JP6396855B2 - Communication fraud prevention system - Google Patents

Description

  The present invention relates to a communication fraud establishment preventing system that prevents unauthorized communication establishment in ID collation communication.

  2. Description of the Related Art Conventionally, an electronic key system for performing ID verification by wirelessly transmitting an electronic key ID from an electronic key to a vehicle in a vehicle or the like is well known. By the way, in this kind of electronic key system, there is a fraudulent act using a repeater (see a repeater use fraud: see Patent Document 1, etc.) as a fraudulent act intended to establish ID verification without depending on the user's will. is there. For example, when the electronic key is located at a location far from the vehicle, the repeater use fraudulent act is an act of establishing a communication between these two parties by connecting the electronic key to the vehicle by a plurality of repeaters and relaying radio waves. is there. Therefore, since ID verification is established without the user's knowledge, there is a possibility that the door unlocking or the engine is illegally started by a third party.

JP 2006-161545 A

  As countermeasures against unauthorized communication using a repeater, for example, a motion sensor (acceleration sensor) is provided in an electronic key, and ID verification is permitted only when vibration can be detected by the sensor. . However, in the case of this measure, for example, if the electronic key is stationary for a long time, ID verification will not be established, and it will not be possible to open the vehicle door or start the engine. There was a problem.

  An object of the present invention is to provide a communication fraud prevention system capable of detecting unauthorized communication by a method other than providing a motion sensor in an electronic key to detect the presence or absence of vibration.

  In the communication fraud prevention system that solves the above problem, when the electronic key ID is wirelessly transmitted from the electronic key to the communication partner and the electronic key ID is verified by the communication from the communication partner, In the configuration for determining correctness, the communication partner and the object are measured using a strength measurement unit that measures the received signal strength of a radio wave communicated in the communication network for ID verification, and a radar provided in the communication partner of the electronic key. A distance measuring unit that measures the distance to a plurality of objects existing between the two, and a correlation between the received signal strength and the distance is confirmed, and whether the ID verification communication is correct or not is determined based on the correlation result. A communication correctness determination unit.

  According to this configuration, the correlation between the received signal strength and the radar measurement distance is compared. When these correlations are high, it is determined that the communication between the communication partner and the electronic key is valid, and conversely, when the correlation is low, the communication is illegal. Process as. For this reason, for example, when unauthorized communication using a repeater by a third party is performed, there is a high possibility that the correlation between the received signal strength and the radar measurement distance is broken, so the communication at this time is determined to be invalid, It becomes possible not to permit establishment of ID verification.

  In the communication fraud prevention system, the radio wave used for the measurement of the received signal strength is transmitted at least once, and the strength measurement unit performs the measurement of the received signal strength a plurality of times using these radio waves, The radar radio wave is transmitted at least once, the distance measurement unit performs distance measurement a plurality of times using these radio waves, and the communication correctness determination unit has a plurality of received signals measured at least once. It is preferable to determine whether communication is correct or not by checking the correlation between the intensity and a plurality of distances measured at least once. According to this configuration, since the correlation is compared using a plurality of measurement parameters, whether the correlation is correct or not can be confirmed more correctly. Therefore, it is advantageous to correctly determine whether the ID verification communication is correct.

  In the communication fraud prevention system, it is preferable that the radar transmits a radio wave to the outside of the communication partner, and the distance measuring unit measures a distance from an object located outside the room. According to this configuration, since it is possible to confirm whether the communication is correct with respect to the electronic key located outside the room, for example, when permitting or executing the locking / unlocking of the door provided on the communication partner, this operation is secured. It is advantageous to perform well.

  In the communication fraud prevention system, it is preferable that the strength measuring unit measures the received signal strength of the radio wave in the process of the ID verification communication. According to this configuration, since the received signal strength of the radio wave is measured while executing ID verification, the received signal strength can be efficiently measured.

  In the communication fraud prevention system, the distance measuring unit senses the surroundings by transmitting radio waves at a constant period, excludes objects that remain stationary from the determination, and sets only moving objects as the object of determination. Is preferred. According to this configuration, when the object is monitored by the radar, it is possible to exclude the moving object from the determination, which is advantageous in accurately performing this in obtaining the distance from the human body. As a result, it is advantageous to accurately determine whether the ID collation communication is correct.

  In the communication fraud establishment prevention system, it is preferable that the communication correctness determination unit performs the determination using only information on objects having close correlation results when a plurality of objects are detected. According to this configuration, it is possible to determine whether communication is correct even when a plurality of objects approach the vehicle.

