RU2114456C1 - Method and device for avoiding critical operation modes of operator-object system - Google Patents

Abstract

FIELD: control systems. SUBSTANCE: method involves storing of dangerous causes and commands for termination of dangerous situation, detection of current dangerous causes, index of control complexity and increment of this index, detection of current dangerous causes for which increment is greater than threshold value, output of commands corresponding to these causes in sequence which depends on increment value of index of control complexity. Corresponding device has unit of detectors of characteristics of operational condition, position and movement of driven aircraft, unit of detectors of position of control handles, information displaying unit, unit for detection of current dangerous causes, generator of control complexity index, generator of commands for termination of dangerous situation. EFFECT: prediction of emergency situation, increased safety of aircraft flights. 12 cl, 2 tbl, 1 dwg

Description

 The invention relates to signaling and control means for a wide class of human-machine systems, including for manned mobile objects such as watercraft, submarines and aircraft, spacecraft, etc.

 In human-machine systems, there is the problem of decision-making in complex and emergency situations, due to malfunctions of the object and its systems, external influences and errors of the human operator, as a rule, in conditions of lack of time for decision-making. The difficulty of making decisions in such situations, hereinafter referred to as special, is determined by the large amount of information that needs to be processed in a short time, and the large number of possible special situations reaching tens and hundreds of thousands.

 There are known cases in which erroneous decisions of the operator entailed catastrophic consequences. Such, for example, the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant on April 26, 1986 and the crash of the A-310 airbus near Mezhdurechensk on March 22, 1994. An analysis of the materials of the investigation into the accidents of domestic civil aircraft with gas turbine engines of 1-3 classes over the past 10 years shows that most of of them (84%) occurred as a result of deviations from the norm in the work of the crew in maintaining flight parameters and in working with aircraft systems.

 In such situations, it is necessary to prevent the operator-facility system from reaching critical operating conditions. Critical operating modes are understood as modes leading to complete or partial loss by the system of its functions, or loss of an object, or loss of an object and the death of an operator (crew).

 A known method and system for manual control of an aircraft, in which the parameters of the technical condition of the aircraft are measured (Dobrolensky Yu.P. et al. Methods of engineering psychological research in aviation. -M.: Mashinostroenie, 1975, p.32). The specified information through the information display system is presented to the crew.

 There is also a known method and system of semi-automatic control of an airplane, in which the parameters of the position and movement of the airplane, the parameters of the technical condition of the airplane, and the parameters of the position of the airplane’s controls are measured (Dobrolensky Yu.P. et al. Methods of psychological engineering research in aviation. M.: Mashinostroenie, 1975 g., p. 34). With this control method, command signals are also generated that are sent to the command device and serve to control the aircraft in certain modes: stabilization of altitude, speed, etc.

 A known method and control device designed to prevent the loss of the creation of the pilot, by limiting the magnitude and duration of the overload. With this method, the parameters of the movement and the position of the aircraft are measured and control signals are generated to prevent the aircraft parameters from exceeding the restrictions (US patent N 4821982, CL B 64 C 13/16 NKI 244-76K).

 The known critical warning system used on aircraft IL-96-300, TU-204 (Technical Maintenance Manual N 6E2.528.011 RE of the critical warning system SPKR-85. Ulyanovsk Instrument Design Bureau, 1992). This system alerts the aircraft crew about the flight parameters of the aircraft (altitude, speed, angle of attack) to operating limits, but this does not take into account the technical condition of the aircraft, the crew’s ability to control the aircraft in the current situation.

 In these methods and systems, the problem of predicting and preventing critical conditions is not solved based on taking into account all the adverse factors operating in the current situation.

 The basis of the invention is the solution to the problem of increasing the efficiency (safety) of the functioning of the operator-object system by preventing the operator-object system from reaching critical modes and, in particular, preventing the manned mobile object from reaching critical flight modes.

 Critical modes are prevented by assisting the operator with actions in complex and emergency situations. These situations are characterized by a high probability of transition to irreversible (catastrophic) situations (detailed explanations of the terms used are given at the end of the section).

 This goal is achieved by the fact that in the method for preventing critical conditions, including the method for preventing critical modes of a manned moving object, the state parameters (position and movement, technical condition, position of controls of the manned moving object) of the operator-object system are measured, hazardous factors are stored , determine the current dangerous factors, form an indicator of the complexity of management, if necessary, form and issue instructions to the operator to display the operator-object system from the current situation, according to the invention, the teams corresponding to dangerous factors are stored, the increment of the control difficulty indicator is determined for each current dangerous factor, those current dangerous factors are determined for which the increment of the control difficulty indicator exceeds a threshold value, and instructions are issued to the operator corresponding to these current dangerous factors, in a sequence depending on the values of the indicated increments of the indicator of control complexity.

 The invention is of particular importance for ensuring the safety of manned moving objects, since a violation of the safety of the movement of a manned moving object can lead either to an accident or to a disaster.

 The specified method can be implemented in a critical modes warning device for a manned moving object, comprising a block of sensors for the parameters of the position and motion of the manned moving object, a block of sensors for the parameters of the technical condition of the manned moving object, a block of sensors for the position parameters of the controls of the manned moving object, an information display unit characterized in that the crew unit for determining the current hazardous factors of the crew system is introduced in series - a manned movable object, the inputs of which are connected to a block of sensors of the parameters of the position and motion of the manned mobile object, a block of sensors of the parameters of the technical condition of the manned mobile object, a block of sensors of the parameters of the position of the controls of the manned mobile object, a driver of the complexity control indicator and a command generator for translating the manned mobile object into a state characterized by an acceptable level of indicator of control complexity, the second input of which the second is connected to the second output of the driver of the control difficulty indicator, and the output is to the information display unit, the driver of the control difficulty indicator configured to determine the control difficulty indicator characterizing the probability of crew error under the action of current dangerous factors, and the command generator to translate the manned moving object into a condition characterized by an acceptable level of management complexity indicator is made with the possibility of forming teams depending and on the magnitude of the indicator of complexity of management and their ranking depending on the magnitude of the increments of the indicator of complexity of management for the corresponding current hazardous factors.

