TW200836118A - User authentication method, system and computer system with atm ic-card system - Google Patents
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200836118 七、指定代表圓： 為：第（二）圖 符號簡單說明： (一） 本案指定代表圖 (二） 本代表圖之元件 (610)工作一 ( 6 20 )工作二 的化 拿責了有化學式時，請揭示最能顯示發明特徵 九、發明說明： 【發明所屬之技術領域】 本發明係屬於刹 苟工利用電腦裝置、電腦系統、 作為持卡人認證（e a r H l ^ + · 通机網路 V ardholder authentication、技 u 用。 ）技術的應 【先前技術】 曰曰片金融卡配合了安全強度較佳的「基碼（key)」與邏輯運曾 ’讓ATM機器計算出交易驗證碼即使交易驗證碼被戴冑，也：式 #被破解出基碼。該基碼也稱為「使用者基碼」，它是邏輯運算 使用的密碼學金論（Crypt0 Key)，也是計算交易驗證碼的重要^ = ，必須受到妥善的管控。目前ATM機器所使用的邏輯運算式包含了 對稱式密碼學（Symmetric Crypt〇graphy)的演算法。發卡銀行為有致 官理眾多晶片金融卡上的基碼，在銀行系統端的亂碼化設備中儲存 了一個主基碼（Master Key，MK)，用以衍生出各個使用者基碼，並 確保每個使用者基碼的唯一性與安全性。 第十一圖為習用發卡系統產生「使用者基碼」之流程圖。發卡 4 200836118 銀行的亂碼化設備（1 〇 〇 備（⑽)所儲存的為主基碼（n o)MK，是所有持卡人 2用者基碼的根源；另一輸入值（120)為計算持卡人之使用者基碼 ^ , ^ ΡΑΝΧ#^ ΡΑΝ1 ^ ραννρ^^ 文此值可以疋持卡人的唯-識別資料，例如卡號或依功能性質 同而。十开出的值，在相同的發卡銀行的亂碼化設備0⑽）中進行計 算過程（13G)，以計算出持卡人的使用者基瑪DKn(140)。 宜.使用者基石馬DKn(l40)係晶片卡的記憶體（EEpR〇M)的一部份， ’、中儲存了曰曰片金融卡記憶體端接收來自前一步驟依功能性質所計 算出的持卡人基碼，包括DKi、DK2…·.DKn等等。 从丑入ATM系統的持卡人必須提供合法的晶片金融卡，及正確 /亍馬（password)或個人識別碼（pers〇n aHdentifi cat ion Number, N)目岫銀行系統大多採用離線的通行碼輸入之驗證。因此，晶 片金融卡的5己f思體内存放有通行碼的驗證資訊。晶片金融卡（^ )使 用者基碼（140)與通行碼檔（26〇 )是晶片金融卡上的兩個記憶體區 鬼刀別存放「使用者基碼」及「通行碼的驗證資訊」。使用者基碼 是在發卡時由發卡系統所產生，其存放的記憶體空間稱為「使用者 基碼祂」，存放了配合不同金融交易項目所使用的多個使用者基碼； 存放通仃碼驗證資訊的記憶體空間則稱為「通行碼檔」。在晶片金融 卡記憶體空間的佈局設計中，「使用者基碼檔」與「通行碼檔」統稱 為「基碼播」。 第十二圖係習用持卡人使用晶片金融卡於實體Ατιν[系統完成一 筆交易的流程圖，包含： 步驟3 0 5 ·持卡人（1 〇)將晶片金融卡〇 $ 〇)插入實體AT Μ系統的 提款機（30)，建立與提款機（30)之連線； . 步驟310 :提款機（30)接收晶片金融卡（15〇)，啟動交易程式； 200836118 步驟315 :提款機（30)的ATM系統讀取晶片金融卡（150)記憶體 之使用者基碼檔（140)所儲存的資訊； 步驟320 :提款機（30)的ATM系統依據步驟315所得之資訊來 驗證晶片金融卡（150)之真偽，其驗證方法可包括SDA(Static Data Authentication)與 DDA (Dynamic Data Authentication)。若驗證後判 斷為正確的晶片金融卡（150)，則繼續執行步驟325。反之，跳至步 驟3 9 0，結束此次持卡人的交易； 步驟325 :持卡人在提款機（30)輸入通行碼； ▲ 步驟330 :提款機（30)的ATM系統接收持卡人所輸入的通行碼 ，並於步驟335中將該接收的通行碼送到晶片金融卡（1 50)中進行驗 證； 步驟340:晶片金融卡（150)以通行碼檔（260)中的通行碼驗證資 说比對持卡人所輸入的通行碼是否正確； 步驟 345 :晶片金融卡（150)將通行碼驗證所得的結果回傳給提 款機（3 0)的ATM系統； 步驟3 5 0 :提款機（30)的ATM系統根據晶片金融卡（150)回傳通 行碼驗證成功的訊息，繼續執行步驟3 5 5。若晶片金融卡（150)回傳 •通行碼驗證失敗的訊息，則跳至步驟 390，結束此次持卡人的交易 ， 步驟355 :提款機（30)的ATM系統執行風險控管，包括根據銀 行的安全政策，控制交易的金額或交易之次數，以規避風險。若符 合風險控管的安全政策，則執行步驟360，反之，則跳至步驟390， 結束此次持卡人的交易； 步驟360 :提款機（30)的八丁1^系統根據請求交易的訊息產生授 權請求碼（Authorization Request Cryptogram)，傳送到銀行系統端， 6 200836118 由實體ATM的銀行端系統（20)驗證之，實體ATM的銀行端系統（20) 產生授權回覆碼（Authorization Response Cryptogram)，回覆給提款 機（3 0)的ATM系統，提款機（30)的ATM系統驗證授權回覆訊息，以 確έ忍授權之回覆，完成交易後，提供交易證明（Transaction Certificate)。 步驟390 :結束交易。 上述的步驟325、330、335、340、345、及350形成「離線式 持卡人身分認證程序（3 5 3 )」。此類程序允許多種驗證方法的應用， 鲁包括驗證通行碼的輸入或驗證持卡人的指紋等，但是目前銀行系統 大多採用離線的通行輸入之驗證。離線式持卡人身分認證程序可以 提高晶片金融卡的安全性，也讓ATM系統的服務得以延伸，端末設 備改以讀卡機取代實體ATM提款機，透過網際網路（Internet)連線到 銀行形成網路ATM(Web ATM)系統，除了現金之匯兒業務外，其他 服務都可以進行。 網 尔、〜w川啊丨禾^ %吁峰付下人磲興銀行間的資訊 因而充斥駭客（hacker)的攻擊。糸鉉、土令 等馮解决客戶電腦被駭客植入特洛伊 馬㈣an h。㈣程式（簡稱為木馬程式）的問題，部份銀行章者在 •UTM 入、態驗證碼（Dynamie 細⑽⑻ C〇de，―心ΜΑ〇」機制，銀行端系統接收持卡人端的交易項 後，傳回一個隨機產生的圖檔式驗證 、 要喪拉士人於人斑^不於持卡人端的螢筹 要求持卡人輸人與勒内容相同的文字或數字，_ 並非由駭客植入的程式所操控。 ’、路ATM秀 A丰其次，持卡人可能在未取出晶片金融卡的情形下，於六易f 尚未完成時離開電腦，為了防範其他人趁著此一 、、又易七 身分執行交易作業，故網路ΑΤμ 二榣目用持卡/ TM㈣在^持卡人輸人之驗^ 200836118 ，要求持卡人輸入通行碼進行離線身分認證。 第十三圖說明了料ATM系統的交易程序，詳細說明如下： 乂秣4 1 0 ·持卡人（1 〇)將晶片金融卡（〗5 〇)插入讀卡機中，建立 與網路ATM用戶端系統（11)的連線·； v驟4 1 5 ·網路ATM用戶端系統⑴）透過讀卡機讀取晶片金融 卡記憶體之使用者基碼檔（1 4〇)所儲存的資訊； v驟420 ·、、、罔路ATM用戶端系統⑴）依據步驟4丨5所得之資訊 來驗證晶片金融卡（150)之直後，甘a 異偽其驗泣方法如同實體ATM所使用 之方法，可包括 S D A盘Γ) D Δ ^ ^ \ A。右驗證後判斷為正確的晶片金融卡 ，則繼續執行步驟425。反之，碰尽止碰 夂之，跳至步驟490，結束此次持卡人的交 易； 步驟425 :網路ATM用戶端李蛴n 、，收& ^ , 鳊糸統（11)要未持卡人輸入通行碼， 亚將接收之通行碼透過與讀卡機間的溝通指令 進行^證’進行如第十二圖程序353之「離線式持卡人身== …步驟430 .網路ATM用戶端系統⑴)依據晶片金融 」 通行碼驗證成功的訊息，繼續 ）W傳 只巩仃步驟4 3 5。吱去，曰u人 (150)回傳通行碼驗證失敗的 ㈤片金融卡 >人的交易； ^息’則跳至步驟例，結束此次持卡 步驟⑶：持卡人進入網路仙用戶端 的交易項目，並送出交易請求到網路atm銀行二二選擇所需要 言’網路則用戶端系統⑴)所提供的交易已)。一般而 定的風險控管政策； '匕付合銀行所訂 步驟4 4 0 :產生一組動離 播傳送到網路ATM用戶端系:=再轉換為圖槽的型態，將圖 步驟445 ·•網路atm用戶 戶鳊乐統（11)並且要求 侍卡人（10)再進 8 200836118 行一-人離線式持卡人身分認證」，避免交易過程中，中途離開，有 人冒名進行交易； 步驟450 ’網路ATM用戶端系統（11)依據晶片金融卡（1 50)回傳 通行瑪驗證成功的訊息，繼續執行步驟4 5 5。或者，晶片金融卡 (1 50)回傳通行碼驗證失敗的訊息，則跳至步驟49〇，結束此次持卡 人的交易； 步驟45 5 ··網路ATM用戶端系統（11)要求持卡人（1〇)依所顯示 之動態驗證碼輸入相同的訊息； • 步驟460 ··網路ATM用戶端系統（11)傳送持卡人於步驟455所 輸入之訊息給網路ATM銀行端系統（〗2); 步驟4 6 5 ·網路AT Μ銀行端系統（i 2)將所接收的動態驗證碼與 步驟440所產生的動態驗證碼相比對； 接著’如果動態驗證碼比對的結果是正確的，則傳送成功訊息 到、、’罔路AT Μ用戶端系統（η )執行步驟* 7 〇，完成此筆交易。若比對 的、’、°果不正確，則回應失敗訊息到網路AT Μ用戶端系統（1 1)執行步 驟490，結束此筆交易。 除上述使用動態驗證碼的解決辦法外，銀行業者紛紛以第二代 鲁讀卡機取代第-代讀卡機，而新-代的晶片讀卡機已有螢幕及密碼 鍵盤可供必要輸入，降低被木馬程式側錄通行碼的可能，但費用較 高。 前述由晶片金融卡驗證使用者通行碼的r離線式持卡人身分認 證程序」作法中，晶片金融卡中必須存有使用者通行碼，以驗證使 用者輸入的通行碼是否正確。因此，為了防止使用者通行碼不因晶 片金融卡遺失而被他人取得，晶片金融卡必須具有一定程度保護内 存資料的能力。持卡人必須提供「使用者通行碼」與「晶片金融卡 9 200836118 」等兩個認證因子（authentication factor)才能利用 ATM系統進行交 易，形成更具安全性的雙因子認證機制（two factor authentication)， 但因執行「離線式持卡人身分認證程序」之需要，晶片金融卡中必 須存有使用者通行碼，因此，遺失晶片金融卡時，就相當於兩個認 證因子都遺失了。 雖然晶片金融卡具有一定程度保護内存資料的能力，但已有許 多公開的技術可以直接攻擊強迫讀取晶片金融卡内的資訊，例如 1996年9月份，Bellcore之資訊安全專家Boneh、DeMillo與Lipton200836118 VII. Designated representative circle: For: (2) The symbol of the figure is simple: (1) The representative representative of the case (2) The component of the representative figure (610) Work 1 (6 20) The work of the second is responsible In the chemical formula, please reveal the features that can best show the invention. 9. Description of the invention: [Technical field to which the invention pertains] The present invention belongs to a brake worker using a computer device, a computer system, and as a cardholder authentication (ear H l ^ + · general machine Network V ardholder authentication, technology u.) Technology should be [previous technology] 曰曰 金融 金融 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 配合 A A A A A A A A A A A A Even if the transaction verification code is worn, the formula # is cracked out of the base code. This base code is also called the "user base code". It is the Crypt0 Key used for logic operations. It is also important for calculating the transaction verification code ^ ^ and must be properly controlled. The logic equations currently used in ATM machines include the algorithm of Symmetric Crypt〇graphy. The card-issuing bank stores a base code (Master Key, MK) in the garbled device on the bank system side to generate the base code on the multi-chip financial card of the bank system, to derive the user base code and ensure each The uniqueness and security of the user's base code. The eleventh figure is a flow chart for generating a "user base code" for the conventional card issuance system. Issuing card 4 200836118 The garbled device of the bank (1 〇〇 ((10)) stores the main base code (no) MK, which is the source of all cardholder 2 user base codes; the other input value (120) is the calculation Cardholder's user base code ^ , ^ ΡΑΝΧ#^ ΡΑΝ1 ^ ραννρ^^ This value can hold the cardholder's unique-identification data, such as the card number or the functional nature. The value of the ten-out is the same. The calculation process (13G) is performed in the cryptographic device 0 (10) of the issuing bank to calculate the cardholder's user Sigma DKn (140).宜. User base stone DKn (l40) is a part of the memory card (EEpR〇M) of the chip card, ', stored in the memory card memory terminal received from the previous step according to the functional properties Cardholder base code, including DKi, DK2...·.DKn and so on. Cardholders who are ugly into the ATM system must provide a legal chip financial card, and a correct/password or personal identification number (per). The bank system mostly uses offline passcodes. Input verification. Therefore, the financial card of the wafer financial card stores the verification information of the pass code. The chip financial card (^) user base code (140) and the pass code file (26〇) are the two memory areas on the chip financial card, and the "user base code" and "passcode verification information" are stored. . The user base code is generated by the card issuing system at the time of card issuance, and the memory space stored therein is called "user base code He", and stores a plurality of user base codes used in conjunction with different financial transaction items; The memory space of the code verification information is called the "pass code file". In the layout design of the memory card memory space, the "user base code file" and the "pass code file file" are collectively referred to as "base code broadcast". The twelfth figure is a flow chart of the use of the chip financial card by the cardholder in the entity Ατιν [system completes a transaction, including: Step 3 0 5 · Cardholder (1 〇) inserts the chip financial card 〇 $ 〇) into the entity AT Μ The cash machine (30) of the system establishes a connection with the cash dispenser (30); Step 310: The cash machine (30) receives the wafer financial card (15〇) and starts the transaction program; 200836118 Step 315: The ATM system of the machine (30) reads the information stored in the user base code file (140) of the chip financial card (150) memory; Step 320: The ATM system of the cash machine (30) according to the information obtained in step 315 To verify the authenticity of the chip financial card (150), the verification method may include SDA (Static Data Authentication) and DDA (Dynamic Data Authentication). If it is determined to be the correct wafer financial card (150) after verification, then step 325 is continued. Otherwise, skip to step 390 to end the cardholder's transaction; Step 325: The cardholder enters the passcode at the cash machine (30); ▲ Step 330: The ATM system of the cash dispenser (30) receives The pass code input by the card holder, and the received pass code is sent to the chip financial card (1 50) for verification in step 335; Step 340: The chip financial card (150) is in the pass code file (260) The pass code verification statement compares whether the pass code entered by the card holder is correct; Step 345: The chip financial card (150) returns the result of the pass code verification to the ATM system of the cash machine (30); Step 3 5 0: The ATM system of the cash dispenser (30) returns the success message of the passcode verification according to the chip financial card (150), and continues to perform step 35 5 . If the chip financial card (150) returns a message that the passcode verification failed, then the process jumps to step 390 to end the cardholder transaction, and step 355: the ATM system of the cash dispenser (30) performs risk control, including According to the bank's security