Alex Deagon

There are at least three serious problems with the formulation in the QHRA in the sense that it is inconsistent with the human right to religious freedom under international law as expressed in the ICCPR, and therefore the right to religious freedom is not properly implemented.

The proposed changes to the Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act seek to narrow further the already narrow religious exceptions. These changes are the most restrictive regime for regulating religious bodies in Australia and will significantly undermine the ability of religious organisations to employ persons in accordance with their faith, contrary to both international law and constitutional law. In particular, the ‘reasonable and proportionate’ standard is inappropriate because Article 18 of the ICCPR requires any restrictions on religious freedom to be ‘necessary’, not merely reasonable. The standard also requires a secular court to impose a theological definition of what is reasonable conduct on the basis of religion, which is a disturbing intrusion of the state into religious organisations and communities. Imposing a ‘genuine occupational requirement’ standard and reasonableness inquiry are not necessary restrictions on religious freedom and ignore the fact that for many religious organisations, they are trying to create a faith culture. This necessitates employment of persons who fit in that culture by believing and acting consistently with the requirements of the faith, not merely by having technical proficiency in the role. These laws go as far as interfering with the employment choices of churches, synagogues, mosques and other faith organisations by preventing dismissal of a religious leader where they engage in practices which are inconsistent with the doctrine of the religion. The proposed exceptions should be expanded by removing the genuine occupational requirement and reasonableness standards, and reframed by providing positive associational rights for religious organisations to select or preference persons for potential employment in accordance with the beliefs and practices of the organisation. Since the proposed changes are extremely narrow, they are inconsistent with the rights provided to religious organisations under the current Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act, and consequently they are likely to be invalid under s 109 of the Constitution.

The draft report recommends the removal of the Basic Religious Charity Exception within the ACNC regime, with the result that the ACNC Commissioner will be able to suspend, appoint and remove the leaders of religious institutions. This is a significant imposition on religious freedom under international law and the Australian Constitution. In particular, international human rights bodies have strongly contended that government interference in the leadership of religious organisations will breach human rights norms. Commonwealth legislation enabling such interference may be beyond the powers granted to the Parliament under the Constitution. Even if the legislation is within power, it is likely to be invalid on the basis of breaching the freedom of religion provision of the Constitution which imposes limits on Commonwealth legislative power.

This chapter proposes that the law of love provides a theological framework for the principles of civility, which consist of the civic virtues and moral engagement exhibited by citizens debating controversial policy issues and law reform in a liberal democracy. The principles of civility include virtues such as honesty, humility, patience and gracious listening to alternative points of view during an argument. Moral engagement involves practicing these virtues through political advocacy in the process of a deeper consideration of what justice or the common good requires. Drawing on John Milbank and the Parable of the Good Samaritan, I argue that is only through Christian conceptions of what it means to 'love your neighbour as yourself' that the civic virtues and their transcendent foundation can properly inform public debate. The civic virtues are inherited from Christianity and find their culmination in the law of love as paradigmatically displayed through Christ, pointing to their eternal nature. The consequence of this argument is that any Habermasian attempt to translate the law of love into a merely secular principle will fundamentally limit its effect; the full benefit of the law of love for a legal community comes through its uniquely religious origin.

The free exercise clauses in the First Amendment of the US Constitution and Section 116 of the Australian Constitution are almost identical textually. However, they have been interpreted very differently, with the United States providing broad protection for religious freedom and Australia very narrow protection. I suggest that secularism has influenced First Amendment jurisprudence to some extent but Section 116 jurisprudence more significantly, and that this influence may explain the difference in interpretations. Hence, more secularist approaches to the free exercise clauses appear to contribute to narrower interpretations that undermine religious freedom.

I support the Religious Discrimination Bill Package (‘the Bill’) as it currently stands. I only comment on the following particularly controversial aspects of the Bill for the purpose of providing scholarly justifications of those aspects.

