KR20220026507A - Secure Protocol System for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and the Method thereof - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention provides a security protocol system for an unmanned aerial vehicle and a method therefor. The security protocol system of the unmanned aerial vehicle of the present invention, in a direct communication environment between the unmanned aerial vehicle and the ground control system, after receiving the operation ID ID _MISSION and pin number P from the user, the ECDH private key and public key of the unmanned aerial vehicle an unmanned aerial vehicle that generates, generates HMAC values for authentication messages and digital signatures using the ECDH private key or public key, and decrypts the operational command CMD transmitted from the ground control system; A ground control system that authenticates the HMAC value transmitted from the unmanned aerial vehicle, generates a session encryption key and authentication key through the ECDH private key or public key of the ground control system, encrypts the operation command CMD, and transmits it to the unmanned aerial vehicle It is characterized by that.

Description

Unmanned aerial vehicle security protocol system and method thereof

The present invention relates to an unmanned aerial vehicle security protocol system and method, and more particularly, to an unmanned aerial vehicle security protocol system and method capable of improving security reliability by providing integrity in an environment in which an unmanned aerial vehicle directly communicates with a ground control system. it's about

UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, hereafter referred to as unmanned aerial vehicle) has been developed for military purposes, but thanks to recent technological advances, industrial and private sectors such as broadcast photography, communication relay, agriculture, traffic monitoring, disaster response, reconnaissance, delivery, leisure, etc. The market is rapidly expanding in this field. UAV uses wireless communication technology to perform missions through remote control or autopilot, and in order to properly perform a given mission, the high reliability of the wireless communication system that continuously connects the UAV and the ground control system is very important.

UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, hereafter referred to as unmanned aerial vehicle) has been developed for military purposes, but thanks to recent technological advances, industrial and private sectors such as broadcast photography, communication relay, agriculture, traffic monitoring, disaster response, reconnaissance, delivery, leisure, etc. The market is rapidly expanding in this field. UAV uses wireless communication technology to perform missions through remote control or autopilot, and in order to properly perform a given mission, the high reliability of the wireless communication system that continuously connects the UAV and the ground control system is very important.

The wireless communication channel of the UAV uses a wireless network that is always open, so it is highly vulnerable to wireless security attacks. It is placed in an environment where there is a high possibility that it can be destroyed or stolen and misused for other purposes.

In particular, with respect to communication security using radio, data link spoofing can be said to be a more serious security problem because it can completely seize control of the UAV.

UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, hereafter referred to as unmanned aerial vehicle) has been developed for military purposes, but thanks to recent technological advances, industrial and private sectors such as broadcast photography, communication relay, agriculture, traffic monitoring, disaster response, reconnaissance, delivery, leisure, etc. The market is rapidly expanding in this field. UAV uses wireless communication technology to perform missions through remote control or autopilot, and in order to properly perform a given mission, the high reliability of the wireless communication system that continuously connects the UAV and the ground control system is very important.

The security technology of the conventional UAV data link encrypts data using encryption algorithms such as DES (Digital Encryption Standard), AES (Advanced Encryption Standard), ARIA (Academy, Research Institute, Agency), and SEED, and then performs modulation/demodulation of the modem. It is implemented in a structure that transmits and receives through It is common that the transmitter encrypts the transmitted data and modulates it through a modem for wireless transmission, and the receiver demodulates and decrypts the received data and restores the data.

UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, hereafter referred to as unmanned aerial vehicle) has been developed for military purposes, but thanks to recent technological advances, industrial and private sectors such as broadcast photography, communication relay, agriculture, traffic monitoring, disaster response, reconnaissance, delivery, leisure, etc. The market is rapidly expanding in this field. UAV uses wireless communication technology to perform missions through remote control or autopilot, and in order to properly perform a given mission, the high reliability of the wireless communication system that continuously connects the UAV and the ground control system is very important.

At this time, data encryption is implemented by being built-in together with the data processing unit, which is a modem unit that performs modulation/demodulation in the data link, or is interfaced with an external encryption device to encrypt/decrypt the transmitted/received data. In addition, the encryption key is transmitted from the control device controlling the data link or an external storage medium and stored inside, and it is common to use a fixed encryption key of a symmetric key method using the same key between the UAV and the control station or radio station. It is the management and operation form of data link transmission/reception data encryption key.

In general, the transmission/reception data of the UAV data link is UAV remote command (TC), telemetry (TM) or observation image information from the ground control system. In particular, the TC/TM data is within the system standard. Since it has a repeating form in a certain pattern in , the possibility of guessing or estimating the original data when a third party collects or observes data repeatedly transmitted and received over the radio is relatively higher than that of general communication.

As described above, in the conventional UAV data link security structure, the characteristics of transmission and reception data, the encryption application method, and the key management structure provide a high level of security in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability from a security point of view. It is difficult to satisfy or maintain the status, and in addition to the possibility of observing the radio channel by a third party, if the UAV is hijacked, the security system is exposed and the operation of the existing UAV must be stopped or the structure has to be changed.

Korean Patent Application No. 10-2013-0058922

An embodiment of the present invention is to provide an unmanned aerial vehicle security protocol system and method capable of improving security reliability by providing integrity in an environment in which the unmanned aerial vehicle directly communicates with the ground control system.

