KR100892616B1 - How to join a new device in a wireless sensor network - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention relates to a new device participation method in a wireless sensor network, and more particularly, by authenticating a new device participating in the network, and securely distributing the network key to be used for group communication in the network to the authenticated device. It solves the exposure problem, reduces the traffic concentrated in the trust center, reduces the network join time of the device, simplifies the management of the key used for encryption, and prevents intrusion from outside and participation of unauthorized devices. The present invention relates to a new device participation method in a wireless sensor network that can improve network stability.

for teeth,

In a wireless sensor network composed of a trust center, a router, and a device,

(a) an initialization step in which the trust center generates a private key and a public key of the trust center and a secret key of a device currently connected to the network;

(b) connecting a device to join a network with the router;

(c) the router authenticating the device;

(d) the trust center confirming the validity of the device;

(e) the router generating a link key and sending a message to the device by encrypting a network key through the link key;

and (f) the device using the message to authenticate the router, generate a link key, and decrypt the network key to provide a new device participation method in a wireless sensor network.

Wireless sensor network, Zigbee network, mutual authentication, link key, network key, trust center, public key, symmetric key, Wireless Sensor Network, ZigBee Network, link key, Network key, trust center, public key, symmetric key.

Description

{Method For Joining New Device In Wireless Sensor Network}

1 is a diagram showing a node configuration on a general Zigbee network;

2 is a diagram illustrating a network connection and network key distribution process of a device according to the prior art;

3 is a flowchart illustrating a new device participation process according to the present invention;

4 is a diagram illustrating an authentication and network key distribution process of a new device participating in a network according to the present invention;

5 is a view showing a PKAKE according to the present invention.

The present invention relates to a new device participation method in a wireless sensor network, and more particularly, by initializing a unique secret key for each device belonging to the network, authenticating a new device to newly participate in the network, and a link key. After generating a, and a method of joining a new device in a wireless sensor network for transmitting the encrypted network key using the generated link key.

Hereinafter, the ZigBee wireless standard is adopted as a standard of the wireless network for the present invention. However, the present invention is not limited thereto, and all wireless network standards that can be used by those skilled in the art to which the present invention pertains are described. Include.

In general, ZigBee refers to one of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard that supports near field communication. It is a technology for near field communication and ubiquitous computing within 10-20m in wireless networking field such as home and office.

In other words, Zigbee is a concept of a mobile phone or a wireless LAN. A feature different from the existing technology is a wireless sensor network standard that communicates a small amount of information instead of minimizing power consumption.

The Zigbee network as described above is utilized in short-range communication markets such as intelligent home networks, buildings, industrial equipment automation, logistics, environmental monitoring, human interfaces, telematics, military, and the like. Recently, it consumes a lot of power and consumes a lot of money, making it a ubiquitous solution for home networks.

The structure of the Zigbee network will be described with reference to FIG. 1. The Zigbee network is composed of a coordinator 101, a router 102, and an end device 103.

The coordinator 101 serves as a trust center for key distribution and management for encryption in the security of the network, and the router 102 performs routing for network configuration. The terminal device 103 can send and receive data through a router or directly with a coordinator. A network is generally configured between the coordinator 101 and the router 102 in a mesh topology, and a network topology of a tree structure is used between the terminal device 103 and the router 102.

When a new device 104 wishes to join the network, the device 104 wishing to join is connected to the network 105 via a message transfer with the router 102 and then serves as a trust center. Through the communication with the coordinator 101 (105) and 106, the network key for group communication is distributed. At this time, the router 102 serves as a relay in the middle.

In the conventional Zigbee network as described above, the communication is performed securely using a symmetric key cryptography. Each node performs point-to-point communication using a master key or a link key and performs group communication using a network key. When a new device joins the Zigbee network, the trust center delivers the master key to the device, generates a new link key using the device, and then securely transmits the network key using the generated link key. Use the method.

Hereinafter, referring to FIG. 2, a conventional method of receiving a network key securely from a new device 104 that wants to join a network in a Zigbee network will be described in detail.

The device 104 sends and receives a beacon message 201 and 202 with the router 102 to which a connection is being made, secures a channel, and then transmits a connection request message 203 over this channel, and this message is valid (203). If so, the router 102 sends a connection acknowledgment message 204 to the device to indicate that the device is connected.

