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WO2016076792A1 - Academic certificate - Google Patents

Academic certificate Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2016076792A1
WO2016076792A1 PCT/SG2015/050437 SG2015050437W WO2016076792A1 WO 2016076792 A1 WO2016076792 A1 WO 2016076792A1 SG 2015050437 W SG2015050437 W SG 2015050437W WO 2016076792 A1 WO2016076792 A1 WO 2016076792A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
certificate
smart
smart chip
academic
chip
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/SG2015/050437
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Kok Ann WONG
Original Assignee
Wong Kok Ann
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Wong Kok Ann filed Critical Wong Kok Ann
Publication of WO2016076792A1 publication Critical patent/WO2016076792A1/en

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Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06KGRAPHICAL DATA READING; PRESENTATION OF DATA; RECORD CARRIERS; HANDLING RECORD CARRIERS
    • G06K19/00Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings
    • G06K19/02Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the selection of materials, e.g. to avoid wear during transport through the machine
    • G06K19/025Record carriers for use with machines and with at least a part designed to carry digital markings characterised by the selection of materials, e.g. to avoid wear during transport through the machine the material being flexible or adapted for folding, e.g. paper or paper-like materials used in luggage labels, identification tags, forms or identification documents carrying RFIDs
    • GPHYSICS
    • G07CHECKING-DEVICES
    • G07DHANDLING OF COINS OR VALUABLE PAPERS, e.g. TESTING, SORTING BY DENOMINATIONS, COUNTING, DISPENSING, CHANGING OR DEPOSITING
    • G07D7/00Testing specially adapted to determine the identity or genuineness of valuable papers or for segregating those which are unacceptable, e.g. banknotes that are alien to a currency
    • G07D7/01Testing electronic circuits therein

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to academic certificate. More specifically, the present invention relates to an academic certification having an electronic chip embedded therein and a method of verifying the same through smart phone as chip reader.
  • An academic certificate is a document that certifies that the recipient of the certificate has received specific education or has passed a test or series of tests through the issuing institute. Academic certificates are generally made up of a piece of paper, with the relevant seal and signatures from the issuer's authorities. The stamp seals and signatures are used as a form of authentication of the certificates.
  • an academic certificate comprises two printable sheets; and a smart chip embedded on an inlay, wherein the inlay is sandwich between the printed sheet, wherein the smart chip stores a number of data that provides information relating to a holder of the academic certificate.
  • the academic certificate further includes an embedded antenna that is attached to the smart chip, hi another embodiment, the printed sheet is made of any of paper, plastic, etc.
  • the smart chip is adapted to prevent the academic certificate from being falsified, mistreated by an unauthorized party, etc.
  • a system for maintaining records of the aforesaid academic certificate comprises a remote verification server having a database storing the records of the certificates; a program module deployed on a smart phone, wherein the smart phone is adapted to communicate with the smart chip of the academic certificate wirelessly or contactless; and the aforesaid certificate, wherein the smart chip of the certificate is readable contactlessly through the smart phone to extract information therein.
  • the smart chip of the certificate is read through the program module, the program module communicates with the remote verification server for extracting information therefrom for verifying the authenticity of the certificate.
  • the smart phone communicates with the smart chip via Near Field Communication (NFC) module.
  • NFC Near Field Communication
  • a method of forming an academic certificate comprises embedding a smart chip within a printed sheet, wherein the smart chip is readable by a smart phone contactlessly; enrolling recipient and issuer's information on the smart chip; depositing the enrolled information on a remote server, the remote server is accessible through the smart phone to retrieve corresponding information therefrom for verifying the authenticity of the academic certificate; and deploying a program module on the smart phone, the program module operationally reads the smart chip and communicates with the remote server to retrieve information of at least the recipient of the academic certificate for verification.
  • the smart phone is communicable with the smart chip via Near Field Communication (NFC) module.
  • NFC Near Field Communication
  • the recipient's information includes personal biometric information and personal particulars.
  • FIG. 1 illustrates an overall view of an academic certificate as one embodiment in the present invention
  • FIG. 2 illustrates a schematic diagram showing academic certificate register network as another embodiment in the present invention.
  • FIG.3 illustrates a block diagram of the smart chip of FIG. 1 in accodance with one embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Description
  • FIG. 1 illustrates an academic certificate 100 embedded with a smart chip therein in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention.
  • the Academic Certificate 100 comprises a top printable sheet 101 and a bottom printable sheet and an inlay 102 sandwiched between the top printable and the bottom printable sheet 103.
  • the top and bottom printed sheets 101 and 103 may be made of any material such as paper, plastic, or combination of both etc.
