WO2025027288A1

WO2025027288A1 - A method of authenticating and preventing spoofing of an optically readable security element

Info

Publication number: WO2025027288A1
Application number: PCT/GB2024/051957
Authority: WO
Inventors: Blake Allan HALLIDAY; David Ian Howarth; Hugo BARRELLON-KENDALL; Phillip SPEED; Robert James Young
Original assignee: Quantum Base Limited
Priority date: 2023-07-28
Filing date: 2024-07-25
Publication date: 2025-02-06
Also published as: GB202311616D0; GB2632251A

Abstract

There is described a method of authenticating an optically readable security element (20) by an image capturing device (10). The method comprises determining S1 whether a spoofing attempt is taking place by checking for a presence of a display apparatus (40). The presence causes it to be determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place. The method also comprises reading S2 the optically readable security element (20) and verifying S3 the optically readable security element (20) as authentic based on the reading S2 of the optically readable security element and the determining S1 of whether a spoofing attempt is taking place.

Description

A METHOD OF AUTHENTICATING AND PREVENTING SPOOFING OF AN OPTICALLY READABLE SECURITY ELEMENT

TECHNICAL FIELD

The present disclosure relates to a method of authenticating an optically readable security element and an image capturing device for authenticating an optically readable security element.

BACKGROUND

Security elements or tags are used to provide security in relation to an object to which they are attached. These security elements provide security in relation to the object by labelling the object. For example, a security element may be encoded with a unique identity that can be extracted from the security element, thereby enabling authentication of the object.

However, security elements, or devices for reading such elements, may be vulnerable to spoofing (i.e., passing off a fraudulent/inauthentic security element as authentic). For example, a nefarious party may attempt to spoof a security element or device by displaying a duplicate (e.g., an image, such as a photograph) of an authentic security element on a device such as a smartphone.

Hence, there is a desire to provide a method of authenticating a security element that prevents or inhibits spoofing thereof.

SUMMARY

It is one aim of the present disclosure, amongst others, to provide a method of authenticating an optically readable security element which at least partially obviates or mitigates at least some of the disadvantages of the prior art, whether identified herein or elsewhere, or to provide an alternative approach. For instance, it is an aim of embodiments of the invention to provide a method of authenticating an optically readable security element that prevents or inhibits spoofing of the optically readable security element.

According to the present invention there is provided a method of authenticating an optically readable security element and an image capturing device for authenticating an optically readable security element, as set forth in the appended claims. Other features of the invention will be apparent from the dependent claims and the description that follows.

According to a first aspect, there is provided a method of authenticating an optically readable security element by an image capturing device. The method comprises determining whether a spoofing attempt is taking place by checking for a presence of a display apparatus. The presence causes it to be determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place. The method also comprises reading the optically readable security element and verifying the optically readable security element as authentic based on the reading of the optically readable security element and the determining of whether a spoofing attempt is taking place.

The optically readable security element may be verified as authentic only if it is determined that a spoofing attempt is not taking place.

The method may further comprise extracting an identity from the optically readable security element, retrieving a stored identity from a data store and verifying the optically readable security element as authentic by comparing the extracted identity with the retrieved stored identity.

The optically readable security element may be verified as authentic only if the extracted identity matches the retrieved stored identity within a preset range.

The display apparatus may be configured to duplicate an optically readable security element, and determining whether a spoofing attempt is taking place may comprise determining whether the display apparatus is duplicating the optically readable security element.

The method may further comprise calculating a confidence measure that the display apparatus is present and determining that spoofing is taking place only if the confidence measure is above a threshold value.

Checking for the presence of the display apparatus may comprise detecting an optical artifact associated with the display apparatus.

The optical artifact may be at least one of: a pictorial element, reflection, emission and a moire pattern.

The method may further comprise detecting a change in the moire pattern. The method may further comprise detecting a change in the moire pattern in response to a relative change in configuration between the optically readable security element and the image capturing device.

The method may further comprise detecting and/or prompting the change in configuration between the optically readable security element and the image capturing device.

The method may further comprise determining if the change is as expected, optionally based on a relative change in configuration between the optically readable security element and the image capturing device.

In the event that it is determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place, the method may further comprise delaying the reading for a predetermined period of time.

In the event that it is determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place, the method may further comprise transmitting an output signal.

The output signal may be an alert signal.

