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WO2022135383A1 - 一种身份鉴别方法和装置 - Google Patents

一种身份鉴别方法和装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2022135383A1
WO2022135383A1 PCT/CN2021/140035 CN2021140035W WO2022135383A1 WO 2022135383 A1 WO2022135383 A1 WO 2022135383A1 CN 2021140035 W CN2021140035 W CN 2021140035W WO 2022135383 A1 WO2022135383 A1 WO 2022135383A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
authentication
message
key
identity
requesting device
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2021/140035
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
赖晓龙
曹军
铁满霞
赵晓荣
李琴
张变玲
黄振海
Original Assignee
西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Publication date
Application filed by 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 filed Critical 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司
Publication of WO2022135383A1 publication Critical patent/WO2022135383A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
    • H04L63/0414—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden during transmission, i.e. party's identity is protected against eavesdropping, e.g. by using temporary identifiers, but is known to the other party or parties involved in the communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the technical field of network communication security, and in particular, to an identity authentication method and device.
  • communication networks often require two-way authentication between users and network access points to ensure that legitimate users can communicate with legitimate networks.
  • the privacy information of the user cannot be generally protected, and there is a problem of malicious charging by the network access point, causing abnormal charging to the user.
  • the present application provides an identity authentication method and device, which adopts a symmetric key entity authentication protocol to ensure the confidentiality of entity identity and related information, and at the same time, realizes the communication between the requesting device and the authentication access controller.
  • the two-way identity authentication between the two-way authentication ensures that legitimate users access the legitimate network; and can prevent the network access point from maliciously charging users who do not attempt to access the network within its service area.
  • choosing to use key exchange calculation and through ingenious details and process design enhances the protocol's ability to resist quantum computing attacks or dictionary brute force attacks.
  • an identity authentication method including:
  • the requesting device sends an authentication request message to the authentication access controller, where the authentication request message includes the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device; the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device is the public key of the encryption certificate used by the requesting device Obtained by encrypting encrypted data including the identity of the requesting device;
  • the authentication access controller sends a first authentication request message carrying the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device to the second authentication server it trusts, and receives the first authentication response message sent by the second authentication server , obtain the certificate random number generated by the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device and the identity authentication key generated by the first authentication server from the first authentication response message, wherein the certificate random number and the identity authentication key is generated by the first authentication server after decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device and determining that the identity of the requesting device is legal according to the decrypted identity of the requesting device;
  • the identity authentication key is calculated according to the calculation data including the pre-shared encryption key of the first authentication server and the requesting device;
  • the requesting device receives the first verification message sent by the authentication access controller, and sends a second verification message to the authentication access controller, where the first verification message includes the certificate-storing random number, and the The second verification message includes a first identity authentication code and a first message integrity check code; the first identity authentication code is the pre-shared certificate verification code used by the requesting device and the first authentication server.
  • the verification key is calculated and generated from the information including the certificate random number; the first message integrity check code is the message integrity between the requesting device and the authentication access controller.
  • the verification key pair is calculated and generated by including other fields in the second verification message except the first message integrity verification code; wherein, the message integrity verification key is calculated and generated according to the Calculated from the information including the key;
  • the authentication access controller verifies the integrity check code of the first message, and after the verification is passed, determines that the identity of the requesting device is legal, and generates an authentication completion message and a first certificate deposit message;
  • the requesting device verifies the second message integrity check code in the authentication complete message, and after the verification is passed, determines that the identity of the authentication access controller is legal; the second message integrity check code is calculated and generated by the authentication access controller using the message integrity check key to include other fields in the authentication complete message except the second message integrity check code;
  • the first authentication server verifies the first identity authentication code in the first certificate deposit message, and after the verification is passed, generates and stores a request passing record of the requesting device.
  • an authentication access controller including:
  • the receiving unit is configured to receive the authentication request message sent by the requesting device, where the authentication request message includes the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device;
  • the key is obtained by encrypting the encrypted data including the identity of the requesting device;
  • a sending unit configured to send a first authentication request message carrying the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device to a second authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller;
  • the receiving unit is further configured to receive the first authentication response message sent by the second authentication server, and obtain the certificate generated by the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device from the first authentication response message
  • the random number and the identity authentication key generated by the first authentication server are the first authentication server decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device and storing it.
  • the identity authentication key is generated after determining that the identity of the requesting device is legitimate according to the decrypted identity of the requesting device; the identity authentication key is based on a pre-shared encryption key including the first authentication server and the requesting device in Calculated from the calculation data in;
  • the sending unit is further configured to send a first verification message to the requesting device, where the first verification message includes the certificate storage random number;
  • the receiving unit is further configured to receive a second verification message sent by the requesting device, where the second verification message includes a first identity verification code and a first message integrity check code; the first identity verification The right code is calculated and generated by the requesting device using its pre-shared certificate verification key with the first authentication server for information including the certificate random number; the first message integrity check The code is that the requesting device uses the message integrity check key pair between it and the authentication access controller to include other fields in the second verification message except the first message integrity check code Calculated and generated; wherein, the message integrity check key is calculated and generated according to information including the identity authentication key;
  • a processing unit configured to verify the integrity check code of the first message, and after the verification is passed, determine that the identity of the requesting device is legal, and generate an authentication complete message and a first certificate deposit message;
  • the sending unit is further configured to send the authentication complete message to the requesting device, and send the first certificate deposit message to the second authentication server.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a request device, including:
  • a sending unit configured to send an authentication request message to the authentication access controller, where the authentication request message includes the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device; the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device is the encrypted certificate used by the requesting device The public key is obtained by encrypting the encrypted data including the identity of the requesting device;
  • a receiving unit configured to receive a first verification message sent by the authentication access controller, where the first verification message includes a certificate-storing random number;
  • a processing unit configured to use the pre-shared certificate verification key of the requesting device and its trusted first authentication server to calculate and generate a first identity authentication code for the information including the certificate random number; and, using The message integrity check key pair between the requesting device and the authentication access controller includes other fields in the second verification message except the first message integrity check code. Verification code; wherein, the message integrity check key is calculated according to information including an identity authentication key, and the identity authentication key is calculated according to the information including the request device and the first authentication server. Calculated from the calculation data including the pre-shared encryption key;
  • the sending unit is further configured to send the second verification message to the authentication access controller, where the second verification message includes the first identity verification code and the integrity check of the first message code;
  • the receiving unit is further configured to receive an authentication complete message sent by the authentication access controller
  • the processing unit is further configured to verify the second message integrity check code in the authentication complete message, and after the verification is passed, determine that the identity of the authentication access controller is legal; the second message is complete
  • the authenticity check code is calculated and generated by the authentication access controller using the message integrity check key to include other fields in the authentication complete message except the second message integrity check code.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a first authentication server, where the first authentication server is an authentication server trusted by the requesting device, including:
  • the processing unit is configured to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device by using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to obtain the identity of the requesting device, determine the legitimacy of the requesting device according to the identity of the requesting device, and determine the identity of the requesting device after determining the identity of the requesting device. After being legal, generate a certificate random number and an identity authentication key, and the identity authentication key is calculated according to the calculation data including the pre-shared encryption key of the first authentication server and the requesting device;
  • the processing unit is further configured to verify the first identity authentication code in the first certificate deposit message, and after the verification is passed, generate and store a request passing record of the requesting device.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a second authentication server, where the second authentication server is an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, including:
  • a receiving unit configured to receive the first authentication request message that is sent by the authentication access controller and carries the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device;
  • a sending unit configured to send a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller, where the first authentication response message includes a certificate random number generated by a first authentication server trusted by the requesting device and the first authentication response message. an identity authentication key generated by the authentication server;
  • the receiving unit is further configured to receive a first certificate deposit message sent by the authentication access controller, where the first certificate deposit message includes a first identity authentication code.
  • an authentication access controller including:
  • the processor is configured to call the program instructions stored in the memory, and execute the method for identifying the access controller side in the first aspect according to the obtained program.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a requesting device, including:
  • the processor is configured to call the program instructions stored in the memory, and execute the method on the requesting device side in the first aspect according to the obtained program.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a first authentication server, including:
  • the processor is configured to call the program instructions stored in the memory, and execute the method on the first authentication server side in the first aspect according to the obtained program.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a second authentication server, including:
  • the processor is configured to call the program instructions stored in the memory, and execute the method on the second authentication server side in the first aspect according to the obtained program.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a computer storage medium, where the computer storage medium stores computer-executable instructions, where the computer-executable instructions are used to cause the computer to execute the method described in the first aspect.
  • the identity information of the requesting device is transmitted in the form of ciphertext in the process of transmitting the message. Ensure the security of the real identity information of the requesting device during the authentication process.
  • the authentication access controller will correspondingly send a first authentication message to the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device, so as to use the first authentication server to record the behavior of the requesting device requesting access to the network , which provides objective evidence for subsequent network access point charging, and effectively prevents network access points from maliciously charging users who do not attempt to access the network within its service area.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method under a non-roaming situation provided by an embodiment of the present application, wherein "*" represents an optional field or an optional operation;
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of an identity authentication method under a roaming situation provided by an embodiment of the present application, wherein "*" represents an optional field or an optional operation;
  • FIG. 4 is a structural block diagram of an authentication access controller AAC according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 5 is a structural block diagram of a requesting device REQ provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 6 is a structural block diagram of a first authentication server AS-REQ provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 7 is a structural block diagram of a second authentication server AS-AAC according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 8 is a structural block diagram of another authentication access controller AAC provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 9 is a structural block diagram of another requesting device REQ provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 10 is a structural block diagram of another first authentication server AS-REQ provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 11 is a structural block diagram of another second authentication server AS-AAC according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the requesting device can access the network through the authentication access controller.
  • the authentication between the access controller and the requesting device is usually Two-way authentication is required.
  • the requesting device may be a terminal device such as a mobile phone, a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), or a tablet computer, and the authentication access controller may be wireless access point.
  • the requesting device may be a terminal device such as a desktop computer or a notebook computer, and the authentication access controller may be a switch or a router.
  • the requesting device accesses the 4th/5th Generation mobile communication technology (4G/5G) network through the authentication access controller, the requesting device can be a mobile phone, and the authentication access controller can for the base station.
  • 4G/5G 4th/5th Generation mobile communication technology
  • 4G/5G 4th/5th Generation mobile communication technology
  • the requesting device can be a mobile phone, and the authentication access controller can for the base station.
  • the present application is also applicable to various data communication scenarios such as other wired networks and short-range communication networks.
  • the requesting device In the process of identity authentication of the requesting device, the requesting device needs to provide its own real identity information so that the access controller can authenticate the requesting device.
  • the identity information can be the identity of the requesting device, which may carry ID number, home address, bank card information, geographic location and other private and sensitive information, if the attacker intercepts and uses it for illegal purposes during the identity authentication process, it will cause great damage to the authentication access controller, requesting device and even the network. security risks.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides an identity authentication method, in which the requesting device sends an authentication request message to the authentication access controller, and the authentication request message includes the identity information ciphertext of the requesting device, the identity
  • the information ciphertext is obtained by the requesting device using the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt the encrypted data including the identity of the requesting device; the authentication access controller sends the encrypted data containing the identity information of the requesting device to the second authentication server it trusts.
  • the certificate storage random number and the identity authentication key generated by the first authentication server, the identity authentication key is calculated according to the calculation data including the pre-shared encryption key of the first authentication server and the requesting device; the requesting device receives the authentication
  • the integrity check code is calculated and generated by the requesting device using the message integrity check key between it and the authentication access controller to include other fields in the second verification message except the first message integrity check code.
  • the authentication access controller verifies the integrity check code of the first message, and after the verification is passed, it is determined that the identity of the requesting device is legal, and the authentication complete message and the first certificate deposit message are generated; the requesting device verifies that the second message in the authentication complete message is complete After the verification is passed, it is determined that the identity of the authentication access controller is legal, and the second message integrity check code is the authentication access controller using the message integrity check key to include in the authentication complete message Calculated and generated from other fields except the second message integrity check code; the first authentication server verifies the first identity authentication code in the first certificate deposit message, and after the verification is passed, it generates and stores the request passed by the requesting device. Record.
  • the identity information of the requesting device is transmitted in the form of cipher text, thereby ensuring the true identity of the requesting device during the identity authentication process. Information security.
  • the authentication access controller will accordingly send a first certificate message including the first identity authentication code generated by the requesting device to the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device, so that the The authentication server generates and stores a record of the requesting device's request to access the network according to the first identity authentication code, provides objective evidence for subsequent network access point billing, and effectively prevents the network access point from trying not to be within its service area. Malicious billing for users accessing the network.
  • the identity authentication method provided in the embodiment of the present application is used to realize the mutual identity authentication (Mutual Identity Authentication, MIA for short) that authenticates the access controller and the requesting device.
  • MIA Mutual Identity Authentication
  • a requesting device REQuester, REQ for short
  • an Authentication Access Controller AAC for short
  • an Authentication Server AS for short
  • the AS trusted by REQ is called the first authentication server AS-REQ
  • the AS trusted by the AAC is called the second authentication server AS-AAC.
  • REQ can be an endpoint participating in the identity authentication process, establish a connection with AAC, access services provided by AAC, and access AS through AAC.
  • AAC can establish a connection with REQ for another endpoint participating in the identity authentication process, provide services, and can directly access AS-AAC; AS-AAC can directly access AS-REQ.
  • AS-AAC and AS-REQ can be the same AS; when the AS trusted by REQ and AAC are different, AS-AAC and AS-REQ are different ASs, and roaming occurs at this time.
  • the certificate decryption server (Certificate Sever-Decrypt, CS-DEC for short) holds the encryption certificate and the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate in accordance with ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509, other standards or other technical systems, CS-DEC It can be an independent server, or it can reside in the AS-REQ; and the REQ knows the encryption certificate or the public key in the encryption certificate.
  • An identity authentication method shown in FIG. 1 is introduced below, and the method includes:
  • the REQ sends an authentication request message ATTACH to the AAC.
  • the ATTACH includes the ciphertext EncPub AS of REQ's identity information.
  • EncPub AS is obtained by REQ encrypting the encrypted data including its own ID REQ by using the public key of the encryption certificate. In this way, in the process of transmitting the message, illegal elements are prevented from obtaining the real ID of the REQ, and the security of the real ID of the REQ is guaranteed.
  • the encrypted object is called encrypted data.
  • the encrypted data of the REQ calculation EncPub AS may also include the identity encryption key Nonce REQID generated by REQ, that is, REQ can also use the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt the encrypted data including ID REQ and Nonce REQID to obtain.
  • Identity information ciphertext EncPub AS may also include the identity encryption key Nonce REQID generated by REQ, that is, REQ can also use the public key of the encryption certificate to encrypt the encrypted data including ID REQ and Nonce REQID to obtain.
  • the ATTACH may also include the security capability parameter information supported by REQ, Security capabilities REQ , and the Security capabilities REQ includes the identity authentication suite supported by REQ (the identity authentication suite contains one or more identity authentication methods), integrity check Authentication algorithm, hash (HASH) algorithm, key exchange algorithm and/or key derivation algorithm, etc., for AAC to select the specific security policy Security capabilities AAC to use.
  • the ATTACH may further include the identity identifier Route AS of at least one authentication server trusted by REQ, so that the AAC determines the second authentication server AS-AAC according to the Route AS and the identity identifier of the authentication server trusted by itself.
  • the ATTACH may further include the first random number Nonce REQ generated by REQ .
  • the AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC it trusts.
  • the AACVeri includes the ciphertext EncPub AS of the identity information of the REQ carried in the ATTACH.
  • the AAC needs to determine the second authentication server according to the Route AS in the ATTACH and the identity identifier of the authentication server it trusts.
  • Server AS-AAC Specifically, if REQ and AAC have mutually trusted authentication servers, it can be determined that the situation is non-roaming, that is, AS-AAC and AS-REQ are the same authentication server; if there is no mutually trusted authentication server between REQ and AAC , it can be determined that this is a roaming situation, that is, AS-AAC and AS-REQ are two independent authentication servers.
  • the AACVeri may further include the identity ID AAC of the AAC and/or the second random number Nonce AAC generated by the AAC . If the ATTACH sent by the REQ to the AAC includes the Nonce REQ , the AACVeri sent by the AAC to the AS-AAC may also include the Nonce REQ .
  • the AAC receives the first authentication response message ASVeri sent by the AS-AAC.
  • the ASVeri includes the random number and the identity authentication key IAK generated by the AS-REQ after verifying that the identity of the REQ is legal.
  • AS-REQ can also be used
  • AS-AAC can be used to represent the authentication server trusted by REQ and AAC.
  • AAC sends AACVeri carrying EncPub AS to AS-AAC (also can be expressed as AS-REQ), and after AS-AAC (can also be expressed as AS-REQ) receives AACVeri, it obtains and decrypts EncPub using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate.
  • ID REQ obtained by AS , and judge whether the identity of REQ is legal according to ID REQ .
  • Nonce AS_AAC which can also be expressed as Nonce AS_REQ
  • IAK identity authentication key
  • ASVeri which can be expressed as Nonce AS_REQ
  • IAK is sent to AAC.
  • the above-mentioned decryption of EncPub AS can be executed by CS-DEC which has interaction and trust relationship with AS-AAC (also expressed as AS-REQ), or by AS-AAC (also expressed as AS-REQ) .
  • IAK is calculated by AS-AAC (may also be expressed as AS-REQ) using the key derivation algorithm agreed with REQ on the calculation data including the pre-shared encryption key K REQ_AS between itself and REQ.
  • AS-AAC may also be expressed as AS-REQ
  • the calculation object used in the algorithm operation is referred to as calculation data.
  • AS-REQ and AS-AAC are different authentication servers, that is, roaming situation
  • AAC first sends AACVeri carrying EncPub AS to AS-AAC, and AS-AAC generates a second authentication request message AS-AACVeri according to AACVeri, Send AS-AACVeri to AS-REQ, and the EncPub AS is carried in the AS-AACVeri.
  • AS-REQ obtains the ID REQ obtained by decrypting the EncPub AS with the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate, and judges whether the identity of the REQ is legal according to the ID REQ .
  • AS-REQVeri including AS_REQ and IAK is sent to AS-AAC, then AS-AAC generates ASVeri according to AS-REQVeri, and sends the ASVeri including Nonce AS_REQ and IAK to AAC.
  • AS-DEC that has an interaction and trust relationship with the AS-REQ
  • AS-REQ may be performed by the AS-REQ.
  • IAK is calculated by AS-REQ using the key derivation algorithm agreed with REQ on the calculation data including the pre-shared encryption key K REQ_AS between itself and REQ.
  • the calculation data when the authentication server calculates the IAK also includes Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC .
  • AS-AAC (of course, it can also be expressed as AS-REQ) can also use the decryption EncPub
  • the Nonce REQID obtained by the AS encrypts the ID REQ to obtain the ID ciphertext of the REQ
  • ASVeri can also include the ID ciphertext of the REQ
  • AS-REQ can also use the Nonce REQID obtained by decrypting the EncPub AS to pair the ID REQ is encrypted to obtain REQ's identity ciphertext
  • AS-REQVeri and ASVeri can also include REQ's identity ciphertext
  • REQ's identity ciphertext can be the result of using Nonce REQID to perform XOR operation on ID REQ , that is, ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID
  • ID AAC and/or Nonce AAC may also be included in ASVeri.
  • ASVeri the AAC receives ASVeri, it can judge whether the ID AAC in the ASVeri is consistent with its own identity ID AAC , and/or, judge whether the Nonce AAC in the ASVeri is consistent with the Nonce AAC generated by itself, and if they are consistent, continue Perform subsequent operations, if inconsistent, discard ASVeri.
  • EK AAC_AS there is a pre-shared encryption key EK AAC_AS between AAC and AS-AAC.
  • AS-AAC can use EK AAC_AS to encrypt the information including IAK to obtain the identity authentication key ciphertext EncData AS_AAC , which can be replaced by EncData AS_AAC IAK in ASVeri.
  • AAC sends a first authentication message AACAuth to REQ.
  • the AACAuth includes a certificate random number.
  • AACAuth may further include the first key exchange parameter KeyInfo AAC .
  • KeyInfo AAC is the result obtained by AAC using the identity authentication key IAK to encrypt the information including the temporary public key generated by itself using the symmetric encryption algorithm.
  • AAC calculates KeyInfo AAC , it can first calculate the hash value of IAK, that is, HASH (IAK), and then perform XOR operation on HASH (IAK) and the information including the temporary public key generated by AAC to generate KeyInfo AAC .
  • the AAC when the AAC calculates the KeyInfo AAC , it can first calculate the extended identity authentication key EIAK, and then perform an exclusive OR operation on the information including the EIAK and the temporary public key generated by the AAC to generate the KeyInfo AAC , where the EIAK is the AAC according to the IAK and other information (other information used by AAC and REQ are the same and optional, such as a specific character string, etc.) are calculated and generated by using the key derivation algorithm.
  • the temporary public key generated by the AAC is a temporary public key in the temporary public-private key pair generated by the AAC.
  • the AAC needs to use its pre-shared encryption key EK AAC_AS with the AS-AAC to decrypt the EncData AS_AAC to obtain the IAK.
  • the AAC may determine the specific security policy Security capabilities AAC used by itself according to the Security capabilities REQ , and add the Security capabilities AAC to AACAuth and send it to the REQ.
  • Security capabilities AAC represents the identity authentication method, integrity check algorithm, hash algorithm, key exchange algorithm and/or key derivation algorithm that AAC determines to use.
  • AAC can add the ciphertext of the REQ's identity to AACAuth and send it to the REQ, that is, the AACAuth can also include the ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID .
  • AAC can also add any one or more of ID AAC , Nonce AAC and Nonce REQ to AACAuth and send it to REQ.
  • REQ utilizes its pre-shared certificate verification key IK REQ_AS with AS-REQ to calculate and generate the first identity authentication code MIC REQ on the calculation data including the certificate random number, and utilizes the message between it and AAC
  • the integrity check key pair includes other fields in the second verification message except the first message integrity check code to generate the first message integrity check code MacTag REQ .
  • REQ can generate a second key exchange parameter KeyInfo REQ , for example, after REQ receives AACAuth, it can use the identity authentication key IAK to encrypt the information including the temporary public key generated by REQ using a symmetric encryption algorithm. The calculation generates the KeyInfo REQ .
