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WO2016043388A1 - Serveur de gestion de balise pour la lutte anti-contrefaçon - Google Patents

Serveur de gestion de balise pour la lutte anti-contrefaçon Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2016043388A1
WO2016043388A1 PCT/KR2015/000720 KR2015000720W WO2016043388A1 WO 2016043388 A1 WO2016043388 A1 WO 2016043388A1 KR 2015000720 W KR2015000720 W KR 2015000720W WO 2016043388 A1 WO2016043388 A1 WO 2016043388A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
count information
user
packet
terminal device
beacon
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/KR2015/000720
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Dong Hyun Kim
Original Assignee
Hana Micron Inc.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from KR1020150003436A external-priority patent/KR101624343B1/ko
Application filed by Hana Micron Inc. filed Critical Hana Micron Inc.
Publication of WO2016043388A1 publication Critical patent/WO2016043388A1/fr

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/63—Location-dependent; Proximity-dependent
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/80—Services using short range communication, e.g. near-field communication [NFC], radio-frequency identification [RFID] or low energy communication

Definitions

  • the present invention generally relates to a beacon management server for anti-spoofing and, more particularly, to a beacon management server that may enhance the security of location-based service of a user's terminal device.
  • Locating a user's terminal device with GPS-based technology is widely used outdoors. However, indoors or below ground level, the use of GPS is limited because it is difficult to receive a GPS signal. Consequently, to solve this problem, short-distance communication methods have been suggested. Specifically, beacon devices using Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) have recently emerged as a solution to the problem.
  • BLE Bluetooth Low Energy
  • a BLE beacon device periodically transmits its own location information to a user's terminal device, and the user's terminal device receives the information and retransmits it to a beacon management server. Accordingly, the beacon management server may detect the location of the user's terminal device through the location of the BLE beacon device.
  • any user's terminal device in the transmission range may receive the location information of the beacon device. Consequently, packet sniffing is done by a user's terminal device, which does not have appropriate authority, thus spoofing is possible.
  • existing BLE beacon devices are convenient for detecting a current location of a user, but a service provider may not trust the information about the current location of the user. For example, by sniffing information transmitted from a beacon device that is installed in location A, the information may be retransmitted in location B. Accordingly, even though the user is not in location A, it is possible to receive a service provided in location A, for example acquiring a check-in point. Particularly, in case of a beacon device in connection with a payment system, it is difficult to provide a reliable service because location information of the beacon device may not be trusted.
  • an embodiment of the present invention intends to provide a beacon management server for anti-spoofing, which may prevent spoofing by an illegal user's terminal device.
  • the beacon management server for anti-spoofing may include: a communicating unit for receiving, from a user's terminal device, a packet including both count information and a beacon device ID (UUID), which is broadcast from a beacon device, the count information being generated according to a first time rule in the beacon device and corresponding to a time at which the count information is generated, and the packet being generated according to a second time rule; a packet extracting unit for extracting, from the received packet, the count information and the beacon device ID; and a validating unit for confirming a location of a user's terminal device according to a difference of times corresponding to pieces of the count information extracted from at least the two packets.
  • UUID beacon device ID
  • the validating unit may confirm the location of a user's terminal device according to whether the difference between the difference of the count information generation times and the difference of the packet reception times is within a tolerance, the count information generation times corresponding to the extracted count information and previously stored count information.
  • the beacon management server may further include a decrypting unit for decrypting the packet using either a single encryption method or a double encryption method.
  • the communicating unit may be synchronized with an internal timer of the beacon device.
  • the beacon management server may further include a storing unit for storing the first time rule and the count information.
  • the validating unit may update count information with the extracted count information when the location of the user's terminal device is confirmed according to the extracted count information.
  • the packet extracting unit may extract, according to the first time rule, a time at which the count information is generated, from the extracted count information.
  • the validating unit may block the user's terminal device by determining that the location of the user's terminal device is invalid when the difference between the difference of the count information generation times and the difference of the packet reception times is repeatedly outside the tolerance range.
  • a method for anti-spoofing of a beacon management server may include: receiving, from a user's terminal device, a packet including both count information and a beacon device ID (UUID), which is broadcast from a beacon device, the count information being generated according to a first time rule in the beacon device and corresponding to a time at which the count information is generated, and the packet being generated according to a second time rule; extracting, from the received packet, the count information and the beacon device ID; and confirming a location of a user's terminal device according to a difference of times corresponding to pieces of the count information extracted from at least the two packets.
