WO2011030455A1 - セキュア監査システム及びセキュア監査方法 - Google Patents
セキュア監査システム及びセキュア監査方法 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2011030455A1 WO2011030455A1 PCT/JP2009/066004 JP2009066004W WO2011030455A1 WO 2011030455 A1 WO2011030455 A1 WO 2011030455A1 JP 2009066004 W JP2009066004 W JP 2009066004W WO 2011030455 A1 WO2011030455 A1 WO 2011030455A1
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
- G06F21/56—Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
- G06F21/562—Static detection
- G06F21/565—Static detection by checking file integrity
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a technique for auditing the security of a terminal connected to a network and capable of executing a given program.
- Patent Document 1 describes an information processing apparatus that easily and effectively prevents execution of a virus file.
- This information processing device has a file name that is subject to execution in accordance with an instruction from a user via a terminal among a plurality of files stored in a global database provided in a server, and matches a predetermined naming rule. If it does not match the naming rule and the discriminating unit for determining whether or not to execute, the execution target file is allowed to be executed as a virus-safe file, and when the naming rule is met, the execution target file is And an execution processing unit that warns the user that there is a possibility that the file is dangerous to the virus.
- Patent Document 1 includes a prohibited file list holding unit that holds a prohibited file list indicating a file that should be prohibited from being executed, even if a file that does not conform to the naming rule is registered in the prohibited file list. It is described that the execution of the file is not permitted. In this way, by using the safe file list and the dangerous file list, virus file execution is easily and effectively prevented.
- Patent Document 1 determines whether or not to execute a file depending only on the final intention of the user, only with a warning display, regardless of the possibility (risk level) of virus infection. There is a problem that a virus infection file is highly likely to be executed.
- a monitoring device is arranged on a network to which a plurality of terminal devices are connected, so that feature information of each terminal device can be acquired, and vulnerable software is obtained from the acquired feature information.
- a software monitoring system that can efficiently detect a terminal device or a terminal device infected with malware and take appropriate measures is described.
- the system described in Patent Document 2 is suitable for knowing the security level of the terminal device, for example, measures against viruses are taken after detecting a change in the hash value (paragraph numbers 0019 to 0020), there is still a time lag that cannot be ignored.
- An object of the present invention is to provide a secure audit method for checking the risk of virus infection on a program file installed in a terminal and not starting a virus by allowing execution of the program on an uninfected file, and It is to provide such a system.
- a secure audit system includes a plurality of terminals connected to a network and capable of executing a given program in accordance with an instruction from an operation unit, and connected to the network and executing the program on each terminal.
- a management server that performs an audit on permission / inhibition, and the terminal creates and executes a program storage unit in which the given program is stored in an updated manner, and a list of predetermined programs among the given programs
- the execution permission list creating unit that stores the permission list in an update list, the given program is stored in the execution permission list storage unit.
- Determination means for determining whether or not the program corresponds to the list stored in the list, and the determination by the determination means is affirmative In the case where the given program is read out from the program storage unit, first verification information is created, and the difference from the information in the list corresponding to the execution instruction program in the execution permission list storage unit is determined.
- the given program is read out from the program storage unit to create second collation information and transmitted to the management server A collation information creating unit; a reply signal from the management server corresponding to transmission of the second collation information to the management server by the collation information creating unit; and the difference from the first collating unit
- Execution permission / inhibition means for instructing permission / inhibition of execution of the program based on the result obtained, and the management server stores the given program in the program storage unit.
- a verification source information storage unit that stores verification source information corresponding to the second verification information of the program according to the input, the second verification information received from the terminal, and the verification And a second collation unit that collates with the collation source information stored in the original information storage unit and returns the result to the terminal as the reply signal.
- the secure audit method is a secure audit method for controlling whether or not each terminal connected to a network is allowed to execute a program, wherein the given program is updated in the program storage unit of the terminal.
- the execution permission list creation means of the terminal creates a list for a predetermined program of the given programs, stores the list in an execution permission list storage unit, and the determination means of the terminal When there is an execution instruction for one of the given programs from the operation unit, whether the given program is a program corresponding to the list stored in the execution permission list storage unit or not If the determination by the first verification unit of the terminal is affirmed by the determination unit, the given program is stored in the program description.
- the first verification information is read out from the storage unit, the difference between the execution permission list storage unit and the list information corresponding to the execution instruction program is determined, and the verification information generation unit of the terminal
- the given program is read from the program storage unit to create second verification information, transmitted to the management server, and the management server connected to the network
- verification source information storage unit verification source information corresponding to the second verification information of the program is stored in response to the writing of the given program to the program storage unit, and the management server
- a second collation unit collates the second collation information received from the terminal with the collation source information stored in the collation source information storage unit, and obtains the result.
- a reply signal from the management server corresponding to transmission of the second verification information to the management server by the verification information creating unit The execution of the program is instructed based on the result of determining the difference from the first collating means.
- each terminal connected to the network can execute the program is controlled based on the secure audit. That is, the given program is stored in an updated manner in the program storage unit of the terminal, and a list is created for a predetermined program of the given program by the execution permission list creating means of the terminal. The update is stored in the execution permission list storage unit.
- the given program corresponds to the list stored in the execution permission list storage unit
- the determination by the determination unit is affirmed by the first verification unit of the terminal
- the given program is read from the program storage unit and is first Is created, and it is determined whether or not it is different from the list information corresponding to the execution instruction program in the execution permission list storage unit.
- the determination by the determination unit is denied by the verification information generation unit of the terminal
- the given program is read from the program storage unit and second verification information is generated, and the management server stores the second verification information. Sent.
- verification source information corresponding to the second verification information of the program is stored in the verification source information storage unit in accordance with the writing of the given program to the program storage unit. Then, the second collation unit of the management server collates the second collation information received from the terminal with the collation source information stored in the collation source information storage unit. Is returned to the terminal as the reply signal. Therefore, a reply signal from the management server corresponding to the transmission of the second verification information to the management server by the verification information creation unit by the execution permission / denial unit of the terminal, and from the first verification unit Based on the determination result, whether to execute the program is instructed.
- the terminal in a secure state by preventing the virus from being activated by permitting the execution of the program for the virus-uninfected file.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic configuration diagram of a network system to which a secure audit system according to the present invention is applied. It is a figure explaining the process which determines the propriety of execution using the hash value of the file of a program. It is a figure explaining the process regarding embedding of a terminal certification stamp (unique certification information) about the file of the program which suspicious normal operation for every terminal. It is a figure explaining the process regarding embedding a terminal certification stamp (unique certification
- FIG.2 It is a flowchart which shows the virus monitoring process by the side of the terminal management server 5 of the system shown in FIG.2, FIG.3, FIG.4. It is a flowchart which shows the registration process of files, such as programs, such as a macro in the terminal 1 side of the system shown in FIG. It is a flowchart which shows the registration process of files, such as programs, such as a macro by the side of the terminal management server 5 of the system shown in FIG. It is a flowchart which shows the virus monitoring process by the side of the terminal 1 of the system shown in FIG. 3, FIG. It is a flowchart which shows the virus monitoring process by the side of the terminal 1 of the system shown in FIG. 3, FIG.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic configuration diagram of a network system to which a secure audit system according to the present invention is applied.
- the network system shown in FIG. 1 includes, for example, a terminal 1 that is a member, a consumer, a store or a company, a terminal 1 arranged in one or a plurality of financial institutions that perform settlement, and each of these terminals 1 and 1.
- a member information server 4 disposed in a management organization that performs overall management and storage of information and a terminal management server 5 that manages security of the terminal 1.
- the terminal 1 is generally composed of a personal computer or the like with a built-in CPU (Central Processing Unit).
- general processing such as information creation, processing, storage using general document and figure creation software, and transmission / reception of information using communication software, etc.
- program monitoring unit 3 for executing a program auditing process to be described later.
- the terminal 1 such as a consumer, a store, or a company has a terminal processing unit 2 that is a software that performs the creation and communication of each document related to the purchase and sale of goods and services, estimation or billing, and deposits and withdrawals. Is installed.