  • the inlay 102 comprises a smart chip 105 and antenna embedded therein.
  • the antenna transmits and receives electromagnetic waves, allowing the smart ship to be read contactlessly through a smart phone integrated with a suitable wireless communication module, such as Near Field Communication (NFC) module.
  • NFC Near Field Communication
  • the academic certificate 100 contains information such as the name of the recipient and issuer, the relevant qualification, signatories, etc. printed thereon. For visual authentication, it is usually provided with a stamp seal from the issuing institute or department of concerns. With the smart chip 102, it allows the academic certificate to store further information digitally thereon. The information may include the recipient ID, photo, and other personal particulars, as well as the academic results therein. The information is extractable through a suitable reader, preferably any personal mobile devices, such as smart phones. Further, the smart chip 102 may further store some security information, such as authentication keys for verification.
  • the remote server belongs to or resides at an authorized source, or any trusted source, such as the certificate issuer/institution, or even government authority for maintaining such database centrally.
  • the security of the smart chip and the associating server is well known in the art and any of these may be desired.
  • the system may adapt asymmetric or symmetric key encryption thereon.
  • the information stored on the smart chip is encoded.
  • the information stored on the smart chip 102 may be categorized in two groups, with are readable according to the authentication right given to the user. This can be achieve through basic access control (BAC) and extended access control (EAC) similar to that introduced by the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization). Certainly, it is understood to a skilled person that other security standard can also be adapted. These mechanisms would enhance the security of the smart chip 102, which prevent it to be tampered or duplicated by any unauthorized parties. It is well known in the art that smart chip is provided with strong security authentication for protecting the information stored therein and it is proven. It is also used widely for authenticate identify.
  • BAC basic access control
  • EAC extended access control
  • the smart chip can be locked permanently against any future changes.
  • Any general public carrying a smart phone deploying with a suitable application would be able to retrieve some or all of the information stored on the smart chip for viewing only for verification. Accordingly, even if a person is capable of tampering the information that are visually printed or engraved on the printed sheet 101, he still won't be able to make any changes to the information stored on the smart chip. The information altered on the printed sheet will therefore not able to conform to the information contained on the smart chip as the academic certificate is verified.
  • the smart chip 102 embedded in the printed sheet 101 of the academic certificate 100 may also include further security element such as a security hologram etc., which may prevent the Academic Certificate 100 from being falsified or mistreated by any unauthorized party. As such, the authenticity of the academic certificate 100 can be certified and proven to be a genuine copy.
  • further security element such as a security hologram etc.
  • the data that may be retrieved from the academic certificate 100 as provided above is by way of example and it is not intended to be limited to the scope of the present invention. Any other information that may be required or found in the certificate may also be stored as digital data in the smart chip embedded in the printed sheet.
  • the smart chip 102 includes a near field communication (NFC) module, which allows the smart chip to be read by ordinary smart phone or smart devices adapted with NFC module for communicating with the smart chip.
  • FIG.2 illustrates a schematic diagram showing academic certificate register network in accordance with an embodiment in the present invention.
  • the network comprises a certificate registration backend system 200 and an authentication frontend system 220.
  • the certificate registration backend system 200 comprises certificate registration server 202, a certificate printer 204 and a holder enrolment station 206.
  • the backend system 200 maybe adapted as a closed system whereby it is not connected to the public network. Data is can thus be transport between the servers/terminals through portable storage medium.
  • the certificate enrollment station 202 is a standalone computer or work station, which may equiped with a finger print scanner 212 and a digital imaging device 214 for acquiring the holder's biometric data. If other biometric information is required, an appropriate biometric reader or scanner can be deployed.
  • the certificate enrollment station 206 may also connect or capable of retrieving the holders' particulars from the issuing organisation's registrations system. Depending on the needs, the holders' particulars and possibly the holders' biometric data may be freshly acquired through the enrolment station 206, or it can possibly be retrieved from the existing register from the certificate issuing organisation.
  • the holder's particulars and biometric data, if any, are transported to the certificate registration server 202.
  • the data can be transported to the certificate registration server 202 though any portable storage media if there is no link between the the enrolment station 206 and the server 202.
  • the certificate registration server 202 is deployed with a Chip Management System (CMS) for processingthe certificate holders' particulars, including the biomatric data and and a chip writer 216 for deploying into individual smart chips.
  • CMS Chip Management System
  • the certificate registration backend server 202 is further connected with a certificate printer 204 for printing the academic certificate having the chip embadded therein.
