KR101864340B1 - Train-to-train communication based preceding train discovery and the integrity checking method - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention relates to a preceding train search and an integrity checking method in a train-to-rail communication-based train control system. In the train-based autonomous train control system, the trains are traced through the direct-path-type direct control path between the preceding train and the trailing train, The present invention provides a method of searching for an upcoming train and confirming the integrity of a train-based communication control system that enables a train operation to be recognized and operated in a safe manner.
The present invention requests registration of a communication group to all traveling trains and control ATS existing on the corresponding sales route by using the multicast address of the previously stored business route when the start command of the ground ATS is received by the on-board ATP of the service train A first step of multicasting a Group Solicitation (GS) message; A second step of switching to a communication group complete state when a Group Advertisement (GA) message accepting a communication group registration from the traveling train is received in a unicast; When the PR message transmitted by the traveling train is received, the on-board ATP of the traveling train transmits its position to the traveling train, and collects the traveling information including the position, the traveling direction and the traveling path of the traveling train, A third step of updating the operation DB of the ATP; A fourth step of mapping the position of the traveling train to its own map and searching for and determining a preceding train which is geographically close to itself when the traveling DB is updated; And the on-board ATP of the running train checks whether there is a train within a certain radio coverage (RC) from its position using D2D (Device to Device) And a fifth step of verifying integrity.

Description

[0001] The present invention relates to a train-to-train communication based train control system,

[0001] The present invention relates to a method of searching for a preceding train and an integrity of an inter-train communication-based train control system, and more particularly, to a method for checking the safety interval between trains through a direct control path between a preceding train and a trailing train, The present invention relates to a method of confirming the search of the preceding train and the verification of the position information integrity of the preceding train so that the train itself can recognize the operation state of the train around itself and perform safe operation.

Generally, a railway car is a large-scale transportation means for transporting a lot of cargo or passengers, and a railway car is equipped with various and complex forms of train control system for safe operation along the railway.

At this time, the train control system adopts a complicated system configuration so that various monitoring and control can be carried out so as to be responsible for the safe operation of the train. In order to ensure the safe operation of the train, it is very important to secure the safety distance and the safe speed between the train An example of this is proposed in Japanese Patent Registration No. 10-1449742. This is related to a train spacing control apparatus, in which a device capable of measuring the position and speed of a preceding train on a train in real time is attached to the train in a radio communication based train control system, and the on- And the safety interval is calculated using the value of the preceding train speed position so that the train interval control between the preceding train and the trailing train can be automatically performed without human intervention in a range in which the vehicle can travel in a close range.

The conventional radio communication based train control system such as CBTC (Communication Based Train Control), which controls the train interval based on the conventional radio communication, can control the safe interval control of the train based on the control information between the on- . In other words, it has a triangular-path control path that provides the authority to move the train and the velocity profile from the ground to the ground based on the real-time location report of the train.

On the other hand, the inter-train connection-based train control system has a direct-path control path that determines the ownership and velocity profile of the train itself based on the location report of the preceding train without the ground control system. The function of searching and registering a train that is geographically close to a train-based connection-based train control system should be managed by a safety function.

As shown in FIG. 1, when the train T3 does not recognize the preceding train T2 and recognizes the train T1 as the preceding train, a collision accident may occur.

In addition, the connection-based train control system between trains must maintain the integrity of the connection in case the train connection should be changed due to branching or failure of the train.

Reference 1: Registration No. 10-1449742

Therefore, the present invention solves these problems, and the present invention performs the search of the preceding train and the verification of the position information integrity of the preceding train so that the safe interval control of the train can be performed through the control path between the preceding train and the trailing train The present invention provides a method of searching for a train and checking the integrity of a train-based communication control system.

In particular, the present invention relates to a method for searching for a preceding train in a train-based autonomous train control system for controlling the safe interval of trains through a direct control path between a preceding train and a trailing train, The present invention has been made to solve the above problems. It is an object of the present invention to provide a method for checking the integrity of a train.

