The power change in Ukraine and the violent crackdown on the post electoral protestors in Belarus... more The power change in Ukraine and the violent crackdown on the post electoral protestors in Belarus jeopardize the Eastern Partnership. The EU's efforts to democratize and stabilize its eastern border could become more and more difficult if Brussels does not find quickly a solution to keep the six partners interested in its projects. This paper examines the latest challenges of the Eastern Partnership and the reasons why the Republic of Moldova could be the successful story the Eastern Partnership is seeking.
The 2008 invasion of Georgia, followed by the recognition of the independence of the breakaway re... more The 2008 invasion of Georgia, followed by the recognition of the independence of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the annexation of Crimea and the involvement in the war in Donbas, and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine have all marked the return to active Russian participation in separatist regions in the ‘near abroad’. They took the international community by surprise. To be sure, the Russian Federation had played a role in all previous secessionist conflicts in the former Soviet space. Nonetheless, Moscow’s post-2008 bold actions – open invasion, recognition of separatist regions and annexation of a neighbour’s territory – have marked an innovation in Russia’s foreign policy. This points to questions about how Moscow is legitimising these actions and whether the official narrative suggests a change in Russia’s strategy towards secessionist conflicts in the ‘near abroad’.
The 2008 invasion of Georgia, followed by the recognition of the independence of the breakaway re... more The 2008 invasion of Georgia, followed by the recognition of the independence of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the annexation of Crimea and the involvement in the war in Donbas, and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine have all marked the return to active Russian participation in separatist regions in the ‘near abroad’. They took the international community by surprise. To be sure, the Russian Federation had played a role in all previous secessionist conflicts in the former Soviet space. Nonetheless, Moscow’s post-2008 bold actions – open invasion, recognition of separatist regions and annexation of a neighbour’s territory – have marked an innovation in Russia’s foreign policy. This points to questions about how Moscow is legitimising these actions and whether the official narrative suggests a change in Russia’s strategy towards secessionist conflicts in the ‘near abroad’.
The article undertakes a comparative analysis of the evolution of the six former soviet republics... more The article undertakes a comparative analysis of the evolution of the six former soviet republics within the framework of the Eastern Partnership, highlighting the differences between the levels of Europeanization of these countries. The research demonstrates that after two years of existence, the Eastern Partnership still needs to convince the high-level European leaders about its relevance for the EU foreign policy and to become more attractive for the post soviet republics. As the economic crisis and the Arab Spring shifted EU’s attention from its Eastern neighbours and the rollback of democracy that took place in some Eastern partners, and the lack of positive progress in others increased EU leaders’ reluctance towards former soviet republics, the Eastern Partnership needs a new impetus. A “successful story” could be a powerful example both for the Eastern neigbhours and the EU skeptical leaders. Republic of Moldova is the most active country within the Eastern Partnership surpa...
The 2011-2013 domestic protests and the 2013-2015 Ukraine crisis have brought to the Russian poli... more The 2011-2013 domestic protests and the 2013-2015 Ukraine crisis have brought to the Russian politics forefront an increasing preoccupation for the soft power. The concept started to be used in official discourses and documents and a series of measures have been taken both to avoid the ‘dangers’ of and to streamline Russia’s soft power. This dichotomous approach towards the ‘power of attraction’ have revealed the differences of perception of the soft power by Russian officials and the Western counterparts. The present paper will analyse Russia’s efforts to control and to instrumentalize the sources of soft power, trying to assess the effectiveness of such an approach.
Embedded in a realist worldview, Russia has a "weakness" for hard power and zones of in... more Embedded in a realist worldview, Russia has a "weakness" for hard power and zones of influence. For Moscow the control of the former Soviet republics represent both the guarantee of its security and the condition for the growth of its geopolitical strength. The present paper analyses Russian hard power presence in the former Soviet space, with a focus on the countries residing between the EU and Russia, assessing that Moscow has modernized recently not only its capabilities but also the military strategy and tactics in the area. The author compares the Georgian and Ukrainian wars arguing that the changes in approach of these military operations prove also Russian attempts to adapt its hard power to the evolutions of the international environment.