policy, the amount of transactions or the number of transactions is controlled to avoid risks. If the risk control policy is met, step 360 is performed. Otherwise, the process jumps to step 390 to end the cardholder transaction. Step 360: The cash machine (30) is based on the requested transaction message. An Authorization Request Cryptogram is generated and transmitted to the bank system side. 6 200836118 is verified by the bank ATM system (20) of the entity ATM, and the bank ATM system (20) of the entity ATM generates an Authorization Response Cryptogram. Reply to the ATM system of the cash machine (30), the ATM system of the cash dispenser (30) verifies the authorization reply message to confirm the response of the authorization, and after the transaction is completed, provide the transaction certificate. Step 390: End the transaction. The above steps 325, 330, 335, 340, 345, and 350 form an "offline cardholder identity authentication program (3 5 3 )". Such programs allow the application of multiple verification methods, including verifying the entry of passcodes or verifying the fingerprints of cardholders, but most banking systems currently use offline pass-through authentication. The offline cardholder identity authentication program can improve the security of the chip financial card, and also extend the service of the ATM system. The terminal device replaces the physical ATM with a card reader and connects to the Internet through the Internet. The bank forms a network ATM (Web ATM) system, and other services can be carried out in addition to the cash exchange business. Net er, ~wchuan ah 丨 Wo ^% Yu Feng pays the next person's information between the bank, so it is full of hacker attacks.糸铉, 土令, etc. Feng solves the client computer being hacked into Trojan horse (4) an h. (4) The problem of the program (referred to as the Trojan horse program). Some bank members are in the UTM import and verification code (Dynamie fine (10) (8) C〇de, “heart ΜΑ〇” mechanism, after the bank end system receives the cardholder’s transaction item , returning a randomly generated graphic file verification, to the mourners in the human spot, not to the cardholder's volleyball, asking the cardholder to enter the same text or number as the Le content, _ not by the guest The program entered is controlled. ', Road ATM show A Feng second, the cardholder may not leave the chip financial card, when the six easy f has not completed, leave the computer, in order to prevent others from taking advantage of this, and Yiqi is responsible for the execution of the transaction, so the network ΑΤμ 榣 用 用 / / TM (4) in the ^ cardholder input test ^ 200836118, requires the cardholder to enter the pass code for offline identification. The thirteenth figure illustrates the material The trading procedure of the ATM system is described in detail as follows: 乂秣4 1 0 • The cardholder (1 〇) inserts the chip financial card (〗 〖5 插入) into the card reader to establish a network ATM client system (11). Connection·; vStep 4 1 5 · Network ATM client system (1) Reading the information stored in the user base code file (1 4 〇) of the chip financial card memory through the card reader; v 420 ·, ,, 罔路 ATM client system (1)) according to step 4丨5 After the information is verified to verify the wafer financial card (150), the method of checking the cry is like the method used by the physical ATM, which may include the SDA disk) D Δ ^ ^ \ A. After the right verification is determined to be the correct wafer financial card, step 425 is continued. On the other hand, if you do not touch it, skip to step 490 and end the cardholder's transaction; Step 425: Network ATM client Li Wei n,, Receive & ^, SiS (11) The card enters the pass code, and the pass code received by the Asian pass through the communication command with the card reader to perform the 'offline card holder body == ... step 430. Network ATM user The end system (1)) continues according to the success message of the chip finance "passcode verification", and only passes the step 4 3 5 .吱 曰 , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( The client's transaction item, and send the transaction request to the network atm bank 22 to select the required transaction 'network is the client system (1)) provided by the transaction). Generally, the risk control policy is adopted; 'Step 4 of the Bank's order is set to generate a set of dynamic broadcasts to the network ATM user system: = then convert to the type of the map slot, step 445 ·• Network atm user account (11) and ask the cardholder (10) to enter 8 200836118 line one-person offline cardholder identity certification, to avoid the transaction process, leave halfway, someone impersonation to trade Step 450 'The network ATM client system (11) returns the message that the pass verification succeeds according to the chip financial card (1 50), and proceeds to step 455. Alternatively, the chip financial card (1 50) returns the message that the passcode verification failed, and then skips to step 49〇 to end the cardholder transaction; Step 45 5 · The network ATM client system (11) requires The card person (1〇) inputs the same message according to the dynamic verification code displayed; • Step 460 · The network ATM client system (11) transmits the message input by the cardholder in step 455 to the network ATM bank system (ie 2); Step 4 6 5 · Network AT Μ The bank end system (i 2) compares the received dynamic verification code with the dynamic verification code generated in step 440; then 'if the dynamic verification code is aligned The result is correct, then the success message is sent to, '罔路 AT Μ client system (η) performs step * 7 〇, complete the transaction. If the comparison ', ' is not correct, then the failure message is sent to the network AT Μ client system (1 1) to execute step 490 to end the transaction. In addition to the above solutions using dynamic captcha, the bankers have replaced the first-generation card reader with the second-generation card reader, and the new-generation chip reader has a screen and a PIN pad for the necessary input. Reduce the possibility of being recorded by the Trojan horse, but at a higher cost. In the above-mentioned r offline cardholder identity authentication procedure for verifying the user passcode by the chip financial card, a user passcode must be stored in the wafer financial card to verify that the passcode entered by the user is correct. Therefore, in order to prevent the user's passcode from being obtained by others due to the loss of the wafer financial card, the chip financial card must have a certain degree of ability to protect the stored data. Cardholders must provide two authentication factors such as User Passcode and Chip Financial Card 9 200836118 to use the ATM system for transactions to form a more secure two factor authentication mechanism. However, due to the need to implement the "Offline Cardholder Identity Certification Procedure", the user's passcode must be stored in the chip financial card. Therefore, when the chip financial card is lost, it is equivalent to the loss of both authentication factors. Although the chip financial card has a certain degree of ability to protect memory data, there are many publicly available technologies that can directly attack the information in the forced reading of the chip financial card. For example, in September 1996, Bellcore's information security experts Boneh, DeMillo and Lipton
發展的Developed
Kocher 「故障分析攻擊」（hardware fault cryptanalysis) ;又如 Paul 在1996年於Crypto會議上發表基於密碼系統執行時間特性 與秘後、金錄有關連性的時間分析（timing analysis) ; CryptographyKocher "hardware fault cryptanalysis"; and Paul, at the Crypto conference in 1996, published timing analysis based on the cryptosystem execution time characteristics and the relevance of secrets and transcripts; Cryptography
Research 公司的 Paul Kocher、Joshua Jaffe 與 Benjamin Jun 於 1999 年Crypto會議中發表簡單電力攻擊（simple Power Analysis，SPA)與 差異電力分析（Differential Power Analysis，DPA)兩種技術。此外， 錯誤歸納（fault induction)、以及瞬間的電磁脈衝放射標準 (Transient Electro-Magnetic Pulse Emanation Standard，TEMPEST) 等方法，也是直接攻擊強迫讀取晶片金融卡内之資訊的技術。嚴格 鲁來說’將兩個認證因子放在一起的作法，並不完全符合雙因子認證 機制的設計精神。 不論實體ATM系統和網路ATM系統，持卡人的身分認證方式 都是使用「離線式持卡人身分認證」。在現行持卡人身分認證系統中 ’除了第一次登入時系統所產生的預設通行碼外，銀行系統端的系 統官理者無法得知持卡人的通行碼，所有的風險都在晶片金融卡上 。因此’在使用以晶片金融卡作為持卡人身分認證的過程當中，有 必要加強保護儲存於晶片金融卡中的個人通行碼的安全。 10 200836118 【發明内容】 本發明藉由一個隨機產生的認證秘密（a randomly generated authentication secret)與一個個人化秘密（a personalized secret)二者 之結合的技巧來設計建置以晶片金融卡作為實體ATM或網路ATM 系統（統稱為ATM系統）的持卡人身分認證機制，本說明書包含了方 法、技巧、裝置以及系統等。 本發明中所謂之「隨機產生的認證秘密」，其產生的方法係主基Research's Paul Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, and Benjamin Jun presented two technologies, simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA), at the 1999 Crypto conference. In addition, methods such as "fault induction" and "Transient Electro-Magnetic Pulse Emanation Standard" (TEMPEST) are also techniques for directly attacking the information in the forced reading of the wafer financial card. Strictly speaking, the practice of putting together two authentication factors does not fully comply with the design spirit of the two-factor authentication mechanism. Regardless of the physical ATM system and the network ATM system, the cardholder's identity authentication method uses "offline cardholder identity authentication". In the current cardholder identity authentication system, in addition to the default passcode generated by the system when the first login is made, the system administrator at the bank system cannot know the cardholder's passcode, and all risks are in the chip finance. On the card. Therefore, in the process of using the chip financial card as the cardholder identity authentication, it is necessary to strengthen the security of protecting the personal passcode stored in the chip financial card. 10 200836118 SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION The present invention designs a chip financial card as a physical ATM by a combination of a randomly generated authentication secret and a personalized secret. Or the cardholder identity authentication mechanism of the network ATM system (collectively referred to as the ATM system). This manual contains methods, techniques, devices, and systems. The method of generating a "randomly generated authentication secret" in the present invention is mainly based on