Thereafter, when the router 102 sends an update-device command 206 to the trust center 101, the trust center 101 determines whether the new device 104 will be included in the network. After determining, the process of distributing the network key to the device 104 proceeds as follows.

When the trust center 101 transmits the master key to the device 104 (208, 209), the trust center 101 and the device 104 use the master key to set a symmetric-key key establishment (SKKE). (210) to generate a new secret key (link key) between each other by performing the protocol (210, 211, 212, 213). In this case, the router 102 plays a relay role 217 in the middle. If the SKKE protocol is successfully performed, the trust center 101 transmits the encrypted value of the network key to the device 104 using the generated link key (214). The device 104 then obtains the network key from the data transmitted to the trust center 101 using the link key to participate in the network (215). In this conventional method, the device 104 recognizes that the network key is obtained from the trust center 101 by authentication.

However, the conventional Zigbee network has the following problems.

First, there is a problem with key management in the trust center.

The trust center has a structural disadvantage in that it has to have not only the network key but also the master and link keys of all the nodes joined to the network, as well as the master key of all nodes to communicate with. Therefore, as the number of nodes on the network increases, more storage space is required in proportion.

Second, there is a problem that network security is disabled due to the exposure of the master key.

If the newly participating device 104 does not have a master key, the master key should be transmitted to the device 104 (208, 209) as shown in FIG. 2, in which the router 102 and the device 104 act as relays. Because no secure channel is secured between the master keys, the master key is exposed to the outside. When the master key is exposed, regardless of the safety of communication to be performed later, anyone can know the generated link key and the network key, and thus the entire network security is disabled.

Third, there is a problem that an intruder can connect to the network by disguising as a new device.

When the device requests to connect to the network, since the beacon request message 201 or the connection request message 202 is transmitted unencrypted, the IP address of the device has a risk of being exposed to the outside.

Therefore, even if a malicious external intruder uses the IP address of an exposed device to impersonate that device and send a connection request message to the network, the connection request message contains no information to determine whether the original device originated or will be issued by an external intruder. Because it is not, the network has no way of verifying that the received message is from a legitimate device. Therefore, an intruder can connect to the network without any doubt by disguising as a device. In this case, the intruder can obtain a master key and a link key and finally a network key, thereby defeating the security of the network.

Fourth, there is a problem that the load is concentrated in the trust center.

In other words, all devices that want to participate in the network are connected to the trust center to receive the master key, the link key and the network key so that all traffic is concentrated in the trust center. Thus, if the number of nodes to join the network increases, the load is concentrated in the trust center, resulting in a long communication time, which degrades the performance of the network system.

The present invention has been made in view of the above, and solves the problem of key management in a trust center, improves the efficiency of the network by reducing the traffic concentrated in the trust center, and intruders disguised as a new device The purpose of the present invention is to provide a new method for device participation in a wireless sensor network that can prevent network connection and improve the stability of the network by not using a master key.

The new device participation method in the wireless sensor network of the present invention as described above,

In a wireless sensor network composed of a trust center, a router, and a device,

(a) an initialization step in which the trust center generates a private key and a public key of the trust center and a secret key of a device currently connected to the network;

(b) connecting a device to join a network with the router;

(c) the router authenticating the device;

(d) the trust center confirming the validity of the device;

(e) the router generating a link key and sending a message to the device by encrypting a network key through the link key;

and (f) the device using the message to authenticate the router and generate a link key to decrypt the network key.

The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular example embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the present invention. A singular expression includes a plural expression unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. In this application, the terms “comprises” or “having” are intended to indicate that there is a feature, number, step, action, component, part, or combination thereof described in the specification, and one or more other It is to be understood that the present invention does not exclude the possibility of the presence or the addition of features, numbers, steps, operations, components, parts, or a combination thereof.

Prior to the detailed description of the invention, the parameters used in the present invention are summarized below.