 The main task includes two particular tasks.

 The first particular task is to obtain a quantitative assessment of the management complexity indicator characterizing the probability of crew error (operator).

 The second particular task is the formation of commands for the crew to manage the facility and its systems, providing a way out of a dangerous situation.

 The first particular problem is solved in two stages.

 At the first stage, current hazardous factors are determined. Hazardous factors are set by experts, they are characterized by the minimum number of necessary signs (reference values of the state parameters of the object) that allow them to be attributed to a situation of increasing complexity of functioning conditions (movement, flight), or to complex or emergency situations. (The reference value of the parameter is a certain interval from the region of variation of the parameter). The determination of current hazardous factors makes it possible to identify conditions consisting both in changing individual parameters of the state of the operator-object system, and their various combinations that determine the complexity of decision-making by the operator and pose a potential danger to the functioning of the operator-object system.

 The determination of current hazardous factors is carried out on the basis of the method in which hazardous factors are stored, according to the invention, the reference values of the state parameters of the operator-object system are stored, compared with the measured parameters of the state of the operator-object system, and the current reference values of the state parameters of the operator-object system are determined, which compare with the hazards and determine the current hazards.

 To determine the current dangerous factors of the system, the crew-manned mobile object remembers the reference values of the position and motion parameters of the manned mobile object, the reference values of the technical state parameters of the manned mobile object, the reference values of the time reserves until the motion parameters of the manned mobile object reach the limits, the limits of the set motion parameters manned moving object, and the hazards of the crew-manned moving object system, for Once a given parameter of the motion of a manned mobile object is determined, its rate of change and the current value of the time reserve before the output of the restriction parameter are compared, the indicated current values of the time reserves with their reference values are compared, and the current reference values of the time reserves until the parameters of the movement of the manned mobile object are limited, the measured values are compared. position and motion parameters of a manned moving object with reference values of the position and motion parameters of the pilot the moving mobile object and register the current reference values of the position and movement parameters of the manned mobile object, compare the measured parameters of the technical condition of the manned mobile object with the reference values of the technical conditions of the manned mobile object and record the current reference values of the technical condition of the manned mobile object, compare the measured parameters of the organs control of a manned moving object with reference values by means of the position parameters of the controls of the manned mobile object and register the current reference values of the parameters of the controls of the manned mobile object, compare the current reference values of the time reserves until the motion parameters of the manned mobile object reach the constraints, the current reference values of the position and motion parameters of the manned mobile object, the current reference the values of the position parameters of the controls of the manned moving object, the current reference the values of the technical condition parameters of the manned mobile object with dangerous factors of the crew-manned mobile object system and the current dangerous factors of the crew-manned mobile system are recorded.

 This method can be implemented in a critical modes warning device for a manned moving object, comprising a block of sensors for the position and motion parameters of the manned moving object, a block for sensors of the technical condition of the manned moving object, a block of sensors for the position parameters of the controls of the manned moving object, an information display unit, characterized in that the unit for determining the current dangerous factors of the crew-manned moving object system is made in the form of therefore, the connected memory block of the reference values of the parameters of the position and movement of the manned mobile object, the first comparator and the registrar of the current reference values of the parameters of the position and the movement of the manned mobile object, the series-connected memory block of the reference values of the technical parameters of the manned mobile object, the second comparator and the recorder of the current reference values of the parameters technical condition of a manned moving object, connected in series x power supply of the reference values of the position parameters of the controls of the manned mobile object, the third comparator and the registrar of the current reference values of the parameters of the position of the controls of the manned mobile object, the memory blocks of the reference values of the time reserves until the motion parameters of the manned mobile object are constrained, the fourth comparator and the registrar the current reference values of the time reserves until the output of the motion parameters of the manned mobile the object for restrictions, the shaper of time reserves before the movement parameters of the manned mobile object move to the restrictions connected to the second input of the fourth comparator, the memory block of hazardous factors of the Ekapage-piloted mobile object connected to the fifth comparator, other inputs are connected to the recorder of the current reference values of position parameters and the movement of a manned moving object by the registrar of the current reference values of the parameters of the technical condition of the manned moving object one, a registrar of current reference values of the position parameters of the controls of the manned mobile object, a registrar of current reference values of the time reserves until the motion parameters of the manned mobile object are limited, and an output with a memory unit for memorizing current dangerous factors, the output of which is the output of the block, the input of the shaper of time reserves before the motion parameters of the manned moving object reach the restrictions and the second input of the first comparator is connected to the sensor unit in pairs meters of the position and movement of the manned moving object, the second input of the second comparator is connected to the sensor unit of the technical parameters of the manned mobile object, the second input of the third comparator is connected to the sensor block of the position parameters of the controls of the manned moving object.

 At the second stage of solving the first particular problem, an indicator of management complexity is formed. It is possible to formulate the indicator of control complexity as the probability of an operator error under the action of current hazardous factors in a priority sequence, which is determined by the difference between the conditional probability of an operator error under the action of a given dangerous factor, provided the hypothesis of the possibility of an operator error and the conditional probability of an operator error under the action of this dangerous factor, provided that the hypothesis about the possibility of operator error, which is previously stored, is false.

