US6260142B1 - Access and storage of secure group communication cryptographic keys - Google Patents
Access and storage of secure group communication cryptographic keys Download PDFInfo
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- US6260142B1 US6260142B1 US09/470,551 US47055199A US6260142B1 US 6260142 B1 US6260142 B1 US 6260142B1 US 47055199 A US47055199 A US 47055199A US 6260142 B1 US6260142 B1 US 6260142B1
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- group
- security credentials
- credentials
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- security
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/065—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for group communications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
- H04L63/104—Grouping of entities
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0822—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using key encryption key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
- H04L9/0833—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
- H04L9/0897—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
- H04L2463/102—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying security measure for e-commerce
Definitions
- This invention relates generally to secure communications and more particularly to securing group communications.
- Securing data such as digitized voice, digitized video, computer data (e.g., e-mail, files, programs), etc.
- the data may be encrypted using an encrypted algorithm, such as Data Encryption Standard (DES), and/or a symmetric key.
- DES Data Encryption Standard
- the data is encrypted, it is provided to a receiving party, or parties, where each receiving party uses its own copy of the symmetric key to decrypt the encrypted message.
- the sending and receiving parties may discard the symmetric key after one transmission or use it for a plurality of transmissions.
- Data secured and transmitted in this manner provides reliable security as long as the symmetric key is known only by the sending and receiving parties.
- a critical issue with symmetric key encryption is providing the symmetric key to all parties without compromising its security. Note that the security of a symmetric key is compromised when an unauthorized party has obtained it.
- Another encryption process utilizes a public/private key pair that includes, for each party, a private decryption key and a public encryption key.
- a private signature key and a public signature verification key may be used for signing.
- the public encryption key and the public signature verification key are publicly available, such that a sending party may obtain the public encryption key for each targeted recipient.
- the sending party individually encrypts a message utilizing the public encryption keys of each recipient.
- the recipient When the recipient receives the encrypted message, it utilizes its private decryption key to the decrypt the message.
- the sending party may sign the message using its private signature key. As such, when each recipient receives the encrypted message, it retrieves the public signature verification key of the sending party to authenticate the signature.
- the sending party may access a recipient list, which includes the identity of each member of a particular group.
- a recipient list may include members of an accounting department, another list for finance, another list for engineering, etc.
- client software i.e., the encryption software incorporated into the computer operated by the user
- interprets the recipient list obtains the encryption keys for each of the recipients (typically from a directory) and individually encrypts the message for each.
- the overhead processing of individually encrypting messages for the members identified in the recipient list does not overburden the system.
- the processing by the client software as well as the amount of data generated increases proportionately.
- a typical encrypted message is approximately 15 kilobytes in size, while the overhead portion, (i.e., the portion that includes the wrapped session keys for each recipient and the identity of each recipient), may exceed the data size by two-fold, three-fold, ten-fold, etc.
- a group security credential such as a cryptographic key, group private decryption key, for example, may be stored with a member's individual security credentials.
- group communication system may have group security credentials stored in a same file as a member's other private decryption keys and private signing keys.
- the member credential file can become too large.
- the new security credential along with the other member security credentials can be difficult to re-obtain and/or be required to be completely regenerated.
- members of a group may be deleted, requiring a suitable update of the security credentials of the group in an efficient manner. This would be useful for large numbers of members.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating one example of an apparatus for providing secure group communication in accordance with one embodiment of the invention.
- FIG. 2 is a flow chart illustrating a method for secure group communication that stores group credentials on a per group basis as separate group credentials from individual member credential information.
- FIG. 3 is a flow chart illustrating an example of a method for secure group communication which sends notification to deleted member requesting deletion of a group credential in accordance with one embodiment of the invention.
- FIG. 4 is a flow chart illustrating a method for secure group communication in accordance with one embodiment of the invention which employs a pull operation from a member's point of view based on the deletion of a member from the group.
- a method and apparatus for secure group communication detects the deletion of a member of the group and uses the detected deletion to update the security credentials of a group by updating a repository containing credentials of members of a group.
- updating of the security credentials may be performed by sending a group credential deletion request for a member that has been deleted from the group so that the member deletes a stored copy of the group security credential.