  • REQ calculates the hash value of IAK, namely HASH (IAK), and carries out XOR operation to the information including the temporary public key generated by REQ to generate KeyInfo REQ ; perhaps, REQ first calculates the extended identity authentication key EIAK, and then perform XOR operation on EIAK and the information including the temporary public key generated by REQ to generate KeyInfo REQ , where EIAK is REQ according to including the IAK and other information (other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and Optional, such as a specific string, etc.), calculated and generated using the key derivation algorithm.
  • the IAK used by the REQ is obtained by calculating the calculation data including the pre-shared encryption key K REQ_AS between itself and the AS-REQ by using the key derivation algorithm agreed with the AS-REQ by the REQ.
  • the calculation data when REQ calculates IAK may also include Nonce REQ and Nonce AAC .
  • the message integrity check key between REQ and AAC may be pre-shared between REQ and AAC, or may be generated through negotiation between REQ and AAC.
  • the manner in which the REQ and the AAC negotiate to generate the message integrity check key includes: the REQ can obtain the first key K1 by performing key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to the KeyInfo REQ and the temporary public key recovered by the KeyInfo AAC , and the K1 Combined with Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ and other information (other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific character string, etc.), the key derivation algorithm is used to calculate the message integrity check key.
  • the key exchange refers to a key exchange algorithm such as Diffie-Hellman (DH for short).
  • the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo REQ is the temporary private key in the temporary public-private key pair generated by REQ.
  • REQ can verify the consistency between the Nonce REQ in AACAuth and the Nonce REQ generated by REQ . If they are consistent, continue to perform subsequent operations. If they are inconsistent, discard AACAuth.
  • the calculation data used to calculate MIC REQ may also include ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , that is, REQ can use the message integrity check algorithm agreed upon by itself and AS-REQ, Use IK REQ_AS to calculate and generate MIC REQ from the calculation data including ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID and certificate random number.
  • REQ can verify ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID in AACAuth according to Nonce REQID and its own identity ID REQ ; one way is, REQ can use Nonce REQID to communicate with ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID performs XOR operation to restore ID REQ , and then compares whether the recovered ID REQ is consistent with REQ's own ID REQ .
  • REQ performs XOR operation on Nonce REQID and its own ID REQ , and compares Whether the result of the XOR operation is consistent with the ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID in AACAuth; if they are consistent, continue to perform subsequent operations; if not, discard AACAuth.
  • REQ sends a second verification message REQAuth to the AAC.
  • the REQAuth includes the MIC REQ and the MacTag REQ .
  • REQAuth can also include KeyInfo REQ .
  • AACAuth includes Nonce AAC
  • REQ can add Nonce AAC to REQAuth.
  • the AAC verifies the MacTag REQ , and after the verification is passed, an authentication completion message AACFinish and a first certificate deposit message AACUpdate are generated.
  • the verification process of MacTag REQ includes: if MacTag REQ is calculated and generated by REQ using the message integrity check key pair between it and AAC including other fields in REQAuth except MacTag REQ , then AAC shall use The message integrity check key pair between it and REQ includes other fields in REQAuth except MacTag REQ . Calculate and generate MacTag REQ . Compare the calculated MacTag REQ with the MacTag REQ in REQAuth. If they are consistent, the verification is passed. , determine that the identity of the REQ is legal, and if they are inconsistent, perform the following operations according to the local policy, including discarding REQAuth or determining that the identity of the REQ is illegal.
  • the message integrity check key between the AAC and the REQ may be pre-shared between the AAC and the REQ, or may be generated through negotiation between the AAC and the REQ.
  • the manner in which AAC and REQ negotiate to generate a message integrity check key includes: AAC can obtain the first key K1 by performing key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo AAC and the temporary public key recovered by KeyInfo REQ , and K1 Combined with Nonce AAC , Nonce REQ and other information (other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific character string, etc.), the key derivation algorithm is used to calculate the message integrity check key.
  • the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo AAC is the temporary private key in the temporary public-private key pair generated by AAC
  • the temporary public key recovered by KeyInfo REQ is the temporary public key in the temporary public-private key pair generated by REQ.
  • the AAC can also verify whether the Nonce AAC in the REQAuth is consistent with the Nonce AAC generated by itself before verifying the MacTag REQ . Discard REQAuth.
  • AAC may also assign a temporary identity identifier TID REQnew to REQ, which is used to add TID REQnew to AACFinish and AACUpdate.
  • the AAC in order to realize the identity authentication of the AAC by the REQ, the AAC also needs to generate a second message integrity check code MacTag AAC , and add the MacTag AAC to AACFinish.
  • the MacTag AAC may be calculated and generated for the AAC using the message integrity check key pair between it and the REQ, including other fields except the MacTag AAC in the authentication complete message AACFinish.
  • the AAC may also calculate a session key for ensuring the subsequent confidential communication between the REQ and the AAC.
  • AAC can obtain the first key K1 by performing key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo AAC and the temporary public key recovered by KeyInfo REQ , and combining K1 with ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , ID AAC and other information ( Other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific character string, etc.), and uses a key derivation algorithm to calculate a session key (including data encryption key and/or data integrity check key).
  • AAC calculates the session key in the above manner, it can use the key derivation algorithm to calculate a string of key data, and the key data can be used as a data encryption key and/or a data integrity check key, or, A part of the key data in the key data is used as a data encryption key, and another part of the key data is used as a data integrity check key.
  • the AAC sends an authentication completion message AACFinish to the REQ.
  • the AACFinish includes MacTag AAC . If AAC assigns a temporary identity identifier TID REQnew to REQ, AACFinish also includes TID REQnew .
  • the verification process of MacTag AAC includes: If MacTag AAC is calculated and generated by AAC using the message integrity check key pair between itself and REQ including other fields in AACFinish except MacTag AAC , REQ shall use the The message integrity check key pair between it and AAC includes other fields in AACFinish except MacTag AAC . Calculate and generate MacTag AAC . Compare the calculated MacTag AAC with the MacTag AAC in AACFinish. If they are consistent, the verification is passed. , determine that the identity of the AAC is valid. If it is inconsistent, perform the following operations according to the local policy, including discarding AACFinish or determining that the identity of the AAC is invalid.
  • the TID REQnew can also be stored, so that the TID REQnew can be used to replace its own real identity identifier in the subsequent identity authentication process.
  • the session key used to ensure subsequent confidential communication between the REQ and the AAC may also be calculated.
  • REQ can obtain the first key K1 by performing key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo REQ and the temporary public key recovered by KeyInfo AAC , and combining K1 with ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , ID AAC and other information ( Other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific character string, etc.), and the session key (including the data encryption key and/or the data integrity check key) is calculated by using the key derivation algorithm.
  • the temporary public key recovered by KeyInfo AAC is the temporary public key in the temporary public-private key pair generated by AAC.
  • REQ can use the key derivation algorithm to calculate a string of key data when calculating the session key in the above manner, and the key data can be used as a data encryption key and/or a data integrity check key, or, A part of the key data in the key data is used as a data encryption key, and another part of the key data is used as a data integrity check key.
  • the AAC sends the first certificate deposit message AACUpdate to the AS-REQ.
  • the AACUpdate includes the MIC REQ carried in REQAuth.
  • AAC can directly send AACUpdate to AS-AAC (of course, it can also be expressed as AS-REQ).
  • AAC In the case of roaming, after AAC generates AACUpdate, AAC first sends AACUpdate to AS-AAC; then AS-AAC generates a second certificate deposit message ASUpdate according to AACUpdate, ASUpdate includes MIC REQ , and sends ASUpdate to AS-REQ.
  • the AACUpdate may further include the temporary identity identifier TID REQnew allocated by the AAC for the REQ.
  • the AACUpdate may further include the second identity authentication code MIC AAC .
  • the MIC AAC is calculated and generated by AAC using the pre-shared verification key IK AAC_AS with AS-AAC and using the pre-shared message integrity verification algorithm to calculate and generate other fields before the MIC AAC in AACUpdate.
  • the AS-REQ verifies the MIC REQ , and after the verification passes, generates and stores a request passing record of the REQ.
  • AS-REQ can also save TID REQnew when generating and storing REQ request pass records.
  • AACUpdate also includes MIC AAC
  • AS-AAC (of course, it can also be expressed as AS-REQ) to verify the MIC REQ and MIC AAC , that is, AS-AAC (of course, it can also be expressed as AS-REQ)
  • AS-AAC (of course, it can also be expressed as AS-REQ)
  • AS-AAC calculates MIC AAC locally by using its pre-shared verification key IK AAC_AS with AAC
  • calculate MIC REQ locally by using its pre-shared verification key IK REQ_AS with REQ
  • combine the calculated MIC AAC with The MIC AAC in AACUpdate is compared, and the calculated MIC REQ is compared with the MIC REQ in AACUpdate. If they are consistent, the verification is passed.
  • the AS-AAC first verifies the MIC AAC , that is, the AS-AAC first uses the pre-shared verification key IK AAC_AS with the AAC to calculate the MIC AAC locally, and The calculated MIC AAC is compared with the MIC AAC in AACUpdate. If they are consistent, the verification is passed. After the verification is passed, AS-AAC regenerates ASUpdate and sends ASUpdate to AS-REQ.
  • the MIC REQ in ASUpdate is verified by AS-REQ, that is, the MIC REQ is calculated locally by AS-REQ using its pre-shared certificate verification key IK REQ_AS with REQ , and the calculated MIC REQ is compared with ASUpdate.
  • the MIC REQ is compared, and if they are consistent, the verification is passed, and the REQ request passing record can be generated and saved.
  • S108 may be performed first and then S110 may be performed, or S110 may be performed first and then S108 may be performed, or S108 and S110 may be performed simultaneously.
  • the AAC may first execute S110 to send the first certificate deposit message, and after passing the verification of the first identity authentication code MIC REQ in the first certificate deposit message in S111, generate a first certificate deposit confirmation message. , which is used to prevent REQ from intentionally sending a wrong first identity authentication code MIC REQ to evade charging. After receiving the first certificate deposit confirmation message, the AAC executes S108 to send the authentication complete message to the REQ.
  • the identity information of the requesting device is transmitted in the form of ciphertext, thereby ensuring that the requesting device is requested in the identity authentication process. Security of the device's real-identity information.
  • the authentication access controller will correspondingly send a first authentication message to the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device, so as to use the first authentication server to record the behavior of the requesting device requesting access to the network , providing objective evidence for subsequent network access point charging, effectively preventing network access points from maliciously charging users who do not attempt to access the network within their service area.
  • the following describes the identity authentication method provided by the embodiments of the present application for two situations of non-roaming and roaming.
  • AS-AAC can also be expressed as AS-REQ
  • AS-REQ can be used to represent the authentication server jointly trusted by AAC and REQ
  • the identity authentication method includes:
  • REQ generates Nonce REQ , Nonce REQID and EncPub AS , and generates Security capabilities REQ as required.
  • the REQ sends an authentication request message ATTACH to the AAC.
  • the ATTACH includes Security capabilities REQ , EncPub AS , Route AS and Nonce REQ .
  • EncPub AS is the identity information ciphertext of REQ calculated by REQ using the public key of the encryption certificate to the encrypted data including ID REQ and Nonce REQID ;
  • Route AS represents the identity of the authentication server trusted by REQ;
  • Security capabilities REQ is available
  • the optional field indicates the security capability parameter information supported by REQ, including the identity authentication suite, integrity check algorithm, hash (HASH) algorithm, key exchange algorithm and/or key derivation algorithm supported by REQ (the same below).
  • AAC generates Nonce AAC .
  • AAC judges whether the authentication server trusted by REQ is the same as the authentication server trusted by itself. If they are the same, it is determined to be a non-roaming situation.
  • REQ and AAC have shared authentication servers.
  • the AAC sends a first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AACVeri includes EncPub AS , Nonce REQ , ID AAC and Nonce AAC .
  • EncPub AS and Nonce REQ should be equal to the corresponding fields in ATTACH respectively;
  • ID AAC is an optional field.
  • AS-AAC After receiving the AACVeri, AS-AAC performs the following operations (if there is no special description or logical relationship, the following actions numbered with (1), (2)... . Full text is the same), including:
  • AS-AAC uses the pre-shared encryption key K REQ_AS between it and REQ to combine calculation data including ID REQ , Nonce REQ , ID AAC , and Nonce AAC , and calculates IAK by using the key derivation algorithm pre-agreed with REQ.
  • the AS-AAC uses the pre-shared encryption key EK AAC_AS between it and the AAC to encrypt the information including the IAK to generate EncData AS_AAC .
  • the AS-AAC sends the first authentication response message ASVeri to the AAC.
  • the ASVeri includes ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , Nonce REQ , ID AAC , Nonce AAC , Nonce AS_AAC and IAK.
  • ID AAC is an optional field, if and only if ID AAC exists in AACVeri; ID AAC and Nonce AAC should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACVeri respectively; if there is EncData AS_AAC , AS-AAC uses EncData AS_AAC to replace the field in ASVeri IAK.
  • EncData AS_AAC is included in ASVeri , then use the pre-shared encryption key EK AAC_AS between it and AS-AAC to decrypt EncData AS_AAC to obtain IAK;
  • AAC performs XOR operation on the EIAK and the information including the temporary public key generated by AAC to generate KeyInfo AAC .
  • AAC sends a first verification message AACAuth to REQ.
  • the AACAuth includes Security capabilities AAC , KeyInfo AAC , ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , Nonce REQ , ID AAC , Nonce AAC and Nonce AS_AAC .
  • ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC , and Nonce AS_AAC should be respectively equal to the corresponding fields in ASVeri.
  • Security capabilities AAC is an optional field, indicating the selection of a specific security policy made by AAC according to the Security capabilities REQ , that is, the identity authentication method, integrity check algorithm, hash (HASH) algorithm, key exchange algorithm and/or the AAC determines to be used. Or key derivation algorithm, etc. (the same below), Security capabilities AAC exists if and only if Security capabilities REQ exists in ATTACH.
  • REQ After REQ receives AACAuth, it performs the following operations, including:
  • REQ uses the pre-shared encryption key K REQ_AS with AS-AAC to combine calculation data including ID REQ , Nonce REQ , ID AAC , and Nonce AAC , and calculates IAK using the key derivation algorithm pre-agreed with AS-AAC.
  • the calculation data used by REQ to calculate IAK is the same as the calculation data used by AS-AAC to calculate IAK in S205.
  • REQ performs XOR operation on EIAK and the information including the temporary public key generated by REQ to generate KeyInfo REQ .
  • REQ performs key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo REQ and the temporary public key recovered by KeyInfo AAC to obtain the first key K1, and combines K1 with Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC and other information (other information used by REQ and AAC)
  • the information is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.), and the key derivation algorithm is used to calculate the message integrity check key.
  • REQ sends a second verification message REQAuth to the AAC.
  • the REQAuth includes Nonce AAC , KeyInfo REQ , MIC REQ and MacTag REQ .
  • Nonce AAC should be equal to Nonce AAC in AACAuth
  • MIC REQ is that REQ uses the pre-shared certificate verification key IK REQ_AS between itself and AS-AAC, and adopts the pre-shared message integrity check with AS-AAC. It is calculated by the verification algorithm on the calculation data including Nonce AS_AAC .
  • MacTag REQ is calculated by REQ using the message integrity check key pair including other fields in REQAuth except MacTag REQ .
  • the AAC After receiving the REQAuth, the AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • AAC performs key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo AAC and the temporary public key recovered by KeyInfo REQ to obtain the first key K1, and combines K1 with Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC and other information (other information used by AAC and REQ)
  • the information is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.), and the key derivation algorithm is used to calculate the message integrity check key.
  • AAC calculates the MacTag REQ locally by using the message integrity check key pair, including other fields except MacTag REQ in REQAuth (this calculation method is the same as the way REQ calculates MacTag REQ ), and compares the calculated MacTag REQ Whether it is consistent with the MacTag REQ in REQAuth. If it is consistent, the identity of the REQ is determined to be legal. If it is inconsistent, the REQAuth is discarded.
  • the AAC sends the first certificate deposit message AACUpdate to the AS-AAC.
  • the AACUpdate includes ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , ID AAC , Nonce AAC , TID REQnew , MIC REQ and MIC AAC .
  • ID AAC and MIC AAC are optional fields;
  • MIC AAC is that AAC uses the pre-shared verification key IK AAC_AS between itself and AS-AAC, and adopts the message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with AS-AAC Calculated for other fields before MIC AAC in AACUpdate.
  • AACUpdate includes ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , ID AAC , Nonce AAC , TID REQnew , MIC REQ and MIC AAC in sequence
  • the MIC AAC is the AAC using the IK AAC_AS and the message integrity check algorithm to AACUpdate
  • ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , ID AAC , Nonce AAC , TID REQnew and MIC REQ are calculated.
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the AACUpdate, the AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • AS-AAC uses the pre-shared verification key IK AAC_AS with AAC, and uses the message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with AAC to calculate MIC AAC for other fields before MIC AAC in AACUpdate, and compare the calculated Whether the MIC AAC is consistent with the MIC AAC in AACUpdate, if not, discard AACUpdate.
  • AS-AAC uses the pre-shared certificate verification key IK REQ_AS with REQ, uses the pre-shared message integrity verification algorithm to calculate the MIC REQ including Nonce AS_AAC , and compares the calculated MIC REQ Whether it is consistent with the MIC REQ in AACUpdate, if not, discard AACUpdate.
  • the AS-AAC sends the first certificate deposit confirmation message ASAck to the AAC.
  • the ASAck includes ID AAC , Nonce AAC and MIC AS_AAC .
  • ID AAC , MIC AS_AAC are optional fields;
  • MIC AS_AAC is that AS-AAC uses the pre-shared verification key IK AAC_AS between itself and AAC, and adopts the message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with AAC to verify the integrity of ASAck Calculated from other fields before MIC AS_AAC .
  • the AAC After receiving the ASAck, the AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • AAC uses the pre-shared verification key IK AAC_AS with AS-AAC, and uses the message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with AS-AAC to calculate MIC AS_AAC for other fields before MIC AS_AAC in ASAck , and compare the calculation Whether the output MIC AS_AAC is consistent with the MIC AS_AAC in ASAck.
  • AAC combines K1 calculated in S211 with ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , Nonce REQ , ID AAC , Nonce AAC and other information (other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.)
  • the key derivation algorithm calculates the session key, which is used for the subsequent secure communication of REQ and AAC.
  • the AAC sends an authentication completion message AACFinish to the REQ.
  • the AACFinish includes TID REQnew and MacTag AAC .
  • MacTag AAC is calculated locally by AAC using the message integrity check key pair including other fields in AACFinish except MacTag AAC ;
  • TID REQnew should be the same as TID REQnew in AACUpdate.
  • REQ calculates the MacTag AAC locally by using the message integrity check key pair including other fields in AACFinish except MacTag AAC (this calculation method is the same as the way AAC calculates MacTag AAC ), and compares the calculated MacTag AAC with the calculated MacTag AAC . Whether it is consistent with the MacTag AAC in AACFinish. If it is consistent, it is determined that the AAC identity is legal. If it is inconsistent, AACFinish is discarded.
  • REQ combines the K1 calculated in S209 with ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , Nonce REQ , ID AAC , Nonce AAC and other information (other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.),
  • the session key is calculated by using the key derivation algorithm, which is used for the subsequent confidential communication of REQ and AAC.
  • the identity authentication method includes:
  • REQ generates Nonce REQ , Nonce REQID and EncPub AS , and generates Security capabilities REQ as required.
  • the REQ sends an authentication request message ATTACH to the AAC.
  • the ATTACH includes Security capabilities REQ , EncPub AS , Route AS and Nonce REQ .
  • EncPub AS is the ciphertext of the identity information of REQ calculated by REQ using the public key of the encryption certificate to the encrypted data including ID REQ and Nonce REQID .
  • Route AS represents the identity of the authentication server trusted by REQ; Security capabilities REQ is an optional field.
  • AAC generates Nonce AAC .
  • AAC judges whether the authentication server trusted by REQ is the same as the authentication server trusted by itself according to the Route AS . If they are not the same, it is determined as a roaming situation.
  • the AS-REQ trusted by REQ and the AS-AAC trusted by AAC are two independent Authentication server.
  • the AAC sends the first authentication request message AACVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AACVeri includes EncPub AS , Nonce REQ , ID AAC , Nonce AAC and Route AS .
  • EncPub AS , Nonce REQ and Route AS should be respectively equal to the corresponding fields in ATTACH; ID AAC is an optional field.
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the AACVeri, the AS-AAC determines the AS-REQ according to the Rout AS , and sends the second authentication request message AS-AACVeri to the AS-REQ.
  • AS-AACVeri is generated according to AACVeri
  • AS-AACVeri includes EncPub AS , Nonce REQ , ID AAC and Nonce AAC .
  • EncPub AS , Nonce REQ , ID AAC and Nonce AAC shall be equal to the corresponding fields in AACVeri respectively.
  • AS-REQ uses the pre-shared encryption key K REQ_AS between itself and REQ to combine calculation data including ID REQ , Nonce REQ , ID AAC , and Nonce AAC , and calculates the IAK using the key derivation algorithm pre-agreed with REQ.
  • the AS-REQ uses the pre-shared encryption key EK AS between it and the AS-AAC to encrypt the information including the IAK to generate EncData AS_REQ .
  • the AS-REQ sends the second authentication response message AS-REQVeri to the AS-AAC.
  • the AS-REQVeri includes ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , ID AAC , Nonce AAC , Nonce AS_REQ and IAK. Among them, ID AAC and Nonce AAC should be respectively equal to the corresponding fields in AS-AACVeri; if there is EncData AS_REQ , AS-REQ uses EncData AS_REQ to replace IAK in AS-REQVeri.
  • the AS-AAC uses the pre-shared encryption key EK AAC_AS between it and the AAC to encrypt the information including the IAK to generate EncData AS_AAC .
  • the AS-AAC sends the first authentication response message ASVeri to the AAC.
  • the ASVeri includes ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , Nonce REQ , ID AAC , Nonce AAC , Nonce AS_REQ and IAK.
  • ID AAC is an optional field, and Nonce REQ , ID AAC and Nonce AAC should be equal to the corresponding fields in AACVeri respectively; if there is EncData AS_AAC , AS-AAC will use EncData AS_AAC to replace IAK in ASVeri.
