EP4345409A1

EP4345409A1 - Unmanned turret having a ballistic protection system in the roof structure and in the floor

Info

Publication number: EP4345409A1
Application number: EP22199203.5A
Authority: EP
Inventors: James Caudle
Original assignee: John Cockerill Defense SA
Current assignee: John Cockerill Defense SA
Priority date: 2022-09-30
Filing date: 2022-09-30
Publication date: 2024-04-03
Also published as: WO2024068117A1

Abstract

A remotely operated unmanned turret (1) intended to be mounted on a supporting platform,
wherein the turret may comprise some operational equipment, while it is devoid of crew ;
wherein the first ballistic protection unit (11) is designed to allow detonation, penetration and expansion cone dispersion of energetic material (10) and/or shockwave propagation (9) within the air gap (6) ; and
wherein the second ballistic protection unit (12) is designed to act as a barrier between the turret (1) and a chassis-crew compartment (7) of the supporting platform, so as to prevent further over-pressure and/or blast propagation into the chassis-crew space (7) and/or to absorb dispersed energetic material.

Description

Field of the Invention

The present invention relates to the technological field of protection system integration against threats, which is effective in particular against hollow charges (HC threats), explosively-formed or projectile-forming charges (P charges) and kinetic energy penetrators (KE munitions) on an unmanned (tele-operated) rotating turret integrated with a supporting platform which can be for example a terrestrial armored vehicle, a warship or an ISO container.
The present invention relates more particularly to a protection system with a significantly increased crew and platform survivability against aggressively expanding top-attack threats, at low cost and with low weight penalty.

Background and Prior Art

The threat to turrets and associated supporting platforms (TSPs) from above ("top attack") is increasing rapidly in terms of quantity, precision and lethality. This trend threatens the future viability of manned TSPs as conventional technical solutions are impractically costly and heavy. Furthermore the value of the personnel crewing in the TSP is increasing over time, as is societal intolerance of human casualties. The purpose is to satisfy the need to increase the survivability of the TSP crew while maintaining the affordability and operational effectiveness of the TSP as a combat system.
In the field of anti-armor weapons, the generic device is known of the skilled person by a variety of names such as hollow-charge (HC), shaped-charge (SC), High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT), etc., but the principle is the same: to explosively collapse a metallic plate in order to create a penetrator and to project that penetrator to the target at high speed. The device has many variables changing the effects thereof. The most common is the collapsing of a nominally cone-shaped thin copper alloy plate into a narrow ultra-high-speed "needle" or "jet" that hydro-dynamically penetrates the armor to a potentially great depth, eventually causing injury to crew and damage to the interior of the vehicle. The effect is purely kinetic in nature with no explosive or incendiary effect on the target. However if the armor of the target is not that thick then one should vary the parameters to turn the jet into a "slug" which is much shorter and with higher diameter. This punches a bigger hole in the armour and is more lethal than a jet once it enters the crew compartment - this variety of weapon is often called explosive formed projectile (EFP) or self-forming fragment (SFF).
In some of these weapons, the warhead specifically behaves as a hybrid of the HC and the EFP and produces a series of metal penetrators projected in line towards the target. Such a weapon will be referred to herein as a hybrid warhead. Hybrid warheads behave according to how much "jetting" or HC effect it has, and how much of a penetration effect (i.e. EFP effect) it produces.
So there is a wide spectrum or continuum of threats from a single common root device or mechanism.
Today the procurement of cheap loitering munitions marks the start of a more serious challenge to the effectiveness of the TSP.
While counter-drone systems will come, joining for example Active Protection Systems (APS) and roof-mounted remote weapon systems (RWS), the adoption of these systems is likely to be limited by their cost and complexity.
There is no obvious limit to the payload or quantity of the cheap "suicide drones" that can now be deployed by even a nation with limited resources.
For top-attack, overmatch may have to be managed rather than prevented. This is because the price paid in mobility (weight) and money for full TSP protection will not be acceptable to most users.
Many users are going to have to abandon the illusion of immunity, to which they have clung for years.
The technology used by top-attack systems to destroy a TSP are diverse and varied ; however they use one or both of the following fundamental physical mechanisms:

a) the projection or creation of high velocity material within the interior of the TSP ;
b) the creation or propagation of blast or shock-waves within the interior of the TSP.