In addition, another embodiment of the present invention is to provide an unmanned aerial vehicle security protocol system and method capable of improving security reliability by providing integrity in an environment in which an unmanned aerial vehicle communicates indirectly through a monitoring drone.

However, the technical task to be achieved by the present embodiment is not limited to the technical task as described above, and other technical tasks may exist.

As a technical means for achieving the above-described technical problem, the security protocol system of the aircraft according to an embodiment of the present invention, in the direct communication environment between the unmanned aerial vehicle and the ground control system, the operation ID ID _MISSION and pin number from the user After receiving the P input, the ECDH private key and public key of the unmanned aerial vehicle are generated, the HMAC value for the authentication message and digital signature is generated using the ECDH private key or public key, and the operation command CMD transmitted from the ground control system an unmanned aerial vehicle that decrypts and performs; A ground control system that authenticates the HMAC value transmitted from the unmanned aerial vehicle, generates a session encryption key and authentication key through the ECDH private key or public key of the ground control system, encrypts the operation command CMD, and transmits it to the unmanned aerial vehicle It is characterized by that.

Here, in particular, the unmanned aerial vehicle generates an ECDH private key and public key dD and dD*G, and sends the authentication message M1 = (ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) to the ECDAS private key PR(D). Signature S1, M1, and digital signature S1 are characterized in that they generate an HMAC value through pin number P.

Here, in particular, the unmanned aerial vehicle generates security keys EK _D - _GCS and AK _D - _GCS for the authentication message M2 transmitted from the ground control system, verifies the HMAC value, and returns E (EK _D - _GCS , CMD). Decrypt to detect the operational command CMD, generate the authentication message M3=(ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _GCS , ts3) and digital signature S3 for the operational command CMD, and obtain the HMAC value for the authentication message M3 and digital signature S3 It is characterized by the point of creation.

Here, in particular, the ground control system checks the timestamp ts1 of the authentication message M1=(ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) received from the unmanned aerial vehicle, and then verifies the HMAC value through the pin number P After calculating the ECDH private key and public key dGCS and dGCS*G of the ground control system, the session encryption key and authentication key EK _{D - GCS} and AK _{D- GCS} are generated through the dGCS and the public key QD of the unmanned aerial vehicle. It is characterized by that.

Here, in particular, the ground control system generates a digital signature S2 for the authentication message M2=(IDMISSION, CERT(GCS), QGCS, ts2), and after encrypting the operation command CMD through EK _{D - GCS} , AK _{D -} It is characterized in that it generates HMAC value for encryption result and authentication message M2 by applying _GCS .

Here, in particular, after verifying the timestamp ts3 and the HMAC value for the authentication message M3 received from the unmanned aerial vehicle, the validity of the electronic signature S3 is checked, and after confirming whether the operation command CMD of the unmanned aerial vehicle is received, the authentication message M4 and It is characterized in that it generates a digital signature S4 to verify whether the unmanned aerial vehicle transmits it or not, and when the unmanned aerial vehicle receives the authentication message M4, the timestamp ts4, HMAC value, and digital signature S4 are verified.

In addition, as a technical means for achieving the above-described technical problem, the security protocol system of the unmanned aerial vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention, in the communication environment between the unmanned aerial vehicle, the monitoring drone, and the ground control system, from the ground control system Receive ticket ST(D) and session key SK, generate ECDH private key and public key dD and dD*G, send authentication message M1=(ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) to session key SK an unmanned aerial vehicle that generates an HMAC value through, checks the timestamp ts2 of the authentication message M2=(ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1), and verifies the HMAC value to authenticate the monitoring drone; After verifying the HMAC value of the authentication message M1 from the unmanned aerial vehicle through the session key SK, calculating the ECDH private key and public key dMD and dMD*G of the monitoring drone, the session encryption key and the QD through the dMD and UAV public key QD It is characterized in that it includes a monitoring drone that generates authentication keys EK _D - _MD and AK _D-MD and generates an HMAC value for authentication message M2 = (IDMISSION, IDMD, QMD, ts2).

Here, in particular, the unmanned aerial vehicle generates EK _D-MD and AK _D- MD based on the monitoring drone's ECDH public key Q _MD and verifies the HMAC value of the authentication message M2. Whether the generated two keys are correctly exchanged , and the HMAC value is verified, the feature is that the HMAC value of the authentication message M3=(ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _MD , ts3) is generated through the AK _D-MD .

Here, in particular, the monitoring drone generates an HMAC value for the authentication messages M2 and M2 again through the session key SK, and receives the authentication message M3 = (ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _MD , ts3) from the unmanned aerial vehicle. Its feature is that it includes a monitoring drone that receives, checks the timestamp ts3, and verifies the HMAC value to confirm that the key was correctly exchanged.

