KR101373542B1 - System for Privacy Protection which uses Logical Network Division Method based on Virtualization - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention discloses a privacy protection system and method based on logical network separation. According to an aspect of the present invention, a user terminal based on logical network separation may read and write in a general mode in which access to an internal network providing personal information and sensitive information is limited, and may access the internal network, but may access an external network. General storage used read-only in secure mode, where access to the server is limited; An encrypted virtual store that is indeterminate and inaccessible in the normal mode, and that is invisible, accessible, read and write in the secure mode; And a virtualization manager that, when installed and executed, controls executable processes, access allowance and disconnection to the internal network and the external network in the normal mode and the security mode according to the security policy provided by the virtualization server. Characterized in that.

Description

System for Privacy Protection which uses Logical Network Division Method based on Virtualization}

The present invention relates to a personal information protection system, and more particularly to a logical network separation-based personal information protection system and method that can prevent the leakage of personal information and sensitive information even if the user terminal is taken over by an attacker.

Recently, personal information leakage accidents continue to occur, and the importance of personal information protection is increasing.

Accordingly, the government and the National Assembly have enacted and amended the Information and Communication Network Act and enacted and enforced the Personal Information Protection Act (enacted on September 30, 2012) to impose legal obligations on the safety of personal information to individuals and companies.

In addition, with the announcement of the standard notification for the safety management of personal information (Ministry of Public Administration and Security, September 30, 2012), security companies are developing and providing privacy compliance technology and solutions.

Typically, there is a "Host Data Loss Prevention Solution" (hereinafter referred to as Host DLP), and the core technologies of the Host DLP solution are information management and control technology and information flow control technology. Here, the information holding status management and control technology is to search for files containing personal information and sensitive information stored in the disk of the user terminal and take measures such as encryption, deletion, and quarantine. In addition, the information flow control technology restricts or controls the transmission of files containing personal and sensitive information to the Internet, copying, printing, etc. to a portable storage medium (eg, USB).

Since the core technology of the Host DLP solution meets the compliance requirements for privacy, it is widely used in the information security technology and solution market.

However, if a particular user terminal of a target enterprise and organization is attacked by a new target hacking technique, Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attack, the compliance function of the applied host DLP may be disabled, even if the attacker arbitrarily generates it. Personal and sensitive information can be leaked through a custom communication channel (collectively referred to as a user-defined protocol-based communication channel using well-known ports to help attackers bypass the detection of firewalls or other security systems). have.

Therefore, there is a need for a new function and technology that can be prepared in case the user terminal is taken over by the attacker, the compliance function of the host DLP is disabled, information leakage through the individual communication channel is attempted.

The present invention has been made in the technical background as described above, and can prevent the leakage of personal and sensitive information due to new threats by the convergence technology of file system virtualization, storage encryption, process and network access control of the user terminal. Its purpose is to provide a privacy protection system and method based on logical network separation.

According to an aspect of the present invention, a user terminal based on logical network separation may read and write in a general mode in which access to an internal network providing personal information and sensitive information is limited, and may access the internal network, but may access an external network. General storage used read-only in secure mode, where access to the server is limited; An encrypted virtual store that is indeterminate and inaccessible in the normal mode, and that is invisible, accessible, read and write in the secure mode; And a virtualization manager that, when installed and executed, controls executable processes, access allowance and disconnection to the internal network and the external network in the normal mode and the security mode according to the security policy provided by the virtualization server. Characterized in that.

Logical network separation-based virtualization server according to another aspect of the present invention, the policy management unit for managing the security policy to be provided to the virtualization manager installed in the user terminal; When the virtualization manager is first installed in the user terminal, it receives and stores user information input by the user, and when the virtualization manager attempts to switch from the normal mode to the secure mode at the request of the user, A manager manager which performs authority authentication based on the user information according to the authority authentication request; And when the virtualization manager requests approval of a copy job by an execution process of the user terminal in the secure mode, requests the approval to the approver or the person in charge of privacy, and approves the permission of the approver or person in charge of privacy. And an approval settlement management unit for approving or returning the copy job by the execution process in response to the return.