In each case the mechanism acts by killing or disabling the TSP's crew and/or by destroying or damaging the technical systems thereof.
The technical problem to be solved is to seek to defeat or attenuate these fundamental physical mechanisms at minimum penalty in terms of cost, weight and volume. It has also to deal with new threats. The dominant top-attack defeat mechanism is high-explosive anti-tank (HEAT) for example by drone, anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) or bomblet.
HEAT jets are naturally dynamic and unstable. If they destabilize and expand, their penetrative performance and lethality are reduced. HEAT jets can be artificially destabilized and disrupted through the use of various passive and energetic technologies, e.g. Explosive Reactive Armor (ERA). But HEAT jets also destabilize naturally over time, if they are allowed to do this.
A kinetic energy penetrator (or KE weapon) is another type of ammunition, like a bullet or a flechette, that does not contain explosives but uses kinetic energy to penetrate the target.
The need is currently not being met. The TSP is facing disruptive change and an existential threat. Current attempts to defeat the top-attack threat focus on the development of complex and costly active protection systems, because conventional armor systems are too heavy to use. Active protection and conventional armor each has some utility, but neither offers a practical or affordable solution to the needs of the mass-market.
Various protection systems are effective at defeating HC jets. Among different systems, the best known are reactive armors that use explosives in the protection layers that detonate on being hit to physically disrupt most of the HC jet before it penetrates the target. The problem is that these explosive systems are poor at defeating EFP or hybrid systems.
Currently ballistic protection systems depending on the level of protection are becoming more and more heavy and expensive.
A rather exhaustive prior art review with regard to ballistic protection against HEATs reveals at least seven groups of patents (with non-exhaustive examples) :

a) « spaced »: disclose armor systems according to a "variable" and "adaptable" space according to the detected threat (see EP1499846B1 , US20120152101A1 , US6622608B1 , US7513186B2 , WO2014123597A3 ) ;
b) « reactive »: disclose armor systems with components that will exploit (primary explosion) and reduce the HEAT damage of ammunition. On detection of a threat, they can explode using explosive material, compressed gas, or specific flow (see EP1731870A1 , EP2040024B1 , EP3137842B1 , IL254104A , US20050211086A1 , US20100282062A1 , US20120186437A1 , US20130213211A1 , US20140096673A1 , US20180017358A1 , US5070764A , US5293806A , US5577432A , US7424845B2 , US7540229B2 , US9032858B2 ) ;
c) « multilayer»: disclose armor systems by the superposition of different materials, with very specific properties and functions (see EP2133649A3 , US20090293709A1 , US20110067561A1 , US7987762B2 , US8091464B1 , US8151686B2 , US8336439B2 , US9068802B2 , WO2008100343A2 , WO2008153613A3 , WO2011053399A2 );
d) « modular »: disclose armor systems thanks to a "survivability capsule" with protection according to foreseen threats. The survivability capsule is constructed around occupants oriented to minimize the capsule width and may incorporate traditional or spaced frame construction (see US20120181100A1 , US8752470B2 ) ;
e) « electromagnetic »: disclose reactive armor systems composed by an armor structure comprising an electromagnetic field such that the magnetic field will interfere with a warhead blast to weaken the blast. Electromagnetic field will interfere with a molten metal jet from a shaped charge to disperse the jet, allowing subsequent layers of armor to absorb the jet energy without penetration (see EP3149427B1 , US7730823B1 , US8807009B2 , WO2006085989A2 );
f) « adaptive »: disclose systems with an array of armor elements, capable to rotate, move or orient armor panels with respect to the vehicle body and direction of thread (see ES2704553T3 , US10670375B1 , US10775136B2 , US5824941A , US7080587B2 ) ;
g) « absorption »: disclose armor systems by diffusing energy (from the ammunition) via elastic/plastic deformation of different materials (see US10408578B2 , US20120137867A1 , US20140318360A1 , US7546795B1 ).