  • the chip writer 216 can be integgrated on the certificate printer 204 such that the data are written onto the chip as it is printing the certificate, which otherwise, the chip writer 216 writes the required data into the chips of the certificates before it is being sent for printing.
  • the data is written into the chip of the ceritifcate through the certificate registration backend server 202, whereby a chip reader can be employed on the certificate printer 204 so that the printer prints in correspond with the readed chip. That elimites human error and ensures that the printed certificate matches the holder details .
  • the CMS is a backbone system provided for data collections and managements on the stations and server. On the enrolment station, it functions as a data collection station for acquiring holder identity and particulars.
  • the data can be exported and transmitted to the server and printing station via any known means.
  • the collected data can be exported into any suitable data repository format, such as XML or MS Excel® or the like.
  • Any portable storage device such as portable hard disk drive or thumb drives, can be used as a medium for transporting the database from one workstation to another.
  • the network 200 cam be configured as an isolated network, whereby the data can be transmitted to the backend server 202 through a wired network.
  • the CMS module may provide different access levels to the CMS, allowing corresponding authorized personnel to access the different modules of CMS.
  • the access levels include administrator account for accessing user management module and create, alter and remove user credential; an operator account for accessing em-olment module for create new holder's profile; and backend office account for processing new certificate creation through the card printing module.
  • the certficiate registration server 202 further includes a Key Management System (KMS) that facilitates solutions to protect the certificate holders' data.
  • KMS Key Management System
  • the KMS manages all the generations, exchanges, injections and transfer of the keys.
  • the KMS may include SSID key generator, secure access module (SAM) key injector, SSID personalisation module, SSID verification module, etc.
  • SAM secure access module
  • the operations and customizations can be done according to the requirements of the issuing organisation.
  • the key management is carried out in phases: securing the transportation and card protection, generaing key, injecting key, chip personalization, backing up keys, and key rotation. These processes are well know in the art, and it is possible to adapt a different process for managing the key which in turn secure the chip and information stored therein.
  • Transport Key is required for writing PERSO data into the chip. Once data is transported, Final key would be generated and used for later verification.
  • one key will be written on the chip and another key will be stored on the verification server.
  • the app will communicate with the verification server for verifying authentication, before any data can be extracted from the chip.
  • the certificate regsitration backend system 200 can be configured as a closed system. Accordingly, the academic certificate register network further provide a verification server 220 for verifying the authenticity of the certifcate remotely. The verification server 220 is connected to the public network 230, such as Internet, for public access. [0039] The certificate 250 embedded with the smart chip is then issued to the intended holder 280.
  • the certificate 250 can be verified for authenticity through a mobile device 240.
  • the mobile device 240 can be mobile computing device or smart devices capable of accessing the public network, i.e. the Internet. More desirably, the mobile device 240 is integrated with Near Field Communication (NFC) module that is able to read the smart chip wirelessly. Preferably, the mobile device 240 is deployed with application modules adapted for verifying the chip of the certificate.
  • NFC Near Field Communication
  • the mobile device 240 attempts to connect to the verification server 220 through the Internet 230.
  • the mobile application performs the key exchange with the verification server 220 for authentication.
  • the verification server 220 stores on the authentication keys only, of which, it is adapted for verifying the authenticity of the verifying certificate 250.
  • the authentication status is then displayed on the mobile device 240. Besides the authentication status, the mobile application may further display the holder's particulars for further verification.
  • the system may adapt any known cryptography system and method for authentication, such as PKI or the like.
  • the mobile device 240 may further prompt the holder for further authentication through the thumb print for matching the holder's identity.
  • the verification server 220 be resided at the relevant authority, a trusted network or the certificate issuing organization that authorized to host the relevant information. Accordingly, such network allows one to verify if the academic certificate 250 is a genuine one through scanning the smart ship embedded in the academic certificate.
  • the mobile reader may further retrieve the holder's photo for facial verification of the holder visually.
  • the mobile device 240 may further comprise a fingerprint scanner or biometric scanner. Through the scanner, the person holding the academic certificate 250 can also be verified is the truthful holder through matching the person's fingerprint with the biometric information stored on the smart chip on the certificate 250 on-site. This provides an optional level of verification for the certificate.
  • human resource personnel may utilize a personal smart phone that deploys with the dedicated application module to scan the academic certificate presented to them.
  • the dedicated application module connects to the verification server 220 through Internet to verify the authenticity of the certificate.
  • the verification may first verify if the certificate is on records. Once the record is matched, the holder particulars including the holder photo from the host system will be displayed on mobile device 240. The personnel may then verify the information on the mobile device 240 against the certificate and the holder visually.
