KR101429434B1 - Apparatus and method improving trustworthiness of virtual machine execution environment in cloud computing - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention relates to a user virtual machine apparatus in a cloud computing environment, and more particularly, to a virtual machine apparatus for managing a virtual machine in a cloud computing environment, the virtual machine apparatus comprising: a management domain for creating and managing a virtual machine; an authentication device for storing authentication data for authenticating the virtual machine; , A hypervisor that isolates the authentication device, and an independent domain that accesses the authentication device exclusively, thereby providing a cloud service with improved reliability.

Description

[0001] APPARATUS AND METHOD IMPROVING TRUSTWORTHINESS OF VIRTUAL MACHINE [0002] TECHNICAL FIELD [0001] The present invention relates to an apparatus and method for enhancing reliability of a user virtual machine execution environment in a cloud computing environment,

The present invention relates to a user virtual machine device, and more particularly, to an apparatus capable of authenticating a virtual machine using an independent independent domain, thereby assuring the reliability of a virtual machine even if the management domain is malicious.

Cloud computing is a computing model that can reduce costs by efficiently managing and utilizing computing resources. A cloud service provider (CSP) manages computing resources to distribute resources according to the needs of the cloud customer. Cloud users request the cloud service provider as needed to provide the actual physical computing environment We use as much computing resources as we want without having to build, and we pay the cloud provider based on usage. Cloud computing can be divided into several models according to the services provided. Among them, in the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) model, which provides services to the users in units of virtual machines, the users can set the virtual machines provided by the cloud service providers as their own It is used with the physical machine. Cloud service providers provide services through a technology called virtualization to provide virtual machines to cloud users. Virtualization is a technology that manages resources of one physical machine and controls the sharing of multiple virtual machines. It mainly consists of a hypervisor and a management domain. The hypervisor manages CPU and memory, and the management domain controls all other hardware devices to be shared by virtual machines.

The first problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a user virtual machine device that improves the reliability of a virtual machine by authenticating a virtual machine using an independent domain independent of a management domain.

A second object of the present invention is to provide a user virtual machine system that improves the reliability of a virtual machine by authenticating the virtual machine using an independent domain independent of the management domain.

A third problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a method for improving the reliability of a user virtual machine that improves the reliability of a virtual machine by authenticating the virtual machine using an independent domain independent of the management domain.

In order to solve the first problem, the present invention provides a user virtual machine apparatus in a cloud computing environment, comprising: a management domain for creating and managing a virtual machine; An authentication device for storing authentication data for authenticating the virtual machine; A virtual platform for executing the virtual machine, the hypervisor isolating the authentication device; And an independent domain that accesses the authentication device only.

According to one embodiment of the present invention, the authentication device may be a hardware device that permanently stores data and supports cryptographic operations, or may be a device that permanently stores data, wherein the hypervisor , And allows only the independent domain to access the authentication device using the input / output page table of the input / output memory management device (IOMMU).

According to another embodiment of the present invention, the hypervisor further includes a first hash value generated from a kernel image of the independent domain received from the management domain, and a second hash value of a kernel image of the independent domain stored in the hypervisor, And may execute the independent domain by loading the kernel image of the independent domain received from the management domain into the independent domain if the first hash value and the second hash value match.

According to another embodiment of the present invention, the independent domain may include an authentication protocol for communicating with a certification authority for authentication of the virtual machine, the management domain including a nonce, which is a random number from the user And a copying unit for copying a kernel image of the virtual machine for creation of the virtual machine and transmitting the copied image to the selected node together with the nonce when receiving the virtual machine creation request, The hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine and the key generated at the time of registration of the node and the secure cell host key (ssh host key) are transmitted to the certification authority to authenticate the virtual machine Wherein the hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine is the kernel of the virtual machine stored in the certification authority When not match any of the hash value list it may be characterized in that the authentication device.

To solve the second problem, the present invention provides a user virtual machine system in a cloud computing environment, comprising: a management domain for creating and managing a virtual machine; An authentication device for storing authentication data for authenticating the virtual machine; A virtual platform for executing the virtual machine, the hypervisor isolating the authentication device; An independent domain comprising an authentication protocol that accesses the authentication device only and communicates with a certificate authority for authentication of the virtual machine; And an authentication authority for authenticating the virtual machine using a hash value of a kernel image of the virtual machine received through communication with the authentication protocol.