  • EncData AS_AAC is included in ASVeri , then use the pre-shared encryption key EK AAC_AS between it and AS-AAC to decrypt EncData AS_AAC to obtain IAK;
  • AAC performs XOR operation on the EIAK and the information including the temporary public key generated by AAC to generate KeyInfo AAC .
  • AAC sends a first authentication message AACAuth to REQ.
  • the AACAuth includes Security capabilities AAC , KeyInfo AAC , ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , Nonce REQ , ID AAC , Nonce AAC and Nonce AS_REQ .
  • ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , Nonce REQ , ID AAC , Nonce AAC , Nonce AS_REQ should be equal to the corresponding fields in ASVeri respectively;
  • Security capabilities AAC is an optional field, if and only if there is Security capabilities REQ in ATTACH, Security capabilities REQ exists. capabilities AAC .
  • the REQ After receiving the AACAuth, the REQ performs the following operations, including:
  • REQ uses the pre-shared encryption key K REQ_AS with AS-REQ to combine calculation data including ID REQ , Nonce REQ , ID AAC , and Nonce AAC , and uses the key derivation algorithm pre-agreed with AS-REQ to calculate IAK.
  • the calculation data used by REQ to calculate IAK is the same as the calculation data used by AS-REQ to calculate IAK in S306.
  • REQ performs key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo REQ and the temporary public key recovered by KeyInfo AAC to obtain the first key K1, and combines K1 with Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC and other information (other information used by REQ and AAC)
  • the information is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.), and the key derivation algorithm is used to calculate the message integrity check key.
  • REQ sends a second verification message REQAuth to the AAC.
  • the REQAuth includes Nonce AAC , KeyInfo REQ , MIC REQ and MacTag REQ .
  • Nonce AAC should be equal to Nonce AAC in AACAuth
  • MIC REQ is that REQ uses the pre-shared certificate verification key IK REQ_AS between itself and AS-REQ, and adopts the message integrity check pre-shared with AS-REQ. It is calculated by the verification algorithm on the calculation data including Nonce AS_REQ .
  • MacTag REQ is calculated locally by REQ using the message integrity check key pair including other fields in REQAuth except MacTag REQ .
  • the AAC After receiving the REQAuth, the AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • AAC performs key exchange calculation according to the temporary private key corresponding to KeyInfo AAC and the temporary public key recovered by KeyInfo REQ to obtain the first key K1, and combines K1 with Nonce REQ , Nonce AAC and other information (other information used by AAC and REQ)
  • the information is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.), and the key derivation algorithm is used to calculate the message integrity check key.
  • AAC calculates the MacTag REQ locally by using the message integrity check key pair including other fields in REQAuth except MacTag REQ , and compares the calculated MacTag REQ with the MacTag REQ in REQAuth. If they are consistent, then It is determined that the identity of the REQ is valid. If it is inconsistent, REQAuth is discarded.
  • the AAC is calculated to generate the MIC AAC .
  • the AAC sends the first certificate deposit message AACUpdate to the AS-AAC.
  • the AACUpdate includes ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , ID AAC , Nonce AAC , TID REQnew , MIC REQ and MIC AAC .
  • ID AAC is an optional field;
  • ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID should be equal to the corresponding field in ASVeri;
  • MIC REQ should be equal to the corresponding field in REQAuth;
  • MIC AAC is an optional field,
  • MIC AAC is AAC using itself and AS-AAC
  • the pre-shared verification key IK AAC_AS is calculated from other fields before MIC AAC in AACUpdate using the message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with AS-AAC.
  • the AS-AAC After receiving the AACUpdate, the AS-AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • AS-AAC uses the pre-shared verification key IK AAC_AS with AAC, and uses the message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with AAC to calculate MIC AAC for other fields before MIC AAC in AACUpdate.
  • the MIC AAC is compared with the MIC AAC in AACUpdate. If they are inconsistent, the AACUpdate is discarded.
  • AS-AAC calculates to generate MIC AS_AAC .
  • S317 AS-AAC sends a second certificate deposit message ASUpdate to AS-REQ.
  • the ASUpdate includes ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , ID AAC , TID REQnew , MIC REQ and MIC AS_AAC .
  • ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , ID AAC , TID REQnew , and MIC REQ should be respectively equal to the corresponding fields in AACUpdate;
  • MIC AS_AAC is an optional field, and
  • MIC AS_AAC is AS-AAC using the pre-shared calibration between itself and AS-REQ
  • the verification key IK AS is calculated locally for other fields before MIC AS_AAC in ASUpdate.
  • AS-REQ uses the pre-shared verification key IK with AS -AAC to calculate MIC AS_AAC locally for other fields before MIC AS_AAC in ASUpdate , and compare the calculated MIC AS_AAC with the MIC AS_AAC in ASUpdate to see if they are consistent, If not, ASUpdate is discarded.
  • AS-REQ uses the pre-shared certificate verification key IK REQ_AS with REQ, uses the pre-shared message integrity verification algorithm to calculate the MIC REQ including Nonce AS_REQ , and compares the calculated MIC REQ Whether it is consistent with the MIC REQ in ASUpdate, if not, discard ASUpdate.
  • the AS-REQ sends the second certificate deposit confirmation message AS-REQAck to the AS-AAC.
  • the AS-REQAck includes ID AAC and MIC AS_REQ .
  • ID AAC should be equal to the corresponding field in ASUpdate;
  • MIC AS_REQ is an optional field, which means that AS-REQ uses the pre-shared verification key IK AS between it and AS-AAC, and adopts the pre-shared verification key IK AS between AS-REQ and AS-AAC.
  • the shared message integrity check algorithm is calculated from other fields before MIC AS_REQ in AS-REQAck.
  • S320 and AS-AAC perform the following operations after receiving AS-REQAck, including:
  • AS-AAC uses the pre-shared certificate verification key IK AS with AS-REQ, and uses the message integrity check algorithm pre-shared with AS-REQ to calculate the MIC for other fields before MIC AS_REQ in AS-REQAck to obtain MIC AS_REQ : Compare whether the calculated MIC AS_REQ is consistent with the MIC AS_REQ in AS-REQAck, if not, discard AS-REQAck.
  • the AS-AAC sends a first existence confirmation message AS-AACAck to the AAC.
  • the AS-AACAck includes ID AAC , Nonce AAC and MIC AS .
  • ID AAC MIC AS are optional fields;
  • MIC AS is that AS-AAC uses the pre-shared verification key IK AAC_AS between itself and AAC, and adopts the message integrity verification algorithm pre-shared with AAC to verify AS - Calculated from other fields before MIC AS in AACAck.
  • AAC After receiving the AS-AACAck, AAC performs the following operations, including:
  • ID AAC exists in AS-AACAck, check whether ID AAC is the same as AAC's own identity ID AAC ;
  • AAC uses the pre-shared check key IK AAC_AS with AS-AAC, and uses the message integrity check algorithm pre-shared with AS-AAC to calculate MIC AS for other fields before MIC AS in AS-AACAck, Compare whether the calculated MIC AS is consistent with the MIC AS in AS-AACAck.
  • AAC combines K1 calculated in S314 with ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , Nonce REQ , ID AAC , Nonce AAC and other information (other information used by AAC and REQ is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.)
  • the key derivation algorithm calculates the session key, which is used for the subsequent secure communication of REQ and AAC.
  • the AAC sends an authentication completion message AACFinish to the REQ.
  • the AACFinish includes TID REQnew and MacTag AAC .
  • TID REQnew should be the same as TID REQnew in AACUpdate;
  • MacTag AAC is calculated locally by AAC using the message integrity check key pair including other fields in AACFinish except MacTag AAC .
  • REQ uses the message integrity check key pair to calculate the MacTag AAC locally, including other fields except MacTag AAC in AACFinish, and compare the calculated MacTag AAC with the MacTag AAC in AACFinish. If they are consistent, then Make sure that the AAC identity is valid. If it is inconsistent, discard AACFinish.
  • REQ combines the K1 calculated in S312 with ID REQ ⁇ Nonce REQID , Nonce REQ , ID AAC , Nonce AAC and other information (other information used by REQ and AAC is the same and optional, such as a specific string, etc.),
  • the session key is calculated by using the key derivation algorithm, which is used for the subsequent confidential communication of REQ and AAC.
  • the identity authentication of REQ and AAC are respectively realized at S314 and S324, that is, the bidirectional identity authentication of REQ and AAC is realized.
  • each message may also carry a hash value HASH X_Y , and the hash value HASH X_Y is calculated by the sender entity X of the message using the hash algorithm on the latest pre-order message sent by the peer entity Y received. obtained, which is used by the peer entity Y to verify whether the entity X has received the complete latest pre-order message.
  • HASH REQ_AAC represents the hash value calculated by REQ on the latest pre-order message sent by AAC received
  • HASH AAC_REQ represents the hash value calculated by AAC on the latest pre-order message sent by REQ received
  • HASH AAC_AS-AAC represents the hash value calculated by AAC on the received Hash value calculated by the latest pre-order message sent by the received AS-AAC
  • HASH AS-AAC_AAC represents the hash value calculated by AS-AAC for the latest pre-order message sent by the received AAC
  • HASH AS-AAC_AS-REQ represents the AS-AAC Hash value calculated for the latest pre-order message sent by AS-REQ received
  • HASH AS-REQ_AS-AAC indicates the hash value calculated by AS-REQ for the latest pre-order message sent by AS-AAC received.
  • HASH X_Y may not exist in the message or meaningless.
  • entity Y uses the hash algorithm to calculate the hash value locally for the latest pre-order message previously sent to entity X, and compares it with the hash value HASH X_Y carried in the received message. Then execute the following steps, otherwise discard or end the current authentication process.
  • the pre-order message sent by peer entity Y to entity X refers to the received message M sent by peer entity Y to entity X before entity X sends message M to peer entity Y.
  • the latest pre-order message sent by peer entity Y to entity X refers to the latest message sent by peer entity Y to entity X before entity X sends message M to peer entity Y. If the message M sent by entity X to its peer entity Y is the first message exchanged between entity X and entity Y, then there is no peer entity Y to the entity before entity X sends message M to its peer entity Y The preorder message sent by X.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides an authentication access controller, where the authentication access controller includes:
  • the receiving unit 401 is configured to receive an authentication request message sent by a requesting device, where the authentication request message includes the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device;
  • the public key is obtained by encrypting the encrypted data including the identity of the requesting device;
  • a sending unit 402 configured to send a first authentication request message carrying the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device to a second authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller;
  • the receiving unit 401 is further configured to receive a first authentication response message sent by the second authentication server, and obtain a certificate random generated by the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device from the first authentication response message. number and the identity authentication key generated by the first authentication server; the identity authentication key is calculated according to the calculation data including the pre-shared encryption key of the first authentication server and the requesting device;
  • the sending unit 402 is further configured to send a first verification message to the requesting device, where the first verification message includes the certificate storage random number;
  • the receiving unit 401 is further configured to receive a second verification message sent by the requesting device, where the second verification message includes a first identity verification code and a first message integrity check code; the first message integrity
  • the check code is that the requesting device uses the message integrity check key pair between it and the authentication access controller to include the second verification message except the first message integrity check code.
  • Other fields are calculated and generated; wherein, the message integrity check key is calculated according to the information including the identity authentication key;
  • the processing unit 403 is configured to verify the integrity check code of the first message, and after the verification is passed, determine that the identity of the requesting device is legal, and generate an authentication completion message and a first certificate deposit message;
  • the sending unit 402 is further configured to send the authentication completion message to the requesting device, and send the first certificate deposit message to the second authentication server.
  • the sending unit 402 is further configured to:
  • the first certificate deposit message is sent, and after the first certificate deposit confirmation message is received through the receiving unit 401, the authentication complete message is sent to the requesting device.
  • the first verification message further includes the first key exchange parameter generated by the authentication access controller according to the identity authentication key
  • the second verification message also includes the requesting device according to the The second key exchange parameter generated by the identity authentication key
  • the processing unit 403 is also used for:
  • the message integrity check key is calculated using the key derivation algorithm from the information in the message.
  • the second key exchange parameter in the second verification message received by the receiving unit 401 is that the requesting device uses the identity authentication key and uses a symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt the data including the temporary public key generated by the requesting device.
  • the information inside is encrypted and generated;
  • the processing unit 403 is further configured to: use the identity authentication key to encrypt the information including the temporary public key generated by the authentication access controller with a symmetric encryption algorithm to generate the first key exchange parameter;
  • the processing unit 403 calculates the message integrity check key by performing a key according to the temporary private key corresponding to the first key exchange parameter and the temporary public key recovered from the second key exchange parameter.
  • the first key is generated by exchange calculation, and the message integrity check key is calculated by using the key derivation algorithm according to the information including the first key.
  • processing unit 403 is specifically configured to:
  • a hash value of the identity authentication key is calculated, and an exclusive OR operation is performed on the hash value and information including the temporary public key generated by the authentication access controller to generate the first key exchange parameter.
  • the authentication request message received by the receiving unit 401 also includes the first random number generated by the requesting device;
  • the first authentication request message sent by the sending unit 402 also includes the first random number and the authentication request. access the second random number generated by the controller;
  • the first authentication response message received by the receiving unit 401 also includes the first random number and the second random number;
  • the first authentication message sent by the sending unit 402 also includes the first random number and the second random number.
  • the calculation data of the identity authentication key further includes the first random number and the second random number;
  • the second verification message received by the receiving unit 401 also includes the second random number;
  • the processing unit 403 is further configured to: verify the second random number in the first authentication response message and the second random number generated by the authentication access controller. Consistency of random numbers; and,
  • the processing unit 403 is further configured to: verify the consistency between the second random number in the second verification message and the second random number generated by the authentication access controller authenticating.
  • the authentication request message received by the receiving unit 401 further includes the security capability parameter information supported by the requesting device, and the processing unit 403 is further configured to:
  • the specific security policy used by the authentication access controller is determined according to the security capability parameter information, and the first verification message further includes the specific security policy.
  • the authentication request message received by the receiving unit 401 further includes the identity identifier of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device, and the processing unit 403 is further configured to:
  • the second authentication server is determined according to the identity of at least one authentication server trusted by the requesting device and the identity of the authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller in the authentication request message.
  • the processing unit 403 is further configured to:
  • the authentication completion message and the first certificate deposit message sent by the sending unit 402 further include the temporary identity of the requesting device.
  • the receiving unit 401 specifically obtains the identity authentication key in the following manner:
  • the pre-shared encryption key with the second authentication server uses the pre-shared encryption key with the second authentication server to decrypt the identity authentication key ciphertext to obtain the identity authentication key;
  • the information including the identity authentication key is encrypted and generated by the pre-shared encryption key of the ingress controller.
  • the first authentication request message sent by the sending unit 402 further includes the identity of the authentication access controller; the first authentication response message received by the receiving unit 401 also includes the authentication access controller. identity;
  • the processing unit 403 is further configured to: verify the identity of the authentication access controller and the authentication access controller in the first authentication response message Consistency of the identity of the controller itself.
  • the first authentication response message received by the receiving unit 401 further includes the ciphertext of the identity identifier of the requesting device, and the first authentication message sent by the sending unit 402 also includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller. ;
  • the processing unit 403 is further configured to: when it is determined that the identity of the requesting device is legal, according to the ciphertext including the first key, the identity of the requesting device and the identity of the authentication access controller.
  • the information in the calculation generates a session key for subsequent secure communications.
  • the first message integrity check code in the second verification message received by the receiving unit 401 is that the requesting device uses the message integrity check key pair to include the second verification message except the The other fields except the first message integrity check code are calculated and generated.
  • the message sent by the authentication access controller to the requesting device further includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller on the received latest pre-order message sent by the requesting device; the authentication The message sent by the access controller to the second authentication server further includes a hash value calculated by the authentication access controller on the received latest pre-order message sent by the second authentication server.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a requesting device, where the requesting device includes:
  • the sending unit 501 is configured to send an authentication request message to the authentication access controller, where the authentication request message includes the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device; the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device is the encrypted The public key of the certificate is obtained by encrypting the encrypted data including the identity of the requesting device;
  • a receiving unit 502 configured to receive a first verification message sent by the authentication access controller, where the first verification message includes a certificate-storing random number;
  • a processing unit 503 configured to use the pre-shared certificate verification key of the requesting device and its trusted first authentication server to calculate and generate a first identity authentication code for information including the certificate random number; and, Using the message integrity check key between the requesting device and the authentication access controller to calculate and generate the first message integrity including other fields in the second verification message except the first message integrity check code Check code; wherein, the message integrity check key is calculated according to the information including the identity authentication key, and the identity authentication key is calculated according to the information including the request device and the first authentication server Calculated from the calculation data including the pre-shared encryption key;
  • the sending unit 501 is further configured to send the second verification message to the authentication access controller, where the second verification message includes the first identity verification code and the first message integrity check code ;
  • the receiving unit 502 is further configured to receive the authentication complete message sent by the authentication access controller;
  • the processing unit 503 is further configured to verify the second message integrity check code in the authentication complete message, and after the verification is passed, determine that the identity of the authentication access controller is legal; the second message integrity The check code is calculated and generated by the authentication access controller using the message integrity check key to include other fields in the authentication complete message except the second message integrity check code.
  • the first verification message further includes the first key exchange parameter generated by the authentication access controller according to the identity authentication key;
  • the second verification message also includes the requesting device according to the The second key exchange parameter generated by the identity authentication key, the processing unit 503 is also used for:
  • the message integrity check key is calculated using the key derivation algorithm from the information in the message.
  • the first key handover parameter in the first verification message received by the receiving unit 502 is that the authentication access controller uses the identity authentication key, and adopts a symmetric encryption algorithm to perform a pair of keys including the authentication access controller.
  • the information including the temporary public key generated by the server is encrypted and generated;
  • the processing unit 503 is further configured to: use the identity authentication key to encrypt the information including the temporary public key generated by the requesting device by using a symmetric encryption algorithm to generate the second key exchange parameter;
  • the processing unit 503 calculates the message integrity check key by performing a key according to the temporary private key corresponding to the second key exchange parameter and the temporary public key recovered from the first key exchange parameter.
  • the first key is generated by exchange calculation, and the message integrity check key is calculated by using the key derivation algorithm according to the information including the first key.
  • the processing unit 503 is specifically configured to: calculate the hash value of the identity authentication key, and perform an XOR operation on the hash value and the information including the temporary public key generated by the requesting device to generate the first number. Two key exchange parameters.
  • the authentication request message sent by the sending unit 501 further includes the first random number generated by the requesting device; the first verification message received by the receiving unit 502 also includes the first random number and the authentication access.
  • the processing unit 503 is further configured to: verify the first random number in the first verification message and the first random number generated by the requesting device consistency.
  • the encrypted data of the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device further includes an identity encryption key generated by the requesting device;
  • the first verification message received by the receiving unit 502 also includes the identity ciphertext of the requesting device;
  • the identity ciphertext of the requesting device is obtained by the first authentication server by decrypting the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device.
  • the identity encryption key is obtained by encrypting the identity of the requesting device;
  • the processing unit 503 is further configured to: encrypt the first verification message according to its own identity and the identity encryption key. Request the device's identity ciphertext for verification.
  • the authentication complete message received by the receiving unit 502 further includes a temporary identity identifier allocated by the authentication access controller to the requesting device;
  • processing unit 503 is further configured to: save the temporary identity of the requesting device when it is determined that the identity of the authentication access controller is legal.
  • the first verification message received by the receiving unit 502 further includes the identity identifier of the authentication access controller, and the processing unit 503 is further configured to:
  • the identity of the authentication access controller When it is determined that the identity of the authentication access controller is valid, calculating and generating according to the information including the first key, the ciphertext of the identity identifier of the requesting device and the identity identifier of the authentication access controller Session key for subsequent secure communications.
  • processing unit 503 is further configured to:
  • the second message integrity check code in the authentication complete message received by the receiving unit 502 is that the authentication access controller uses the message integrity check key pair to include the authentication complete message in addition to the second message. Fields other than the integrity check code are calculated and generated.
  • the message sent by the requesting device to the authentication access controller further includes a hash value calculated by the requesting device on the received latest pre-order message sent by the authentication access controller.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a first authentication server, where the first authentication server is an authentication server trusted by the requesting device, including:
  • the processing unit 601 is configured to decrypt the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device by using the private key corresponding to the encryption certificate to obtain the identity of the requesting device, determine the legitimacy of the requesting device according to the identity of the requesting device, and determine the validity of the requesting device after determining the ciphertext of the requesting device.
  • a certificate random number and an identity authentication key are generated; the identity authentication key is calculated according to the calculation data including the pre-shared encryption key of the first authentication server and the requesting device;
  • the processing unit 601 is further configured to verify the first identity authentication code in the first certificate deposit message, and after the verification is passed, generate and store a request passing record of the requesting device.
  • the processing unit 601 is further configured to generate a first certificate deposit confirmation message after passing the verification of the first identity authentication code in the first certificate deposit message.
  • the processing unit 601 is further configured to: when generating and storing the request passing record of the requesting device, save the temporary identity identifier allocated by the authentication access controller to the requesting device.
  • the first authentication server when the first authentication server is different from the second authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, the first authentication server further includes:
  • a receiving unit configured to receive a second authentication request message sent by the second authentication server; the second authentication request message includes the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device;
  • a sending unit configured to send a second authentication response message to the second authentication server, where the second authentication response message includes the identity authentication key and the certificate storage random number;
  • the receiving unit is further configured to receive a second certificate deposit message sent by the second authentication server, where the second certificate deposit message includes the first identity authentication code;
  • the processing unit 601 is specifically configured to verify the first identity authentication code in the second certificate deposit message.
  • the processing unit 601 is further configured to generate a second certificate deposit confirmation message after passing the verification of the first identity authentication code in the second certificate deposit message;
  • the second authentication server sends the second certificate confirmation message.
  • the message sent by the first authentication server to the second authentication server further includes a hash value calculated by the first authentication server on the received latest pre-order message sent by the second authentication server.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a second authentication server, where the second authentication server is an authentication server trusted by the authentication access controller, including:
  • a receiving unit 701 configured to receive a first authentication request message that is sent by the authentication access controller and carries the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device;
  • the sending unit 702 is configured to send a first authentication response message to the authentication access controller, where the first authentication response message includes the certificate random number generated by the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device and the The identity authentication key generated by the first authentication server;
  • the receiving unit 701 is further configured to receive a first certificate deposit message sent by the authentication access controller, where the first certificate deposit message includes a first identity authentication code.