- the terminal 1 performs settlement in general commercial transactions, for example, issuance and receipt of invoices from a merchant store, and deposit (i.e., payment) instructions from the purchaser to the account of the contract financial institution that issued the invoice.
- deposit i.e., payment
- the terminal 1 can create various documents as electronic files in text format or binary format.
- the electronic file is exchanged between the terminals 1 via the member information server 4, for example.
- Software that performs payment instruction processing (instructions for payment processing between financial institutions, etc.) according to the financial payment document from the terminal 1 of the consumer or company is also installed in the terminal 1 of each financial institution. .
- the member information server 4 stores member information such as a member's name, name, e-mail address, address, etc. as necessary, for example, as appropriate. Further, the member information server 4 may further include a storage unit for storing the file transmission / reception history of each member and the files thereof for management.
- the terminal management server 5 is operated by a predetermined system audit organization that is a main body that creates and distributes software for managing the security of the terminal 1.
- this system creates and stores secret information, for example, information communication between a plurality of terminals 1 connected to a LAN in a corporate organization that is a public institution,
- secret information for example, information communication between a plurality of terminals 1 connected to a LAN in a corporate organization that is a public institution.
- This system uses an Internet network in terms of hardware. That is, while the terminal 1 is connected to the Internet, as will be described later, security between the terminal 1 and the terminal 1 is ensured in software with the Internet.
- the present invention ensures security in terms of software and can be handled as a dedicated network different from the Internet in terms of a network to which the terminal 1 is connected. As a result, it is possible to construct a system that does not require a new infrastructure, and each terminal 1 can communicate with other personal computers via the Internet as needed and perform normal information communication and Web site on the Internet. Search, browse and obtain information.
- the terminal 1 is connected to a network 7 via a provider (ISP) 6.
- ISP provider
- a plurality of terminals 1 are connected to the ISP 6.
- an appropriate number of servers having Web sites that provide various types of information are connected to the ISP 6.
- the terminal 1 connected to the ISP 6 includes a terminal 1 in which the program monitoring unit 3 is installed and a normal terminal 1 ′ in which the program monitoring unit 3 is not installed.
- the program monitoring unit 3 checks in advance whether or not a program file executed on the terminal 1 is infected with a virus, and executes only a program file that is not infected with a virus. It includes software for prohibiting the execution of files of programs that may be infected with the virus and a database necessary for auditing.
- the terminal management server 5 includes a program certifying unit 50 that performs anti-virus measures to be described later on the terminal 1 installed with software as the program monitoring unit 3 among the terminals connected to the network 7. That is, it is proved that the program file executed on the terminal 1 is not infected with a virus before the execution.
- FIG. 2 to 5 are block diagrams showing the functions of the terminal processing unit 2, the program monitoring unit 3 and the program certification unit 50 of the terminal 1, respectively. 2 to 5 show each function divided as appropriate for convenience of explanation and drawing.
- FIG. 2 is a diagram for explaining processing for determining whether or not to execute using a hash value of a program file.
- FIG. 3 is a diagram for explaining processing related to embedding a terminal certification stamp (unique certification information) for a program file whose suspicious normal operation is performed for each terminal 1.
- FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining processing related to embedding a terminal certification stamp (unique certification information) for a program file created by its own terminal 1.
- FIG. 5 is a diagram for explaining processing for prohibiting the execution of an illegal operation pattern.
- the terminal processing unit 2 of the terminal 1 includes a storage unit 200 and a control unit 210.
- the control unit 210 includes a program execution processing unit 211 that executes an instructed program.
- the terminal processing unit 2 includes an operation unit 21 including a mouse and a keyboard for performing information display and information processing (ie, execution of a corresponding program) instruction, and a display unit for displaying input information and processing results. 22 is provided.
- the storage unit 200 includes a ROM (Read Only Memory) 201 that stores an OS (Operating System), a BIOS (Basic Input / Output System), and the like, and a RAM (Random Access Memory).
- the RAM includes a program memory unit 202 that stores files of various application programs necessary for a given process, and a buffer memory unit 203 that is provided in an input / output unit with the outside and temporarily stores received information. ing.
- the RAM also has a work memory area for temporarily storing information being processed.
- the program monitoring unit 3 executes a monitoring program and a storage unit 300 that stores information necessary for monitoring the program file obtained as a result of individually installing the software for monitoring the program file in the terminal 1 And a control unit 310.
- the storage unit 300 preferably uses a partial area of the storage unit 200 of the terminal processing unit 2.
- the storage unit 300 includes an execution permission list storage unit 301.
- the execution permission list is a list created for each terminal 1, and is information for a list for identifying a file of a program permitted to be executed by the terminal management server 5 as not being infected with a virus in the terminal 1. It is.
- Each list information in the execution permission list includes at least a (unique) hash value obtained from the program file.
- a hash value of a program from a program file composed of binary codes
- any method can be adopted. For example, the entire program file or a predetermined bit of a predetermined range is taken out and divided into two, and then new code information is obtained by performing predetermined logical processing, for example, logical product, of each divided code group. , The new code information is further divided into two, and the logical processing is repeated until the predetermined number of bits is reached (decreased). Then, code information of a predetermined bit obtained from a program file at the time of registration in the program memory unit 202 may be obtained and handled as a hash value.
- program vendor information and product information may be provided, and version information may also be provided.
- the software for monitoring the program file is written in an external recording medium 9, such as a hard disk, an optical disk, a flexible disk, a CD, a DVD, a USB memory, a semiconductor memory, etc. It is made readable via a known driver such as a disk drive, a silicon disk drive, a cassette medium reader, etc., and is taken in (installed) in a proper area (RAM area) of the storage unit 200 of the terminal 1.
- the software may be received and installed by transmitting a predetermined issuance request from the member terminal 1 to a management organization computer (such as the member information server 4 or the terminal management server 5). .
- a management organization computer such as the member information server 4 or the terminal management server 5
- an extension board on which the program is installed may be incorporated. Then, when installing the software, information input for member registration is obtained through the display unit 22, for example, and necessary information may be input to be registered in the member information server 4. .
- the control unit 310 is designated by the operation unit 21 when the installed software for monitoring the program file is read from an appropriate area of the storage unit 200 and executed by the CPU of the terminal processing unit 2.
- the execution program specifying unit 311 for specifying the program file for executing the process and the execution permission list storage unit 301 include the specified program file
- the hash value first value of the program file
- Hash value creating unit 312 for creating the hash value collating unit 312 for creating the hash value and the hash value collating unit for determining the difference between the created hash value and the hash value included in the file list information of the program in the execution permission list storage unit 301 (First collating means)
- the hash value matches 313, the execution of the program is permitted.
- An execution permission / denial unit 314 that generates an instruction signal and generates an instruction signal that prohibits execution of the program in the case of mismatch, and outputs the instruction signal to the program execution processing unit 211; and an execution permission list storage unit 301 that stores the specified program file.
- the verification information creation unit 315 for creating verification information (second verification information) in the file of the program, and reading the designated program file from the program memory unit 202 for virus inspection
- program identification information list information
- the execution permission list storage unit 01 functions as an update unit 317 to update the contents of.
- the update unit 317 performs processing for deleting the list information of the program from the execution permission list storage unit 301 when the result of the hash value collation unit 313 does not match.
- the program specifying unit 311 specifies a program that executes the process specified by the operation unit 21, determines whether the specified program is a program corresponding to a list included in the execution permission list storage unit 301, When the determination result is included, a read instruction signal is generated based on the information and transmitted to the execution permission list storage unit 301 and the program memory unit 202. This read instruction signal reads the corresponding program file from the program memory unit 202 to the hash value creation unit 312, and also obtains the hash value in the corresponding program list information from the execution permission list storage unit 301 as the hash value matching unit 313. Read to.
- specification part 311 produces
- an executable program file has MZ and PE (Portable Executable Header) headers as header information for the OS to determine.
- the executable program file is read using the presence or absence of these header information. It is possible to specify a program file.
- the hash value creation unit 312 calculates a hash value using a rule that is preset from the input program file (same as the creation rule of the hash value of the list information in the execution permission list storage unit 301). is there.