According to another aspect of the present invention, a method for protecting personal information based on logical network separation by a virtualization manager installed in a user terminal, the method comprising: requesting an agent authentication based on a user ID and password from a virtualization server; If the agent is authenticated by the virtualization server, receiving and storing a security policy from the virtualization server; In a normal mode, restricting access to an internal network providing personal and sensitive information, allowing access to an external network, and controlling the general storage to read and write; Requesting authorization of the user from the virtualization server when a switch from the normal mode to the secure mode is requested by the user; And upon receiving the authorization authentication by the virtualization server, enters the secure mode, permits access to the internal network, blocks access to the external network, controls the general storage to be read-only, and Mounting the encrypted virtual storage, which cannot be identified and accessed in the normal mode, is used as a storage path of a process executable in the secure mode.

According to the present invention, the storage area of the user terminal is not accessible to the internal network that handles personal or sensitive information, and is accessible to the external network, the general storage used in the normal mode, and accessible only to the internal network. It is possible to prevent leakage of personal information and sensitive information by managing it by classifying it into encrypted virtual storage which is inaccessible and used in a secure mode.

In addition, the present invention does not mount the virtual storage, if the agent authentication and authorization through the virtualization server is not received, so that the user can not check and access, the user terminal or hard disk (HDD) to which the present invention is applied is stolen Even if it is stolen or leaked, the agent authentication and authority authentication cannot be performed, and thus files containing personal and confidential information stored in the virtual storage may not be leaked.

Furthermore, the present invention encrypts the virtual storage with a high encryption ratio by an IT security certification bureau of the National Intelligence Service or an encryption module specified and verified on a common standard for CC (Common Criteria) certification. This makes it impossible to recover the virtual store to plain text files, which can be very secure.

In addition, the present invention is a general repository to export a file containing personal or confidential information stored in the virtual storage to the outside, even if the user terminal is seized by an attacker by an intelligent persistent threat (APT) attack, or user account acquisition, etc. When the user attempts to copy the file, the user's approval request can be filtered by the approver or the person in charge of protecting personal information, thereby preventing the user from leaking the file.

Furthermore, the present invention can not only provide functions of the privacy compliance system through logical network separation but also can be used by installing one plug-in type program (virtualization manager) in the user terminal. It can also be easily interworked with agents of the host DLP system or DB access control system to provide an integrated environment of a strong privacy compliance system.

1 is a conceptual diagram illustrating a personal information protection system based on logical network separation of the present invention.
2 is a block diagram showing a personal information protection system based on logical network separation of the present invention.
3 is a block diagram illustrating a virtualization manager of the present invention.
4 is a diagram showing an example of screen control of the screen control module of the present invention;

Advantages and features of the present invention and methods for achieving them will be apparent with reference to the embodiments described below in detail with the accompanying drawings. The present invention may, however, be embodied in many different forms and should not be construed as being limited to the embodiments set forth herein. Rather, these embodiments are provided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete, and will fully convey the scope of the invention to those skilled in the art. Is provided to fully convey the scope of the invention to those skilled in the art, and the invention is only defined by the scope of the claims. It is to be understood that the terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the invention. In the present specification, the singular form includes plural forms unless otherwise specified in the specification. As used herein, the terms " comprises, " and / or "comprising" refer to the presence or absence of one or more other components, steps, operations, and / Or additions.

Embodiments of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. 1 is a conceptual diagram showing a personal information protection system based on logical network separation according to an embodiment of the present invention, Figure 2 is a block diagram showing a personal information protection system based on logical network separation according to an embodiment of the present invention. .

As shown in FIG. 2, the personal information protection system 20 according to the embodiment of the present invention includes a user terminal 100 and a virtualization server 200 in which the virtualization manager 110 is installed.

As shown in FIG. 1, the virtualization manager 110 is installed in the user terminal 100 to perform a process execution control function and a network access control function in a normal mode and a security mode, respectively, based on a security policy.

When the virtualization manager 110 is first installed in the user terminal 100, the user requests a user to receive user information including a user name, company number, department code, user ID, user password, IP address, and the like, and user information. To the virtualization server 200.

The virtualization manager 110 is automatically executed at the time of booting the user terminal 100, and operates in a normal mode after agent authentication based on a user ID and password.

When the mode switch is requested by the user, the virtualization manager 110 requests the virtualization server 200 to switch to the secure mode after authorization authentication. In this case, the virtualization manager 110 downloads the updated security policy from the virtualization server 200 and stores it. Here, the security policy may be a process name to block execution, an IP address and URL list to control access, and a size of the virtual store.

The virtualization manager 110 blocks access to the internal network providing personal or sensitive information in the normal mode, and does not mount the virtual storage 150, thereby allowing access to the virtual storage 150 as well as confirmation. Instead, it only allows access to the external network and general storage 140.