碼儲存於發卡銀行的亂碼化設備中，所有的使用者基碼（DK)都是以 主基碼搭配一輸入項來衍生的，該輸入項可為每個持卡人的唯一識 別資料，如卡號等，而衍生的使用者基碼儲存於晶片金融卡的 EEPROM中，除了透過晶片金融卡的權限控管防止未經授權人員取 得基碼值外，晶片金融卡的實體防護機制同樣可確保其基碼之安全 性，至於部分晶片金融卡可能使用之Session Key (SK)係由使用者 基碼所衍生出，只在某個S e s s i ο η有效，無法重複使用，*且通常儲 存於RAM中，一般在晶片金融卡自讀卡機拔出.時，基碼便同時消失 ，使用者基碼可依據銀行的應用範圍之需要而產生，其儲存在晶片 金融卡中的記憶體區域則被稱為使用者基碼檔。 於本發明中，持卡人身分認證方法所提出的持卡人端秘密（user-side secret) ’ 也可 看成是 銀行系 統中的 使用者 基碼， 持卡人 端秘密 是藉由持卡人的通行碼（password)分割認證秘密計算而得，此持卡 人端秘密是認證秘密的部份值，將此值永久儲存在晶片金融卡内， 進行身分認證的程序中，持卡人端利用實體ATM提款機或讀卡機等 等端末設備與晶片金融卡間的溝通指令，讀取持卡人端秘密；atm 系統利用持卡人通行碼和持卡人端秘密來重新回復認證秘密，作為 AT Μ系統認證該持卡人身分之基礎。 200836118 本發明為解決晶片金融卡遺失時發生字典攻擊的風險， 晶片金融卡内已經不儲存認證秘密，改以持卡人端秘密取代 此為基礎，本發明進一步提出一種雙因子的安全認證方法作 持卡人身分的依據。 【實施方式】 本發明實施於ATM系統時，持卡人必需持有晶片金融卡 行身分認證。本發明共具有三項特性：其一，係以一個「強 密」（strong authenticati〇n secret)取代晶片金融卡片内 作為新的認證秘密；其二，持卡人端使用兩個 回復認證秘密，持卡人端的第一個秘密稱為「個人所選擇之 (personalized secret)，以Sp表示之，它是一個持卡人所 通行碼’持卡人端的第二個秘密則稱為「持卡人端秘穷」 side Secret)，以Su表示之，持卡人端秘密是經由計算I割 密所獲得的輸出值，並且存放於晶片金融卡記憶體中；其二 明應用在習用ATM系統的身分認證方式，不需要變更原有= 統架構、資料結構和新增任何周邊硬體設備，也不需要改變 片金融卡身分認證方式之處理流程。 一 鲁另外，本發明使得猜測攻擊*容易成功因為攻擊者必 一個強秘密，或者竊取持卡人所擁有的兩個秘密才能冒用持 分侵入ATM系統，本發明將一個強秘密分割成兩個部I是基 基礎，因此本方法將顯著地強化秘密的防護。 土 本發明引用了美國專利公開號2〇〇5/〇〇81〇41文件中的二 函數f 1、f 2與f 3，利用此三個轉換函數對認證秘密進行分 復’該美國專利中請案之發明人也是本專利中請案的發明人 依據前述之公開文件的内容，f丨、f2與f3可設定如下·/ 所以在 之；以 為認證 ，以進 認證秘 的通行 秘密來 秘密」 選擇的 (user- 認證秘 ，本發 銀行系 現行晶 須猜測 卡人身 於數論 個轉換 割及回 — 〇 12 200836118 Υ = λ(χ)，其中，γ為單向雜湊函數輸出值； (1) υ=Η(Χ)=λ(χ)+β= γ + β，其中，\是輪入的變數值，它 代表個人化秘密的一個數值例，λ是一個碰撞阻抗雜凑函數 (colhsiorwesistant hash functi〇n)，此函數對任何輪入值皆會產生一 個非負的整數，# β為-非負整數的常數，u A此轉換函數的輪出 值’ ϋ又稱為數位秘密無關部份； (2) V= f2(fl(x)，S)= (fl(x)+ axs) mod q，其中，χ 也同樣代 表個人化秘密的數值例作為輸入變數，s是一個正整數，代表受保 _護的數位秘密，q是大於數位秘密s所有數值例的正整數，也大於 所有個人化秘密輸入值所產生的雜凑值，a是一個與^互質的正整 數f 1 (x)和8疋第二轉換函數f2的二個輸入值，而v是第二轉換 函數的輸出值，V又稱為數位秘密相關部份； (3) S-f3(fl(x)5 V)=： (a_1xV+ ((-(a"1xfl(x)mod q))mod q))mod q ’其中fl(x)、V、q、a和s如同上述定義，則是^在m〇d ^之 模運异的乘法反元素。 fi的公式設定可讓個人化秘密的選擇具有彈性，舉例來說，它 可以疋一個由持卡人所選擇的個人化通行碼，或者是一個個人識別 鲁碼（Personal Identification Number，PIN)，也可以是數個秘密的結合 如持卡人通行碼和特定裝置識別碼（device-Specific c〇(|e)的組合。 本發明應用前述分割與回復的方法於ATM系統的持卡人身分認 5丘，其貫施例說明如下： ”心也秘禮’以S表示，可以是發卡銀行之亂碼化設備所輸出的 使用者基碼之一’其產生是以主基碼和一個隨機亂數（或虛擬隨機 亂數）作為亂碼化設備的兩項輸入，最後輸出一使用者基碼作為認 證使用者的基礎，故稱為認證秘密9 13 200836118 認證秘密的驗證值，以Sv表示，是認證秘密經過兩次雜凑函數 運算所輸出的雜湊值，用以取代原本的通行碼檔中所存放的通行石 驗證值，作為新的驗證值。 1 持卡人的第一項秘密，以Sp表示，是n的一項獨立的輪入值 因此’可允許持卡人自主地⑷^^丨㈣訂丨…選擇這個秘密’而雨 行馬疋種持卡人容易記憶的選擇。在fl是一個碰撞阻抗雜凑函數 的假設之下，此選擇是非常有彈性的，舉例來說，假設(X)二 sha-256(x)，那麼此選擇可以是任何小於位元長度的一個數Z i秘密。這樣的彈性創造了許多應用情境。例如持卡人的第一項秘密 Sp可以是持卡人所選擇的通行碼以及裝置識別碼的結合，如此一 2 持卡人登入可被限制於使用特定的裝置；另外，持卡人之生物 =指二，經特：裝置將其數位化之後，可視為第一個持卡人端秘 人二例疋來::的一部份。在某些實施例中，Sp可以是多項秘密的組The code is stored in the garbled device of the issuing bank, and all the user base code (DK) are derived by using the main base code with an input item, and the input item can be unique identification information of each card holder, such as The card number, etc., and the derived user base code is stored in the EEPROM of the chip financial card. In addition to preventing unauthorized persons from obtaining the base code value through the authority control of the chip financial card, the physical protection mechanism of the chip financial card can also ensure its The security of the base code. As for the partial chip financial card, the Session Key (SK) may be derived from the user base code. It is valid only in a certain essi ο η and cannot be reused, * and is usually stored in RAM. Generally, when the chip financial card is pulled out from the card reader, the base code disappears at the same time, and the user base code can be generated according to the needs of the bank's application range, and the memory area stored in the chip financial card is called For the user base code file. In the present invention, the card-holder identity authentication method (user-side secret) can also be regarded as the user base code in the banking system, and the cardholder secret is by card. The person's pass code is divided into the authentication secret. The card holder's secret is the partial value of the authentication secret. This value is permanently stored in the chip financial card. In the process of identity authentication, the cardholder end The cardholder's secret is read by using a communication instruction between the end-end device and the chip financial card, such as a physical ATM or a card reader; the ATM system uses the cardholder passcode and the cardholder's secret to re-send the authentication secret. As the AT Μ system to certify the cardholder's identity. 200836118 The invention solves the risk of dictionary attack when the chip financial card is lost. The authentication secret is not stored in the chip financial card, and the cardholder end secret is used instead. The present invention further proposes a two-factor security authentication method. The basis for the cardholder's identity. [Embodiment] When the present invention is implemented in an ATM system, the card holder must hold the wafer financial card identity authentication. The invention has three characteristics: one is to replace the wafer financial card with a strong authentication (strong) (secret) as a new authentication secret; second, the cardholder uses two reply authentication secrets. The first secret of the cardholder is called "personalized secret", which is denoted by Sp. It is a cardholder's pass code. The second secret of the cardholder is called "cardholder". Side secret), denoted by Su, the cardholder secret is the output obtained by calculating the I secret and stored in the chip financial card memory; the second is applied to the identity of the conventional ATM system. The authentication method does not need to change the original architecture, data structure, and any peripheral hardware devices, and does not need to change the processing procedure of the financial card identity authentication method. In addition, the present invention makes the guessing attack* easy to succeed because the attacker has a strong secret, or steals two secrets possessed by the cardholder to fraudulently invade the ATM system, and the present invention divides a strong secret into two parts. I is the base, so this method will significantly enhance the protection of the secret. The present invention cites the two functions f 1 , f 2 and f 3 in the U.S. Patent Publication No. 2〇〇5/〇〇81〇41, which utilizes the three conversion functions to separate the authentication secrets. The inventor of the case is also the inventor of the patent in this patent. According to the contents of the above-mentioned public documents, f丨, f2 and f3 can be set as follows. / / Therefore, it is believed that the authentication is secret to the secret of the authentication secret. Selected (user-certification secret, the current bank is the current whisker guess card in the number of conversion and back - 〇 12 200836118 Υ = λ (χ), where γ is the one-way hash function output value; (1) υ=Η(Χ)=λ(χ)+β= γ + β, where \ is a rounded variable value, which represents a numerical example of a personalized secret, and λ is a collision impedance hash function (colhsiorwesistant hash functi 〇n), this function will produce a non-negative integer for any round-robin value, #β is a constant of - non-negative integer, u A the round-out value of this conversion function ' ϋ is also known as the digital secret-independent part; V= f2(fl(x),S)= (fl(x)+ axs) mod q, where χ is also the same The numerical example of the table personalization secret is taken as the input variable, s is a positive integer representing the digital secret of the protected _ guard, q is a positive integer greater than all numerical examples of the digital secret s, and is greater than all personalized secret input values. The hash value, a is a two-input value of a positive integer f 1 (x) and a second conversion function f2, and v is the output value of the second conversion function, and V is also called a digital secret. Related parts; (3) S-f3(fl(x)5 V)=: (a_1xV+ ((-(a"1xfl(x)mod q))mod q))mod q 'where fl(x), V , q, a, and s, as defined above, are the multiplicative anti-elements of ^ in the model of m〇d ^. The formula of fi can make the choice of personalized secrets flexible, for example, it can be The personalized passcode selected by the cardholder, or a Personal Identification Number (PIN), may also be a combination of several secrets such as the cardholder passcode and the device identifier (device-Specific c The combination of 〇(|e). The present invention applies the foregoing method of segmentation and recovery to the cardholder of the ATM system, and recognizes it. The description is as follows: "Heart is also secret" is indicated by S, which can be one of the user base codes output by the card-issuing device of the issuing bank. The generation is based on the primary base code and a random random number (or virtual random number) As the two inputs of the garbled device, and finally output a user base code as the basis of the authentication user, it is called the authentication secret. 9 13 200836118 The authentication value of the authentication secret, represented by Sv, is the authentication secret after two hash functions. The hash value output by the operation is used to replace the passstone verification value stored in the original passcode file as a new verification value. 1 The first secret of the cardholder, denoted by Sp, is an independent turn-in value of n. Therefore, the cardholder can be allowed to autonomously (4)^^丨(4) order...select this secret' and the rainy horses A cardholder's choice to remember easily. Under the assumption that fl is a collision impedance hash function, this choice is very flexible. For example, assuming (X) two sha-256(x), then this choice can be any less than the length of the bit. Number Z i secret. This flexibility creates many application scenarios. For example, the first secret Sp of the cardholder may be a combination of the passcode selected by the cardholder and the device identification code, such that the cardholder login may be restricted to use a particular device; in addition, the cardholder's creature = refers to two, the special: after the device digitizes it, it can be regarded as the first cardholder's secret person: In some embodiments, Sp can be a multiple secret group
