JP2000048141A - Terminal authentication method using IC card - Google Patents

Abstract

PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To make authenticatable a system where the device of authenticating side is difficult to have a CPU by previously constituting a table for authenticating terminal in a card and collating a ciphered sentence sent from the terminal with the table so as to authenticate the terminal. SOLUTION: This method consists of an IC card 201 provided with a memory 202, a wired logic 203 and a transmitting/receiving I/F 204 executing remote communication between it and R/W 211, a terminal 221 provided with a memory 222 and a CPU 223, and R/W 211 connecting the IC card 201 and a terminal 221. The propriety of access is controlled by the logic 203 mounted on the IC card 201. A terminal kind identifying table being the list of ciphered data of a card ID is stored in the memory 202 in the IC card 201. This IC card 201 and the terminal 221 communicates through R/W 211, thereby the IC card 201 authenticates the terminal 221.

Description

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0001]

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION 1. Field of the Invention The present invention relates to a system for confirming the validity of terminals in an environment where a plurality of terminals communicate with each other in some way.

[0002]

2. Description of the Related Art "Information technology-Securi"
ty techniques − Entity authentication mechanisms
-Part2; Entity authentication using symmetric
techniques, "pp.2-pp.3, ISO / IEC DI
S 9798-2, ISO, May 2, 1994, stipulates the following authentication method.

(1) One-pass authentication The authenticated side encrypts the plain text with the identifier of the authenticated side and a time stamp or serial number added using its own secret key. The authenticating side receives the ciphertext, decrypts it using the public key paired with the secret key of the authenticated side, and performs authentication by checking the identifier and the time stamp or serial number.

(2) Two-pass authentication The authenticated side receives a random number from the authenticating side and encrypts the random number and the identifier of the authenticating side using a secret key. The authenticating side receives the ciphertext, performs decryption using the public key corresponding to the secret key of the authenticated side, and performs authentication by checking the identifier and the random number.

However, these require CPUs on both the authenticating side and the authenticated side. An authentication method that does not require an encryption function on the authenticated side is “EMV '96
Integrated Circuit Card Specifidcation for Pa
yment Systems, "Version 3.0, IV-1-IV-8,
As shown in June 30, 1996, the following static authentication method is specified by EMV.

(3) Static Authentication The side to be authenticated has a plaintext, a ciphertext obtained by encrypting the plaintext with a secret key, and a public key paired with the secret key, which has been authenticated by a certificate authority. . The authenticator receives the plaintext, ciphertext and public key, decrypts the ciphertext using the public key, and checks the consistency with the plaintext to perform authentication. A method in which the authenticated party does not require public key cryptography.

However, this method also requires a CPU for the authenticating side.

[0008]

There are many demands for IC cards not only in fields requiring high functionality and high security, such as electronic money, but also as forms for use as tags for managing luggage attached to luggage. Remote type IC like distribution tag
Since the amount of power that can be supplied via radio waves is limited in a card, it is very difficult to mount a CPU on the card. Also, in terms of cost, expensive CPU like financial system
Card cannot be used. In the distribution tag system, the terminal of the dealer and the mobile terminal of the carrier,
Information such as the destination, sender, and package type is written and changed in the memory in the card, and the terminal of the distribution center manages the delivery using the information.

[0009] If the personal data in the card is read or falsified by an illegal operation, it leads to loss of trust of the business operator. Therefore, in order to prevent an unauthorized terminal from operating the data in the card, it is essential that the card itself has a function of authenticating the terminal.

However, any of the conventional authentication methods requires a common key on the authentication side or an encryption function of a public key encryption method to be installed. Therefore, due to cost considerations such as a system using a remote IC card as a distribution tag, a system using a card without a CPU cannot perform terminal authentication using the card, and an unauthorized operation on the card by an unauthorized terminal cannot be performed. Could not be prevented.

An object of the present invention is to propose an authentication method which does not require a cryptographic function on the authenticating side, and the authenticating side device is required
It is to realize authentication in a system where it is difficult to have a PU.