  • the first certificate deposit message received by the receiving unit 701 further includes a second identity authentication code
  • the second identity authentication code is used by the authentication access controller to communicate with the second authentication server.
  • the pre-shared verification key is calculated and generated by other fields before the second identity authentication code in the first certificate deposit message; then the second authentication server further includes:
  • a verification unit configured to verify the correctness of the second identity authentication code by using the pre-shared verification key with the authentication access controller.
  • the second authentication server when the second authentication server is different from the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device, the second authentication server further includes:
  • a processing unit configured to generate a second authentication request message according to the first authentication request message, where the second authentication request message includes the ciphertext of the identity information of the requesting device;
  • the sending unit 702 is further configured to send the second authentication request message to the first authentication server;
  • the receiving unit 701 is further configured to receive a second authentication response message sent by the first authentication server, where the second authentication response message includes the identity authentication key and the certificate storage random number;
  • the processing unit is further configured to generate the first authentication response message according to the second authentication response message;
  • the processing unit is further configured to generate a second certificate deposit message according to the first certificate deposit message, where the second certificate deposit message includes the first identity authentication code;
  • the sending unit 702 is further configured to send the second certificate deposit message to the first authentication server.
  • the receiving unit 701 is further configured to receive a second certificate confirmation message generated by the first authentication server;
  • the processing unit is further configured to generate a first certificate deposit confirmation message after the receiving unit 701 receives the second certificate deposit confirmation message; the sending unit 702 is further configured to send the first certificate deposit confirmation message to the authentication access controller. Confirmation message.
  • the message sent by the second authentication server to the authentication access controller further includes a hash value calculated by the second authentication server on the received latest pre-order message sent by the authentication access controller.
  • the message sent by the second authentication server to the first authentication server further includes a hash value calculated by the second authentication server on the received latest pre-order message sent by the first authentication server.
  • the identity information of the requesting device is transmitted in the form of ciphertext, thereby ensuring the security of the real identity information of the requesting device during the identity authentication process. sex.
  • the authentication access controller will correspondingly send a first authentication message to the first authentication server trusted by the requesting device, so as to use the first authentication server to record the behavior of the requesting device requesting access to the network , which provides objective evidence for subsequent network access point charging, and effectively prevents network access points from maliciously charging users who do not attempt to access the network within its service area.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides an authentication access controller AAC, including:
  • the processor 802 is configured to call the program instructions stored in the memory 801, and execute the steps performed by the AAC in the foregoing embodiment according to the obtained program.
  • the authentication access controller may implement the corresponding processes implemented by the AAC in the various methods in the embodiments of the present application, which will not be repeated here for brevity.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a requesting device REQ, including:
  • the processor 902 is configured to call the program instructions stored in the memory 901, and execute the steps of REQ execution in the foregoing embodiment according to the obtained program.
  • the requesting device may implement the corresponding processes implemented by REQ in each method of the embodiments of the present application, which will not be repeated here for brevity.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a first authentication server AS-REQ, including:
  • the processor 1002 is configured to call the program instructions stored in the memory 1001, and execute the steps performed by the AS-REQ in the above embodiment according to the obtained program.
  • the first authentication server may implement the corresponding processes implemented by the AS-REQ in each method in the embodiments of the present application, which will not be repeated here for brevity.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a second authentication server AS-AAC, including:
  • the processor 1102 is configured to call the program instructions stored in the memory 1101, and execute the steps performed by the AS-AAC in the foregoing embodiment according to the obtained program.
  • the second authentication server may implement the corresponding processes implemented by the AS-AAC in each method in the embodiments of the present application, and for brevity, details are not described herein again.
  • the aforementioned program may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when the program is executed, the execution includes the above The steps of the method embodiment; and the aforementioned storage medium may be at least one of the following media: read-only memory (English: Read-Only Memory, abbreviation: ROM), RAM, magnetic disk or optical disk and other various programs that can store programs medium of code.
  • ROM Read-Only Memory
  • each embodiment in this specification is described in a progressive manner, and the same and similar parts between the various embodiments can be referred to each other, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments. place.
  • the description is relatively simple, and reference may be made to some descriptions of the method embodiments for related parts.
  • the device and system embodiments described above are only schematic, wherein the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in One place can also be distributed to multiple network elements. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution in this embodiment. Those of ordinary skill in the art can understand and implement it without creative effort.

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Abstract

本申请实施例公开了一种身份鉴别方法和装置，在本申请实施例中：请求设备和鉴别接入控制器采用对称密钥的实体鉴别协议进行双向身份鉴别时，在传输消息的过程中以密文的形式传输请求设备的身份信息，由此保证身份鉴别过程中请求设备的真实身份信息的安全性。另外，鉴别接入控制器在验证请求设备的身份合法后，会相应地向请求设备信任的第一鉴别服务器发送第一存证消息，以利用该第一鉴别服务器记录请求设备请求访问网络的行为，为后续网络接入点计费提供客观证据，有效地防止网络接入点对没有在其服务区内尝试访问网络的用户恶意计费。

Description

一种身份鉴别方法和装置
相关申请的交叉引用
本申请要求在2020年12月26日提交中国专利局、申请号为202011569190.0、申请名称为“一种身份鉴别方法和装置”的中国专利申请的优先权，其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本申请涉及网络通信安全技术领域，特别是涉及一种身份鉴别方法和装置。
背景技术
目前，通信网络通常要求在用户和网络接入点之间执行双向身份鉴别，确保合法用户能够与合法网络通信。但在已有的实体鉴别方案中，通常不能保护用户的隐私信息，且会存在网络接入点恶意计费，给用户造成异常收费的问题。
发明内容
为了解决上述技术问题，本申请提供了一种身份鉴别方法和装置，采用对称密钥的实体鉴别协议，在保障实体身份和相关信息机密性的同时，实现了请求设备和鉴别接入控制器之间的双向身份鉴别，确保合法用户访问合法网络；并且可以防止网络接入点对没有在其服务区内尝试访问网络的用户恶意计费。同时，选择采用密钥交换计算并通过巧妙的细节及过程设计，增强了协议的抗量子计算攻击或者抗字典暴力破解攻击的能力。
本申请实施例公开了如下技术方案：
第一方面，本申请实施例提供了一种身份鉴别方法，包括：
请求设备向鉴别接入控制器发送鉴别请求消息，所述鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；所述请求设备的身份信息密文是所述请求设备利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的身份标识在内的加密数据加密得到的；
所述鉴别接入控制器向其信任的第二鉴别服务器发送携带有所述请求设备的身份信息密文的第一鉴权请求消息，接收所述第二鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴权响应消息，从所述第一鉴权响应消息中获得所述请求设备信任的第一鉴别服务器产生的存证随机数和所述第一鉴别服务器生成的身份鉴别密钥，其中，所述存证随机数和所述身份鉴别密钥是所述第一鉴别服务器在解密所述请求设备的身份信息密文并根据解密得到的所述请求设备的身份标识确定所述请求设备的身份合法后产生的；所述身份鉴别密钥是根据包括所述第一鉴别服务器与所述请求设备的预共享加密密钥在内的计算数据计算得到的；
所述请求设备接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的第一验证消息，向所述鉴别接入控制器发送第二验证消息，所述第一验证消息中包括所述存证随机数，所述第二验证消息中包括第一身份鉴权码和第一消息完整性校验码；所述第一身份鉴权码是所述请求设备利用其与所述第一鉴别服务器的预共享存证校验密钥对包括所述存证随机数在内的信息计算生成的；所述第一消息完整性校验码是所述请求设备利用其与所述鉴别接入控制器之间的消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述第二验证消息中除所述第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；其中，所述消息完整性校验密钥是根据包括所述身份鉴别密钥在内的信息计算得到的；
所述鉴别接入控制器对所述第一消息完整性校验码进行验证，验证通过后，确定所述请求设备的身份为合法，生成鉴别完成消息和第一存证消息；
所述请求设备对所述鉴别完成消息中的第二消息完整性校验码进行验证，验证通过后，确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份为合法；所述第二消息完整性校验码是所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别完成消息中除所述第二消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；
所述第一鉴别服务器对所述第一存证消息中的所述第一身份鉴权码进行验证，验证通过后，生成并存储所述请求设备的请求通过记录。
第二方面，本申请实施例提供了一种鉴别接入控制器，包括：
接收单元，用于接收请求设备发送的鉴别请求消息，所述鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；所述请求设备的身份信息密文是所述请求设备利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的身份标识在内的加密数据加密得到的；
发送单元，用于向所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第二鉴别服务器发送携带有所述请求设备的身份信息密文的第一鉴权请求消息；
所述接收单元，还用于接收所述第二鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴权响应消息，并从所述第一鉴权响应消息中获得所述请求设备信任的第一鉴别服务器产生的存证随机数和所述第一鉴别服务器生成的身份鉴别密钥；其中，所述存证随机数和所述身份鉴别密钥是所述第一鉴别服务器在解密所述请求设备的身份信息密文并根据解密得到的所述请求设备的身份标识确定所述请求设备的身份合法后产生的；所述身份鉴别密钥是根据包括所述第一鉴别服务器与所述请求设备的预共享加密密钥在内的计算数据计算得到的；
所述发送单元，还用于向所述请求设备发送第一验证消息，所述第一验证消息中包括所述存证随机数；
所述接收单元，还用于接收所述请求设备发送的第二验证消息，所述第二验证消息中包括第一身份鉴权码和第一消息完整性校验码；所述第一身份鉴权码是所述请求设备利用其与所述第一鉴别服务器的预共享存证校验密钥对包括所述存证随机数在内的信息计算生成的；所述第一消息完整性校验码是所述请求设备利用其与所述鉴别接入控制器之间的消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述第二验证消息中除所述第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；其中，所述消息完整性校验密钥是根据包括所述身份鉴别密钥在内的信息计算生成的；
处理单元，用于对所述第一消息完整性校验码进行验证，验证通过后，确定所述请求设备的身份为合法，生成鉴别完成消息和第一存证消息；
所述发送单元，还用于向所述请求设备发送所述鉴别完成消息，以及向所述第二鉴别服务器发送所述第一存证消息。
第三方面，本申请实施例提供了一种请求设备，包括：
发送单元，用于向鉴别接入控制器发送鉴别请求消息，所述鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；所述请求设备的身份信息密文是所述请求设备利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的身份标识在内的加密数据加密得到的；
接收单元，用于接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的第一验证消息，所述第一验证消息中包括存证随机数；
处理单元，用于利用所述请求设备与其信任的第一鉴别服务器的预共享存证校验密钥对包括所述存证随机数在内的信息计算生成第一身份鉴权码；以及，利用所述请求设备与所述鉴别接入控制器之间的消息完整性校验密钥对包括第二验证消息中除第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成第一消息完整性校验码；其中，所述消息完整性校验密钥是根据包括身份鉴别密钥在内的信息计算得到的，所述身份鉴别密钥是根据包括所述请求设备与所述第一鉴别服务器的预共享加密密钥在内的计算数据计算得到的；
所述发送单元，还用于向所述鉴别接入控制器发送所述第二验证消息，所述第二验证消息中包括所述第一身份鉴权码和所述第一消息完整性校验码；
所述接收单元，还用于接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的鉴别完成消息；
所述处理单元，还用于对所述鉴别完成消息中的第二消息完整性校验码进行验证，验证通过后，确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份为合法；所述第二消息完整性校验码是所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别完成消息中除所述第二消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的。
第四方面，本申请实施例提供了一种第一鉴别服务器，所述第一鉴别服务器为请求设备信任的鉴别服务器，包括：
处理单元，用于利用加密证书对应的私钥解密请求设备的身份信息密文得到请求设备的身份标识，根据请求设备的身份标识确定所述请求设备的合法性，在确定所述请求设备的身份合法后，产生存证随机数和身份鉴别密钥，所述身份鉴别密钥是根据包括所述第一鉴别服务器与所述请求设备的预共享加密密钥在内的计算数据计算得到的；
所述处理单元还用于对第一存证消息中的第一身份鉴权码进行验证，验证通过后，生成并存储所述请求设备的请求通过记录。
第五方面，本申请实施例提供了一种第二鉴别服务器，所述第二鉴别服务器为鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器，包括：
接收单元，用于接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的携带有请求设备的身份信息密文的第一鉴权请求消息；
发送单元，用于向所述鉴别接入控制器发送第一鉴权响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息中包括所述请求设备信任的第一鉴别服务器产生的存证随机数和所述第一鉴别服务器生成的身份鉴别密钥；
所述接收单元还用于接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的第一存证消息，所述第一存证消息中包括第一 身份鉴权码。
第六方面，本申请实施例提供了一种鉴别接入控制器，包括：
存储器，用于存储程序指令；
处理器，用于调用所述存储器中存储的程序指令，按照获得的程序执行上述第一方面中鉴别接入控制器侧的方法。
第七方面，本申请实施例提供了一种请求设备，包括：
存储器，用于存储程序指令；
处理器，用于调用所述存储器中存储的程序指令，按照获得的程序执行上述第一方面中请求设备侧的方法。
第八方面，本申请实施例提供了一种第一鉴别服务器，包括：
存储器，用于存储程序指令；
处理器，用于调用所述存储器中存储的程序指令，按照获得的程序执行上述第一方面中第一鉴别服务器侧的方法。
第九方面，本申请实施例提供了一种第二鉴别服务器，包括：
存储器，用于存储程序指令；
处理器，用于调用所述存储器中存储的程序指令，按照获得的程序执行上述第一方面中第二鉴别服务器侧的方法。
第十方面，本申请实施例提供了一种计算机存储介质，所述计算机存储介质存储有计算机可执行指令，所述计算机可执行指令用于使所述计算机执行上述第一方面所述的方法。
由上述技术方案可以看出，请求设备和鉴别接入控制器采用对称密钥的实体鉴别协议进行双向身份鉴别时，在传输消息的过程中以密文的形式传输请求设备的身份信息，由此保证身份鉴别过程中请求设备的真实身份信息的安全性。另外，鉴别接入控制器在验证请求设备的身份合法后，会相应地向请求设备信任的第一鉴别服务器发送第一存证消息，以利用该第一鉴别服务器记录请求设备请求访问网络的行为，为后续网络接入点计费提供客观证据，有效地防止网络接入点对没有在其服务区内尝试访问网络的用户恶意计费。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本申请实施例或现有技术中的技术方案，下面将对实施例或现有技术描述中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍，显而易见地，下面描述中的附图仅是本申请的一些实施例，对于本领域普通技术人员来讲，在不付出创造性劳动性的前提下，还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图1为本申请实施例提供的一种身份鉴别方法的示意图；
图2为本申请实施例提供的非漫游情况下一种身份鉴别方法的示意图，其中“*”表示可选的字段或可选的操作；
图3为本申请实施例提供的漫游情况下一种身份鉴别方法的示意图，其中“*”表示可选的字段或可选的操作；
图4为本申请实施例提供的一种鉴别接入控制器AAC的结构框图；
图5为本申请实施例提供的一种请求设备REQ的结构框图；
图6为本申请实施例提供的一种第一鉴别服务器AS-REQ的结构框图；
图7为本申请实施例提供的一种第二鉴别服务器AS-AAC的结构框图；
图8为本申请实施例提供的另一种鉴别接入控制器AAC的结构框图；
图9为本申请实施例提供的另一种请求设备REQ的结构框图；
图10为本申请实施例提供的另一种第一鉴别服务器AS-REQ的结构框图；
图11为本申请实施例提供的另一种第二鉴别服务器AS-AAC的结构框图。
具体实施方式
在通信网络中，请求设备可以通过鉴别接入控制器访问网络，为了确保访问网络的请求设备为合法设备，以及用户所请求访问的网络为合法网络，鉴别接入控制器和请求设备之间通常需要进行双向的身份鉴别。
例如，在请求设备通过鉴别接入控制器接入无线网络的场景下，请求设备可以为手机、个人数字助理(Personal Digital Assistant，简称PDA)、平板电脑等终端设备，鉴别接入控制器可以是无线接入点。在请求设备通过鉴别接入控制器接入有线网络的场景下，请求设备可以为台式机、笔记本电脑等终端设备，鉴别接入控制器可以是交换机或路由器等。在请求设备通过鉴别接入控制器接入第四/五代移动通 信技术(The 4th/5th Generation mobile communication technology，简称4G/5G)网络的场景下，请求设备可以为手机，鉴别接入控制器可以为基站。当然，本申请同样适用于其他有线网络、近距离通信网络等各种数据通信场景。
在请求设备进行身份鉴别的过程中，请求设备需要提供自身真实的身份信息，以便鉴别接入控制器对请求设备进行身份鉴别，例如该身份信息可以为请求设备的身份标识，身份标识中可能携带了身份证号、家庭住址、银行卡信息、地理位置等私密、敏感信息，若在身份鉴别过程中被攻击者截获用于非法用途，会对鉴别接入控制器、请求设备甚至网络造成极大的安全隐患。
为了解决上述技术问题，本申请实施例提供了一种身份鉴别方法，在该方法中，请求设备向鉴别接入控制器发送鉴别请求消息，鉴别请求消息中包括请求设备的身份信息密文，身份信息密文是请求设备利用加密证书的公钥对包括请求设备的身份标识在内的加密数据加密得到的；鉴别接入控制器向其信任的第二鉴别服务器发送携带有请求设备的身份信息密文的第一鉴权请求消息，并接收第二鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴权响应消息，从第一鉴权响应消息中获得请求设备信任的第一鉴别服务器在确定请求设备的身份合法后产生的存证随机数和第一鉴别服务器生成的身份鉴别密钥，身份鉴别密钥是根据包括第一鉴别服务器与请求设备的预共享加密密钥在内的计算数据计算得到的；请求设备接收鉴别接入控制器发送的第一验证消息，第一验证消息中包括存证随机数，并向鉴别接入控制器发送第二验证消息，第二验证消息中包括第一身份鉴权码和第一消息完整性校验码，第一身份鉴权码是请求设备利用其与第一鉴别服务器的预共享存证校验密钥对包括存证随机数在内的信息计算生成的，第一消息完整性校验码是请求设备利用其与鉴别接入控制器之间的消息完整性校验密钥对包括第二验证消息中除所述第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；鉴别接入控制器验证第一消息完整性校验码，验证通过后，确定请求设备的身份合法，生成鉴别完成消息和第一存证消息；请求设备验证鉴别完成消息中的第二消息完整性校验码，验证通过后，确定鉴别接入控制器的身份为合法，第二消息完整性校验码是鉴别接入控制器利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括鉴别完成消息中除所述第二消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；第一鉴别服务器验证第一存证消息中的第一身份鉴权码，验证通过后，生成并存储请求设备的请求通过记录。