- the method and apparatus for secure group communication may also provide separate storage of group security credentials and individual group security credentials to provide storage as independent group member credentials.
- one method includes generating security credentials of a group to initiate a secured group communication, and storing at least a part of the security credentials of the group on a per group basis, separately from individual member security credentials to provide storage as independent group member credentials.
- the apparatus and method maintains a history of the stored security credential of the group separately from cryptographic key histories associated with the individual member security credentials.
- the individual member security credentials may include, for example, at least one private decryption key of a public/private key pair stored in a separate file from the at least part of the security credential of the group.
- a group (e.g., quantity greater than two) is a user entity, objects, such as a device, software processes, routers or any suitable category or entity. In one embodiment, this is done by having a processor store at least a portion of the security credentials of the group in a location accessible from more than one member of the group, such as in an encrypted form in a public directory.
- Security credentials include at least a cryptographic key used to secure information. Each member may have a dedicated entry containing a group security credential associated with that member. The information may also be stored in a variety of other ways including, for example, storing a composite set of encrypted group security credentials.
- a member accesses the stored group security credentials on an on-demand basis. For example, at the time of login, at the time of connection to a server, or at any point, under control of a member, the security credential of the group is obtained for the member.
- FIG. 1 illustrates an apparatus for secured group communication that employs a group security credential generator 10 , which may, for example, be included as part of a certification authority, server, or other information security provider.
- the group security credential generator 10 generates group security credentials 15 for a plurality of members of the group.
- the members include a plurality of subscribers 12 a through 12 n , which may be, for example, software applications, network nodes, stand alone units, or any other suitable user of a group security credential.
- the group security credential generator 10 generates security credentials of a group 14 to initiate a secure group communication among the plurality of members 12 a - 12 n .
- a stored medium 16 stores at least a portion 14 of the security credentials of the group in a location accessible for more than one member in the group.
- the storage medium 16 may be part of a certification authority that includes the group security credential generator 10 , may be a separate storage unit accessible through any suitable network connection such as the Internet or a non-public network, or any other suitable storage unit.
- the storage medium 16 may be in the form of a certificate directory such as an X.500-type directory.
- Each of the members may be in communication with the storage medium 16 through any suitable communication link that may communicate in any suitable format.
- the group security credential generator may be part of a Web server or other server and the members may be any suitable software applications or processing units that may communicate in HTTP protocol or in any other suitable format as desired.
- Each of the members 12 a - 12 n includes an on-demand group security credential retriever 18 which may be, for example, a software module that obtains, on-demand, under control of the respective member of the group, the stored security credentials of the group 14 that are stored in the storage medium 16 .
- the group security credential generator 10 may be a software module, or any other suitable hardware, firmware or combination thereof.
- the group security credential generator 10 generates the group security credentials 15 which may include, for example, a private decryption key 14 associated with the group or any other suitable cryptographic key (e.g., symmetric key).
- Other credentials may include, for example, a certificate key ID 20 which is a unique ID identifying the group, public key certificates or any other suitable data. This may be presented, for example, in a public key certificate corresponding to the group private decryption key.
- all or portions of the group security credentials may be encrypted through an optional encryptor 22 which may be any suitable encryption mechanism such as an RSA-based encryption algorithm, elliptic curve-based algorithm or any other suitable algorithm, depending upon whether or not the system employs an asymmetric key infrastructure or a symmetric key based infrastructure.
- an optional encryptor 22 may be any suitable encryption mechanism such as an RSA-based encryption algorithm, elliptic curve-based algorithm or any other suitable algorithm, depending upon whether or not the system employs an asymmetric key infrastructure or a symmetric key based infrastructure.
- a group security credential generator 10 stores at least part of the security credentials (e.g., the group private decryption key) on a per-group basis.
- the encryptor 22 encrypts on a per-member basis at least a portion of the security credentials of the group, for example, the group private decryption key, and generates a per-member encrypted group credential.
- each member may have a dedicated set of entries wherein a header identifies the particular member and subsequent entries include the group security decryption private key encrypted with a random symmetric key that is wrapped using the public key associated with the member. Another entry would be dedicated for another member having a copy of the group private decryption.
- the storage medium 16 stores the per-member encrypted group credentials on a per-member basis in separate entries.
