US10452564B2 - Format preserving encryption of object code - Google Patents
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- US10452564B2 US10452564B2 US15/496,287 US201715496287A US10452564B2 US 10452564 B2 US10452564 B2 US 10452564B2 US 201715496287 A US201715496287 A US 201715496287A US 10452564 B2 US10452564 B2 US 10452564B2
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F12/00—Accessing, addressing or allocating within memory systems or architectures
- G06F12/14—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory
- G06F12/1408—Protection against unauthorised use of memory or access to memory by using cryptography
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/088—Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2212/00—Indexing scheme relating to accessing, addressing or allocation within memory systems or architectures
- G06F2212/10—Providing a specific technical effect
- G06F2212/1052—Security improvement
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- H04L2209/38—
Definitions
- Object code is used to execute instructions via a processor. In some instances, such object code is sensitive, and in need of protection.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating one example of a system for format preserving encryption of object code.
- FIG. 2 is a flow diagram illustrating one example of a method for format preserving encryption of object code.
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating one example of a computer readable medium for format preserving encryption of object code.
- Object code specifies executable instructions for a processor.
- Object code may be utilized to program a variety of computer-based applications. In many instances, such applications may be directed to handle sensitive data. Accordingly, any malicious manipulation of the instructions may result in an unauthorized access to sensitive data, cause applications to fail, and/or direct applications to perform in an unintended manner.
- object code may be protected via protocols that safeguard and protect the confidentiality of the sensitive code.
- additional protocols may require additional resources that may still be vulnerable to attack from hostile elements. Accordingly, there is a need to improve security of the object code with a minimal impact on businesses that must process such object code.
- format preserving encryption of object code is disclosed.
- One example is a system including at least one processor and a memory storing instructions executable by the at least one processor to identify object code to be secured, where the object code comprises a list of instructions, each instruction comprising an opcode and zero or more parameters.
- a format preserving encryption (FPE) is applied to the received object code, where the FPE is applied separately to a sub-plurality of instructions in the list of instructions, to generate an encrypted object code comprising a sub-plurality of encrypted instructions.
- An encrypted object code is provided to a service provider, where the encrypted object code comprises the sub-plurality of encrypted instructions, and any unencrypted portions of the object code.
- FIG. 1 is a functional block diagram illustrating one example of a system 100 for format preserving encryption of object code.
- System 100 is shown to include a processor 102 , and a memory 104 storing instructions 106 - 110 to perform various functions of the system.
- system may be used to refer to a single computing device or multiple computing devices that communicate with each other (e.g. via a network) and operate together to provide a unified service.
- the components of system 100 may communicate with one another over a network.
- the network may be any wired or wireless network, including a network of cloud computing resources, and may include any number of hubs, routers, switches, cell towers, and so forth.
- Such a network may be, for example, part of a cellular network, part of the internet, part of an intranet, and/or any other type of network.
- Memory 104 may store instructions 106 to identify object code to be secured, where the object code comprises a list of instructions, each instruction comprising an opcode and zero or more parameters.
- the code may be in structured form, and may need to be secured so as to prevent malicious use of the code.
- object code comprises a sequence of instructions, each of which in turn may comprise a sequence starting with a valid opcode and continuing with zero or more parameters.
- An instruction may be represented as: OpCode, Parm 1 , Parm 2 , . . . , Parm n , where “Parm” denotes a parameter value.
- the instructions 106 may include instructions to parse the object code to identify the list of instructions, along with respective opcodes and respective parameters.
- the instructions 106 may include instructions to identify an instruction format for the list of instructions.
- one format is a Microprocessor without Interlocked Pipelined Stages (MIPS) format which is a reduced instruction set computer (RISC) instruction set.
- MIPS Microprocessor without Interlocked Pipelined Stages
- RISC reduced instruction set computer
- the MIPS instruction set provides machine code where each instruction is 32 bits long.
- the instruction is given by an operation code (opcode) field.
- the instruction format may be one of an R-type, an I-type, and a J-type instruction.
- An I-type instruction is an immediate instruction
- a J-type instruction is a jump instruction.