The virtualization manager 110 only allows access to the processes and the internal network allowed in the secure mode.

In the secure mode, the virtualization manager 110 controls the general storage 140 to be read only, and controls the virtual storage 150 for read / write.

In the secure mode, the virtualization manager 110, when an executing process (for example, an application) edits a file in the general storage 140, receives approval from the virtualization server 200, and then copies on write. The function resets the path of the editing operation to the virtual storage 150.

In addition, when the virtualization manager 110 performs a write operation on the general storage 140, the virtualization manager 110 resets the path of the write operation to the virtual storage 150.

As such, the virtualization manager 110 of the present invention permits only an authorized network connection, such as an internal network or an internal system, to transmit or store personal information or sensitive information by an authorized network connection. ), So that only personal information or sensitive information is stored in the virtual storage 150, and when copying to the general storage 140, the personal information or sensitive information can be copied after approval payment to prevent leakage of personal information or sensitive information. You can prevent it. In addition, since the virtualization manager 110 blocks access (access) to external networks and unauthorized systems in a secure mode, personal or sensitive information may be prevented from leaking through unauthorized access. Meanwhile, detailed components of the virtualization manager 110 will be described later with reference to FIG. 3.

As shown in FIG. 2, the virtualization server 200 includes a policy manager 220, a manager manager 210, and an approval management manager 230. Hereinafter, each component of the virtualization server 200 will be described.

The policy manager 220 defines a security policy to be applied by the virtualization manager 110 installed in each user terminal 100. Here, the security policy includes at least one of a process name to be blocked in each mode, an IP address and URL list to control access, and a size of the virtual storage (for example, several MB). In this case, the security policy can be defined and applied to each user or department.

The manager manager 210 receives and stores the user information including the user name, the department or the personnel information such as the rank, the user IP address, the user ID or the user information including authentication information such as the user password from the virtualization manager 110.

When the manager manager 210 receives the user ID and password from the virtualization manager 110 executed after the booting of the user terminal 100, the manager manager 210 performs agent authentication.

When the manager manager 210 receives the authorization authentication from the virtualization manager 110 to the secure mode from the virtual manager 110, the manager manager 210 verifies that the virtualization manager and the authentication information are valid, and if it is valid, the authorization is authenticated. .

The manager manager 210 receives a hash value generated from a combination of [agent ID | user ID | user password | IP address] from the virtualization manager 110 and hashes it, and compares the hashed value with the value stored in the database. do.

At this time, if the hashed value and the stored value match, the manager manager 210 determines that it is valid virtualization manager and authentication information. Otherwise, the manager manager 210 determines that it is invalid virtualization manager and authentication information.

Thereafter, the manager manager 210 notifies the virtualization manager 110 of the authentication success if it is a valid virtualization manager and authentication information, or notifies the virtualization manager 110 of the authentication failure.

If the approval management unit 230 requests a new approval for the copy job from the virtual storage 150 to the general storage 140 by the virtualization manager 110, it requests a approval from a predetermined approver.

The approval settlement management unit 230 requests approval from the approver or the person in charge of personal information protection by text message or e-mail, and the approver or person in charge of personal information protection confirms the request for approval, referring to the approval request time and prior approval status. Approve or return the request.

For example, if the approver finds that the time the approval request time is received is outside of business hours (e.g., midnight hours) or overlaps with the user's travel / vacation / out of office hours, the approver determines that it is an abnormal approval request and You can return.

At this time, the approving authority may determine that the emergency situation is suspected of leaking information, and may take actions such as reporting to the police. Alternatively, if the approval request is rejected, the approval management manager 230 may perform a predetermined operation to cope with an emergency situation.

As such, the virtualization manager 110 of the present invention divides and manages the storage area of the user terminal 100 into the general storage 140 and the encrypted virtual storage 150, and cannot access the external network in the security mode. Only editing of the virtual storage 150 is allowed, and in the normal mode, the virtual storage 150 is invisible and is not accessible, thereby preventing the leakage of personal information and sensitive information.

In addition, if the user terminal 100 to which the virtualization manager 110 of the present invention is applied does not receive the agent authentication and the authorization of the virtualization server 200, the user terminal 100 is not mounted and cannot be accessed, and thus, the virtualization manager 110 of the present invention. Even if the user terminal 100 or the hard disk (HDD) to which the is applied is stolen or leaked, a file including personal information and confidential information stored in the virtual storage 150 may not be leaked.