Religious belief and activity is the only attribute that does not attract comprehensive, separate protection under Commonwealth discrimination legislation. Such protection is necessary to address increasing hostility to religion and to fulfil our international obligations.

Religious Schools and Discrimination

Sections 7-11 of the Religious Discrimination Bill enable religious bodies, including religious educational institutions, to give preference to persons who adhere to the religious belief and activity of the body for employment purposes. This will override the recently passed amendments to the Victorian Equal Opportunity Act which prevent religious schools from preferencing staff in accordance with a religious ethos. However, it will not override state or Commonwealth discrimination laws relating to sex, sexual orientation or other protected attributes. It deals with religious discrimination only. The media has reported rumours of a deal to remove the Section 38 religious exemptions in the Sex Discrimination Act in exchange for passing the Bill. To the extent such rumours are accurate and within the scope of the Committee’s terms of reference, this would be misconceived. Previous parliamentary committees considered such a move and rejected it, recommending the issue be considered in depth by the Australian Law Reform Commission. This is still the best approach as religious discrimination and religious exemptions to sex discrimination are conceptually and legally separate.

Under the Bill, religion as a protected attribute includes religious belief and activity, which includes standards of behaviour, speech and conduct. So the Bill will have the effect of allowing religious schools to preference staff with belief and behaviour consistent with the ethos of the school, as indicated in the relevant sections. Such preferencing is a fundamental human right. It fulfills Article 18(4) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which obliges states (without limitation) to facilitate parents educating their children in accordance with their own convictions. This entails the ability for religious schools to preference staff who adhere to the religious beliefs and activities of the school's religious ethos. As held by the European Court of Human Rights considering the issue under the European Convention of Human Rights, such preferencing is a necessary aspect of a pluralist democracy with diverse views.

Statements of Belief

Section 12 of the Bill protects statements of belief by stating that they are not discrimination, specifically overriding the Tasmanian Anti-Discrimination Act which provides that statements which cause ‘offence’ may be discriminatory. This is a positive move because the Tasmanian legislation is far too broad. It is an outlier in Australian anti-discrimination law and stifles freedom of speech and the expression of religion in public life. Detractors claim that this will license hurtful personal attacks on the basis of religion. This is extremely unlikely for three reasons. First, the hypotheticals posed as possible examples are fanciful. Second, in the event such hypotheticals do occur, they are not currently unlawful and the Bill will not affect this. Such statements can be dealt with through existing disciplinary or other legal processes. Finally, statements of belief must overcome significant hurdles to attract protection from the Bill: they must be made in good faith, and not be malicious, and not be reasonably considered to threaten, harass, intimidate or vilify, and must not urge the commission of a criminal offence. This combination of limitations means the kinds of hypotheticals posed by the detractors, if they exist, would not meet the standard to be protected. The protection of statements of belief is appropriately designed to promote the robust discourse which is the hallmark of a democratic and pluralist society.

Corporations as Discrimination Litigants

The Bill effectively empowers religious bodies, including associations and corporations, to be litigants in discrimination matters. The Australian Human Rights Commission has argued that the first exposure draft of the Bill was too broad in defining who may be a victim of religious discrimination, arguing that the ability of religious corporations such as religious institutions, schools, charities and businesses to make claims is a significant departure from international human rights law which protect only the rights of natural persons. However, there are two independent constitutional supports for protecting the ability of religious corporations to be litigants in the Bill. First, the Constitution supports the power to legislate to protect incorporated and unincorporated religious bodies against religious discrimination through the external affairs power. This gives effect to Article 18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other connected provisions and international law instruments, which protect individuals manifesting their beliefs in community with others (including through incorporated and unincorporated communities), and protect such communal entities against discrimination. In this respect international law jurisprudence clearly accepts religious associations as distinct persons at law which can sue and be sued in their own right. Second, the Commonwealth has the power to legislate with respect to constitutional corporations through the corporations power. Where a religious corporation is a constitutional corporation, and such a corporation is the object of statutory command or has rights and obligations conferred upon it, the Commonwealth has the ability to designate a religious corporation as a litigant. Therefore, as a constitutional matter, there is no impediment to empowering religious corporations as litigants in a law protecting against religious discrimination, and indeed such is required as a means to give adequate effect to the protections afforded to individuals and groups against religious discrimination in international law.