[0012]

The above object can be attained by setting the following means in an IC card to be authenticated.

(1) A function of creating a correspondence table of a terminal type ID and a card ID encrypted with a terminal type key in an IC card.

(2) A function of checking whether a pair of the terminal type ID and the cipher text passed from the terminal is included in a table in the card.

[0015]

Embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the drawings. FIG. 2 shows a system configuration of the present invention. The present device includes a memory 202, a wired logic 203, an IC card 201 including a transmission / reception I / F 204 for performing remote communication with the R / W, a terminal 221 including a memory 222 and a CPU 223, and further connects the IC card and the terminal. R / W 211. The memory of the IC card has an area for storing general data such as customer information and an area for storing a terminal authentication table and the like. Both of these areas are controlled by wired logic mounted on the IC card.

In FIG. 3, a memory 202 in the IC card is provided.
And the processing composed by the wired logic 203 will be described. In the memory 202 in the IC card,
A card type identification table 303, which is a list of card IDs 302 and terminal type IDs 304, which are unique identifiers of the card, and encrypted data 305 of the card IDs corresponding thereto, is stored. In addition, the IC card side authentication processing 301 is incorporated in the IC card as wired logic.

Referring to FIG. 4, the contents recorded in the memory 222 in the terminal will be described. Terminal memory 2
22 stores a terminal ID 403 unique to the terminal, a terminal type ID 404 common to each terminal type, and a terminal type key 405. In addition, terminal-side authentication processing 401 and setting processing 402 are registered as processing. By the setting process, I
A card ID 302 and a terminal type identification table 303 are set in the C card 202.

FIG. 8 shows a flow of the entire processing performed by the present system. Reference numeral 801 denotes a flow on the IC card side, and reference numeral 811 denotes a flow on the terminal side. In step 802, IC
A session between the card and the terminal is established, step 81
When the terminal recognizes the card in 2, first, in steps 803 and 813, terminal authentication using an IC card is performed. If the authentication is successful, the terminal can read and write to the protected memory inside the card within a range permitted according to the type of the terminal. Therefore, in steps 804 and 814, processing of data stored in the IC card is performed. When the data processing ends, termination processing is performed between the IC card and the terminal in steps 805 and 815, and the session ends. In the present invention, the terminal authentication process will be described.

FIG. 1 shows a flow of the terminal authentication process. In this system, the IC card 201 and the terminal 221 shown in FIG.
The card authenticates the terminal by performing communication via W211. As shown in FIG. 1, the present process is configured by two processes, a card-side authentication process 301 and a terminal-side authentication process 401, which are realized by wired logic in the card.

FIGS. 5 and 6 show the APDU format used when exchanging data between the IC card and the terminal. APDU format is command APDU (Fig. 5)
And a response APDU (FIG. 6). The command APDU includes a header 501 and a body 502.
The response APDU includes a body 601 and a trailer 602.

First, in step 111, when communication between the card and the terminal is started, the terminal transmits a card ID request command to the card. In step 101, when the card receives the command, in step 10
At 2, the card ID is transmitted to the terminal. Step 11
In 2, the terminal receives the card ID through the R / W, and in step 113, encrypts the received card ID using the terminal type key.

In step 114, a terminal ID and a terminal type ID are added to the thus obtained ciphertext to generate a response message. In step 115, the response message is transmitted to the card.

Here, the configuration of the response message will be described with reference to FIG. The response message is terminal ID 70
1, a terminal type ID 702, and a sentence obtained by encrypting a card ID 703 with a terminal type key. This is stored in the body of the APDU format and sent to the IC card. Thereafter, the card receives the response message in step 103 and uses the table in step 104 to determine whether the pair of the terminal type ID stored in the response message and the corresponding card ID cipher text is in the table. I do. If the content of the response message is included in the identification table, it is determined that the card has been successfully authenticated.