The method may further comprise disabling one or more authentic optically readable security elements based on the output signal.

In the event that it is determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place, the method may further comprise narrowing the preset range.

The method may further comprise illuminating the optically readable security element and determining whether a spoofing attempt is taking place based on an optical response of the optically readable security element to the illuminating.

According to a second aspect, there is provided an image capturing device for authenticating an optically readable security element. The image capturing device comprises a reader, a sensor and a processor. The reader is configured to read the optically readable security element. The sensor is configured to check for a presence of a display apparatus. The processor is configured to determine whether a spoofing attempt is taking place based on an output of the sensor. The presence of a display apparatus causes it to be determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place. The processor is also configured to verify the optically readable security element as authentic based on the reading of the optically readable security element reader and the determining of whether a spoofing attempt is taking place.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS For a better understanding of the invention, and to show how embodiments of the same may be brought into effect, reference will be made, by way of example only, to the accompanying Figures, in which:

Figure 1 shows a flowchart for a method of authenticating an optically readable security element;

Figure 2 shows an optically readable security element being read by an image capturing device;

Figure 3 shows an image capturing device; and

Figures 4a-4e show principles associated with the use of moire patterns.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Figure 1 shows a flowchart for a method of authenticating an optically readable security element (as yet unknown whether to be authentic or inauthentic, for example a spoofing attempt or otherwise). The method of Figure 1 is best understood in conjunction with Figure 2, which shows an image capturing device 10 reading an optically readable security element 20 in a field of view 30 (e.g., in a same image frame) of the image capturing device 10.

The method comprises determining S1 whether a spoofing attempt is taking place by checking for a presence (e.g., at least partially in the field of view 30 of the image capturing device 10) of a display apparatus 40, whereby the presence causes it to be determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place. In other words, the method comprises determining S1 whether there is any sign of a display apparatus 40 (e.g., using machine vision), because the presence of a display apparatus 40 is likely indicative of a spoofing attempt (e.g., a nefarious party displaying an image of an authentic optically readable security element 20 on a smartphone or otherwise duplicating the authentic optically readable security element 20).

This is a subtle but powerful feature, which at first glance might not be apparent. For example, it is known to take a picture or image of a barcode or QR code and store this image, all using a first image capturing device. Then, someone could use a second image capturing device to read and extract information from that image, provided by a display of the first image capturing device. For instance, this process may be used to share product information, access details or access login permissions. However, the present invention is effectively the opposite of this process. That is, rather than improving or facilitating such methodology, the present invention seeks to prevent or inhibit this process to ensure that a real, live, physical optically readable security element 20 is being read and used. Therefore, the present invention vastly improves the security provided by such an optically readable security element 20.

It may be determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place only if it is determined that the display apparatus 40 is present (including being used to display an optically readable security element 20) with a certain degree of confidence, thereby, advantageously, avoiding false positives. To this end, the method may comprise calculating a confidence measure that that the display apparatus 40 is present and determining that spoofing is taking place only if the confidence measure is above a first threshold value (e.g., 90%, 95%).

The method also comprises reading S2 the optically readable security element 20 and verifying S3 the optically readable security element 20 as authentic based on the reading S2 of the optically readable security element 20 and the determining S1 of whether a spoofing attempt is taking place. For example, the optically readable security element 20 may be verified as authentic only if it is determined that a spoofing attempt is not taking place. Thus, advantageously, verification of the authenticity of the optically readable security element 20 is based on two factors, such that enhanced security is facilitated.

The method preferably comprises extracting (e.g., as part of the reading S2) an identity from the optically readable security element 20. This extracting may include, for example, retrieving a stored identity from a data store and verifying the optically readable security element 20 as authentic by comparing the extracted identity with the retrieved stored identity. Therefore, advantageously, irrespective of whether it is determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place, authentication of the optically readable security element 20 is contingent on the identity.

The optically readable security element 20 may be verified as authentic only if the extracted identity matches the retrieved stored identity within a preset range. For instance, the method may comprise calculating a confidence measure that the extracted identity matches the retrieved identity and only verifying the optically readable security element 20 as authentic if the calculated confidence measure is above a second threshold value (e.g., 90%, 95%). In this way, advantageously, false negatives are avoided while maintaining high accuracy. Further advantageously, as noted above, reliability of the verification of the authenticity of the optically readable security element 20 may be enhanced by requiring both the confidence measure that the display apparatus 40 is present to be above the first threshold and the confidence measure that the extracted identity matches the retrieved identity to be above the second threshold.