INTRODUCTIONIn May 2009, six former Soviet republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Mold... more INTRODUCTIONIn May 2009, six former Soviet republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, signed in Prague the Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), a European initiative meant to bring these countries closer to the EU. However, despite EU's assurances that the EaP will benefit not only Europe, but also the former Soviet countries and Russia, by transforming the Eastern neighbours into a stable and prosperous common border, Moscow saw the initiative only to EU's advantage, doubting that the former Soviet countries were so eager to join the EaP, considering the large number of costly reforms they had to implement. Thus, from its inception, Russian officials openly expressed their suspicion and concern towards the EaP. The Prime Minister Putin, for instance, characterized the initiative as "an alternative to NATO's expansion to the East", while for Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, it was "an attempt to...
After the annexation of Crimea, Russia has not acknowledged either the violation of the internati... more After the annexation of Crimea, Russia has not acknowledged either the violation of the international law or the infringement of sovereignty of Ukraine. Instead, Moscow has (mis-)used a series of arguments meant to justify its actions in Crimea both domestically and externally and to present an illegal act of breaching the basic international principles into a necessary, legitimate measure. Within this context, the article will attempt to decode the arguments of the Kremlin's post-Crimea political discourse of legitimization, analysing their impact on Russia's relations with the Eastern Partnership countries, and drawing attention to the theoretical problem regarding the legitimacy in international relations. The paper will use the qualitative content analysis as research method. We will examine mainly the content of speeches, statements, governmental documents and other relevant studies as primary and secondary data, and will focus on the main topics of Russia's interna...
So far, an eastern enlargement of the B9 and 3SI has not been publicly discussed among the two in... more So far, an eastern enlargement of the B9 and 3SI has not been publicly discussed among the two initiatives’ member states or their potential new members. Presumably, there are major stakeholders or even entire national governments within the B9 and 3SI that would be reluctant to extend them beyond their current confines. It will thus take a larger debate driven by Georgian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian actors as well as their supporters within both groups’ member states to push the membership extension agenda. The major Western organizations and east-central European governments would have to come to an agreement that a restructuring of post-Soviet geopolitics in such a way is useful and in the interest of all parties involved. At that point, the B9 and 3SI could start gradually filling the current security vacuum in the eastern European gray zone.
After the annexation of Crimea, Russia has not acknowledged either the violation of the internati... more After the annexation of Crimea, Russia has not acknowledged either the violation of the international law or the infringement of sovereignty of Ukraine. Instead, Moscow has (mis-)used a series of arguments meant to justify its actions in Crimea both domestically and externally and to present an illegal act of breaching the basic international principles into a necessary, legitimate measure. Within this context, the article will attempt to decode the arguments of the Kremlin’s post-Crimea political discourse of legitimization, analysing their impact on Russia’s relations with the Eastern Partnership countries, and drawing attention to the theoretical problem regarding the legitimacy in international relations. The paper will use the qualitative content analysis as research method. We will examine mainly the content of speeches, statements, governmental documents and other relevant studies as primary and secondary data, and will focus on the main topics of Russia’s international legit...
The power change in Ukraine and the violent crackdown on the post electoral protestors in Belarus... more The power change in Ukraine and the violent crackdown on the post electoral protestors in Belarus jeopardize the Eastern Partnership. The EU's efforts to democratize and stabilize its eastern border could become more and more difficult if Brussels does not find quickly a solution to keep the six partners interested in its projects. This paper examines the latest challenges of the Eastern Partnership and the reasons why the Republic of Moldova could be the successful story the Eastern Partnership is seeking.
The 2008 invasion of Georgia, followed by the recognition of the independence of the breakaway re... more The 2008 invasion of Georgia, followed by the recognition of the independence of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the annexation of Crimea and the involvement in the war in Donbas, and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine have all marked the return to active Russian participation in separatist regions in the ‘near abroad’. They took the international community by surprise. To be sure, the Russian Federation had played a role in all previous secessionist conflicts in the former Soviet space. Nonetheless, Moscow’s post-2008 bold actions – open invasion, recognition of separatist regions and annexation of a neighbour’s territory – have marked an innovation in Russia’s foreign policy. This points to questions about how Moscow is legitimising these actions and whether the official narrative suggests a change in Russia’s strategy towards secessionist conflicts in the ‘near abroad’.