- the encryptor 22 encrypts the group security credential, or at least a portion thereof, on a per-member basis by wrapping at least a portion of generated security credential of the group separately using a public key of each of the plurality of members.
- the security credentials of a group includes a private group decryption key and a public group encryption key.
- suitable symmetric keys may be used.
- any other suitable cryptographic keys may also be used such as signing keys and verification keys.
- Each member 12 a - 12 n has memory 28 that stores the group security credentials received from the directory separate from individual member security credentials to provide independent storage of group member credentials.
- individual member security credentials 26 may be stored in a member profile in the form of a file encrypted using a symmetric key wrapped with a member public key, or encrypted using any suitable password encryption methodology or any other suitable encryption technique.
- the group security credential 14 obtained from the directory is stored in a separate file, entry (or files) although it may also be stored in the same RAM, ROM or larger storage device.
- the group security credentials, or portion thereof may also be suitably encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm or asymmetric encryption algorithm or any other suitable encryption technique.
- the member stores the group security credential independent from member credentials of the group in memory 28 .
- the amount of data needed to be stored by a given member may be substantially less than if the group private decryption key was wrapped using a header that included all members of the group.
- the member 12 a - 12 n uses its storage 28 for maintaining a history of the stored security credentials of the group separate from cryptographic key histories associated with the individual member's security credentials located in location 26 .
- a key history of group security credentials may be maintained by a member so that the member may decrypt old e-mail messages or other data, for example, even after the group security credential has been updated or replaced by a new private decryption key, for example.
- the on-demand group security credential retriever 18 retrieves a group security credential for a given subscriber from the directory 16 (or server) on demand, namely, when the member logs in, or any time when the member needs to update group credentials.
- the group security credential generator 10 may also include a digital signature authentication algorithm to authenticate the member requesting to obtain, on demand, a stored security credential of the group. This is typically done prior to releasing the stored security credential of the group if the group security credentials are not stored for access by the subscribers in a directory.
- a digital signature authentication algorithm to authenticate the member requesting to obtain, on demand, a stored security credential of the group. This is typically done prior to releasing the stored security credential of the group if the group security credentials are not stored for access by the subscribers in a directory.
- this alternative requires an authentication of a member where, for example, the group private decryption key is not encrypted (or is encrypted during a session communication) prior to storage in a directory.
- the authentication may not be necessary where the group private decryption key is already encrypted through encryptor 22 and stored in an encrypted form in a directory or other format only decrypted by a given member.
- the member may communicate using a conventional digital signature based secure session with the generator 10 and/or the directory to provide the group security credentials to the member.
- the encryptor 22 may also encrypt the security credential of the group using cryptographic keys (asymmetric key(s), symmetric key(s), a combination thereof or any other suitable key) associated with all members of the group to produce a composite set of encrypted group security credentials for all members such as generating a large header which would include the group private decryption key but using the public key of each of the members.
- This composite set may then be stored as a composite set in a repository, such a X.500 directory, that is accessible by the members.
- the members retrieve the entire composite set and decrypt the group private decryption key using their respective private decryption key as part of member security credential.
- the on-demand group credential retriever may retrieve for a member, the composite set of encrypted group security credentials from the storage medium 16 .
- a flow chart illustrates a method for secure communication wherein security credentials are stored independently from the individual member security credentials.
- the subscriber may pull (request) the group security credentials 14 and 20 or a portion thereof, namely the group private decryption key 14 , from the directory.
- the group security credential generator may push the newly generated group private decryption key to each of the members upon generation so that the members need not pull the information from the directory.
- the member decrypts the group security credentials to obtain the group decryption private key. This may be done, for example, using any suitable public key or symmetric key-based decryption algorithms, as known in the art.
- a member stores the obtained group credentials on a per group basis as separate group credentials in the group security credential memory 28 .
- the member may be a member to a plurality of different groups and as such stores the group credentials on a per group basis.
- the group credentials are stored on a per group basis separately from the individual member credentials that are stored, for example, in memory location 26 . This is shown in block 204 .
- the member may also maintain a group credential key history on a per-member or per-group basis so that the member may, for example, decrypt older group communications even after the group security credentials have been updated. It may be desirable to revoke one or more of the group keys.