Checking for the presence of the display apparatus 40 may comprise detecting at least one optical artifact associated with the display apparatus 40 (which includes an artifact in or around any displayed image of the optically readable security element 20). In other words, in order to determine whether a display apparatus 40 is present, the presence of a display apparatus 40 being indicative of spoofing, the method may comprise detecting (e.g., sensing) an optical characteristic from which the presence of the display apparatus 40 may be inferred.

The optical artifact may be one or more a pictorial element (typically a picture element - i.e., a pixel), reflection, emission and a moire (i.e., fringe or interference) pattern. For instance, in the case of a nefarious party attempting to spoof using an image of an authentic optically readable security element 20 displayed on a screen of a display apparatus 40, the screen of the display apparatus 40 will typically reflect ambient light differently to how light would be reflected by the authentic optically readable security element 20. Therefore, this reflection and/or light interference may be used to infer the presence of the display apparatus 40 and, hence, determine that there is a spoofing attempt.

The particularly advantageous use of a moire (i.e., fringe or interference) pattern is discussed in more detail below.

In the event that it is determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place, the method may comprise transmitting an output signal. The output signal may be an alert signal. For instance, the alert signal may cause the image capturing device 10 to output an audio alert via a speaker and/or to output a visual alert via a display. Advantageously, in this way, a user is alerted to a potential security risk.

The method may comprise delaying the reading S2 and/or disabling one or more (authentic) optically readable security elements 20 based on the output signal. For example, the optically readable security element 20 of which an attempt at spoofing was made may be disabled based on the output signal. In more detail, if, for instance, an identity is extracted from an inauthentic optically readable security element 20 during the method shown in Figure 1 , but it is determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place, the identity may be used to identity the corresponding authentic optically readable security element 20 in order to disable it and, optionally, other optically readable security elements 20, such as those part of the same manufacturing batch. The delaying and/or disabling may be permanent or time limited (i.e., for a predetermined period of time). Advantageously, this delaying and/or disabling thwarts repeat spoofing attempts.

Disabling of an element or device might involve anything that prevents the element being used or read, or the device being used or used to read the element. For example, this might involve changing a flag or other indicator in a data store or the device, to indicate this change or limitation in functionality. In other words, the device or element cannot be used in the usual way, i.e. the device is unable to read an element (e.g. as an authentic element), or that element is not able to be read (e.g. as an authentic element) by the device.

Relatedly, in the event that it is determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place, the method may comprise narrowing the preset range (e.g., raising the second threshold value). In other words, extracted identity may be deemed as matching the retrieved identity less readily if is determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place. Analogously, in the event that it is determined that a spoofing attempt is not taking place, the method may comprise widening the preset range (e.g., lowering the second threshold). In general, the method may comprise adjusting the second threshold based on the confidence measure that the display apparatus 40 is present. Advantageously, therefore, the level of the enhanced security provided by the method is congruent with the security risk.

It could be that these actions in the event that a spoofing event is taking place are performed after a single application of the method of Figure 1 or after more than one application of the method of Figure 1 . For example, a first determining S1 could indicate a spoofing attempt is taking place, and a further determining S2 may be prompted to confirm the spoofing attempt is taking place.

The aforementioned data store may be part of the image capturing device 10 or part of an external device in electronic communication (e.g., via a server) with the image capturing device 10. The data store may also be part of the optically readable security element 20. For example, the optically readable security element 20 may comprise an engineered component, such as a hologram, bar code, QR code or similar programmable component, encoded with, or generally comprising information such as the stored identity.

Preferably, the optically readable security element 20 comprises a unique (e.g., randomised) component (e.g., a random deterministic feature), encoding the identity. The randomised component encoding the identity, compared with the engineered component encoding the identity, advantageously engenders a more robust barrier to fraudulent reading of the optically readable security element 20.

More preferably, the optically readable security element 20 comprises at least one optical emitter arranged to be read via emission radiation emitted therefrom. Relatedly, the at least one optical emitter may be arranged to be excited by excitation radiation. The one or more emitters may serve as the component that provides or serves as the unique identity. Advantageously, the optically readable security element 20 being read via emission emitted therefrom provides a more robust barrier to fraudulent reading, more readily preventing spoofing or copying by, for instance, simply replicating (e.g., by printing) a bar code, QR code or similar. This advantage is particularly true when one or more (e.g., hundreds, thousands or millions or more) of emitters are distributed randomly. For instance, this effect may be achieved using quantum dots, flakes of 2D materials, (e.g., small) molecules, atomic defects or vacancies, plasmonic structures or similar.