- R-type instructions are register instructions.
- the object code has a structure that resembles opcode, register, register, register, and shift.
- the R-type instructions may include an additional parameter, a function value funct, that determines an exact operation to be performed.
- Memory 104 may store instructions 108 to apply a format preserving encryption (FPE) to the received object code, where the FPE is applied separately to a sub-plurality of instructions in the list of instructions, to generate an encrypted object code comprising a sub-plurality of encrypted instructions.
- a format-preserving encryption function E may be applied to cryptographically obfuscate the list of instructions in a way that preserves their respective formats. For example, the function E may be applied to each instruction in turn, producing the sequence E(OpCode), E(Parm 1 ), E(Parm 2 ), . . . , E(Parm n ), mapping the original opcode to another valid opcode, the original first parameter to another valid first parameter, and so forth. Determining the original object code from the encrypted source code may be as difficult as reversing the encryption operation E, which may be near impossible.
- the instructions 108 may include instructions to identify a sub-plurality of the list of instructions, where only the sub-plurality of the list of instructions needs to be secured. For example, certain instructions in the list of instructions may be directed to handling and/or processing sensitive information. Accordingly, these instructions may be encrypted, whereas the other instructions may be unencrypted.
- some parameters may be representative of highly confidential data, and it may be necessary to secure such parameters.
- a subset of all the fields may include sensitive information to be encrypted.
- one or more registers, or the shift or the function value may be encrypted. Therefore, in some examples, it may be more cost effective to encrypt a portion of the object code.
- FPE is a mode of advanced encryption standard (AES) encryption.
- AES advanced encryption standard
- it may be an AES encryption as described by the NIST SP800-38G Standard and accepted by the PCI Security Standards Council (SSC) as strong encryption.
- SSC PCI Security Standards Council
- the instructions 108 may include instructions to identify a computing architecture associated with the object code, and select the FPE to be compatible with the identified architecture.
- system 100 may generate a call such as “FPE encrypt Intel instruction object code,” or “FPE encrypt MIPS instruction object code,” based on a computing architecture, where the call summons the correct encryption format that is compatible with the architecture.
- the FPE may depend on the way the object code is parsed based on the specific architecture. In other words, the architecture may dictate the manner in which an instruction set is structured. In some examples, the FPE may depend on the encryption function, E, which may generally be selected based on the parsed object code. In some examples, the FPE may depend on a type of processor, and a class of opcode that is generated on the processor.
- the computing architecture may be based on processor speed, or connections between a central processing unit (CPU) and a memory. In some examples, the computing architecture may be a parallel or distributed architecture.
- the processor may be an Advanced RISC Machines (ARM) architecture.
- ARM Advanced RISC Machines
- the processor may be an Intel architecture.
- each encryption generates a different value. For example, when a name is encrypted, an encrypted output is generated along with a random (RAND) value that was used to encrypt the name.
- RAND random
- the RAND value may change each time an encryption algorithm is applied, so the encrypted output may vary each time the encryption algorithm is applied.
- a tweak is a non-random value that may be used to give ciphertext variability.
- the encryption may be performed by mapping a sector to another sector, thereby preserving the format.
- the tweak may be a block number and sector number for the hard drive. Accordingly, upon application of an encryption algorithm, a different value may be obtained for a sector each time an encryption algorithm is applied to the sector. This provides a form of variability, while preserving the format.
- a random value in a random encryption scheme is called an initialization vector (IV).
- IV initialization vector
- a tweak is a way to use a non-random value to get the same property as when an IV is used. Although, a tweak is generally more complicated than an IV, the tweak provides the same type of security.
- the FPE may be deterministic
- the instructions 108 may include instructions to identify an offset into a file for each instruction of the list of instructions, and utilize the offset as a tweak for the deterministic encryption.
- the tweak is a block number and sector number
- an object code has an offset into the file for each instruction. This non-random value may be utilized as the tweak.
- Memory 104 may store instructions 110 to provide the encrypted object code to a service provider, where the encrypted object code comprises the sub-plurality of encrypted instructions, and any unencrypted portions of the object code.