The 2008 invasion of Georgia, followed by the recognition of the independence of the breakaway re... more The 2008 invasion of Georgia, followed by the recognition of the independence of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the annexation of Crimea and the involvement in the war in Donbas, and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine have all marked the return to active Russian participation in separatist regions in the ‘near abroad’. They took the international community by surprise. To be sure, the Russian Federation had played a role in all previous secessionist conflicts in the former Soviet space. Nonetheless, Moscow’s post-2008 bold actions – open invasion, recognition of separatist regions and annexation of a neighbour’s territory – have marked an innovation in Russia’s foreign policy. This points to questions about how Moscow is legitimising these actions and whether the official narrative suggests a change in Russia’s strategy towards secessionist conflicts in the ‘near abroad’.
The article undertakes a comparative analysis of the evolution of the six former soviet republics... more The article undertakes a comparative analysis of the evolution of the six former soviet republics within the framework of the Eastern Partnership, highlighting the differences between the levels of Europeanization of these countries. The research demonstrates that after two years of existence, the Eastern Partnership still needs to convince the high-level European leaders about its relevance for the EU foreign policy and to become more attractive for the post soviet republics. As the economic crisis and the Arab Spring shifted EU’s attention from its Eastern neighbours and the rollback of democracy that took place in some Eastern partners, and the lack of positive progress in others increased EU leaders’ reluctance towards former soviet republics, the Eastern Partnership needs a new impetus. A “successful story” could be a powerful example both for the Eastern neigbhours and the EU skeptical leaders. Republic of Moldova is the most active country within the Eastern Partnership surpa...
The 2011-2013 domestic protests and the 2013-2015 Ukraine crisis have brought to the Russian poli... more The 2011-2013 domestic protests and the 2013-2015 Ukraine crisis have brought to the Russian politics forefront an increasing preoccupation for the soft power. The concept started to be used in official discourses and documents and a series of measures have been taken both to avoid the ‘dangers’ of and to streamline Russia’s soft power. This dichotomous approach towards the ‘power of attraction’ have revealed the differences of perception of the soft power by Russian officials and the Western counterparts. The present paper will analyse Russia’s efforts to control and to instrumentalize the sources of soft power, trying to assess the effectiveness of such an approach.
Embedded in a realist worldview, Russia has a "weakness" for hard power and zones of in... more Embedded in a realist worldview, Russia has a "weakness" for hard power and zones of influence. For Moscow the control of the former Soviet republics represent both the guarantee of its security and the condition for the growth of its geopolitical strength. The present paper analyses Russian hard power presence in the former Soviet space, with a focus on the countries residing between the EU and Russia, assessing that Moscow has modernized recently not only its capabilities but also the military strategy and tactics in the area. The author compares the Georgian and Ukrainian wars arguing that the changes in approach of these military operations prove also Russian attempts to adapt its hard power to the evolutions of the international environment.
INTRODUCTIONIn May 2009, six former Soviet republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Mold... more INTRODUCTIONIn May 2009, six former Soviet republics, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, signed in Prague the Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), a European initiative meant to bring these countries closer to the EU. However, despite EU's assurances that the EaP will benefit not only Europe, but also the former Soviet countries and Russia, by transforming the Eastern neighbours into a stable and prosperous common border, Moscow saw the initiative only to EU's advantage, doubting that the former Soviet countries were so eager to join the EaP, considering the large number of costly reforms they had to implement. Thus, from its inception, Russian officials openly expressed their suspicion and concern towards the EaP. The Prime Minister Putin, for instance, characterized the initiative as "an alternative to NATO's expansion to the East", while for Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, it was "an attempt to...
After the annexation of Crimea, Russia has not acknowledged either the violation of the internati... more After the annexation of Crimea, Russia has not acknowledged either the violation of the international law or the infringement of sovereignty of Ukraine. Instead, Moscow has (mis-)used a series of arguments meant to justify its actions in Crimea both domestically and externally and to present an illegal act of breaching the basic international principles into a necessary, legitimate measure. Within this context, the article will attempt to decode the arguments of the Kremlin's post-Crimea political discourse of legitimization, analysing their impact on Russia's relations with the Eastern Partnership countries, and drawing attention to the theoretical problem regarding the legitimacy in international relations. The paper will use the qualitative content analysis as research method. We will examine mainly the content of speeches, statements, governmental documents and other relevant studies as primary and secondary data, and will focus on the main topics of Russia's interna...
