an empty world. Rather, the topic of this essay is important as one consideration out of many when prioritizing limited altruistic efforts and resources; for example when asking, should we worry about the future having no sentient life, and if so how much compared to other things we have to worry about, such as preventing extreme suffering?
The purpose of this essay is to present to a general audience ideas from the philosophical literature that are important for altruism and policymaking. Such ideas unfortunately tend to stay hidden in niche books and articles behind paywalls, and oftentimes they are unnoticed and forgotten as only a few specialists are aware of them.
If I died and was offered to be born again as an insect or cease to exist, I would definitely cho... more If I died and was offered to be born again as an insect or cease to exist, I would definitely choose not to exist. This essay focuses on the quality of life of honey bees because they are well-studied, and on what have been suggested to be the most numerous insects: springtails, ants, termites, and aquatic insects such as mayflies and midges (although some sources no longer classify springtails as insects). There is enormous inequality among the fates of insects. Some die very young, either as larvae, pupae, or just after having emerged from the pupa stage as adults, and it is difficult to see how most such lives can be good on balance. Death often seems very painful so, because their lives are so short, they do not include enough positive wellbeing to compensate their suffering. On the other hand, successful honey bee queens can live for years while being fed, protected, and taken care of by others. In general, though, honey bees live short lives. The vast majority of them are workers who live on average only about 15–38 days as adults during summer. Mayflies and some midges have even shorter adult lives—they never eat, and they die within a few days. Ants and other kinds of insects live longer. This is probably fortunate from a population perspective, since it means fewer deaths per unit of time, although it may not be better for any individual to live longer.
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1
In addition, “scores of [professional philosophers] recognize no moral call to keep the human race in existence.”
2
Related ideas have been discussed extensively in philosophy, sometimes for millennia, as in the case of the value of existence versus non-existence. But the ideas in this cluster are very different from one another; for example, the idea that horrors in the past have not been counterbalanced by good things in the past, and the related but very different idea that nothing could possibly be better than an empty world. It is important to keep such ideas apart, partly because some are much less controversial than others. This essay briefly surveys the different ideas.
This is a text on axiology, on which outcomes or states of affairs are better or worse than others. It does not make normative claims about what should be done. In particular, even if an empty world would be better, it does not claim that one should try to bring about an empty world. Rather, the topic of this essay is important as one consideration out of many when prioritizing limited altruistic efforts and resources; for example when asking, should we worry about the future having no sentient life, and if so how much compared to other things we have to worry about, such as preventing extreme suffering?
The purpose of this essay is to present to a general audience ideas from the philosophical literature that are important for altruism and policymaking. Such ideas unfortunately tend to stay hidden in niche books and articles behind paywalls, and oftentimes they are unnoticed and forgotten as only a few specialists are aware of them.
1
In addition, “scores of [professional philosophers] recognize no moral call to keep the human race in existence.”
2
Related ideas have been discussed extensively in philosophy, sometimes for millennia, as in the case of the value of existence versus non-existence. But the ideas in this cluster are very different from one another; for example, the idea that horrors in the past have not been counterbalanced by good things in the past, and the related but very different idea that nothing could possibly be better than an empty world. It is important to keep such ideas apart, partly because some are much less controversial than others. This essay briefly surveys the different ideas.
This is a text on axiology, on which outcomes or states of affairs are better or worse than others. It does not make normative claims about what should be done. In particular, even if an empty world would be better, it does not claim that one should try to bring about an empty world. Rather, the topic of this essay is important as one consideration out of many when prioritizing limited altruistic efforts and resources; for example when asking, should we worry about the future having no sentient life, and if so how much compared to other things we have to worry about, such as preventing extreme suffering?
The purpose of this essay is to present to a general audience ideas from the philosophical literature that are important for altruism and policymaking. Such ideas unfortunately tend to stay hidden in niche books and articles behind paywalls, and oftentimes they are unnoticed and forgotten as only a few specialists are aware of them.