In order to solve such a technical problem,

When the start command of the ground ATS is received by the on-board ATP of the running train, GS (Group (Group) which requests the registration of the communication group to all running trains and control ATS existing on the corresponding line by using the multicast address of the pre- A first step of multicasting a Solicitation message; A second step of switching to a communication group complete state when a Group Advertisement (GA) message accepting a communication group registration from the traveling train is received in a unicast; When the PR message transmitted by the traveling train is received, the on-board ATP of the traveling train transmits its position to the traveling train, and collects the traveling information including the position, the traveling direction and the traveling path of the traveling train, A third step of updating the operation DB of the ATP; A fourth step of mapping the position of the traveling train to its own map and searching for and determining a preceding train which is geographically close to itself when the traveling DB is updated; And the on-board ATP of the running train checks whether there is a train within a certain radio coverage (RC) from its position using D2D (Device to Device) And a fifth step of checking the integrity of the trains of the trains of the trains.

The second step compares the running DB data of the received GA message to compare whether the number of registered traveling trains is the same as the train ID of all running DB data received from running trains running on the current route, It is checked whether the GA messages of all the trains are transmitted based on the train ID, train IP, and train MAC address of one running DB data. It is checked whether GA data of all trains existing on the running DB are the same, And if it is determined that the message has been received, storing the train information in its own driving DB and switching to the communication group complete state.

In the third step, when the train is newly inserted, its position is initialized to a garbage value by transmitting the train to all traveling trains in the running route.

In the fourth step, the on-board ATP of the driving train searches for the driving DB to determine a traveling train having the same driving route as its own driving route and existing at the head of the driving train in the forward direction as the preceding train do.

In addition, in the fifth step, the on-board ATP of the running train periodically performs a discovery function of the D2D method using its own communication device at a defined short time, And collects the MAC address information and compares it with its own running DB data to check whether the information of the preceding train and the neighboring trains is the same as the information of the preceding train and the neighboring train which are searched by D2D, And confirming the integrity of the data.

In addition, after the fifth step, the on-board ATP of the traveling train obtains control authority to control the branching unit of the branching zone, and the traveling train receives the PR message of the traveling train as the traveling train enters the branching zone And confirming the route and the movement authority to confirm that the train is a new preceding train.

If an ATD (ATS-Train Deletion) message informing of the train deletion is received in the on-board ATP of the running train after the fifth step, the faulty train ID is acquired and the faulty train information is deleted from its running DB. And a seventh step of unicasting a Response ATS-Train Deletion (RATD) message informing completion of the train deletion in response to the message to the control ATS.

In addition, after the fifth step, the on-board ATP of the on-board train multicastly transmits a Finish Train Deletion (FTD) message informing the communication group registered when the on-board ATP is completely terminated to the other on- And receiving an RFTD (Response Finish Train Deletion) message informing that the registration of the train is completed from the unicast, and terminating the operation.

At this time, in the eighth step, the on-board ATP of the running train normally terminates the on-board ATP when an RFTD message is received from all running trains on the route, and if there is a train that has not responded to another oncoming train, Is repeatedly performed.

According to the present invention, it is possible to perform safe interval control of a train by searching for a preceding train and managing the integrity of communication between trains in a train-based connection-based train control system.

In particular, the present invention does not affect the safety level of other devices by managing the communication connection between trains, which is a safety function, on the on-board ATP, and also absorbs the ground equipment of the existing radio communication- It is possible to flexibly cope with the change of operation such as expansion of the route or increase of the input train and simplification of the ground equipment to reduce installation and maintenance costs.