In addition, as a technical means for achieving the above-described technical problem, the security protocol method of the unmanned aerial vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention comprises the steps of receiving an operation ID _MISSION and pin number P from the user to the unmanned aerial vehicle; In the unmanned aerial vehicle, ECDH private key and public key dD and dD*G are generated, and the authentication message M1=(ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) is digitally signed S1 with the ECDAS private key PR(D), The authentication message M1 and the digital signature S1 generate an HMAC value through the pin number P; After checking the timestamp ts1 of the authentication message M1 = (ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) received from the unmanned aerial vehicle in the ground control system, the HMAC value is verified through the pin number P, and the generating session encryption key and authentication key EK _{D - GCS} and AK _D - _GCS through the public key QD of , and encrypting the operation command CMD through EK _{D - GCS} ; Decrypting E(EK _D - _GCS , CMD) in the unmanned aerial vehicle detects the operation command CMD, and generates the authentication message M3=(ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _GCS , ts3) and the digital signature S3 for the operation command CMD and generating an HMAC value for the authentication message M3 and the digital signature S3; After verifying the timestamp ts3 and the HMAC value for the authentication message M3 received from the unmanned aerial vehicle in the ground control system, the validity of the electronic signature S3 is verified, and after confirming whether the operation command CMD of the unmanned aerial vehicle is received, the authentication message generating M4 and digital signature S4 and verifying whether the unmanned aerial vehicle transmits it; and verifying the timestamp ts4, the HMAC value, and the digital signature S4 when the unmanned aerial vehicle receives the authentication message M4.

In particular, in the encrypting step, after calculating the ECDH private key and public key dGCS and dGCS*G of the ground control system, the session encryption key and authentication key EK _{D -} Generating _GCS and AK _{D- GCS} , and generating a digital signature S2 for the authentication message M2=(ID _MISSION , CERT(GCS), QGCS, ts2); And after encrypting the operational command CMD through EK _{D - GCS} in the ground control system, generating an HMAC value for the encryption result and authentication message M2 by applying AK _{D- GCS} ; there is.

Here, in particular, after the step of encrypting, generating security keys EK _D - _GCS and AK _D - _GCS for the authentication message M2 transmitted from the ground control system in the unmanned aerial vehicle and verifying the HMAC value; further comprising The point has its characteristics.

In addition, as a technical means for achieving the above-described technical problem, the security protocol method of the unmanned aerial vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention is a communication environment between the unmanned aerial vehicle, the monitoring drone, and the ground control system, from the ground control system receiving a ticket ST(D) and a session key SK; generating an ECDH private key and public key dD and dD*G in the unmanned aerial vehicle, and generating an HMAC value through the session key SK with the authentication message M1=(ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1); After verifying the HMAC value of the authentication message M1 from the unmanned aerial vehicle through the session key SK, calculating the ECDH private key and public key dMD and dMD*G of the monitoring drone, the session encryption key and the QD through the dMD and UAV public key QD generating authentication keys EK _D - _MD and AK _D-MD ; generating an HMAC value for the authentication message M2=(ID _MISSION , ID _MD , Q _MD , ts2) in the monitoring drone; generating EK _D - _MD and AK _D-MD based on the ECDH public key Q _MD of the monitoring drone in the unmanned aerial vehicle; and generating an HMAC value of the authentication message M3 = (ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _MD , ts3) through the AK _D-MD .

Here, in particular, in the step of authenticating the HMAC value for the authentication message M2, the monitoring drone generates an HMAC value for the authentication messages M2 and M2 again through the session key SK. There is this.

Here, in particular, before the step of generating the EK _D - _MD and AK _D-MD , after checking the timestamp ts2 of the authentication message M2=(ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) in the unmanned aerial vehicle, The feature here is that the method further includes authenticating the monitoring drone by verifying the HMAC value.

Here, in particular, after the step of generating the EK _D - _MD and the AK _D-MD , the HMAC value of the authentication message M2 is verified to check whether the two generated keys are correctly exchanged.

Here, in particular, after the step of generating the HMAC value of the authentication message M3 = (ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _MD , ts3), the authentication message M3 = (ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _MD from the unmanned aerial vehicle in the monitoring drone) , ts3), checking the timestamp ts3, and verifying the HMAC value to confirm that the key has been correctly exchanged.

According to any one of the means for solving the problems of the present invention described above, it can be used to improve the reliability of security by providing integrity in an environment in which the unmanned aerial vehicle directly communicates with the ground control system.

In addition, according to any one of the problem solving means of the present invention, it can be used to improve the reliability of security by providing integrity even in an environment of indirect communication between the unmanned aerial vehicle and the monitoring drone.

1 is a diagram schematically illustrating the configuration of a security protocol system for an unmanned aerial vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention.
2 is a diagram illustrating a direct security protocol between an unmanned aerial vehicle and a ground control system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
3 is a flowchart of a security protocol method of an unmanned aerial vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention.
4 is a configuration diagram of a security protocol system of an unmanned aerial vehicle according to another embodiment of the present invention.
5 is a diagram illustrating a protocol between an unmanned aerial vehicle and a monitoring drone according to another embodiment of the present invention.
6 is a flowchart of a security protocol method of an unmanned aerial vehicle according to another embodiment of the present invention.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings so that those of ordinary skill in the art can easily implement them. However, the present invention may be embodied in several different forms and is not limited to the embodiments described herein. In order to clearly explain the present invention, parts irrelevant to the description in the drawings are omitted, and similar reference numerals are attached to similar parts throughout the specification. In addition, while explaining with reference to the drawings, even if the configuration indicated by the same name, the drawing number may vary depending on the drawing, and the drawing number is merely described for the convenience of description, and the concept, feature, and function of each configuration according to the drawing number Or the effect is not to be construed as limiting.