A third aspect of the present invention is a method for improving reliability of a user virtual machine in a cloud computing environment, the method comprising: storing a kernel image of the independent domain in a memory of a management domain using a disk driver of the management domain; ; Transferring a kernel image of the independent domain stored in the management domain to a hypervisor; Determining whether a first hash value generated from a kernel image of the independent domain received from the management domain matches a second hash value of a kernel image of the independent domain stored in the hypervisor; Executing the independent domain by loading the kernel image of the independent domain received from the management domain into the independent domain if the first hash value matches the second hash value as a result of the determination; Wherein the independent domain accesses only an authentication device that stores authentication data for authenticating the virtual machine.

According to the present invention, a certificate of a certification authority can be securely accessed by directly accessing a device without going through a management domain in an independent domain, using a domain and a device independent of the management domain, which controls hardware to be shared by a virtual machine . Thus, malicious administrators can ensure that the protocol can be safely performed by an independent domain that does not have access to the data that is to be read from the hardware device. This ensures that the virtual machine of the cloud user can only be performed by a reliability hypervisor that protects memory from the management domain. In addition, by using independent domains and accessing the hardware without going through the management domain, cloud service providers can securely store and use the keys necessary for data protection in order to provide higher reliability services to users in terms of services. Furthermore, cloud users can trust cloud service providers more and more, and cloud service providers can also contribute to the spread of cloud computing by providing reliable services.

1 is a block diagram of a user virtual machine apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
2 is a block diagram of a user virtual machine system in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
3 to 4 are user virtual machine devices according to an embodiment of the present invention.
5 illustrates running an independent domain of a user virtual machine device in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
Figure 6 illustrates a method for authenticating a virtual machine of a user virtual machine device in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
7 is a flowchart of a method for improving the reliability of a user virtual machine in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
8 is a flowchart of a method for improving the reliability of a user virtual machine according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Prior to the description of the concrete contents of the present invention, for the sake of understanding, the outline of the solution of the problem to be solved by the present invention or the core of the technical idea is first given.

A user virtual machine device in a cloud computing environment according to an embodiment of the present invention includes a management domain for creating and managing a virtual machine, an authentication device for storing authentication data for authenticating the virtual machine, A virtual platform, a hypervisor for isolating the authentication device, and an independent domain for exclusive access to the authentication device.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. It will be apparent to those skilled in the art, however, that these examples are provided to further illustrate the present invention, and the scope of the present invention is not limited thereto.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS The above and other features and advantages of the present invention will become more apparent by describing in detail preferred embodiments thereof with reference to the attached drawings in which: It is possible to quote the above. In the following detailed description of the principles of operation of the preferred embodiments of the present invention, it is to be understood that the present invention is not limited to the details of the known functions and configurations, and other matters may be unnecessarily obscured, A detailed description thereof will be omitted.

Despite the many advantages of cloud computing, the most important problem is reliability of cloud service providers. In a cloud computing environment, all of the user's data and computations are processed and managed on a machine managed by the cloud service provider, not the machine of the cloud user. In this environment, the cloud administrator can visibly access the data of the user virtual machine through the management domain by accessing the memory of the cloud user virtual machine by using the privilege of the system maliciously. To solve this problem, it is necessary to implement a reliability hypervisor to protect the user virtual machine from the management domain by modifying the hypervisor. However, in a cloud computing environment, the user virtual machine can not know which physical machine in the data center the cloud service provider manages, and the migration can transfer the execution to another physical machine while the virtual machine is running. Failure to properly control these virtual machine management operations will not protect the cloud user virtual machine. For this purpose, a protocol has been proposed that restricts only the physical machine authenticated through the third certificate authority to execute the user virtual machine. However, when realizing it in the current virtualization environment, the hardware is directly managed by the management domain The certificate of the certification authority required for the protocol operation must be read through the management domain. Therefore, in this process, a malicious administrator can arbitrarily adjust the hardware access through the authority of the management domain, and thus change the certificate of the certification authority. In such an environment, the protocol can no longer be guaranteed to be secure, thus preventing the cloud user's virtual machine from being securely protected.