1 is a diagram illustrating a train collision situation due to a linear connection error between trains.
FIG. 2 is a view for explaining a communication connection between trains in the inter-train communication-based train control system according to the present invention.
FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating a process of registering a new input train in a communication group of the train line in the inter-train communication-based train control system according to the present invention.
FIG. 4 is a view for explaining a communication group registration process flow of a corresponding route of a newly entered operating train in an inter-train communication based train control system according to the present invention.
FIG. 5 is a diagram showing an example of visualization of map data of a train N in a train-based communication control system according to the present invention.
FIG. 6 is a diagram for explaining a process of searching for and tracing a train on a train N in an inter-train communication-based train control system according to the present invention.
FIG. 7 is a diagram for explaining the D2D method of confirming the integrity of the preceding train and the neighboring train information of the train N in the inter-train communication based train control system according to the present invention.
FIG. 8 is a diagram for explaining a preceding train search and determination process in a branching and joining situation of a train N in a train-to-rail communication-based train control system according to the present invention.
FIG. 9 is a diagram for explaining a communication group cancellation flow of a train line for a non-recoverable fault train in an inter-train communication based train control system according to the present invention.
FIG. 10 is a view for explaining a flow of re-registration of a communication group on a train line corresponding to a restored fault train in an inter-train communication based train control system according to the present invention.
FIG. 11 is a view for explaining a flow of a communication group deregistration message transmission when an on-vehicle ATP ends in an inter-train communication based train control system according to the present invention.

Hereinafter, the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which like reference numerals refer to like elements, and in which: FIG.

Prior to this, terms and words used in the present specification and claims should not be construed as limited to ordinary or dictionary terms, and the inventor should appropriately interpret the concepts of the terms appropriately It should be interpreted in accordance with the meaning and concept consistent with the technical idea of the present invention based on the principle that it can be defined.

Therefore, the embodiments described in the present specification and the configurations shown in the drawings are only the most preferred embodiments of the present invention, and not all of the technical ideas of the present invention are described. Therefore, It should be understood that various equivalents and modifications may be present.

Referring to FIG. 2, in order to search for preceding trains and verify the integrity of the inter-train communication based train control system according to the present invention, the on-board ATP 10 of the train N in the train- (Train ID, train IP, location, direction of travel, speed, route of operation) in accordance with a predetermined cycle defined on all other running trains (Train N-1, N-2, etc.) , And a route of operation).

The ATP 10 'on the other traveling train (Train N-1, N-2, etc.) recognizes the operation status of all the trains existing on the route using the received PR message, We propose a method to recognize the train operation situation around the train itself and to operate it safely through the discovery of the nearest preceding train and verification of the location information integrity of the preceding train.

At this time, in the train-based communication control system between trains, trains search for and register the nearest geographical trains based on the position and route of the trains themselves, and monitor and control between the trains when the connection changes due to the branching or failure of the connected train An ATS (Automatic Train Supervision) 1 is installed as a ground system for monitoring train information received from a plurality of trains traveling along a track on the ground, and a Train N, N- 1) includes an on-vehicle ATO 20 for performing acceleration / deceleration control of a train by an on-board system, a vehicle-mounted ATP 10 for performing communication between the control ATS 1 and a train in operation on a route, And a reader 30 for recognizing a tag / balise 2 such as a tag or a cover for providing positional information.

Hereinafter, referring to FIG. 2 to FIG. 11, the preceding train search and integrity check process in the inter-train communication based train control system will be described focusing on the data processing process of the train.

At this time, the on-board ATP of the trains (Train N, N-1, N-2 ...) performs both multicast and unicast communication.

The communication group is a logical group for managing communication information between all the trains existing on the sales line (for example, Line 1), and is a logical group for managing the train ATP (Train N, N-1, (10, 10 ') DBs of communication information and operation information of trains (Train N, N-1, N-2 ...) running on the corresponding sales route are DBized and managed in the operation DB.

First, with reference to FIG. 3 and FIG. 4, the registration process S1 according to the start of the mission of the train will be described.

The on-board ATP 10 of the train N receives the start command from the control ATS 1 after power-on and starts operation. At this time, the onboard ATP 10 is set to the 'communication group registration wait state' for proceeding with the registration procedure to the communication group of the route to which the on-vehicle ATP 10 is to be started (the communication group to which all the trains operating on the route are registered) The communication is not started until the communication group registration is completed.