This article examines the theological idea of reconciliation and what this entails, including repentance as mind change, honest confession of wrong, lament for the hurt caused by the wrong, apology, restitution as concrete action to make right, and a mutual trust or unification to build a new, harmonious relationship. However, it also recognizes the potential danger of a purely colonial approach and draws on the Indigenous concept of Makarrata to inform and augment the Christian notion of reconciliation so that it is more relevant to the Australian context. Second, the article briefly considers potential constitutional change which is compatible with Australia’s legal system and could reflect and build upon a new relationship. The article argues that, as Makarrata exhorts, reconciliation is not merely symbolic but must be facilitated by active and tangible change which brings all Australians, Indigenous or otherwise, together – and that this is also a fundamentally Christian imperative.

This chapter argues that there is no truly ‘neutral’ conception of religious freedom which can be assumed by states when they determine how best to regulate religion. Secularism itself is a religious idea. Narrow, strict secular approaches which entail both institutional and political separation of religion and government are predicated upon theological assumptions and frameworks, as are more avowedly neutral secular or accommodationist approaches which institutionally separate church and state but allow some interaction between religion and government. Obviously, weak or strong establishment approaches also involve more overt religious frameworks which variously allow more or less religious freedom in a particular state. The chapter consequently proposes that the fundamental question is not which approach is neutral (for none are), but which approach is most desirable and best suits the cultural, political and legal arrangements of the specific state.

Religious liberty is often viewed as fundamentally unloving, an excuse to discriminate against and exclude those who are different to the accepted norm of the religion. In Australia this has been patently exposed through the public debates about Israel Folau’s social media statements and the selection policies of religious schools. This chapter argues from an evangelical Christian perspective that religious liberty is loving and the progeny of a Christian framework based on the law of love. Free religious speech contributes to social good by providing an alternative paradigm of the good and seeks to bring all people into relationship with the ultimate Good. Yet the method of persuasion must also be loving. This requires individual cultivation and application of the fundamental Christian virtues modelled and exemplified through the Crucifixion and Resurrection of Christ. This framework upholds inclusivity because all people are viewed to have equal dignity, worth, and capacity to practice the Christian virtues. Thus, while we could say that Folau’s evangelism is loving in principle because he is aiming to proclaim the good news of salvation to people, we could question the mode of his delivery with regard to the Christian virtues and the way it is perceived as hate speech which harms inclusivity. Similarly, we could use the Christian virtues as a standard to interrogate the selection and regulation policies of religious schools. Despite the appearance of exclusion, such policies may actually express love and inclusion through creating a religious community able to incubate and contribute diverse views which uphold the dignity and worth of humans, contributing to the common good.

This article explores the idea of violence and peace in Christian theology. In particular, it considers the idea of violence as comprised of antagonism and alienation,  and  ultimately  a  ‘pagan’  celebration  of  war  and  death.  Even  the  famed pax Romana is itself the violent suppression of violence. Drawing on Augustine, the article contrasts this ‘pagan’ violence with the Christian idea of ontological peace—the harmonious ordering and fellowship of difference between God and humanity, or what John Milbank calls ‘the reconciliation of virtue with difference’. Though this Christian critique is historically situated, it creates an opportunity to reconceptualise our modern legal system so that we  may  move  from  a  liberal  atomistic  individualism  to  a  more  harmonious  community of being, governed by ‘the law of love’.