- the hash value collation unit 313 collates the difference between the hash value created by the hash value creation unit 312 and the hash value of the file of the program in the execution permission list storage unit 301. Is output to the execution permission / rejection section 314. If the hash values match, the files of both programs can be regarded as matching, and if they do not match, the files of both programs can be regarded as different.
- the falsification can be detected without overlooking.
- the execution permission / refusal unit 314 receives a verification result signal from the terminal 1, that is, the hash value verification unit 313, and, as will be described later, the program to be executed is not a program included in the execution permission list. In response to the permission / prohibition signal from the terminal management server 5 in this case, a signal for instructing (permitting) execution of the program and a signal for instructing (non-permission) execution of the program are generated.
- the terminal management server 5 includes a program certification unit 50 and an operation unit 51, and a display unit as necessary for the administrator.
- the program certification unit 50 is connected to a storage unit 500 having an area for storing required information and a work area for temporarily storing information in the middle of processing.
- the program certification unit 50 includes a control unit 510 configured by a computer having a CPU.
- the storage unit 500 has a verification source information database 501 for each terminal 1.
- the collation source information database 501 is stored as collation source information for each terminal 1 for collation with collation information created from a program file in each terminal 1.
- the verification source information in the verification source information database 501 is created and stored when the program file is first installed in the program memory 202 of the terminal 1. This corresponds to the collation information created by the collation information creation unit 315. It is preferable in terms of reliability that the verification information and the verification source information include the vendor information and product information of the program in addition to the hash value described above, and further include version information.
- the control unit 510 functions as an execution permission determination unit (second verification unit) 511, a virus check unit 512, and an execution permission / rejection signal creation unit 513 by reading the certification program to the CPU and executing it.
- the execution permission / refusal determination unit 511 executes the above-described verification processing of the verification information and the verification source information when the program to be executed is not included in the program corresponding to the list included in the execution permission list, and determines the difference. , An execution permission / inhibition signal is generated.
- the virus check unit 512 performs a virus scan on the program file to be executed, detects the presence or absence of virus infection by a known pattern matching method, and the like, and from the result, an execution permission signal (execution permission signal, item disapproval) Signal).
- the virus check unit 512 performs a pattern matching check using the virus pattern storage unit 502 in which the virus patterns that are continuously obtained are stored in an updated manner.
- the execution permission / rejection signal creation unit 513 generates the same execution permission / rejection signal as described above according to the operation from the operation unit 51 in a mode other than the execution permission / rejection determination unit 511 and the virus check unit 512.
- the execution permission / non-permission signal generation unit 513 determines whether or not fraud is detected by an administrator or a more advanced external expert (including software such as anti-virus) when fraud cannot be found even by collation and virus check. In response to this conclusion, a permission signal is created in response to an instruction for permission to execute from the operation unit 51.
- the matching information is updated and stored in the matching source information database 501 as new matching source information.
- FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing virus monitoring processing on the terminal 1 side of the system shown in FIG.
- FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing virus monitoring processing on the terminal management server 5 side of the system shown in FIG.
- step S1 it is determined whether or not a program execution command has been input from the operation unit 21 (step S1), and if the command has not been input, this flow is exited.
- step S3 the program file to be executed is specified by this command (step S3), and then the execution of the program to be executed is temporarily suspended for monitoring processing ( Further, it is determined whether or not the execution target program is included in the program corresponding to the list included in the execution permission list storage unit 301 (step S7). If this determination is affirmed, the hash value of the file of the execution target program is read from the execution permission list storage unit 301 to the hash value collation unit 313 (step S9).
- the program file to be executed is read from the program memory unit 202 to the hash value creation unit 312 and a hash value is created according to a predetermined rule (step S11). Then, both hash values are collated (step S13), and it is determined whether or not they match (step S15). If the collation results match, an execution permission signal is generated and output to the program execution processing unit 211 (step S17). As a result, the program execution processing unit 211 starts execution of the execution target program (that is, the execution target program is activated) (step S19).
- step S15 if the collation result does not match in step S15, the list information corresponding to the program is deleted from the execution permission list storage unit 301, and the program is deleted from the program memory unit 202 (step S21). That is, it is synonymous with prohibition of execution of the program.
- step S7 determines whether the file of the execution target program is read, and collation information is created by the collation information creation unit 315 (step S23).
- the created verification information is transmitted to the program certification section 50 of the terminal management server 5 (step S25).
- step S27 it is determined whether or not a permission signal is received from the terminal management server 5 (step S27). If a permission signal is received, it is determined whether or not the received signal is an execution permission signal (step S29). If the received signal is an execution permission signal, the execution permission / rejection unit 314 converts it to a predetermined instruction signal that permits execution, and the converted execution permission signal instructs the execution permission list storage unit 301 to start the list update process. Then (step S31), the process proceeds to step S19, and execution of the execution target program is started. On the other hand, if the received signal is not an execution permission signal in step S29, that is, if it is an execution non-permission signal, the execution target program is deleted from the program memory 202 (step S35). In the list update process in step S31, it is determined that the program that is permitted to execute is free of virus infection, and the update unit 317 uses the same format as the list information in the execution permission list storage unit 301 in the hash value, Given information is created and added.
- Step S37 assumes that it may take time for virus inspection and other inspections for fraud.
- the program being inspected is disposed of.
- the disposal is a deletion process based on an instruction from the terminal management server 5, for example, from the program memory unit 202.
- the predetermined period is a time slightly longer than the time until the normal execution is started after being specified by the operation unit 21, and is, for example, about several seconds to 10 seconds.
- notification indicating that virus inspection is being performed may be performed on the display unit 22. In addition to display, the notification may be performed by voice when a speaker is attached.
- step # 1 it is determined whether or not verification information has been received. If the verification information has not been received, this flow is exited. On the other hand, if the collation information is received, collation between the received collation information and the collation source information in the collation source information database 501 is performed (step # 3). If the two signals match (YES in step # 5), an execution permission signal is created and returned to the terminal 1 that is the source of the verification information (step # 7).
- step # 9 virus check processing is executed (step # 9).
- the transfer unit 316 of the terminal 1 that is the source of the collation information is requested to transfer the file of the execution target program. Checked with matching method. If virus infection is recognized (YES in step # 11), an execution non-permission signal is generated and returned to the terminal 1 that is the transmission source of the file of the execution target program (step # 13).
- step # 15 it is determined whether or not a signal indicating whether the operation unit 51 is illegal is input (step # 15). If the signal input is an illegal signal (YES in step # 17), the process proceeds to step # 13. If the signal input is not an illegal signal, the verification information is registered in the verification source information database 501 (that is, the previous verification source information is Updated) (step # 19), the process proceeds to step # 7.
- step # 21 If there is no signal input for a predetermined period (step # 21), a hold continuation process is performed (step # 23), and the process proceeds to step # 13.
- the predetermined period is the period of step S33 in FIG.
- the pending continuation process can be considered as a further check by the administrator or by an external expert when there is no virus infection in the program file to be executed. Is a process for enabling the update of the data in the program certification unit 50 and the required memory unit of the terminal 1 based on the result of the check by the administrator or the like later. More specifically, a storage unit for storing a list of hold information is provided, and after the check, the corresponding hold information is read out so that the check result can be reflected, thereby enabling an update process.
- the storage unit 300 further includes a normal operation suspicious list storage unit 302.
- the normal operation suspicious list is a list of programs other than the programs included in the execution permission list.
- the normal operation suspicious list is a file containing macros, an add-in file (referred to as a subprogram) used by a program that is permitted to be executed, and is updated and stored in the program memory unit 202 as a gray list for each terminal 1 To do.
- the program is stored in an updated manner in the program memory unit 202 for each terminal 1.
- a macro is a specific program such as document creation software or spreadsheet software that is created in advance as a specific operation procedure as a program and the file is registered to automatically create the specific operation procedure. The function to be executed.
- An add-in file refers to a file (program) additionally provided with an extended function for a predetermined program. These programs are shown as files in an additional format using an extension with respect to the files of the main program, and can be identified. In FIG. 3, it is assumed that the macro file and the add-in file are acquired from the outside, but may be created by the own terminal 1.