由此可见，请求设备和鉴别接入控制器采用对称密钥的实体鉴别协议进行双向身份鉴别时，以密文的形式传输请求设备的身份信息，由此保证身份鉴别过程中请求设备的真实身份信息的安全性。另外，鉴别接入控制器在验证请求设备的身份合法后，会相应地向请求设备信任的第一鉴别服务器发送包括请求设备生成的第一身份鉴权码的第一存证消息，以便第一鉴别服务器根据所述第一身份鉴权码生成并存储请求设备的请求访问网络的记录，为后续网络接入点计费提供客观证据，有效地防止网络接入点对没有在其服务区内尝试访问网络的用户恶意计费。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例提供的身份鉴别方法用于实现鉴别接入控制器与请求设备的双向身份鉴别(Mutual Identity Authentication，简称MIA)。
为便于介绍，在本申请实施例中，将以请求设备(REQuester，简称REQ)、鉴别接入控制器(Authentication Access Controller，简称AAC)和鉴别服务器(Authentication Server，简称AS)为例对一种身份鉴别方法进行介绍。
其中，REQ信任的AS称为第一鉴别服务器AS-REQ，AAC信任的AS称为第二鉴别服务器AS-AAC。REQ可以为参与身份鉴别过程的一个端点，与AAC建立连接，访问AAC提供的服务，且通过AAC访问AS。AAC可以为参与身份鉴别过程的另一个端点，与REQ建立连接，提供服务，且可直接访问AS-AAC；AS-AAC可直接访问AS-REQ。当REQ与AAC信任的AS相同时，AS-AAC与AS-REQ可以为同一AS；当REQ与AAC信任的AS不同时，AS-AAC与AS-REQ为不同的AS，此时发生了漫游。
在采用对称密钥的实体鉴别协议实现REQ与AAC之间的双向身份鉴别之前，REQ和AS-REQ之间具有预共享存证校验密钥K REQ_AS，K REQ_AS为REQ和AS-REQ预置或分发的相同的静态密钥，REQ和AAC均具有能够标识自身身份的ID。证书解密服务器(Certificate Sever-Decrypt，简称CS-DEC)持有符合ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU X.509、其他标准或其他技术体系规定的加密证书和加密证书对应的私钥，CS-DEC可以是独立的服务器，也可以驻留在AS-REQ中；且REQ知晓该加密证书或加密证书中的公钥。
下面对图1示出的一种身份鉴别方法进行介绍，该方法包括：
S101、REQ向AAC发送鉴别请求消息ATTACH。
该ATTACH中包括REQ的身份信息密文EncPub AS。EncPub AS是REQ利用加密证书的公钥对包括自身的身份标识ID REQ在内的加密数据加密得到的。如此，在传输消息的过程中，防止非法分子获取REQ的真实身份标识，保证REQ的真实身份标识的安全性。本申请中，将被加密的对象称为加密数据。
可选的，REQ计算EncPub AS的加密数据中还可以包括REQ生成的身份标识加密密钥Nonce REQID，即REQ还可以利用加密证书的公钥对包括ID REQ和Nonce REQID在内的加密数据加密得到身份信息密文 EncPub AS。
可选的，ATTACH中还可以包括REQ支持的安全能力参数信息Security capabilities REQ，Security capabilities REQ中包括REQ支持的身份鉴别套件(身份鉴别套件中包含一种或多种身份鉴别方法)、完整性校验算法、杂凑(HASH)算法、密钥交换算法和/或密钥导出算法等，以供AAC据以选择要使用的特定安全策略Security capabilities AAC。
可选的，ATTACH中还可以包括REQ信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识Route AS，以便AAC根据Route AS及自身信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定第二鉴别服务器AS-AAC。
可选的，ATTACH中还可以包括REQ生成的第一随机数Nonce REQ。
S102、AAC向其信任的AS-AAC发送第一鉴权请求消息AACVeri。
该AACVeri中包括ATTACH中携带的REQ的身份信息密文EncPub AS。
可选的，若ATTACH中包括REQ信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识Route AS，则AAC在发送AACVeri之前，需要先根据ATTACH中的Route AS和自身信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定第二鉴别服务器AS-AAC。具体的，若REQ与AAC存在共同信任的鉴别服务器，则可以确定此时为非漫游情况，即AS-AAC与AS-REQ为同一鉴别服务器；若REQ与AAC之间不存在共同信任的鉴别服务器，则可以确定此时为漫游情况，即AS-AAC与AS-REQ为两个独立的鉴别服务器。
可选的，AACVeri中还可以包括AAC的身份标识ID AAC和/或AAC生成的第二随机数Nonce AAC。若REQ向AAC发送的ATTACH中包括Nonce REQ，则AAC向AS-AAC发送的AACVeri中也可以包括该Nonce REQ。
S103、AAC接收AS-AAC发送的第一鉴权响应消息ASVeri。
该ASVeri中包括AS-REQ在验证REQ的身份合法后产生的存证随机数和身份鉴别密钥IAK。
需要说明的是，若AS-REQ与AS-AAC为同一个鉴别服务器，即非漫游情况，此时可以用AS-AAC(当然也可以用AS-REQ)表示REQ和AAC共同信任的鉴别服务器，则AAC向AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)发送携带有EncPub AS的AACVeri，AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)接收到AACVeri后，获取利用加密证书对应的私钥解密EncPub AS得到的ID REQ，并根据ID REQ判断REQ的身份是否合法，若合法，则生成存证随机数Nonce AS_AAC(也可以表示为Nonce AS_REQ)和身份鉴别密钥IAK，并将包括Nonce AS_AAC(也可以表示为Nonce AS_REQ)和IAK的ASVeri发送给AAC。其中，上述对EncPub AS的解密可以由与AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)有交互、信任关系的CS-DEC执行，也可以由AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)执行。其中，IAK是AS-AAC(也可以表示为AS-REQ)采用与REQ约定的密钥导出算法对包括自身与REQ的预共享加密密钥K REQ_AS在内的计算数据计算得到的。本申请中，将算法运算时采用的计算对象称为计算数据。
若AS-REQ与AS-AAC为不同的鉴别服务器，即漫游情况，此时AAC先向AS-AAC发送携带有EncPub AS的AACVeri，AS-AAC根据AACVeri生成第二鉴权请求消息AS-AACVeri，向AS-REQ发送AS-AACVeri，AS-AACVeri中携带有EncPub AS。AS-REQ获取利用加密证书对应的私钥解密EncPub AS得到的ID REQ，根据ID REQ判断REQ的身份是否合法，若合法，则生成存证随机数Nonce AS_REQ和身份鉴别密钥IAK，将包括Nonce AS_REQ和IAK在内的第二鉴权响应消息AS-REQVeri发送给AS-AAC，然后AS-AAC根据AS-REQVeri生成ASVeri，并将包括Nonce AS_REQ和IAK的ASVeri发送给AAC。其中，上述对EncPub AS的解密可以由与AS-REQ有交互、信任关系的CS-DEC执行，也可以由AS-REQ执行。IAK是AS-REQ采用与REQ约定的密钥导出算法对包括自身与REQ的预共享加密密钥K REQ_AS在内的计算数据计算得到的。
可选的，当AACVeri中包括Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC时，鉴别服务器计算IAK时的计算数据还包括Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC。
可选的，当REQ的身份信息密文EncPub AS的加密数据还包括身份标识加密密钥Nonce REQID时，非漫游情况下，AS-AAC(当然也可以表示为AS-REQ)还可以利用解密EncPub AS得到的Nonce REQID对ID REQ进行加密得到REQ的身份标识密文，则ASVeri中还可以包括REQ的身份标识密文；漫游情况下，AS-REQ还可以利用解密EncPub AS得到的Nonce REQID对ID REQ进行加密得到REQ的身份标识密文，则AS-REQVeri和ASVeri中还可以包括REQ的身份标识密文；REQ的身份标识密文可以为利用Nonce REQID对ID REQ进行异或运算的结果，即ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID。
可选的，当AACVeri中包括ID AAC和/或Nonce AAC时，ASVeri中也可以包括ID AAC和/或Nonce AAC。相应地，AAC接收到ASVeri后，可以判断ASVeri中的ID AAC与自身的身份标识ID AAC是否一致，和/或，判断ASVeri中的Nonce AAC与自身生成的Nonce AAC是否一致，若一致，则继续执行后续操作，若不一致，则丢弃ASVeri。
可选的，AAC和AS-AAC之间具有预共享加密密钥EK AAC_AS，AS-AAC可以利用EK AAC_AS对包括IAK在内的信息进行加密得到身份鉴别密钥密文EncData AS_AAC，利用EncData AS_AAC替换ASVeri中 的IAK。
S104、AAC向REQ发送第一验证消息AACAuth。
该AACAuth中包括存证随机数。
可选的，AACAuth还可以包括第一密钥交换参数KeyInfo AAC。KeyInfo AAC是AAC利用身份鉴别密钥IAK采用对称加密算法对包括自身产生的临时公钥在内的信息加密计算得到的结果。AAC计算KeyInfo AAC时，可以先计算IAK的杂凑值即HASH(IAK)，进而对HASH(IAK)和包括AAC产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行异或运算生成KeyInfo AAC。或者，AAC计算KeyInfo AAC时，可以先计算扩展身份鉴别密钥EIAK，再对EIAK和包括AAC产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行异或运算生成KeyInfo AAC，其中，EIAK是AAC根据包括所述IAK及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算生成的。其中，AAC产生的所述临时公钥是AAC产生的临时公私钥对中的临时公钥。
可选的，若ASVeri中携带有身份鉴别密钥密文EncData AS_AAC，则AAC需要利用其与AS-AAC的预共享加密密钥EK AAC_AS解密EncData AS_AAC得到IAK。
可选的，若ATTACH中包括Security capabilities REQ，则AAC可以根据Security capabilities REQ确定自身使用的特定安全策略Security capabilities AAC，并将Security capabilities AAC添加至AACAuth中发送给REQ。Security capabilities AAC表示AAC确定使用的身份鉴别方法、完整性校验算法、杂凑算法、密钥交换算法和/或密钥导出算法等。
可选的，当ASVeri中还包括REQ的身份标识密文时，AAC可以将REQ的身份标识密文添加至AACAuth中发送给REQ，即AACAuth中还可以包括ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID。
可选的，AAC还可以将ID AAC、Nonce AAC和Nonce REQ中任意一项或多项添加至AACAuth中发送给REQ。
S105、REQ利用其与AS-REQ的预共享存证校验密钥IK REQ_AS对包括存证随机数在内的计算数据计算生成第一身份鉴权码MIC REQ，利用其与AAC之间的消息完整性校验密钥对包括第二验证消息中除第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成第一消息完整性校验码MacTag REQ。
可选的，REQ可以生成第二密钥交换参数KeyInfo REQ，例如REQ接收到AACAuth后，即可利用身份鉴别密钥IAK，采用对称加密算法对包括REQ产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行加密计算生成KeyInfo REQ。简单的，REQ计算IAK的杂凑值即HASH(IAK)，对HASH(IAK)和包括REQ产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行异或运算生成KeyInfo REQ；或者，REQ先计算扩展身份鉴别密钥EIAK，再对EIAK和包括REQ产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行异或运算生成KeyInfo REQ，其中，EIAK是REQ根据包括所述IAK及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算生成的。其中，REQ利用的IAK是REQ采用与AS-REQ约定的密钥导出算法对包括自身与AS-REQ的预共享加密密钥K REQ_AS在内的计算数据计算得到的。
可选的，当AACAuth中包括Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC时，REQ计算IAK时的计算数据还可以包括Nonce REQ和Nonce AAC。
其中，REQ和AAC之间的消息完整性校验密钥可以是REQ和AAC之间预先共享的，也可以是REQ和AAC协商生成的。REQ和AAC协商生成消息完整性校验密钥的方式包括：REQ可以根据包括KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥和由KeyInfo AAC恢复的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算得到第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(REQ和AAC采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算消息完整性校验密钥。其中，密钥交换是指如迪菲·赫尔曼(Diffie-Hellman，简称DH)等密钥交换算法。KeyInfo REQ对应的所述临时私钥是REQ产生的临时公私钥对中的临时私钥。
可选的，当AACAuth中包括Nonce REQ时，REQ可以验证AACAuth中的Nonce REQ与REQ生成的Nonce REQ的一致性，若一致，则继续执行后续操作，若不一致，则丢弃AACAuth。
可选的，当AACAuth中包括ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID时，计算MIC REQ所采用的计算数据还可以包括ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID，即REQ可以采用自身与AS-REQ约定的消息完整性校验算法，利用IK REQ_AS对包括ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、存证随机数在内的计算数据计算生成MIC REQ。
可选的，当AACAuth中包括ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID时，REQ可以根据Nonce REQID和自身的身份标识ID REQ对AACAuth中的ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID进行验证；一种方式为，REQ可以利用Nonce REQID与ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID进行异或运算恢复ID REQ，再对比恢复出的ID REQ与REQ自身的ID REQ是否一致，另一种方式为，REQ将Nonce REQID和自身的ID REQ进行异或运算，对比异或运算的结果与AACAuth中的ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID是否一致；若一致，则继续执行后续操作，若不一致，则丢弃AACAuth。
S106、REQ向AAC发送第二验证消息REQAuth。
该REQAuth中包括MIC REQ和MacTag REQ。
可选的，REQAuth中还可以包括KeyInfo REQ。可选的，当AACAuth中包括Nonce AAC时，REQ可以将Nonce AAC添加至REQAuth中。
S107、AAC对MacTag REQ进行验证，验证通过后，生成鉴别完成消息AACFinish和第一存证消息AACUpdate。
MacTag REQ的验证过程包括：若MacTag REQ为REQ利用其与AAC之间的消息完整性校验密钥对包括REQAuth中除MacTag REQ外的其他字段计算生成的，则AAC验证MacTag REQ时，应利用其与REQ之间的消息完整性校验密钥对包括REQAuth中除MacTag REQ外的其他字段计算生成MacTag REQ，将计算得到的MacTag REQ与REQAuth中的MacTag REQ进行比较，若一致，则验证通过，确定REQ的身份合法，若不一致，则根据本地策略执行如下操作，包括丢弃REQAuth或确定REQ的身份不合法。
其中，AAC和REQ之间的消息完整性校验密钥可以是AAC和REQ之间预先共享的，也可以是AAC和REQ协商生成的。AAC和REQ协商生成消息完整性校验密钥的方式包括：AAC可以根据包括KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和由KeyInfo REQ恢复的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算得到第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce AAC、Nonce REQ及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算消息完整性校验密钥。KeyInfo AAC对应的所述临时私钥是AAC产生的临时公私钥对中的临时私钥，由KeyInfo REQ恢复的所述临时公钥是REQ产生的临时公私钥对中的临时公钥。
可选的，当REQAuth中包括Nonce AAC时，AAC在验证MacTag REQ之前，还可以先验证REQAuth中的Nonce AAC与自身生成的Nonce AAC是否一致，若一致，则继续执行后续操作，若不一致，则丢弃REQAuth。
可选的，AAC还可以为REQ分配临时身份标识TID REQnew，用于将TID REQnew添加至AACFinish和AACUpdate中。
此外，为了实现REQ对于AAC的身份鉴别，AAC还要生成第二消息完整性校验码MacTag AAC，并将该MacTag AAC添加至AACFinish中。MacTag AAC可以为AAC利用其与REQ之间的消息完整性校验密钥对包括鉴别完成消息AACFinish中除MacTag AAC外的其他字段计算生成的。
可选的，AAC验证REQ的身份合法后，还可以计算用于保证REQ和AAC后续保密通信的会话密钥。具体的，AAC可以根据包括KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和由KeyInfo REQ恢复的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算得到第一密钥K1，将K1结合ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、ID AAC及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算会话密钥(包括数据加密密钥和/或数据完整性校验密钥)。
其中，AAC通过上述方式在计算会话密钥时，可以利用密钥导出算法计算出一串密钥数据，该密钥数据可以作为数据加密密钥和/或数据完整性校验密钥，或者，将该密钥数据中的一部分密钥数据作为数据加密密钥，将另一部分密钥数据作为数据完整性校验密钥。
S108、AAC向REQ发送鉴别完成消息AACFinish。
该AACFinish中包括MacTag AAC。若AAC为REQ分配了临时身份标识TID REQnew，则AACFinish中还包括TID REQnew。
S109、REQ对AACFinish中的MacTag AAC进行验证，验证通过后，确定AAC的身份为合法。
MacTag AAC的验证过程包括：若MacTag AAC为AAC利用其与REQ之间的消息完整性校验密钥对包括AACFinish中除MacTag AAC外的其他字段计算生成的，则REQ验证MacTag AAC时，应利用其与AAC之间的消息完整性校验密钥对包括AACFinish中除MacTag AAC外的其他字段计算生成MacTag AAC，将计算得到的MacTag AAC与AACFinish中的MacTag AAC进行比较，若一致，则验证通过，确定AAC的身份合法，若不一致，则根据本地策略执行如下操作，包括丢弃AACFinish或确定AAC的身份不合法。
可选的，REQ确定AAC的身份合法后，还可以保存TID REQnew，以便在后续身份鉴别过程中，使用该TID REQnew替代自身真实的身份标识。
可选的，REQ验证AAC的身份合法后，还可以计算用于保证REQ和AAC后续保密通信的会话密钥。具体的，REQ可以根据包括KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥和由KeyInfo AAC恢复的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算得到第一密钥K1，将K1结合ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、ID AAC及其他信息(REQ和AAC采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算会话密钥(包括数据加密密钥和/或数据完整性校验密钥)。由KeyInfo AAC恢复的临时公钥是AAC产生的临时公私钥对中的临时公钥。
其中，REQ通过上述方式在计算会话密钥时，可以利用密钥导出算法计算出一串密钥数据，该密钥数据可以作为数据加密密钥和/或数据完整性校验密钥，或者，将该密钥数据中的一部分密钥数据作为数据加密密钥，将另一部分密钥数据作为数据完整性校验密钥。
S110、AAC向AS-REQ发送第一存证消息AACUpdate。
该AACUpdate中包括REQAuth中携带的MIC REQ。
在非漫游情况下，AAC直接将AACUpdate发送至AS-AAC(当然也可以表示为AS-REQ)即可。
在漫游情况下，AAC生成AACUpdate后，先向AS-AAC发送AACUpdate；进而AS-AAC根据AACUpdate生成第二存证消息ASUpdate，ASUpdate中包括MIC REQ，并将ASUpdate发送至AS-REQ。
该AACUpdate中还可以包括AAC为REQ分配的临时身份标识TID REQnew。
可选的，AACUpdate中还可以包括第二身份鉴权码MIC AAC。MIC AAC是AAC利用与AS-AAC的预共享校验密钥IK AAC_AS，采用预共享的消息完整性校验算法对AACUpdate中MIC AAC之前的其他字段计算生成的。
S111、AS-REQ对MIC REQ进行验证，验证通过后，生成并存储REQ的请求通过记录。
AS-REQ在生成和存储REQ的请求通过记录时还可以保存TID REQnew。
若AACUpdate中还包括MIC AAC，则在非漫游情况下，AS-AAC(当然也可以表示为AS-REQ)对MIC REQ和MIC AAC进行验证，即AS-AAC(当然也可以表示为AS-REQ)利用其与AAC的预共享校验密钥IK AAC_AS在本地计算MIC AAC，以及利用其与REQ的预共享存证校验密钥IK REQ_AS在本地计算MIC REQ，再将计算得到的MIC AAC与AACUpdate中的MIC AAC进行比较，以及将计算得到的MIC REQ与AACUpdate中的MIC REQ进行比较，若均一致，则验证通过。
若AACUpdate中还包括MIC AAC，则在漫游情况下，先由AS-AAC对MIC AAC进行验证，即AS-AAC先利用其与AAC的预共享校验密钥IK AAC_AS在本地计算MIC AAC，将计算得到的MIC AAC与AACUpdate中的MIC AAC进行比较，若一致，则验证通过，验证通过后，AS-AAC再生成ASUpdate，并向AS-REQ发送ASUpdate。进而，由AS-REQ对ASUpdate中的MIC REQ进行验证，即由AS-REQ利用其与REQ的预共享存证校验密钥IK REQ_AS在本地计算MIC REQ，将计算得到的MIC REQ与ASUpdate中的MIC REQ进行比较，若一致，则验证通过，可以生成并保存REQ的请求通过记录。
需要说明的是，在实际应用中，可以先执行S108后执行S110，也可以先执行S110后执行S108，还可以同时执行S108和S110。
可选的，AAC可以先执行S110即发送所述第一存证消息，S111中对所述第一存证消息中的第一身份鉴权码MIC REQ验证通过后，生成第一存证确认消息，用于防止REQ有意发送错误的第一身份鉴权码MIC REQ来逃避计费。AAC接收所述第一存证确认消息后再执行S108即向REQ发送所述鉴别完成消息。
由上述技术方案可以看出，请求设备和鉴别接入控制器采用对称密钥的实体鉴别协议进行双向身份鉴别时，以密文的形式传输请求设备的身份信息，由此保证身份鉴别过程中请求设备的真实身份信息的安全性。另外，鉴别接入控制器在验证请求设备的身份合法后，会相应地向请求设备信任的第一鉴别服务器发送第一存证消息，以利用该第一鉴别服务器记录请求设备请求访问网络的行为，为后续网络接入点计费提供客观证据，有效地防止网络接入点对没有在其服务区内尝试访问网络的用户恶意计费。
基于前述实施例，下面针对非漫游和漫游两种情况介绍本申请实施例提供的身份鉴别方法。
参见图2，为非漫游情况下身份鉴别方法的一个实施例，此时可以用AS-AAC(当然也可以表示为AS-REQ)表示AAC和REQ共同信任的鉴别服务器，该身份鉴别方法包括：
S201、REQ生成Nonce REQ、Nonce REQID和EncPub AS，根据需要生成Security capabilities REQ。
S202、REQ向AAC发送鉴别请求消息ATTACH。
该ATTACH中包括Security capabilities REQ、EncPub AS、Route AS及Nonce REQ。其中，EncPub AS为REQ利用加密证书的公钥对包括ID REQ、Nonce REQID在内的加密数据计算得到的REQ的身份信息密文；Route AS表示REQ信任的鉴别服务器的标识；Security capabilities REQ为可选字段，表示REQ支持的安全能力参数信息，包括REQ支持的身份鉴别套件、完整性校验算法、杂凑(HASH)算法、密钥交换算法和/或密钥导出算法等(下文同)。
S203、AAC生成Nonce AAC。
AAC根据Route AS判断REQ信任的鉴别服务器与自身信任的鉴别服务器是否相同，若相同，确定为非漫游情况，此实施例中REQ与AAC存在共同信任的鉴别服务器。
S204、AAC向AS-AAC发送第一鉴权请求消息AACVeri。
该AACVeri中包括EncPub AS、Nonce REQ、ID AAC及Nonce AAC。其中，EncPub AS和Nonce REQ应分别等于ATTACH中的相应字段；ID AAC为可选字段。
S205、AS-AAC接收AACVeri后，执行下述操作(若无特别说明或逻辑上的关系，下述以(1)、(2)……编号的动作并不因为有编号而存在必然的先后顺序。全文同)，包括：
(1)、利用加密证书的私钥解密EncPub AS得到ID REQ和Nonce REQID，根据ID REQ判断REQ的身份是否合法，若合法，则继续执行后续操作，若不合法，则丢弃AACVeri；
(2)、计算生成IAK；
AS-AAC利用其与REQ之间的预共享加密密钥K REQ_AS结合包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、ID AAC、Nonce AAC 在内的计算数据，采用与REQ预先约定的密钥导出算法计算得到IAK。
(3)、产生存证随机数Nonce AS_AAC；
(4)、对ID REQ和Nonce REQID进行异或运算生成ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID；
(5)、可选的，AS-AAC利用其与AAC之间的预共享加密密钥EK AAC_AS对包括IAK在内的信息加密生成EncData AS_AAC。
S206、AS-AAC向AAC发送第一鉴权响应消息ASVeri。
该ASVeri中包括ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、Nonce REQ、ID AAC、Nonce AAC、Nonce AS_AAC及IAK。其中，ID AAC为可选字段，当且仅当AACVeri中ID AAC存在而存在；ID AAC、Nonce AAC应分别等于AACVeri中的相应字段；若存在EncData AS_AAC时，AS-AAC利用EncData AS_AAC替换ASVeri中的IAK。
S207、AAC接收ASVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、检查ASVeri中的Nonce AAC与AAC生成的Nonce AAC是否一致，若ASVeri中存在ID AAC，则检查ASVeri中的ID AAC与AAC自身的身份标识ID AAC是否一致；若任一项不一致，则丢弃ASVeri；
(2)、获得IAK；
在ASVeri中包括EncData AS_AAC的情况下，则利用其与AS-AAC之间的预共享加密密钥EK AAC_AS解密EncData AS_AAC得到IAK；
(3)、根据包括IAK及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算生成EIAK；
(4)、计算生成KeyInfo AAC；
其中，AAC将EIAK和包括AAC产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行异或运算生成KeyInfo AAC。
S208、AAC向REQ发送第一验证消息AACAuth。
该AACAuth中包括Security capabilities AAC、KeyInfo AAC、ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、Nonce REQ、ID AAC、Nonce AAC及Nonce AS_AAC。其中，ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC、Nonce AS_AAC应分别等于ASVeri中的相应字段。Security capabilities AAC为可选字段，表示AAC根据Security capabilities REQ做出的特定安全策略的选择，即AAC确定使用的身份鉴别方法、完整性校验算法、杂凑(HASH)算法、密钥交换算法和/或密钥导出算法等(下文同)，当且仅当ATTACH中存在Security capabilities REQ时才存在Security capabilities AAC。
S209、REQ接收AACAuth后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用Nonce REQID与ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID进行异或运算恢复出ID REQ；
(2)、检查恢复出的ID REQ与REQ自身的身份标识ID REQ是否一致，检查AACAuth中的Nonce REQ与REQ生成的Nonce REQ是否一致；若任一项不一致，则丢弃AACAuth；
(3)、计算IAK；
REQ利用与AS-AAC之间的预共享加密密钥K REQ_AS结合包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、ID AAC、Nonce AAC在内的计算数据，采用预先与AS-AAC约定的密钥导出算法计算IAK。REQ计算IAK所采用的计算数据与S205中AS-AAC计算IAK所采用的计算数据相同。
(4)、根据包括IAK及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算生成EIAK；
(5)、计算生成KeyInfo REQ；
REQ将EIAK和包括REQ产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行异或运算生成KeyInfo REQ。
(6)、计算消息完整性校验密钥；