Sp可能是持卡人通行碼、特定裝置識料、食人法 „ ^ 寺一員貝枓中至少二項之結合。Sp被稱為個人化 e ^ ^ 彳如持卡人通行碼等個人化的選擇 疋攻個秘密最常見的形式。 禪 持卡人的第二項秘密·，以 曰 個輸出值，因為它會在持…進二…秘…割過程的-也卡而進仃登入過程時被使用到，所以％ 也稱為持卡人端秘密。#彳〜、 明俜將拄士人山 。，、岔必須儲存於持久性記憶體中，本發 持：“秘密儲存於晶片金融卡内的記憶體卜 上述δ又计’只改變目前曰 行的方* 引日曰片金融卡中儲存的驗證值，餘皆與現 仃的方式相R，並不需要在銀 一 士 &卡糸統端作任何軟硬體的改變。 (weak : t: ·广人所選擇的通行碼通常被認·為是-個弱秘密 ㈣⑽，相對n隨機亂數產生的秘密是-項強秘密 】4 200836118 (strong secret)。本發明中的認證秘密即為強秘密。 S忍證秘密經過兩次雜濤函备、蓄— 叫歎運鼻所輸出的雜凑值备9 某特定範圍内之非負整數，其筋R 9 ^ "疋—個落於 /、乾圍是依據所選擇的單向 決定，例如，SHA-256會產生小认 雜凑函數所 座生j、於2256的非負整數。由 函數在計算上是無法反推的，因+ 屯衣早向雜凑Sp may be a combination of cardholder passcode, specific device identification, and cannibalism. At least two of the members of the temple are called “personalized e ^ ^, such as cardholder pass codes, etc. Choose the most common form of attacking a secret. The second secret of the Zen cardholder, with an output value, because it will hold in... the second... secret... the process of cutting - also enters the login process It is used, so % is also known as the cardholder's secret. #彳~, 明俜 will be a gentleman's mountain.,,岔 must be stored in persistent memory, this hair hold: "secret stored in the chip financial card The internal memory of the above-mentioned δ is calculated to only change the current verification value stored in the financial card of the Japanese film, and the rest are in the same way as the current one, and do not need to be in the silver one & The system makes any changes in hardware and software. (weak : t: · The pass code chosen by Guangren is usually recognized as a weak secret (four) (10), and the secret generated by n random random numbers is - item strong secret] 4 200836118 (strong secret). In the present invention The secret of authentication is a strong secret. S The secret of forbearing is passed through two miscellaneous waves. The hash value output by the sigh of the nose is 9 non-negative integers within a certain range, and its rib R 9 ^ "疋— The fall in /, the dry bound is based on the choice of one-way decision, for example, SHA-256 will generate a small confession function to generate j, a non-negative integer of 2256. The function can not be reversed in calculation, Due to the + 屯 clothing early to the hash
• 此，以認證秘密雜凑值作盔I 可以確保認證秘密的機密性，闵氣％丄 1卜為驗證值 Η為沒有任何人可以輕易 知的雜湊值來推導出原本的輪入姑 由一個已 鞠入值。以認證秘密的兩 驗證值，主要是為了避免與銀行掊I χi 摊奏值作為 订符卡人貢料庫中的註 其原理將於後續之詳細說明内容φ ^ 秘欲重覆， 1各中，予以更進一步闡、明。 更具體地說，在本發明之掊+ , a 、卡人5忍證方法中，當持去 用端末設備來執行金融作業時，ΑΤλ/ί / 、卞人希望利 ΑΤΜ系統所進行的持卡人套八μ也 程序仍是要求持卡人插入晶片全融本 身刀< 〇丘 乃i岫卡，並輸入正確的通行 卡人而言，其程序與現行ATM车祐从壮上 ώ 馬對持 系統的持卡人身分認證程序相同，但 實際解決了持卡人遺失晶片金融卡沾门认 ^ 一 的風險’加強了使用實體ATM或 網路ATM時的安全性。 此方法比習用方法安全性增強原因在於，晶片金融卡中所儲存 的驗證值是認證秘密之雜湊值，而非認證秘密，且持卡人必須提供 _雨頊輸入來回復此認證秘密，此兩項輸入係作為回復認證秘密的計 算程序中所使用的個人化通行碼與儲存在晶片金融卡中的持卡人端 秘密’由回復的$忍也秘密之雜湊值比對晶片金融卡内的驗證值，於 持卡人端進行離線自我驗證，並根據驗證的結果來決定是否允許或 拒絕持卡人進入銀行atm系統。 利用持卡人所選擇.的通行碼作為第一項秘密，即個人化秘密， <以滿足一般使用上的需求；據此，兩項持卡人端輸入的第一項輸 入即為持卡人輸入之通行碼。在此值得注意的是，持卡人輸入的通 15 200836118 行碼並非利用正確的通行瑪之衍生值來進行驗 是回復之認證秘密。個人化通行碼除了合法持 並無法得知，故只有持卡人本身才能回復認證 在持卡人掌握中，此方法具體解決了現行持卡 的風險。 本發明所說明的持卡人認證機制與系統·， 理持卡人身分認證的計算程序中所使用到的秘 供選擇的方式·· (1)分別以新的秘密作為新的認 •秘密，並據此更新持卡人端秘密；（2)以新的秘 ，並據此更新持卡人端秘密，但保持個人化秘 化秘密，並據此更新持卡人端秘密，但認證秘 為與習用銀行系統結合，並且在不改變現行程 的實施通行碼變更的程序則是採用上述（3)的方 行碼時不需要變更銀行系統端的強認證秘密， 遞到銀行端系統。 本發明所述之實施例中之另一特性係使用 亂數作為計异認證秘密的輸入值之一。前述隨 鲁數之產生已有許多習用方法，故於此不再贅述 一個真正的亂數產生器需要有一個本身具 計一個硬體裝置或軟體程式來製造隨機性來源 且無相關性的位元是一件困難的任務。有數個 體設計方法可供選擇，因均係習用設計方法， 〇 設計一個亂數產生器的軟體比設計一個硬 更加困難，軟體的亂數產生器可以使用到έ 證，所被驗證的資訊 卡人知道外，其他人 秘密，風險程度完全 人遺失晶片金融卡後 允許持卡人改變在處 密；在此，有三個可 證秘密與新的個人化 密作為新的認證秘密 密不變；（3 )更改個人 密保持不變。本發明 序的原則下，所描述 法。持卡人在變更通 且通行碼也不需要傳 隨機亂數或虛擬隨機 機亂數、虛擬隨機亂 〇 有隨機性的來源。設 ，以產生無規則可循 可以達成此目的的硬 亦不擬於此詳加細述 體的亂數產生器來的 l括系統時脈（system 16 200836118 clock)敲擊鍵盤與滑鼠移動間的時間差（elapsed time between keystrokes and mouse m〇vements)、作業系統的系統負載與網路統計 資料的數值（operating system values such as system load and network statistics)等系統程序。一個好的軟體亂數產生器應多多利 用各種具有隨機性的來源，對每一個來源進行抽樣，然後將.抽樣結 果所得的資料序列，利用一個複雜的混合函數予以結合；在此，可 使用的混合函數，可以是碰撞阻抗雜湊函數如SHA-1與MD5等。 在δ午多貫際的應用中’虛擬隨機位元產生器（pseud〇ranCJ〇m bit 鲁generator)通常用來替代真正的隨機位元產生器（true rand〇m generator) ’利用虛擬隨機位元產生器產生的虛擬隨機亂數來取代隨 機亂數。虛擬卩逍機位元產生器是一個輸出非隨機性的（d e t e r m i n i s t丨c) 演异法’此演算法透過給定一個真正的隨機位元串列（truly random binary sequeilce)為輸入，我們假設輸入的位元串列之長度為m，並 作又设輸出一個n>>m長度的隨機位元串列（om指是的η遠大於m) ’而此.演算法的輸入稱之為種子（seed)。ANSI X9.1 7與FIPS 186是 兩個產生虛擬隨機位元與亂數的標準方法，還有其他的方法是使用 數同餘虛擬亂數產生器（multiplicative congruence pseudorandom 籲number generator)。而本發明之銀行發卡的安控系統中已經設計一 套隨機亂數器系統，可以直接應用於本發明實施例中。 下文配合十個圖示來說明本發明之實施方式。 請參閱第一圖，其係認證秘密的產生流程圖，包括以下步驟： 步驟5 1 0 ·•發卡銀行的亂碼化系統（500)中已有N個使用者基碼 毛ί生值’新增一個使用者基碼衍生值，則表示為panN + 1。此值的計 异方式是一個由亂數產生器（random number generator)所產.生的數值 ’此亂數產生器為發卡安控模組内建的指令； 17 200836118 乂驟 0·接收前一步驟的輸入值和儲存於亂碼設備中的主基 碼’作為#用本 土碼演算法的兩個輸入值，計算出使用者基碼（n 〇 )• This, by certifying the secret hash value as a helmet I can ensure the confidentiality of the authentication secret, and the 闵 丄 % 丄 1 卜 is the verification value Η is the hash value that no one can easily know to derive the original round The value has been entered. The two verification values of the authentication secret are mainly to avoid the value of the bank 掊I χi as the note card in the tribute library. The principle will be detailed in the following φ ^ Secret Repetition, 1 each , to further explain and explain. More specifically, in the method of 掊+, a, and cardholder 5 of the present invention, when the terminal device is used to perform financial operations, ΑΤλ/ί / , the person wishing to benefit from the card system The set of eight μ also program is still required for the cardholder to insert the chip full melt itself knife &; 乃 乃 is i 岫 card, and enter the correct pass card for the person, its program with the current ATM car from the strong ώ horse pair The system's cardholder identity authentication process is the same, but the actual risk of the cardholder's loss of the chip's financial card is eliminated. This enhances the security of using physical ATMs or network ATMs. The reason why this method is more secure than the conventional method is that the verification value stored in the chip financial card is the hash value of the authentication secret, not the authentication secret, and the cardholder must provide the rain input to reply to the authentication secret. The entry is used as the personalization passcode used in the calculation procedure for replying to the authentication secret and the cardholder's secret stored in the chip financial card. The verification of the hash value in the wafer financial card is compared with the hash value of the reply. Value, offline self-verification on the cardholder side, and based on the results of the verification to decide whether to allow or refuse the cardholder to enter the bank atm system. Use the passcode selected by the cardholder as the first secret, that is, the personal secret, <to meet the general use requirements; accordingly, the first input entered by the two cardholders is the card The pass code entered by the person. It is worth noting here that the cardholder input 15 200836118 line code is not using the correct pass-through value to verify the authentication secret. Personalized passcodes are not legally known and cannot be known, so only the cardholders can reply to the certification. In the hands of the cardholders, this method specifically addresses the current risk of cardholders. The cardholder authentication mechanism and system described in the present invention, and the secret selection method used in the calculation program of the cardholder identity authentication (1) respectively, the new secret is used as a new secret. And according to this, the cardholder's secret is updated; (2) the new secret is used, and the cardholder's secret is updated accordingly, but the personalization secret is kept, and the cardholder's secret is updated accordingly, but the authentication secret is In combination with the conventional banking system, and the procedure for implementing the passcode change without changing the current itinerary, the above-mentioned (3) square line code is used, and the strong authentication secret of the bank system side is not required to be transferred to the bank terminal system. Another feature in the embodiments of the present invention is the use of random numbers as one of the input values for the different authentication secrets. There are many conventional methods for generating the above-mentioned Lu number, so it is no longer necessary to describe that a real random number generator needs to have a hardware device or a software program to manufacture a random source and no correlation. It is a difficult task. There are several individual design methods to choose from, because they are all custom design methods. It is more difficult to design a software for a random number generator than to design a hard one. The software random number generator can use the certificate, the verified information card person. Knowing that other people are secret, the degree of risk is completely lost after the chip financial card is lost. After that, the cardholder is allowed to change the secret; here, there are three provable secrets and the new personal secret as the new authentication secret; (3) ) Change personal secrets to remain the same. The method described is based on the principles of the present invention. The cardholder does not need to pass random random numbers or virtual random machine random numbers, virtual random chaos, random random sources. To create a random rule that can achieve this goal is not intended to be a detailed description of the random number generator system system clock (system 16 200836118 clock) hit the keyboard and mouse movement System programs such as elapsed time between keystrokes and mouse m〇vements, operating system values such as system load and network statistics. A good software random number generator should use a variety of random sources to sample each source, and then combine the data sequence obtained by the sampling result with a complex mixing function; here, it can be used The mixing function can be a collision impedance hash function such as SHA-1 and MD5. In the application of δ 午 多 ' ' 'virtual random bit generator (pseud〇ranCJ〇m bit 鲁 generator) is usually used to replace the real random bit generator (true rand 〇 generator) The virtual random random number generated by the generator replaces the random random number. The virtual machine bit generator is an output non-random (determinist丨c) algorithm. This algorithm gives input to a true random binary sequeilce. We assume input. The length of the bit string is m, and it is set to output a random bit sequence of n>gt; m length (om means that η is much larger than m) and the input of the algorithm is called a seed. (seed). ANSI X9.1 7 and FIPS 186 are two standard methods for generating virtual random bits and random numbers. Other methods are to use a multiplicative congruence pseudorandom number generator. In the security control system of the bank issuing card of the present invention, a random random number system has been designed, which can be directly applied to the embodiment of the present invention. Embodiments of the present invention are described below in conjunction with ten figures. Please refer to the first figure, which is a flow chart for generating the authentication secret, including the following steps: Step 5 1 0 • The card-issuing bank's garbled system (500) has N user base codes. A user base code derived value is represented as panN + 1. The value of this value is a value generated by the random number generator. The random number generator is a built-in instruction of the card issuing security module. 