The protocol also requires several cryptographic functions and libraries to authenticate. This increases the amount of code in the protocol, which in turn means that the protocol itself is vulnerable. Performing this protocol on the hypervisor that operates with the highest privilege in the system increases the complexity of the hypervisor and causes the reliability of the whole system to deteriorate. Therefore, it is necessary to improve the reliability of the system by allowing the protocol to be executed in a lower privilege rather than being executed in the hypervisor.

In the present invention, an independent domain is used to access the hardware without using a management domain, thereby preventing a malicious administrator from changing the certificate of the certification authority. Virtualization technology basically manages the hardware resources to be managed by the management domain so that the virtual machines can share them. Therefore, the management domain has device drivers for all hardware access, and the hypervisor manages only memory and CPU, thereby reducing the complexity of the hypervisor and improving reliability. However, a device installed in a physical virtual machine can be used exclusively for a virtual machine for special purposes such as performance or security. If a virtual machine accesses hardware directly, it can not share hardware devices with other virtual machines. However, it can improve input / output performance and reliability because virtual machines do not go through a management domain by accessing hardware . In the present invention, an independent domain directly accesses and uses the hardware using hardware that does not require sharing among virtual machines, thereby allowing the certification authority to securely access the certificate without going through the management domain. Thus, malicious administrators can not intervene in the middle of an independent domain's hardware access. Hereinafter, a user virtual machine apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention will be described in detail.

1 is a block diagram of a user virtual machine apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.

The user virtual machine apparatus 100 includes a management domain 110, an independent domain 120, a hypervisor 130, and an authentication device 150 in a cloud computing environment according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.

The management domain 110 creates and manages virtual machines.

More specifically, the management domain 110 includes various drivers necessary for creating a virtual machine. However, since the access right to the authentication device 150 is restricted, it is impossible for the malicious administrator to access the authentication device 150 of the user through the management domain 110. [

The independent domain 120 accesses the authentication device 150 exclusively.

More specifically, the authentication device 150 creates a separate independent domain 120 independent of the management domain 110, independent of the management domain 110, and allows the authentication device 150 to access only through the independent domain 120. Only the independent domain 120 can have exclusive access to the authentication device 150 and the management domain 110 has limited access to the authentication device 150. [

The authentication device 150 stores authentication data for authenticating the virtual machine.

More specifically, the authentication device 150 is used for certificate storage purposes. In order to use the authentication device 150 to store authentication data, the authentication device 150 may be a hardware device that permanently stores data and supports cryptographic operations, or may be a PCI device that permanently stores data. In order to increase the reliability of the certificate, it is isolated by the hypervisor 130 to restrict access of the management domain 110 or other virtual machines other than the independent domain 120.

The hypervisor 130 is a virtual platform for executing the virtual machine, and isolates the authentication device 150.

More specifically, the hypervisor 130 is a virtual platform for one or more virtual machines to share and execute hardware, isolating the authentication device 150 so that the independent domain 120 can access it only. To this end, the hypervisor 130 accesses only the independent domain 120 using the input / output page table of the input / output memory management unit (IOMMU). The input / output memory management apparatus is used to support secure direct memory access (DMA) in a virtual environment. Output page management table managed by the input / output memory management apparatus so that only the independent domain 120 can access the authentication device 150 and access to the authentication device 150 in the management domain 110 or another virtual machine I can not.

The independent domain 120 is also created and managed by the management domain 110 as a virtual machine. Therefore, if the administrative domain 110 maliciously changes the kernel image of the independent domain 120 during the creation of the independent domain 120, the execution environment of the independent domain 120 can not be said to be safe. In order to prevent the management domain 110 from changing the kernel image of the independent domain 120, the hypervisor 130 directly stores the kernel image information of the independent domain 120 in the memory so that the kernel image of the independent domain 120 Lt; / RTI >

The hypervisor 130 generates a first hash value from the kernel image of the independent domain 120 received from the management domain 110 and then generates a first hash value from the kernel image of the independent domain 120 stored in the hypervisor 130 The kernel image of the independent domain 120 received from the management domain 110 when the first hash value matches the second hash value, The independent domain 120 can be executed by loading the independent domain 120 into the independent domain 120. [