The method may comprise illuminating the optically readable security element 20 and determining whether a spoofing attempt is taking place based on an optical response of the optically readable security element 20 to the illuminating. For example, the data store may store an expected optical response in the case that the optically readable security element 20 is authentic, and the method may comprise retrieving the expected optical response, comparing the expected optical response to the optical response and determining that a spoofing attempt is not taking place only if the optical response does not match the expected optical response within a preset range. Illuminating may be a particularly powerful way by which to determine whether spoofing attempt is taking place in the case of the authentic optically readable security element 20 comprising at least one optical emitter. For example, the authentic optically readable security element 20 may comprise optical emitters that can be excited and emit with a known emission profile by which its authenticity is verifiable. Of course, a spoofing attempt, comprising an image of an authentic optically readable security element provided by a display apparatus 40, cannot be excited or caused to emit, and so would fail this test.

The steps of the method may be performed in any order. At least two of the steps S1 , S2, S3 of the method may be simultaneous. Advantageously, performing two or more of the steps simultaneously may reduce the time taken to authenticate the optically readable security element 20. The image capturing device 10 may be a terminal device, such as a smartphone. The image capturing device 10 may be configured to emit excitation radiation to excite the at least one optical emitter (e.g., from an electromagnetic radiation source, such as a flash or LED). By being configured to emit excitation radiation, the image capturing device 10, advantageously, facilitates the aforementioned robust security. Further, emitting the excitation radiation from the image capturing device 10, advantageously, allows convenient control of excitation of the at least one optical emitter.

Figure 3 shows the image capturing device 10 of Figure 2 in more detail. The image capturing device comprises a reader 11 , a sensor 12 and a processor 13. The reader 11 is configured to perform the reading S2. The sensor 12 is configured to check for a presence of a display apparatus 40, as described above. The processor 13 is configured to perform the determining S1 and the verifying S3. The sensor 12 may be part of the processor 13. The processor 13 may perform the determining S1 and the verifying S3 locally or externally (e.g., at a server). The processor 13 may be dedicated hardware or existing hardware specifically configured to perform the determining S1 and the verifying S3. The image capturing device 10 may include a communication unit (not shown) to communicate with, for example, the server. As mentioned, the image capturing device may comprise speakers, and/or a display 14. The device might also comprise a proximity sensor 15, for detecting how proximal an object is to the device (i.e. the distance between the device and the object). This could be implemented using optical (more generally electromagnetic) or acoustic concepts or components. This functionality might alternatively be implemented in software, for example with the software being arranged to detect how proximal an (e.g. imaged) object is to the device (i.e. the distance between the device and the object). This might be achieved by depth perception software, for example by detecting changes in relative positions or orientations of imaged objections, in isolation or with reference to other objects. Alternatively or additionally, one or more accelerometers, gyroscopes, and/or other motion sensors may be included, for example detect (and/or quantify) a movement of the image capturing device 10.

As introduced above, the particular use of a moire (i.e., fringe or interference) pattern is not arbitrary. It is subtle, yet powerful and advantageous.

Some alternative approaches to detecting display-based spoofing attempts may work well in certain applications. However, at least some approaches might require relatively significant (and certainly deliberate) driving, detection, and feedback considerations. This might involve the variation in an illumination intensity to read or attempt to read an identifier (e.g. optical code), and then the determination of whether, or how well, the identifier (code) can be read as part of that variation. From this, a conclusion could perhaps be reached as to whether the identifier (code) is printed or electronically displayed. However, according to a particular embodiment of the present invention, the particular use of a moire (i.e., fringe or interference) pattern means that this relatively complicated approach is not necessary.

That is, according to an embodiment, advantage is taken of something that typically, naturally, occurs when viewing or reading one display via or using another display (or reader having an array of sensors or detectors). This is used to powerful effect. Whereas such a moire (i.e., fringe or interference) pattern might be typically annoying or frustrating for a user, or even make a reading more difficult, here it is a powerful indicator of the presence of the display apparatus. So, in the context of an embodiment of the invention, this is an indication of a spoofing attempt using that display apparatus. Here, then, an embodiment is taking something that is often viewed as a problem, and converting that into a powerful advantage. This is a far simpler and effective way of identifying a spoofing attempt than at least some alternative approaches. Figures 4a- 4e are used to show why this is the case.