- the update unit 317 of the control unit 310 exchanges the list between the execution permission list storage unit 301 and the normal operation suspicious list storage unit 302 based on the execution permission determination result and the usage record determination result, as will be described later.
- the update unit 317 registers a program acquired from the outside or a program created by the own terminal 1 in the program memory unit 202 based on an instruction from the operation unit 21. Also execute. At the time of registration, a file including a macro and an add-in file are identified by referring to an extension or the like.
- the control unit 310 further includes a stamp presence / absence determination unit 318 and a usage record monitoring unit 319.
- the storage unit 500 of the program certification unit 50 further includes a terminal certification stamp storage unit 503.
- Control unit 510 further includes a terminal certification stamp assigning unit 514.
- the terminal certification stamp storage unit 503 When the terminal 1 installs the software that is the program monitoring unit 3, the stamp stored in the terminal certification stamp storage unit 503 is the owner (including the exclusive user) of the terminal 1, the IP address, and the mail address. This is terminal-specific information created using other information or based on the desire of the owner of the terminal 1. Accordingly, the terminal certificate stamp storage unit 503 stores a stamp for each terminal 1.
- a stamp is signature information attached to guarantee the validity of a digital document, and is an electronic representation of characters, symbols, marks, and the like. In this embodiment, a predetermined number of symbols expressed in binary code is used as a stamp.
- the terminal certification stamp assigning unit 514 recognizes the terminal 1 that is the transmission source and electronically assigns a stamp corresponding to the terminal 1 to the file of the program that requests transmission of the stamp that has been transmitted from a certain terminal 1. For example, an embedding process is performed. In the case of electronic embedding processing, which is a form of electronic application, it is performed by embedding a binary code describing a stamp in a program file according to a predetermined rule.
- the predetermined rule is a method of embedding at a predetermined position in a file at once, a method of dividing a binary code of a stamp into a predetermined number and embedding in a plurality of predetermined locations in the file, and various other known methods The method can be adopted. For example, in the case of an executable program file, since there is a free area that is not used for program execution in the MZ header, a stamp may be embedded in this free area.
- the terminal management server 5 for inspection. This is undesirable because it increases the burden of transmission processing, slows down processing, and increases opportunities for information leakage on the network. Therefore, in order to use a program included in the execution permission list in each terminal 1 for a file such as a created macro program, the terminal is designated in order to prove (guarantee) the validity.
- the proof stamp is embedded.
- the stamp presence / absence determination unit 318 When the program corresponding to the list in the normal operation suspicious list storage unit 302 is to be executed, the stamp presence / absence determination unit 318 first determines the presence / absence of a stamp and outputs the determination result to the execution permission / rejection unit 314. I am doing so.
- the execution permission / refusal unit 314 outputs an execution permission signal to the program execution processing unit 211 for the file program to which the stamp is attached.
- the stamp presence / absence determination unit 318 causes the verification information generation unit 315 to generate verification information and outputs an instruction signal to be transmitted to the program certification unit 50 when a stamp is not added to the target program file.
- the usage record monitoring unit 319 monitors each usage history of the corresponding program registered in the execution permission list storage unit 301. If the unused state continues for a predetermined period, such a program is stored in the execution permission list storage unit. It is deleted from 301 and added to the normal operation suspicious list storage unit 302, that is, a downgrade process is performed in view of the possibility of virus infection. That is, if the non-use period exceeds a certain level, an appropriate program file is given an opportunity for falsification, and the possibility that the above hash values do not match increases. Therefore, in such a case, it is possible to make a determination by performing a single virus check process, as will be described later, by performing a downgrade beforehand, without performing hash value collation and collation information collation. Become. Then, if it is determined by the virus check that the virus is not infected, it may be upgraded (returned) to the execution permission list again.
- the collation information creation unit 315 is a case where the program corresponding to the list in the normal operation suspicious list storage unit 302 is an execution target, and when the stamp presence / absence determination unit 318 determines that the stamp is not given, Information for checking the file of the program is created and transmitted to the execution permission / rejection determination unit 511.
- the transfer unit 316 transmits the newly created macro program file to the terminal certification stamp assigning unit 514 and stores the program file after the stamp assignment in the program memory unit 202.
- this file is transmitted as TCP / IP packet data.
- the TCP / IP data part is transmitted after being encrypted.
- the cipher method is changed every time communication is performed.
- the terminal management server 5 returns the macro program file after the stamping to the terminal 1 of the transmission source.
- FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing file registration processing such as a program such as a macro on the terminal 1 side of the system shown in FIG.
- FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing a file registration process such as a macro program on the terminal management server 5 side of the system shown in FIG. 10 and 11 are flowcharts showing virus monitoring processing on the terminal 1 side of the system shown in FIG. 7 also acts as a flowchart showing virus monitoring processing on the terminal management server 5 side of the system shown in FIG.
- step S41 when a macro or add-in program file whose main file is a program file corresponding to the list included in the execution permission list storage unit 301 is acquired and a registration instruction is issued from the operation unit 21 (step S41). YES), it is determined whether or not the program is a macro program (step S41). If the program is a macro program, a stamp assignment request signal is attached to the file of the acquired program and the terminal management server 5 is notified. Transferred (step S45). Next, it is determined whether or not there is a return (step S47). If there is a return, the returned program file is stored in the program memory 202 (step S49), and the corresponding list information is created and It is added to the operation suspicious list storage unit 302 (step S51).
- step S41 if it is determined in step S41 that the program is not a macro program, collation information is created from the acquired program file according to the predetermined rule as described above, and a registration request signal is attached to the terminal management server 5. Transferred (step S53).
- step # 41 when a stamp request or registration request signal is received (step # 41), it is first determined whether or not there is a stamp request (step # 43). If it is not a stamp assignment request signal, it is a registration request, so the collation information of the received file is written in the collation source information database 501 as collation source information (step # 45).
- step # 43 if it is a stamp application request signal in step # 43, the stamp application process is executed in accordance with the rules described above (step # 47). Next, verification source information is created and written in the verification source information database 501 (step # 49). Finally, the program file to which the stamp is attached is returned to the terminal 1 (step # 51).
- step S61 an execution program is specified (step S61).
- step S63 it is determined whether or not the program corresponds to a list in the execution permission list. If it is a program corresponding to the list in the execution permission list, the process proceeds to step S5 in the flowchart shown in FIG. 6 (step S65), and the hash value collation process in the terminal 1 is started.
- step S67 it is determined whether or not the terminal certificate stamp is given to the file of the program. If the stamp is given, an execution permission signal is output (step S69), and then the execution of the program is started (step S71). On the other hand, if no stamp is given in step S67, the verification information is created from the file of the program (step S73) and transmitted to the program certification unit 50 (step S75).
- step S77 it is determined whether or not a permission signal is received (step S77). If the received signal is an execution permission signal (step S79), the execution of the program is started (step S81). Next, it is determined whether or not the program is a macro program (step S83). If the program is not a macro program, the list information for the program is transferred from the normal operation suspicious list to the execution permission list (step S85). On the other hand, if the program is a macro program in step S83, a signal for requesting stamping is transferred to the attached master terminal management server 5 (step S87). Next, it is determined whether or not a program file to which a stamp has been attached has been returned (step S89). If there is a return, the returned program file is stored in the program memory unit 202 (the program file before stun assignment is stored). Updated) (step S91), and this flow ends.
- step S95 execution is prohibited if it is not an execution permission signal in step S79. Note that if the determination process in step S77 passes a predetermined period (YES in step S93), execution is prohibited (step S95), and the process exits this flow.
- collation of information for collation and virus check are executed on the terminal management server 5 side.
- the control unit 310 executes the predetermined rule in reverse to remove the stamp code information from the macro program file. And execute it. For example, in FIG. 9, a step of determining whether or not a stamp has already been added to the program file is added, and if the stamp has not been assigned, the process of FIG. 9 is executed and the stamp has already been assigned. In this case, step # 47 in FIG. 9 may be skipped.
- the storage unit 200 further includes a RAM (work memory) 204.
- the control unit 210 of the terminal 1 further includes a program creation processing unit 212.