  • the verification server 220 may include a centralize authority who collects and receives the relevant information and database from multiple certificate-issuing institutes.
  • the verification server 220 can be an international academic database repository organization for centrally maintaining the records of all the academic certificates.
  • the application module for deploying on the mobile device or the smart phone are obtainable from a trusted or authorized source, such as the issuing institute, or the authentic application store, such as App Store and Google Play.
  • FIG. 3 illustrates a block diagram of the smart chip 102 of FIG. 1 in accodance with one embodiment of the present invention.
  • the smart chip 102 can be a secured contactless chip.
  • the data is stored on the chip in a ISO flexible file system.
  • Various file systems are available such as ICAO LDS.
  • the smart chip 102 comprises a EEPROM 302 and a ROM 304.
  • the EEPROM 302 may store personal information of the holder, such as name, Academic Qualification Attain, and etc.
  • the ROM may further stores the identity of the smart chip 102 such as serial number, access right, validity dates and etc, a facial image of the holder, holder's biometric data such as finger print, etc., and security information such as digital signature.
  • the EEPROM 302 may further provide some spare memory, when necessary.
  • the ROM 304 stored the required applications and applets therein, such as file system application and user right manager, and EMC adjations, or other applications.
  • the secured contactless chip with the operating system and the applications/applets deployed therein as a whole shall be at least CC EAL4+ certifed or FPS-140, such as FIPS-140-2 Level 3 chip certified.
  • the applications/applets may be Java applications supporting EAC (Extended Access Control) similar to that defined in the ICAO standard.
  • ICAO ICAO
  • the certificate issuing authority may adapt some other standards , which protect data stored on the smart chip in one or more authentication levels.

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Abstract

The present invention is an academic certificate (100). The academic certificate (100)comprises a printed sheet (101, 103); and a smart chip (105) embedded within the printed sheet (101, 103), wherein the smart chip (105) stores a number of data that provides information relating to a holder of the academic certificate (100). A system for maintaining records of the academic certificate (100) and method of forming the certificate thereof is also provided.

Description

Academic Certificate
Field of the Invention
[001] The present invention relates to academic certificate. More specifically, the present invention relates to an academic certification having an electronic chip embedded therein and a method of verifying the same through smart phone as chip reader.
Background
[002] An academic certificate is a document that certifies that the recipient of the certificate has received specific education or has passed a test or series of tests through the issuing institute. Academic certificates are generally made up of a piece of paper, with the relevant seal and signatures from the issuer's authorities. The stamp seals and signatures are used as a form of authentication of the certificates.
[003] These certificates are most referred by human resource personnel as a reference to the potential candidate's qualifications. However, until the present date, the only way to verify that the certificates are genuine is though actual contact from the personnel to the issuing institute to verify the same, which is mainly manual works. Those who appreciate would understand that such verification process usually takes days or even weeks before any status can be obtained.
[004] Even when the certificate is verified to be genuine, there is no guarantee that the person holding the certificate actually owns the certificate, for the reason that such academic certificate typically printed only the holder name on it. [005] Therefore, there is a need for an academic certificate that allows any third party or with added security features against un-authorized forgery or replication, etc. There is also a need to minimize the risk of losing the documents relating to the certificate and to also decrease the number of documents that may be held in possession by the owner.
[006] Back in February 2010, The New Paper, a local newspaper from
Singapore, reported that there are fake degrees (certificate) from the Reputable University Certificates are available for sale. A year ago, The New Paper also published methods or current practices for verifying academic certificate, namely less secure verification, more secure verification, and a most secure verification. It was admitted that the human resource (HR) officers are not expert in verifying fake certificates. As reported on the newspaper, the less secure method or a standard method requires (job) applicants to submit a copy of their graduation certificates along with the originals for verification. The more secure method requires the documents to be sent directly from the issuing institute, whereby the HR personnel may verify the letterhead, postmark and transcript. The most secure method according to the newspaper is to pick up a phone and call the issuing institute or contacting the issuing institute through writing.
[007] Fake or forged certificates have been long-standing issues, and there is still no immediate solution to readily address this problem.
Summary
[008] In one aspect of the present invention, there is provided an academic certificate comprises two printable sheets; and a smart chip embedded on an inlay, wherein the inlay is sandwich between the printed sheet, wherein the smart chip stores a number of data that provides information relating to a holder of the academic certificate.
[009] In one embodiment, the academic certificate further includes an embedded antenna that is attached to the smart chip, hi another embodiment, the printed sheet is made of any of paper, plastic, etc.