Throughout the specification, when a part is "connected" with another part, this includes not only the case of being "directly connected" but also the case of being "electrically connected" with another element interposed therebetween. . In addition, when a part "includes" a certain component, it means that other components may be further included, rather than excluding other components, unless specifically stated to the contrary. It should be understood that the existence or addition of features or numbers, steps, operations, components, parts, or combinations thereof, is not precluded in advance.

In this specification, the term 'part' or 'module' includes a unit realized by hardware or software, and a unit realized using both, and one unit is realized using two or more hardware Alternatively, two or more units may be implemented by one piece of hardware.

1 is a diagram schematically showing the configuration of a security protocol system of an unmanned aerial vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in Figure 1, the security protocol system 100 of the unmanned aerial vehicle of the present invention, the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) 110 and the ground control system Ground control system (Ground Control System, hereinafter referred to as GCS) ) (120) is included. Here, the general detailed configuration of the unmanned aerial vehicle and the ground control system will be omitted, and only the configuration for the security protocol according to the direct communication environment between the unmanned aerial vehicle and the ground control system will be described.

The unmanned aerial vehicle 110 includes a first communication module 111 , a first security key generation unit 112 , a first authentication unit 113 , a decryption unit 114 , a first operation unit 115 , and an input unit 116 . may include

The first communication module 111 transmits and receives data about the ground control system 120 and authentication messages and the operation command CMD.

When the operation ID ID _MISSION and pin number P are input to the input unit 112 , the first security key generation unit 112 generates an ECDH private key and public keys dD and dD*G of the unmanned aerial vehicle. In addition, security keys EK _D - _GCS and AK _D - _GCS are generated for the authentication message M2 transmitted from the ground control system 120 .

The first authentication unit 113 digitally signs the authentication message M1 = (ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) from the first security key generation unit 112 with the ECDAS private key PR(D).

In addition, the first authentication unit 113 generates a digital signature S3 for the authentication message M3 = (IDMISSION, IDD, IDGCS, ts3) and the operation command CMD.

The decryption unit 114 decrypts and performs the operation command CMD transmitted from the ground control system. That is, the security keys EKD-GCS and AKD-GCS are generated for the authentication message M2 transmitted from the ground control system, the HMAC value is verified, and the operation command CMD is detected by decrypting E (EKD-GCS, CMD).

The first operation unit 115 generates and calculates an HMAC value through the authentication message M1 = (ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) and the digital signature S1 through the pin number P.

In addition, the first operation unit 115 generates a digital signature S3 for the operation command CMD, and generates an HMAC value for the authentication message M3 = (IDMISSION, IDD, IDGCS, ts3) and the digital signature S3.

The input unit 116 receives the operation ID ID _MISSION and pin number P from the user.

The ground control system 120 may include a second communication module 121 , a second security key generation unit 122 , a second authentication unit 123 , an encryption unit 124 , and a second operation unit 125 . .

The second communication module 121 transmits and receives authentication messages (authentication, electronic signature, etc.) and data for the operation command CMD from the unmanned aerial vehicle 110 .

The second security key generation unit 122 generates a digital signature S2 for the authentication message M2=(ID _MISSION , CERT(GCS), QGCS, ts2). In addition, the session encryption key and authentication key EK _{D - GCS} and AK _{D- GCS} are generated through the public key QD of the ground control system 120 and the unmanned aerial vehicle 110 .

The second authenticator 123 checks the timestamp ts1 of the authentication message M1=(ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) received from the unmanned aerial vehicle 110, and then determines the HMAC value through the pin number P will verify

In addition, the second authentication unit 123 verifies the timestamp ts3 and the HMAC value for the authentication message M3 received from the unmanned aerial vehicle 110 , and then verifies the validity of the electronic signature S3 , and receives the operation command CMD of the unmanned aerial vehicle After checking whether or not the authentication message M4 and the digital signature S4 are generated, the unmanned aerial vehicle proves whether it is transmitted or not, and when the unmanned aerial vehicle receives the authentication message M4, the timestamp ts4, the HMAC value, and the digital signature S4 are verified.

The encryption unit 124 encrypts the operation command CMD through the session key EK _{D - GCS} generated by the first security key generation unit 122 .

The second operation unit 125 calculates the ECDH private and public keys dGCS and dGCS*G of the ground control system 120 . In addition, after the second authentication unit 123 checks the timestamp ts1, the second operation unit 125 calculates the HMAC value through the pin number P. Then, the second operation unit 125 applies AK _{D- GCS} in the encryption unit 124 to generate an HMAC value for the encryption result and the authentication message M2.

2 is a diagram illustrating a direct security protocol between an unmanned aerial vehicle and a ground control system according to an embodiment of the present invention, and FIG. 3 is a flowchart of a security protocol method of an unmanned aerial vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention.

D- GCS security protocol

<D-GCS Security Protocol>

First, as shown in FIGS. 2 and 3 , the security protocol method of an unmanned aerial vehicle according to an embodiment of the present invention includes the steps of first receiving an operation ID ID _MISSION and pin number P from the user to the unmanned aerial vehicle 110 . (S310) is performed.

Then, the unmanned aerial vehicle 110 generates the ECDH private key and public key dD and dD*G, and the authentication message M1 = (ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) is converted to the ECDAS private key PR(D). The digital signature S1, the authentication message M1 and the digital signature S1 generate an HMAC value through the pin number P (S320) is performed.