  According to the present invention, unauthorized communication can be detected by a method other than providing a motion sensor in the electronic key to detect the presence or absence of vibration.

The block diagram of the communication fraud establishment prevention system of one Embodiment. The area figure of the LF electric wave formed in a vehicle. The outline figure of communication right-and-left judgment using LF electric wave and a radar. The correlation graph with the received signal strength and the radar measurement distance with respect to the distance of a vehicle and an electronic key. An image diagram of unauthorized communication using a repeater by a third party. Explanatory drawing which shows how to obtain | require the radar measurement distance of another example.

Hereinafter, an embodiment of a communication fraud establishment prevention system will be described with reference to FIGS.
As shown in FIG. 1, the vehicle 1 includes an electronic key system 3 that performs ID verification wirelessly with the electronic key 2. An electronic key ID is written and stored in the electronic key 2 as an ID unique to the key. The electronic key system 3 of this example is a key operation free system that implements ID collation with the electronic key 2 through narrow area communication triggered by communication from the vehicle 1. Generally, ID collation performed in a key operation free system is called “smart collation”, and the communication is called “smart communication”.

  The vehicle 1 includes a collation ECU (Electronic Control Unit) 4 that performs ID collation (smart collation), a body ECU 5 that manages the power supply and drive of in-vehicle electrical components, and an engine ECU 6 that controls the engine 7. These ECUs are electrically connected through a communication line 8 in the vehicle. The communication line 8 is composed of, for example, a CAN (Controller Area Network) or a LIN (Local Interconnect Network). In the verification ECU 4, the electronic key ID of the electronic key 2 registered in the vehicle 1 is written and stored in a memory (not shown). The vehicle 1 includes an outdoor transmitter 9 that transmits radio waves outdoors, an indoor transmitter 10 that transmits radio waves indoors, and a radio receiver 11 that receives radio waves in the vehicle 1. The outdoor transmitter 9 and the indoor transmitter 10 transmit, for example, radio waves in the LF (Low Frequency) band. The radio wave receiver 11 receives, for example, UHF (Ultra High Frequency) radio waves. The electronic key 2 can receive LF radio waves and can transmit UHF radio waves. The body ECU 5 switches the locking / unlocking of the vehicle door by controlling the operation of the door lock mechanism 12 provided on the vehicle door.

  The electronic key 2 includes a key control unit 15 that controls the operation of the electronic key 2, a receiving unit 16 that enables radio wave reception by the electronic key 2, and a transmission unit 17 that enables radio wave transmission by the electronic key 2. . In the key control unit 15, an electronic key ID is written and stored in a memory (not shown) as an ID unique to the key. The receiving unit 16 receives, for example, LF radio waves. The transmission unit 17 transmits, for example, UHF radio waves.

  When the electronic key 2 enters the communication area Ea (see FIG. 2) of the outdoor transmitter 9 and communication (external smart communication) is established between the vehicle 1 and the electronic key 2, smart verification by bidirectional communication of LF-UHF (Outside car smart verification) is started. The smart verification includes vehicle code verification for authenticating a unique vehicle code of the vehicle 1, challenge response authentication using an encryption key (authentication key), and electronic key ID verification for authenticating an electronic key ID. When the verification ECU 4 confirms that all of these verifications and authentications are established with the electronic key 2 positioned outside the vehicle, the verification ECU 4 regards the smart verification outside the vehicle as successful, and permits or executes, for example, locking and unlocking of the vehicle door.

  When the electronic key 2 enters the communication area of the indoor transmitter 10 and communication (in-car smart communication) is established, the collation ECU 4 executes smart collation (in-car smart collation) similar to that when outside the vehicle. When the verification ECU 4 confirms that the in-vehicle smart verification is established, the verification ECU 4 permits the transition of the vehicle power supply by the operation of the engine switch (not shown).

  The electronic key system 3 includes a communication fraud establishment prevention function (communication fraud establishment prevention system 20) that prevents unauthorized establishment of ID verification communication (smart communication) using a repeater by a third party or the like, for example. The communication fraud establishment prevention system 20 of this example includes a received signal strength indicator (RSSI) when receiving a radio wave of a frequency (for example, LF band) used in a communication network for ID verification, and communication of the electronic key 2. A correlation with the distance (radar measurement distance) Lx between the human body measured from the radar 22 mounted on the opponent 21 (the vehicle 1 in this example) is determined, and the correctness of communication is determined from the correlation. is there.