Train N, which will start the new operation, uses all the train trains (Train N-1, N-2 ...) and control ATS (N-1) 1), a group solicitation (GS) message, which is a 'request to register a communication group with a new input train to start the operation', is multicasted to train N-1, N-2, ... .

Accordingly, the train N-1, N-2 ... receiving the GS message through the multicast adds the information of the train N to the train DB, which is communication group information owned by the train N-1, , And transmits its operation DB data as a response message of 'communication group registration acceptance' to the sender address of the GS message in a unicast GA (Group Advertisement) message.

When the GA message of the train N-1 (N-2) is received, the newly inserted train N (Train N) compares the DB of the GA message. In this case, the comparative inspection condition compares the running DB data of the received GA message to find the train ID of all running DB data received from running trains (Train N-1, N-2 ...) The comparison of the number of the registered train trains (Train N-1, N-2 ...) and the transmission of GA messages of all trains based on the train ID, train IP, To check whether it is.

As described above, the on-board ATP 10 of the newly inserted train N (Train N) performs the above-mentioned conditional test and the running DB data of all the running trains (Train N-1, N-2 ...) When it is judged that the GA message of all the traveling trains (Train N-1, N-2 ...) existing on the running DB is received, the train information is stored in the running DB of the own DB, And start operating.

At this time, the on-board ATP 10 of the newly inserted train N (Train N) transmits the GA message in the state where the GA messages of all the train trains (Train N-1, N-2 ...) If there is a train (train N-1, N-2 ...) that has not been received yet, or if none of the GA messages are received, reception and inspection of a GA (Group Advertisement) message by a preset number of times (for example, three times) Repeat the process.

The on-board ATP 10 of the newly inserted train N (train N) is notified of the train N (train N) that has not transmitted the GA message even after repeating the reception and inspection of the GA (Group Advertisement) message by a predetermined number of times, 1, N-2 ...), or if none of the GA messages are received, the corresponding contents are notified to the control ATS (1), and under the responsibility of the controller of the control center, To determine the operation of the train N (Train N).

As described above, since the train N is registered in the communication group to be inputted to the new route (S1), the process of transmitting and receiving information between the trains (S2) is performed, which will be described with reference to FIG.

First, all traveling trains (Train N-1, N-2 ...) registered in the communication group of the corresponding sales line (for example, Route 1) Position Report) message to the train N and all the trains N-1, N-2 ... by multicasting.

Accordingly, in the case of the newly inputted train N (Train N), since the position of the new train is not initialized because it does not pass the 'position initialization section', the on- (Train N-1, N-2 ...) with the garbage value.

The on-board ATP 10 of the newly inputted train (Train N) receives the PR message transmitted by each train (Train N-1, N-2 ...) of the route, (N-1, N-2,...) From the PR message and updates the driving DB 12 of the on-vehicle ATP 10. Each time the navigation DB 12 is updated, the updated data is used to map the locations of the train N-1, N-2, ... to its own driving map.

5, the on-board ATP 10 of the train N (Train N) receiving the PR message of all the trains N-1, N-2 ... updates its operation DB 12, And visualized the data. Train N transmits a PR message to a train N. The train N then sends a train N-1 to a train N-1, 1 to N-4) is mapped to the operation map and the progress direction and the progress path are visualized.

Thereafter, the on-board ATP 10 of the train N periodically transmits / receives PR messages to and from the other train N-1 to N-4, If the PR message is not received within the defined period, the reception of the PR message of the train is waited for a predetermined waiting time.

If the waiting time is exceeded, the control unit informs the control ATS (1), and the train designates the corresponding section as the guard interval according to the position information of the last received PR message, and does not enter the corresponding section.

After the above-described inter-train information transmission / reception process (S2), the preceding train search process (S3) is performed, which will be described with reference to FIG.