In the general virtual machine creation process, the management domain 110 stores the kernel image of the virtual machine to be generated from the hardware 140 in the memory of the management domain 110 using the disk driver. The management domain 110 then directly loads the kernel image of the virtual machine into the memory of the new virtual machine. In this process, the management domain 110 can change the kernel image of the new virtual machine. Therefore, in creating the independent domain 120, the independent domain 120 needs to protect the kernel image of the independent domain 120 from the management domain 110 in one virtual machine. The process of storing the kernel image of the independent domain 120 in the memory of the management domain 110 through the disk driver of the management domain 110 is the same. Thereafter, the management domain 110 transfers the kernel image of the independent domain 120 to the hypervisor 130, and the hypervisor 130 checks the hash value of the kernel image of the received independent domain 120 The kernel image of the independent domain 120 received from the management domain 110 is transferred to the independent domain 120 only when the first hash value matches the second hash value stored in the hypervisor 130, (120) by loading it into the memory of the independent domain (120). The hash check is used to check whether the kernel image of the independent domain 120 has been changed by the management domain 110. The second hash value to be compared is held when the hypervisor 130 boots The management domain 110 can not change the second hash value stored in the memory of the hypervisor 130 and finally can not change the kernel image of the independent domain 120. [ If the malicious administrator changes the kernel image of the independent domain 120, the hypervisor 130 can detect the change through the hash check.

The independent domain 120 may include an authentication protocol in communication with a certificate authority for authentication of the virtual machine. In order to secure the reliability of the virtual machine, the independent domain 120 may include a protocol for communicating with the certification authority in order to perform authentication of the virtual machine through an external certification authority. The authentication protocol may be included in the hypervisor 130.

An authentication protocol that implements the authentication procedure requires several cryptographic functions and libraries in order to authenticate to the virtual machine through communication with the certification authority. Therefore, the code size of the authentication protocol becomes large, and the vulnerability can be consequently included. Operation of the authentication protocol in the hypervisor 130 operating with the highest privilege in the system may cause the reliability of the system to deteriorate. Accordingly, the authentication protocol can be performed in the independent domain 120 operating at a lower privilege than the hypervisor 130, thereby improving the reliability of the system. The independent domain 120 may access the hardware device without going through the malicious administrative domain 110 and may also perform the authentication protocol. Since the independent domain 120 operates on a virtual platform provided by the hypervisor 130 as a kind of virtual machine, the independent domain 120 operates with a lower privilege than the hypervisor 130. Even if the independent domain 120 does not operate properly because the protocol is weakened, the hypervisor 130 is not affected thereby, and thus the virtual machine of the cloud user is advantageous in that the execution can be maintained without being affected .

When the management domain 110 receives a virtual machine creation request including a random number, which is a random number, from the user, the management domain 110 selects a node to create the virtual machine, and displays a kernel image of the virtual machine for creating the virtual machine The hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine and the key generated at the time of registration of the node with the secure cell host key (ssh host key) Wherein the hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine is one of a list of kernel image hash values of the virtual machine stored in the certification authority, If they match, they can be authenticated.

If the virtual machine creation request is received from the user after creating the independent domain 120, the authentication of the external certification authority may be used to authenticate the virtual machine. If you create and run a virtual machine on a physical machine, you need to make sure that the virtual machine is created and running on a secure physical machine and that the operating system running on that virtual machine has not been maliciously altered. And receives a virtual machine creation request from the cloud user. At this time, in order to prevent a session replay attack, a user can send a random number, a nonce. The cloud service provider may select one of the nodes of the data center to copy the kernel image of the virtual machine for user's virtual machine creation and transmit the virtual machine command. The node receiving the request can calculate the hash value of the kernel image of the user's virtual machine to be created using the authentication protocol operating in the independent domain 120 and execute the virtual machine. In the virtual machine boot process, a secure host key (ssh host key) is generated. The authentication protocol includes a hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine, a key generated in the node registration process of the secure cell host key Sign it, and send it to the certification authority. The certification authority manages the list of hash values of the kernel image of the trusted user virtual machine and compares the hash values of the kernel image of the virtual machine received from the node with the hash value of the kernel image received from the node, The unscannable secure cell host key can be signed using the key of the certification authority and delivered to the user. Finally, the user can verify the signature of the CA and confirm that it matches the nonce passed by the user, and use the authenticated virtual machine safely. At this time, the user can confirm that the virtual machine used by the user operates on the trusted hypervisor 130 and is correctly authenticated to the certification authority through the secure cell host key, so that the user can use the virtual machine with the trust of the virtual machine .