Figure 4a shows a moire effect or pattern seen in two overlaying grids of different resolutions (i.e. grid spacings or periods). The moire pattern is caused by the interaction of two regular patterns, in this case grids. In this example, one of the grids may be or may represent the imaging sensor or element 11 (i.e. reader), or components thereof, of the image capturing device (e.g. smartphone). The other grid may be or may represent the pixels of a display apparatus 40. When the grid of the imaging sensor or element 11 (i.e. reader) does not align exactly with the grid of the pixels of the display apparatus 40, this causes interference patterns - i.e. moire patterns.

Figure 4b shows an actual image of the moire pattern 50. This is what is visible on a display 14 of the image capturing device 10, when viewing a spoof attempt at displaying an optically readable security element 20 on a display apparatus 40. This moire pattern 50 would also be present in any reading (live or captured or stored).

Therefore, if the presence of moire effects is detected in the reading, this can indicate an attempt to fool or spoof the overall system or method, by reproducing the optically readable security element 20 using a displayed image of the optically readable security element 20 on a display 40. Intentionally or unintentionally altering the angle or distance of the image capturing device 10 relative to the optically readable security element 20 can alter this moire effect, so the effect may change in response to angle or distance in a manner which is characteristic of a screen. This can be measurable or quantified, or simply a change looked for and detected, and so can be used to detect (or better detect) that a display is being read, and not a genuine optically readable security element.

Altering the angle or distance might more generally be described as changing a relative configuration (i.e. position or orientation) between the image capturing device 10 and an optically readable security element 20 (and display apparatus 40).

Altering the relative configuration between the image capturing device 10 and an optically readable security element 20 might be intentional or unintentional, as discussed above. If intentional, a user may be prompted to alter the relative configuration (e.g. by an on-display or on-screen message), to see (e.g. detect) if the moire pattern changes. If simply looking for a change in the pattern, this will be very easy to identify. My their very nature, moire patterns or effects will be far easier to detect, and move more readily, than movement in the grids, features, or patterns that caused the moire effect or pattern. If looking to quantify that change (e.g. to see if the change is by a certain amount, or within a certain range), it may be useful to in some way quantify or determine (e.g. detect) the current or altered relative configuration between the image capturing device 10 and an optically readable security element 20. It will be appreciated that this might be implemented in one of a number of ways, for example using the proximity sensor 15 or related proximity detecting function, or by using a reference mark to determine the change in configuration. For instance, if the optically readable security element 20 is expected to be of a certain shape or size, a determined change in read or scanned shape or size can be used to determine and quantity the change in relative configuration. Alternatively or additionally, one or more accelerometers, gyroscopes, and/or other motion sensors may be used, even to simply detect (not quantify) a relative movement. Figures 4c to 4e show how this change in relative configuration may be used.

Figure 4c shows a more detailed and perhaps realistic representation of the grids shown in Figure 4a. Referring to Figure 4c, A first grid 11 may be or may represent the imaging sensor or element 11 (i.e. reader), or components thereof, of the image capturing device (e.g. smartphone). The second grid 40 may be or may represent the pixels of a display apparatus 40. If the image capturing device is configured such that a lattice constant of these two grids (i.e. arrays) 11 , 40 is similar but not the same, then a moire pattern would be visible/detectable in the image (such as shown on the Figure).

In Figure 4c, the difference in lattice constants is a factor of 0.88. In Figure 4d, a similar situation is shown, but where the distance (i.e. separation) between the image capturing device and (spoofing) display apparatus has been increased, so that the difference in lattice constants has changed to a factor of 0.82. As can be seen when comparing Figures 4c and 4d, this has resulted in an increase in the period of the moire effect. As discussed above, this change is easy to detect, and easy to measure (e.g. using a Fourier transform, or similar frequency analysis). A proximity sensor on the image capturing device can measure the device-display apparatus distance, and then this distance can be correlated with the measured moire period. If this is not within some expected bounds, then the image capturing device can infer that the period of the printed features in the measured object is not within expectation and a counterfeit or spoofing attempt is being made.