The on-board ATP 10 of the first priority train (Train N) periodically transmits / receives the other train (train N-1 to N-4) and the PR message after registering in the communication group of the corresponding route, Maps the location of the train to its map and searches for and determines the train N-1 that is geographically close to itself.

As shown in FIG. 6, the preceding train (Train N-1) means an in-line running train having the same running route as the own running route and existing at the head in the running direction.

Therefore, the on-board ATP 10 of the train N trains the train DB 12 and searches for a train that has the same travel route as its own travel route, N-1).

After the preceding train search process (S3), an integrity check process S4 is performed on the result of the preceding train search, which will be described with reference to FIG.

First, the onboard ATP 10 of the train N performs a discovery function of D2D (Device to Device) using its own communication device periodically every defined short time. Unlike the Infra communication method, the D2D communication method is a method of directly communicating with a communication device, and the D2D communication method is a method of directly communicating the neighboring traveling trains (Train N-1, N-2 ...) existing in its radio coverage The MAC address information is collected by searching the communication device.

At this time, the on-board ATP 10 of the train N compares the MAC address of the collected peripheral train communication device with its own running DB data, finds a train equipped with the corresponding communication device, (Train N-1) and peripheral train information that are searched for in D2D and the neighbor train information (Train N-1) are searched and determined in step S3) .

That is, by using D2D, it is confirmed whether or not there is a train in a certain radio coverage (RC) from its own position, and it is checked whether there is a train in the running train DB (for example, train N-1) Train N-3) Confirm the integrity of the information.

Hereinafter, a process S5 for checking an anomalous situation will be described with reference to FIGS. 8 to 10 after the integrity check process S4 of the preceding train search result.

First of all, a process (S5-1) for the branching and joining situation of a train will be described with reference to Fig.

The on-board ATP 10 of the train N also periodically transmits / receives the PR message to the branching state of the train N. When the branching to the other line is performed, (3) is used to change the line.

After the train N has obtained the right to control the branching machine 3 in the branching area BA at the branching time, the branching machine 3 is operated to change the line, (A) to another line (B).

Since Train N-1 and Train N-3 can not be connected to this branch point at this time, Train N-1 on Line A is the same as Train N-1 on Line A, (BA) can not be entered until the authority is returned, and the trains B (Trains N-3) on the B line can not enter the branch area (BA) until the current train returns control authority.

That is, when the branching train N (Train N) acquires the control authority of the branching device 3, the trailing trains A and B (for example Train N-1 and N-3) (BA) can not enter the branch office (BA) because the branch train (Train N) can not enter the branch line (BA) Returns control authority.

In this case, the trailing train (Train N-1) of the A track receives the route and the movement authority from the PR message of the train N as the train N enters the branching area BA, (Train N) is no longer his / her own preceding train, and he / she searches again for his / her preceding train. Likewise, the train N-3 of the B line receives the PR message of the train N as the train N enters the branching area BA and confirms the route and the movement authority from the train N, It is possible to confirm that the train N is a new preceding train existing on its own route.

Next, with reference to Figs. 9 and 10, a corresponding process (S5-2 and S5-3) for the fault situation of the train will be described.

In the event of a train failure, the train will not be able to transmit a PR message, and a train running normally (Train N-1, N-2 ...) will not receive the PR message of the train.

Therefore, the method of designating the guard interval based on the position information of the last PR message transmitted by the corresponding train (train N-1, N-2 ...) If the location information of the PR message is transmitted as the garbage value because the trains recovered from the failure can not perform the location initialization process even though they are recovered from the failure, Do not release the zone.

First, referring to FIG. 9, a description will be given of a situation in which failure recovery is impossible and a case in which the vehicle is restarted after towing a train that has failed by a safe line (S5-2).

(Train N, N-2 ...) can be used for the PR (Train N-1) of the train (N-1) if a failure of the train (e.g., Train N-1) The previous position according to the message not received is designated as the guard interval.

Therefore, in the case of Train N, which is a trailer of Train N-1, there is a guard zone in front of its own route, so that it can not gain the right to enter the zone and stops before the zone.