More specifically, the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) is an algorithm used for encryption, and A and B share the same symmetric key. where the private key is a random integer d selected from {1, ..., n-1} (n is the order of the subgroup), the public key is the point H = dG (G is the reference point of the subgroup) indicates. In this case, if we know d and G (along with other domain parameters), it is easy to find H, but if we know H and G, finding the private key d becomes difficult because we have to solve the discrete logarithm problem.

For example, assuming that A and B generate their own private and public keys, A's private key dA and A's public key HA = dAG, B's private key dB and public key HB = dBG, Both A and B will be using the same domain parameters. At this time, it becomes the same reference point G on the same elliptic curve at the same finite point.

If A and B exchange public keys (HA, HB) through an insecure channel, the middleman can intercept HA and HB, but cannot find dA and dB without solving the discrete logarithm problem.

A calculates S = dAHB (using its own private key and B's public key), and B calculates S = dBHA (using its own private key and A's public key). At this time, the S (symmetric key) of A and B are the same.

However, the middleman can only know HA and HB and cannot find S (symmetric key). That is, the Diffie-Hellman problem cannot be computed.

Thus, the two parties securely exchange information, preventing a third party (the man in the middle) from intercepting and decoding it.

In addition, the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is an algorithm used for digital signature. In order to sign a message, the ECDSA receives two inputs: a message and a private key to generate a signature.

And to verify the message, it checks whether the message was signed by the owner of the key using three inputs: message, signature, and public key.

At this time, the message is only signed by the owner of the private key. For example, when B wants to send a message to A, B creates a digital signature by signing the message (transaction message) with B's private key.

Then, B sends his public key, message, and digital signature to the peer network. The peer network then checks the digital signature to see if the message was correctly signed by B.

In addition, M1 and digital signature S1 are protected by the HMAC value generated through pin number P. More specifically, HMAC (keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code) is a method of creating a hash value by mixing the message and the key shared only by the sender and the receiver (HMAC=Hash(message+Key)). to ensure confidentiality. In other words, the generation procedure - padding the key, performing XOR of the padded key and I pad, combining with message, calculating hash value, performing XOR of padded key and O pad, combining with hash value and calculating hash value, etc. will go through

Next, when the authentication message M1 = (ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) arrives from the unmanned aerial vehicle 110 in the ground control system 120, the timestamp ts1 is obtained before the public key operation, which has a large computational cost. After the inspection, the HMAC value is verified through the pin number P to respond to the resource blackmail type denial of service attack. After calculating the ECDH private and public keys dGCS and dGCS*G of the ground control system, the dGCS and the unmanned aerial vehicle Generates session encryption key and authentication key EK _{D - GCS} and _{AK D- GCS} through the public key QD _of (S330).

More specifically, the ground control system 120 verifies whether the received message, electronic signature, public key, etc. are transmitted by the unmanned aerial vehicle. That is, if the HMAC value is valid, the ground control system (GCS) 120 checks the validity of the certificate CERT(D) of the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 110, verifies the digital signature S1, and if S1 is valid, the ground The control system (GCS) 120 will successfully authenticate the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) 110 .

And, the private key, public key generation, and digital signature generation of the ground control system 120 are generated by applying the same method as described in step S320.

Then, after encrypting the operational command CMD through EK _{D - GCS} in the ground control system 120, AK _{D- GCS} is applied to generate an HMAC value for the encryption result and authentication message M2 (S340). Here, the HMAC value will be referred to in step S320 described above.

Subsequently, after the encrypting step, generating security keys EK _{D - GCS} and AK _D - _GCS for the authentication message M2 transmitted from the ground control system 120 in the unmanned aerial vehicle 110 and verifying the HMAC value (S350) is performed. That is, when a message arrives, the unmanned aerial vehicle authenticates the ground control system by verifying the timestamp ts2 and the digital signature S2, and secures the reliability of the ECDH public key QD of the ground control system. And, the unmanned aerial vehicle generates EKD-GCS and AKD-GCS based on the reliability of the QD, verifies the HMAC value of the received message, and confirms that the two generated keys are correctly exchanged as a result.

Then, the unmanned aerial vehicle 110 decrypts E (EK _D - _GCS , CMD) to detect the operation command CMD, and to the authentication message M3 = (ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _GCS , ts3) and the operation command CMD A step (S360) of generating a digital signature S3 for the digital signature S3 and generating an HMAC value for the authentication message M3 and the digital signature S3 is performed. That is, the integrity of the operation command CMD is checked. If the HMAC value is justified, the unmanned aerial vehicle decrypts E (EKD-GCS, CMD) to secure the operation command CMD.

Then, after verifying the timestamp ts3 and the HMAC value for the authentication message M3 received from the unmanned aerial vehicle 110 in the ground control system 120, the validity of the electronic signature S3 is verified, and the operation command CMD of the unmanned aerial vehicle 110 After confirming whether to receive the authentication message M4 and the digital signature S4 is generated, the step (S370) is performed to prove whether the unmanned aerial vehicle transmits it.

More specifically, upon receiving the message, the GCS verifies the timestamp ts3 and the HMAC, and then verifies the validity of the digital signature S3. If the S3 is in effect, the ground control system will be able to trust that the drone has successfully received the operational command CMD and will operate accordingly.