  The communication fraud establishment prevention system 20 includes an intensity measurement unit 25 that measures a received signal intensity of a radio wave communicated in a communication network for ID verification (in this example, smart verification). The strength measuring unit 25 is provided in the key control unit 15 to measure the received signal strength of radio waves in the electronic key 2. The intensity measuring unit 25 may measure the received signal intensity of the radio wave received in the process of performing smart collation communication, and measures the received signal intensity when the LF radio wave Slf transmitted from the vehicle 1 is received. Note that the radio wave for measuring the received signal strength is not limited to the radio wave exchanged by the smart communication, and is not necessarily the radio wave used for communication as long as it is the LF radio wave Slf transmitted from the vehicle 1.

  The radar 22 is installed in the vehicle 1 that is the communication partner 21 of the electronic key 2, and is arranged so as to transmit radio waves to the outside of the vehicle 1. For example, the radar 22 of this example can be mounted near the outside door handle of the vehicle door to measure the distance of an object outside the vehicle. The radar 22 is preferably capable of measuring a distance from an object, for example, 3 m or more, regardless of the method. Examples of the radar 22 include a millimeter wave radar, a UWB (Ultra Wide Band) radar, a laser radar, and an ultrasonic sonar. The radar 22 is preferably arranged in the vicinity of the outdoor transmitter 9 by being provided in the vicinity of the door handle outside the vehicle.

  The communication fraud establishment prevention system 20 includes a distance measurement unit 26 that measures a distance (radar measurement distance) Lx between a plurality of objects existing between the communication partner 21 and the object using the radar 22. The distance measuring unit 26 is provided in the verification ECU 4. The distance measuring unit 26 measures the distance Lx between an object located outside the room (that is, the user who possesses the electronic key 2) by the radar 22 transmitting radio waves to the outside. The distance measuring unit 26 may sense the periphery by transmitting radio waves at a constant period, exclude objects that remain stationary from the determination, and only determine moving objects.

  The communication fraud establishment prevention system 20 includes a communication correctness determination unit 27 that determines the correctness of ID collation communication from the correlation between the received signal strength and the distance Lx. The communication correctness determination unit 27 is provided in the verification ECU 4. The communication correctness determination unit 27 confirms the correlation between the received signal strength measured by the strength measurement unit 25 and the distance Lx measured by the distance measurement unit 26, and determines whether the communication for ID verification is correct based on the correlation result. judge. The communication correctness determination unit 27 determines that the ID verification communication is valid if the binary correlation is high, and conversely determines that the ID verification communication is invalid if the correlation is low.

Next, the operation of the communication fraud establishment prevention system 20 will be described with reference to FIGS.
As shown in FIG. 2, the verification ECU 4 transmits the LF radio wave Slf for smart communication from the outdoor transmitter 9 to form the communication area Ea at the execution timing of the smart verification. Specifically, when the vehicle 1 is parked (door locking and engine stop), the outdoor transmitter 9 periodically or irregularly checks whether the electronic key 2 exists around the vehicle 1. An operation of transmitting an LF band wake signal is performed. Note that the communication area Ea of the LF radio wave Slf is a narrow area of about several meters from the vehicle 1, for example.

  As shown in FIG. 3, when the electronic key 2 enters the communication area Ea of the LF radio wave Slf, smart communication is established, and smart verification is executed between the vehicle 1 and the electronic key 2. When the LF radio wave Slf of the vehicle 1 reaches the electronic key 2, the electronic key 2 measures the received signal intensity of the received LF radio wave Slf with the intensity measuring unit 25. The received signal strength measured here takes a value corresponding to the distance between the vehicle 1 and the electronic key 2. Therefore, the distance between the vehicle 1 and the electronic key 2 can be generally understood from the measured received signal strength. The measurement of the received signal strength is performed at least once by executing a plurality of transmissions of the LF radio wave Slf from the vehicle 1. Note that the LF radio wave Slf whose reception signal intensity is to be measured is not limited to the wake signal, and may be another radio wave transmitted from the vehicle 1 in the process of smart communication.

  For example, when the vehicle 1 is parked, the radar 22 senses an object near the vehicle by periodically searching the surroundings. Then, the distance measuring unit 26 identifies an object existing around the vehicle 1 based on the detection signal input from the radar 22. When the distance measuring unit 26 detects an object that remains stationary, the distance measuring unit 26 may recognize this as a pillar or an adjacent parked vehicle and exclude it from the determination. The distance measuring unit 26 recognizes a moving object as a human body and measures a distance Lx between the human body. The distance measurement by the radar 22 is performed at least once by executing a plurality of radio wave transmissions from the radar 22.