 To determine the probability of operator error under the action of current hazardous factors, remember the a priori probability of operator error, and for each current hazard factor, in order of priority sequence, calculate the probability of operator error under the action of the specified current hazard factor, as the quotient of the product of the probability of the truth of the hypothesis of the possibility of operator error on the conditional probability of operator error under the action of the indicated current dangerous factor, provided that the hypothesis about the probability of operator error, by the sum of the specified product and the product of the conditional probability of operator error under the action of the specified current dangerous factor, provided the hypothesis about the possibility of operator error is false by the difference between unity and the probability of the truth of the hypothesis about the possibility of operator error, and as the probability of the truth of the hypothesis of the possibility of error the operator is used: for the first, according to priority, current hazard factor - the given a priori probability of operator error, and for the next, according to the priority of the current hazard is the probability of operator error when the previous, priority, current hazard occurs, while the probability of operator error when the current hazards are equated to the probability of operator error when the latter acts in the priority sequence of the current hazard.

 A method for generating a control complexity indicator can be implemented in a critical mode warning device for a manned mobile object, comprising a block of sensors for the parameters of the position and motion of the manned mobile object, a block of sensors for the technical parameters of the manned mobile object, a block of sensors for the position parameters of the controls of the manned mobile object, an information display unit characterized in that the shaper of the indicator of control complexity is made in the form of a block the memory of the a priori probabilities of a crew error, the memory block of the conditional probabilities of a crew error under the action of each dangerous factor of the crew-manned mobile object system, provided that the hypothesis about the possibility of a crew error and a calculator of the control difficulty indicator, the inputs of which are connected to the unit for determining the current dangerous factors of the crew system, is true and false. are a piloted moving object and are the input of the block, the outputs of the memory block of the a priori probabilities of the crew error and the memory block of conditional probabilities Errors by the action of the crew each hazard system crew piloted movable object provided truth and falsity of the hypothesis that crew errors connected with the other inputs of the calculator control complexity index, the first and second outputs which are first and second output block, respectively.

 A priori probabilities of an operator (crew) error with an increase in the work (psychophysiological) load above the normally required level; conditional probabilities of an operator error with an increase in the work (psychophysical) load due to the action of a dangerous factor of the operator-object system (crew-manned moving object) under the condition of truth and falsities of the hypothesis about the possibility of a crew error are set on the basis of expert knowledge about the features of the object (manned moving object) and its systems, the capabilities of the operator (crew) about managing the facility in the presence of a hazard.

 In addition, when the level of the indicator of control complexity exceeds the 2nd threshold value, a sign of the need to prevent critical mode is generated and a control signal is issued to the facility’s automatic control means to transfer the operator-object system to a state characterized by an acceptable level of control complexity indicator.

 This helps to prevent a dangerous development of the situation when the operator for some reason is not able to implement the prompt issued to him.

 The second particular task is to generate a control signal (s). Commands for translating the operator-object system (manned moving object) into a state characterized by an acceptable level of control complexity indicator can be generated in the form of object control commands (which are previously stored) corresponding to those current dangerous factors for which the increment of the probability of operator (crew) error exceeds the threshold value for the increment of the probability of error of the crew and in the sequence determined by the values of the indicated increments of the probability of error of the eki page. The threshold value for the increment of the probability of crew error is set depending on the magnitude of the indicator of complexity of control, the greater the indicator of complexity of control, the greater the threshold value for the increment of probability of error of the crew. This ensures a decrease in the indicator of control complexity to the appropriate level, since the execution of the command eliminates the corresponding hazardous factor. The facility management teams (each team has a specific hazard) are set by experts.

 This method can be implemented in a critical modes warning device for a manned moving object, comprising a block of sensors for the position and motion parameters of the manned moving object, a block for sensors of the technical condition of the manned moving object, a block of sensors for the position parameters of the controls of the manned moving object, an information display unit, characterized in that the shaper commands to translate a manned mobile object into a state characterized by an allowance with a level of complexity indicator of control, made in the form of a series-connected memory block of threshold values for increments of the probability of crew error, a shaper of a threshold value for the magnitude of the increment of probability of crew error and a command calculator for translating a manned moving object into a state characterized by an acceptable level of indicator of complexity of control, as well as a block memory and commands, and the first, second and third inputs of the command calculator for translating a manned moving object into a melting characterized by an acceptable level of the indicator of complexity of control is connected to a threshold value generator for the increment of the probability of crew error, a memory and command block, and a second output of the control complexity indicator, respectively, and the output to the information display unit, and the second input of the threshold value generator for the magnitude of the increment in the probability of crew error is connected to the first output of the driver of the indicator of difficulty control, while the second input of the driver threshold The new value for the increment of the probability of crew error is the first input of the block, the third input of the command calculator for translating the manned mobile object into a state characterized by an acceptable level of control complexity indicator is the second input of the block, and its output is the output of the block.

Signs and terms by which the essence of the invention is characterized have the following meanings:
1. A special situation is a situation that occurs during the operation of the operator-object system (flight) as a result of exposure to adverse factors or their combinations, leading to a decrease in the efficiency (safety) of the functioning of the system (movement).

Exceptions are classified using the following criteria:
a. Deterioration of the characteristics of an object, characteristics of stability and controllability, strength and operation of systems, characteristics of tasks to be solved.

 b. An increase in the working (psychophysical) load on the crew in excess of the normally required level.

 in. Discomfort, injury or death to people on board.

 2. The situation of complicating operating conditions (flight) is a special situation characterized by a deterioration in the characteristics of the operator-object system.