- the program creation processing unit 212 is executed when creating a new macro or other program in the own terminal 1 using the operation unit 21, and executes program description or registration instruction processing.
- the work memory 204 is used as an area for temporarily storing information in the middle of processing when the program creation processing unit 212 creates a program.
- the program creation processing unit 212 detects that the file written in the program memory unit 202 by the OS is new, and thereby recognizes that the write file is a file newly created in the terminal 1. It is like that.
- step S41 of FIG. 8 is not necessary, and the process proceeds to step S45 uniformly. That is, it is assumed that the program file newly created in the terminal 1 is registered, and in step S45, a stamp request signal is attached to the created program file and transferred to the terminal management server 5. Further, step # 41 in FIG. 9 is all reception of a stamp grant request signal, and # 43 and # 45 are not required.
- the control unit 310 further includes a terminal certification stamp verification unit 320.
- the terminal certification stamp verification unit 320 is a program created by the program creation processing unit 212, and the program file stored in the program memory unit 202 with a stamp that proves the terminal 1 at the time of creation is executed later.
- the stamp information is extracted from the file of the corresponding program in the program memory unit 202, and the stamp information of the corresponding terminal in the terminal certification stamp storage unit 503 of the storage unit 500 is read, and both stamps are read. It is to be verified. If the two stamps match, the execution permission / rejection unit 314 generates an execution permission signal.
- the terminal certification stamp verification unit 320 may be used instead of the stamp presence / absence determination unit 318. As a result, even for a macro program, the stamp can be verified each time the program is loaded and the reliability is improved. Conversely, in FIG. 4, a stamp presence / absence determination unit 318 may be used instead of the terminal certification stamp verification unit 320. In this case, it is possible to check on the terminal 1 side.
- the registration of the created program file is transferred from the work memory 204 to the terminal certification stamp assigning unit 514, where the stamp is given, and then returned to the program memory 202 for writing.
- virus monitoring process on the terminal 1 side and the virus monitoring process on the terminal management server 5 side of the system shown in FIG. 4 are performed in substantially the same processing procedure as in FIGS.
- step S67 of FIGS. 10 to 11 the above-described stamp verification process is performed by the terminal certification stamp verification unit 320. If the result of the stamp verification is a match, an execution permission signal shown in step S69 is output. On the contrary, if the result of the stamp collation is a mismatch, the process proceeds to step S73. Also in the embodiment of FIG. 3, it is preferable to employ the terminal certification stamp collating unit 320 as in FIG.
- the storage unit 300 further includes an illegal operation pattern list storage unit 303 and an in-examination list storage unit 304.
- the illegal operation pattern list is a list of typical illegal operation patterns or similar patterns among the patterns executed by the program. Or, an abnormal state where the operation speed is abnormally fast when a human operation is required, meaningless information processing, and the like are included.
- This unauthorized operation pattern list is typically distributed from the terminal management server 5 to all terminals 1 in which software called the program monitoring unit 3 is installed.
- the illegal operation pattern list is a list of instruction code files that can be instructed to the CPU.
- an illegal operation pattern detection unit 322 detects an illegal operation pattern
- the instruction codes of all lists are executed in parallel, so that the verification (check) processing with the program to be inspected is performed simultaneously.
- the presence / absence of an illegal operation pattern and the specification of an illegal operation pattern can be specified.
- the in-inspection list storage unit 304 stores a list of the program and the illegal operation pattern when the illegal operation pattern and the file of the program that generated the pattern are being inspected (analyzed) on the terminal management server 5 side. Is. It is added every time an illegal operation pattern occurs, and is deleted every time analysis ends.
- the in-inspection list storage unit 304 stores individual list information for each terminal 1.
- the control unit 310 further includes an unauthorized operation pattern list update unit 321, an unauthorized operation pattern detection unit 322, and an execution program monitoring unit 323.
- the control unit 510 of the terminal management server 5 includes an unauthorized operation pattern creation unit 515 and an unauthorized operation pattern inspection unit 516.
- the unauthorized operation pattern creation unit 515 creates an unauthorized operation pattern and transmits (distributes) it to all the terminals 1 in which the software of the program monitoring unit 3 is installed. Every time a new illegal operation pattern is confirmed, it is additionally transmitted to the entire terminal 1.
- the unauthorized operation pattern list update unit 321 is configured to updately store the unauthorized operation pattern transmitted from the unauthorized operation pattern creation unit 515 in the unauthorized operation pattern list storage unit 303.
- the illegal operation pattern detection unit 322 monitors whether or not an illegal operation pattern is generated during execution of the program executed based on a command from the operation unit 21. Then, when an illegal operation pattern is generated, the illegal operation pattern detection unit 322 associates information for identifying the program, information for identifying the illegal operation pattern, and information on the location of occurrence of the illegal operation pattern in the program. While being additionally stored in the in-examination list storage unit 304, the transfer unit 316 is instructed to transfer the program and the unauthorized operation pattern to the terminal management server 5.
- the illegal operation pattern is, for example, an operation of opening a specific window or irregularly on the display unit 22 screen, a specific key of the keyboard of the operation unit 21, or an unspecified key. A case where a signal similar to an instruction signal when repeatedly pressing the button at a high speed is created may be considered.
- the transfer unit 316 reads the file of the instructed program from the program memory unit 202 and transfers it to the terminal management server 5 together with information on the illegal operation pattern and the illegal part detected by the illegal operation pattern detection unit 322.
- the illegal operation pattern inspection unit 516 performs analysis and analysis of the cause according to a predetermined procedure based on the program file transferred from the transfer unit 316, the illegal operation pattern, and the information on the illegal part. For example, the contents are analyzed by an analysis process for the presence / absence of falsification, a virus check process, and the like. As a result of the analysis, use prohibition processing is performed for a program having a security problem. Specifically, it is deleted from the execution permission list storage unit 301 and the normal operation suspicious list storage unit 302. Upon completion of the analysis, the list information being inspected is deleted from the in-examination list storage unit 304.
- the execution program monitoring unit 323 prohibits the execution by skipping the process of the portion of the detected illegal operation pattern when the execution command is issued by the operation unit 21 to the program under examination. It is. If the program is a communication program and the program cannot be stopped in the middle, the output port connected to the ISP 6 is blocked by controlling the OS or the like to prevent unexpected information leakage ( That is, the process result may be invalidated).
- FIG. 12 is a flowchart showing an illegal operation pattern detection process on the terminal 1 side of the system shown in FIG.
- FIG. 13 is a flowchart showing an illegal operation pattern list update process on the terminal 1 side of the system shown in FIG.
- FIG. 14 is a flowchart showing the process of updating the checking list on the terminal 1 side of the system shown in FIG.
- FIG. 15 is a flowchart showing an execution program monitoring process on the terminal 1 side of the system shown in FIG.
- step S101 it is determined whether or not the program is being executed. If it is not being executed, this flow is exited. If it is being executed, it is determined whether or not an illegal operation pattern has been detected (step S103). If the illegal operation pattern is not detected, the detection operation is continued until the program ends (NO in step S105). On the other hand, when an illegal operation pattern is detected, a transfer instruction and a storage process of information for identifying the file of the program, information for identifying the illegal operation pattern, and information on the location of the illegal operation pattern of the program are executed ( Step S107) and return to Step S103.
- step S111 it is determined whether or not there is a request for addition to the illegal operation pattern list (step S111), and if there is no request, the process exits this flow. On the other hand, if requested, the received illegal operation pattern information is additionally stored in the illegal operation pattern list storage unit 303 together with information for identifying the pattern (step S113).
- step S121 it is determined whether or not there is an update request for the checking list. If there is no update request, the process exits this flow. On the other hand, if there is an update request, it is determined whether or not to add a checking list (step S123), and if the update request is to add a checking list, the list information is written (step S125) and vice versa. On the other hand, if the update request is to delete the list under inspection, the specified list information is deleted (step S127).