2 is a block diagram of a user virtual machine system in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.

A user virtual machine system 200 in a cloud computing environment according to an embodiment of the present invention includes a management domain 110 for creating and managing a virtual machine, an authentication device 150 for storing authentication data for authenticating the virtual machine A hypervisor 130 for isolating the authentication device 150, a virtual platform for executing the virtual machine, a dedicated access to the authentication device 150, a certification authority 210 for authentication of the virtual machine, And an authentication authority 210 for authenticating the virtual machine using a hash value of a kernel image of the virtual machine received via communication with the authentication protocol 121 do.

By including the user virtual machine device 100 and the certification authority 210 of FIG. 1, the reliability of the user's virtual machine device 100 can be ensured. Is the same as the detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of Fig. 1, except that it further includes the certification authority 210. Fig.

That is, the hypervisor 130 receives the first hash value generated from the kernel image of the independent domain 120 received from the management domain 110 and the first hash value generated from the kernel image of the independent domain 120 stored in the hypervisor 130 The kernel image of the independent domain 120 received from the management domain 110 is loaded into the independent domain 120 by comparing the second hash value of the independent domain 120 with the second hash value, The domain 120 can be executed.

When a virtual machine creation request including a random number that is a random number is received from a user, a node for creating the virtual machine is selected, a kernel image of the virtual machine for creating the virtual machine is copied, And the authentication protocol 121 transmits the hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine and the ssh host key to the selected node using the key generated upon registration of the node And transmits the virtual machine to the certification authority 210 for authentication.

The certification authority 210 authenticates the virtual machine using the hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine received through communication with the authentication protocol 121. [

More specifically, it authenticates the virtual machine by comparing the hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine received from the authentication protocol 121 with a previously stored hash value list, and transmits the received nonce and the secure cell host key to authentication Authenticate the virtual machine by signing with the key of the authority 210 and sending it to the user. The virtual machine is authenticated by determining whether the hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine received from the authentication protocol 121 matches one of the hash value lists of the kernel image of the trusted virtual machine. The hash value list of the kernel image of the virtual machine may be preset or may be set to the hash values of the kernel image of the trusted virtual machine provided by the cloud service provider.

After authenticating the virtual machine, the nonce and secure cell host key received from the authentication protocol 121 are signed using the key of the certification authority 210 and then transmitted to the user so as to provide authentication to the user . The user can judge whether the nonce received from the certification authority 210 is the same as the nonce that he transmitted together with the virtual machine authentication request, so that the user can use the virtual machine with confidence when the nonce is the same.

3 to 4 are user virtual machine devices according to an embodiment of the present invention.

The user virtual machine device may be comprised of a management domain, an independent domain, a mini-domain, a trusted hypervisor, and hardware. The management domain includes various drivers, manages a virtual machine (VM), and performs a user process. The mini domain, which is an independent domain, is a separate domain created from the management domain, and may be called a mini domain. The protocol for authentication may be located in the hypervisor, as shown in FIG. 3, or in a mini domain, which is an independent domain, as shown in FIG. As shown in FIG. 3, when the authentication protocol is located in the hypervisor, it is possible to improve the reliability of the system by being located in a mini domain operating with a lower authority than the hypervisor, as shown in FIG. The authentication data may be stored in a Trusted Platform Board (TPB), which is accessed by a mini domain, which is an independent domain, exclusively. Not only the reliability flat board, but also a PCI device capable of storing permanent data.

5 illustrates running an independent domain of a user virtual machine device in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.