3. A difficult situation - a special situation characterized by:
a noticeable deterioration in the characteristics and / or the output of one or more parameters beyond the operational limits, but without reaching the limit limits, or
a decrease in the crew’s ability to cope with adverse conditions (the situation that has arisen) both due to an increase in workload and because of conditions that reduce the effectiveness of the crew’s actions.

4. Emergency - a special situation characterized by:
a significant deterioration in performance and / or achievement (exceeding) of limiting restrictions and / or partial or complete loss of the functions performed or
physical fatigue or the workload of the crew, which can no longer rely on the fact that he will complete his tasks accurately or completely.

 5. A catastrophic situation is a special situation for which it is accepted that when it occurs, the prevention of death is almost impossible.

 6. Critical operating modes of the operator-object system - emergency or catastrophic situations.

 7. Prevention of critical conditions - any actions aimed at preventing emergency, catastrophic situations or to remove from emergency situations.

 8. Crew error - all sorts of wrong actions (or inaction) without intent to act in violation of established rules.

9. The reference value of the parameter is a pair of parameter values, the left and right border of the interval characterizing a certain interval from the range of variation of the parameter values, for example, the range of the roll from 0 ^o to 180 ^{o is} divided into several intervals. For a parameter that has values of the "on, off" type, the indicated values are the reference ones.

 10. Current parameter reference value - reference parameter value to which the current parameter value belongs.

 11. A dangerous factor is an event in the operator-object system, which can be attributed to a situation of increasing complexity of operating conditions, or to a difficult situation, or to an emergency, characterized by one or a combination of several reference values of the state-of-the-art operator-object system state parameters.

 12. The current (current) hazard factor is a hazard factor characterized by one or a combination of reference values of the state parameters of the operator-object system to which the current values of these parameters belong.

 13. The hypothesis of the possibility of operator error is the assumption that, with an increase in the operator's (psychophysiological) workload beyond the normally required level, the operator may make an error.

 14. The hypothesis about the possibility of an operator (crew) error is true (event H) - an operator error occurs when the operator's workload increases beyond the normally required level.

 The hypothesis about the possibility of operator error is false (event notH) - there is no operator error when the operator's workload increases beyond the normally required level.

 15. Operator error under the action of the Nth hazard factor (event En) - an event consisting in the fact that the operator will make an error under the action of the Nth hazard factor.

16. The a priori probability of operator error (P _HO is the set value of the probability of operator error with an increase in its workload beyond the normally required level, is determined by experts for a certain area of the state space of the operator-object system.

17. The probability of the truth of the hypothesis of the possibility of an operator error (P _n is the probability of an operator error with an increase in his workload in the current situation in excess of the normally required level.

 The a priori value is equal to the a priori probability of operator error.

 The current value (under the influence of dangerous factors) is equal to the posterior probability of operator error under the influence of the indicated dangerous factors of the system.

 18. The conditional probability of operator error under the action of the Nth hazardous factor of the system (the operator-object, provided the hypothesis of the possibility of operator error (Pe / n) is true, is the specified value of the probability of operator error with an increase in its workload due to the action of the Nth hazardous factor of the operator-object system, provided that the operator error occurs when the operator's workload increases above the normally required level, experts determine for each dangerous factor of the operator-object system.

 19. The conditional probability of operator error under the action of the nth dangerous factor of the operator-object system, provided that the hypothesis about the possibility of operator error (Pe / not n) is false - the set value of the probability of operator error with an increase in its workload due to the action of the nth dangerous factor, provided that the operator’s error does not occur when the operator’s workload increases beyond the normally required level, it is determined by experts for each dangerous factor of the operator-object system.

 20. The probability of operator error under the action of current dangerous factors of the operator-object system is the posterior probability of operator error in the conditions of an increase in its workload under the action of current dangerous factors of the operator-object system using the Bayes formula when proposing independence of hazardous factors.

 Bayes formula - establishes the relationship between the posterior probability of an operator (crew) error under the action of the Nth dangerous factor of the operator-object system (crew-manned mobile object system), the probabilities of the truth and falsehood of the hypothesis of the possibility of operator (crew) error, and the conditional probability of operator error (crew) under the action of the N-th current hazard factor of the operator-object system (crew system - manned moving object), provided the truth and falsity of the hypothesis of the possibility of operator error .

If the indicated N-th current hazard factor of the operator-object system (crew-manned mobile object system) is unique, then, in accordance with the formula, the posterior probability of operator error under the action of the N-th current hazard factor of the operator-object system (crew-manned mobile system object (P _n / En) is equal to the quotient of the product of the a priori probability of operator error in the conditional probability of human error by the action of N-th current hazard provided truth of hypotheses may ti operator error in the amount of said product with the product of the conditional probability of human error by the action of N-th current hazard system operator object provided falsity hypothesis the possibility of operator error in the difference between the unit and the a priori probability of truth of a hypothesis the possibility of the operator (crew) error.

 21. The priority of the current dangerous factors of the operator-object system is the sequence of the current dangerous factors of the operator-object system, in which the priority decreases as the number in the sequence increases, the priority of the Nth current dangerous factor of the operator-object system is determined by the difference between the conditional probabilities of the operator error under the action of the Nth current dangerous factor of the operator-object system, provided that the hypothesis about the possibility of operator error is true and the hypothesis that the error is possible is false operators.

 22. The increment in the probability of operator error for the N-th current dangerous factor of the operator-object system is the difference between the probability of operator error under the action of the Nth current dangerous factor of the operator-object system and the probability of operator error when the previous (greater) priority of the current dangerous factor system "operator-object".

 23. The time reserve until the movement parameter of the manned mobile object reaches a limit — the position parameter of the manned mobile object; the current value of the parameter (time reserve) is the amount of time over which the motion parameter of the manned moving object can change from the current value to the limit value, can be calculated based on the current or predicted rate of change of the motion parameter of the manned moving object.