In addition, the present invention, even if the user terminal 100 is seized by an attacker by an intelligent persistent threat (APT) attack or by obtaining a user account, the general storage 140 to export the file stored in the virtual storage 150 to the outside. If you try to copy the file, the authorization is performed and the access to the external network is blocked, so the file leakage to the outside by an unauthenticated user can be blocked.

Furthermore, since the virtual storage 150 of the present invention is encrypted with a high encryption ratio by an IT security certification office of the National Intelligence Service or an encryption module specified and verified on a common standard for CC (Common Criteria) authentication, It cannot be restored to the plain text file by any means other than the encryption module, so that the security of the virtual storage 150 is further ensured.

Hereinafter, a detailed configuration of a virtualization manager according to an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to FIG. 3. 3 is a block diagram illustrating a virtualization manager according to an embodiment of the present invention.

As shown in FIG. 3, the virtualization manager 110 according to an embodiment of the present invention may include an authentication / communication module 111, an encrypted storage management module 112, a file system control module 116, and a screen control module 113. ), Program execution control module 114 and network control module 115.

When the virtualization manager 110 is executed, the authentication / communication module 111 performs agent authentication based on a user ID and a password.

The authentication / communication module 111 downloads the updated security policy from the virtualization server 200 after agent authentication, and at least one of the file system control module 116, the program execution control module 114, and the network control module 115. To pass on.

In the running state of the virtualization manager 110, the authentication / communication module 111 requests permission authorization from the virtualization server 200 when a mode switch is requested from the normal mode to the security mode. At this time, the authentication / communication module 111 transmits the hash value generated by the combination of [agent ID | user ID | user password | IP address]. Thereafter, the authentication / communication module 111 receives a message indicating the authentication success or authentication failure for the authorization authentication request from the virtualization server 200 and transmits the message to the file system control module 116.

In addition, the authentication / communication module 111 transmits an approval request to the virtualization server 200 when a copy job is requested from the virtual storage 150 to the general storage 140 by the user. In this case, the authentication / communication module 111 transmits a file name, a file storage path, or a hash value generated using at least one text included in the file to the virtualization server 200. In addition, the authentication / communication module 111 receives a message indicating the authentication or return of the virtualization server 200 for the approval request for the copy job and delivers a message to the file system control module 116.

The authentication / communication module 111 transmits the audit log corresponding to the copy job generated by the file system control module 116 to the virtualization server 200.

The file system control module 116 re-directs the storage area accessed by the process executed in the secure mode to the virtual storage 150 in association with the file system driver 120.

The file system control module 116 performs a process control function according to a predetermined security policy when a copy operation from the virtual storage 150 to the general storage 140 is requested in the secure mode. In this case, the file system control module 116 may control the copy operation in a manner such as unconditionally blocking or allowing after approval by the virtualization server 200.

Specifically, when the file system control module 116 performs the permission after approval method, the file system control module 116 requests the virtual server 200 to approve the copy operation through the authentication / communication module 111, and the authentication / communication module 111. When the approval success is confirmed through), the copy operation from the virtual storage 150 to the general storage 140 is allowed. On the other hand, if the file system control module 116 confirms the approval failure through the authentication / communication module 111, the file system control module 116 notifies the user of the disallowing a copy operation from the virtual storage 150 to the general storage 140, or the security policy. Take countermeasures (administrator notification, etc.) corresponding to the

When the file system control module 116 completes copying the requested file from the virtual storage 150 to the general storage 140, the file system control module 116 generates an audit log including file information to generate the audit log through the authentication / communication module 111. To send).

The encryption storage management module 112 mounts the virtual storage 150 in the form of a virtual driver of the user terminal 100 (for example, a virtual CD) when the authorization authentication is successful in the secure mode, and in the secure mode in the normal mode. Once switched, the virtual repository 150 is automatically unmounted. In this case, the encrypted storage management module 112 may generate and mount the virtual storage 150 having a size corresponding to the security policy.

That is, the cryptographic storage management module 112 enables the user to check the general store 140 and the virtual store 150 in the secure mode, only the normal store 140 in the normal mode, and the virtual store 150. ) Cannot be verified.

The encrypted storage management module 112 encrypts the data with a high encryption ratio and stores the data in the virtual storage 150. Here, encrypting with a high encryption ratio means that the current supercomputing technology performs a decryptable level only after at least five years of operation.

When the screen control module 113 is switched to the security mode, the screen control module 113 automatically changes the desktop to emphasize that the current mode is the security mode.