For existing technologies, the cost, weight and volume incurred in protecting the TSP from current and emerging top-attack threats render the TSP immobile and/or unaffordable. Thus current TSPs are highly vulnerable to attack by cheap and plentiful top-attack weapons. In every sense, this situation is unacceptable to the customer.
Traditionally, it has been very difficult for the engineers to provide the free-space or "air-gap" required for ERA and similar armors to be fully effective. This compromised mass efficiency, because relatively heavy plates were needed to "catch" energetic spall and disrupted jet material.
However, an unmanned turret has plenty of free-space between turret roof and turret floor. This represents a design opportunity.
If an unmanned turret was reconceived to function as a spaced armor array, then it could offer significant attenuation and containment in the event of top-attack overmatch. And this could be done in a very mass-efficient way.
Document EP 2 195 601 B1 discloses a combination of a ballistic protective assembly and a protective cell for the protection of a turret of a combat vehicle, wherein the protective assembly consists of at least two protective walls, an inner and an outer protective wall, formed from various materials, wherein the inner protective wall protects the protective cell of the turret and the outer protective wall protects the turret. The protective cell accommodates at least one operator's position and is implemented as a self-supporting gas-tight and pressure-tight welded construction, on which the inner protective wall with suitable protective elements can be mounted. An intermediate space between the outer skin and the wall of the protective cell or the turret can be occupied by assemblies, which, in addition to the ammunition, can be the electronics for ammunition delivery and also that of the turret controller or similar. The inner protective wall and the outer protective wall in combination provide various classes of protection, the inner protective wall and the outer protective wall have the same or different levels of protection, the level of protection of the outer protective wall is taken into account in the implementation of the level of protection of the inner protective wall and the protective assembly is modular and adaptable.

Aims of the Invention

The present invention aims, at low cost and weight, to increase the survivability of personnel operating TSPs that are fitted with unmanned turrets, when subject to attacks from above by diverse threats including but not limited to: suicide drones, precision guided munitions, conventional cannon-fired projectiles, submunitions (otherwise referred to as cluster munitions), free-flight rockets, grenades.
A purpose of the invention is to improve the protection of platform and crew against top-attack threat rapidly increasing in terms of lethality and quantity, while provision of protection/immunity against this kind of threat is likely to be unaffordable and/or impracticable, so that, for this solution, the main issue changes from one of turret protection to one of crew survival (perhaps also to avoidance of the total, catastrophic loss of the vehicle).
A new focus is therefore required : how to maximize the probability that, after top-attack overmatch:

the crew can walk away ;
the vehicle chassis can be repaired and restored

Summary of the Invention

The present invention relates to a remotely operated unmanned turret intended to be mounted on a supporting platform, wherein the turret is provided with a two-level ballistic protection system made of a ballistic protection module respectively comprising a first ballistic protection unit mounted in a roof structure of the turret with a first set of specific ballistic protection functions, and of a second ballistic protection unit mounted in a floor of the turret with a second set of ballistic protections functions, an air gap, being provided between the first ballistic protection unit and the second ballistic protection unit, said air gap having also a ballistic protection function,

wherein the turret may comprise some operational equipment, while it is devoid of crew ;
wherein the first ballistic protection unit is designed to allow detonation, penetration and expansion cone dispersion of energetic material and/or shockwave propagation within the air gap ; and
wherein the second ballistic protection unit is designed to act as a barrier between the turret and a chassis-crew compartment of the supporting platform, so as to prevent further over-pressure and/or blast propagation into the chassis-crew space and/or to absorb dispersed energetic material.