Figure 4d shows that much the same approach can be implemented and utilised, but with a change in angle (in this case, rotation) of the grids (i.e. the image capturing device and its reader 11 and display apparatus 40).

As above, any relative change in spatial configuration between the image capturing device 10 and an optically readable security element 20 may (and almost certainly will) change the moire pattern (which includes a location of the pattern). Simple detection of that change is powerful and useful, as discussed above. Detection of the nature of that change, and optionally determining if it is as expected (e.g. qualitatively or quantitatively), may mean that it is even harder to implement a successful spoofing attempt using a display apparatus.

In summary, the present disclosure has described a method that prevents or hinders spoofing of an optically readable security element over the short term or the long term and in a manner sensitive to the level of risk. Again, this method is in stark contrast with, and opposite to, how some optically readable security elements are currently used, where the use and sharing of displayed images of optically readable security elements are encouraged and even required.

Although preferred embodiments have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various changes and modifications might be made without departing from the scope of the invention, as defined in the appended claims and as described above. The optional features set out herein may be used either individually or in combination with each other where appropriate and particularly in the combinations as set out in the accompanying claims. The optional features for each aspect or exemplary embodiment of the invention, as set out herein are also applicable to all other aspects or exemplary embodiments of the invention, where appropriate. In other words, the skilled person reading this specification should consider the optional features for each aspect or exemplary embodiment of the invention as interchangeable and combinable between different aspects and exemplary embodiments.

Claims

1. A method of authenticating an optically readable security element, by an image capturing device, the method comprising: determining whether a spoofing attempt is taking place by checking for a presence of a display apparatus, whereby the presence causes it to be determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place; reading the optically readable security element; and verifying the optically readable security element as authentic based on the reading of the optically readable security element and the determining of whether a spoofing attempt is taking place.

2. The method of claim 1 , wherein the optically readable security element is verified as authentic only if it is determined that a spoofing attempt is not taking place.

3. The method of any preceding claim, further comprising: extracting an identity from the optically readable security element; retrieving a stored identity from a data store; and verifying the optically readable security element as authentic by comparing the extracted identity with the retrieved stored identity.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein the optically readable security element is verified as authentic only if the extracted identity matches the retrieved stored identity within a preset range, and, optionally, wherein, in the event that it is determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place, the method further comprises narrowing the preset range.

5. The method of any preceding claim, wherein the display apparatus is configured to duplicate an optically readable security element, and wherein determining whether a spoofing attempt is taking place comprises determining whether the display apparatus is duplicating the optically readable security element.

6. The method of any preceding claim, further comprising: calculating a confidence measure that that the display apparatus is present; and determining that spoofing is taking place only if the confidence measure is above a threshold value.

7. The method of any preceding claim, wherein checking for the presence of the display apparatus comprises detecting an optical artifact associated with the display apparatus, and, optionally, wherein the optical artifact is at least one of: a pictorial element, reflection, emission and a moire pattern.

8. The method of claim 7, further comprising detecting a change in the moire pattern.

9. The method of claim 8, further comprising detecting a change in the moire pattern in response to a relative change in configuration between the optically readable security element and the image capturing device.

10. The method of claim 9, further comprising detecting and/or prompting the change in configuration between the optically readable security element and the image capturing device.

11 . The method of any of claims 8 to 10, further comprising determining if the change is as expected, optionally based on a relative change in configuration between the optically readable security element and the image capturing device.

12. The method of any preceding claim, wherein, in the event that it is determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place, the method further comprises: delaying the reading for a predetermined period of time.

13. The method of any preceding claim, wherein, in the event that it is determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place, the method further comprises: transmitting an output signal, and, optionally, wherein the output signal is an alert signal, and/or disabling one or more authentic optically readable security elements based on the output signal.

14. The method of any preceding claim, further comprising: illuminating the optically readable security element; and determining whether a spoofing attempt is taking place based on an optical response of the optically readable security element to the illuminating.

15. An image capturing device for authenticating an optically readable security element, the image capturing device comprising: a reader configured to read the optically readable security element; a sensor configured to check for a presence of a display apparatus; and a processor configured to: determine whether a spoofing attempt is taking place based on an output of the sensor, whereby the presence of a display apparatus causes it to be determined that a spoofing attempt is taking place; and verify the optically readable security element as authentic based on the reading of the optically readable security element reader and the determining of whether a spoofing attempt is taking place.