- the format of the object code is preserved during encryption, substantial cost savings may be achieved since existing systems continue to process the object code without additional modifications. For example, storage of the code, transmission of the code, execution of the code, so forth may be based on a specific format of the object code. Such processing systems expect the object code to be in a form comprising a specific format. Accordingly, when the encrypted object code is provided in the same format, the systems may be agnostic to the transformation of the underlying code, and continue to process the code without changes in processor logic or other systems configurations. Accordingly, existing systems are able to process the output code since the format may be preserved.
- the instructions 110 may include instructions to receive a decryption key from the service provider, confirm validity of the decryption key, and enable the service provider to execute the object code based on the valid decryption key to be applied to the encrypted object code.
- the service provider may include a cryptographic process that decrypts the encrypted object code with the help of a key, and then executes the decrypted or original object code. So the encrypted object code is a valid code, but may only be executed if the service provider has access to the key that was used encrypt the object code.
- the object code may be a smart contract in a blockchain
- the instructions 110 may include instructions to store the encrypted smart contract in the blockchain.
- a blockchain generally refers to a distributed database that maintains a dynamic linked list of online records that are called blocks. The blocks are timestamped and arranged in a linked chain. The record may be that of a financial transaction between parties, and the blockchain records such transactions in an open accessible and verifiable manner.
- a smart contract is a digital contractual clause that may be embedded in a blockchain to facilitate a financial transaction. Since the smart contract is a computer protocol, it is comprised of executable object code. Also, financial transactions may be of a sensitive nature. Accordingly, the technology described herein may be applied to the smart contract to generate an encrypted smart contract, which is then embedded in the blockchain. This prevents unauthorized access and use of the smart contract. An authorized user may use a decryption key to unlock the encryption and execute the smart contract. As a result, privacy of a smart contract may be preserved while allowing the smart contract to be executed as needed.
- the components of system 100 may include programming and/or physical networks to be communicatively linked to other components of each respective system.
- the components of each system may include a processor and a memory, while programming code is stored on that memory and is executable by a processor to perform designated functions.
- a computing device may be, for example, a web-based server, a local area network server, a cloud-based server, a notebook computer, a desktop computer, an all-in-one system, a tablet computing device, a mobile phone, an electronic book reader, or any other electronic device suitable for provisioning a computing resource to perform a unified visualization interface.
- the computing device may include a processor and a computer-readable storage medium.
- FIG. 2 is a flow diagram illustrating one example of a method for format preserving encryption of object code.
- such an example method may be implemented by a system such as, for example, system 100 of FIG. 1 .
- the method 200 may begin at block 202 , and continue to end at block 212 .
- object code to be secured may be received.
- the object code may be parsed to identify a list of instructions, where each instruction comprises an opcode and zero or more parameters.
- a format preserving encryption may be applied to the received object code, where the FPE is applied separately to a sub-plurality of instructions in the list of instructions, to generate an encrypted object code comprising a sub-plurality of encrypted instructions.
- the encrypted object code may be provided to a service provider, where the encrypted object code comprises the sub-plurality of encrypted instructions, and any unencrypted portions of the object code.
- the method may include identifying an instruction format for the list of instructions.
- the method may include identifying a computing architecture associated with the object code, and selecting the FPE to be compatible with the identified architecture.
- the method may include receiving a decryption key from the service provider, confirming validity of the decryption key, and enabling the service provider to execute the object code based on the valid decryption key to be applied to the encrypted object code.
- the FPE is deterministic
- the method may include identifying an offset into a file for each instruction of the list of instructions, and utilizing the offset as a tweak for the deterministic encryption.
- the object code is a smart contract in a blockchain
- the method may include storing the encrypted smart contract in the blockchain.
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram illustrating one example of a computer readable medium for format preserving encryption of object code.
- Processing system 300 includes a processor 302 , a computer readable medium 304 , input devices 306 , and output devices 308 .
- Processor 302 , computer readable medium 304 , input devices 306 , and output devices 308 are coupled to each other through a communication link (e.g., a bus).