  • UUID beacon device ID
  • the location of the user's terminal device may be confirmed according to whether the difference between the difference of the count information generation times and the difference of the packet reception times is within a tolerance, the count information generation times corresponding to the extracted count information and previously stored count information.
  • the method may further include decrypting the packet using either a single encryption method or a double encryption method.
  • the method may further include synchronizing with the beacon device.
  • the method may further include updating count information with the extracted count information when the location of the user's terminal device is confirmed according to the extracted count information.
  • a time at which the count information is generated may be extracted from the extracted count information, according to the first time rule.
  • the location of user's terminal device in confirming, when the difference between the difference of the count information generation times and the difference of the packet reception times is repeatedly outside the tolerance range, the location of user's terminal device is determined to be invalid, and the user's terminal device may be blocked.
  • a computer-readable storage medium on which a program for anti-spoofing, executed in a beacon management server, is recorded is provided.
  • the program may include: a code for receiving, from a user's terminal device, a packet including both count information and a beacon device ID (UUID), which is broadcast from a beacon device, the count information being generated according to a first time rule in the beacon device and corresponding to a time at which the count information is generated, and the packet being generated according to a second time rule; a code for extracting, from the received packet, the count information and the beacon device ID; and a code for confirming a location of a user's terminal device according to a difference of times corresponding to pieces of the count information extracted from at least the two packets.
  • UUID beacon device ID
  • the code for confirming may confirm the location of a user's terminal device according to whether the difference between the difference of the count information generation times and the difference of the packet reception times is within a tolerance, the count information generation times corresponding to the extracted count information and previously stored count information.
  • the program may further include a code for decrypting the packet using either a single encryption method or a double encryption method.
  • the program may further include a code for synchronizing with the beacon device.
  • the program may further include a code for updating count information with the extracted count information when the location of the user's terminal device is confirmed according to the extracted count information.
  • the code for extracting may extract, according to the first time rule, a time at which the count information is generated, from the extracted count information.
  • the code for confirming may block the user's terminal device by determining that the location of the user's terminal device is invalid when the difference between the difference of the count information generation times and the difference of the packet reception times is repeatedly outside the tolerance range.
  • a beacon management server for anti-spoofing may enhance reliability of location information of a beacon device by preventing spoofing by an illegal user.
  • beacon device depending on reliable location information of a beacon device, it is possible to construct environments that may provide supplementary services using sensitive personal information, such as financial settlements.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a BLE beacon device system for anti-spoofing according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a BLE beacon device for anti-spoofing according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a beacon management server for confirming a location of a user in connection with a BLE beacon device for anti-spoofing, according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a flow diagram of a method for anti-spoofing according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a BLE beacon device system for anti-spoofing according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • a BLE beacon device system for anti-spoofing according to an embodiment of the present invention will be described in detail.
  • a BLE beacon device system 10 includes a BLE beacon device 100, a user's terminal device 200, and a beacon management server 300.
  • the BLE beacon device 100 may broadcast information for confirming a location of the user's terminal device 200, which includes its own location information, state information, ID, and the like.
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram of a BLE beacon device for anti-spoofing according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • a BLE beacon device 100 may include a count generating unit 110, a state information collecting unit 120, a packet generating unit 130, an encrypting unit 140, and a communicating unit 150.
  • the count generating unit 110 may generate count information with a fixed time rule.
  • the count generating unit 110 may generate the count information according to a first time rule, including a predetermined sequence table or a predetermined rule.
  • the count information is generated according as a value of a timer (not illustrated) inside the BLE beacon device 100 increases with a constant time interval. If count information at a certain time is known, count information before a fixed time period or count information after a fixed time period may be obtained through the predetermined sequence table or the predetermined rule.
  • the count generating unit 110 may be synchronized with an internal timer of the beacon management server 300. In this case, the count generating unit 110 may generate count information that corresponds to the time after the synchronization.
  • the state information collecting unit 120 may collect various state information of the BLE beacon device 100.
  • the state information may include at least one among the temperature, humidity, atmosphere, battery power, power of transmitting RF, power of receiving RF, and seismic intensity of the BLE beacon device 100.
  • the state information collecting unit 120 may collect the state information through a sensor module (not illustrated).
  • the packet generating unit 130 may generate a packet including both the count information generated in the count generating unit 110 and a beacon device ID.