17 200836118 Step 0·Receive the previous one The input value of the step and the primary base code stored in the garbled device 'as the two input values of the native code algorithm are used to calculate the user base code (n 〇 )
J 步驟530 ··接收來自前一步驟所計算出第n+1個使用者基碼J Step 530 ··Receive the n+1th user base code calculated from the previous step
DiCn+i，以 DK 主- A表不之’此值即為本發明之強認證秘密（5 4 0)。 接下來參考第二圖，其主要目的是說明銀行發卡系統的兩項主 愛 丁 。在工作一（610)令，銀行發卡系統為持卡人隨機產生一個 用者基碼，以主- ._ 、 Α表不，該使用者基碼除了作為認證秘密之外，亦 以' 其雜》泰f V» a C? Ιλ 1 . 一 、 h VaUe)作為註冊秘密（registered secret)，儲存於銀 行發卡系統端持卡人 . 一 ^ ^ ^ ^ 卡人； 貝枓庫，在工作一（620)中，銀行發卡系統為持 準備個持卡人端秘密及一個認證秘密的驗證值，儲存於持卡 、曰曰片金融卡中’以為持卡人進行身分驗證時所用。 參閱第二圖，工作一（6 1 0 .)包括以下步驟： 一〜步驟710 :在發卡安控模組系統（ISAM)(700)執行步驟71〇，執 行女控彳日令，產生一個隨機亂數； 絲、^驟71 5 ·由則一步驟產生的隨機亂數和主基碼作為輸入值， 、、莖過基碼演算法計算出使用者基碼（或稱認證秘密（DKa));DiCn+i, which is not the DK main-A table, is the strong authentication secret of the invention (5 4 0). Next, referring to the second figure, its main purpose is to explain the two main loves of the bank card issuance system. In the work one (610) order, the bank card issuance system randomly generates a user base code for the cardholder, with the main - ._, Α table, the user base code in addition to being the authentication secret,泰泰 f V» a C? Ιλ 1 . I, h VaUe) as a registered secret (registered secret), stored in the bank card issuing system cardholder. One ^ ^ ^ ^ card person; Bessie library, at work one ( In 620), the bank card issuance system is used to prepare a cardholder secret and an authentication secret verification value, which is stored in the card holder and the defective financial card, which is used by the cardholder for identity verification. Referring to the second figure, the work one (6 1 0 .) includes the following steps: Step 1 - Step 710: Perform the step 71 in the issuance security module system (ISAM) (700), execute the female control command, and generate a random Random number; silk, step 71 5 · The random number and the primary base code generated by one step are used as input values, and the stem base code algorithm calculates the user base code (or authentication secret (DKa)) ;
"驟720 ·依據所選擇的單向雜湊函數來計算認證秘密a的 雜湊值，即Hash(DKA) ; A 步驟725:將持卡人銀行帳號及計算所得的雜湊值傳送予資料 ， 步驟730 :在資料庫執行註冊步驟，將接收到的雜湊值作為二主 冊秘密，連同接收到的持卡人銀行帳號，儲存於持卡人資料庫⑽） 統； 步驟73 5:傳送一個註冊確認訊息予發卡安控模組系 18 200836118 步驟740 :在安控模組系統執行進入銀行發卡流程的工作二 (620) 〇 工作一（6 10)完成後，工作二（620)會接收其認證秘密dKa、持卡 人銀行帳號等資料。 參閱第四圖，工作二（620)包括以下步驟： 步驟810 :由工作一（6 10)取得認證秘密DKa、持卡人銀行帳號 後，並在發卡安控模組系統（700)產生一個亂數做為預設的個人化秘 密Sp ; 步驟820:藉由計算式Su = f2(fl(SP)，DKA)來得到持卡人端秘密 S u ’其中f 1與f2是兩個用以分割認證秘密的轉換函數； 步驟8 3 0 :持卡人端秘密Su也是一個使用者基碼，作為一個認 證資料，執行安控模組指令將此值更新到晶片金融卡（1 50)之記憶體 的使用者基碼檔（140)中； 步驟 85〇 :計算認證秘密的二次雜涛值，即"Step 720: Calculate the hash value of the authentication secret a according to the selected one-way hash function, that is, Hash (DKA); A Step 725: Transfer the cardholder's bank account number and the calculated hash value to the data, step 730 : Perform the registration step in the database, and use the received hash value as the second main book secret, together with the received cardholder bank account number, stored in the cardholder database (10); Step 73 5: Send a registration confirmation message The card security control module system 18 200836118 Step 740: After the security control module system performs the work of entering the bank card issuance process (620) 〇 work one (6 10) is completed, work two (620) will receive its authentication secret dKa , cardholder bank account and other information. Referring to the fourth figure, the second step (620) includes the following steps: Step 810: After obtaining the authentication secret DKA and the cardholder bank account by the work one (6 10), and generating a mess in the card issuing security control module system (700) The number is used as the preset personalization secret Sp; Step 820: The card holder end secret S u ' is obtained by calculating the formula Su = f2(fl(SP), DKA), where f 1 and f2 are two for segmentation The conversion function of the authentication secret; Step 8 3 0: The card holder's secret Su is also a user base code. As a piece of authentication data, the security module command is executed to update this value to the memory of the chip financial card (1 50). In the user base code file (140); Step 85: Calculate the secondary hash value of the authentication secret, ie
Hash2(DKA) = Hash(Hash(DKA))； 步驟860 :將此二次雜湊值增加於晶片金融卡（1 50)之記憶體中 的驗證值檔（870) 〇 認證秘密的二次雜凑值是為了在持卡人端可以離線進行驗證所 作的準備，它是持卡人端所用到的驗證資訊，為了與原本的通行碼 驗證值區別，可另稱為持卡人驗證值；而晶片金融卡（1 50)之記憶體 佈局中的驗證值檔（870)即是原本的通行碼檔（260)。 使用Hash2(DKA)而非Hash(DKA)作為驗證資訊是為了避免與銀 行端的資訊的重複；根據單向雜湊函數在計算上是無法反推的特性 ，洩露了 Hash2(DKA)並不會有助於猜測Hash(DKA)，而Hash(DKA) 是在銀行系統端所註冊的秘密且必須保密的。 19 200836118 再次回顧第四圖，步驟820的計算式Su = f2(n(Sp)，DKa)，其係 先計算Π，再計算f2，以產生持卡人端秘密Su，其中第一轉換函數 Π應為碰撞阻抗雜湊函數。就安全的需要而言，fl並不一定需要具 有在計算上是無法反推的特性:，因為當攻擊者已經知道fl的輸出值 時，就不需要利用Π的輸出值來推導出輸入的個人化秘密；不過將 fl設計成碰撞阻抗雜湊函數使其具有計算上無法反推的特性仍然有 其益處，Π具備了此一特性後，將得以有效地擴展其輸入值之空間 範圍，例如SHA-1可接收任何長度小於2Mbits的訊息為輸入（見：Hash2(DKA) = Hash(Hash(DKA)); Step 860: Add this secondary hash value to the verification value file in the memory of the wafer financial card (1 50) (870) 二次Secondary of the authentication secret The value is for the cardholder to be able to perform offline verification. It is the verification information used by the cardholder. In order to distinguish it from the original passcode verification value, it can be called the cardholder verification value. The verification value file (870) in the memory layout of the financial card (150) is the original pass code file (260). Using Hash2 (DKA) instead of Hash (DKA) as verification information is to avoid duplication of information with the bank; according to the one-way hash function, it is computationally impossible to reverse the feature. Leaking Hash2 (DKA) does not help. Hash (DKA) is guessed, and Hash (DKA) is a secret registered on the bank system side and must be kept secret. 19 200836118 Reviewing the fourth figure again, the calculation of step 820 is Su = f2(n(Sp), DKa), which is first calculated Π, then f2 is calculated to generate the card holder secret Su, where the first transfer function Π Should be a collision impedance hash function. In terms of security needs, fl does not necessarily need to have a feature that is computationally incapable of reversing: because when the attacker already knows the output value of fl, there is no need to use the output value of Π to derive the input of the individual. Secrets; however, designing fl as a collision-impedance hash function to have computationally unreversible features still has its benefits. With this feature, it will effectively extend the spatial extent of its input values, such as SHA- 1 can receive any message with a length less than 2Mbits as input (see:
Federal Information Standards Publication 180-1, Secure HashFederal Information Standards Publication 180-1, Secure Hash
Standard，1 995·)，2“bhs的訊息長度已足以提供個人化秘密選擇 的彈性。 選擇個人化秘密作為第一轉換函數fl的輸入之彈性，可以衍生 各式各樣有用的應用情境，例如個人化秘密可以是持卡人所選擇的 通仃碼與特定的裝置識別碼的組合，如此持卡人必須要擁有特定、、 裝置才此進行登入；另一個例子是持卡人之生物特徵的數位資料士 指紋等可以是個人化秘密的全部或一部分，如此利用生物特徵來 4持卡人的方式將成為登入程序的一部份。除了上述實例外，复2 參的應用情境也是可能的。 、它 第二轉換函數 f2 在步驟820中，持卡人端秘密Su的計算也使用了 其公式設定如下： 持卡人端秘密S ^ =f2(fl(SP)，DKa) 〜（fl(Sp)十cxxDKa) mod q， 其中’ q是一個大於所有認證秘密dka數值例的整數常數 20 200836118 是-個與q互質的正整數’而參數α與q並不需要保持機密。 在銀行系統註冊持卡人端秘密程序完成後，再經由發卡程序將 認證$料储存在晶片金融卡，此認證資料即由持卡人端㈣％與認 證秘密的二次雜湊值Hash2(DKA)所組成。Standard, 1 995·), 2 “bhs message length is sufficient to provide flexibility for personalized secret selection. Selecting the personalization secret as the elasticity of the input of the first conversion function fl can lead to a variety of useful application scenarios, such as The personalization secret may be a combination of the cardholder's selected overnight code and a specific device identification code, such that the cardholder must have a specific, device to log in; another example is the cardholder's biometrics. Digital fingerprints and so on can be all or part of the personalization secret, so the way to use biometrics to hold the cardholders will be part of the login process. In addition to the above examples, the application context of the complex 2 parameters is also possible. In its second conversion function f2, in step 820, the calculation of the card holder's secret Su is also set using the following formula: Cardholder's secret S ^ = f2 (fl(SP), DKa) ~ (fl(Sp ) ten cxxDKa) mod q, where 'q is an integer constant greater than the value of all authentication secrets dka. 20 200836118 is a positive integer with q and the parameters α and q do not need to be kept secret. After the card system registration cardholder secret procedure is completed, the authentication material is stored in the chip financial card through the card issuing program, and the authentication data is the cardholder end (4)% and the authentication secret second hash value Hash2 (DKA). composition.