After the train N-1 is unrecoverable, it is safely moved to the escape route from the control center and the ATD (ATS-Train Deletion) message informing the train operator of the train's delinquency is sent to all the trains It is transmitted by multicast.

In this case, the message is preferably sent from the control ATS 1. Accordingly, the trains receiving the ATD message acquire the fault train ID in the ATD message, delete the faulty train information from the running DB of the ATD message, and issue a RATD (Response ATS-Train Deletion) message informing the completion of the train deletion in response to the ATD message Unicast transmission to the control ATS (1).

That is, when an ATD (ATS-Train Deletion) message for notifying the train ATP 10 is received on the on-board ATP 10 of the train N (train N), it obtains the fault train ID and deletes the fault train information in its own DB, A response ATS-Train Deletion (RATD) message informing the completion of the train deletion to the control ATS 1 in response to the unauthorized transmission of the train.

Of course, if the RATS message response is not received from all the trains (train N, N-1, N-2 ...) known to the control station ATS 1, the control ATS 1 transmits again the ATD message to all the trains, When the RATD message of all the trains is received, the traction is completed and it is determined that the train is in a state in which it can be operated, and the normal operation is performed.

Next, referring to Fig. 10, a case (S5-3) in which the operation is resumed after repairing the fault of the train will be described.

If a fault occurs during the operation of the train and the fault can be recovered, repeat the procedure from the step S1 of registering the train.

9, when the power of the train N-1 on-train ATP is applied after the failure of the train N-1 is recovered, the on-board ATP transmits the information registered in the communication group and the operation DB All are initialized.

Therefore, after power-on of the repaired train (Train N-1), the on-board ATP sends a GS message to all other trains (Train N, Train N-2 ...) All other trains (Train N, Train N-2 ...) receive the GA message containing the contents of their own driving DB in response to Train N-1 that has been restored. The Train N-1 that has received the contents of the driving DB (Train N-1) carries out the registration process of comparing the contents of the driving DB by performing the registration process (S1) and checking whether all GA's messages have been received.

After completion of the registration of the communication group, the ATS controller manages the position of the train manually, performs position initialization, and transmits the PR message by inputting the position information value of the PR message as a normal position value.

 In addition, the train N-1 that has been restored after being registered in the communication group periodically transmits the PR message. In this situation, the location information value of the PR message is transmitted as the garbage value. If the position information value of the PR message transmitted by the train (Train N-1) judged as the fault is garbage value, the on-car ATP of all other trains (Train N, Train N-2 ...) When the PR message is received with the normal position information value, the guard interval is released.

The registration release process S6 according to the end of the train operation will be described with reference to Fig.

When the train N runs out of operation, the on-board ATP 10 is switched to the stand-by state, but since the on-vehicle ATP 10 is powered on, the periodic PR message transmission between the trains is the same And the communication group also does not unregister.

When the train N completes the on-board ATP 10 completely by repairs, car wash, or the like, a Finish Train Deletion (FTD) message informing the registered communication group of the registration cancellation is sent to other traveling trains (Train N-1 to N -2, etc.). (Train N-1 to N-2, etc.) having received the FTD message deletes the corresponding train (Train N) from its running DB and sends a Response Finish Train Deletion (RFTD) message to the FTD message (Train N) in response to the unicast transmission.

The train N that has transmitted the FTD message normally receives the RFTD message from all the other traveling trains (Train N-1 to N-2, etc.) existing in the running DB of the train, and normally terminates the onboard ATP 10 If there is a train that has not responded to any other train (Train N-1 to N-2, etc.), it repeats the process of transmitting the FTD message again.

It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that various modifications and variations can be made in the present invention without departing from the spirit or scope of the invention. The scope of protection of the present invention should be construed under the following claims, and all technical ideas within the scope of equivalents thereof should be construed as being included in the scope of the present invention.