Attempts to define religion have been controversial and contested. Many competing definitions have been proposed by scholars and judges but no consensus has emerged. As religion is a fundamental term in Section 116 of the Australian Constitution, it is important to continue seeking an accepted definition of religion for the purposes of constitutional interpretation. This chapter identifies four challenges to defining religion and claims the problem has been further entrenched by persuasive arguments that the secular is also a kind of religion. The chapter consequently proposes a new definition which goes some way to addressing these challenges. The new definition is broadly similar to the approach taken by the Australian High Court, with some modifications in response to the four challenges and contemporary interpretations of the secular. It is hoped this chapter will restart what has been a languishing conversation in Australian Constitutional law.

This article examines the historical and theological background to the recognition of God in the preamble to the Australian Constitution and the insertion of section 116. We challenge the account of that context, and the implications for the understanding of section 116, presented in Luke Beck's recent work Religious Freedom and the Australian Constitution: Origins and Future. We argue that the campaign for constitutional recognition was driven by deep theological convictions about the role of religion in public life, not power. Further, contemporaries did not believe in a separation of religion and state and were not, for the most part, suspicious of the influence of religion. Section 116 therefore cannot be plausibly understood as intended to establish a separation between religion and the state, or as being intended to guard against the influence of religion.

(Co-authored with Benjamin B Saunders)

This article explores the idea that recognizing God in the Constitution of a modern liberal democracy benefits both religious and non-religious citizens through symbolizing transcendent meaning and facilitating political solidarity. It first argues that pure autonomous reason is not sufficient to support these benefits and any attempt to ‘translate’ the religious principles into secular ones will diminish the benefits for religious citizens. Second, recognizing God in a Constitution does not necessarily impose a religious character, belief, or practice which is detrimental to non-religious citizens. Rather, recognition alludes to a shared heritage and tradition and acknowledges that religious individuals and groups are legitimately part of and interact with the modern democratic state. Finally, and most importantly, recognition of God as a broader symbolic recognition of religion can enhance the democratic process by motivating virtuous conduct and opening up the political space to higher levels of meaning and the good.

The Ruddock Review recommended that the Commonwealth should pass legislation allowing religious schools to refuse to provide marriage services if the refusal conforms with the religion and is necessary to avoid injury to religious adherents. However, the Panel did not recommend that similar legislative protections be provided to religious vendors. This article argues there is no principled basis for this differential treatment. It proposes two criteria for a permissible refusal of marriage services: the service must be directly connected to the marriage, and the entity refusing the service must be truly and consistently religious in nature. This framework provides a unified conception for a consistent approach to refusing services which takes into account the similarities between religious vendors and religious schools in this context.

This chapter proposes some potential legal implications for free public religion in the context of ‘equal voice liberalism’.  Equal voice liberalism and its antecedent connections to priority for democracy are first outlined in conjunction with an analysis of free public religion.  The chapter subsequently argues that equal voice liberalism is a framework conducive to facilitating free public religion while preserving equality.  In this context the chapter attempts to give more analytical and evaluative precision to the commonplace ideas of freedom and equality in terms of proportionate, reasonable accommodation of difference.  Finally, the chapter argues in support of religious associations requiring the space to independently form and develop unique perspectives which they can contribute to public discourse, which in turn enhances the importance of freedom and equality.

Many scholars and politicians argue that excluding religious perspectives from political decision-making is the only way to guarantee genuine neutrality, freedom and equality.  This addresses the common view that religion should not directly influence public policy and law because it can be sectarian and divisive.  However, this chapter argues that secular liberalism is not neutral between faith perspectives.  It is a kind of faith.  More significantly, it is an approach which relies on violence. Christian theology provides an alternative framework which relies on peace rather than violence, and this is the ‘law of love’. This chapter makes the case for Christianity as the most desirable framework for religious diversity in political discourse, arguing in particular that the neutrality, freedom and equality sought by liberalism cannot be sustained by liberalism, and are actually better fulfilled in Christianity.