在現行的晶片金融卡持卡人認證方 並不需與銀行系統有連線程序。延續此 離線變更通行碼，本發明提出了 一種更 端的註冊秘密保持不變，藉由變更通行 端秘密之更新。 法中’持卡人變更通行碼時 〜特色，為了讓持卡人得以 新的方法，認證秘密與銀行 螞為新的秘密來啟動持卡人 接下來將說明處理持卡人要求變 卡人變更銀行預設的通行碼為例，·說 工作。 更通行碼的方法。第五圖以 明持卡人端變更通行碼的兩 持 項 乡閱第五圖’在工作二(91〇)中’持卡人輸入銀行給予的預設通 行碼’經計算回復認證秘密（DKa)，並在持卡人端進行驗證；在工作 四（920)中，通過持卡人端的驗證之後，持卡人輸入—變更通行碼， 並將忒通行碼與被回復的認證秘密作為輪入值以獲得新的持卡人端 秘密，進行變更晶片金融卡内原儲存的持卡人端秘密。 參閱第六圖，工作三（9 10)包括以下步驟： v驟1010 ·在持卡人端（〗000)執行將晶片金融卡（15〇)插入端末 :備中，例如實體ATM系統的提款機或網路ATM系統的讀卡機， 亚且輪入一個銀行給予的預設通行碼（PWD); 步驟1020 : ATM系統内的安控模組（1〇6〇)接收前一步驟的輸入 值，執行了 f3(fUPWD)，Su)之計算以回復認證秘密； ^驟1 0 3 0 ·利用所選擇的單向雜湊函數從已回復的認證秘密來 計异持卡人端認證秘密的二次雜湊值； 21 200836118 步驟1 040 :執行持卡人端離線驗證工作（參閱第七圖所示）。驗 證成功後，則進入工作四（9 2 0 )，驗證失敗後，則執行步驟1 〇 5 〇，在 相同的持卡人端（1 000)再次輸入預設通行碼重新進行認證。 在步驟ί 020中，回復的計算使用了一個複合轉換式，此複合轉 換式先a十异fl ’接者再计异f3。fl如先前的說明中所定義，第三轉 換函數f3的定義如下： DKa - f3(fl(PWD)? Su) ^ (a 1xSu + ((-(a'ixfl(PWD) mod q)) mod q)) mod^ • 在此’ PWD是在步驟1020所接收到的通行碼輸入值，持卡人 端秘密Si)是在步驟1 020所接收到晶片金融卡（〗5 〇 )内中所取得的， 而q與a同f 2公式之定義，DKA是回復的認證秘密。 參閱第七圖所示’持卡人端離線驗證之工作包括以下步驟·· 步驟111 0 ·· ATM系統内的安控模組〇6〇)以回復的認證秘密來 計算一項二次雜湊值Hash2(DKA；); 步驟1120 :讀取晶片金融卡（150)中記憶體之驗證值檔中的持卡 人驗證值； 步驟11 40 ·將計异所得的二次雜湊值與取得的持卡人驗證值相 鲁比對；如果比對的結果是正確的，則執行通行碼變更處理程序：工 作四（920)’若比對的結果不正確’則返回至第六圖之步驟1〇5〇，再 輸入一次預設通行碼。 在工作四（920)中，變更持卡人之通行碼的詳細過程如第八圖所 示，包括以下步驟： 步驟12 10 :在持卡人端（1〇⑽）輸入一個新的個人化的通行碼， 表不為S p，n e w， 22 200836118 步驟122 0 : ATM系統内安控模組（1〇60)接收來於前一步 入值SP，new，也接收來自第六圖中步驟1〇2〇回復的認證秘密 將新的持卡人個人化通行碼Sp，new與回復的認證秘密DKA作 值以獲得新的持卡人端秘密Su，new，公式為：新的持卡人端 f2 (f 1 (新的個人化通行碼），回復的認證秘密； 步驟123 0 ··將新的持卡人端秘密Su，new更新到晶片金融 體（ 1240)内，取代原始的持卡人端秘密SlJ，ATM系統接收到 融卡的成功回應訊息後，傳送一個成功訊息告知持卡人端， 行碼變更程序。 本發明之貫現僅需在習用銀行發卡系統中進行少許的改 括·· (1) .在發卡安控模組系統（j s A M)中增加產生認證秘密的 如其產生過程如第一圖所示，其中，亂數產生的方法已是現 安控模組内建的指令； (2) ·將晶片金融卡中現行的通行碼檔所儲存之内容置換 明中所述的驗證值，即認證秘密的二次雜湊值，因此，必須 文控模組系統中增加雜湊函數，例如MD2、MD5、SHA-1 2 5 6、S Η A - 3 8 4 或 S H A - 5 1 2 ; (3) •在晶片金融卡中增加一個作為持卡人端秘密的使用 。由於持卡人端秘密的計算必須使用本發明所描述之分割方 此，必須在發卡安控模組系統中增加該分割方法所使用的fi 轉換函數。 承上所述的改變，於現行發卡安控模組系統中實現本發 容時，所需的工作如第九圖所示，包括： 工作五（1 3 1 0) ·發卡系統產生一個使用者基碼作為認證 驟的輸 dka， 為輸入 秘密= 卡記憶 晶片金 結束通 變，包 方法， 行發卡 為本發 在發卡 、SHA- 者基碼 法，因 與f2 明之内 秘密， 23 200836118 其詳細程序如第三圖之舟_ ^ ^ 口 <步驟71 〇及步驟7丨5所示。此_ 過程及所需指令均為現杆狄 見订免卡安控模組系統的現有作業^ 工作六（ 1 320):捲物T a 作五（1 3 1 0)所產生的認證秘密 認證秘密之雜湊值作為拄本 与得卡人的註冊秘密，其詳細程序 步驟720、步驟725、步驟^ ^ ^驟730、及步驟73 5所示。此一 過程是為了實現本發明之向—％ &似 a 5之内谷所新增，包括必須於發卡 統增加一單向雜凑函鉍 、山歎，例如 MD2、MD5、$HA-1、 SHA-384 或 SHA-512 ; • 工作七（1 3 3 0) ·由發卡安控模組系統產生一隨機亂 人的預設通行碼，並與工作五（1310)中所產生的認證秘 明所引用之分割方法的二項輸入，分割方法的輸出值則 端秘密，存入晶片金融卡的使用者基碼檔中，其詳細程 之步驟810、步驟820、及步驟83〇所示。此一工作的執 了貝現本叙明之内谷而新增於現行發卡系統，包括必須 模組系統增加分割方法所使用的fl與f2轉換函數； 工作八（1340):計算工作五（1 3 1〇)中所產生之認證秘 湊值，存入晶片金融卡的通行碼檔，作為驗證持卡人是 馨復認證秘密.之驗證值’其詳細程序如第四圖之步驟8 5 〇 所示。此一工作的執行過程是為了實現本發明之内容而 系統所做的變更，計算二次雜湊值所需的單向雜湊函數 (1 320)中所使用之單向雜湊函數； 藉由認證秘密來建立晶片金融卡、ATM系統、及銀 之間的關聯性，此一刻意的設計是本發明所描述的實施 的一項特性。更具體地說，一個持卡人與ATM系統之間 秘密的連結來建立。本發明持卡人認證方法之雙因子認 I作的執行 ^功能； ’並計算該 如第三圖之 =作的執行 安控模組系 SHA-256、 數作為持卡 &作為本發 作為持卡人 序如第四圖 行過程是為 於發卡安控 密的二次雜 否有能力回 及步驟 8 3 0 對現行發卡 ，同工作六 行系統四者 例中所具有 可透過認證 證示意圖如 24 200836118 第十圖，詳細說明如下： 本發明之持卡人身分認證具有雙因子認證的特性，其持卡人 (10)的兩個認證因子分別是晶片金融卡（150)和個人化秘密Sp(i42〇) 。晶片金融卡（150)是第一個認證因子，其記憶體中儲存了一個持卡 人端秘密Su( 1415)，係由認證秘密DKa之分割而得，故持卡人端秘 密Su(14i5)與認證秘密dKa具有關係；個人化秘密Sp(142〇)可以是 持卡人自主性選擇的個人化通行碼，為第二個認證因子。當端末設 備（ 1 42 5)，即實體ATM的提款機或網路ATM的讀卡機，接收到此 •兩個認證因子輸入後，便可得到兩個秘密，即Sp與％ ;隨後， ATM安控系統（1430)，利用三個轉換函數，回復認證秘密 DKA( 1435 卜 上文之描述表達了一個合法的持卡人必須同時提出正確的晶片 金融卡和正確的個人通行碼，才能回復正確的認證秘密來通過身分 認證，而後與銀行端系統（1440)建立連線。在執行ATM交易時，銀 行端系統（1440)接收到交易請求後，即至持卡人資料庫（75〇)中索引 該持卡人之註冊秘密（1450)，即認證秘密的雜湊值；最後，銀行 ATM系統利用回復的認證秘密之雜湊值及註冊秘密作為對稱式密碼 •金鑰，藉由進行挑戰與回應程序驗證此次交易授權，並完成此次交 易相關訊息之傳送。 如本發明所設計之登入程序，持卡人端驗證技巧（user_side validation technique)是在持卡人端執行。所謂持卡人端驗證是與一 驗證資訊（a verifier)作比對，而驗證資訊必須提供給持卡人登入之 處的處理器。那麼什麼是驗證資訊呢？在此實施例中，持卡人端儲 存了 Hash(HaSh(SA))作為比對用的驗證資訊；也就是說，認證秘密 sA經過兩次雜湊運算後得到的二次雜湊值（double_hashed value)被儲 25 200836118 存於晶片金融卡的記憶體中八次 作為驗说負汛之用。因為這裡所提的 雜湊函數具有單向的特性 亏生，沒有人可以從第二次雜湊值In the current wafer financial card holder certification party, there is no need to have a connection procedure with the banking system. Continuing this offline change of passcode, the present invention proposes that a more restrictive registration secret remains unchanged by altering the update of the passend secret. In the law, when the cardholder changes the pass code~ characteristics, in order to allow the cardholder to get a new method, the authentication secret and the bank peas are the new secrets to start the cardholder. Next, the cardholder will be asked to change the card changer. The bank's default pass code is an example. More passcode method. The fifth picture shows the two holders of the change of the pass code of the cardholder. The fifth picture is 'in the second job (91〇), the cardholder enters the default pass code given by the bank' to calculate the authentication secret (DKa). ), and verify at the cardholder's end; in Work 4 (920), after the cardholder's verification, the cardholder enters - change the passcode, and the passcode and the replied authentication secret are rounded The value is obtained to obtain the new cardholder secret, and the cardholder secret of the original storage in the wafer financial card is changed. Referring to the sixth figure, the work three (9 10) includes the following steps: v Step 1010. • Insert the wafer financial card (15〇) into the terminal at the cardholder end (〗 〖): in the standby, for example, the ATM of the physical ATM system Or the card reader of the network ATM system, and enters a preset pass code (PWD) given by a bank; Step 1020: The security control module (1〇6〇) in the ATM system receives the input value of the previous step. Execute the calculation of f3(fUPWD), Su) to reply to the authentication secret; ^1 1 3 3 0 · Use the selected one-way hash function to count the second time from the authenticated secret of the card holder Hash value; 21 200836118 Step 1 040: Perform cardholder-side offline verification (see Figure 7). After the verification is successful, enter the work four (9 2 0). After the verification fails, perform step 1 〇 5 〇, and re-enter the default pass code on the same cardholder end (1 000) to re-authenticate. In step ί 020, the calculation of the reply uses a compound conversion type, and the composite conversion type first differs from the other. Fl As defined in the previous description, the third conversion function f3 is defined as follows: DKa - f3(fl(PWD)? Su) ^ (a 1xSu + ((-(a'ixfl(PWD) mod q)) mod q )) mod^ • Here 'PWD is the passcode input value received in step 1020, the cardholder's secret Si) is obtained in the chip financial card (〗 〖5) received in step 1 020 , and q and a are the same as the definition of the f 2 formula, and DKA is the authentication secret of the reply. Refer to the figure 7 in the figure below. The work of the cardholder end offline verification includes the following steps: Step 111 0 · · Security control module in the ATM system 〇 6〇) Calculate a secondary hash value by replying the authentication secret Hash2(DKA;); Step 1120: Read the cardholder verification value in the verification value file of the memory in the wafer financial card (150); Step 11 40 · Calculate the secondary hash value obtained by the difference and the obtained card holder If the result of the comparison is correct, execute the passcode change handler: Work 4 (920) 'If the result of the comparison is incorrect', return to step 1〇5 of the sixth diagram. Oh, enter the default passcode again. In Work 4 (920), the detailed process of changing the cardholder's pass code is as shown in the eighth figure, including the following steps: Step 12 10: Enter a new personalized at the cardholder end (1〇(10)) Pass code, the table is not S p, new, 22 200836118 Step 122 0: ATM security control module (1〇60) receives the previous step SP, new, also receives step 1 from the sixth figure认证2〇Responsible authentication secret will be the new cardholder's personalized passcode Sp,new and the replied authentication secret DKA to obtain the new cardholder secret Su,new, the formula is: new cardholder F2 (f 1 (new personalized passcode), reply to the authentication secret; Step 123 0 ··Renew the new cardholder secret Su, new to the chip financial body (1240), replacing the original cardholder End secret SlJ, after receiving the success response message of the fusion card, the ATM system transmits a success message to the card holder and the line code change procedure. The present invention only needs to be slightly modified in the conventional bank card issuance system. · (1) Increase the generation of authentication secrets in the issuance control module system (js AM) If the process of generating is as shown in the first figure, the method of generating random numbers is already built-in instructions of the current security module; (2) replacing the contents stored in the current pass code file in the chip financial card The verification value described in the second hash value of the authentication secret. Therefore, the hash function must be added to the document control module system, such as MD2, MD5, SHA-1 2 5 6 , S Η A - 3 8 4 or SHA. - 5 1 2 ; (3) • Add a secret as a cardholder's secret to the chip's financial card. Since the cardholder's secret calculation must use the segmentation described in the present invention, it must be in the issuing control mode. The fi conversion function used in the segmentation method is added to the group system. With the changes described above, when the present hair issue is implemented in the current card issuance control module system, the required work is as shown in the ninth figure, including: Five (1 3 1 0) · The card issuance system generates a user base code as the authentication input dka, for input secret = card memory chip gold end change, package method, line issuing card is issued in the card, SHA-based Code method, due to the secret within f2, 23 200 836118 The detailed procedures are as shown in the third chart of the boat _ ^ ^ mouth < Step 71 〇 and Step 7 丨 5. This _ process and the required instructions are the existing existing system of the card-free security module system Job ^ Work 6 ( 1 320): Volume T a is the hash value of the authentication secret authentication secret generated by the fifth (1 3 1 0) as the registration secret of the transcript and the cardholder, detailed procedure steps 720, 725 , step ^ ^ step 730, and step 73 5 are shown. This process is to achieve the addition of the present invention to the -% & like a 5 valley, including the addition of a one-way hash function, mountain sigh, such as MD2, MD5, $HA-1 , SHA-384 or SHA-512; • Work 7 (1 3 3 0) · Generate a random random random pass code from the card security module system, and the authentication secret generated in Work 5 (1310) The two inputs of the segmentation method cited in the description, the output value of the segmentation method is secretly stored in the user base code file of the wafer financial card, and the detailed steps 810, 820, and 83 are shown. This work has been added to the current card issuance system, including the fl and f2 conversion functions used by the module system to increase the segmentation method; Work 8 (1340): Calculation work 5 (1 3 The authentication secret value generated in 1〇) is stored in the pass code file of the chip financial card, and the verified cardholder is the verification value of the civic certificate. The detailed procedure is as shown in step 4 of the fourth figure. Show. The execution of this work is a one-way hash function used in the one-way hash function (1 320) required to calculate the second hash value in order to implement the changes made by the system in order to implement the content of the present invention; Establishing a correlation between a wafer financial card, an ATM system, and silver, this deliberate design is a feature of the implementation described herein. More specifically, a secret link between a cardholder and an ATM system is established. The implementation of the two-factor authentication method of the cardholder authentication method of the present invention; 'and calculating the execution security control module SHA-256 as the third figure, the number as the card & as the present as Cardholder order, as shown in the fourth figure, is the ability to check the secondary miscellaneous of the card issuing security. Step 8 3 0 For the current card issuance, the same work six lines system has a transparent certificate. For example, 24th 200836118, the tenth figure, the detailed description is as follows: The cardholder identity authentication of the present invention has the characteristics of two-factor authentication, and the two authentication factors of the cardholder (10) are the chip financial card (150) and the personalized secret. Sp(i42〇). The chip financial card (150) is the first authentication factor, and a memory card holder secret Su (1415) is stored in the memory, which is obtained by dividing the authentication secret DKa, so the card holder side secret Su (14i5) It has a relationship with the authentication secret dKa; the personalized secret Sp (142〇) may be a personalized pass code selected by the card holder autonomously, and is a second authentication factor. When the terminal device (1, 4 5), that is, the ATM of the physical ATM or the card reader of the network ATM, after receiving the input of the two authentication factors, two secrets, namely, Sp and %, are obtained; The ATM security control system (1430) uses three transfer functions to reply to the authentication secret DKA (1435). The above description expresses that a legitimate cardholder must present the correct chip financial card and the correct personal passcode in order to respond. The correct authentication secret is passed through the identity authentication, and then the connection is established with the bank-side system (1440). When the ATM transaction is executed, the bank-side system (1440) receives the transaction request, that is, to the cardholder database (75〇). Indexing the cardholder's registered secret (1450), that is, the hash value of the authentication secret; finally, the bank ATM system uses the hash value of the authenticated secret of the reply and the registered secret as a symmetric password key to challenge and respond The program verifies the transaction authorization and completes the transmission of the transaction related information. As the login program designed by the present invention, the user_side validation technique is The card end is executed. The cardholder end verification is compared with a verifier, and the verification information must be provided to the processor where the cardholder is logged in. So what is the verification information? In the example, the cardholder side stores Hash (HaSh(SA)) as the verification information for comparison; that is, the double hash value (double_hashed value) obtained by the authentication secret sA after two hash operations is stored. 200836118 Eight times in the memory of the chip financial card is used as the test result. Because the hash function mentioned here has one-way characteristic loss, no one can get the second hash value.