: 소수

를 위수로 갖는 덧셈 군

Minority

Addition group with

: 소수

를 위수로 갖는 곱셈 군

Minority

Multiplication group with

:

의 생성원

:

Source of

: 패어링(pairing) 함수

: Pairing function

: 신뢰센터(trust center)

Trust center

: 라우터(router)

Router

: 네트워크에 새롭게 참여하려는 장치(device)

: Device to join the network

: 신뢰센터의 비밀키

: Secret Key of Trust Center

: 신뢰센터의 공개키

: Public key of trust center

: 장치 i의 IP 주소

: IP address of device i

: 장치 i의 공개키

: Public key of device i

: 장치 i의 비밀키

: Secret key of device i

,

: 해쉬함수

,

Hash Function

:네트워크키

Network key

:A와 B의 공유정보

A and B shared information

: A와 B의 링크키

: A and B Link Keys

: 키

를 이용하여 메시지

을 암호화

Key

Message using

Encrypt

: 키

를 이용하여 메시지

을 복호화

Key

Message using

Decrypt

는 다음 세가지 조건 ① 모든

와

에 대하여,

를 만족하는 겹선형성. ②

를 만족하는

의 존재성. ③ 모든

에 대한

계산의 효율성을 만족하는 함수이다.The pairing function

The following three conditions ① all

Wow

about,

Formation satisfying. ②

To satisfy

Presence. ③ all

For

This function satisfies the efficiency of computation.

In addition, the H1, H2 is a hash function, the hash function is a calculation method for generating a pseudo-random of a fixed length in a given text, the generated value is called a "hash value".

In the present invention, the hybrid encryption method is used to simplify the key management of the trust center and to greatly increase the security on the network. That is, in the present invention, the link key generation process uses public key cryptography and the network key distribution uses symmetric key cryptography.

Unlike symmetric key cryptography, which uses only a private key, public key cryptography uses a pair of public and private keys, where a secret key is kept secretly in the user's system and the public key is kept in a public repository. I can do it. Public key cryptography is largely divided into certificate-based cryptography and personal identification information-based cryptography. In certificate-based public key cryptography, a user's public key is linked to a user's personal identification information by an electronic certificate generated by a trusted third party. However, in a certificate infrastructure, a person's digital certificate must be verified before encrypting the information using the person's public key. Therefore, for a large number of users, the certificate infrastructure requires a large amount of computation time and storage space. In order to solve the certificate management problem, the present invention uses a personal identification information infrastructure. The public key encryption method based on personal identification information uses a user's public personal identification information such as an e-mail address as a public key, and a trusted third party uses his private key and the user's personal identification information. The user creates and uses this private key. Therefore, since the user receives the secret key from the secret key generator, the user can reduce the storage space and the calculation amount.

The present invention is also designed based on elliptic curve cryptography for light weight. Elliptic curve cryptography is known as a public key cryptography that is sufficiently applicable to sensor networks because it requires a much smaller key size while providing a similar level of security as conventional cryptography designed in finite bodies.

Hereinafter, a new device participation method in the Zigbee network according to the present invention will be described in detail with reference to FIGS. 3 and 4.

The present invention relates to a method for authenticating a device to participate in a Zigbee network, and securely distributing a network key to be used for group communication in a network to an authenticated device, as shown in FIG. 3. It is divided into a step 302, an authentication and link key generation step, and a network key distribution step 303 step, which are divided into a network participation completion step 304 or a network participation failure step 305 according to the result.

는 자신의 비밀키

및 공개키

를 계산하며, 자신의 비밀키와 각 노드의 IP주소를 이용하여 각 노드들의 비밀키

를 계산하고 시스템 파라미터

를 공개한다. First, in the initialization step 301 above, the trust center

Is his secret key

And public key

Compute each node's private key using its own private key and the IP address of each node.

Calculate the system parameters

To the public.

In the present invention, the secret key of each node is stored using a secure method such as being stored at the production stage or directly input by the user, and the public key of each node is an IP address which is their identification information.

In the present invention, the trust center T records and stores a list of IPs to be used as public keys of legitimate nodes participating in the network. When the network is established and the nodes are connected, the trust center T manages the IP list of the nodes connected to the network, and also manages the IP list of the nodes damaged or revoked from the network. The IP of the node included in this revocation list includes not only the malicious node or the damaged node, but also the IP of the node that voluntarily notified the network. When each node leaves the network or detects damage to its key, it informs Trust Center T of this status and notifies the revocation list of updates. However, because all nodes can not guarantee that they always inform themselves of their status, every node on the network monitors the status of its neighbors and detects the damage caused by the fraud or attack of a specific node. Notify. By managing the revocation list, Trust Center T also checks whether the IP of the device is registered in the revocation list when checking the participation request message, thereby preventing attempts to join the network by disguising the illegal device as a stolen key. .

를 이용하여 그룹통신을 한다.All nodes in the network communicate point-to-point using the link key and the network key.

Use group to communicate.