- the non-transitory, computer readable medium 304 may store configuration data for the logic to perform the various functions of the processor 302 .
- Processor 302 executes instructions included in the computer readable medium 304 that stores configuration data for logic to perform the various functions.
- Computer readable medium 304 stores configuration data for logic 312 to identify a list of instructions in an object code to be secured, each instruction comprising an opcode and zero or more parameters.
- Computer readable medium 304 stores configuration data for logic 314 to apply a format preserving encryption (FPE) to the received object code, where the FPE is applied separately to each instruction in the list of instructions, to generate an encrypted object code comprising a list of encrypted instructions.
- FPE format preserving encryption
- Computer readable medium 304 stores configuration data for logic 316 to provide the encrypted object code to a service provider.
- the computer readable medium 304 stores configuration data for logic to enable execution of the object code based on a valid decryption key to be applied to the encrypted object code.
- the FPE is deterministic
- the computer readable medium 304 stores configuration data for logic to identify an offset into a file for each instruction of the list of instructions, and utilize the offset as a tweak for the deterministic encryption.
- the object code is a smart contract in a blockchain
- the computer readable medium 304 stores configuration data for logic to store the encrypted smart contract in the blockchain.
- a “computer readable medium” may be any electronic, magnetic, optical, or other physical storage apparatus to contain or store information such as executable instructions, data, and the like.
- any computer readable storage medium described herein may be any of Random Access Memory (RAM), volatile memory, non-volatile memory, flash memory, a storage drive (e.g., a hard drive), a solid state drive, and the like, or a combination thereof.
- RAM Random Access Memory
- volatile memory volatile memory
- non-volatile memory non-volatile memory
- flash memory e.g., a hard drive
- solid state drive e.g., a solid state drive, and the like, or a combination thereof.
- the computer readable medium 304 can include one of or multiple different forms of memory including semiconductor memory devices such as dynamic or static random access memories (DRAMs or SRAMs), erasable and programmable read-only memories (EPROMs), electrically erasable and programmable read-only memories (EEPROMs) and flash memories; magnetic disks such as fixed, floppy and removable disks; other magnetic media including tape; optical media such as compact disks (CDs) or digital video disks (DVDs); or other types of storage containers.
- semiconductor memory devices such as dynamic or static random access memories (DRAMs or SRAMs), erasable and programmable read-only memories (EPROMs), electrically erasable and programmable read-only memories (EEPROMs) and flash memories
- magnetic disks such as fixed, floppy and removable disks
- optical media such as compact disks (CDs) or digital video disks (DVDs); or other types of storage containers.
- various components of the processing system 300 are identified and refer to a combination of hardware and programming to perform a designated visualization function.
- the programming may be processor executable instructions stored on tangible computer readable medium 304
- the hardware may include Processor 302 for executing those instructions.
- computer readable medium 304 may store program instructions that, when executed by Processor 302 , implement the various components of the processing system 300 .
- Such computer readable storage medium or media is (are) considered to be part of an article (or article of manufacture).
- An article or article of manufacture can refer to any manufactured single component or multiple components.
- the storage medium or media can be located either in the machine running the machine-readable instructions, or located at a remote site from which machine-readable instructions can be downloaded over a network for execution.
- Computer readable medium 304 may be any of a number of memory components capable of storing instructions that can be executed by processor 302 .
- Computer readable medium 304 may be non-transitory in the sense that it does not encompass a transitory signal but instead is made up of memory components to store the relevant instructions.
- Computer readable medium 304 may be implemented in a single device or distributed across devices.
- processor 302 represents any number of processors capable of executing instructions stored by computer readable medium 304 .
- Processor 302 may be integrated in a single device or distributed across devices.
- computer readable medium 304 may be fully or partially integrated in the same device as processor 302 (as illustrated), or it may be separate but accessible to that device and processor 302 .
- computer readable medium 304 may be a machine-readable storage medium.
- the general techniques described herein provide a way to apply format preserving encryption to an object code.
- One benefit of the techniques described herein is that the format of the object code is preserved during encryption. This makes it useful for the encrypted object code to be processed in many legacy environments.
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