  • the count information included in the generated packet may correspond to the time at which the count information is generated. More specifically, when the first time rule is the same as the second time rule, the packet generating unit 130 may generate packets to sequentially include the generated count information. For example, when the packet generation time is the same as the time at which the count information is generated, the packet generating unit 130 may generate packets to have the different count information. Also, when the first time rule is different from the second time rule, the packet generating unit 130 may generate packets to include the generated count information according to a predetermined order.
  • packets may be generated to include the same count information according to the predetermined rule.
  • the number of the packets including the same count information may be different.
  • the generated packet may include the state information of the BLE beacon device 100, which is collected by the state information collecting unit 120.
  • the encrypting unit 140 may encrypt the packet generated in the packet generating unit 130.
  • the encrypting unit 140 may encrypt the generated packet using either a single encryption method or a double encryption method.
  • the encrypting unit 140 encrypts the generated packet using a fixed key.
  • the fixed key may be distributed in advance to a user's terminal device 200 or a beacon management server 300.
  • the encrypting unit 140 encrypts the generated packet using a random shared key. In this case, the packet including the random shared key may be transmitted to the user's terminal device 200 or the beacon management server 300.
  • the encrypting unit 140 after encrypting the generated packet using a random shared key, the encrypting unit 140 encrypts the random shared key using a fixed key. Then, the packet including the encrypted random shared key may be transmitted to the user's terminal device 200 or the beacon management server 300. In this case, the fixed key may be distributed in advance to the user's terminal device 200 or the beacon management server 300. Alternatively, after encrypting the generated packet using the random shared key, the encrypting unit 140 may encrypt the packet including the random shared key using the fixed key.
  • a BLE beacon device 100 includes an encrypting unit 140, but not limited to the above description, the encrypting unit 140 may be omitted.
  • the communicating unit 150 may broadcast the packet encrypted in the encrypting unit 140, or when the encrypting unit 140 is omitted, it may broadcast the packet generated in the packet generating unit 130. Accordingly, the user's terminal device 200 or the beacon management server 300 confirms a location of the user's terminal device 200 according to the difference of the times corresponding to the pieces of count information included in at least two packets that are generated depending on the second time rule.
  • the communicating unit 150 may use Bluetooth Low Energy, but the communicating unit 150 is not limited to this, and it is possible to use any short-distance communication method, including Wi-Fi.
  • a user's terminal device 200 may transmit a packet received from a BLE beacon device 100 into a beacon management server 300 to confirm its own location.
  • the user's terminal device 200 may transmit the packet received from the BLE beacon device 100 to the beacon management server 300 through a secure link such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or a cellular network.
  • the beacon management server 300 may confirm a location of the user's terminal device 200.
  • FIG. 3 is a block diagram of a beacon management server for confirming a location of a user in connection with a BLE beacon device for anti-spoofing, according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the beacon management server 300 may include a communicating unit 310, a decrypting unit 320, a packet extracting unit 330, a validating unit 340, and a storing unit 350.
  • the communicating unit 310 may receive a packet including both count information and a beacon device ID (UUID) from the user's terminal device 200, the packet being broadcast from the BLE beacon device 100.
  • the communicating unit 310 may communicate with the user's terminal device 200 using a long-distance communication method such as a cellular network.
  • the communicating unit 310 may communicate with the user's terminal device 200 using Wi-Fi or Bluetooth.
  • the communicating unit 310 may be synchronized with an internal timer (not illustrated) of the beacon device 100.
  • the decrypting unit 320 may decrypt the packet received from the communicating unit 310.
  • the decrypting unit 320 may decrypt the packet using either a single encryption method or a double encryption method.
  • the decrypting unit 320 may decrypt the received packet using a fixed key distributed in advance.
  • the decrypting unit 320 may extract a random shared key from the packet, and decrypt the packet using the extracted random shared key.
  • the decrypting unit 320 extracts a random shared key, which has been encrypted, from the packet and decrypts the extracted random shared key using a fixed key that has been distributed in advance. Then, the decrypting unit 320 may decrypt the packet using the decrypted random shared key. Alternatively, the decrypting unit 320 decrypts the packet using a fixed key that has been distributed in advance, and extracts a random shared key from the decrypted packet. Then, the decrypting unit 320 may decrypt the packet using the extracted random shared key.
  • the beacon management server 300 includes a decrypting unit 320, but not limited to the above description, the decrypting unit 320 may be omitted.
  • the packet extracting unit 330 may extract count information and a beacon device ID from the packet decrypted in the decrypting unit 320.