Hash(Hash(SA))做反向運算來獾p给 u匕 水獲付第一次的雜湊值，在這樣的實施 例中，持卡人端的驗證資訊的洁氓 ^ 叼茂漏亚不會危及銀行系統端的安全。 在本發明中，晶片金融卡φ 〇 中/、儲存與涊證秘密相關的部份資訊 ，即持卡人端秘密，而另一個邱八& — α t e 调。p份秘密則是只有合法持卡人才知道 正確的通行碼。在持卡人端，持 一 讨卞人現在可以利用兩個秘密來存取 銀行AT Μ系統：一個是個人μ * 疋人化秘抢SP，另一個是持卡人端秘密Su 。雖然晶片金融卡本身就具有一定 ^ 夂的保濩作用，可保護持卡人端秘 後S U ’但萬一持卡人不小心遺生了曰u a Η ^天了日日片金融卡，也被破解存取到持 卡人端秘密 S U，但是另一伽你I /. ,/θ U個個人化秘密SP是儲存在持卡人的記憶 中。侍知持卡人端秘密Su的非本找上 非法持卡人仍然無法通過身分認證，竊 取持卡人銀行的帳戶存款。本發、 ^ ^ ^ - λλ* . Χ月之技術7刀別地保護兩個秘密，顯 者地強化秘密的防護。 對於持卡人而言，持卡人妇：女β , A ^ - ATM ^ „ 寺有曰曰片金融卡並記憶通行碼便能登 入銀仃ATM糸統，完全和現行操 ^ θ ^ A ^ ^ , 伟作相同。持卡人將晶片金融卡插入 各入裝置，例如ATM提款機或讀卡棬 r ^ a # ^ ^ 、機專蚝末权備，進行身分認證過 私。登入裝置一旦接收刭拉4 、 ., 、卡编兩個輸入值後，隨即執行如發卡 程序中所定義的第一轉換函數η 本认 I卡 持卡人輸入值，接下來將轉換後拄 …、後 作為第三轉換函數f3的輸入 下人輸入值 與第二轉換函數f2具有可 轉換函數f3 土關係，如此才能還原認證秘密，η认 表達公式如下：輸出值二f3(轉換 的 付卞人輸入值，第二持卡A私X 值）二（α- x(第二持卡人輸入值）） 人輸入 ))((·(α X(轉換後持卡人輸入插、, q))mod q))oiod q，其中 α•[與 值）则d q如先别所定義的；接著，持卡 26 200836118 入裝置计异第三轉換函數輸出值的雜湊值作為持卡人端 持卡人端雜湊值與料在晶片金融卡内驗證值㈣/ 確實為合法持卡人，才允許持卡人存取系統的請求，否 人的存取請求。 雖然認證秘密扮演了核心的角色，但是，認證秘密 性地存在。我們可以在發卡程序、持卡人登入、與通行 的相關S十算70成後即將認證秘密由個別記憶體中予以刪 儲存認證秘密，銀行系統端只儲存認證秘密的—次雜凑 會有認證秘密之存在。 Μ、 由於認證秘密是隨機產生的亂數，即使駭客直接猜 ，成功地猜對隨機產生的秘密純粹是一項機率問題。^ 產生的秘密的位元長度為16〇,則成功猜對的機率為2 測一次所化費的時間為一亳秒（3秒），那麼成功猜測 為10 X2 秒，經過換算約等於1〇·3χ1〇48秒戈 ，在合理的時間内成功地的猜對秘密的機率低到幾乎不 極度困難的猜測不但適用於線上攻擊也適用於離線攻擊γ 依本發明的内容所實作之系統實施例，其優點包括： (1 )·在無法取得持卡人通行碼之的情形下，即使遺 卡並遭破解，竊取持卡人端秘密僅能竊取持卡人所擁有 之一；晶片金融卡内的驗證資訊為認證秘密的二次雜奏 可以從第二次雜湊值做反向運算來獲得第一次的雜凑值 銀行系統端的安全；而透過其他技巧如銀行内部人員侵 來竊取通行碼也是困難甚至是不可能的，因為通行碼並 行系統端； (2)·沒有特定通行碼的衍生值被儲存於銀行系統端 雜湊值， 才表示目 則拒絕持 並不需持 碼更新過 除，不需 值，從來 測認證秘 們假設隨 16()，假設 的預期時 年；換言 可能，如 當 月1J 卡 久 裎 要 不 密 機 猜 間 之 此 失晶片金 的兩個秘 值，沒有 ’不會危 入發卡系 不儲存於 。所謂通 融 密 人 及 統 銀 行 27 200836118 碼：衍士值可以是通行碼的雜凑值、通行碼的密文、或者是將通 ―單輸入函數（Slngle'inPut function)所獲得的轉換值。唯 與通行碼相關的儲左奴Μ θ 值疋組合第一與第二複合轉換函數轉換而 的持卡人端秘密，盆由 ,^ /、甲’此设合轉換式有兩項相互獨立的輸入值 通行碼與認證秘密。同也^ 认一 因為廷項優良特性，本發明所提的方法不會 給攻擊者任何有關通行碼的線索。 在兩述貫施例中，拉 ^ ^ Τ ,Λ, ^ ^ 9由持卡人知驗證，持卡人端和系統端分 驗泣工作的責任，持 、 ’、銀行糸統端皆負有安全防護的責任。 卡人端驗證之目的在於 貝 , '、设產生回應訊息所用的輸入值是正確的 而糸統端之驗證則县田Μ ^ ^ 用以保證存取之請求係來自合法的持卡人， 不疋來自入侵者。 本發明所提出的拄本，& .寺卡人柒驗證技巧同樣也可以用於苴 人認證之方法與系纺。杜上 八匕的符 ^ X η ^ ^ ^ 、持卡人端驗證資訊可因應不同種類的方法 有不同的没疋，例如去姑 ^ I #答& π 田持卡利用公開/私密金鑰對的私密金鑰來 造數位簽章作為對挑辭μ ^ 士 的回應，則持卡人端驗證資訊可以是相對 的公開金鑰；在此例由 么认 疋祁對 ^ μ / 中，系統端使用相同的公開金鑰作為系统端 驗證資訊。再舉一個如2 丄 勺示、九鲕 |中，Huh、# +例子，在以通行碼為基礎的傳統持卡人認證 法肀，Hash (持卡人&、阳，尬 。 所選擇的通行碼）可以作為持卡人端的驗證資 相較於將本發明脊^ Α & 1Hash (Hash (SA)) does the reverse operation to give the first hash value to the water. In such an embodiment, the cardholder's verification information will not be cleaned. Endangering the security of the banking system. In the present invention, the chip financial card φ 〇 /, stores part of the information related to the secret of the card, that is, the card holder's secret, and the other Qiu Ba & α t e tune. The secret of p is that only legitimate cardholders know the correct passcode. On the cardholder's side, a confidant can now use two secrets to access the bank's AT system: one is the personal μ * 疋 化 秘 SP SP, and the other is the card holder secret Su. Although the chip financial card itself has a certain protection effect, it can protect the card holder end secret SU 'but in case the card holder accidentally gave birth to 曰 Η Η ^天日日片金融卡, also Crack access to the cardholder's secret SU, but another gamma I /., / θ U personalized secret SP is stored in the cardholder's memory. The cardholder's secret Su is not found. The illegal cardholder still cannot pass the identity authentication and steal the account deposit of the cardholder's bank. This issue, ^ ^ ^ - λλ* . The technology of Haoyue 7 protects two secrets and obviously strengthens the protection of secrets. For cardholders, cardholders: female beta, A ^ - ATM ^ „ Temple has a financial card and remembers the passcode to log in to the Silver Jubilee ATM system, complete and current operation ^ θ ^ A ^ ^, Weishu is the same. The cardholder inserts the chip financial card into each device, such as ATM or card reader r ^ a # ^ ^, machine-specific rights, for identity authentication and privacy. After receiving the two input values of the pull 4, ., and card, the first conversion function η defined in the card issuing program is executed, and the input value of the card holder is recognized, and then the conversion is performed... The input human input value of the third transfer function f3 and the second transfer function f2 have a transferable function f3 soil relationship, so that the authentication secret can be restored, and the η recognition expression formula is as follows: the output value is f3 (the converted input value of the input, The second card A private X value) two (α- x (second cardholder input value)) person input)) ((· (α X (cardholder input plug, q)) mod q) )oiod q, where α•[and value) then dq is defined as follows; then, the card 26 200836118 enters the device to calculate the third conversion The hash value of the number of output values is used as the cardholder end cardholder hash value and the verification value in the chip financial card (4) / is indeed a legitimate cardholder, and the cardholder is allowed to access the system request, or the person's deposit Request for authentication. Although the authentication secret plays a central role, the authentication exists secretly. We can apply the authentication secret to the individual memory after the card issuance process, the cardholder login, and the relevant S-70 calculation. Delete the storage authentication secret, the bank system only stores the authentication secret - the second hash will have the existence of the authentication secret. Μ, because the authentication secret is randomly generated random number, even if the hacker directly guesses, successfully guess the random generated secret It is purely a matter of chance. ^ The length of the generated secret bit is 16〇, then the probability of successful guessing is 2 seconds (3 seconds), then the successful guess is 10 X2 seconds. After the conversion is equal to 1〇·3χ1〇48 seconds, the probability of successfully guessing the secret in a reasonable time is as low as almost impossible. The guess is not only applicable to online attacks but also to offline. The advantages of the system embodiment implemented according to the content of the present invention include: (1)· In the case that the cardholder pass code cannot be obtained, even if the old card is cracked, the cardholder end secret is only stolen. Can steal one of the cardholders; the verification information in the chip financial card is the second accompaniment of the authentication secret. The second hash value can be reversed to obtain the first hash value of the bank system security; It is difficult or even impossible to steal the pass code through other techniques such as in-house personnel intrusion, because the pass code is parallel to the system; (2) · The derivative value without the specific pass code is stored in the bank system side hash value, indicating If you refuse to hold the code, you don't need to update the code. You don't need to value. The test secrets are assumed to follow the 16(), the expected time of the year; in other words, if the 1J card is not in the same month, it will not be secretly guessed. The two secret values of this lost chip gold, there is no 'not dangerous card issuer is not stored. The so-called cipher and the bank 27 200836118 Code: The value of the franchise can be the hash value of the passcode, the ciphertext of the passcode, or the converted value obtained by the Slngle'inPut function. Only the storage of the left slave θ value associated with the pass code 疋 combines the first and second composite transfer functions to convert the card holder's secret, potted, ^ /, A 'this combination conversion type has two independent Enter the value passcode and the authentication secret. The same is true. Because of the excellent characteristics of the court, the method proposed by the present invention does not give the attacker any clues about the pass code. In the two examples, pull ^ ^ Τ, Λ, ^ ^ 9 is verified by the cardholder, and the cardholder and the system end are responsible for the work of checking the cry, and the bank and the bank are all safe. Responsibility for protection. The purpose of the card-side verification is to shell, ', the input value used to generate the response message is correct, and the verification of the system is the county. ^ ^ The request to ensure access is from the legal cardholder, no疋 From the intruder. The transcripts proposed by the present invention, &. Temple card 柒 verification techniques can also be used for the method of 苴人 certification and tying. Dushang gossip's character ^ X η ^ ^ ^, cardholder end verification information can be different according to different types of methods, such as going to Gu ^ I # answer & π field card use public / private key The private key of the pair is used to create a digital signature as a response to the challenge. The cardholder verification information can be a relative public key; in this case, the system is recognized as ^μ / in the system. The end uses the same public key as the system side verification information. Give another example such as 2 丄 示 、, 鲕 鲕 | 中, Huh, # + example, in the traditional cardholder authentication method based on the pass code, Hash (cardholder & amp, yang, 尬. selected The pass code can be used as the cardholder's verification fee compared to the present invention.