  FIG. 4 shows a correlation graph between the received signal intensity and the radar measurement distance with respect to the distance between the vehicle 1 and the electronic key 2. By the way, since the electronic key 2 is possessed by the user, when the user approaches the vehicle 1 in an attempt to unlock the vehicle door, the received signal strength and the radar measurement distance Lx change in the same decreasing tendency. As the distance from the vehicle 1 increases, the received signal strength and the radar measurement distance Lx change in the same upward tendency. Therefore, by looking at the correlation between the received signal strength and the radar measurement distance Lx, it should be possible to more correctly identify whether or not the human body in the vicinity of the vehicle is a user having a regular key.

  The communication correctness determination unit 27 is now established by confirming the correlation between the change in the received signal intensity measured at least once and the change in the radar measurement distance Lx measured at least once. Whether the ID collation communication is correct or not is determined. At this time, if it is determined that the correlation between the two is high, establishment of ID verification (smart verification) is permitted. Therefore, when the outside door handle provided on the vehicle door is touch-operated, the vehicle door is unlocked, so that it is possible to get on.

  On the other hand, as shown in FIG. 5, for example, when a plurality of third parties cooperate to establish communication illegally by a repeater, the electronic key 2 remains stopped, but the vehicle 1 Since the approaching person should be detected by the radar 22, the correlation between the received signal intensity and the radar measurement distance Lx is likely to be lost. For this reason, if it is determined that the correlation between the change in the received signal strength and the change in the radar measurement distance Lx is low, establishment of ID verification (smart verification) is disallowed. Therefore, since locking / unlocking operation (including engine start operation) of the vehicle door is not permitted, security against unauthorized use of the vehicle 1 (such as vehicle theft) is ensured.

According to the configuration of the present embodiment, the following effects can be obtained.
(1) The correlation between the received signal strength of the LF radio wave Slf and the distance Lx measured by the radar 22 is compared. When these correlations are high, it is determined that the ID verification communication is valid, and conversely, when the correlation is low, Treat communication as invalid. For this reason, for example, when an unauthorized communication using a repeater by a third party is performed, there is a high possibility that the correlation between the received signal strength and the radar measurement distance Lx is lost. , ID verification is not permitted. Therefore, unauthorized communication can be detected by a method other than providing a motion sensor in the electronic key 2 to detect the presence or absence of vibration.

  (2) The radio wave (LF radio wave Slf) used for the measurement of the received signal strength is transmitted at least once, and the intensity measuring unit 25 performs the measurement of the received signal strength a plurality of times using these radio waves. The radio wave of the radar 22 is transmitted at least once, and the distance measuring unit 26 performs distance measurement a plurality of times using these radio waves. The communication correctness determination unit 27 determines the communication correctness by confirming the correlation between a plurality of received signal strengths measured at least once and a plurality of radar measurement distances Lx measured at least once. judge. In this way, since the correlation is determined using a plurality of measurement parameters, it is possible to more correctly check whether the correlation is correct. Therefore, the correctness determination of ID verification communication can be performed more correctly.

  (3) The radar 22 transmits radio waves to the outside of the vehicle 1, and the distance measuring unit 26 measures the distance Lx with an object located outside the room. Therefore, since it is possible to determine whether communication is correct or not with respect to the electronic key 2 located outside the room, this operation can be performed with high security, for example, when permitting or executing the locking and unlocking of the vehicle door.

  (4) The intensity measuring unit 25 measures the received signal intensity of the LF radio wave Slf in the process of ID verification communication. Therefore, it is possible to measure the received signal strength of the LF radio wave Slf while performing ID collation (smart collation), so that the received signal strength can be measured efficiently.

  (5) The distance measuring unit 26 senses the surroundings by transmitting radio waves at a constant period, excludes objects that remain stationary from the determination, and sets only moving objects as a determination target. Therefore, it is advantageous to accurately perform the distance between the human body and the human body. As a result, it is advantageous to accurately determine whether the ID collation communication is correct.

Note that the embodiment is not limited to the configuration described so far, and may be modified as follows.
As shown in FIG. 6, the radar 22 is not limited to being disposed on the driver's seat side, and may be disposed on the passenger seat side. In this case, the distance L1 (= L2-L3) outside the driver's seat may be measured by canceling the distance L3 in the vehicle from the distance L2 measured by the radar 22.

  When a plurality of objects can be detected by the radar 22, the object having the highest correlation among them may be taken in as a determination target. For example, when the radar 22 detects a plurality of objects, the communication correctness determination unit 27 uses only information on an object having a close correlation result among the plurality of objects. In this example, since the received signal strength measurement and the radar distance measurement are executed a plurality of times, if the object moves and is measured at another opportunity, the correlation results are likely to match. Therefore, when the radar 22 detects a plurality of objects, it is possible to determine whether the communication is correct or not even when the plurality of objects approach the vehicle 1 by adopting the one with a close correlation result.