REQ根据包括KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥和由KeyInfo AAC恢复出的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算得到第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC及其他信息(REQ和AAC采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算消息完整性校验密钥。
(7)、计算MIC REQ；
(8)、计算MacTag REQ。
S210、REQ向AAC发送第二验证消息REQAuth。
该REQAuth中包括Nonce AAC、KeyInfo REQ、MIC REQ及MacTag REQ。其中，Nonce AAC应等于AACAuth中的Nonce AAC；MIC REQ是REQ利用自身与AS-AAC之间的预共享存证校验密钥IK REQ_AS，采用与AS-AAC之间预共享的消息完整性校验算法对包括Nonce AS_AAC在内的计算数据计算得到的。MacTag REQ是REQ利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括REQAuth中除MacTag REQ外的其他字段在内的信息计算得到的。
S211、AAC接收REQAuth后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、检查REQAuth中的Nonce AAC与AAC生成的Nonce AAC是否一致，若不一致，则丢弃REQAuth；
(2)、计算消息完整性校验密钥；
AAC根据包括KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和由KeyInfo REQ恢复出的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算得 到第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算消息完整性校验密钥。
(3)、验证MacTag REQ；
AAC利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括REQAuth中除MacTag REQ外的其他字段在内的信息在本地计算得到MacTag REQ(该计算方式与REQ计算MacTag REQ的方式相同)，对比计算出的MacTag REQ与REQAuth中的MacTag REQ是否一致，若一致，则确定REQ的身份合法，若不一致，则丢弃REQAuth。
(4)、为REQ分配生成的临时身份标识TID REQnew；
(5)、可选的，计算MIC AAC。
S212、AAC向AS-AAC发送第一存证消息AACUpdate。
该AACUpdate中包括ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、ID AAC、Nonce AAC、TID REQnew、MIC REQ及MIC AAC。其中，ID AAC、MIC AAC为可选字段；MIC AAC是AAC利用自身与AS-AAC之间的预共享校验密钥IK AAC_AS，采用与AS-AAC之间预共享的消息完整性校验算法对AACUpdate中MIC AAC之前的其他字段计算得到的。例如，当AACUpdate中依次包括ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、ID AAC、Nonce AAC、TID REQnew、MIC REQ及MIC AAC时，MIC AAC是AAC利用所述IK AAC_AS，采用所述消息完整性校验算法对AACUpdate中的字段ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、ID AAC、Nonce AAC、TID REQnew及MIC REQ计算得到的。
S213、AS-AAC接收AACUpdate后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若AACUpdate中存在MIC AAC，则验证MIC AAC；
AS-AAC利用与AAC之间的预共享校验密钥IK AAC_AS，采用与AAC之间预共享的消息完整性校验算法对AACUpdate中MIC AAC之前的其他字段计算得到MIC AAC，对比计算出的MIC AAC与AACUpdate中的MIC AAC是否一致，若不一致，则丢弃AACUpdate。
(2)、验证MIC REQ；
AS-AAC利用与REQ之间的预共享存证校验密钥IK REQ_AS，采用预共享的消息完整性校验算法对包括Nonce AS_AAC在内的计算数据计算得到MIC REQ，对比计算出的MIC REQ与AACUpdate中的MIC REQ是否一致，若不一致，则丢弃AACUpdate。
(3)、生成并保存REQ的请求通过记录，保存TID REQnew；
(4)、可选的，计算MIC AS_AAC。
S214、AS-AAC向AAC发送第一存证确认消息ASAck。
该ASAck中包括ID AAC、Nonce AAC及MIC AS_AAC。其中，ID AAC、MIC AS_AAC为可选字段；MIC AS_AAC是AS-AAC利用自身与AAC之间的预共享校验密钥IK AAC_AS，采用与AAC之间预共享的消息完整性校验算法对ASAck中MIC AS_AAC之前的其他字段计算得到的。
S215、AAC接收到ASAck后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若ASAck中存在ID AAC，则检查ID AAC是否与AAC自身的身份标识ID AAC相同；
(2)、检查Nonce AAC是否与AAC生成的Nonce AAC相同；
(3)、若ASAck中存在MIC AS_AAC，则验证MIC AS_AAC；
AAC利用与AS-AAC之间的预共享校验密钥IK AAC_AS，采用与AS-AAC之间预共享的消息完整性校验算法对ASAck中MIC AS_AAC之前的其他字段计算得到MIC AS_AAC，对比计算出的MIC AS_AAC与ASAck中的MIC AS_AAC是否一致。
(4)、上述检查与验证通过后，计算MacTag AAC；上述检查与验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃ASAck；
(5)、计算会话密钥；
AAC将S211中计算的K1结合ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、Nonce REQ、ID AAC、Nonce AAC及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算出会话密钥，用于REQ和AAC后续的保密通信。
S216、AAC向REQ发送鉴别完成消息AACFinish。
该AACFinish中包括TID REQnew和MacTag AAC。其中，MacTag AAC是AAC利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括AACFinish中除MacTag AAC外的其他字段在内的信息在本地计算得到的；TID REQnew应与AACUpdate中的TID REQnew相同。
S217、REQ接收到AACFinish后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、验证MacTag AAC；
REQ利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括AACFinish中除MacTag AAC外的其他字段在内的信息在本地计算得到MacTag AAC(该计算方式与AAC计算MacTag AAC的方式相同)，对比计算出的MacTag AAC与AACFinish中的MacTag AAC是否一致，若一致，则确定AAC身份合法，若不一致，则丢弃AACFinish。
(2)、保存TID REQnew；
(3)、计算会话密钥；
REQ将在S209中计算得到的K1结合ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、Nonce REQ、ID AAC、Nonce AAC及其他信息(REQ和AAC采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算出会话密钥，用于REQ和AAC后续的保密通信。
由此在S211和S217分别实现对REQ和对AAC的身份鉴别，即实现REQ和AAC的双向身份鉴别。
参见图3，为漫游情况下身份鉴别方法的实施例，该身份鉴别方法包括：
S301、REQ生成Nonce REQ、Nonce REQID和EncPub AS，根据需要生成Security capabilities REQ。
S302、REQ向AAC发送鉴别请求消息ATTACH。
该ATTACH中包括Security capabilities REQ、EncPub AS、Route AS及Nonce REQ。其中，EncPub AS为REQ利用加密证书的公钥对包括ID REQ、Nonce REQID在内的加密数据计算得到的REQ的身份信息密文。Route AS表示REQ信任的鉴别服务器的标识；Security capabilities REQ为可选字段。
S303、AAC生成Nonce AAC。
AAC根据Route AS判断REQ信任的鉴别服务器与自身信任的鉴别服务器是否相同，若不相同，确定为漫游情况，此实施例中REQ信任的AS-REQ与AAC信任的AS-AAC为两个独立的鉴别服务器。
S304、AAC向AS-AAC发送第一鉴权请求消息AACVeri。
该AACVeri中包括EncPub AS、Nonce REQ、ID AAC、Nonce AAC及Route AS。其中，EncPub AS、Nonce REQ和Route AS应分别等于ATTACH中的相应字段；ID AAC为可选字段。
S305、AS-AAC接收到AACVeri后，根据Rout AS确定AS-REQ，向AS-REQ发送第二鉴权请求消息AS-AACVeri。
其中，AS-AACVeri是根据AACVeri生成的，AS-AACVeri中包括EncPub AS、Nonce REQ、ID AAC及Nonce AAC。EncPub AS、Nonce REQ、ID AAC和Nonce AAC应分别等于AACVeri中的相应字段。
S306、AS-REQ接收AS-AACVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用加密证书的私钥解密EncPub AS得到ID REQ和Nonce REQID，根据ID REQ判断REQ的身份是否合法，若合法，则继续执行后续操作，若不合法，丢弃AAC-ASVeri；
(2)、产生存证随机数Nonce AS_REQ。
(3)、对ID REQ和Nonce REQID进行异或运算得到ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID；
(4)、计算IAK；
AS-REQ利用其与REQ之间的预共享加密密钥K REQ_AS结合包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、ID AAC、Nonce AAC在内的计算数据，采用与REQ预先约定的密钥导出算法计算得到IAK。
(5)、可选的，AS-REQ利用其与AS-AAC之间的预共享加密密钥EK AS对包括IAK在内的信息加密生成EncData AS_REQ。
S307、AS-REQ向AS-AAC发送第二鉴权响应消息AS-REQVeri。
该AS-REQVeri中包括ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、ID AAC、Nonce AAC、Nonce AS_REQ及IAK。其中，ID AAC、Nonce AAC应分别等于AS-AACVeri中的相应字段；若存在EncData AS_REQ时，AS-REQ利用EncData AS_REQ替代AS-REQVeri中的IAK。
S308、AS-AAC接收AS-REQVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、获得IAK；当AS-REQVeri中存在EncData AS_REQ时，利用其与AS-REQ之间的预共享加密密钥EK AS对EncData AS_REQ解密得到IAK；
(2)、可选的，AS-AAC利用其与AAC之间的预共享加密密钥EK AAC_AS对包括IAK在内的信息加密生成EncData AS_AAC。
S309、AS-AAC向AAC发送第一鉴权响应消息ASVeri。
该ASVeri中包括ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、Nonce REQ、ID AAC、Nonce AAC、Nonce AS_REQ及IAK。其中，ID AAC为可选字段，且Nonce REQ、ID AAC和Nonce AAC应分别等于AACVeri中的相应字段；若存在EncData AS_AAC时，AS-AAC将利用EncData AS_AAC替换ASVeri中的IAK。
S310、AAC接收ASVeri后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、检查ASVeri中的Nonce AAC与AAC生成的Nonce AAC是否一致，若ASVeri中存在ID AAC，则检查ASVeri中的ID AAC与AAC自身的身份标识ID AAC是否一致；若任一项不一致，则丢弃ASVeri；
(2)、获得IAK；
在ASVeri中包括EncData AS_AAC的情况下，则利用其与AS-AAC之间的预共享加密密钥EK AAC_AS解密EncData AS_AAC得到IAK；
(3)、根据包括IAK及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算生成EIAK；
(4)、计算KeyInfo AAC；
其中，AAC将EIAK和包括AAC产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行异或运算生成KeyInfo AAC。
S311、AAC向REQ发送第一验证消息AACAuth。
该AACAuth中包括Security capabilities AAC、KeyInfo AAC、ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、Nonce REQ、ID AAC、Nonce AAC及Nonce AS_REQ。其中，ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、Nonce REQ、ID AAC、Nonce AAC、Nonce AS_REQ应分别等于ASVeri中的相应字段；Security capabilities AAC为可选字段，当且仅当ATTACH中存在Security capabilities REQ时才存在Security capabilities AAC。
S312、REQ接收AACAuth后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、利用Nonce REQID与ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID进行异或运算恢复出ID REQ；
(2)、检查恢复出的ID REQ与REQ自身的身份标识ID REQ是否一致，检查AACAuth中的Nonce REQ与REQ生成的Nonce REQ是否一致；若任一项不一致，则丢弃AACAuth；
(3)、计算IAK；
REQ利用与AS-REQ之间的预共享加密密钥K REQ_AS结合包括ID REQ、Nonce REQ、ID AAC、Nonce AAC在内的计算数据，采用预先与AS-REQ约定的密钥导出算法计算IAK。REQ计算IAK所采用的计算数据与S306中AS-REQ计算IAK所采用的计算数据相同。
(4)、根据包括IAK及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算生成EIAK；
(5)、计算KeyInfo REQ；其计算方式与图2实施例中的相关描述相同；
(6)、计算消息完整性校验密钥；
REQ根据包括KeyInfo REQ对应的临时私钥和由KeyInfo AAC恢复出的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算得到第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC及其他信息(REQ和AAC采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算消息完整性校验密钥。
(7)、计算MIC REQ；
(8)、计算MacTag REQ。
S313、REQ向AAC发送第二验证消息REQAuth。
该REQAuth中包括Nonce AAC、KeyInfo REQ、MIC REQ及MacTag REQ。其中，Nonce AAC应等于AACAuth中的Nonce AAC；MIC REQ是REQ利用自身与AS-REQ之间的预共享存证校验密钥IK REQ_AS，采用与AS-REQ之间预共享的消息完整性校验算法对包括Nonce AS_REQ在内的计算数据计算得到的。MacTag REQ是REQ利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括REQAuth中除MacTag REQ外的其他字段在内的信息在本地计算得到的。
S314、AAC接收REQAuth后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、检查REQAuth中的Nonce AAC与AAC生成的Nonce AAC是否一致，若不一致，则丢弃REQAuth；
(2)、计算消息完整性校验密钥；
AAC根据包括KeyInfo AAC对应的临时私钥和由KeyInfo REQ恢复出的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算得到第一密钥K1，将K1结合Nonce REQ、Nonce AAC及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算消息完整性校验密钥。
(3)、验证MacTag REQ；
AAC利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括REQAuth中除MacTag REQ外的其他字段在内的信息在本地计算得到MacTag REQ，对比计算出的MacTag REQ与REQAuth中的MacTag REQ是否一致，若一致，则确定REQ的身份合法，若不一致，则丢弃REQAuth。
(4)、为REQ分配生成的临时身份标识TID REQnew；
(5)、可选的，AAC计算生成MIC AAC。
S315、AAC向AS-AAC发送第一存证消息AACUpdate。
该AACUpdate中包括ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、ID AAC、Nonce AAC、TID REQnew、MIC REQ及MIC AAC。其中，ID AAC为可选字段；ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID应等于ASVeri中的相应字段；MIC REQ应等于REQAuth中的相应字段；MIC AAC为可选字段，MIC AAC是AAC利用自身与AS-AAC之间的预共享校验密钥IK AAC_AS，采用与AS-AAC之间预共享的消息完整性校验算法对AACUpdate中MIC AAC之前的其他字段计算得到的。
S316、AS-AAC接收AACUpdate后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、当AACUpdate中存在MIC AAC时，验证MIC AAC；
AS-AAC利用与AAC之间的预共享校验密钥IK AAC_AS，采用与AAC之间预共享的消息完整性校验算法对AACUpdate中MIC AAC之前的其他字段计算得到MIC AAC，将计算出的MIC AAC与AACUpdate中的MIC AAC进行对比，若不一致，则丢弃AACUpdate。
(2)、可选的，AS-AAC计算生成MIC AS_AAC。
S317、AS-AAC向AS-REQ发送第二存证消息ASUpdate。
该ASUpdate中包括ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、ID AAC、TID REQnew、MIC REQ及MIC AS_AAC。其中，ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、ID AAC、TID REQnew、MIC REQ应分别等于AACUpdate中的相应字段；MIC AS_AAC为可选字段，MIC AS_AAC是AS-AAC利用自身与AS-REQ之间的预共享校验密钥IK AS对ASUpdate中MIC AS_AAC之前的其他字段在本地计算得到的。
S318、AS-REQ接收ASUpdate之后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、当ASUpdate中存在MIC AS时，验证MIC AS_AAC；
AS-REQ利用与AS-AAC之间的预共享校验密钥IK AS对ASUpdate中MIC AS_AAC之前的其他字段在本地计算得到MIC AS_AAC，对比计算出的MIC AS_AAC与ASUpdate中的MIC AS_AAC是否一致，若不一致，则丢弃ASUpdate。
(2)、验证MIC REQ；
AS-REQ利用与REQ之间的预共享存证校验密钥IK REQ_AS，采用预共享的消息完整性校验算法对包括Nonce AS_REQ在内的计算数据计算得到MIC REQ，对比计算出的MIC REQ与ASUpdate中的MIC REQ是否一致，若不一致，则丢弃ASUpdate。
(3)、生成并保存REQ的请求通过记录，保存ASUpdate中的TID REQnew；
(4)、可选的，计算MIC AS_REQ。
S319、AS-REQ向AS-AAC发送第二存证确认消息AS-REQAck。
该AS-REQAck中包括ID AAC和MIC AS_REQ。其中，ID AAC应等于ASUpdate中的相应字段；MIC AS_REQ为可选字段，是AS-REQ利用其与AS-AAC之间的预共享校验密钥IK AS，采用其与AS-AAC之间预共享的消息完整性校验算法对AS-REQAck中MIC AS_REQ之前的其他字段计算得到的。
S320、AS-AAC收到AS-REQAck后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若AS-REQAck中存在MIC AS_REQ，则验证MIC AS_REQ；
AS-AAC利用与AS-REQ之间的预共享存证校验密钥IK AS，采用与AS-REQ预共享的消息完整性校验算法对AS-REQAck中MIC AS_REQ之前的其他字段计算得到MIC AS_REQ，对比计算出的MIC AS_REQ与AS-REQAck中的MIC AS_REQ是否一致，若不一致，则丢弃AS-REQAck。
(2)、可选的，计算MIC AS。
S321、AS-AAC向AAC发送第一存在确认消息AS-AACAck。
该AS-AACAck中包括ID AAC、Nonce AAC及MIC AS。其中，ID AAC、MIC AS为可选字段；MIC AS是AS-AAC利用自身与AAC之间的预共享校验密钥IK AAC_AS，采用与AAC之间预共享的消息完整性校验算法对AS-AACAck中MIC AS之前的其他字段计算得到的。
S322、AAC收到AS-AACAck后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、若AS-AACAck中存在ID AAC，则检查ID AAC是否与AAC自身的身份标识ID AAC相同；
(2)、检查Nonce AAC是否与AAC生成的Nonce AAC相同；
(3)、若AS-AACAck中存在MIC AS，则验证MIC AS；
AAC利用与AS-AAC之间的预共享校验密钥IK AAC_AS，采用与AS-AAC之间预共享的消息完整性校验算法对AS-AACAck中MIC AS之前的其他字段计算得到MIC AS，对比计算出的MIC AS与AS-AACAck中的MIC AS是否一致。
(4)、上述检查与验证通过后，计算MacTag AAC；上述检查与验证中任一步不通过，则立即丢弃AS-AACAck；
(5)、计算会话密钥；
AAC将S314中计算的K1结合ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、Nonce REQ、ID AAC、Nonce AAC及其他信息(AAC和REQ采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算会话密钥，用于REQ和AAC后续的保密通信。
S323、AAC向REQ发送鉴别完成消息AACFinish。
该AACFinish中包括TID REQnew和MacTag AAC。其中，TID REQnew应与AACUpdate中的TID REQnew相同；MacTag AAC是AAC利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括AACFinish中除MacTag AAC外的其他字段在内的信息在本地计算得到的。
S324、REQ接收AACFinish后，执行下述操作，包括：
(1)、验证MacTag AAC；
REQ利用消息完整性校验密钥对包括AACFinish中除MacTag AAC外的其他字段在内的信息在本地计算得到MacTag AAC，对比计算出的MacTag AAC与AACFinish中的MacTag AAC是否一致，若一致，则确定AAC身份合法，若不一致，则丢弃AACFinish。
(2)、保存TID REQnew；
(3)、计算会话密钥；
REQ将在S312中计算得到的K1结合ID REQ⊕Nonce REQID、Nonce REQ、ID AAC、Nonce AAC及其他信息(REQ和AAC采用的其他信息是相同的且可选的，譬如特定字符串等)，利用密钥导出算法计算出会话密钥，用于REQ和AAC后续的保密通信。
由此在S314和S324分别实现对REQ和对AAC的身份鉴别，即实现REQ和AAC的双向身份鉴别。
在上述各实施例中，每条消息还可以携带一个杂凑值HASH X_Y，该杂凑值HASH X_Y是该消息的发送方实体X利用杂凑算法对接收到的对端实体Y发送的最新前序消息计算得到的，用于对端实体Y来验证实体X是否接收到完整的最新前序消息。其中，HASH REQ_AAC表示REQ对接收到的AAC发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值，HASH AAC_REQ表示AAC对接收到的REQ发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值，HASH AAC_AS-AAC表示AAC对接收到的AS-AAC发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值，HASH AS-AAC_AAC表示AS-AAC对接收到的AAC发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值，HASH AS-AAC_AS-REQ表示AS-AAC对接收到的AS-REQ发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值，HASH AS-REQ_AS-AAC表示AS-REQ对接收到的AS-AAC发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。若发送方实体X当前发送的消息为实体X和实体Y之间交互的首条消息，意味着实体X未曾收到对端实体Y发送的前序消息，则该条消息中HASH X_Y可以不存在或者无意义。
对应的，对端实体Y接收到实体X发送的消息后，若该条消息中包含HASH X_Y，则当实体Y未曾向实体X发送过前序消息时，实体Y忽略HASH X_Y；当实体Y曾向实体X发送过前序消息时，实体Y利用杂凑算法对之前向实体X发送的最新前序消息在本地计算杂凑值，并与接收到的消息中携带的杂凑值HASH X_Y比较，若一致，则执行后续步骤，否则丢弃或者结束本次鉴别过程。
本申请中，对实体X而言，对端实体Y向实体X发送的前序消息指的是：实体X向对端实体Y发送消息M之前，接收过的对端实体Y向实体X发送的消息；对端实体Y向实体X发送的最新前序消息指的是：实体X向对端实体Y发送消息M之前，接收的对端实体Y向实体X发送的最新一条消息。若实体X向其对端实体Y发送的消息M是实体X和实体Y之间交互的第一条消息，则实体X向其对端实体Y发送消息M之前，不存在对端实体Y向实体X发送的前序消息。
上述图2和图3对应实施例中的可选字段和可选操作，在说明书附图的图2和图3中用“*”表示。以上所有实施例涉及的消息中包括的各个内容不限定顺序，且在没有特别说明的情况下，不限定消息接收方收到消息后对相关消息的操作顺序以及对消息中所包括的内容进行处理的顺序。
基于图1至图3所对应的方法实施例，参见图4，本申请实施例提供了一种鉴别接入控制器，所述鉴别接入控制器包括：
接收单元401，用于接收请求设备发送的鉴别请求消息，所述鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；所述请求设备的身份信息密文是所述请求设备利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的身份标识在内的加密数据加密得到的；
发送单元402，用于向所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第二鉴别服务器发送携带有所述请求设备的身份信息密文的第一鉴权请求消息；
接收单元401，还用于接收所述第二鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴权响应消息，并从所述第一鉴权响应消息中获得所述请求设备信任的第一鉴别服务器产生的存证随机数和所述第一鉴别服务器生成的身份鉴别密钥；所述身份鉴别密钥是根据包括所述第一鉴别服务器与所述请求设备的预共享加密密钥在内的计算数据计算得到的；
发送单元402，还用于向所述请求设备发送第一验证消息，所述第一验证消息中包括所述存证随机数；
接收单元401，还用于接收所述请求设备发送的第二验证消息，所述第二验证消息中包括第一身份鉴权码和第一消息完整性校验码；所述第一消息完整性校验码是所述请求设备利用其与所述鉴别接入控制器之间的消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述第二验证消息中除所述第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；其中，所述消息完整性校验密钥是根据包括所述身份鉴别密钥在内的信息计算得到的；
处理单元403，用于对所述第一消息完整性校验码进行验证，验证通过后，确定所述请求设备的身份为合法，生成鉴别完成消息和第一存证消息；
发送单元402，还用于向所述请求设备发送所述鉴别完成消息，以及向所述第二鉴别服务器发送所述第一存证消息。
可选的，发送单元402还用于：
发送所述第一存证消息，当通过接收单元401接收到所述第一存证确认消息后，向所述请求设备发送所述鉴别完成消息。
可选的，所述第一验证消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器根据所述身份鉴别密钥生成的第一密钥交换参数，所述第二验证消息中还包括所述请求设备根据所述身份鉴别密钥生成的第二密钥交换参数，则处理单元403还用于：
根据包括所述第一密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述第二密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算出所述消息完整性校验密钥。
可选的，接收单元401接收的第二验证消息中的第二密钥交换参数是所述请求设备利用所述身份鉴别密钥，采用对称加密算法对包括所述请求设备产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行加密生成的；
处理单元403还用于：利用所述身份鉴别密钥，采用对称加密算法对包括所述鉴别接入控制器产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行加密生成所述第一密钥交换参数；
处理单元403计算所述消息完整性校验密钥具体为，根据包括所述第一密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和由所述第二密钥交换参数恢复出的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成所述第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用所述密钥导出算法计算出所述消息完整性校验密钥。
可选的，处理单元403具体用于：