John Milbank's critique of the secular as a violent distortion of Christian theology is well established. Less clear is how Milbank's framework might bear upon secular liberalism as it specifically relates to liberal ideas of religious freedom and public or secular reasons in political contexts. This is especially worthy of investigation since 'religious freedom' is part of the liberal framework Milbank so stridently critiques. This article attempts to reconcile Milbank's theological critique of secular liberalism with the idea of religious freedom by applying Milbank's theology and the law of love to liberal notions of public discourse for the purpose of redeeming and transforming that discourse. This redeemed 'liberalism' provides a framework for persuasion to the Good by recognising that all public positions (including secularism) are ultimately faith positions, and advocates a discourse governed by the law of love to produce genuine religious freedom which paradoxically transcends and fulfils the liberal ideals that secular liberalism proclaims but can never attain.

This article places the current political debate on the religious freedom of religious schools to 'discriminate' against staff and students in its theoretical, international, constitutional and domestic legal context. It briefly overviews the situation which led to the debate before setting out this context. The article argues that religious schools ought to have the discretion to select and regulate members of the school community as a function of religious freedom. Since there seems to be agreement that the current use of exemptions is problematic, the article recommends that a principled and considered legislative approach that provides schools with positive legal rights to select and regulate staff and students may be the best way forward.

In Queensland the law generally requires drivers to give way to buses in urban areas. This requirement is depicted on the back of many buses with a diagram including the phrase 'it's not just courtesy, it's the law'. This paper argues the contrast between 'courtesy' and 'law' assumes a positivist distinction between law and morality. More perniciously, 'law' in this context is framed as keeping peace through fear and coercion, or violently alienating members existing in a community. Instead, the paper proposes that law ought not to ground its authority in an ability to produce a spurious peace through violence. Rather, courteous conduct in a broader context of harmonious community can be achieved through the law of love.

It is well known that the ‘free exercise’ and ‘establishment’ clauses in Section 116 of the Australian Constitution have been interpreted narrowly by the High Court of Australia.  However, there has been limited examination of theoretical assumptions or perspectives which may have consciously or unconsciously informed this interpretation.  This article argues the High Court has adopted liberal assumptions about the nature of religion and its relationship to the state in the Section 116 cases.  These liberal assumptions are a sharp distinction between ‘private’ religious and ‘public’ non-religious exercise, that religious freedom is subject to state determinations of what is required for neutrality between religions, and religious freedom is subject to state determinations of what is required for social order.  The article proceeds to consider the implications of these assumptions for Section 116 cases in terms of a narrowing of religious freedom and a broadening of state power, and suggests awareness of these issues may produce a more nuanced approach to Section 116 in the future.

Section 116 of the Australian Constitution states that the Commonwealth shall not make a law establishing any religion. This is commonly understood in the literature as equivalent to the establishment of a secular state. However, the implicit dichotomy between religion and the secular is questionable when neither term is clearly defined in an establishment context. Some constitutional jurisprudence appears to explicitly or implicitly view the 'secular' as a type of religion. This understanding has important implications for High Court jurisprudence surrounding non-establishment. In particular, this article argues that if the secular is a kind of religion, like all other religions it is conceivably subject to the prohibition against state establishment. It follows that the 'secular state' is not a constitutionally coherent approach to the relationship between religion and the state.

Article can be accessed online at https://walta.net.au/wajurist/vol8/secularism-as-a-religion-questioning-the-future-of-the-secular-state/

Many students are driven by their perceptions of assessment, and consequently assessment can be used as a tool to enhance the learning process. The increased focus on student-centred learning in this context has resulted in student involvement in assessment. However, the literature in law focuses primarily on self-assessment and peer assessment, or criteria and marking, rather than student involvement in the creation of assessment content. This article investigates collaborative assessment in the context of legal education by undertaking a case study of staff collaborating with students to create the content of assessment in the undergraduate law subject 'Evidence' at the Queensland University of Technology. The case study found through surveys that when students have a degree of choice in the creation of assessment, they feel more confident, engaged and motivated to complete the assessment. Students felt this enhanced their learning experience. This study adds to the literature on student involvement in assessment by specifically considering collaborative assessment in law, which can then inform teaching practices with the aim of enhancing the learning experience for students.