[0010] In yet another embodiment, the smart chip is adapted to prevent the academic certificate from being falsified, mistreated by an unauthorized party, etc.
[0011] In another aspect, there is also provided a system for maintaining records of the aforesaid academic certificate. The system comprises a remote verification server having a database storing the records of the certificates; a program module deployed on a smart phone, wherein the smart phone is adapted to communicate with the smart chip of the academic certificate wirelessly or contactless; and the aforesaid certificate, wherein the smart chip of the certificate is readable contactlessly through the smart phone to extract information therein. The smart chip of the certificate is read through the program module, the program module communicates with the remote verification server for extracting information therefrom for verifying the authenticity of the certificate.
[0012] In one embodiment, the smart phone communicates with the smart chip via Near Field Communication (NFC) module.
[0013] In a further aspect, there is also provided a method of forming an academic certificate. The method comprises embedding a smart chip within a printed sheet, wherein the smart chip is readable by a smart phone contactlessly; enrolling recipient and issuer's information on the smart chip; depositing the enrolled information on a remote server, the remote server is accessible through the smart phone to retrieve corresponding information therefrom for verifying the authenticity of the academic certificate; and deploying a program module on the smart phone, the program module operationally reads the smart chip and communicates with the remote server to retrieve information of at least the recipient of the academic certificate for verification.
[0014] In one embodiment, the smart phone is communicable with the smart chip via Near Field Communication (NFC) module. The recipient's information includes personal biometric information and personal particulars.
Brief Description of the Drawings
[0015] This invention will be described by way of non-limiting embodiments of the present invention, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:
[0016] FIG. 1 illustrates an overall view of an academic certificate as one embodiment in the present invention;
[0017] FIG. 2 illustrates a schematic diagram showing academic certificate register network as another embodiment in the present invention; and
[0018] FIG.3 illustrates a block diagram of the smart chip of FIG. 1 in accodance with one embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Description
[0019] The following descriptions of a number of specific and alternative embodiments are provided to understand the inventive features of the present invention. It shall be apparent to one skilled in the art, however that this invention may be practiced without such specific details. Some of the details may not be described in length so as to not obscure the invention. For ease of reference, common reference numerals will be used throughout the figures when referring to same or similar features common to the figures.
[0020] FIG. 1 illustrates an academic certificate 100 embedded with a smart chip therein in accordance with one embodiment of the present invention. The Academic Certificate 100 comprises a top printable sheet 101 and a bottom printable sheet and an inlay 102 sandwiched between the top printable and the bottom printable sheet 103. The top and bottom printed sheets 101 and 103 may be made of any material such as paper, plastic, or combination of both etc. The inlay 102 comprises a smart chip 105 and antenna embedded therein. The antenna transmits and receives electromagnetic waves, allowing the smart ship to be read contactlessly through a smart phone integrated with a suitable wireless communication module, such as Near Field Communication (NFC) module.
[0021] The academic certificate 100 contains information such as the name of the recipient and issuer, the relevant qualification, signatories, etc. printed thereon. For visual authentication, it is usually provided with a stamp seal from the issuing institute or department of concerns. With the smart chip 102, it allows the academic certificate to store further information digitally thereon. The information may include the recipient ID, photo, and other personal particulars, as well as the academic results therein. The information is extractable through a suitable reader, preferably any personal mobile devices, such as smart phones. Further, the smart chip 102 may further store some security information, such as authentication keys for verification. Preferably, the remote server belongs to or resides at an authorized source, or any trusted source, such as the certificate issuer/institution, or even government authority for maintaining such database centrally. More preferably, it is understood that the security of the smart chip and the associating server is well known in the art and any of these may be desired. For example, the system may adapt asymmetric or symmetric key encryption thereon. [0022] Preferably, the information stored on the smart chip is encoded.
[0023] It is also desired that the information stored on the smart chip 102 may be categorized in two groups, with are readable according to the authentication right given to the user. This can be achieve through basic access control (BAC) and extended access control (EAC) similar to that introduced by the ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization). Certainly, it is understood to a skilled person that other security standard can also be adapted. These mechanisms would enhance the security of the smart chip 102, which prevent it to be tampered or duplicated by any unauthorized parties. It is well known in the art that smart chip is provided with strong security authentication for protecting the information stored therein and it is proven. It is also used widely for authenticate identify. Accordingly, only the relevant authorities holding the relevant authentication rights are allowed to modify the information on the smart chip 102 when necessary, h another embodiment, the smart chip can be locked permanently against any future changes. Any general public carrying a smart phone deploying with a suitable application would be able to retrieve some or all of the information stored on the smart chip for viewing only for verification. Accordingly, even if a person is capable of tampering the information that are visually printed or engraved on the printed sheet 101, he still won't be able to make any changes to the information stored on the smart chip. The information altered on the printed sheet will therefore not able to conform to the information contained on the smart chip as the academic certificate is verified.