- step S131 it is determined whether or not the program scheduled to be executed, which is instructed by the operation unit 21, is a program included in the list under inspection. If the program to be executed is a program that is not included in the checking list, the process exits this flow. On the other hand, if the program to be executed is a program included in the in-check list, it is determined that the program is started (step S133), and the presence or absence of an illegal operation pattern is monitored (step S135). If the process of the program being executed is where the illegal operation pattern has occurred (step S137), the process is skipped, or a process is executed that controls the OS and invalidates the result of the process execution (step S137). S139). Note that which is executed if the process is a program that can be skipped, and if the program cannot be modified, the OS controls the process that invalidates the process execution result. It is set in advance so that it can be performed.
- step S141 it is determined whether or not the execution of the program has ended. If it has not ended, the process returns to step S135 to continue monitoring, while if it has ended, this flow ends.
- the present invention can employ the following objects.
- processing related to electronic payment is performed between members via the terminal 1. Therefore, even in a mode in which a plurality of terminals are connected to a LAN (Local Area Network) such as a company or an organization, it is possible to correspond to each individual terminal 1.
- a program certification server 81 corresponding to the program certification unit 50 of the terminal management server 5 may be provided on the LAN 8 to manage each terminal 1 on the LAN 8.
- the terminal 1 on the LAN 8 is preferably responsible for a part of the functions described above in the program certification server 81, for example, a program certification function for an in-house developed program.
- the terminal management server 5 treats the file of the program once determined as a virus infection file on the terminal 1 as an illegal file list (black list), that is, distinguishes it from other programs and starts it. You may perform the process which makes it impossible to perform immediately, without performing the process which receives confirmation from the terminal management server 5 for every instruction
- an inexecutable stamp corresponding to the above-described terminal certification stamp may be assigned (embedded) to the program file. In this way, communication with the terminal management server 5 can be omitted.
- the terminal certification stamp assigning unit 514 is provided on the terminal management server 5 side.
- the present invention is not limited to this, and is included in the software of the program monitoring unit 3. You may make it install in each terminal 1 side. In this way, it is not necessary to reciprocate the target program on the network before and after the stamp is applied every time the terminal certification stamp is applied.
- the terminal management server 5 has a terminal certification stamp storage unit 501, stores the stamp of each terminal 1 as an original, and from each terminal 1 at a desired point in time or when stamping is necessary.
- a stamp issuing unit 520 (see FIG. 3) that issues the requested one or a required number of unique stamps of the terminal 1 in response to the transmitted stamp transmission request signal.
- the terminal 1 side receives the issued stamp and temporarily stores it in the storage unit 200, and further includes a functional unit corresponding to the terminal certification stamp giving unit 514 on the terminal 1 side.
- the new terminal certification stamp assigning unit 330 (see FIG. 3) provided on the terminal 1 side receives the subprogram file or the program file created by the terminal from the stamp storage unit 200 as described above. A process of reading and adding (embedding) the stamp is executed. Note that the stamp issued from the terminal management server 5 and stored in the stamp storage unit is suppressed from being duplicated, for example, by adding identification information (for example, a serial number).
- the hash value of the program file and other information are used as the verification source information.
- the hash value and header related information may be used.
- the program file has header information in the head area, and text data and execution file data for the program are written in the next section. Each entry point and size data are recorded in the header information. Accordingly, if there is any change (typically virus infection) in the executable file data area, a change appears in at least one of the entry point and size data. Therefore, the header information may be used as it is, or the hash value calculated from the header information or the entry point and size data may be adopted as the header related information.
- a plurality of terminals connected to a network and capable of executing a given program according to an instruction from an operation unit, and whether or not to execute the program at each terminal connected to the network A management server that performs an audit on the program, the terminal creates a list for a predetermined program of the given program, and a program storage unit in which the given program is stored in an update manner, and permits execution
- the execution permission list creating means that stores the list storage section in an update manner
- the given program is stored in the execution permission list storage section.
- the first program for reading out the given program from the program storage unit to create first collation information, and determining the difference from the list information corresponding to the execution instruction program in the execution permission list storage unit
- the collation information creating means for reading the given program from the program storage unit to create second collation information and transmitting it to the management server when the judgment by the judgment unit is negative
- a response signal from the management server corresponding to transmission of the second collation information to the management server by the collation information creating means and a result of determining the difference from the first collating means.
- Execution permission / inhibition means for instructing whether to execute the program and the management server responds to writing of the given program in the program storage unit.
- a verification source information storage unit that stores verification source information corresponding to the second verification information of the program, and the second verification information and the verification source information storage unit received from the terminal.
- a secure audit system comprising: a second collating unit that collates with the stored collation source information and returns the result to the terminal as the reply signal. According to this configuration, even a program corresponding to a list included in the execution permission list is checked for falsification or virus infection by self-diagnosis on the terminal side, and the program is not included in the execution permission list. Since a security audit is performed with the management server so that only a secure program can be executed, even if a virus enters the file later and is infected, it will not be activated.
- the first verification information includes a hash value generated from the file of each program.
- the hash value generated from the program file is a small number of predetermined bits, and is unique information for each program such as the presence or absence of falsification or virus infection.
- the second verification information and the verification source information are stored in a hash value generated from the program file and a header area of the program file. It is preferable to include header related information corresponding to the header information. According to this configuration, it is possible to detect a change in the executable file area other than the hash value, and the reliability of the determination can be improved.
- the terminal includes a first transfer unit that reads the given program from the program storage unit and transmits the program to the management server when the result of the verification by the second verification unit does not match,
- the management server checks whether or not the given program transmitted from the transfer means is infected, and if the given server is infected, the execution permission / refusal means does not permit the execution of the given program. It is preferable to provide virus check means for returning a signal. According to this configuration, it is first determined whether or not the collation information matches, and the virus check is performed in the case of a mismatch, so that it is not necessary to check the virus every time.
- the terminal stores a list of macro programs mainly including programs corresponding to the list included in the execution permission list in a normal operation suspicious list storage unit different from the execution permission list.
- a list creating unit and a second transfer unit configured to receive an instruction from the operation unit and to install the macro program in the program storage unit before the program is installed in the program storage unit.
- a unique certificate information storage unit for storing unique certificate information for each terminal, and unique certificate information adding means for adding the unique certificate information of the terminal to the received macro program file and returning the file to the terminal, The terminal further installs a macro program file to which the unique certification information is attached in the program storage unit.
- the unique certification information given to the macro program is stored in the unique certification information storage unit.
- a macro program whose main body is a program corresponding to a list included in the execution permission list is assumed to correspond to a normal operation suspicious list.
- the unique certification information is attached (for example, embedded) and installed in the program storage unit.
- the terminal includes a program creation unit that creates a program via the operation unit, and a normal operation suspicious operation that stores a list of new programs created by the program creation unit in the normal operation suspicious list storage unit.
- a list creating unit ; and a second transfer unit that transmits the new program to the management server before installing the new program in the program storage unit in response to an instruction from the operation unit.
- the terminal further stores a file of the new program to which the unique certification information is attached in the program storage unit.
- the unique certificate information given to the new program is stored as unique certificate information of the new program in the unique certificate information storage unit.
- it is provided with unique proof information collating means for outputting a signal indicating that execution is permitted to the execution permission / refusal means when it is determined that the information matches the stored information.
- the new program created by the terminal is assumed to correspond to the normal operation suspicious list, while unique certification information unique to the terminal is added (for example, embedded) to the file of the new program. Installed in the program storage unit. Later, when an execution instruction is issued for this new program, the unique certificate information given to the file of the new program is checked against the unique certificate information stored in the management server, which is considered to be the original. So you can check for unauthorized tampering and virus infection.
- the collation information creating means creates the second collation information and transmits it to the management server when the result of the collation by the unique proof information collating means is inconsistent, and the second collating means
- the second verification information transmitted from the terminal is compared with the verification source information stored in the verification source information storage unit, and the result is returned to the terminal as the reply signal.
- the verification result of the unique proof information does not match, the verification information is verified, so that the reliability can be measured with high accuracy.
- the terminal stores a list of macro programs mainly including programs corresponding to the list included in the execution permission list in a normal operation suspicious list storage unit different from the execution permission list.
- the management server comprises a unique certificate information storage unit for storing unique certificate information for each terminal, and an issuing unit for issuing unique certificate information to the terminal in response to a request from the terminal, In response to an instruction from the operation unit, the terminal further assigns the issued unique certification information to the macro program file before installing the macro program in the program storage unit.