This thesis proposes that the modern Western legal system contains secularised or otherwise distorted Christian theology as an integral part of its conceptual foundation.  It argues that this secularisation has led to legal violence in the form of antagonism between the members of the legal community, and alienation of the individuals in the community from each other and the state.  In order to establish a peaceful system of law and mitigate this violence, the thesis contends that these distorted concepts ought to be identified and returned to their ‘orthodox’ understandings.  In particular, the Christian ideas of truth, faith and reason require analysis in a jurisprudential context.  To this end, the thesis engages the work of John Milbank and attempts to articulate a particular conception of the relationship between truth, faith and reason – one which will be conducive to the construction of a legal community characterised by peace rather than violence.

The introductory chapter summarises the thesis and its methodology, and positions the thesis in its relevant jurisprudential, philosophical and theological context.  The first chapter of the thesis more specifically structures the content by reviewing and critiquing John Milbank’s work in terms of constructing working definitions of truth, faith and reason.  Having proposed these, chapter two examines and extends Milbank’s theological critique of science, exposing the secularisation of ‘scientific’ reason and its divorce from ‘Christian’ faith which forms the foundation for ‘modern’ (secular) thinking.  With an analysis of Jacques Derrida in chapter three, the thesis proceeds to explain how faith and reason are reconciled in Christian theology, allowing the development of a ‘post-modern’ theology with the view of producing peace rather than violence.

Chapter four adopts this postmodern theology, tracing the genealogy of secularisation and violence in the development of law and the modern legal community.  This shows the contingent nature of the secular legal system and creates a space for it to be redeemed and made peaceful.  Chapter five commences the process of articulating this Christian idea of a peaceful legal community through the revelation of theological truth by reading law and truth in the trial of Christ, arguing for a system which embraces a loving mutual trust rather than a calculating drive for decision or finality.  Chapter six contends that trust in the face of the mysterious divine is in fact the desirable Christian legacy, one which is nevertheless materialised and accessible through Christ’s resurrection, and makes possible eternal life beyond the constraints of violence.  The resurrection instantiates the Pauline law to love your neighbour as yourself, and chapter seven explores the nature of this theological truth, and argues that its application to the modern legal system will allow a love beyond law which produces a peaceful community.

This is an accepted version of an article published in Volume 20 of the International Trade and Business Law Review (2017).  All publishing and editorial credit go to the International Trade and Business Law Review and Professor Gabriel Moens.

A number of recent cases in Australia have highlighted an emerging tension between religious freedom and anti-discrimination law, particularly in relation to sexual orientation and same-sex marriage. Opponents of same-sex marriage assert that if same-sex marriage is legalised, anti-discrimination law could be used to restrict religious exercise which conflicts with same-sex marriage. Any constitutional protection of religious exercise is questionable due to the historically narrow construction of the free exercise clause by the High Court. Consequently, this article defines the boundaries of the free exercise clause in this dynamic context, arguing that the High Court should adopt a broader interpretation of free exercise informed by the same priority for democracy reasoning which undergirds the implied freedom of political communication. Contextually appropriate and clear boundaries for the free exercise clause are required for law to effectively engage with this continuing tension between religious freedom and anti-discrimination in a same-sex marriage context.

This article argues that the secular liberal and positivist foundations of the modern Western legal system render it violent. In particular, the liberal exclusion of faith and subjectivity in favour of abstract and universal reason in conjunction with its privileging of individual autonomy at the expense of the community leads to alienation of the individual from the community. Similarly, the positivist exclusion of faith and theology from law, with its enforced conformity to the posited law, also results in this violence of alienation. In response, this article proposes a new foundation for law, a natural law based in the truth of Trinitarian theology articulated by John Milbank. In the Trinity, the members exist as a perfect unity in diversity, providing a model for the reconciliation of the legal individual and community: the law of love. Through the law of love as the basic norm, individuals love their neighbours as themselves, reconciling the particular and the universal, and providing a community of peace rather than violence.