 24. The reference value of the parameter (time reserve) is two values of time characterizing a certain interval from the range of variation of the parameter (time reserve).

 25. A dangerous factor of the crew system, a manned mobile object, an event that can lead to a disruption in the normal functioning of the manned mobile object and cause a special situation, is characterized by one or a combination of several reference values of the position and movement parameters of the manned mobile object, technical parameters of the manned mobile object , the position parameters of the controls of the manned mobile object, the time reserves until the output of the motion parameters of a moving object for restrictions.

 26. The current dangerous factor of the crew system, a manned mobile object, is the dangerous factor of the crew system, a manned mobile object, characterized by one or a combination of reference values of parameters (position and movement, technical condition, time reserve, position of governing bodies) to which the current values of the indicated parameters.

 An example should not be construed either as limiting the scope of the invention, or as the preferred, in all cases, form of its implementation.

 In FIG. 1 shows a block diagram of a device. The critical modes warning device for a manned moving object contains a block 1 of sensors for the position and motion parameters of the manned moving object, a block 2 for sensors of the technical condition of the manned moving object, a block of 3 sensors for the position parameters of the controls of the manned moving object, an information display unit 4, and a recorder 5 of current dangerous factors , driver 6 of the control difficulty indicator, driver 8 of the control signal for translating a manned mobile object in a state characterized by an acceptable level of performance management complexity.

 Block 1 may include airborne sensors for flight information of altitude, speed, pitch, roll, heading and attack, angular velocity, overload, etc., as well as airborne sensors for the position and movement of a manned moving object (aircraft) relative to external objects ( airfields, targets, etc.), (not shown).

 Block 2 may include on-board sensors of serviceability of aircraft systems: power plant, hydraulic systems, control systems, etc. (not shown).

 Block 3 may include position sensors: aircraft control knobs, engine control knobs, chassis, etc. (not shown).

 Block 4 may include an indicator and a voice informant, for example, Collins or Sextant, or Honeywel 1 (not shown).

 Blocks 5, 6, 8 are computers based, for example, on a processor such as Intel 276 or Intel 376.

 Block 5 contains a shaper 9 of time reserves until the parameters of the motion of the manned mobile object reach restrictions, a block 10 of the memory of the reference values of the parameters of the position and movement of the manned mobile object, a first comparator 11, a recorder 12 of the current reference values of the parameters of the position and movement of the manned mobile object, memory block 13 reference values of the parameters of the technical condition of the manned mobile object, the second comparator 14, the registrar 15 of the current reference values of the parameters of the technical the state of the manned moving object, the memory block 16 of the reference values of the position parameters of the controls of the manned mobile object, the third comparator 17, the recorder 18 of the current reference parameters of the controls of the manned mobile object, the block 19 of the memory of the reference values of the time reserves until the motion parameters of the manned moving object are subject to restrictions , the fourth comparator 20, the registrar 21 of the current reference values of the time reserves - until the output of the motion parameters of the manned mobile Object of the limitations of memory block 22 of hazards, the fifth comparator 23, a block 24 storing the current hazard.

 Block 6 contains a block 24 of the memory of a priori probabilities of a crew error, a block 25 of memory of the conditional probabilities of a crew error under the action of each hazard factor, provided the hypothesis about the possibility of a crew error is false and true, and a calculator 26 of the control complexity index.

 Block 8 contains a block 30 of threshold values for increments of the probability of crew error, block 31 of memory controls, a threshold value generator 32 for the value of the increment of probability of crew error and a calculator 33 of the control signal for translating a manned aircraft into a state characterized by an acceptable level of control complexity index.

 Blocks 10, 11, 12 are connected in series. The second input of block 11 is connected to the output of block 1, which is also connected to the input of block 9. Blocks 13, 14, 15 are connected in series. The second input of block 14 is connected to block 2.

 Blocks 16, 17, 18 are connected in series, the second input of block 17 is connected to block 3. Blocks 19, 20, 21 are connected in series. The second input of block 20 is connected to block 9. Blocks 22, 23, 24 are connected in series. Other inputs of block 23 are connected to blocks 12, 15, 18, 21. The output of block 24 is connected to inputs of blocks 25, 26, 27. Other inputs of block 27 are connected to blocks 25, 26. The input of block 33 is connected to blocks 31, 32 and the second the output of block 27. The first output of block 33 is connected to block 4, the second output to block 31. The inputs of block 32 are connected to the first output of block 27 and block 30.

 The following describes the operation of the device in relation to aircraft control.

 Block 1 measures the parameters of the position and movement of the aircraft: altitude, velocity components, pitch, roll, heading, attack, acceleration components, angular velocity components, etc.

 Block 2 determines the parameters of the technical condition of the aircraft: condition of engines, serviceability of hydraulic systems, control systems, etc., the presence of fire, icing, etc.

 Block 3 measures the parameters of the position of the aircraft controls: + aircraft control knobs, engine control knobs, rudder pedals, landing gear release knobs, flaps, etc.

 The unit computes the time reserves until the aircraft’s motion parameters reach the specified limits: altitude, speed, overload, angle of attack, etc.

,
где
A_гр - заданные граничные значения параметра A;
A' - скорость изменения параметра A, в случае если A' не измеряется, она вычисляется в блоке по измеряемым параметрам.The time reserve is calculated by the formula:

,
Where
A _gr - the specified boundary values of the parameter A;
A 'is the rate of change of parameter A, if A' is not measured, it is calculated in the block according to the measured parameters.