가 네트워크에 조인하고자 할 때, 장치

는 연결하고자 하는 라우터(102)

와 비컨 메시지(401,402)를 주고 받아 채널을 확보한 후에 이 채널을 통해서 연결 요청 메시지(403)를 전송하고 라우터

는 장치

에 연결 승인 메시지(404)를 보내 장치가 연결되었음을 알린다.Secondly, in the connection step 302 above, the new device 104 in the established network.

When you want to join the network, the device

To the router 102

Sends and receives a beacon message (401,402) and secures a channel, and then sends a connection request message (403) through this channel.

Device

A connection authorization message 404 is sent to indicate that the device is connected.

Third, the device 104 then performs step i) authentication and step ii) link key generation and step d) network key distribution.

The authentication is divided into device authentication (407) at the router, list confirmation (409) at the trust center, and router authentication (412) at the device.

는 임의의 정수

를 선택하고 J₁, J₂를 다음의 수학식 1과 같이 계산한다. 여기서 J₁은 장치의 링크키 생성정보이고, J₂는 이에 대한 장치의 인증정보가 된다.Device

Is a random integer

Select and calculate J ₁ , J ₂ as shown in Equation 1 below. J ₁ is link key generation information of the device, and J ₂ is authentication information of the device.

에게

를 전송(406)한다. 이때, 상기의

는 시간정보이다. After router

to

Send (406). At this time,

Is time information.

The router receiving m ₁ checks whether the following Equation 2 is established and authenticates the device (407).

는 신뢰센터

에게 해당 장치의 업데이트 요청 메시지를 전송(408)한다. 반대로 수학식 1이 성립하지 않을 경우에는 네트워크 연결과정을 종료(305)한다. 이때, 필요한 경우 라우터

와 신뢰센터

간의 통신은 미리 설정된 라우터와 신뢰센터간의 링크키

를 사용하여 안전하게 통신을 수행할 수 있다. If Equation 1 above is established, Router

Trust Center

In step 408, the device transmits an update request message of the corresponding device. In contrast, if Equation 1 does not hold, the network connection process is terminated (305). At this time, if necessary,

And trust center

Communication between the preconfigured router and the trust center

You can safely communicate using.

는 해당 장치

가 취소목록에 등록된 장치인지 리스트를 확인(409)하여 장치의 정당성을 확인하고, 정당성이 인정될 경우 라우터

에게 해당 장치의 업데이트 완료 메시지(410)를 보낸다. 반대로 장치

가 취소목록에 등록되어 있는 경우 업데이트 실패 메시지(410)을 라우터

에게 보내고 네트워크 연결 과정을 종료(305) 시킨다. 이때에 도 상기와 마찬가지로 필요한 경우에는 링크키

를 사용하여 안전하게 통신을 수행할 수 있다. Trust center receiving device update request message 408

Is that device

Checks whether the device is registered in the revocation list (409) and checks the validity of the device.

Sends an update complete message 410 of the device. Anti device

Update failed message (410) if is registered on the revocation list

And the network connection process is terminated (305). At this time, if necessary as above, link key

You can safely communicate using.

를 계산하고 계산된 링크키를 사용하여 네트워크키

를 암호화한 후 자신의 인증정보 R₂, 링크키 생성정보 R₁, 네트워크키를 암호화한 암호문

을 장치에게 보낸다. 라우터로부터 m₂을 전송받은 장치는 라우터 인증(412)을 수행하고 네트워크키를 복호화하여 네트워크에 참여한다. 이에 대한 자세한 수행과정은 다음과 같다. After the two-step authentication of the device authentication in the router (407) and the list verification in the trust center (409) is performed, the router receives link key generation information J ₁ and its own link key generation information R ₁ received from the device. Link key using

And calculate the network key using the calculated link key

After encrypting the authentication information R ₂ , link key generation information R ₁ , the ciphertext encrypted network key

To the device. The device receiving m ₂ from the router performs router authentication 412 and decrypts the network key to participate in the network. The detailed process for this is as follows.

는 임의의 정수

를 선택하여 라우터와 장치간의 공유정보(L_RJ)와 링크키(LK_RJ)를 다음의 수학식 3을 통해 생성한다.router

Is a random integer

Select to generate shared information (L _RJ ) and link key (LK _RJ ) between router and device through Equation 3 below.

를 이용하여 네트워크키

을 다음 수학식 4와 같이 암호화 한다.Link key generated above

Network key

Is encrypted as in Equation 4 below.