[0024] Further, the smart chip 102 embedded in the printed sheet 101 of the academic certificate 100 may also include further security element such as a security hologram etc., which may prevent the Academic Certificate 100 from being falsified or mistreated by any unauthorized party. As such, the authenticity of the academic certificate 100 can be certified and proven to be a genuine copy.
[0025] hi the above embodiment, the data that may be retrieved from the academic certificate 100 as provided above is by way of example and it is not intended to be limited to the scope of the present invention. Any other information that may be required or found in the certificate may also be stored as digital data in the smart chip embedded in the printed sheet.
[0026] In one specific embodiment, the smart chip 102 includes a near field communication (NFC) module, which allows the smart chip to be read by ordinary smart phone or smart devices adapted with NFC module for communicating with the smart chip. [0027] FIG.2 illustrates a schematic diagram showing academic certificate register network in accordance with an embodiment in the present invention. The network comprises a certificate registration backend system 200 and an authentication frontend system 220. The certificate registration backend system 200 comprises certificate registration server 202, a certificate printer 204 and a holder enrolment station 206. In come cases, the organization issuing the certificates may wish to maintain security and privacy over at the data and particulars of the certificate holders. Accordingly, the backend system 200 maybe adapted as a closed system whereby it is not connected to the public network. Data is can thus be transport between the servers/terminals through portable storage medium.
[0028] The certificate enrollment station 202 is a standalone computer or work station, which may equiped with a finger print scanner 212 and a digital imaging device 214 for acquiring the holder's biometric data. If other biometric information is required, an appropriate biometric reader or scanner can be deployed. The certificate enrollment station 206 may also connect or capable of retrieving the holders' particulars from the issuing organisation's registrations system. Depending on the needs, the holders' particulars and possibly the holders' biometric data may be freshly acquired through the enrolment station 206, or it can possibly be retrieved from the existing register from the certificate issuing organisation.
[0029] The holder's particulars and biometric data, if any, are transported to the certificate registration server 202. The data can be transported to the certificate registration server 202 though any portable storage media if there is no link between the the enrolment station 206 and the server 202. The certificate registration server 202 is deployed with a Chip Management System (CMS) for processingthe certificate holders' particulars, including the biomatric data and and a chip writer 216 for deploying into individual smart chips. The certificate registration backend server 202 is further connected with a certificate printer 204 for printing the academic certificate having the chip embadded therein. In another embodiment, the chip writer 216 can be integgrated on the certificate printer 204 such that the data are written onto the chip as it is printing the certificate, which otherwise, the chip writer 216 writes the required data into the chips of the certificates before it is being sent for printing.
[0030] In another embodiment, the data is written into the chip of the ceritifcate through the certificate registration backend server 202, whereby a chip reader can be employed on the certificate printer 204 so that the printer prints in correspond with the readed chip. That elimites human error and ensures that the printed certificate matches the holder details .
[0031] The CMS is a backbone system provided for data collections and managements on the stations and server. On the enrolment station, it functions as a data collection station for acquiring holder identity and particulars. The data can be exported and transmitted to the server and printing station via any known means. For example, for off-line configuration, the collected data can be exported into any suitable data repository format, such as XML or MS Excel® or the like. Any portable storage device, such as portable hard disk drive or thumb drives, can be used as a medium for transporting the database from one workstation to another. Alternatively, the network 200 cam be configured as an isolated network, whereby the data can be transmitted to the backend server 202 through a wired network.
[0032] The CMS module may provide different access levels to the CMS, allowing corresponding authorized personnel to access the different modules of CMS. The access levels include administrator account for accessing user management module and create, alter and remove user credential; an operator account for accessing em-olment module for create new holder's profile; and backend office account for processing new certificate creation through the card printing module.
[0033] The certficiate registration server 202 further includes a Key Management System (KMS) that facilitates solutions to protect the certificate holders' data. The KMS manages all the generations, exchanges, injections and transfer of the keys. The KMS may include SSID key generator, secure access module (SAM) key injector, SSID personalisation module, SSID verification module, etc. The operations and customizations can be done according to the requirements of the issuing organisation. In one embodiment, the key management is carried out in phases: securing the transportation and card protection, generaing key, injecting key, chip personalization, backing up keys, and key rotation. These processes are well know in the art, and it is possible to adapt a different process for managing the key which in turn secure the chip and information stored therein. [0034] Transport Key is required for writing PERSO data into the chip. Once data is transported, Final key would be generated and used for later verification.