,
где
H_оп - значение опасной высоты;
H_Т - измеренное значение высоты;
V_y - вертикальная скорость.For example, for flight altitude

,
Where
H _op - the value of the dangerous height;
H _T - the measured value of the height;
V _y - vertical speed.

 Block 10 stores reference values of a number of parameters of the position and movement of the aircraft, such as height, speed, roll angle, etc.

 For example: for the roll, the reference values are: (Г0, Г1) = [0.30] deg, (Г1, Г2) = [30.45] deg, (Г3, Г4) = [45, 70] deg.

 for height (H0, H1) = [0,100] m, (H1, H2) = [100,600] m.

 In block 11, the current value of the parameter from block 1 is compared with its reference value from block 10, and the current reference value is generated, which enters block 12, where it is stored.

For example: at 30 deg ≥ 0 deg tech.op is (Г0, Г1);
at 100 <H <600 Htekop it is equal to (Н1, Н2).

 Block 13 stores reference values of a number of parameters of the technical condition of the manned aircraft.

 For example, for engines, the following signals are used as reference values: 1st engine off (D1), 2nd engine off (D2), etc.

 In block 14, a comparison is made of the technical state parameters from block 2 with the reference values from block 13 and the formation of the current reference values, which are received in block 15.

 For example, when the 1st motor is turned off, the current reference value (Dtec reference) is equal to D1.

 Block 16 stores reference values of the position parameters of the controls of the manned aircraft.

 In block 17, the measured position parameters of the controls of the manned aircraft from block 3 are compared with their reference values from block 16 and the current reference values of the parameters of the position of the controls of the manned aircraft are generated, which are received in block 18, where they are stored. For example, if the chassis is removed the current value of the chassis is equal to Ш1.

 Block 19 stores reference values of the time reserves.

 For example, for the reserve of time in height (Tn), the reference values are: (Tn0, Tn1) = [0.1] s, (Tn1, Tn2) = (1.3) s, (Tn2, Tn3) = (3.5 )from.

In block 20, the current values of the time reserves are compared with the reference values and the current reference values of the time reserves are formed. For example, for the flight altitude, if the current value of the reserve of time for altitude is less than 5 s and more than 3 s, then it is written as:
Tn tec. = (Tn2, Tn3).

 In block 21, the current reference values of the time reserves of the motion parameters of the manned aircraft are stored.

 Block 22 stores the parameters characterizing the dangerous factors of the crew system, manned aircraft.

A hazardous factor is such a combination of reference values of the state parameters of a manned aircraft that represents a certain control complexity (danger). For example, if during a climb, the flight altitude is less than 600 m and the landing gear is removed and one engine fails, then this dangerous factor has the form:
OF1- (N1, H2, D1, Sh1)
Where
Н1, Н2 - reference height value corresponding to the interval 100 <H <600;
D1 - the reference value of the state of the engine, corresponding to the shutdown of the left engine;
Ш1 - reference value of the state of the chassis corresponding to the position of the chassis removed.

If the engine control knob is not set to stop when you climb and turn off one engine, this is also a dangerous factor:
OF2 = (Н1, Н2, Ш1, Д1, РД11)
Where
RD11 - the reference value of the throttle position of the 1st engine corresponding to any throttle position other than the stop position.

If during the climb, the height is less than 600 m, the chassis is retracted and the vertical speed is less than the required climb speed, or it is the reduction speed (V _y <0), then this is also a dangerous factor:
OFZ = (Н1, Н2, V _yo , Ш1)
Where
V _yo is the reference value of the vertical velocity corresponding to the interval V _y <V _yo .

If there is an effect of all these factors, then the current flight situation (TPN1) has the form:
TPS1 = (H1, H2, W1, D1, RD11, V _yo ).

 In block 23, the current reference values of the parameters coming from blocks 12, 15, 18, 21 are compared with the parameters characterizing the dangerous factors and stored in block 22 and the parameters characterizing the current dangerous factors are highlighted.

 In this example, these are OF1, OF2, OF3. The specified parameters (current hazardous factors) enter the memorization unit 24, where they are stored.

The memory block 25 stores the a priori values of the probabilities of the crew error. For the climb stage, the specified value determined by experts is
P _HO = 0.203.

 The memory block 26 also stores the values of the conditional probabilities of the crew error under the action of each dangerous factor of the system, the crew, the manned aircraft, subject to the truth (Re / n) or falsity (Re / not n) of the hypothesis about the possibility of a crew error.

For the hazards considered in the example, these probabilities are summarized in table. 1
Calculator 27 calculates the posterior probability of crew error in a flight situation characterized by current hazards using the Bayes formula.

The following calculations are performed:
primary ranking of current hazards by calculating the difference
ΔP ⁱ = P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{i}}{\text{e / n}}$ -P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{i}}{\text{e / nen}}$ (1),
Where
i is the number of the hazard factor.

,
где
i = 1 - N номер в приоритетной последовательности, P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{o}}{\text{н/е}}$ = P_HO.For the considered example, the priority sequence has the form:
OF3, OF1, OF2 (see tab. 1);
the calculation of the posterior probability of crew error for each current hazard in a priority sequence, and the posterior probability at the current step is used as a priori at the next:

,
Where
i = 1 - N number in priority sequence, P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{o}}{\text{not}}$ = P _HO .

 For this example, the values of Pn / e are given in table. one.

 The value of the posterior probability of crew error at the N-th step (i-N), where N is equal to the number of dangerous factors, characterizes the probability of crew error in a given flight situation and an indicator of control complexity, for the considered example, Pн / е = 0.51.

From block 27 are issued:
in blocks 32 - an indicator of the complexity of management (1st exit);
in block 33 - the values of the posterior probability of crew error for each current hazard in the initial ranking sequence (2nd exit).