- a flow chart illustrates one embodiment of a secure group communication method used when a member of group is deleted.
- the group security credential generator performs one of a plurality of different operations. For example, as shown in block 300 , the group security credential generator generates the first group credentials. This may be done, for example, as described in co-pending entitled “Method and Apparatus for Secure Group Communications,” filed on Oct. 8, 1998, having Ser. No. 09/169,242, owned by instant Assignee, and hereby incorporated by reference.
- the group security credential generator (or any other suitable entity or process) then determines whether a member of the group has been deleted from a group list as shown in block 302 .
- the group security credential generator is part of a certification authority
- a member of a group may be deleted because the person associated with the member ID has left the company or is otherwise denied access to the particular group.
- the group list may be updated through a graphic user interface by an operator or automatically deleted from the list through an automatic deletion mechanism based on other policy information identified, for example, in a certificate or through another software control mechanism, if desired. If no member has been deleted from the group list, the group security credential generator continues to generate security credentials for other groups, if necessary. However, if it is determined that a member has been deleted from a group list, the group security credential generator generates a deletion command signal (data) for the member of the group that has been deleted.
- the member that has been deleted performs deletion of the security credential for the group that was stored by the member. For example, a notification signal may be sent to the member, requesting that the member delete the group security credential from the separate group security storage 28 . This is shown in block 304 . As shown in block 306 , the notified member then removes a group credential from the independent file or location 28 . In addition, if desired, as shown in block 308 , the group security credential generator may then update the group security credentials by generating a new group private decryption key, for example, and publish it for the remaining members of the group. Also, it will be recognized that updating may include revoking group security credentials. As shown in block 310 , the message can then be encrypted using the new group security credentials and sent to each listed member. In this embodiment, a group security credential generator pushes the notification for the member to delete the group security credentials.
- a pull method for obtaining group security credentials in response to a member being deleted is shown.
- the method includes generating the group security credential.
- the method includes generating new group credentials, as shown in block 404 , while leaving access to old group security credentials for the deleted member.
- the group security credential generator then may publish the new group security credentials in the directory for all members.
- Each member receiving a message may then poll the directory to obtain a requisite group security credential to decrypt the message, if desired.
- the group security credentials may be simply deleted from the members' sentries in the directory so that when the member removed from the group attempts to obtain (e.g., polls the directory or server) the group security credential, no entries are available.
- the group security credential generator controls the deletion of the security credential of the group for a member in response to determining if the member has been deleted from the group.
- processors may operate in accordance with the invention by reading executable instructions that cause the processors to perform as indicated above.
- a storage medium or a plurality of storage mediums may contain the executable instructions.
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Abstract
Description
Claims (35)
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US09/470,551 US6260142B1 (en) | 1998-10-08 | 1999-12-22 | Access and storage of secure group communication cryptographic keys |
Applications Claiming Priority (3)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US09/169,242 US6266420B1 (en) | 1998-10-08 | 1998-10-08 | Method and apparatus for secure group communications |
US09/343,761 US6256733B1 (en) | 1998-10-08 | 1999-06-30 | Access and storage of secure group communication cryptographic keys |
US09/470,551 US6260142B1 (en) | 1998-10-08 | 1999-12-22 | Access and storage of secure group communication cryptographic keys |
Related Parent Applications (1)
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US09/343,761 Division US6256733B1 (en) | 1998-10-08 | 1999-06-30 | Access and storage of secure group communication cryptographic keys |
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US6260142B1 true US6260142B1 (en) | 2001-07-10 |
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US09/470,551 Expired - Lifetime US6260142B1 (en) | 1998-10-08 | 1999-12-22 | Access and storage of secure group communication cryptographic keys |
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US09/343,761 Expired - Lifetime US6256733B1 (en) | 1998-10-08 | 1999-06-30 | Access and storage of secure group communication cryptographic keys |
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Cited By (34)
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US20020083429A1 (en) * | 2000-08-02 | 2002-06-27 | Alla Rozenfeld | Method and system to customize and update a network connection application for distribution to multiple end-users |
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WO2006135102A1 (en) * | 2005-06-16 | 2006-12-21 | Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. | Method and device for securely distributing data in group communication |
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