Derek Strijbos
At present, I am director of the psychiatry residency training program (A-opleider) at Dimence Groep mental health institute in Overijssel (NL), and professor by special appointment in philosophy in mental health care at the Department of Philosophy, Theology and Religion Studies of the Radboud University Nijmegen (NL). As a psychiatrist, I currently work at a (top clinical) specialised center for people with autism-related mental health problems. I obtained my PhD in the philosophy of mind and cognition with a thesis on social cognition/folk psychology as a shared normative practice. My research focuses on philosophical issues in psychiatry and mental health care:
-new medical professionalism in mental health care;
-enactivist and ecological approaches to mental disorders and neurodiversity;
-complexity models of mental disorders and mental health care.
Phone: 0031-24-3616223
Address: Dept. of Philosophy
Radboud University Nijmegen
Erasmusplein 1
P.O. Box 9103
6500 HD Nijmegen
The Netherlands
-new medical professionalism in mental health care;
-enactivist and ecological approaches to mental disorders and neurodiversity;
-complexity models of mental disorders and mental health care.
Phone: 0031-24-3616223
Address: Dept. of Philosophy
Radboud University Nijmegen
Erasmusplein 1
P.O. Box 9103
6500 HD Nijmegen
The Netherlands
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Papers by Derek Strijbos
that causes problems in social interaction? Or
should we conceive of autism primarily at the
level of interaction, as a “two-way” phenomenon
(Krueger & Maiese, 2018) that develops in the
relation between the person with autism and her
social-material environment? Over the last decade
or so, this issue has increasingly gained interest,
not only in academia, but also in the field of mental
health care and in the wider public domain.
implications of these studies are the topic of intense debate in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. An important question
in this debate is whether the confabulation studies pose a serious threat to the possibility of self-knowledge. In this paper we
are not primarily interested in the consequences of confabulation for self-knowledge. Instead, we focus on a different issue:
what confabulation implies for the special status of self-attributions, i.e. first-person authority (FPA). In the first part of the
paper, we propose that FPA is based on a capacity for self-regulation. Accordingly, FPA depends on the extent to which we
are able to bridge the gap between our sayings and doings by aligning our actions with our avowed self-ascriptions and vice
versa. FPA is withheld when we (systematically) fail at such re-alignment. In the second part of the paper, we contrast our
view with the accounts of Scaife (Acta Anal 29:469–485, 2014) and Bortolotti (Rev Philos Psychol 9(2):227–249, 2018).
We claim (contra Scaife) that the apparent fact that we cannot reliably distinguish, from a first-person perspective, when we
are confabulating and when we are not, does not necessarily undermine FPA. We argue (contra Bortolotti) that a systematic
failure to align our actions with our self-ascriptions and vice-versa is a genuine threat to FPA. In the last part of the paper, we
introduce the concept of self-know-how—the know-how embodied in the way one is disposed to relate to oneself in making
sense of oneself with or in the face of others—and briefly explored the importance of diminished or absent self-know-how
in clinical cases.
that causes problems in social interaction? Or
should we conceive of autism primarily at the
level of interaction, as a “two-way” phenomenon
(Krueger & Maiese, 2018) that develops in the
relation between the person with autism and her
social-material environment? Over the last decade
or so, this issue has increasingly gained interest,
not only in academia, but also in the field of mental
health care and in the wider public domain.
implications of these studies are the topic of intense debate in philosophy and the cognitive sciences. An important question
in this debate is whether the confabulation studies pose a serious threat to the possibility of self-knowledge. In this paper we
are not primarily interested in the consequences of confabulation for self-knowledge. Instead, we focus on a different issue:
what confabulation implies for the special status of self-attributions, i.e. first-person authority (FPA). In the first part of the
paper, we propose that FPA is based on a capacity for self-regulation. Accordingly, FPA depends on the extent to which we
are able to bridge the gap between our sayings and doings by aligning our actions with our avowed self-ascriptions and vice
versa. FPA is withheld when we (systematically) fail at such re-alignment. In the second part of the paper, we contrast our
view with the accounts of Scaife (Acta Anal 29:469–485, 2014) and Bortolotti (Rev Philos Psychol 9(2):227–249, 2018).
We claim (contra Scaife) that the apparent fact that we cannot reliably distinguish, from a first-person perspective, when we
are confabulating and when we are not, does not necessarily undermine FPA. We argue (contra Bortolotti) that a systematic
failure to align our actions with our self-ascriptions and vice-versa is a genuine threat to FPA. In the last part of the paper, we
introduce the concept of self-know-how—the know-how embodied in the way one is disposed to relate to oneself in making
sense of oneself with or in the face of others—and briefly explored the importance of diminished or absent self-know-how
in clinical cases.
This volume brings together philosophers working across a broad range of the philosophical literature - not only in mainstream contemporary epistemology, but also in the epistemology of understanding, in art and aesthetics, in the history of philosophy (both 20th C. and ancient greek), in ethics, in action-theory, in philosophy of psychiatry, and in the philosophy of mind - to consider how best to theorise the heterogeneity, and the possible unity - of some of the most central of our ordinary epistemological categories.
Contributors:
* Anita Avramides
* Lucy Campbell
* Roy Dings and Derek Strijbos
* Matt Duncan and Hannah Nahas
* Naomi Eilan
* Katalin Farkas
* Kim Frost
* Stephen Grimm
* Nathan Hauthaler
* Alison Hills
* Eric Marcus
* MM McCabe
* Alan Millar
* Johannes Roessler
* Natalia Waights Hickman
* Kurt Sylvan
and desires. On this so-called belief-desire model, we interpret the discursive minds of others essentially and exclusively as representational minds. This dissertation departs from this consensus view and argues that our quotidian, spontaneous
understanding of one another in terms of goals and reasons is a form of relational sense-making. Accordingly, folk psychological practice is based on the ascription of relational mental states, states that relate the individuals we interact with to their goals and reasons out in the public world of common understanding. On this account, representational belief-desire psychology is not the conceptual core of folk psychology, nor the driving psychological force behind our discursive engagements with one another. Rather, it is an essentially complementary form of social cognition, designed for reflection on and management of such discursive engagements when our default, relational modus of understanding runs aground.
Many of the problems and theories discussed in this book fall under what is traditionally known as analytical philosophy of mind, such as the mind-body problem, mental causation, mental content and consciousness. The range of this book, however, is wider, and includes other themes that are directly connected with the bigger issue of what it is that makes us human beings or persons. These topics are ‘the self’, ‘free will’, ‘understanding other minds’, ‘embodied, embedded cognition’ and ‘emotions’.