 The memory unit 30 stores threshold values for increments of the probability of crew error (U30-1, U30-2, U30-3, U30-4) and their corresponding levels (U30-11, U30-21, U30-31, U30-41 ) that enter block 32.

The memory unit 31 stores commands for all dangerous factors. For these dangerous factors, the teams have the following form:
for the first dangerous factor, the team is missing,
for the second hazard factor - ORE TO STOP,
for the third hazard - STOP REDUCING.

 From block 31 to block 33 commands are issued that correspond to significant hazardous factors, the numbers of which are sent to block 31 from block 33.

In block 32, a threshold value is generated for the increment of the probability of crew error (P n2), which enters block 33, in the form of a step function of the magnitude of the control complexity indicator received from the first output of block 27 (Table 2), and the value " steps "is set from the output of block 30: Pn 2 = U30-i with Pn / e <U30-i1, where i = 1 ^o C4 (4).

In block 33, the formation of teams entering block 4. is carried out. The following calculations are carried out:
secondary ranking of current hazardous factors by calculating and storing the increment of the probability of operator error for each current hazardous factor by signals from the second output of block 27, in the form:
▽ P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{i}}{\text{not}}$ = P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{i}}{\text{not}}$ -P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{j}}{\text{n / e}}$ (3)
Where
i is the number of the current hazard;
j is the number of the previous hazard factor determined by the formula (1),
for the first priority hazard factor, the increment value is calculated with respect to the a priori value of the probability of crew error:
▽ P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{i}}{\text{not}}$ = P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{i}}{\text{not}}$ -P _but ; ,
Where
i is the number of the first priority hazardous factor.

For the considered example, ▽ Pi are given in table. 1. The priority sequence according to the results of the secondary ranking is: OF3, OF1, OF2;
since Rn / e = 0.51 <0.7, then Rn2 = U30-3 = 0.15
the determination of the numbers of significant hazardous factors is carried out by comparing the obtained increments of the probability of crew error for each hazard factor (Рн / е) with the threshold value (Рн2) from block 32, for significant dangerous factors, the increment of the probability of crew error must exceed the specified threshold value, the indicated numbers hazardous factors (2nd output of block 33) are issued to block 31.

 In the considered example, the third dangerous factor (OF3) is significant.

▽ P3 = ▽ P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{3}}{\text{not}}$ > P $\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{\text{2}}{\text{n}}$ .
the formation of teams for issuance to block 4 is carried out by organizing a sequence of commands received from block 31, the priority of which is determined by the results of the secondary ranking.

 In this example, this is the command corresponding to the third dangerous factor: "stop the decline."

From block 33 are issued:
in block 4, control commands in the secondary ranking sequence (1st output);
in block 31, the numbers of hazardous factors for which the increment of the probability of crew error exceeds the threshold level, (2nd exit).

 The semi-natural modeling of the proposed system as applied to a light aircraft (40 t) at take-off stages, climb, route flight under single and group failure conditions showed the possibility of reducing the accident rate due to crew errors by 1.5-2 times.

Claims (12)