So far, an eastern enlargement of the B9 and 3SI has not been publicly discussed among the two in... more So far, an eastern enlargement of the B9 and 3SI has not been publicly discussed among the two initiatives’ member states or their potential new members. Presumably, there are major stakeholders or even entire national governments within the B9 and 3SI that would be reluctant to extend them beyond their current confines. It will thus take a larger debate driven by Georgian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian actors as well as their supporters within both groups’ member states to push the membership extension agenda. The major Western organizations and east-central European governments would have to come to an agreement that a restructuring of post-Soviet geopolitics in such a way is useful and in the interest of all parties involved. At that point, the B9 and 3SI could start gradually filling the current security vacuum in the eastern European gray zone.
After the annexation of Crimea, Russia has not acknowledged either the violation of the internati... more After the annexation of Crimea, Russia has not acknowledged either the violation of the international law or the infringement of sovereignty of Ukraine. Instead, Moscow has (mis-)used a series of arguments meant to justify its actions in Crimea both domestically and externally and to present an illegal act of breaching the basic international principles into a necessary, legitimate measure. Within this context, the article will attempt to decode the arguments of the Kremlin’s post-Crimea political discourse of legitimization, analysing their impact on Russia’s relations with the Eastern Partnership countries, and drawing attention to the theoretical problem regarding the legitimacy in international relations. The paper will use the qualitative content analysis as research method. We will examine mainly the content of speeches, statements, governmental documents and other relevant studies as primary and secondary data, and will focus on the main topics of Russia’s international legit...
This article analyses Russia’s endeavours in legitimising the annexation of Crimea in the eyes of... more This article analyses Russia’s endeavours in legitimising the annexation of Crimea in the eyes of the Western community. The paper argues that Russia’s strategy of “silencing” the international contestation has been focused on the use of the West’s “language” for the justification of contested actions. Starting from the assertion that the formulation of Russia’s foreign policy is determined by Western normative frameworks and by the West’s international behaviour, the article scrutinised Moscow’s official narrative after March 2014 by comparing it with the West’s arguments used in particular in the cases of NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia and the recognition of Kosovo’s independence.
Μέχρι στιγμής, η ανατολική διεύρυνση της B9 και της 3SI δεν συζητήθηκε δημοσίως μεταξύ των κρατών... more Μέχρι στιγμής, η ανατολική διεύρυνση της B9 και της 3SI δεν συζητήθηκε δημοσίως μεταξύ των κρατών-μελών των δύο πρωτοβουλιών ή των πιθανών νέων μελών τους. Πιθανώς, υπάρχουν σημαντικοί ενδιαφερόμενοι ή ακόμη και ολόκληρες εθνικές κυβερνήσεις στο πλαίσιο της B9 και της 3SI που θα ήταν απρόθυμοι να τις επεκτείνουν πέρα από τα σημερινά σύνορά τους. Έτσι, θα χρειαστεί μια ευρύτερη συζήτηση καθοδηγημένη από δρώντες της Γεωργίας, της Μολδαβίας και της Ουκρανίας καθώς και οι υποστηρικτές τους στα κράτη-μέλη των δύο ομάδων για να προωθήσουν την ατζέντα διεύρυνσης των συμμετοχών. Οι μεγάλες Δυτικές οργανώσεις και οι κυβερνήσεις της Ανατολικής και Κεντρικής Ευρώπης θα πρέπει να καταλήξουν σε συμφωνία ότι μια αναδιάρθρωση της μετασοβιετικής γεωπολιτικής είναι χρήσιμη και προς όφελος όλων των εμπλεκόμενων μερών. Σε αυτό το σημείο, οι B9 και 3SI θα μπορούσαν να αρχίσουν σταδιακά να γεμίζουν το σημερινό κενό ασφαλείας στην γκρίζα ζώνη της ανατολικής Ευρώπης.