Then, in step 105, the card sends the authentication result (match / mismatch) to the terminal. In step 116, the terminal receives the authentication result. If the terminal authentication is successful, the IC card permits access to data stored in the terminal card thereafter, and
6. In step 117, the data processing is continued. If the authentication fails, the card checks the number of terminal authentication retries, and if the number of times is equal to or less than the predetermined value, in steps 108 and 118, the card retries. If the number of retries is greater than the default,
In step 109, the IC card prohibits further access from the terminal, and the communication ends as in step 119.

In this embodiment, authentication is performed by encrypting the card ID on the terminal side. However, a plurality of card-specific data to be encrypted by the terminal and an authentication table corresponding to the data are prepared in the card. In addition, by selecting and using an arbitrary one of them for each authentication, it becomes possible to crack down to a certain degree a fraud by a replay attack.

Lastly, in the present embodiment, the processing on the IC card side is described as being realized using wired logic. However, the same processing can be realized using an IC card mounted with a CPU instead of wired logic. That is clear. Further, the present invention is not limited to the terminal authentication using a card, but can be applied to other authentication processes such as authentication between terminals connected via a network.

[0027]

According to the present invention, when terminal authentication is performed, I
Since the encryption function of the C card is not required, even if the IC card or the like without a CPU is equipped with a wired logic or the like that realizes a simple function such as comparison with a table, terminal authentication using the card becomes possible. The cost can be reduced by using wired logic instead of the CPU. In addition, power consumption can be reduced. Therefore, terminal authentication using a remote IC card or the like can be realized.

In the method of the present invention, the terminal does not perform any special processing, so that authentication can be performed by an IC card equipped with an encryption function by the same processing. Therefore, a system in which an IC card without an encryption function and an IC card with an encryption function are mixed can be realized.

[Brief description of the drawings]

FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an authentication processing flow according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a hardware configuration according to an embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 3 is a diagram for explaining memory contents of an IC card according to the embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 4 is a diagram for explaining memory contents of a terminal according to the embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 5 is a diagram showing a format of an APDU command used when exchanging data between an IC card and a terminal.

FIG. 6 is a diagram showing an APDU response format used when exchanging data between an IC card and a terminal.

FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating a structure of a response message according to the embodiment of the present invention.

FIG. 8 is a diagram showing a flow of an entire process in the embodiment of the present invention.

[Explanation of symbols]

201: IC card, 202: IC card memory, 203: wired logic, 204: transmission / reception I / F: transmission / reception interface, 211: R / W: reader / writer, 221: terminal, 222: terminal memory,
223 CPU: Central processing unit.

 ────────────────────────────────────────────────── ─── Continuing from the front page (72) Katsuo Tashiro, Inventor 5-2-1 Omikacho, Hitachi City, Ibaraki Prefecture F-term in Omika Plant, Hitachi, Ltd. F-term (reference) 5B035 AA13 BB09 BC00 CA29 5B058 KA33 KA35

Claims (5)

[Claims] In a system comprising an IC card, an R / W, and a terminal, a terminal authentication table is previously configured in the card, and a cipher text sent from the terminal is compared with the table. A terminal authentication method using an IC card, which performs terminal authentication. 2. The IC according to claim 1, wherein the terminal authentication table comprises an ID for each card and a result obtained by encrypting the ID with a key of each terminal.
Terminal authentication method using a card. 3. The method according to claim 2, wherein the card sends a card individual ID to the terminal, and the terminal encrypts the ID with a key held in the terminal and returns the result to the card. A terminal authentication method using an IC card, wherein the terminal is authenticated by collating the terminal with a self table. 4. A system comprising an IC card, an R / W and a terminal, comprising a terminal authentication table and a logic for realizing authentication by comparing the cipher text sent from the terminal with the table. Characteristic terminal authentication method using an IC card. 5. The IC according to claim 4, wherein the terminal authentication table comprises an ID for each card and a result of encrypting the ID with a key of each terminal.
Terminal authentication method using a card.