實％於實體ATM系統，本發明於網路 統之實作更為簡單，"I …/令 两路ATM 、而要更新銀仃知伺服器的程式即可，益需 逐一更新所有實體ATM , …而 之提款機，可縮短建置時間，說明如 應用網路程式的l Γ 、性，將三個轉換函數實作成ActiveX元件 持卡人一但瀏覽銀行網 件 、、同路ATM的網址，自動會載此 端的電腦，此時已下# & Α · v 什詞得卡 载的ActlVeX就會利用持卡人端電腦的計算 行 來 留 擔 持 f 而 卡 而 製 應 的 方 訊 系 像 人 能 28 200836118 力’來完成持卡人端的身分驗證。 依本發明的内容所實作之系統，1 卡A其说々i /、糸、洗令而與現行利用晶片金融 卡為基礎之認證方法的系統端無異，但是在持卡人 有报大的差異，舉例來說，本發明之實施例的持卡人端使=間 T換函數η、【2與f3。三個轉換函數可以有多種設定的方法，：例 來况’第-轉換函數fl可設定為—個碰撞阻抗雜凑函數加上 疋不變的正整數，如fl(Sp)=Hash(Sp)+p，如此 碰 撞阻抗雜凑函數。參…以代表裝置識別資 =二 次的機密保護。 捉供了另一層 綜上所述，實施本發明所提之方法， 大 作業流程’而且無需增購任何硬體，肖現更改現行銀行的 任何的成本，此為本發明的主要特色，說：如法相比較並沒有增加 序上’將三個轉換函數設計於發卡安控模組°下·在銀行發卡的程 的秘密存入晶片金融卡，取代現行所儲 便可產生持卡人端 更新發卡設備中之發卡安全模組即可·另外、，仃碼’此部份只需要 更新;同樣加入三個轉換函數，便能在接收二M系統只需要稍微 因子後，回復認證秘密，以驗證持卡人之八人提供的兩個認證 人鈿的紅作流程也沒有改變，所以本發更進一來說，持 實施於現存ATM系統，強 袄之方法可在短砗„ 目前晶片金融卡作為持卡人金融卡的身分安全辦/間内 【圖式簡單說明】 斤义遇的威脅。 决 第 圖·係本發明之政_ 上 ’、 例涊證秘密產生户拍㈤ 第二圖··係本發明之銀行發卡系統的兩項：：圖。 第三圖：係本發明之持卡人註冊 產：示意圖。 第四圖：係本發明之持+ 座生流程圖。 卡人端秘密的產生流程圖。 29 200836118 第五圖：係本發明之持卡人端變更通行碼的兩項工作示意 圖。 第六圖：係本發明之持卡人認證準備資訊流程圖。 第七圖：係本發明之持卡人端自我驗證流程圖。. 第八圖.係·本發明之持卡人變更通行碼流程圖。 第九圖.係本發明於現行發卡安控模組系統中實現所需的 四項工作示意圖。 第十圖：係本發明之雙因子認證示意圖。 •第十一圖：係習用發卡系統之實施例流程圖。 第十二圖：係習用晶片金融卡於實體ATM系統完成一筆 交易的程序之發卡系統之實施例流程圖。 第十三圖：係使用晶片金融卡於習用網路ATM系統之交 易程序圖。 【主要元件符號說明】 (3 0 5)(3 10)(3 1 5)(3 20)(3 25)(3 30)(33 5)(340)(3 45)(3 5 0)(3 5 5)(3 60)(3 90) (410)(41 5)(42 0)(4 2 5)(4 3 0)(43 5)(440)(44 5)(4 5 0)(45 5)(46 0)(46 5)(470) (475)(490)(5 10)(5 20)(5 30)(710)(715)(720)(72 5)(73 0)(73 5)(740)(8 10) • (820)(830)(850)(860)(870)(10 10)(1020)(1030)(1040)(1 050)(1 1 10)(1 1 20)(1 140)(12 10)(1 220)(1230)(1240)步驟 (10)持卡人 （1 1)網路ATM用戶端系統 (12)網路ATM銀行端系統 （20)實體ATM銀行端系統 (3〇)實體ATM系統提款機 （100)亂碼化設備 (110)主基碼 （120)另一輸入值 （130)計算過程 (140)使用者基碼檔（〗50)晶片金融卡 （260)通行碼檔 (353)離線式持卡人身分認證程序 （500)亂碼化系統 30 200836118 (6 2 0)工作二 (750)持+人資料庫 (920)工作四 (1 3 1 0)工作五 (1 340)工作八 (540)認證秘密（610)工作一 (700)發卡安控模組系統 (870)驗證值檔 （9 10)工作三 (1000)持卡人端（1〇6〇)安控模組端 (1 130)持卡人驗證值 (1 320)工作六 （ 1 330)工作七 (1 4 1 5)持卡人端秘密 （1 4 2 0)個人化秘密 (1425)端末設備（提款機或讀卡機） （143〇)ATM安控系統 ( 143 5)認證秘密 （1440)銀行端系統 • (1450)註冊秘密In fact, the entity ATM system, the invention is simpler to implement in the network system, "I ... / two-way ATM, and to update the program of the silver know server, it is necessary to update all physical ATMs one by one. , ... and the cash machine can shorten the construction time, indicating the application network program l 、, sex, the three conversion functions are implemented as ActiveX component cardholders, but browse the bank network, the same ATM The URL will automatically carry the computer on this side. At this time, the #1############################################################################################### The system can be used to verify the identity of the cardholder. According to the system implemented by the content of the present invention, 1 card A says that 々i /, 糸, and washing orders are the same as the system side of the current authentication method based on the chip financial card, but the cardholder has a large report. The difference, for example, is that the cardholder end of the embodiment of the present invention makes the =T-transform function η, [2 and f3. The three conversion functions can be set in a variety of ways: for example, the 'first-transition function fl can be set to a collision impedance hash function plus a constant positive integer such as fl(Sp)=Hash(Sp) +p, so collision impedance hash function. Participate in ... to identify the device = two times of confidential protection. Capturing another layer, in summary, implementing the method of the present invention, the large operation flow 'and without adding any hardware, Xiao is now changing any cost of the current bank, which is the main feature of the invention, saying: If the comparison is not as follows, the three conversion functions are designed to be issued in the issuing security control module. The secret of the process of issuing the card in the bank is stored in the chip financial card, which can replace the current storage to generate the cardholder update card. The card issuance security module in the device can be used. In addition, the weight only needs to be updated. The same three conversion functions can be used to verify the secret after receiving the second M system. The red-manufacturing process of the two certifiers provided by the eight people of the card has not changed. Therefore, this issue is further implemented. In the existing ATM system, the method of being strong can be shortened. The card security card's identity security office / room [simple description of the map] the threat of the jinyi encounter. The decision of the map is the government of the invention _ on the ', the example of the secret certificate of the household shot (5) second map · · This hair Two of the bank card issuance system:: Figure. The third picture: the cardholder registration of the invention: schematic diagram. The fourth picture: the flow chart of the holder + seat of the present invention. 29 200836118 Fig. 5 is a schematic diagram of two working procedures of the cardholder's change of the pass code of the present invention. Fig. 6 is a flow chart of the cardholder certification preparation information of the present invention. Card human end self-validation flow chart. Eighth figure. The card holder of the present invention changes the pass code flow chart. The ninth figure is the four tasks required to implement the present invention in the current card issuance control module system. Fig. 10 is a schematic diagram of the two-factor authentication of the present invention. • Figure 11 is a flow chart of an embodiment of a conventional card issuing system. Fig. 12: Procedure for completing a transaction by using a wafer financial card in a physical ATM system Flow chart of an embodiment of the card issuance system. Fig. 13 is a transaction procedure diagram of a wafer financial card used in a conventional network ATM system. [Description of main component symbols] (3 0 5) (3 10) (3 1 5) (3 20)(3 25)(3 30)(33 5)(340)(3 4 5) (3 5 0) (3 5 5) (3 60) (3 90) (410) (41 5) (42 0) (4 2 5) (4 3 0) (43 5) (440) (44 5) (4 5 0) (45 5) (46 0) (46 5) (470) (475) (490) (5 10) (5 20) (5 30) (710) (715) (720) ( 72 5)(73 0)(73 5)(740)(8 10) • (820)(830)(850)(860)(870)(10 10)(1020)(1030)(1040)(1 050 ) (1 1 10) (1 1 20) (1 140) (12 10) (1 220) (1230) (1240) Step (10) Cardholder (1 1) Network ATM Client System (12) Network Road ATM Bank System (20) Entity ATM Bank System (3〇) Entity ATM System Cash Dispenser (100) Garbled Device (110) Primary Base Code (120) Another Input Value (130) Calculation Process (140) User base code file (〗 50) chip financial card (260) pass code file (353) offline card holder identity authentication program (500) garbled system 30 200836118 (6 2 0) work two (750) hold + person Database (920) work four (1 3 1 0) work five (1 340) work eight (540) authentication secret (610) work one (700) issue card security control module system (870) verification value file (9 10) Work three (1000) cardholder end (1〇6〇) security control module end (1 130) cardholder verification value (1 320) work six (1 330) work seven (1 4 1 5) cardholder Secret (1 4 2 0) Personalized Secrets (1425) End Devices (Cash Machines or Card Readers) (143〇) ATM Security Systems (143 5) Authentication Secrets (1440) Bank End Systems • (1450) Registration Secrets
3131
Claims (1)
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| TW97110143A TWI383327B (en) | 2008-03-21 | 2008-03-21 | The use of wafer financial card in the ATM system cardholder authentication methods, systems and computer systems |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| TW97110143A TWI383327B (en) | 2008-03-21 | 2008-03-21 | The use of wafer financial card in the ATM system cardholder authentication methods, systems and computer systems |
Publications (2)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| TW200836118A true TW200836118A (en) | 2008-09-01 |
| TWI383327B TWI383327B (en) | 2013-01-21 |
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Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| TW97110143A TWI383327B (en) | 2008-03-21 | 2008-03-21 | The use of wafer financial card in the ATM system cardholder authentication methods, systems and computer systems |
Country Status (1)
| Country | Link |
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| TW (1) | TWI383327B (en) |
Cited By (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TWI398791B (en) * | 2009-05-22 | 2013-06-11 | ||
| TWI408938B (en) * | 2009-12-30 | 2013-09-11 | Univ Vanung | Flexible multi - digit signature method |
| TWI427574B (en) * | 2010-10-01 | 2014-02-21 | Apex Internat Financial Engineering Res & Tech Co | Finance specialty certification system |
| TWI801744B (en) * | 2020-06-24 | 2023-05-11 | 玉山商業銀行股份有限公司 | Financial transaction device, method and system with non-contact authentication function |
Family Cites Families (5)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TW535114B (en) * | 1999-04-30 | 2003-06-01 | Ling-Huei Chen | Safety interface for certification of personal identification document |
| US6871288B2 (en) * | 2003-02-21 | 2005-03-22 | Ronald K. Russikoff | Computerized password verification system and method for ATM transactions |
| US7412603B2 (en) * | 2003-12-05 | 2008-08-12 | Microsoft Corporation | Methods and systems for enabling secure storage of sensitive data |
| TWI261451B (en) * | 2004-05-14 | 2006-09-01 | Infoteam Technology Corp | Transaction confirmation method and system transmitting on time password |
| TWI258969B (en) * | 2004-07-28 | 2006-07-21 | Pochin Technology Corp | Security authentication method for web financial transaction |
-
2008
- 2008-03-21 TW TW97110143A patent/TWI383327B/en not_active IP Right Cessation
Cited By (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TWI398791B (en) * | 2009-05-22 | 2013-06-11 | ||
| TWI408938B (en) * | 2009-12-30 | 2013-09-11 | Univ Vanung | Flexible multi - digit signature method |
| TWI427574B (en) * | 2010-10-01 | 2014-02-21 | Apex Internat Financial Engineering Res & Tech Co | Finance specialty certification system |
| TWI801744B (en) * | 2020-06-24 | 2023-05-11 | 玉山商業銀行股份有限公司 | Financial transaction device, method and system with non-contact authentication function |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| TWI383327B (en) | 2013-01-21 |
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