For example, the screen control module 113 may display a normal desktop in a normal mode as shown in FIG. 4, and display a letter and an icon of “running the PC secure virtual environment” on the desktop in the security mode. .

The program execution control module 114 shares information of a program (or process) executable in the security mode with the screen control module 113 corresponding to the security policy. Accordingly, the screen control module 113 may display only the shortcut icon of the program executable in the security mode on the desktop based on the information of the shared executable program.

The program execution control module 114 blocks execution of programs other than the executable program displayed on the desktop in the secure mode.

For example, when the program execution control module 114 is switched to the security mode, the program execution control module 114 searches for processes running in the operating system, such as Explorer.exe and gmer.exe, in addition to the process management program "Taskmgr.exe" provided by the Windows operating system. do. The program execution control module 114 blocks the execution of the process explorer or the execution process of the similar program among the searched processes according to the security policy.

The network control module 115, in connection with the network driver 130 for network separation, permits access only to network systems and web URLs allowed to access programs executed in normal mode and security mode according to the security policy. Block the connection.

For example, the network control module 115, in connection with the network driver 130 for network separation, permits only access to the personal information processing system of the internal network in a secure mode, and blocks other access to the Internet and unauthorized systems. do.

In addition, the network control module 115 in connection with the network driver 130 for network separation does not allow the connection of the internal network in the normal mode, and allows only the connection of the external network.

The network driver 130 for network separation actually controls a network connection through TCP / IP packet control according to the instruction of the network control module 115.

Specifically, the network control module 115 checks the blacklist to be blocked in the normal mode and the whitelist to be allowed in the security mode in the security policy downloaded from the virtualization server 200. In addition, the network control module 115 transmits the blacklist based control command to the network separation network driver 130 in the normal mode, and transmits the whitelist based control command to the network separation network driver 130 in the security mode. . Then, in the normal mode, the network separation network driver 130 blocks transmission and reception of a packet corresponding to the server IP + server port combination included in the blacklist according to the blacklist based control command. In addition, the network driver 130 for network separation allows the transmission and reception of packets corresponding to the server IP + server port combination included in the white list according to the white list based control command.

Meanwhile, in the above example, the authentication / communication module 111, the encryption storage management module 112, the screen control module 113, the program execution control module 114, the network control module 115, and the file system control module 116 are described. Has been described as an example consisting of the respective components, each module may provide a comprehensive function of the other module, of course.

On the other hand, the virtualization manager 110 of the present invention may further perform the following self-protection function.

The encrypted storage management module 112 stores the user password, the encryption key associated with the operation of the virtualization manager 110, the setting values of the virtualization manager 110, audit data, and the like in the encrypted virtual storage 150. In addition, the encrypted storage management module 112 inevitably stores such information in a file system or a registry when it is stored. Therefore, the encrypted storage management module 112 can prevent exposure to unauthorized users or attackers who have illegally obtained user rights, and can secure confidentiality.

The manager manager 210 or another component may be configured at least once when the virtualization manager 110 is executed, a system setting value (security policy, execution environment), an executable file of the virtualization manager 110, a file system driver 120, or the like. The network driver 130 for network separation may be verified using a hash algorithm, and the result of the integrity verification may be notified to an administrator through an e-mail.

When the manager management unit 210 or another component detects the forged information as a result of the integrity verification, the final system setting value, the executable file, the file system driver 120 or the network driver 130 for network separation that did not have any abnormality in the past integrity. ), Etc.

On the other hand, the virtualization manager 110 may provide a random termination prevention function of the executable file so that it is not terminated arbitrarily by malicious code or unauthorized forced termination command.

As described above, the present invention allows access only to the personal information processing system (web, DB), etc., which is caused in the secure mode, and blocks access to Naver, the following Internet portal sites, or other unspecified Internet sites. Even if the user terminal 100 is secured by an attacker, personal information leakage through the Internet may be fundamentally blocked.

While the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings, it is to be understood that the invention is not limited to the above-described embodiments. Those skilled in the art will appreciate that various modifications, Of course, this is possible. Accordingly, the scope of protection of the present invention should not be limited to the above-described embodiments, but should be determined by the description of the following claims.