- it is provided with unique proof information collating means for outputting a signal to permit execution to the execution permission / refusal means when it is determined that the information matches the information stored as proof information.
- the terminal includes a program creation unit that creates a program via the operation unit, and a normal operation suspicious operation that stores a list of new programs created by the program creation unit in the normal operation suspicious list storage unit.
- the list creation means the management server includes a unique certificate information storage unit that stores unique certificate information for each terminal, and an issuing unit that issues unique certificate information to the terminal in response to a request from the terminal, In response to an instruction from the operation unit, the terminal further grants the unique certification information granting the issued unique certification information to the file of the new program before installing the new program in the program storage unit And a program for installing a new program file to which the unique certification information is attached in the program storage unit.
- the unique certification information given to the new program is stored as unique certification information of the new program in the unique certification information storage unit It is preferable to include a unique proof information collating unit that outputs a signal indicating that execution is permitted to the execution permission / refusal unit when it is determined that the information matches. According to this configuration, it is possible to receive the issuance of unique certification information in advance. Then, it becomes possible to attach the unique certification information to the file of the new program when necessary.
- the collation information creating means creates the second collation information and transmits it to the management server when the result of the collation by the unique proof information collating means is inconsistent, and the second collating means
- the second verification information transmitted from the terminal is compared with the verification source information stored in the verification source information storage unit, and the result is returned to the terminal as the reply signal.
- the verification result of the unique proof information does not match, the verification information is verified, so that the reliability can be measured with high accuracy.
- the terminal includes a monitoring unit that monitors whether or not a non-execution state of a program corresponding to the list included in the execution permission list exceeds a predetermined period, and a program that has the non-execution state exceeds the predetermined period. It is preferable to include a list deletion unit that deletes the list from the execution permission list. According to this configuration, even if the program corresponds to a list included in the execution permission list, if it is not executed for a predetermined period, conversion and virus infection opportunities increase during that period. As for programs with reduced security reliability, they were downgraded.
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Abstract
Description
2 端末処理部
21 操作部
3 プログラム監視部
5 端末管理サーバ
7 ネットワーク
202 プログラムメモリ(プログラム記憶部)
211プログラム実行処理部
212 プログラム作成処理部(プログラム作成手段)
301 実行許可リスト記憶部
302 正常動作不審リスト記憶部
303 不正動作パターンリスト記憶部
304 検査中リスト記憶部
311 プログラム特定部(判断手段)
312 ハッシュ値作成部(第1の照合手段)
313 ハッシュ値照合部(第1の照合手段)
314 実行許否部(実行許否手段)
315 照合情報作成部(照合情報作成手段)
316 転送部(転送手段)
317 更新部(実行許可リスト作成手段、正常動作不審リスト作成手段、リスト削除手段、インストール処理手段)
318 スタンプ有無判断部
319 使用実績監視部(監視手段)
320 端末証明スタンプ照合部(固有証明情報照合手段)
321 不正動作パターン更新部
322 不正動作パターン検知部
323 実行プログラム監視部
330 端末証明スタンプ付与部(固有証明情報付与手段)
501 照合元情報データベース(照合元情報記憶部)
502 ウイルスパターン記憶部
503 端末証明スタンプ記憶部(固有証明情報記憶部)
511 実行許否判断部(第2の照合手段)
512 ウイルスチェック部
513 実行許否信号作成部
514 端末証明スタンプ付与部(固有証明情報付与手段)
515 不正動作パターン作成部
516 不正動作パターン検査部(インストール処理手段)
520 スタンプ発行部(発行手段)
Claims (12)
- ネットワークに接続され、操作部からの指示に従って所与のプログラムが実行可能にされた複数の端末と、前記ネットワークに接続され、前記各端末における前記プログラムの実行の許否に関する監査を行う管理サーバとを備え、
前記端末は、
前記所与のプログラムが更新的に記憶されるプログラム記憶部と、
前記所与のプログラムのうちの所定のプログラムについてリストを作成し、実行許可リスト記憶部に更新的に記憶する実行許可リスト作成手段と、
前記操作部からの前記所与のプログラムのいずれかの実行指示があったとき、当該所与のプログラムが前記実行許可リスト記憶部に記憶されているリストに対応するプログラムであるか否かを判断する判断手段と、
前記判断手段による判断が肯定された場合に、当該所与のプログラムを前記プログラム記憶部から読み出して第1の照合用情報を作成し、前記実行許可リスト記憶部の前記実行指示のプログラムに対応するリストの情報との異同を判断する第1の照合手段と、
前記判断手段による判断が否定された場合に、前記所与のプログラムを前記プログラム記憶部から読み出して第2の照合用情報を作成し、前記管理サーバに送信する照合情報作成手段と、
前記照合情報作成手段による前記第2の照合用情報の前記管理サーバへの送信に対応する前記管理サーバからの返信信号、及び前記第1の照合手段からの前記異同を判断した結果に基づいて当該プログラムの実行の許否を指示する実行許否手段とを備え、
前記管理サーバは、
前記プログラム記憶部への前記所与のプログラムの書き込みに応じて、当該プログラムの前記第2の照合用情報に対応する照合元情報が記憶される照合元情報記憶部と、
前記端末から受信された前記第2の照合用情報と前記照合元情報記憶部に記憶されている前記照合元情報とを照合し、その結果を前記返信信号として当該端末に返信する第2の照合手段とを備えたことを特徴とするセキュア監査システム。 - 前記第1の照合用情報は、前記各プログラムのファイルから生成されるハッシュ値を含むことを特徴とする請求項1に記載のセキュア監査システム。
- 前記第2の照合用情報及び前記照合元情報は、プログラムのファイルから生成されるハッシュ値及び当該プログラムのファイルのヘッダー領域に記憶されているヘッダー情報に対応するヘッダー関連情報を含むことを特徴とする請求項1又は2に記載のセキュア監査システム。