计算所述身份鉴别密钥的杂凑值，对所述杂凑值和包括所述鉴别接入控制器产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行异或运算生成所述第一密钥交换参数。
可选的，接收单元401接收的鉴别请求消息中还包括所述请求设备生成的第一随机数；发送单元402发送的第一鉴权请求消息中还包括所述第一随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第二随机数；
则接收单元401接收的第一鉴权响应消息中还包括所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数；发送单元402发送的第一验证消息中还包括所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数；所述身份鉴别密钥的计算数据还包括所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数；接收单元401接收的第二验证消息中还包括所述第二随机数；
则发送单元402向所述请求设备发送第一验证消息之前，处理单元403还用于：验证所述第一鉴权响应消息中的第二随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第二随机数的一致性；以及，
所述处理单元403确定所述请求设备的身份为合法之前，还用于：对所述第二验证消息中的第二随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第二随机数的一致性进行验证。
可选的，接收单元401接收的鉴别请求消息中还包括所述请求设备支持的安全能力参数信息，则处理单元403还用于：
根据所述安全能力参数信息确定所述鉴别接入控制器使用的特定安全策略，则所述第一验证消息中还包括所述特定安全策略。
可选的，接收单元401接收的鉴别请求消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，则处理单元403还用于：
根据所述鉴别请求消息中所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识和所述鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述第二鉴别服务器。
可选的，处理单元403在生成所述鉴别完成消息和所述第一存证消息之前，还用于：
为所述请求设备分配临时身份标识；则发送单元402发送的鉴别完成消息和第一存证消息中还包括所述请求设备的临时身份标识。
可选的，接收单元401具体通过以下方式获得所述身份鉴别密钥：
利用与所述第二鉴别服务器的预共享加密密钥解密身份鉴别密钥密文得到所述身份鉴别密钥；所述身份鉴别密钥密文是所述第二鉴别服务器利用与所述鉴别接入控制器的预共享加密密钥对包括所述身份鉴别密钥在内的信息加密生成的。
可选的，发送单元402发送的第一鉴权请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识；接收单元401接收的第一鉴权响应消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识；
则发送单元402向所述请求设备发送第一验证消息之前，处理单元403还用于：验证所述第一鉴权响应消息中的所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识和所述鉴别接入控制器自身的身份标识的一致性。
可选的，接收单元401接收的第一鉴权响应消息中还包括所述请求设备的身份标识密文，发送单元402发送的第一验证消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识；
则处理单元403还用于：当确定所述请求设备的身份为合法时，根据包括所述第一密钥、所述请求设备的身份标识密文和所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识在内的信息计算生成用于后续保密通信的会话密钥。
可选的，接收单元401接收的第二验证消息中的第一消息完整性校验码是所述请求设备利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述第二验证消息中除所述第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的。
可选的，所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述请求设备发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；所述鉴别接入控制器向所述第二鉴别服务器发送的消息 还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述第二鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
参见图5，本申请实施例还提供了一种请求设备，所述请求设备包括：
发送单元501，用于向鉴别接入控制器发送鉴别请求消息，所述鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；所述请求设备的身份信息密文是所述请求设备利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的身份标识在内的加密数据加密得到的；
接收单元502，用于接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的第一验证消息，所述第一验证消息中包括存证随机数；
处理单元503，用于利用所述请求设备与其信任的第一鉴别服务器的预共享存证校验密钥对包括所述存证随机数在内的信息计算生成第一身份鉴权码；以及，利用所述请求设备与所述鉴别接入控制器之间的消息完整性校验密钥对包括第二验证消息中除第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成第一消息完整性校验码；其中，所述消息完整性校验密钥是根据包括身份鉴别密钥在内的信息计算得到的，所述身份鉴别密钥是根据包括所述请求设备与所述第一鉴别服务器的预共享加密密钥在内的计算数据计算得到的；
发送单元501，还用于向所述鉴别接入控制器发送所述第二验证消息，所述第二验证消息中包括所述第一身份鉴权码和所述第一消息完整性校验码；
接收单元502，还用于接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的鉴别完成消息；
处理单元503，还用于对所述鉴别完成消息中的第二消息完整性校验码进行验证，验证通过后，确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份为合法；所述第二消息完整性校验码是所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别完成消息中除所述第二消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的。
可选的，所述第一验证消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器根据身份鉴别密钥生成的第一密钥交换参数；所述第二验证消息中还包括所述请求设备根据所述身份鉴别密钥生成的第二密钥交换参数，则处理单元503还用于：
根据包括所述第二密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述第一密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算出所述消息完整性校验密钥。
可选的，接收单元502接收的第一验证消息中所述第一密钥交接参数是所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述身份鉴别密钥，采用对称加密算法对包括所述鉴别接入控制器产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行加密生成的；
处理单元503还用于：利用所述身份鉴别密钥，采用对称加密算法对包括所述请求设备产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行加密，生成所述第二密钥交换参数；
处理单元503计算所述消息完整性校验密钥具体为，根据包括所述第二密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和由所述第一密钥交换参数恢复出的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成所述第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用所述密钥导出算法计算出所述消息完整性校验密钥。
可选的，处理单元503具体用于：计算所述身份鉴别密钥的杂凑值，对所述杂凑值和包括所述请求设备产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行异或运算生成所述第二密钥交换参数。
可选的，发送单元501发送的鉴别请求消息中还包括所述请求设备生成的第一随机数；接收单元502接收的第一验证消息中还包括所述第一随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第二随机数；所述身份鉴别密钥的计算数据还包括所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数；发送单元501发送的第二验证消息中还包括所述第二随机数；
则发送单元501向所述鉴别接入控制器发送第二验证消息之前，处理单元503还用于：验证所述第一验证消息中的第一随机数和所述请求设备生成的第一随机数的一致性。
可选的，所述请求设备的身份信息密文的加密数据还包括所述请求设备生成的身份标识加密密钥；
则接收单元502接收的第一验证消息中还包括请求设备的身份标识密文；所述请求设备的身份标识密文是所述第一鉴别服务器利用解密所述请求设备的身份信息密文所得的所述身份标识加密密钥对所述请求设备的身份标识加密得到的；
则发送单元501向所述鉴别接入控制器发送第二验证消息之前，处理单元503还用于：根据自身的身份标识和所述身份标识加密密钥对所述第一验证消息中的所述请求设备的身份标识密文进行验证。
可选的，接收单元502接收的鉴别完成消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器为所述请求设备分配的临时身份标识；
则处理单元503还用于：确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份合法时保存所述请求设备的临时身份标识。
可选的，接收单元502接收的第一验证消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识，则处理单元503还用于：
当确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份为合法时，根据包括所述第一密钥、所述请求设备的身份标识密 文和所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识在内的信息计算生成用于后续保密通信的会话密钥。
可选的，处理单元503还用于：
利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述第二验证消息中除第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成第一消息完整性校验码；
接收单元502接收的鉴别完成消息中的第二消息完整性校验码是所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别完成消息中除所述第二消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的。
可选的，所述请求设备向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述请求设备对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
参见图6，本申请实施例还提供了一种第一鉴别服务器，所述第一鉴别服务器为请求设备信任的鉴别服务器，包括：
处理单元601，用于利用加密证书对应的私钥解密请求设备的身份信息密文得到请求设备的身份标识，根据请求设备的身份标识确定所述请求设备的合法性，在确定所述请求设备的身份合法后，产生存证随机数和身份鉴别密钥；所述身份鉴别密钥是根据包括所述第一鉴别服务器与所述请求设备的预共享加密密钥在内的计算数据计算得到的；
处理单元601，还用于对第一存证消息中的第一身份鉴权码进行验证，验证通过后，生成并存储所述请求设备的请求通过记录。
可选的，处理单元601还用于：对所述第一存证消息中的所述第一身份鉴权码验证通过后，生成第一存证确认消息。
可选的，处理单元601还用于：在生成和存储所述请求设备的请求通过记录时，保存所述鉴别接入控制器为所述请求设备分配的临时身份标识。
可选的，所述第一鉴别服务器与所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第二鉴别服务器不同时，所述第一鉴别服务器还包括：
接收单元，用于接收所述第二鉴别服务器发送的第二鉴权请求消息；所述第二鉴权请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；
发送单元，用于向所述第二鉴别服务器发送第二鉴权响应消息，所述第二鉴权响应消息中包括所述身份鉴别密钥和所述存证随机数；
所述接收单元还用于接收所述第二鉴别服务器发送的第二存证消息，所述第二存证消息中包括所述第一身份鉴权码；
处理单元601具体用于验证所述第二存证消息中的所述第一身份鉴权码。
可选的，处理单元601还用于在对所述第二存证消息中的所述第一身份鉴权码验证通过后，生成第二存证确认消息；所述发送单元还用于向所述第二鉴别服务器发送所述第二存证确认消息。
可选的，所述第一鉴别服务器向所述第二鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第一鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第二鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
参见图7，本申请实施例还提供了一种第二鉴别服务器，所述第二鉴别服务器为鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器，包括：
接收单元701，用于接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的携带有请求设备的身份信息密文的第一鉴权请求消息；
发送单元702，用于向所述鉴别接入控制器发送第一鉴权响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息中包括所述请求设备信任的第一鉴别服务器产生的存证随机数和所述第一鉴别服务器生成的身份鉴别密钥；
接收单元701，还用于接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的第一存证消息，所述第一存证消息中包括第一身份鉴权码。
可选的，接收单元701接收的第一存证消息中还包括第二身份鉴权码，所述第二身份鉴权码是所述鉴别接入控制器利用其与所述第二鉴别服务器的预共享校验密钥对所述第一存证消息中所述第二身份鉴权码之前的其他字段计算生成的；则所述第二鉴别服务器还包括：
验证单元，用于利用与所述鉴别接入控制器的预共享校验密钥验证所述第二身份鉴权码的正确性。
可选的，所述第二鉴别服务器与所述请求设备信任的第一鉴别服务器不同时，所述第二鉴别服务器还包括：
处理单元，用于根据所述第一鉴权请求消息生成第二鉴权请求消息，所述第二鉴权请求消息包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；
发送单元702，还用于向所述第一鉴别服务器发送所述第二鉴权请求消息；
接收单元701，还用于接收所述第一鉴别服务器发送的第二鉴权响应消息，所述第二鉴权响应消息中包括所述身份鉴别密钥和所述存证随机数；
所述处理单元，还用于根据所述第二鉴权响应消息生成所述第一鉴权响应消息；
所述处理单元，还用于根据所述第一存证消息生成第二存证消息，所述第二存证消息包括所述第一身份鉴权码；
发送单元702，还用于向所述第一鉴别服务器发送所述第二存证消息。
可选的，接收单元701还用于接收所述第一鉴别服务器生成的第二存证确认消息；
所述处理单元还用于在接收单元701接收到第二存证确认消息后，生成第一存证确认消息；发送单元702还用于向所述鉴别接入控制器发送所述第一存证确认消息。
可选的，所述第二鉴别服务器向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述第二鉴别服务器对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；所述第二鉴别服务器向所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第二鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第一鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
上述请求设备和鉴别接入控制器采用对称密钥的实体鉴别协议进行双向身份鉴别时，以密文的形式传输请求设备的身份信息，由此保证身份鉴别过程中请求设备的真实身份信息的安全性。另外，鉴别接入控制器在验证请求设备的身份合法后，会相应地向请求设备信任的第一鉴别服务器发送第一存证消息，以利用该第一鉴别服务器记录请求设备请求访问网络的行为，为后续网络接入点计费提供客观证据，有效地防止网络接入点对没有在其服务区内尝试访问网络的用户恶意计费。
参见图8，本申请实施例还提供了一种鉴别接入控制器AAC，包括：
存储器801，用于存储程序指令；
处理器802，用于调用所述存储器801中存储的程序指令，按照获得的程序执行上述实施例中的AAC执行的步骤。
应理解，该鉴别接入控制器可以实现本申请实施例的各个方法中由AAC实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
参见图9，本申请实施例还提供了一种请求设备REQ，包括：
存储器901，用于存储程序指令；
处理器902，用于调用所述存储器901中存储的程序指令，按照获得的程序执行上述实施例中的REQ执行的步骤。
应理解，该请求设备可以实现本申请实施例的各个方法中由REQ实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
参见图10，本申请实施例还提供了一种第一鉴别服务器AS-REQ，包括：
存储器1001，用于存储程序指令；
处理器1002，用于调用所述存储器1001中存储的程序指令，按照获得的程序执行上述实施例中的AS-REQ执行的步骤。
应理解，该第一鉴别服务器可以实现本申请实施例的各个方法中由AS-REQ实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
参见图11，本申请实施例还提供了一种第二鉴别服务器AS-AAC，包括：
存储器1101，用于存储程序指令；
处理器1102，用于调用所述存储器1101中存储的程序指令，按照获得的程序执行上述实施例中的AS-AAC执行的步骤。
应理解，该第二鉴别服务器可以实现本申请实施例的各个方法中由AS-AAC实现的相应流程，为了简洁，在此不再赘述。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解：实现上述方法实施例的全部或部分步骤可以通过程序指令相关的硬件来完成，前述程序可以存储于计算机可读取存储介质中，该程序在执行时，执行包括上述方法实施例的步骤；而前述的存储介质可以是下述介质中的至少一种：只读存储器(英文：Read-Only Memory，缩写：ROM)、RAM、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
需要说明的是，本说明书中的各个实施例均采用递进的方式描述，各个实施例之间相同相似的部分互相参见即可，每个实施例重点说明的都是与其他实施例的不同之处。尤其，对于设备及系统实施例而言，由于其与方法实施例相一致和对应，所以描述得比较简单，相关之处参见方法实施例的部分说明即可。以上所描述的设备及系统实施例仅是示意性的，其中作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，也可以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或全部模块来实现本实施例方案的目的。本领域普通技术人员在不付出创造性劳动的情况下，即可理解并实施。
以上所述，仅为本申请的一种具体实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本申请揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到的变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。因此，本申请的保护范围应该以权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims (58)

  1. 一种身份鉴别方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    请求设备向鉴别接入控制器发送鉴别请求消息，所述鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；所述请求设备的身份信息密文是所述请求设备利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的身份标识在内的加密数据加密得到的；
    所述鉴别接入控制器向其信任的第二鉴别服务器发送携带有所述请求设备的身份信息密文的第一鉴权请求消息，接收所述第二鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴权响应消息，从所述第一鉴权响应消息中获得所述请求设备信任的第一鉴别服务器产生的存证随机数和所述第一鉴别服务器生成的身份鉴别密钥，其中，所述存证随机数和所述身份鉴别密钥是所述第一鉴别服务器在解密所述请求设备的身份信息密文并根据解密得到的所述请求设备的身份标识确定所述请求设备的身份合法后产生的；所述身份鉴别密钥是根据包括所述第一鉴别服务器与所述请求设备的预共享加密密钥在内的计算数据计算得到的；
    所述请求设备接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的第一验证消息，向所述鉴别接入控制器发送第二验证消息，所述第一验证消息中包括所述存证随机数，所述第二验证消息中包括第一身份鉴权码和第一消息完整性校验码；所述第一身份鉴权码是所述请求设备利用其与所述第一鉴别服务器的预共享存证校验密钥对包括所述存证随机数在内的信息计算生成的；所述第一消息完整性校验码是所述请求设备利用其与所述鉴别接入控制器之间的消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述第二验证消息中除所述第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；其中，所述消息完整性校验密钥是根据包括所述身份鉴别密钥在内的信息计算生成的；
    所述鉴别接入控制器对所述第一消息完整性校验码进行验证，验证通过后，确定所述请求设备的身份为合法，生成鉴别完成消息和第一存证消息；
    所述请求设备对所述鉴别完成消息中的第二消息完整性校验码进行验证，验证通过后，确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份为合法；所述第二消息完整性校验码是所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别完成消息中除所述第二消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；
    所述第一鉴别服务器对所述第一存证消息中的所述第一身份鉴权码进行验证，验证通过后，生成并存储所述请求设备的请求通过记录。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器发送所述第一存证消息，所述第一鉴别服务器对所述第一存证消息中的所述第一身份鉴权码验证通过后，生成第一存证确认消息；
    所述鉴别接入控制器接收所述第一存证确认消息后，向所述请求设备发送所述鉴别完成消息。
  3. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述消息完整性校验密钥是所述请求设备和所述鉴别接入控制器协商生成的，包括：
    所述第一验证消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器根据所述身份鉴别密钥生成的第一密钥交换参数；
    所述第二验证消息中还包括所述请求设备根据所述身份鉴别密钥生成的第二密钥交换参数；
    所述请求设备根据包括所述第二密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述第一密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算所述消息完整性校验密钥；
    所述鉴别接入控制器根据包括所述第一密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述第二密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成所述第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用所述密钥导出算法计算所述消息完整性校验密钥。
  4. 根据权利要求3所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述身份鉴别密钥，采用对称加密算法对包括所述鉴别接入控制器产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行加密，生成所述第一密钥交换参数；
    所述请求设备利用所述身份鉴别密钥，采用对称加密算法对包括所述请求设备产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行加密，生成所述第二密钥交换参数；
    则所述请求设备计算所述消息完整性校验密钥具体为，根据包括所述第二密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和由所述第一密钥交换参数恢复出的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成所述第一密钥，再根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算所述消息完整性校验密钥；
    所述鉴别接入控制器计算所述消息完整性校验密钥具体为，根据包括所述第一密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和由所述第二密钥交换参数恢复出的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成所述第一密钥，再根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用所述密钥导出算法计算所述消息完整性校验密钥。
  5. 根据权利要求4所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器计算所述身份鉴别密钥的杂凑值，对所述杂凑值和包括所述鉴别接入控制器产 生的临时公钥在内的信息进行异或运算生成所述第一密钥交换参数；
    所述请求设备计算所述身份鉴别密钥的杂凑值，对所述杂凑值和包括所述请求设备产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行异或运算生成所述第二密钥交换参数。
  6. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述鉴别请求消息中还包括所述请求设备生成的第一随机数；所述第一鉴权请求消息中还包括所述第一随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第二随机数；
    则所述第一鉴权响应消息中还包括所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数；所述第一验证消息中还包括所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数；所述身份鉴别密钥的计算数据还包括所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数；所述第二验证消息中还包括所述第二随机数；
    则所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送第一验证消息之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器验证所述第一鉴权响应消息中的第二随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第二随机数的一致性；
    则所述请求设备向所述鉴别接入控制器发送第二验证消息之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述请求设备验证所述第一验证消息中的第一随机数和所述请求设备生成的第一随机数的一致性；
    则在所述鉴别接入控制器确定所述请求设备的身份为合法之前，还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器对所述第二验证消息中的第二随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第二随机数的一致性进行验证。
  7. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述鉴别请求消息中还包括所述请求设备支持的安全能力参数信息，则所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器根据所述安全能力参数信息确定所述鉴别接入控制器使用的特定安全策略，则所述第一验证消息中还包括所述特定安全策略。
  8. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述鉴别请求消息中还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，则所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器根据所述鉴别请求消息中所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识和所述鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述第二鉴别服务器。
  9. 根据权利要求3所述的方法，其特征在于，所述请求设备的身份信息密文的加密数据还包括所述请求设备生成的身份标识加密密钥；
    则所述第一鉴权响应消息中还包括所述请求设备的身份标识密文，所述请求设备的身份标识密文是所述第一鉴别服务器利用解密所述请求设备的身份信息密文所得的所述身份标识加密密钥对所述请求设备的身份标识加密得到的；所述第一验证消息中还包括所述请求设备的身份标识密文；
    在所述请求设备向所述鉴别接入控制器发送第二验证消息之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述请求设备根据自身的身份标识和所述身份标识加密密钥对所述第一验证消息中的所述请求设备的身份标识密文进行验证。
  10. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，在生成所述鉴别完成消息和所述第一存证消息之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器为所述请求设备分配临时身份标识，则所述鉴别完成消息和所述第一存证消息中还包括所述请求设备的临时身份标识；
    所述请求设备确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份合法时还保存所述请求设备的临时身份标识，所述第一鉴别服务器在生成和存储所述请求设备的请求通过记录时还保存所述请求设备的临时身份标识。
  11. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述鉴别接入控制器通过以下方式获得所述身份鉴别密钥：