[0035] For symmetric key system, one key will be written on the chip and another key will be stored on the verification server. The app will communicate with the verification server for verifying authentication, before any data can be extracted from the chip.
[0036] For asymmetric key, a private key is transmitted onto the chip and a secret key will be stored on a verification center for verification. [0037] The system enhances the security of the academic certificate through embedding smart chip therein, wherein the smart chip is readable contactlessly through any personal smart phone, Accordignly, it allows the HR personnel to easily check whether the original certificate is geniune through the personal smart phone. [0038] As mentioned, the certificate regsitration backend system 200 can be configured as a closed system. Accordingly, the academic certificate register network further provide a verification server 220 for verifying the authenticity of the certifcate remotely. The verification server 220 is connected to the public network 230, such as Internet, for public access. [0039] The certificate 250 embedded with the smart chip is then issued to the intended holder 280.
[0040] When in used, the certificate 250 can be verified for authenticity through a mobile device 240. The mobile device 240 can be mobile computing device or smart devices capable of accessing the public network, i.e. the Internet. More desirably, the mobile device 240 is integrated with Near Field Communication (NFC) module that is able to read the smart chip wirelessly. Preferably, the mobile device 240 is deployed with application modules adapted for verifying the chip of the certificate.
[0041] As the smart chip on the academic certificate 250 is scanned through the mobile device 240, the mobile device 240 attempts to connect to the verification server 220 through the Internet 230. The mobile application performs the key exchange with the verification server 220 for authentication. In one implementation, the verification server 220 stores on the authentication keys only, of which, it is adapted for verifying the authenticity of the verifying certificate 250. The authentication status is then displayed on the mobile device 240. Besides the authentication status, the mobile application may further display the holder's particulars for further verification.
[0042] The system may adapt any known cryptography system and method for authentication, such as PKI or the like. [0043] In another optional implementation according to an alternative embodiment of the present invention, once the chip (i.e. the certificate 250) is successfully authenticated, the mobile device 240 may further prompt the holder for further authentication through the thumb print for matching the holder's identity.
[0044] It is desired that the verification server 220 be resided at the relevant authority, a trusted network or the certificate issuing organization that authorized to host the relevant information. Accordingly, such network allows one to verify if the academic certificate 250 is a genuine one through scanning the smart ship embedded in the academic certificate. The mobile reader may further retrieve the holder's photo for facial verification of the holder visually. [0045] The mobile device 240 may further comprise a fingerprint scanner or biometric scanner. Through the scanner, the person holding the academic certificate 250 can also be verified is the truthful holder through matching the person's fingerprint with the biometric information stored on the smart chip on the certificate 250 on-site. This provides an optional level of verification for the certificate. [0046] Through the present system of the present invention, human resource personnel may utilize a personal smart phone that deploys with the dedicated application module to scan the academic certificate presented to them. The dedicated application module connects to the verification server 220 through Internet to verify the authenticity of the certificate. The verification may first verify if the certificate is on records. Once the record is matched, the holder particulars including the holder photo from the host system will be displayed on mobile device 240. The personnel may then verify the information on the mobile device 240 against the certificate and the holder visually.
[0047] In an alternative embodiment, the verification server 220 may include a centralize authority who collects and receives the relevant information and database from multiple certificate-issuing institutes.
[0048] In yet another embodiment, the verification server 220 can be an international academic database repository organization for centrally maintaining the records of all the academic certificates.
[0049] In accordance with the present invention, it is desired that the application module for deploying on the mobile device or the smart phone are obtainable from a trusted or authorized source, such as the issuing institute, or the authentic application store, such as App Store and Google Play.
[0050] FIG. 3 illustrates a block diagram of the smart chip 102 of FIG. 1 in accodance with one embodiment of the present invention. The smart chip 102 can be a secured contactless chip. The data is stored on the chip in a ISO flexible file system. Various file systems are available such as ICAO LDS. The smart chip 102 comprises a EEPROM 302 and a ROM 304. The EEPROM 302 may store personal information of the holder, such as name, Academic Qualification Attain, and etc. The ROM may further stores the identity of the smart chip 102 such as serial number, access right, validity dates and etc, a facial image of the holder, holder's biometric data such as finger print, etc., and security information such as digital signature. The EEPROM 302 may further provide some spare memory, when necessary. The ROM 304 stored the required applications and applets therein, such as file system application and user right manager, and EMC aplications, or other applications. The secured contactless chip with the operating system and the applications/applets deployed therein as a whole shall be at least CC EAL4+ certifed or FPS-140, such as FIPS-140-2 Level 3 chip certified. The applications/applets may be Java applications supporting EAC (Extended Access Control) similar to that defined in the ICAO standard.