On the other hand, S3 may be used when the unmanned aerial vehicle 110 denies reception of the operation command CMD in the future. Similarly, the ground control system 120 allows the unmanned aerial vehicle to prove that it has transmitted the operational command CMD through the electronic signature S4.

Finally, upon receiving the authentication message M4 from the unmanned aerial vehicle 110, a step (S380) of verifying the timestamp ts4, the HMAC value, and the digital signature S4 is performed. That is, to counter the threat of denial of service attack caused by public key operation, the HMAC value is calculated based on AKD-GCS.

On the other hand, in the scenario where the unmanned aerial vehicle needs to communicate with the monitoring drone, the ground control system additionally issues an authentication ticket ST(D) of D through the monitoring drone and the shared secret key KGCS-MD, and sets the encryption session key SK to EKD- It must be converted to GCS-based encrypted form ENC(D).

Finally, when the unmanned aerial vehicle receives the message, it verifies the timestamp ts4, HMAC value, and digital signature S4 to prove that the GCS sent the operational command CMD and secure the basis for this. If the unmanned aerial vehicle is in a situation to communicate with the monitoring drone, the session key SK and key life cycle LT are obtained by decrypting the ENC(D).

4 is a configuration diagram of a security protocol system of an unmanned aerial vehicle according to another embodiment of the present invention.

As shown in Figure 4, the security protocol system of the unmanned aerial vehicle according to another embodiment briefly shows the configuration of the communication environment between the unmanned aerial vehicle, the monitoring drone, and the ground control system, and a general unmanned aerial vehicle, a monitoring drone and The configuration of the ground control system will be omitted, and the configuration of FIG. 1 will be omitted for reference.

Here, only the security protocol of the indirect communication environment between the unmanned aerial vehicle 410 and the monitoring drone 420 will be described.

The unmanned aerial vehicle 410 receives a ticket ST(D) and a session key SK from the ground control system, generates an ECDH private key and public keys dD and dD*G, and an authentication message M1=(ID _MISSION , CERT(D) , QD, ts1) generate HMAC value through session key SK, check timestamp ts2 of authentication message M2=(ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1), and verify HMAC value to monitor drone will certify

In addition, the unmanned aerial vehicle 410 generates EKD-MD and AKD-MD based on the ECDH public key QMD of the monitoring drone 420 to verify the HMAC value of the authentication message M2, and whether the generated two keys are correctly exchanged , and if the HMAC value is verified, the HMAC value of the authentication message M3=(IDMISSION, IDD, IDMD, ts3) is generated through AKD-MD.

The monitoring drone 420 verifies the HMAC value of the authentication message M1 from the unmanned aerial vehicle 410 through the session key SK, calculates the ECDH private key and public key dMD and dMD*G of the monitoring drone, and then dMD and UAV It may include generating a session encryption key and authentication keys EK _{D -MD} and AK _D-MD through the public key QD, and generating an HMAC value for the authentication message M2 = (IDMISSION, IDMD, QMD, ts2).

In addition, the monitoring drone 420 generates HMAC values for the authentication messages M2 and M2 again through the session key SK, and the authentication message M3 = (ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _MD , ts3) from the unmanned aerial vehicle. Upon receipt, the timestamp ts3 is checked, and the HMAC value is verified to confirm that the key was exchanged correctly.

5 is a diagram illustrating a protocol between an unmanned aerial vehicle and a monitoring drone according to another embodiment of the present invention, and FIG. 6 is a flowchart of a security protocol method of an unmanned aerial vehicle according to another embodiment of the present invention.

D-MD Secure Protocol

<D-MD Security Protocol>

5 and 6, the security protocol method of the unmanned aerial vehicle according to another embodiment of the present invention is first, in a communication environment between the unmanned aerial vehicle, the monitoring drone, and the ground control system, from the ground control system. A step of issuing the ticket ST(D) and the session key SK is performed (S610).

Then, the unmanned aerial vehicle 410 generates the ECDH private key and public key dD and dD*G, and the authentication message M1=(ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) generates an HMAC value through the session key SK. step is performed (S620).

Then, when the monitoring drone receives the authentication message M1 from the unmanned aerial vehicle, it inspects the timestamp ts1 before the computationally expensive public key operation, verifies the HMAC value through the session key SK, and responds to a resource depletion type denial of service attack. will respond And, if the HMAC value is valid, after calculating the ECDH private key and public key dMD and dMD*G of the monitoring drone, the session encryption key and authentication key EK _{D -MD} and AK _D through the public key QD of the monitoring drone and the unmanned aerial vehicle - A step of generating an _MD is performed (S630).

Then, the step of generating an HMAC value for the authentication message M2 = (IDMISSION, IDMD, QMD, ts2) in the monitoring drone is performed (S640). Here, the monitoring drone generates HMAC values for authentication messages M2 and M2 again through the session key SK.

And, when a message arrives from the unmanned aerial vehicle, the unmanned aerial vehicle checks the timestamp ts2 of the authentication message M2 = (IDMISSION, CERT(D), QD, ts1), and then verifies the HMAC value to authenticate the monitoring drone. After securing the reliability of the ECDH public key QMD of the monitoring drone, the step of generating EK _D - _MD and AK _D-MD based on the ECDH public key Q _MD of the monitoring drone is performed (S650). Here, before the step of generating the EKD-MD and AKD-MD, the unmanned aerial vehicle checks the timestamp ts2 of the authentication message M2=(IDMISSION, CERT(D), QD, ts1), and then verifies the HMAC value. The monitoring drone will be certified.