- 前記端末は、前記第2の照合手段による照合の結果が不一致であった場合、前記所与のプログラムを前記プログラム記憶部から読み出して前記管理サーバに送信する第1の転送手段を備え、
前記管理サーバは、前記転送手段から送信された前記所与のプログラムのウイルス感染の有無をチェックし、ウイルス感染している場合には、前記実行許否手段に当該所与のプログラムの実行を不許可にするべく信号を返送するウイルスチェック手段を備えたことを特徴とする請求項1~3のいずれかに記載のセキュア監査システム。 - 前記端末は、
前記実行許可リストに含まれるリストに対応するプログラムを本体とするマクロのプログラムのリストを前記実行許可リストとは異なる正常動作不審リスト記憶部に更新的に記憶する正常動作不審リスト作成手段と、
前記操作部からの指示を受けて前記マクロのプログラムを前記プログラム記憶部にインストールする前に、前記管理サーバに送信する第2の転送手段とを備え、
前記管理サーバは、
前記端末毎の固有証明情報を記憶する固有証明情報記憶部と、
当該端末の固有証明情報を前記受信したマクロのプログラムのファイルに付与して当該端末に返信する固有証明情報付与手段とを備え、
前記端末は、さらに、
前記固有証明情報が付与されたマクロのプログラムのファイルを前記プログラム記憶部にインストールするインストール処理手段と、
前記操作部からの前記マクロのプログラムについて実行指示があったとき、当該マクロのプログラムに付与された前記固有証明情報が前記固有証明情報記憶部に当該マクロのプログラムの固有証明情報として記憶されている情報と一致すると判断した場合に、前記実行許否手段に実行を許可する旨の信号を出力する固有証明情報照合手段とを備えたことを特徴とする請求項1~3のいずれかに記載のセキュア監査システム。 - 前記端末は、
前記操作部を介してプログラムを作成するプログラム作成手段と、
前記プログラム作成手段によって作成された新規プログラムのリストを前記正常動作不審リスト記憶部に更新的に記憶する正常動作不審リスト作成手段と、
前記操作部からの指示を受けて前記新規プログラムを前記プログラム記憶部にインストールする前に、当該新規プログラムを前記管理サーバに送信する第2の転送手段とを備え、
前記管理サーバは、
前記端末毎の固有証明情報を記憶する固有証明情報記憶部と、
当該端末の固有証明情報を前記受信した新規プログラムのファイルに付与して当該端末に返信する固有証明情報付与手段とを備え、
前記端末は、さらに、
前記固有証明情報が付与された新規プログラムのファイルを前記プログラム記憶部にインストールするインストール処理手段と、
前記操作部からの前記新規プログラムについて実行指示があったとき、当該新規プログラムに付与された前記固有証明情報が前記固有証明情報記憶部に当該新規プログラムの固有証明情報として記憶されている情報と一致すると判断した場合に、前記実行許否手段に実行を許可する旨の信号を出力する固有証明情報照合手段とを備えたことを特徴とする請求項1~3のいずれかに記載のセキュア監査システム。 - 前記照合情報作成手段は、前記固有証明情報照合手段による照合の結果が不一致である場合、前記第2の照合用情報を作成して前記管理サーバに送信し、前記第2の照合手段は、前記端末から送信された前記第2の照合用情報と前記照合元情報記憶部に記憶されている前記照合元情報とを照合し、その結果を前記返信信号として当該端末に返信することを特徴とする請求項5又は6に記載のセキュア監査システム。
- 前記端末は、
前記実行許可リストに含まれるリストに対応するプログラムを本体とするマクロのプログラムのリストを前記実行許可リストとは異なる正常動作不審リスト記憶部に更新的に記憶する正常動作不審リスト作成手段を備え、
前記管理サーバは、
前記端末毎の固有証明情報を記憶する固有証明情報記憶部と、
端末からの要求に応じて当該端末に固有証明情報を発行する発行部とを備え、
前記端末は、さらに、
前記操作部からの指示を受けて、前記マクロのプログラムを前記プログラム記憶部にインストールする前に、当該マクロのプログラムのファイルに前記発行された前記固有証明情報を付与する固有証明情報付与手段と、
前記固有証明情報が付与されたマクロのプログラムのファイルを前記プログラム記憶部にインストールするインストール処理手段と、
前記操作部からの前記マクロのプログラムについて実行指示があったとき、当該マクロのプログラムに付与された前記固有証明情報が前記固有証明情報記憶部に当該マクロのプログラムの固有証明情報として記憶されている情報と一致すると判断した場合に、前記実行許否手段に実行を許可する旨の信号を出力する固有証明情報照合手段とを備えたことを特徴とする請求項1~3のいずれかに記載のセキュア監査システム。 - 前記端末は、
前記操作部を介してプログラムを作成するプログラム作成手段と、
前記プログラム作成手段によって作成された新規プログラムのリストを前記正常動作不審リスト記憶部に更新的に記憶する正常動作不審リスト作成手段と、
前記管理サーバは、
前記端末毎の固有証明情報を記憶する固有証明情報記憶部と、
端末からの要求に応じて当該端末に固有証明情報を発行する発行部とを備え、
前記端末は、さらに、
前記操作部からの指示を受けて、前記新規プログラムを前記プログラム記憶部にインストールする前に、当該新規プログラムのファイルに前記発行された前記固有証明情報を付与する固有証明情報付与手段と、
前記固有証明情報が付与された新規プログラムのファイルを前記プログラム記憶部にインストールするインストール処理手段と、
前記操作部からの前記新規プログラムについて実行指示があったとき、当該新規プログラムに付与された前記固有証明情報が前記固有証明情報記憶部に当該新規プログラムの固有証明情報として記憶されている情報と一致すると判断した場合に、前記実行許否手段に実行を許可する旨の信号を出力する固有証明情報照合手段とを備えたことを特徴とする請求項1~3のいずれかに記載のセキュア監査システム。 - 前記照合情報作成手段は、前記固有証明情報照合手段による照合の結果が不一致である場合、前記第2の照合用情報を作成して前記管理サーバに送信し、前記第2の照合手段は、前記端末から送信された前記第2の照合用情報と前記照合元情報記憶部に記憶されている前記照合元情報とを照合し、その結果を前記返信信号として当該端末に返信することを特徴とする請求項8又は9に記載のセキュア監査システム。
- 前記端末は、前記実行許可リストに含まれるリストに対応するプログラムの不実行状態が所定期間を超えたか否かを監視する監視手段と、
前記不実行状態が前記所定期間を超えたプログラムのリストを前記実行許可リストから削除するリスト削除手段とを備えたことを特徴とする請求項1~10のいずれかに記載のセキュア監査システム。 - ネットワークに接続された個々の端末によるプログラムの実行の許否を制御するセキュア監査方法において、
前記端末のプログラム記憶部に、前記所与のプログラムが更新的に記憶されており、
前記端末の実行許可リスト作成手段が、前記所与のプログラムのうちの所定のプログラムについてリストを作成し、実行許可リスト記憶部に更新的に記憶し、
前記端末の判断手段が、前記操作部からの前記所与のプログラムのいずれかの実行指示があったとき、当該所与のプログラムが前記実行許可リスト記憶部に記憶されているリストに対応するプログラムであるか否かを判断し、
前記端末の第1の照合手段が、前記判断手段による判断が肯定された場合に、当該所与のプログラムを前記プログラム記憶部から読み出して第1の照合用情報を作成し、前記実行許可リスト記憶部の前記実行指示のプログラムに対応するリストの情報との異同を判断し、
前記端末の照合情報作成手段が、前記判断手段による判断が否定された場合に、前記所与のプログラムを前記プログラム記憶部から読み出して第2の照合用情報を作成し、前記管理サーバに送信し、
前記ネットワークに接続された前記管理サーバの照合元情報記憶部に、前記プログラム記憶部への前記所与のプログラムの書き込みに応じて、当該プログラムの前記第2の照合用情報に対応する照合元情報が記憶されており、
前記管理サーバの第2の照合手段が、前記端末から受信された前記第2の照合用情報と前記照合元情報記憶部に記憶されている前記照合元情報とを照合し、その結果を前記返信信号として当該端末に返信し、
前記端末の実行許否手段が、前記照合情報作成手段による前記第2の照合用情報の前記管理サーバへの送信に対応する前記管理サーバからの返信信号、及び前記第1の照合手段からの前記異同を判断した結果に基づいて当該プログラムの実行の許否を指示することを特徴とするセキュア監査方法。
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JP2014164392A (ja) * | 2013-02-22 | 2014-09-08 | Dainippon Printing Co Ltd | 情報処理装置および情報処理システム |
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CN104217159A (zh) * | 2013-05-31 | 2014-12-17 | 马子熙 | 一种不依赖查杀引擎的互助式移动终端反病毒方法和系统 |
JP2016532381A (ja) * | 2013-08-14 | 2016-10-13 | ダニエル チエン | 疑わしいネットワーク通信の評価 |
JP2019012442A (ja) * | 2017-06-30 | 2019-01-24 | 大日本印刷株式会社 | セキュアエレメント、コンピュータプログラム、デバイス、サーバ及びファイル情報の照合方法 |
JP2020046829A (ja) * | 2018-09-18 | 2020-03-26 | 株式会社東芝 | 情報処理装置、情報処理方法およびプログラム |
US11132467B2 (en) | 2018-09-18 | 2021-09-28 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Information processing device, information processing method, and computer program product |
JP2020144629A (ja) * | 2019-03-06 | 2020-09-10 | コニカミノルタ株式会社 | 情報処理装置、機能実行可否判断方法および機能実行可否判断プログラム |
JP7156098B2 (ja) | 2019-03-06 | 2022-10-19 | コニカミノルタ株式会社 | 情報処理装置、機能実行可否判断方法および機能実行可否判断プログラム |
CN111309978A (zh) * | 2020-02-24 | 2020-06-19 | 广西电网有限责任公司防城港供电局 | 变电站系统安全防护方法、装置、计算机设备和存储介质 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
EP2479700A4 (en) | 2013-05-01 |
US20120198553A1 (en) | 2012-08-02 |
JPWO2011030455A1 (ja) | 2013-02-04 |
CN102498491A (zh) | 2012-06-13 |
EP2479700A1 (en) | 2012-07-25 |
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