에게 전송할 정보 R₁과 R₂를 다음과 같이 계산한다. 여기서 R₁은 라우터의 링크키 생성정보이고, R₂는 이에 대한 라우터의 인증정보가 된다.Also, the device

Calculate the information R ₁ and R ₂ to be sent to Here, R ₁ is link key generation information of the router, and R ₂ is authentication information of the router.

를 장치

에게 전송(411)한다. 이때 상기의

는 시간 정보를 의미한다.Calculated above

Device

Send to the server 411. At this time

Means time information.

The device receiving m ₂ authenticates the router (412) using Equation 6 below.

When the router is normally authenticated, shared information and link keys are generated using Equation 7 below.

를 이용하여 암호문

를 복호화

하여 네트워크키

를 획득한다.Calculated link key above

Ciphertext

Decrypt

Network key

Acquire it.

If the device newly participating in the network successfully acquires the network key through the above process, network participation is completed (304).

Hereinafter, a description will be given of a case where a plurality of devices want to join the network at one time.

In general, in the actual network, as in the case where only one device participates in the network as described above, many devices participate in the network at the same time. In the present invention, when a plurality of devices send messages to the router at once to join the network (406), it is possible to reduce the burden on the router by enabling the router to confirm the received messages and the validity of the devices at once.

들이 네트워크에 참여하려고 라우터

에게 메시지를 동시에 전송한다고 가정한다. 그러면 라우터

는 장치

로부터 한꺼번에

를 전송 받게 된다. 이때

와

는 각각

,

이다. 이 경우 라우터

은 각각의 메시지들을 아래의 수학식 8의 성립여부를 체크함으로써 한번에 인증이 가능하다. In one embodiment, n new devices

Routers trying to join the network

Suppose you send a message to Router

Device

All at once

Will be sent. At this time

Wow

Are each

,

to be. Router in this case

Is able to authenticate each message at a time by checking whether the following Equation 8 is established.

Hereinafter, the public-key authenticated key establishment (PKAKE) protocol 406 (= 503) and 411 (= 504) of the present invention will be described with reference to FIG.

와

는 장치 U와 V의 주소이고,

과

는 링크키 생성정보이고,

와

는 각각 장치 U와 V의 비밀키를 이용한 인증메시지들이며 이때 사용된

는 시간정보이다. 그리고

는 PKAKE 과정으로부터 생성된 장치 U와 V간의 링크키

를 이용하여 네트워크키

를 암호화한 암호문이다.The device U 501 executes the public key authenticated key setting (PKAKE) protocol with the device V 502, sharing the link keys with each other, and encrypts and transmits the network key using the shared link key.

Wow

Is the address of devices U and V,

and

Is the link key generation information,

Wow

Are authentication messages using device U and V private keys respectively.

Is time information. And

Is the link key between device U and V generated from the PKAKE process.

Network key

Encrypted ciphertext.

While the invention has been shown and described with respect to certain preferred embodiments, the invention is not limited to these embodiments, and those of ordinary skill in the art claim the invention as claimed in the appended claims. It includes all the various forms of embodiments that can be implemented without departing from the spirit.

According to the new device participation method in the wireless sensor network of the present invention as described above,

First, it is designed to satisfy full omnidirectional security and satisfies the highest password security level.

Second, by allowing the Trust Center to manage a list of devices connected to the network, it is possible to prevent revoked or rogue devices from joining the network by disguising them as stolen keys.

Third, the Trust Center manages only its own private key, network key, and link keys between directly connected routers, simplifying key management of the Trust Center, eliminating the previously used master key, and using the number of keys and communication times. Can reduce the

Fourth, in the process of setting a secret key for each node and exchanging a message for generating a link key, by transmitting information that authenticates a device or a router, the IP address of an intruder exposed from the outside in the wireless sensor network is used. You can prevent attempts to break into your network.

Fifth, it is possible to prepare for the retransmission attack by including time information in the transmission of the link key generation message.

Sixth, by applying the encryption method of the personal identification method, by using the IP address itself as public information solved the problem in the conventional method that was dangerous when the IP address is exposed to the outside,

Seventh, it is designed to allow mutual authentication between devices so that new devices to join the network can receive network keys directly from routers in close proximity, distributing traffic concentrated in the trust center to multiple routers. Improved network efficiency by reducing the network join time of the device. In addition, since the device is designed to receive the network key directly from the router in close proximity, it is more advantageous in a multi-hop environment, and it is possible to check several messages at the same time, thereby improving network efficiency.