  • the packet extracting unit 330 may extract count information and a beacon device ID from the packet that is periodically received in the communicating unit 310. In this case, according to a predetermined sequence table or a predetermined rule, the packet extracting unit 330 may extract the time at which the count information is generated from the extracted count information.
  • the validating unit 340 may confirm a location of the user's terminal device according to the difference of the times corresponding to the pieces of count information, which are extracted from at least two packets by the packet extracting unit 330. More specifically, the validating unit 340 may confirm the location of the user's terminal device 200 according to whether the difference between the difference of the count information generation times and the difference of the packet reception times is within a tolerance.
  • the count information generation times correspond to the count information extracted by the packet extracting unit 330 and previously stored count information.
  • the validating unit 340 measures a packet reception time (T new ) ,and extracts a time corresponding to the extracted count information, which is the time (T n ) at which the count information is generated.
  • the validating unit 340 may confirm the location of the user's terminal device 200.
  • ⁇ T up and ⁇ T down are predetermined tolerances.
  • the validating unit 340 confirms that the location of the user's terminal device 200 is valid.
  • the validating unit 340 may store the count information extracted from the packet as the latest count information in the storing unit 350.
  • the validating unit 340 determines that spoofing or sniffing is done by an illegal user's terminal device. Accordingly, the validating unit 340 determines that the location of the user's terminal device 200 is invalid, and may block the user's terminal device.
  • the storing unit 350 may store both the count information used for confirming a location of a user's terminal device 200 and the first time rule, including a predetermined sequence table or a predetermined rule, the first time rule being for extracting the time at which the count information is generated from the count information.
  • the storing unit 350 may store the count information included in the first received packet. After that, if the location of the user's terminal device is confirmed by comparing the extracted count information with the previously stored count information in the validating unit 340, the storing unit 350 may update the count information with the extracted count information.
  • a BLE beacon device 100 may enhance reliability of location information of a beacon device by preventing spoofing by an illegal user. Also, depending on reliable location information of the beacon device, it is possible to construct environments that may provide supplementary services using sensitive personal information, such as financial settlements.
  • FIG. 4 is a flow diagram of a method for anti-spoofing according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the method for anti-spoofing 400 includes: a step for encrypting a packet including count information and for broadcasting the packet (S401 to 404); a step for transmitting a packet through a secure link (S405); a step for decrypting the received packet (S406); a step for extracting count information form the decrypted packet (S407); a step for confirming the location of a user's terminal device or blocking a user's terminal device by comparing the extracted count information with a previously stored count information (S408); and a step for updating with the received count information (S409).
  • a BLE beacon device 100 may generate count information with a fixed time rule to confirm the location of a user's terminal device (S401).
  • the count information may be generated according to a first time rule, including a predetermined sequence table or a predetermined rule.
  • various state information of the BLE beacon device 100 may be collected.
  • the state information may include at least one among the temperature, humidity, atmosphere, battery power, power of transmitting RF, power of receiving RF, and seismic intensity of the BLE beacon device 100.
  • the state information may be collected through a sensor module (not illustrated).
  • a packet including both the generated count information and a beacon device ID may be generated according to a second time rule (S402).
  • the count information included in the packet may correspond to the time at which the count information is generated.
  • packets may be generated to sequentially include the generated count information. For example, when the packet generation time is the same as the time at which the count information is generated, packets may be generated to have different count information. Also, when the first time rule is different from the second time rule, packets may be generated to include the generated count information according to a predetermined order.
  • packets may be generated to include the same count information according to a predetermined rule.
  • the number of the packets including the same count information may be different.
  • the generated packet may include the collected state information of the BLE beacon device 100.
  • the generated packet may be encrypted (S403).
  • the generated packet may be encrypted using either a single encryption method or a double encryption method.
  • the generated packet is encrypted using a fixed key, and the fixed key may be distributed in advance to a user's terminal device 200 or a beacon management server 300.
  • the generated packet may be encrypted using a random shared key, and the packet including the random shared key may be transmitted to the user's terminal device 200 or the beacon management server 300.
  • the random shred key is encrypted using a fixed key.
  • the packet including the encrypted random shared key may be transmitted to the user's terminal device 200 or the beacon management server 300.
  • the fixed key may be distributed in advance to the user's terminal device 200 or the beacon management server 300.
  • the packet including the random shared key may be encrypted using the fixed key.
  • encryption of the packet is performed, but not limited to the above description, encryption of the packet may be omitted.
  • the encrypted packet may be broadcast to the user's terminal device connected to the beacon management server (S404).