 1. A way to prevent critical operating modes of the operator-object system, in which the parameters of the state of the system operator-object are measured, hazardous factors are stored, current dangerous factors are determined, an indicator of control complexity is generated, and if necessary, commands are generated and issued to the operator to output the operator-object system from the current situation, characterized in that the teams that correspond to the dangerous factors are memorized, determine, for each current dangerous factor, the increment of the management difficulty indicator, determine the current hazardous factors for which the increment of the control complexity indicator exceeds the threshold value, and issue the operator with the command corresponding to these current hazardous factors, in a sequence depending on the magnitude of the indicated increments of the control difficulty indicator.  2. The method according to p. 1, characterized in that the threshold value is set depending on the magnitude of the indicator of control complexity, the greater the indicator of control complexity, the greater the threshold value.  3. The method according to p. 1 or 2, characterized in that the complexity indicator of control is formed as the probability of an operator error under the action of current hazardous factors in a priority sequence, which is determined by the difference between the conditional probability of an operator error under the action of this hazardous factor, provided the hypothesis is true about the possibility of operator error and the conditional probability of operator error under the action of this dangerous factor, provided the hypothesis about the possibility of operator error is false, which are preceded by tionary remember.  4. The method according to p. 3, characterized in that to determine the probability of an operator error under the action of current hazardous factors, remember the a priori probability of an operator error and for each current hazard factor in the order of priority sequence, calculate the probability of an operator error when a specified current hazard factor acts, as quotient of dividing the product of the probability of the truth of the hypothesis of the possibility of operator error by the conditional probability of operator error under the action of the specified current dangerous factor subject to the truth of the hypothesis of the possibility of operator error, by the sum of the specified product and the product of the conditional probability of operator error under the action of the specified current dangerous factor, provided that the hypothesis of the possibility of operator error on the difference between the unit and the probability of the truth of the hypothesis of the possibility of operator error is false, and as the probability the truth of the hypothesis of the possibility of operator error using the given a priori probability of error for the first priority current dangerous factor Key operator, and for the next priority of the current hazard - the likelihood of operator error by the action of the previous priority of this hazard, the likelihood of operator error by the action of the current hazard equates to the likelihood of operator error by the action of the latter in a priority sequence of this hazard.  5. The method according to p. 1, or 2, or 3, or 4, characterized in that they form and issue a control signal to the facility’s automatic control means to transfer the operator-operator system to a state characterized by an acceptable level of control complexity indicator at an indicator level control complexity exceeding the second threshold value.  6. The method according to p. 1, or 2, or 3, or 4, or 5, characterized in that for determining the current hazardous factors, the reference values of the state parameters of the operator-object system are stored, compared with the measured state parameters of the operator-object system and determine the current reference values of the state parameters of the operator-object system, which are compared with hazardous factors and determine the current hazardous factors.  7. The method according to p. 1, or 2, or 3, or 4, or 5, or 6, characterized in that for a manned moving object as parameters of the state of the operator-object system, use the position and motion parameters of the manned moving object, technical parameters the state of the manned moving object, the technical condition of the manned moving object, the position parameters of the controls of the manned moving object, the time reserves before the output of the motion parameters of the manned moving object at the border Niya.  8. The method according to p. 7, characterized in that in the case where the current dangerous factor of the crew system is a manned moving object, including the current reference value of the time reserve until the movement parameter of the manned moving object reaches the limit, it has the highest priority, the crew control signal and a control signal to the means of automatic control of a manned moving object to translate a manned moving object into a state characterized by an acceptable level of control complexity indicator yut in the form of a control signal to prevent the specified parameter of the motion of the manned moving object from reaching a limit.  9. A warning device for critical conditions of a manned moving object, comprising a block of sensors for the parameters of the position and motion of the manned moving object, a block of sensors for the parameters of the technical condition of the manned moving object, a block of sensors for the parameters of the position of the controls of the manned moving object, an information display unit, characterized in that a series-connected unit for determining the current hazardous factors of the crew-manned mobile object system has been introduced which is connected to the block of sensors of the parameters of the position and motion of the manned mobile object, the block of sensors of the parameters of the technical condition of the manned mobile object, the block of sensors of the parameters of the position of the controls of the manned mobile object, the driver of the indicator of complexity of control and the command generator to transfer the manned mobile object to a state characterized by an acceptable level indicator of control complexity, the second input of which is connected to the second output atelier of the control indicator, and the output with the information display unit, moreover, the driver of the indicator of complexity of control is made with the possibility of determining the indicator of difficulty of management, characterizing the probability of crew error under the action of current dangerous factors, and the command generator for translating a manned mobile object into a state characterized by an acceptable level of indicator the complexity of management, made with the possibility of forming teams depending on the value of the indicator of complexity of management their ranking depending on the magnitude of the increments of the indicator of complexity of management for the corresponding current hazardous factors.  10. The device according to p. 9, characterized in that the unit for determining the current dangerous factors of the crew-manned mobile object system is made in the form of series-connected memory blocks of the reference values of the position and motion parameters of the manned mobile object, the first comparator and the recorder of the current reference values of the position parameters and the movement of a manned moving object, series-connected memory block of the reference values of the position parameters of the controls of the manned moving object, three a comparator and a registrar of current values of the position parameters of the controls of the manned mobile object, sequentially connected memory blocks of the reference values of the time reserves until the parameters of the movement of the manned mobile object are limited, the fourth comparator and a registrar of the current reference values of the reserves of time until the parameters of the movement of the manned mobile object are limited , a shaper of time reserves until the output of the motion parameters of a manned moving object restrictions, connected to the second input of the fourth comparator, memory block of hazardous factors of the system, the crew is a manned mobile object connected to the fifth comparator, the other inputs of which are connected to the recorder of the current reference values of the position and movement parameters of the manned mobile object, the registrar of the current reference values of the parameters of the technical condition of the manned moving object, the registrar of the current reference values of the position parameters of the manned mobile controls the facility, the registrar of the current reference values of the time reserves until the motion parameters of the manned mobile object are limited, and the output is with the current hazardous factor storage unit, the output of which is the output of the block, and the input of the time shaper until the parameters of the manned mobile object motion is limited and the second the input of the first comparator is connected to the block of sensors of the parameters of the position and motion of the manned moving object, the second input of the second comparator is connected to the block ohm of the sensors of the parameters of the technical condition of the manned moving object, the second input of the third comparator is connected to the block of sensors of the position parameters of the controls of the manned moving object.  11. The device according to p. 9 or 10, characterized in that the driver of the control complexity indicator is made in the form of a memory block of a priori probabilities of a crew error, a memory block of conditional probabilities of a crew error under the action of each dangerous factor of the crew-manned mobile object subject to truth and falsity hypotheses about the possible errors of the crew and the calculator of the control difficulty indicator, the inputs of which are connected to the unit for determining the current dangerous factors of the crew-manned mobile object system and are input of the block, the outputs of the memory block of the a priori probabilities of the crew error and the memory block of the conditional probabilities of the crew error under the action of each dangerous factor of the crew-manned mobile object subject to the instability and falsity of the hypothesis of the possibility of crew error are connected to other inputs of the calculator of the control complexity indicator, the first and the second outputs of which are the first and second outputs of the block, respectively.  12. The device according to claim 11, characterized in that the command generator for translating the manned mobile object into a state characterized by an acceptable level of control difficulty indicator is made in the form of a series-connected memory block of threshold values of the increments of the probability of crew error, a shaper of the threshold value for the value of the probability increment crew and command calculator errors for transferring a manned moving object to a state characterized by an acceptable level of complexity indicator board, as well as a command memory unit, the first, second and third inputs of the command calculator for translating a manned mobile object into a state characterized by an acceptable level of control difficulty indicator are connected to a threshold value shaper for the crew error probability increment, a command memory block, and a second output the shaper of the indicator of control complexity, respectively, and the output with the information display unit, and the second input of the threshold shaper for the value is incremented the crew error probability is connected to the first output of the control difficulty indicator shaper, while the second threshold shaper input for the crew error probability increment is the first block input, the third input of the command calculator for translating a manned moving object to a state characterized by an acceptable level of control complexity indicator, is the second input of the block, and its output is the output of the block.

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