When the correlation between the received signal strength and the radar measurement distance Lx is low, establishment of ID verification may be prohibited by disabling radio wave transmission from the electronic key 2, for example.
The LF radio wave Slf transmitted from the vehicle 1 is not limited to the configuration using the hardware of the electronic key system 3. For example, an antenna dedicated to determining whether communication is correct may be provided in the vehicle 1 and the LF radio wave Slf may be transmitted from this antenna.

The radar 22 may be disposed at any position on the vehicle body.
The sensing algorithm of the object by the radar 22 is arbitrary as long as the object can be detected.

The LF radio wave Slf that is the target of received signal strength measurement is not limited to the wake signal, and may be changed to another signal.
The received signal strength is not limited to that performed on the electronic key 2 side, but may be implemented on the vehicle 1 side by measuring the received signal strength when the vehicle 1 receives a radio wave transmitted from the electronic key 2. Good.

The measurement of received signal strength may be performed with radio waves having a frequency other than LF.
If the communication area Ea is formed around the vehicle, the number, location, and the like can be changed as appropriate.

The measurement timing of the received signal strength and the measurement timing of the radar measurement distance Lx may be different from each other.
A plurality of LF antennas may be provided, and the received signal strength used for the determination may be determined based on the received signal strength of each radio wave transmitted from each antenna. The same can be said for distance measurement by the radar 22. In this case, for example, where two LF antennas and two radars 22 are provided and the distance to the electronic key 2 or the object is measured, where the electronic key 2 or the object is located on the plane using trigonometry. Can also be determined.

  The electronic key system 3 is a system that determines whether the electronic key 2 is inside or outside the vehicle by, for example, arranging LF antennas on the left and right sides of the vehicle body and checking the combination of responses from the electronic key 2 to radio waves transmitted from these antennas. But you can.

The communication fraud establishment prevention system 20 is not limited to being applied to the communication for the smart collation outside the vehicle, but may be used for the communication for the smart collation in the vehicle.
The determination of whether communication is correct or not is not limited to being performed on the vehicle 1 side, but may be performed on the electronic key 2 side.

The electronic key 2 can be changed to another terminal such as a high function mobile phone.
The communication partner 21 is not limited to the vehicle 1 and can be changed to another device or apparatus.

  DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 ... Vehicle which is an example of a communication partner, 2 ... Electronic key, 20 ... Communication fraud establishment prevention system, 21 ... Communication partner, 22 ... Radar, 25 ... Strength measurement part, 26 ... Distance measurement part, 27 ... Communication correctness determination part , Slf... LF radio wave, which is an example of a radio wave whose received signal intensity is measured.

Claims (6)

In the communication fraud establishment prevention system for determining whether the ID verification communication is correct or not when the electronic key ID is wirelessly transmitted from the electronic key to the communication counterpart and the electronic key ID is verified by the communication from the communication partner.
An intensity measurement unit for measuring the received signal intensity of radio waves communicated in the ID verification communication network;
A distance measuring unit that measures distances between a plurality of objects existing between the communication partner and the object using a radar provided in the communication partner of the electronic key;
A communication fraud establishment preventing system comprising: a communication correctness determination unit that confirms a correlation between the received signal strength and the distance and determines whether the ID verification communication is correct based on the correlation result. The radio wave used for the measurement of the received signal strength is transmitted at least once or more, and the intensity measurement unit performs the measurement of the received signal strength a plurality of times using these radio waves,
The radar radio waves are transmitted at least once, and the distance measurement unit performs distance measurement a plurality of times using these radio waves,
The communication correctness determination unit determines the correctness of communication by confirming the correlation between a plurality of received signal strengths measured at least once and a plurality of distances measured at least once. The system for preventing unauthorized establishment of communication according to claim 1. The radar transmits radio waves to the outside of the communication partner,
The communication fraud prevention system according to claim 1, wherein the distance measuring unit measures a distance from an object located outdoors. The communication strength establishment prevention system according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein the strength measurement unit measures the received signal strength of the radio wave in the process of the ID verification communication. The distance measuring unit senses the periphery by transmitting radio waves at a constant period, excludes a stationary object from the determination, and sets only a moving object as a determination target. The communication fraud establishment prevention system according to any one of 4. The said communication correctness determination part performs determination using only the information of the object with a close correlation result, when a several object is detected, It is characterized by the above-mentioned. Communication fraud prevention system.