In order to create a mini domain that is an independent domain, the management domain first stores the kernel image from the hardware using the disk driver. The kernel image may be modified by the management domain so that the kernel image is not directly loaded from the management domain into the mini domain but via the trusted hypervisor. The hash value generated from the kernel image stored in the management domain is compared with the hash value stored in the hypervisor, and the mini domain can be executed by loading the kernel image into the mini domain only when the two hash values are equal to each other. This prevents malicious administrators from changing the kernel image of the mini domain.

Figure 6 illustrates a method for authenticating a virtual machine of a user virtual machine device in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.

When a user sends a virtual machine creation request including a nonce to a cloud manager, the cloud manager selects a node to create the virtual machine, copies the kernel image, and transmits the copied image to the corresponding node do. The node signs the node ID, the hash value of the kernel image, the nonce, and the secure cell host key, and sends it to the Certificate Authority. The certification authority authenticates the virtual machine using the hash value of the kernel image, signs the nonce and secure cell host key, and sends it to the user to notify the virtual machine that the virtual machine has been authenticated. The user can confirm that the virtual machine has been authenticated from the certification authority and can safely use the virtual machine.

7 is a flowchart of a method for improving the reliability of a user virtual machine in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.

In order to improve the reliability of the user virtual machine, authentication can be performed using an independent domain independent of the management domain. Here, the independent domain is a domain that can access the authentication device for storing the authentication data for authenticating the virtual machine. The authentication device may be a hardware device that permanently stores data and supports cryptographic operations, or may be a PCI device that permanently stores data, and the hypervisor may use the input / output page table of the input / output memory management device (IOMMU) Only the domain can access the authentication device. The independent domain is one virtual machine, and performs the method of FIG. 7 so that the independent domain can be executed in a secure environment.

In operation 710, the kernel image of the independent domain is stored in the memory of the management domain using the disk driver of the management domain.

More specifically, the step of storing a kernel image of an independent domain is the same as generating a kernel image of another virtual machine. The detailed description of this step corresponds to the detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of FIG. 1 and is replaced with a detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of FIG.

In step 720, the kernel image of the independent domain stored in the management domain is transferred to the hypervisor.

More specifically, for a safe execution environment of an independent domain, a kernel image of an independent domain from a management domain is not directly loaded into an independent domain, but a kernel image of the independent domain stored in the management domain, To the hypervisor. The detailed description of this step corresponds to the detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of FIG. 1 and is replaced with a detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of FIG.

In step 730, the hypervisor determines whether the first hash value generated from the kernel image of the independent domain received from the management domain matches the second hash value of the kernel image of the independent domain stored in the hypervisor .

More specifically, in order to check whether a kernel image of the independent domain received from the management domain has been changed by a malicious administrator, a first hash value generated from a kernel image of the independent domain received from the management domain, It is determined whether the second hash value of the kernel image of the independent domain stored by the visor matches the second hash value. The detailed description of this step corresponds to the detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of FIG. 1 and is replaced with a detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of FIG.

If it is determined that the first hash value matches the second hash value in operation 740, the hypervisor loads the kernel image of the independent domain received from the management domain into the independent domain, .

More specifically, if it is determined in step 730 that the first hash value matches the second hash value, the kernel image of the independent domain received from the management domain is not changed by the malicious administrator. And loads the independent domain into the independent domain. The detailed description of this step corresponds to the detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of FIG. 1 and is replaced with a detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of FIG.

8 is a flowchart of a method for improving the reliability of a user virtual machine according to an embodiment of the present invention.

In order to improve the reliability of the user virtual machine, the user can perform authentication with respect to the virtual machine to be used. An authentication authority may be used for authentication of the virtual machine and an authentication protocol capable of communicating with the authentication authority may be used. The method of FIG. 8 is performed to authenticate the virtual machine.

Step 810 is a step in which the management domain receives a virtual machine creation request including a nonce which is a random number from the user.

More specifically, when a request to create a virtual machine is made from a user, a random number is received together with a random number to prevent a session reuse attack. The detailed description of this step corresponds to the detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of FIG. 1 and is replaced with a detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of FIG.

In step 820, the management domain selects a node to create the virtual machine, copies the kernel image of the virtual machine for creation of the virtual machine, and transmits the copied image to the selected node together with the nonce.