Eighth, the present invention can be expanded in various fields in which security is important, such as military and commercial, by enhancing the security of the sensor network, and various economic and commercial effects are expected.

Claims (19)

In a new device participation method in a wireless sensor network consisting of a trust center, a router, and a device, (a) an initialization step in which the trust center generates a private key and a public key of the trust center and a secret key of a device currently connected to the network; (b) connecting a device to join a network with the router; (c) the router authenticating the device; (d) the trust center confirming the validity of the device; (e) the router generating a link key and sending a message to the device by encrypting a network key through the link key; and (f) the device authenticating the router using the message and generating a link key to decrypt the network key. The method according to claim 1, If the authentication of the device fails in step (c), or if the validation of the device fails in step (d) or if the authentication of the router fails, the wireless sensor network characterized in that the end of the network connection process How to join a new device at The method according to claim 1 or 2, In step (a), The trust center is configured to store a list of devices currently connected to the network and simultaneously manage a list of devices that are damaged or canceled in the network. The method according to claim 3, In step (a), Trust Center System Parameters

It further comprises a step, wherein p is an arbitrary group, G ₁ is an addition group having a decimal number p, G ₂ is a multiplication group having a decimal number p, P is a generator of G ₁ , H ₁ , H ₂ is a hash function, and K _PT is a public key of a trust center. The method according to claim 1 or 2, In step (b), The device and the router, after acquiring and receiving a beacon message, secures a channel, and sends and receives a connection request message and a connection approval message. The method according to claim 1 or 2, In step (c), And sending, by the device, a message including link key generation information of the device and authentication information thereof to the router. The method according to claim 6, The message sent by the device (J) to the router (R)

And said

silver

As the linker generation information of the device,

Is

As above

Is the authentication information of the device for d, d is any integer, and P is an addition group with any prime p.

Is the source of

Is the time information

and

Hash function with input

Hash value of,

Is the device's secret key,

Is a public key of the device. The method according to claim 6, In step (c), And the device authenticates the device by using the message received from the device, the public key of the trust center and the public key of the device. delete The method according to claim 1 or 2, In step (d), The trust center checks a list of whether the device is a device registered in the revocation list to determine whether the device is legitimate. The method according to claim 6, In step (e), And the router generates a link key using the link key generation information received from the device. The method according to claim 7, In step (e), The router selects a random integer r, and the linker generation information of the device received from the selected integer r and the device

Share information between router and device using

Calculated Shared Information

Linker of router and device using

Generates a link key

Network key

To the equation

Encryption by using the router's link key generation information

And

Router's credentials for

Message to the device by calculating

By sending remind

Is

Hash function with input

Is a hash of

Is

Means an encryption algorithm with

Is

Means the encrypted value.

Is the time information

and

Hash function with input

Is a hash of

Is the router's private key,

Is a public key of a router. The method according to claim 11, Step (f), Authenticating the router using the message received from the router, the public key of the trust center and the public key of the router, and generating a link key using the link key generation information received from the router and decrypting the encrypted network key. New device participation method in a wireless sensor network, characterized in that comprises a. The method according to claim 12, In step (f), Message received by the device from the router

Public key of trust center (T)

And the public key of the router

Equation using

Step to authenticate the router by checking the establishment of remind

Router credentials

And generator

Is a pairing function value that takes as input,

Is the public key of the trust center,

Is time information

Wow

Hash function with input

Hash value of,

Is the router linker generation information.

Is the router's public key,

Is

and

And a pairing function value for inputting a new device. The method according to claim 14, In step (f), The device said message

Share information between the router and the device using

Calculated Shared Information

Link key of router and device using

After generating the link key generated

Encryption value using

To the equation

Decrypted by network key

By acquiring remind

Is

Is a decryption algorithm with

The key

Using

The new device participation method in a wireless sensor network, characterized in that the decoded decoding value. delete The method according to claim 1 or 2, In step (c), If the router successfully authenticates the device, the router further comprising sending a device update request message to a trust center. The method according to claim 17, In step (d), And if the trust center successfully authenticates the device, the trust center further comprises sending a device update complete message to a router. The method according to claim 6, In step (e), And sending, by the router, a message including link key generation information of the router and authentication information thereof to the device.

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