  • the generated packet may be broadcast to the user's terminal device connected to the beacon management server (S404).
  • the packet may be broadcast using Bluetooth Low Energy, but not limited to this, the packet may be broadcast using any short-distance communication method such as Wi-Fi.
  • the user's terminal device 200 may transmit the packet, received from the BLE beacon device 100, to the beacon management server 300 (S405).
  • the user's terminal device 200 may transmit the received packet through a secure link such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or a cellular network.
  • the beacon management server 300 may confirm the location of the user's terminal device 200 based on the count information from the BLE beacon device 100. More specifically, first, the beacon management server may receive the packet broadcast from the BLE beacon device, which includes the count information and the beacon device ID, via the user's terminal device 200.
  • the received packet may be decrypted (S406).
  • the packet may be decrypted using either a single encryption method or a double encryption method.
  • the packet may be decrypted using a fixed key that has been distributed in advance.
  • a random shared key is extracted from the packet, and the packet may be decrypted using the extracted random shared key.
  • the encrypted random shared key is extracted from the packet, and the extracted random shared key is decrypted using the fixed key that has been distributed in advance. Then, the packet may be decrypted using the decrypted random shared key. Alternatively, the packet is decrypted using the fixed key that has been distributed in advance, and the random shared key is extracted from the decrypted packet. Then, the packet may be decrypted using the extracted random shared key.
  • decryption of the packet is performed, but not limited to the above description, decryption of the packet may be omitted.
  • the count information and the beacon device ID may be extracted from the decrypted packet (S407).
  • the time at which the count information is generated may be extracted from the extracted count information.
  • the location of a user's terminal device may be confirmed according to the difference of the times corresponding to the pieces of count information extracted from at least two packets. More specifically, according to whether the difference between the difference of the count information generation times and the difference of the packet reception times is within a tolerance, the location of the user's terminal device 200 may be confirmed (S408).
  • the count information generation times correspond to the extracted count information and previously stored count information. For example, the packet reception time (T new )is measured, and the time corresponding to the extracted count information, which is the time(T n )at which the count information is generated, is extracted.
  • the location of the user's terminal device 200 may be confirmed.
  • the count information may be stored as the latest count information (S409). For example, count information included in the first received packet is stored. After that, if the location of the user's terminal device is confirmed by comparing the extracted count information with the previously stored count information, the count information may be updated with the extracted count information.
  • a method for anti-spoofing may enhance reliability of a location of a beacon device by preventing spoofing by an illegal user. Also, based on the high reliability of the location information of the beacon device, it is possible to construct environments that may provide supplementary services using sensitive personal information, such as financial settlements.
  • the method described above may be implemented by the beacon management server 300 illustrated in FIG. 1, and especially, may be implemented by software programs that perform the described steps.
  • these programs may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, or may be transmitted by a computer data signal combined with carrier wave through the transmission medium or communication network.
  • the computer-readable storage medium includes all kind of recording devices storing data that can be read by computer systems.
  • the computer-readable storage medium may be ROM, RAM, CD-ROM, DVD-ROM, DVD-RAM, magnetic tapes, floppy disks, hard disks, optical data storage devices, and the like.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un serveur de gestion de balise pour la lutte anti-contrefaçon. Le serveur de gestion de balise pour la lutte anti-contrefaçon comprend : une unité de communication pour recevoir d'un dispositif terminal d'utilisateur un paquet contenant à la fois des informations de compte et un ID de dispositif de balise (UUID), qui est diffusé à partir d'un dispositif de balise, les informations de compte étant générées selon une première règle de temps dans le dispositif de balise et correspondant à un moment auquel les informations de compte sont générées, le paquet étant généré selon une deuxième règle de temps; une unité d'extraction de paquet pour extraire du paquet reçu les informations de compte et l'ID de dispositif de balise; et une unité de validation pour confirmer un emplacement d'un dispositif terminal d'utilisateur d'après une différence entre les temps correspondant à des éléments des informations de compte extraites au moins des deux paquets.
PCT/KR2015/000720 2014-09-18 2015-01-23 Serveur de gestion de balise pour la lutte anti-contrefaçon WO2016043388A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (4)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
KR20140124403 2014-09-18
KR10-2014-0124403 2014-09-18
KR1020150003436A KR101624343B1 (ko) 2014-09-18 2015-01-09 안티-스푸핑을 위한 비콘 관리 서버
KR10-2015-0003436 2015-01-09

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