[0051] It is well understood to a skilled person that the BAC and EAC of the ICAO standard is illustrated above for example only, not limitations. It is illustrated herewith because it is readily available to illustrate an implementation in a similar way.
A skilled person can easily modify the ICAO standard and adapted for academic certificate as according to the need and requirements by the institutes. One will appreciate that other suitable security protocols, currently established or not yet implemented, may also be adapted according to the needs and requirements. The certificate issuing authority may adapt some other standards , which protect data stored on the smart chip in one or more authentication levels.
[0052] The above description illustrates various embodiments of the present invention along with examples of how aspects of the present invention may be implemented. While specific embodiments have been described and illustrated it is understood that many charges, modifications, variations and combinations thereof could be made to the present invention without departing from the scope of the present invention. The above examples, embodiments, instructions semantics, and drawings should not be deemed to be the only embodiments, and are presented to illustrate the flexibility and advantages of the present invention as defined by the following claims:

Claims

Claims
1. An academic certificate comprising: two printable sheets; and a smart chip embedded on an inlay, wherein the inlay is sandwich between the printed sheet, wherein the smart chip stores a number of data that provides information relating to a holder of the academic certificate.
2. The academic certificate according to claim 1, wherein the academic certificate further includes an embedded antenna that is attached to the smart chip.
3. The academic certificate according to claim 1, wherein the printed sheet is made of any of paper, plastic, etc.
4. The academic certificate according to claim 1, wherein the smart chip may prevent the academic certificate from being falsified, mistreated by an unauthorized party, etc.
5. A system for maintaining records of academic certificate according to claim 1, the system comprises: a remote verification server having a database storing the records of the certificates; a program module deployed on a smart phone, wherein the smart phone is adapted to communicate with the smart chip of the academic certificate wirelessly or contactless; and the certificate of claim 1, wherein the smart chip of the certificate is readable contactlessly through the smart phone to extract information therein, wherein as the smart chip of the certificate is read through the program module, the program module communicates with the remote verification server for extracting information therefrom for verifying the authenticity of the certificate.
6. The system according to claim 5, wherein the smart phone communicates with the smart chip via Near Field Communication (NFC) module.
7. A method of forming an academic certificate, the method comprising: embedding a smart chip within a printed sheet, wherein the smart chip is readable by a smart phone contactlessly; enrolling recipient and issuer's information on the smart chip; depositing the enrolled information on a remote server, the remote server is accessible through the smart phone to retrieve corresponding information therefrom for verifying the authenticity of the academic certificate; and deploying a program module on the smart phone, the program module operationally reads the smart chip and communicates with the remote server to retrieve information of at least the recipient of the academic certificate for verification.
8. The method of claim 7, wherein the smart phone is communicable with the smart chip via Near Field Communication (NFC) module.
9. The method of claim 7, wherein the recipient's information includes personal biometric information and personal particulars.
PCT/SG2015/050437 2014-11-12 2015-11-06 Academic certificate WO2016076792A1 (en)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
SG10201407491W 2014-11-12
SG10201407491W 2014-11-12

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Citations (6)

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CN2569260Y (en) * 2002-02-16 2003-08-27 姜卫华 IC intelligent anti-fake certificate
CN2722335Y (en) * 2003-12-23 2005-08-31 冯保全 Electronic anti-fogery certificate of motor vehicle
JP2006277641A (en) * 2005-03-30 2006-10-12 Nippon Paper Industries Co Ltd Ic chip interior sheet
US7159241B1 (en) * 2000-06-15 2007-01-02 Hitachi, Ltd. Method for the determination of soundness of a sheet-shaped medium, and method for the verification of data of a sheet-shaped medium
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Patent Citations (6)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2000085278A (en) * 1998-09-07 2000-03-28 Konica Corp Security card, method and device for its manufacture
US7159241B1 (en) * 2000-06-15 2007-01-02 Hitachi, Ltd. Method for the determination of soundness of a sheet-shaped medium, and method for the verification of data of a sheet-shaped medium
CN2569260Y (en) * 2002-02-16 2003-08-27 姜卫华 IC intelligent anti-fake certificate
CN2722335Y (en) * 2003-12-23 2005-08-31 冯保全 Electronic anti-fogery certificate of motor vehicle
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