More specifically, a node of the hardware to which a new virtual machine to be generated is to be assigned is selected, and the kernel image of the virtual machine for creating a virtual machine is copied and transmitted to the selected node together with the nonce. The detailed description of this step corresponds to the detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of FIG. 1 and is replaced with a detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of FIG.

In step 830, the node calculates a hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine and executes the virtual machine.

More specifically, the hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine necessary for authentication of the certification authority is calculated, and the virtual machine is executed. The detailed description of this step corresponds to the detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of FIG. 1 and is replaced with a detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of FIG.

In step 840, after the authentication protocol of the independent domain signs the nonce, the hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine, and the ssh host key using the key generated upon registration of the node, And receiving authentication for the virtual machine.

More specifically, after an authentication protocol communicating with an authentication authority has signed using the nonce, a hash value of a kernel image of the virtual machine, and a key generated at the time of registration of the node with the secure host key (ssh host key) To the certification authority. Authentication from the certification authority to the virtual machine is performed as follows. If the hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine received by the certification authority matches with the hash value list of the kernel image of the virtual machine stored in the certification authority, the kernel image of the received virtual machine is malicious It can be authenticated by determining that it has not been changed by the administrator and by signing the received nonce and the secure cell host key using the key of the certification authority and then delivering it to the user. The user who has received the nonce and the secure cell host key from the certification authority checks the nonce that is transmitted along with the virtual machine creation request and the received nonce in step 810. If the nonce is the same nonce, A virtual machine can be used. The detailed description of this step corresponds to the detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of FIG. 1 and is replaced with a detailed description of the user virtual machine device 100 of FIG.

Embodiments of the present invention may be implemented in the form of program instructions that can be executed on various computer means and recorded on a computer readable medium. The computer-readable medium may include program instructions, data files, data structures, and the like, alone or in combination. The program instructions recorded on the medium may be those specially designed and constructed for the present invention or may be available to those skilled in the art of computer software. Examples of computer-readable media include magnetic media such as hard disks, floppy disks and magnetic tape; optical media such as CD-ROMs and DVDs; magnetic media such as floppy disks; Magneto-optical media, and hardware devices specifically configured to store and execute program instructions such as ROM, RAM, flash memory, and the like. Examples of program instructions include machine language code such as those produced by a compiler, as well as high-level language code that can be executed by a computer using an interpreter or the like. The hardware devices described above may be configured to operate as one or more software modules to perform the operations of the present invention, and vice versa.

As described above, the present invention has been described with reference to particular embodiments, such as specific elements, and specific embodiments and drawings. However, it should be understood that the present invention is not limited to the above- And various modifications and changes may be made thereto by those skilled in the art to which the present invention pertains.

Accordingly, the spirit of the present invention should not be construed as being limited to the embodiments described, and all of the equivalents or equivalents of the claims, as well as the following claims, belong to the scope of the present invention .

100: User virtual machine device
110: Admin Domain
120: Independent domain
121: Authentication Protocol
130: hypervisor
140: Hardware
150: Authentication device
200: User virtual machine system
210: Certification Body

Claims (14)