This article seeks to clarify and theorise three fundamental themes in the work of John Milbank: truth, faith and reason. In his work, Milbank often uses these terms in ambiguous ways, so the terminology requires clarity to facilitate further productive discussion. It is found that truth refers to the revelation of the divine relations in the Trinity, and these correspond with human relations when this revelation is apprehended by faith through participation. Faith means trust or persuasion, such that when the divine is graciously revealed, the mind is transformed and persuaded to participate in the divine relations. This faith is reconciled with reason, or logos, the divine word which is Christ and is the ultimate revelation of the Trinity through the Incarnation, which produces a reason that leads to peace based in faith.

In accordance with secular liberalism, many scholars and politicians argue excluding religious perspectives from political decision-making is the only way to guarantee genuine neutrality, freedom and equality. However, this paper argues secular liberalism is actually a non-neutral theology which violently excludes other religious perspectives. The paper attempts to apply Christian theology to liberal notions of public discourse for the purpose of redeeming and transforming that discourse. This redeemed 'liberalism' provides a framework for persuasion to the Good by advocating a discourse governed by the law of love. This produces genuine religious freedom which paradoxically transcends and fulfils the liberal ideals that secular liberalism proclaims but can never attain.

The standard liberal account of religious freedom assumes that religious freedom is independent of non-establishment, and this preserves state neutrality and consequently facilitates freedom and equality for both religious and non-religious citizens. The article first argues that this assumption of domain independence actually privileges non-establishment over religious freedom, with the result that the independent domain approach is actually secularist, and so not truly neutral and does not treat religion equally to non-religion. Second, the article argues that the High Court of Australia has uncritically adopted this assumption of domain independence and the dominance of a liberal secular approach to s 116, leading to undue restriction of religious freedom. Finally, the article proposes a more capacious view of religious freedom which allows the non-interference of the state in religious life and facilitates the equal participation of all religions and non-religions in public life, more effectively promoting the virtues of neutrality, equality and freedom the liberal account seeks.

The place of religion in the Australian democracy and the nature of religious freedom in Australia has recently attracted controversy, particularly when debating controversial social issues such as the legalisation of same-sex marriage.  The Australian Law Reform Commission has recognised this through their recent Freedoms Inquiry, which identified provisions of Commonwealth law which unreasonably encroach upon traditional rights and freedoms, including religious freedom.  The Commonwealth Parliament has also recognised this through the work of the Select Committee on the Exposure Draft of the Marriage Amendment (Same-Sex Marriage) Bill which considered religious exemptions to relevant anti-discrimination law relating to the legalisation of same-sex marriage, and the work of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (Human Rights Sub-Committee) Inquiry into the status of the human right to freedom of religion or belief.  This draft paper, which is intended to outline a project for a DECRA application next year, overviews the legal and theoretical questions pertaining to the place of religion in a democracy like Australia.  In particular, the paper discusses the function of Section 116 of the Constitution, the nature of religious freedom and conflict with anti-discrimination law, understandings of the 'secular' and what it means for Australia to be a secular state, and different views of liberal democracy in an era of religious pluralism.  The paper suggests no principled theoretical perspective has engaged with these questions in an integrated, holistic way, and the project aims to address this deficiency by using the approach of Christian theologian John Milbank.

This presentation outlines some of the teaching research and innovations undertaken as part of my Graduate Certificate of Academic Practice from 2015-2016.  It is divided into three parts.  The first part suggests that targeted group work in tutorials enhances learning outcomes and creates a sense of belonging for students operating in an online environment.  The second part suggests that use of Facebook as an online collaborative platform can help students interact together to understand particular legal issues.  It is especially useful for allowing internals to interact directly with externals in an environment which is more naturally comfortable for contemporary communication.  Finally, the presentation proposes an innovative approach to assessment which involves students collaborating with staff to create assessment by enabling them to propose their own essay topics for an exam.  This arguably enhances learning outcomes by providing students with intrinsic motivation to prepare for assessment.