    所述鉴别接入控制器利用与所述第二鉴别服务器的预共享加密密钥解密身份鉴别密钥密文得到所述身份鉴别密钥；所述身份鉴别密钥密文是所述第二鉴别服务器利用与所述鉴别接入控制器的预共享加密密钥对包括所述身份鉴别密钥在内的信息加密生成的。
  12. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一存证消息中还包括第二身份鉴权码，所述第二身份鉴权码是所述鉴别接入控制器利用与所述第二鉴别服务器的预共享校验密钥对所述第一存证消息中所述第二身份鉴权码之前的其他字段计算生成的，则所述第一鉴别服务器在生成和存储所述请求设备的请求通过记录之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述第二鉴别服务器利用与所述鉴别接入控制器的预共享校验密钥验证所述第二身份鉴权码的正确性。
  13. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一鉴权请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识；则所述第一鉴权响应消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识，所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送第一验证消息之前，还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器验证所述第一鉴权响应消息中的所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识和所述鉴别 接入控制器自身的身份标识的一致性。
  14. 根据权利要求9所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一验证消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识，所述方法还包括：
    当确定所述请求设备的身份为合法时，所述鉴别接入控制器根据包括所述第一密钥、所述请求设备的身份标识密文和所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识在内的信息计算生成用于后续保密通信的会话密钥；
    当确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份为合法时，所述请求设备根据包括所述第一密钥、所述请求设备的身份标识密文和所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识在内的信息计算生成用于后续保密通信的会话密钥。
  15. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一鉴别服务器和所述第二鉴别服务器不同时，则所述方法还包括：
    所述第二鉴别服务器接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的第一鉴权请求消息，根据所述第一鉴权请求消息生成第二鉴权请求消息，向第一鉴别服务器发送所述第二鉴权请求消息；所述第二鉴权请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；
    所述第一鉴别服务器产生存证随机数，生成并向所述第二鉴别服务器发送第二鉴权响应消息；所述第二鉴权响应消息中包括所述身份鉴别密钥和所述存证随机数；
    所述第二鉴别服务器根据所述第二鉴权响应消息生成所述第一鉴权响应消息，所述第一鉴权响应消息中包括所述身份鉴别密钥和所述存证随机数；
    所述鉴别接入控制器生成所述第一存证消息之后，向所述第二鉴别服务器发送所述第一存证消息；
    所述第二鉴别服务器根据所述第一存证消息生成第二存证消息，向所述第一鉴别服务器发送所述第二存证消息；所述第二存证消息中包括所述第一身份鉴权码；
    则所述第一鉴别服务器对所述第一身份鉴权码进行验证，具体为所述第一鉴别服务器验证所述第二存证消息中的所述第一身份鉴权码。
  16. 根据权利要求15所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述鉴别接入控制器先向所述第二鉴别服务器发送所述第一存证消息，所述第二鉴别服务器根据所述第一存证消息生成第二存证消息，向所述第一鉴别服务器发送所述第二存证消息，所述第一鉴别服务器验证所述第二存证消息中的所述第一身份鉴权码，验证通过后生成第二存证确认消息；
    所述第二鉴别服务器接收所述第二存证确认消息后生成第一存证确认消息，并向所述鉴别接入控制器发送所述第一存证确认消息；
    所述鉴别接入控制器接收所述第一存证确认消息后再向所述请求设备发送所述鉴别完成消息。
  17. 根据权利要求1至16任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一消息完整性校验码是所述请求设备利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述第二验证消息中除所述第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；
    所述第二消息完整性校验码是所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别完成消息中除所述第二消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的。
  18. 根据权利要求1至16任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述请求设备向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述请求设备对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；则所述鉴别接入控制器收到所述请求设备发送的消息时，对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，且确定验证通过；
    所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述请求设备发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；则所述请求设备收到所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息时，对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，且确定验证通过；
    所述鉴别接入控制器向所述第二鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述第二鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；则所述第二鉴别服务器收到所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息时，对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，且确定验证通过；
    所述第二鉴别服务器向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述第二鉴别服务器对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；则所述鉴别接入控制器收到所述第二鉴别服务器发送的消息时，对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，且确定验证通过；
    所述第一鉴别服务器向所述第二鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第一鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第二鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；则所述第二鉴别服务器收到所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息时，对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，且确定验证通过；
    所述第二鉴别服务器向所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第二鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第一鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；则所述第一鉴别服务器收到所述第二鉴别服务器发送的消息时，对接收到的消息中的杂凑值进行验证，且确定验证通过。
  19. 一种鉴别接入控制器，其特征在于，所述鉴别接入控制器包括：
    接收单元，用于接收请求设备发送的鉴别请求消息，所述鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；所述请求设备的身份信息密文是所述请求设备利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的身份标识在内的加密数据加密得到的；
    发送单元，用于向所述鉴别接入控制器信任的第二鉴别服务器发送携带有所述请求设备的身份信息密文的第一鉴权请求消息；
    所述接收单元，还用于接收所述第二鉴别服务器发送的第一鉴权响应消息，并从所述第一鉴权响应消息中获得所述请求设备信任的第一鉴别服务器产生的存证随机数和所述第一鉴别服务器生成的身份鉴别密钥；所述身份鉴别密钥是根据包括所述第一鉴别服务器与所述请求设备的预共享加密密钥在内的计算数据计算得到的；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述请求设备发送第一验证消息，所述第一验证消息中包括所述存证随机数；
    所述接收单元，还用于接收所述请求设备发送的第二验证消息，所述第二验证消息中包括第一身份鉴权码和第一消息完整性校验码；所述第一消息完整性校验码是所述请求设备利用其与所述鉴别接入控制器之间的消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述第二验证消息中除所述第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的；其中，所述消息完整性校验密钥是根据包括所述身份鉴别密钥在内的信息计算生成的；
    处理单元，用于对所述第一消息完整性校验码进行验证，验证通过后，确定所述请求设备的身份为合法，生成鉴别完成消息和第一存证消息；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述请求设备发送所述鉴别完成消息，以及向所述第二鉴别服务器发送所述第一存证消息。
  20. 根据权利要求19所述的鉴别接入控制器，其特征在于，所述发送单元还用于：
    发送所述第一存证消息，当通过所述接收单元接收到所述第一存证确认消息后，向所述请求设备发送所述鉴别完成消息。
  21. 根据权利要求19所述的鉴别接入控制器，其特征在于，所述第一验证消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器根据所述身份鉴别密钥生成的第一密钥交换参数，所述第二验证消息中还包括所述请求设备根据所述身份鉴别密钥生成的第二密钥交换参数，则所述处理单元还用于：
    根据包括所述第一密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述第二密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算出所述消息完整性校验密钥。
  22. 根据权利要求21所述的鉴别接入控制器，其特征在于，所述接收单元接收的第二验证消息中的第二密钥交换参数是所述请求设备利用所述身份鉴别密钥，采用对称加密算法对包括所述请求设备产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行加密生成的；
    所述处理单元还用于：利用所述身份鉴别密钥，采用对称加密算法对包括所述鉴别接入控制器产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行加密生成所述第一密钥交换参数；所述处理单元计算所述消息完整性校验密钥具体为，根据包括所述第一密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和由所述第二密钥交换参数恢复出的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成所述第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用所述密钥导出算法计算出所述消息完整性校验密钥。
  23. 根据权利要求22所述的鉴别接入控制器，其特征在于，所述处理单元具体用于：
    计算所述身份鉴别密钥的杂凑值，对所述杂凑值和包括所述鉴别接入控制器产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行异或运算生成所述第一密钥交换参数。
  24. 根据权利要求19所述的鉴别接入控制器，其特征在于，所述接收单元接收的鉴别请求消息中还包括所述请求设备生成的第一随机数；所述发送单元发送的第一鉴权请求消息中还包括所述第一随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第二随机数；
    则所述接收单元接收的第一鉴权响应消息中还包括所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数；所述发送单元发送的第一验证消息中还包括所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数；所述身份鉴别密钥的计算数据还包括所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数；所述接收单元接收的第二验证消息中还包括所述第二随机数；
    则所述处理单元还用于：验证所述第一鉴权响应消息中的第二随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第二随机数的一致性；以及，对所述第二验证消息中的第二随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第二随机数的一致性进行验证。
  25. 根据权利要求19所述的鉴别接入控制器，其特征在于，所述接收单元接收的鉴别请求消息中还包括所述请求设备支持的安全能力参数信息，则所述处理单元还用于：
    根据所述安全能力参数信息确定所述鉴别接入控制器使用的特定安全策略，则所述第一验证消息中还包括所述特定安全策略。
  26. 根据权利要求19所述的鉴别接入控制器，其特征在于，所述接收单元接收的鉴别请求消息中 还包括所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识，则所述处理单元还用于：
    根据所述鉴别请求消息中所述请求设备信任的至少一个鉴别服务器的身份标识和所述鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器的身份标识，确定所述第二鉴别服务器。
  27. 根据权利要求19所述的鉴别接入控制器，其特征在于，所述处理单元还用于：
    为所述请求设备分配临时身份标识；则所述发送单元发送的鉴别完成消息和第一存证消息中还包括所述请求设备的临时身份标识。
  28. 根据权利要求19所述的鉴别接入控制器，其特征在于，所述接收单元具体通过以下方式获得所述身份鉴别密钥：
    利用与所述第二鉴别服务器的预共享加密密钥解密身份鉴别密钥密文得到所述身份鉴别密钥；所述身份鉴别密钥密文是所述第二鉴别服务器利用与所述鉴别接入控制器的预共享加密密钥对包括所述身份鉴别密钥在内的信息加密生成的。
  29. 根据权利要求19所述的鉴别接入控制器，其特征在于，所述发送单元发送的第一鉴权请求消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识；所述接收单元接收的第一鉴权响应消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识；
    则所述处理单元还用于：验证所述第一鉴权响应消息中的所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识和所述鉴别接入控制器自身的身份标识的一致性。
  30. 根据权利要求21所述的鉴别接入控制器，其特征在于，所述接收单元接收的第一鉴权响应消息中还包括所述请求设备的身份标识密文，所述发送单元发送的第一验证消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识；
    则所述处理单元还用于：当确定所述请求设备的身份为合法时，根据包括所述第一密钥、所述请求设备的身份标识密文和所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识在内的信息计算生成用于后续保密通信的会话密钥。
  31. 根据权利要求19至30任一项所述的鉴别接入控制器，其特征在于，所述接收单元接收的第二验证消息中的第一消息完整性校验码是所述请求设备利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述第二验证消息中除所述第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的。
  32. 根据权利要求19至30任一项所述的鉴别接入控制器，其特征在于，所述鉴别接入控制器向所述请求设备发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述请求设备发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；所述鉴别接入控制器向所述第二鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述鉴别接入控制器对接收到的所述第二鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
  33. 一种请求设备，其特征在于，所述请求设备包括：
    发送单元，用于向鉴别接入控制器发送鉴别请求消息，所述鉴别请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；所述请求设备的身份信息密文是所述请求设备利用加密证书的公钥对包括所述请求设备的身份标识在内的加密数据加密得到的；
    接收单元，用于接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的第一验证消息，所述第一验证消息中包括存证随机数；
    处理单元，用于利用所述请求设备与其信任的第一鉴别服务器的预共享存证校验密钥对包括所述存证随机数在内的信息计算生成第一身份鉴权码；以及，利用所述请求设备与所述鉴别接入控制器之间的消息完整性校验密钥对包括第二验证消息中除第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成第一消息完整性校验码；其中，所述消息完整性校验密钥是根据包括身份鉴别密钥在内的信息计算得到的，所述身份鉴别密钥是根据包括所述请求设备与所述第一鉴别服务器的预共享加密密钥在内的计算数据计算得到的；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述鉴别接入控制器发送所述第二验证消息，所述第二验证消息中包括所述第一身份鉴权码和所述第一消息完整性校验码；
    所述接收单元，还用于接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的鉴别完成消息；
    所述处理单元，还用于对所述鉴别完成消息中的第二消息完整性校验码进行验证，验证通过后，确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份为合法；所述第二消息完整性校验码是所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别完成消息中除所述第二消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的。
  34. 根据权利要求33所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述第一验证消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器根据身份鉴别密钥生成的第一密钥交换参数；所述第二验证消息中还包括所述请求设备根据所述身份鉴别密钥生成的第二密钥交换参数，则所述处理单元还用于：
    根据包括所述第二密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和所述第一密钥交换参数所包括的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用密钥导出算法计算出所述消息完整性校验密钥。
  35. 根据权利要求34所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述接收单元接收的第一验证消息中所述第一密钥交接参数是所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述身份鉴别密钥，采用对称加密算法对包括所述鉴别接入控制器产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行加密生成的；
    所述处理单元还用于：利用所述身份鉴别密钥，采用对称加密算法对包括所述请求设备产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行加密，生成所述第二密钥交换参数；
    所述处理单元计算所述消息完整性校验密钥具体为，根据包括所述第二密钥交换参数对应的临时私钥和由所述第一密钥交换参数恢复出的临时公钥进行密钥交换计算生成所述第一密钥，根据包括所述第一密钥在内的信息利用所述密钥导出算法计算出所述消息完整性校验密钥。
  36. 根据权利要求35所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述处理单元具体用于：
    计算所述身份鉴别密钥的杂凑值，对所述杂凑值和包括所述请求设备产生的临时公钥在内的信息进行异或运算生成所述第二密钥交换参数。
  37. 根据权利要求34所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述发送单元发送的鉴别请求消息中还包括所述请求设备生成的第一随机数；所述接收单元接收的第一验证消息中还包括所述第一随机数和所述鉴别接入控制器生成的第二随机数；所述身份鉴别密钥的计算数据还包括所述第一随机数和所述第二随机数；所述发送单元发送的第二验证消息中还包括所述第二随机数；
    则所述处理单元还用于：验证所述第一验证消息中的第一随机数和所述请求设备生成的第一随机数的一致性。
  38. 根据权利要求34所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述请求设备的身份信息密文的加密数据还包括所述请求设备生成的身份标识加密密钥；
    则所述接收单元接收的第一验证消息中还包括请求设备的身份标识密文；所述请求设备的身份标识密文是所述第一鉴别服务器利用解密所述请求设备的身份信息密文所得的所述身份标识加密密钥对所述请求设备的身份标识加密得到的；
    则所述处理单元还用于：根据自身的身份标识和所述身份标识加密密钥对所述第一验证消息中的所述请求设备的身份标识密文进行验证。
  39. 根据权利要求33所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述接收单元接收的鉴别完成消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器为所述请求设备分配的临时身份标识；
    则所述处理单元还用于：确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份合法时保存所述请求设备的临时身份标识。
  40. 根据权利要求38所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述接收单元接收的第一验证消息中还包括所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识，则所述处理单元还用于：
    当确定所述鉴别接入控制器的身份为合法时，根据包括所述第一密钥、所述请求设备的身份标识密文和所述鉴别接入控制器的身份标识在内的信息计算生成用于后续保密通信的会话密钥。
  41. 根据权利要求33至40任一项所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述处理单元还用于：
    利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述第二验证消息中除第一消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成第一消息完整性校验码；
    所述接收单元接收的鉴别完成消息中的第二消息完整性校验码是所述鉴别接入控制器利用所述消息完整性校验密钥对包括所述鉴别完成消息中除所述第二消息完整性校验码外的其他字段计算生成的。
  42. 根据权利要求33至40任一项所述的请求设备，其特征在于，所述请求设备向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述请求设备对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
  43. 一种第一鉴别服务器，其特征在于，所述第一鉴别服务器为请求设备信任的鉴别服务器，所述第一鉴别服务器包括：
    处理单元，用于利用加密证书对应的私钥解密请求设备的身份信息密文得到请求设备的身份标识，根据请求设备的身份标识确定所述请求设备的合法性，在确定所述请求设备的身份合法后，产生存证随机数和身份鉴别密钥，所述身份鉴别密钥是根据包括所述第一鉴别服务器与所述请求设备的预共享加密密钥在内的计算数据计算得到的；
    所述处理单元，还用于对第一存证消息中的第一身份鉴权码进行验证，验证通过后，生成并存储所述请求设备的请求通过记录。
  44. 根据权利要求43所述的第一鉴别服务器，其特征在于，所述处理单元还用于：
    对所述第一存证消息中的所述第一身份鉴权码验证通过后，生成第一存证确认消息。
  45. 根据权利要求43所述的第一鉴别服务器，其特征在于，所述处理单元还用于：
    在生成和存储所述请求设备的请求通过记录时，保存所述鉴别接入控制器为所述请求设备分配的临时身份标识。
  46. 根据权利要求43所述的第一鉴别服务器，其特征在于，所述第一鉴别服务器与所述鉴别接入 控制器信任的第二鉴别服务器不同时，所述第一鉴别服务器还包括：
    接收单元，用于接收所述第二鉴别服务器发送的第二鉴权请求消息，所述第二鉴权请求消息中包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；
    发送单元，用于向所述第二鉴别服务器发送第二鉴权响应消息，所述第二鉴权响应消息中包括所述身份鉴别密钥和所述存证随机数；
    所述接收单元，还用于接收所述第二鉴别服务器发送的第二存证消息，所述第二存证消息中包括所述第一身份鉴权码；
    所述处理单元，具体用于验证所述第二存证消息中的所述第一身份鉴权码。
  47. 根据权利要求46所述的第一鉴别服务器，其特征在于，所述处理单元还用于：在对所述第二存证消息中的所述第一身份鉴权码验证通过后，生成第二存证确认消息；
    所述发送单元还用于：向所述第二鉴别服务器发送所述第二存证确认消息。
  48. 根据权利要求43至47任一项所述的第一鉴别服务器，其特征在于，所述第一鉴别服务器向所述第二鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第一鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第二鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
  49. 一种第二鉴别服务器，其特征在于，所述第二鉴别服务器为鉴别接入控制器信任的鉴别服务器，所述第二鉴别服务器包括：
    接收单元，用于接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的携带有请求设备的身份信息密文的第一鉴权请求消息；
    发送单元，用于向所述鉴别接入控制器发送第一鉴权响应消息，所述第一鉴别响应消息中包括所述请求设备信任的第一鉴别服务器产生的存证随机数和所述第一鉴别服务器生成的身份鉴别密钥；
    所述接收单元，还用于接收所述鉴别接入控制器发送的第一存证消息，所述第一存证消息中包括第一身份鉴权码。
  50. 根据权利要求49所述的第二鉴别服务器，其特征在于，所述接收单元接收的第一存证消息中还包括第二身份鉴权码，所述第二身份鉴权码是所述鉴别接入控制器利用其与所述第二鉴别服务器的预共享校验密钥对所述第一存证消息中所述第二身份鉴权码之前的其他字段计算生成的；则所述第二鉴别服务器还包括：
    验证单元，用于利用与所述鉴别接入控制器的预共享校验密钥验证所述第二身份鉴权码的正确性。
  51. 根据权利要求49所述的第二鉴别服务器，其特征在于，所述第二鉴别服务器与所述请求设备信任的第一鉴别服务器不同时，所述第二鉴别服务器还包括：
    处理单元，用于根据所述第一鉴权请求消息生成第二鉴权请求消息，所述第二鉴权请求消息包括所述请求设备的身份信息密文；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述第一鉴别服务器发送所述第二鉴权请求消息；
    所述接收单元，还用于接收所述第一鉴别服务器发送的第二鉴权响应消息，所述第二鉴权响应消息中包括所述身份鉴别密钥和所述存证随机数；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据所述第二鉴权响应消息生成所述第一鉴权响应消息；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据所述第一存证消息生成第二存证消息，所述第二存证消息包括所述第一身份鉴权码；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述第一鉴别服务器发送所述第二存证消息。
  52. 根据权利要求51所述的第二鉴别服务器，其特征在于，所述接收单元还用于接收所述第一鉴别服务器生成的第二存证确认消息；
    所述处理单元还用于在所述接收单元接收到第二存证确认消息后，生成第一存证确认消息；所述发送单元还用于向所述鉴别接入控制器发送所述第一存证确认消息。
  53. 根据权利要求49至52所述的第二鉴别服务器，其特征在于，所述第二鉴别服务器向所述鉴别接入控制器发送的消息还包括所述第二鉴别服务器对接收到的所述鉴别接入控制器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值；所述第二鉴别服务器向所述第一鉴别服务器发送的消息还包括所述第二鉴别服务器对接收到的所述第一鉴别服务器发送的最新前序消息计算的杂凑值。
  54. 一种鉴别接入控制器，其特征在于，所述鉴别接入控制器包括：
    存储器，用于存储程序指令；
    处理器，用于调用所述存储器中存储的程序指令，按照获得的程序执行如权利要求1～18任一项中鉴别接入控制器侧的方法。
  55. 一种请求设备，其特征在于，所述请求设备包括：
    存储器，用于存储程序指令；
    处理器，用于调用所述存储器中存储的程序指令，按照获得的程序执行如权利要求1～18任一项中 请求设备侧的方法。
  56. 一种第一鉴别服务器，其特征在于，所述第一鉴别服务器包括：
    存储器，用于存储程序指令；
    处理器，用于调用所述存储器中存储的程序指令，按照获得的程序执行如权利要求1～18任一项中第一鉴别服务器侧的方法。
  57. 一种第二鉴别服务器，其特征在于，所述第二鉴别服务器包括：
    存储器，用于存储程序指令；
    处理器，用于调用所述存储器中存储的程序指令，按照获得的程序执行如权利要求1～18任一项中第二鉴别服务器侧的方法。
  58. 一种计算机存储介质，其特征在于，所述计算机存储介质存储有计算机可执行指令，所述计算机可执行指令用于使所述计算机执行权利要求1～18任一项所述的方法。
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