Then, it is checked whether the two generated keys are correctly exchanged by verifying the HMAC value of the authentication message M2.

Next, if the HMAC value is justified, a step of generating the HMAC value of the authentication message M3 = (ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _MD , ts3) through the AK _D-MD is performed (S660).

Finally, after generating the HMAC value of the authentication message M3 = (IDMISSION, IDD, IDMD, ts3), the monitoring drone receives the authentication message M3 = (IDMISSION, IDD, IDMD, ts3) from the unmanned aerial vehicle. A step of checking the timestamp ts3 and verifying the HMAC value to confirm that the key has been correctly exchanged is performed (S670).

The above description of the present invention is for illustration, and those of ordinary skill in the art to which the present invention pertains can understand that it can be easily modified into other specific forms without changing the technical spirit or essential features of the present invention. will be. Therefore, it should be understood that the embodiments described above are illustrative in all respects and not restrictive. For example, each component described as a single type may be implemented in a dispersed form, and likewise components described as distributed may be implemented in a combined form.

The scope of the present invention is indicated by the following claims rather than the above detailed description, and all changes or modifications derived from the meaning and scope of the claims and their equivalent concepts should be interpreted as being included in the scope of the present invention. do.

110: drone
111: first communication module
112: first security key generation unit
113: first authentication unit
114: decryption unit
115: first operation unit
116: input unit
120: ground control system
121: second communication module
122: second security key generation unit
123: second authentication unit
124: encryption unit
125: second operation unit
410: drone
420: monitoring drone

Claims (17)