So far, an eastern enlargement of the B9 and 3SI has not been publicly discussed among the two in... more So far, an eastern enlargement of the B9 and 3SI has not been publicly discussed among the two initiatives’ member states or their potential new members. Presumably, there are major stakeholders or even entire national governments within the B9 and 3SI that would be reluctant to extend them beyond their current confines. It will thus take a larger debate driven by Georgian, Moldovan, and Ukrainian actors as well as their supporters within both groups’ member states to push the membership extension agenda. The major Western organizations and east-central European governments would have to come to an agreement that a restructuring of post-Soviet geopolitics in such a way is useful and in the interest of all parties involved. At that point, the B9 and 3SI could start gradually filling the current security vacuum in the eastern European gray zone.
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 2018
Un allargamento a Est del 3SI e del B9 non è stato discusso pubblicamente – né tra gli Stati Memb... more Un allargamento a Est del 3SI e del B9 non è stato discusso pubblicamente – né tra gli Stati Membri che fanno parte di questi due gruppi di cooperazione, né tra i potenziali nuovi membri. Presumibilmente, vi sono importanti parti interessate o addirittura interi governi nazionali all’interno del B9 e del 3SI che sarebbero refrattari ad una loro estensione oltre i confini attuali. Sarà necessario, quindi, un dibattito più ampio guidato da attori di Ucraina, Georgia, e Moldavia, nonché dei loro sostenitori all’interno del B9 e del 3SI per mettere all’ordine del giorno questa riconfigurazione. Potrebbe anche essere necessario un accordo esplicito o addirittura un incoraggiamento attivo per la ridefinizione delle due iniziative da parte di Washington, Bruxelles, Berlino e Parigi. Il B9 e il 3SI potrebbero iniziare a riempire gradualmente l’attuale “vacuum” in termini di sicurezza per quella “zona grigia” dell’est europeo.
Până în prezent, nu s-a discutat public despre extinderea estică a B9 și 3SI. Este posibil să exi... more Până în prezent, nu s-a discutat public despre extinderea estică a B9 și 3SI. Este posibil să existe decidenți politici importanți în cadrul B9 și 3SI care ar fi reticienți. Ar fi nevoie de o dezbatere amplă promovată de actori politici din Georgia, Republica Moldova și Ucraina, precum și de susținătorii lor din ambele inițiative pentru a promova agenda de extindere. Organizațiile occidentale și guvernele central și est-europene ar trebui să ajungă la o înțelegere că o asemenea restructurare a geopoliticii post-sovietice este utilă și de interes pentru toate părțile implicate. În acel moment, B9 și 3SI ar putea umple treptat golul de securitate din zona gri din estul Europei.
Если Бухарестская девятка (B9) и «Триморье» (3SI) решат включить Украину, Молдову и Грузию, это п... more Если Бухарестская девятка (B9) и «Триморье» (3SI) решат включить Украину, Молдову и Грузию, это повысит европейскую безопасность
Якщо Бухарестська дев’ятка (B9) та «Тримор’я» (3SI) вирішать включити Україну, Молдову та Грузію,... more Якщо Бухарестська дев’ятка (B9) та «Тримор’я» (3SI) вирішать включити Україну, Молдову та Грузію, це підвищить європейську безпеку
Umland and Rotaru argued that by extending their membership to Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, the... more Umland and Rotaru argued that by extending their membership to Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, the B9 and 3SI would not only help not only these three countries, but also improve their own geopolitical position and could start gradually filling the current security vacuum in what they termed “the eastern European gray zone”. The problem, as Umland explained in the lecture, which was co-sponsored by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta, the Ukrainian Professional and Business Association of Edmonton and the Alberta Foundation for Ukrainian Education Studies Society, is that countries like Poland and Romania are concerned that entering into any kind of regional security agreement with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova could imperil their Article 5 NATO security guarantees. Therefore, they need assurances that will not happen. But precedents do exist. He cited the example of NATO member Turkey, which has a regional security agreement with former USSR republic Azerbaijan. An agreement, ratified by both countries’ parliaments in 2010, pledges that both Turkey and Azerbaijan will support each other “using all possibilities” in the case of a military attack or “aggression” against either of the countries. This precedent could therefore be used for the B9 to expand their security arrangements with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova. But another problem is that Ukraine is not on Washington’s high radar. This is where Canada comes in. Canada could use its influence to nudge the U.S., U.K., France and Germany in the right direction.
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