A user virtual machine device in a cloud computing environment,
An administrative domain that creates and manages virtual machines;
An authentication device for storing authentication data for authenticating the virtual machine;
A virtual platform for executing the virtual machine, the hypervisor isolating the authentication device; And
An independent domain that accesses the authentication device only,
The hypervisor includes:
Output page table of the input / output memory management device (IOMMU) so that only the independent domain can access the authentication device.
The method according to claim 1,
Wherein the authentication device is a hardware device that permanently stores data and supports cryptographic operations, or is a PCI device that permanently stores data.
delete The method according to claim 1,
The hypervisor includes:
Comparing a first hash value generated from a kernel image of the independent domain received from the management domain with a second hash value of a kernel image of the independent domain stored by the hypervisor,
And if the first hash value and the second hash value match, executing the independent domain by loading the kernel image of the independent domain received from the management domain into the independent domain.
The method according to claim 1,
Wherein the independent domain comprises an authentication protocol in communication with a certificate authority for authentication of the virtual machine.
6. The method of claim 5,
The management domain includes:
When receiving a virtual machine creation request including a random number that is a random number from a user, selects a node to create the virtual machine, copies the kernel image of the virtual machine for creation of the virtual machine, To the selected node,
Wherein the authentication protocol comprises:
The hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine and the key generated at the time of registration of the node and the secure cell host key (ssh host key) are transmitted to the certification authority to authenticate the virtual machine ,
The virtual machine includes:
And if the hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine matches one of the list of kernel image hash values of the virtual machine stored by the certification authority.
In a user virtual machine system in a cloud computing environment,
An administrative domain that creates and manages virtual machines;
An authentication device for storing authentication data for authenticating the virtual machine;
A virtual platform for executing the virtual machine, the hypervisor isolating the authentication device;
An independent domain comprising an authentication protocol that accesses the authentication device only and communicates with a certificate authority for authentication of the virtual machine; And
And an authentication authority for authenticating the virtual machine using a hash value of a kernel image of the virtual machine received through communication with the authentication protocol,
The hypervisor includes:
Output page table of the input / output memory management device (IOMMU) so that only the independent domain can access the authentication device.
8. The method of claim 7,
The hypervisor includes:
Comparing a first hash value generated from a kernel image of the independent domain received from the management domain with a second hash value of a kernel image of the independent domain stored by the hypervisor,
Wherein the independent domain is executed by loading the kernel image of the independent domain received from the management domain into the independent domain when the first hash value matches the second hash value.
8. The method of claim 7,
When receiving a virtual machine creation request including a random number that is a random number from a user, selects a node to create the virtual machine, copies the kernel image of the virtual machine for creation of the virtual machine, To the selected node,
Wherein the authentication protocol comprises:
The hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine and the key generated at the time of registration of the node and the secure cell host key (ssh host key) are transmitted to the certification authority to authenticate the virtual machine ,
Wherein the certification authority authenticates the virtual machine by comparing the hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine received from the authentication protocol with a list of hash values stored in advance, and transmits the received nonce and the secure cell host key to the certification authority And transmits the signature to the user.
A method for improving reliability of a user virtual machine in a cloud computing environment,
Storing a kernel image of an independent domain in a memory of a management domain using a disk driver of the management domain;
Transferring a kernel image of the independent domain stored in the management domain to a hypervisor;
Determining whether the first hash value generated from the kernel image of the independent domain received by the hypervisor matches the second hash value of the kernel image of the independent domain stored in the hypervisor;
Executing the independent domain by loading the kernel image of the independent domain received from the management domain into the independent domain if the first hash value matches the second hash value as a result of the determination; Including,
The independent domain accesses only an authentication device that stores authentication data for authenticating the virtual machine,
The hypervisor includes:
Wherein the independent domain is accessible only to the authentication device using the input / output page table of the input / output memory management device (IOMMU).
11. The method of claim 10,
Wherein the authentication device is a hardware device that permanently stores data and supports cryptographic operations, or is a PCI device that permanently stores data.
11. The method of claim 10,
The hypervisor includes:
Output page table of the input / output memory management device (IOMMU) so that only the independent domain can access the authentication device.
A method for improving reliability of a user virtual machine in a cloud computing environment,
Receiving a virtual machine creation request including a nonce that is a random number from the management domain;
Selecting a node for which the management domain will create the virtual machine, copying a kernel image of the virtual machine for creation of the virtual machine, and transmitting the copied kernel image to the selected node together with the nonce;
The node calculating a hash value of a kernel image of the virtual machine and executing the virtual machine; And
The authentication protocol of the independent domain signing using the nonce, the hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine, and the key generated upon registration of the node with the secure host key (ssh host key) And receiving authentication for the virtual machine,
Wherein the independent domain comprises:
Accessing an authentication device for storing authentication data for authenticating the virtual machine,
The virtual machine includes:
If the hash value of the kernel image of the virtual machine received by the certification authority matches with the hash value list of the kernel image of the virtual machine stored in the certification authority, the kernel image of the received virtual machine is malicious Characterized in that it is determined that it has not been changed by the administrator and is authenticated by signing the received nonce and the secure cell host key using the key of the certification authority and then delivering it to the user.
A computer-readable recording medium storing a program for causing a computer to execute the method according to any one of claims 10 to 13.

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