1: Control ATS 2: Paper box
3: Dispenser 10,10 ': On-board ATP
20: On-board ATO 30: Leader
BA: Branching area RC: Radio coverage
Train N: Train N-1: Train N-1
Train N-2: Train N-3: Train N-2
Train N-4: Train

Claims (9)

When the start command of ground ATS is received by the on-board ATP of the running train, GS (Group (Group)) requesting registration of the communication group to all running trains and control ATS existing on the corresponding line by using the multicast address of the pre- A first step of multicasting a Solicitation message;
A second step of switching to a communication group complete state when a Group Advertisement (GA) message accepting a communication group registration from the traveling train is received in a unicast;
When the PR message transmitted by the traveling train is received, the on-board ATP of the traveling train transmits its position to the traveling train, and collects the traveling information including the position, the traveling direction and the traveling path of the traveling train, A third step of updating the operation DB of the ATP;
A fourth step of mapping the position of the traveling train to its own map and searching for and determining a preceding train which is geographically close to itself when the traveling DB is updated; And
The on-board ATP of the above-mentioned train confirms the existence of a train within a certain radio coverage from its position by using D2D (Device to Device), and confirms the integrity of the preceding train and neighboring train information in its running DB The method as claimed in claim 1, wherein the step (b) comprises the steps of:
The method according to claim 1,
The second step compares the running DB data of the received GA message to compare whether the number of registered traveling trains equals the number of the train ID of all the running DB data received from the traveling train running on the current route, It is checked whether the GA message of all trains is transmitted based on the train ID, train IP, and train MAC address of the DB data. The GA message of all running trains existing on the running DB is the same as the running DB data of all running trains And if it is determined that the received train information has been received, storing the train information in its own running DB and switching to a communication group complete state.
The method according to claim 1,
Wherein when the train is newly inserted in the third step, the position is initialized by transmitting its own position to all traveling trains running on the route with a garbage value, And integrity verification methods.
The method according to claim 1,
Wherein the on-board ATP of the driving train in the fourth step searches the driving DB to determine a traveling train having the same driving route as its own driving route and existing at the head of the driving train in the forward direction as a preceding train A Study on the Preceding Train Search and Integrity Verification of Train - based Communication Control System.
The method according to claim 1,
In the fifth step, the on-board ATP of the on-board train periodically performs a discovery function of the D2D system using its own communication device at a defined short time so that the communication of the surrounding oncoming train in its radio coverage The MAC address information is collected and compared with the own running DB data to check whether the information of the preceding train and the neighboring trains is the same as the information of the preceding train or the neighboring train which is searched for by the D2D and the integrity of the preceding train and the neighboring train information The method of claim 1, further comprising the step of:
The method according to claim 1,
After the fifth step, the on-board ATP of the train obtains the control authority to control the branching unit of the branching zone, and the traveling train receives the PR message of the running train as the running train enters the branching zone, And confirming the movement authority to confirm that the train is a new preceding train. The method of claim 1, further comprising:
The method according to claim 1,
After the fifth step, if an ATD (ATS-Train Deletion) message informing of the train deletion is received in the on-board ATP of the running train, the faulty train ID is acquired and the faulty train information is deleted from its running DB. Further comprising a seventh step of unicasting a Response ATS-Train Deletion (RATD) message informing completion of deleting the train to the control ATS. How to check integrity.
The method according to claim 1,
After the fifth step, the on-board ATP of the on-board train multicastly transmits a Finish Train Deletion (FTD) message informing the communication group registered when the on-board ATP is completely terminated to the other on-board train, Further comprising the step of receiving a response finish train deletion (RFTD) message informing that registration cancellation of the train is completed by unicast and ending the train operation. The train control system according to claim 1, And integrity verification methods.
9. The method of claim 8,
In the eighth step, the onboard ATP of the on-board train normally completes the on-vehicle ATP upon receiving an RFTD message from all the on-going trains, and if there is a train that has not responded to the other on- Wherein the first and second trains of the trains are connected to each other in a predetermined order.

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