In a direct communication environment between an unmanned aerial vehicle and a ground control system,
After receiving the operation ID ID _MISSION and pin number P from the user, the ECDH private key and public key of the unmanned aerial vehicle are generated, and the HMAC value for the authentication message and digital signature is generated using the ECDH private key or public key, an unmanned aerial vehicle that decodes and executes the operational command CMD transmitted from the ground control system;
A ground control system that authenticates the HMAC value transmitted from the unmanned aerial vehicle, generates a session encryption key and authentication key through the ECDH private key or public key of the ground control system, encrypts the operation command CMD, and transmits it to the unmanned aerial vehicle UAV security protocol system.
According to claim 1,
The unmanned aerial vehicle generates an ECDH private key and public key dD and dD*G, and digitally signs the authentication message M1 = (ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) with the ECDAS private key PR(D) S1, , M1 and the digital signature S1 are the security protocol system of the unmanned aerial vehicle, characterized in that it generates the HMAC value through the pin number P.
According to claim 1,
The unmanned aerial vehicle generates security keys EK _D - _GCS and AK _D - _GCS for the authentication message M2 transmitted from the ground control system, verifies the HMAC value, and decrypts E (EK _D - _GCS , CMD) to operate Detecting the command CMD, generating the authentication message M3=(ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _GCS , ts3) and the digital signature S3 for the operational command CMD, and generating the HMAC value for the authentication message M3 and the digital signature S3 The security protocol system of the unmanned aerial vehicle, which features.
The method of claim 1,
The ground control system is
After checking the timestamp ts1 of the authentication message M1=(ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) received from the unmanned aerial vehicle, the HMAC value is verified through the pin number P, and the ECDH private key of the ground control system and after calculating the public keys dGCS and dGCS*G, the session encryption key and authentication keys EK _{D - GCS} and AK _{D- GCS} are generated through dGCS and the public key QD of the unmanned aerial vehicle. protocol system.
5. The method of claim 4,
The ground control system generates a digital signature S2 for the authentication message M2=(ID _MISSION , CERT(GCS), QGCS, ts2), encrypts the operation command CMD through EK _{D - GCS} , and then AK _D-GCS A security protocol system for an unmanned aerial vehicle, characterized in that by applying an HMAC value for the encryption result and authentication message M2. According to claim 1,
After verifying the timestamp ts3 and the HMAC value for the authentication message M3 received from the unmanned aerial vehicle, the validity of the electronic signature S3 is checked, and after confirming whether the operation command CMD of the unmanned aerial vehicle is received, the authentication message M4 and the electronic signature S4 A security protocol system for an unmanned aerial vehicle, characterized in that the unmanned aerial vehicle validates the timestamp ts4, the HMAC value, and the digital signature S4 when the unmanned aerial vehicle receives the authentication message M4.
In a communication environment between an unmanned aerial vehicle, a monitoring drone, and a ground control system,
Receive ticket ST(D) and session key SK from the ground control system, generate ECDH private key and public key dD and dD*G, and send authentication message M1=(ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) After generating the HMAC value through the session key SK, checking the timestamp ts2 of the authentication message M2=(ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1), and verifying the HMAC value, ;
After verifying the HMAC value of the authentication message M1 from the unmanned aerial vehicle through the session key SK, calculating the ECDH private key and public key dMD and dMD*G of the monitoring drone, the session encryption key and the QD through the dMD and UAV public key QD A security protocol system for an unmanned aerial vehicle including a monitoring drone that generates authentication keys EK _D - _MD and AK _D-MD and generates HMAC values for authentication messages M2=(ID _MISSION , ID _MD , Q _MD , ts2).
8. The method of claim 7,
The unmanned aerial vehicle generates EK _D - _MD and AK _D-MD based on the monitoring drone's ECDH public key Q _MD , verifies the HMAC value of the authentication message M2, and checks whether the two generated keys are correctly exchanged and , when the HMAC value is verified, the HMAC value of the authentication message M3 = (ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _MD , ts3) is generated through the AK _D-MD .
8. The method of claim 7,
The monitoring drone generates HMAC values for authentication messages M2 and M2 again through the session key SK,
A monitoring drone that receives the authentication message M3=(ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _MD , ts3) from the drone, checks the timestamp ts3, and verifies the HMAC value to confirm that the key was exchanged correctly. Unmanned aerial vehicle security protocol system.
Receiving an operation ID _MISSION and pin number P from the user to the unmanned aerial vehicle;
In the unmanned aerial vehicle, ECDH private key and public key dD and dD*G are generated, and the authentication message M1=(ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) is digitally signed S1 with the ECDAS private key PR(D), The authentication message M1 and the digital signature S1 generate an HMAC value through the pin number P;
After checking the timestamp ts1 of the authentication message M1 = (ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) received from the unmanned aerial vehicle in the ground control system, the HMAC value is verified through the pin number P, and the generating session encryption key and authentication key EK _{D - GCS} and AK _D - _GCS through the public key QD of , and encrypting the operation command CMD through EK _{D - GCS} ;
Decrypting E(EK _D - _GCS , CMD) in the unmanned aerial vehicle detects the operation command CMD, and generates the authentication message M3=(ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _GCS , ts3) and the digital signature S3 for the operation command CMD and generating an HMAC value for the authentication message M3 and the digital signature S3;
After verifying the timestamp ts3 and the HMAC value for the authentication message M3 received from the unmanned aerial vehicle in the ground control system, the validity of the electronic signature S3 is verified, and after confirming whether the operation command CMD of the unmanned aerial vehicle is received, the authentication message generating M4 and digital signature S4 and verifying whether the unmanned aerial vehicle transmits it; and
Upon receiving the authentication message M4 from the unmanned aerial vehicle, verifying the timestamp ts4, the HMAC value, and the digital signature S4;
11. The method of claim 10,
The encryption step is
After calculating the ECDH private key and public key dGCS and dGCS*G of the ground control system, the session encryption key and authentication key EK _{D - GCS} and AK _{D- GCS} are generated through dGCS and the public key QD of the unmanned aerial vehicle. , generating a digital signature S2 for the authentication message M2 = (IDMISSION, CERT (GCS), QGCS, ts2); and
After encrypting the operational command CMD through the EK _{D - GCS} in the ground control system, generating an HMAC value for the encryption result and the authentication message M2 by applying the AK _D-GCS ; of the security protocol method.
11. The method of claim 10,
After the encryption, the unmanned aerial vehicle generates security keys EK _D - _GCS and AK _D - _GCS for the authentication message M2 transmitted from the ground control system to verify the HMAC value; characterized by further comprising: The drone's security protocol method.
In a communication environment between an unmanned aerial vehicle, a monitoring drone, and a ground control system,
receiving a ticket ST(D) and a session key SK from the ground control system;
generating an ECDH private key and public key dD and dD*G in the unmanned aerial vehicle, and generating an HMAC value through the session key SK with the authentication message M1=(ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1);
After verifying the HMAC value of the authentication message M1 from the unmanned aerial vehicle through the session key SK, calculating the ECDH private key and public key dMD and dMD*G of the monitoring drone, the session encryption key and the QD through the dMD and UAV public key QD generating authentication keys EK _D - _MD and AK _D-MD ;
generating an HMAC value for the authentication message M2=(IDMISSION, IDMD, QMD, ts2) in the monitoring drone;
generating EK _D - _MD and AK _D-MD based on the ECDH public key Q _MD of the monitoring drone in the unmanned aerial vehicle; and
Generating an HMAC value of the authentication message M3 = (ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _MD , ts3) through the AK _D-MD ;
14. The method of claim 13,
In the step of generating an HMAC value for the authentication message M2,
and generating, by the monitoring drone, the HMAC values for the authentication messages M2 and M2 again through the session key SK.
14. The method of claim 13,
Before the step of generating the EK _D - _MD and AK _D-MD ,
After checking the timestamp ts2 of the authentication message M2 = (ID _MISSION , CERT(D), QD, ts1) in the unmanned aerial vehicle, verifying the HMAC value to authenticate the monitoring drone Aircraft security protocol method.
14. The method of claim 13,
After generating the EK _D - _MD and AK _D-MD ,
The security protocol method of the unmanned aerial vehicle, characterized in that by verifying the HMAC value of the authentication message M2 to check whether the two generated keys are correctly exchanged.
14. The method of claim 13,
After generating the HMAC value of the authentication message M3 = (ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _MD , ts3),
The monitoring drone receives an authentication message M3=(ID _MISSION , ID _D , ID _MD , ts3) from the unmanned aerial vehicle, checks the timestamp ts3, and verifies the HMAC value to confirm that the key is correctly exchanged. A security protocol method of an unmanned aerial vehicle, characterized in that.

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