Claims (13)

Read and write in normal mode, where access to the internal network providing personal and sensitive information is restricted, and access to the internal network but limited to access to the external network. General store;
An encrypted virtual store that is indeterminate and inaccessible in the normal mode, and that is invisible, accessible, read and write in the secure mode; And
When installed and executed, the virtual mode manager includes a virtualization manager for controlling access to and blocking access to the executable process, the internal network and the external network in the normal mode and the security mode according to the security policy provided by the virtualization server. ,
The virtualization manager,
When the copy job is requested from the virtual storage to the general storage by the executable process in the secure mode, requesting the virtual server to approve the copy job, and when receiving the approval of the virtual server, Allowing said copy operation
Logical network separation based user terminal. The method of claim 1, wherein the virtualization manager,
When the execution is performed, after the agent authentication of the virtualization server operates in the normal mode, when a switch to the security mode is requested by the user, after receiving the user's authorization authentication to the virtualization server, the security mode is switched to Logical network separation based user terminal. Read and write in normal mode, where access to the internal network providing personal and sensitive information is restricted, and access to the internal network but limited to access to the external network. General store;
An encrypted virtual store that is indeterminate and inaccessible in the normal mode, and that is invisible, accessible, read and write in the secure mode; And
When installed and executed, the virtual mode manager includes a virtualization manager for controlling access to and blocking access to the executable process, the internal network and the external network in the normal mode and the security mode according to the security policy provided by the virtualization server. ,
The virtualization manager,
When the execution is performed, after the agent authentication of the virtualization server operates in the normal mode, when a switch to the security mode is requested by the user, after receiving the authority authentication of the user to the virtualization server, the security mode is switched to Sending a hash value generated by a combination of an agent ID, a user ID, a user password and an IP address when requesting the authorization authentication,
The virtualization server includes:
And receiving the hash value, hashing the hash value, and comparing the hashed value with a value stored in a database to perform authorization authentication for the user's switching to the security mode. delete The method of claim 1, wherein the virtualization manager,
Logical network separation based user terminal to generate an audit log including the file information of the copy operation after completion of the copy operation to the virtualization server. The method of claim 1, wherein the virtualization manager,
In the secure mode, the virtual storage is mounted and controlled to be identified and accessible, and in the normal mode, the virtual storage is unmounted to control the identification and access. User terminal. The method of claim 1, wherein the virtualization manager,
In the secure mode, a logical network separation based user terminal to display at least one of the icon and the character indicating that the security mode on the desktop. The method of claim 1, wherein the virtualization manager,
And in the secure mode, resetting the storage path of the executable processor to the virtual storage. A policy manager for managing a security policy to be provided to a virtualization manager installed in a user terminal;
When the virtualization manager is first installed in the user terminal, it receives and stores user information input by the user, and when the virtualization manager attempts to switch from the normal mode to the secure mode at the request of the user, A manager manager which performs authority authentication based on the user information according to the authority authentication request; And
When the virtualization manager requests the approval of the copy job by the execution process of the user terminal in the secure mode, the approver or the personal information protection officer requests the approval, and the approval or return of the approver or personal information protection officer. In response to the approval settlement management unit for approving or returning the copy job by the execution process
Logical network separation based virtualization server comprising a. The method of claim 9, wherein the payment management unit,
The approver or the person in charge of personal information is requested to approve the copying job by at least one of a text message and an e-mail. The virtual network server based on the logical network separation which approves or returns the copy operation by referring to at least one of the. As a privacy protection method based on logical network separation by a virtualization manager installed in a user terminal,
Requesting an agent authentication based on a user ID and a password to the virtualization server when first installed;
If the agent is authenticated by the virtualization server, receiving and storing a security policy from the virtualization server;
In a normal mode, restricting access to an internal network providing personal and sensitive information, allowing access to an external network, and controlling the general storage to read and write;
Requesting authorization of the user from the virtualization server when a switch from the normal mode to the secure mode is requested by the user; And
Upon receiving the authorization authentication by the virtualization server, the security mode is switched to allow access to the internal network, block access to the external network, control the general storage to be read-only, and general Mounting encrypted virtual storage, which is invisible and inaccessible in mode, to use as a storage path for processes executable in the secure mode.
Logical network separation based privacy protection method comprising a. 12. The method of claim 11,
Requesting approval for the copy job from the virtualization server when a copy job from the virtual storage to the general storage is requested by the executable process in the secure mode;
Allowing the copy operation for the executable process when the approval is completed by the virtualization server; And
Generating, after the completion of the copying operation by the executable process, an audit log including file information on which the copying operation is performed and transmitting the audit log to the virtualization server;
Logical network separation based privacy protection method comprising a. 12. The method of claim 11,
Limiting the executable process in the normal mode and the security mode according to the security policy
Logical network separation based privacy protection method further comprising.

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