According to preferred embodiments, the remotely operated unmanned turret is further limited by one of the following characteristics or by a suitable combination thereof:

the turret comprises a bustle rack holding explosive ammunitions, ammunitions being also possibly present in ammunition delivery systems located in a main compartment of the turret;
the first set of specific ballistic protection functions comprises assuring structural integrity of the turret, immunity to basic ballistic threats, KE projectile destabilization and/or disruption, HEAT charge detonation and/or disruption, and ammunition blow-off venting ;
the second set of specific ballistic protection functions comprise assuring structural integrity of the turret, blast and overpressure protection, gas sealing, flash, fluid, particulate and aerosol protection, fire-barrier protection, Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CNBC) barrier protection and capture and attenuation of spall, KE projectiles and fragments, HEAT jets or parts thereof and of other energetic material;
the air gap contains structures and/or systems such as gun breech-ring and recoil cylinders, that cooperate with the two-level ballistic protection system in preventing energetic material and blast to penetrate into the crew compartment;
at least one of the first ballistic protection unit mounted in a roof structure of the turret and of second ballistic protection unit mounted in a floor of the turret comprises passive armor systems such as plates which are geometrically variable, adaptable, removable, interchangeable in reaction to a detected threat;
at least one of the first ballistic protection unit mounted in a roof structure of the turret and of second ballistic protection unit mounted in a floor of the turret comprises reactive armor systems that can, in reaction to a threat, explode using explosive material or trigger the production of compressed gas or molten metal ;
the reactive armor system produces an electromagnetic field interfering with a warhead blast;
at least one of the first ballistic protection unit mounted in a roof structure of the turret and of second ballistic protection unit mounted in a floor of the turret comprises multilayer systems resulting of the superposition of materials having different physical properties ;

at least one of the first ballistic protection unit mounted in a roof structure of the turret and of second ballistic protection unit mounted in a floor of the turret comprises an adaptive array of armor elements capable to move, rotate or orient armor panels with respect to the vehicle body and/or direction of threat;
at least one of the first ballistic protection unit mounted in a roof structure of the turret and of second ballistic protection unit mounted in a floor of the turret comprises armor systems capable of diffusing or absorbing warhead energy via elastic or plastic deformation of said systems ;
the first ballistic protection unit and the second ballistic protection unit have the same or different levels of protection ;
the first ballistic protection unit and the second ballistic protection unit are modular;
the turret is further provided with an anti-explosion system for relieving an excess pressure differential between the interior and the exterior of the turret, said system comprising a rupture panel or disk or a venting panel, so as to allow rapidly expanding heated gases to be vented to the outside of the turret and disperse the potential explosion.

The concept of two-level or double ballistic plate protection is already evoked e.g. in EP 2 195 601 , with a free space or void or air gap located between an outer and an inner protective walls, in which free space ammunition and electronics for example can be stored and thereby are not located in the crew protective cell. However, in this configuration, the crew protective cell remains inside the turret, while, in the instant invention, the crew is located in the chassis or supporting platform and the turret is completely sacrificial, and intended to fully "accept" and to attenuate the top-attack overmatch.

Brief Description of the Drawings

FIG. 1 is representing an example of traditional use of light armor plates to derive protection from MBT track-space.
FIG. 2 schematically shows an attack of unmanned TSP turret from above.
FIG. 3 schematically represents the first ballistic protection module protecting the turret roof structure according to the present invention.
FIG. 4 schematically represents the second ballistic protection module protecting the turret floor structure according to the present invention.

Description of a Preferred Embodiments of the Invention

The present invention intends to concretize the sacrifice of the turret, while satisfying the following requirements :

new turrets are increasingly designed as unmanned sub-systems, with the turret crew being relocated to the vehicle chassis ;
a high level of top-attack overmatch requires the unmanned turret to become a sacrificial element of the vehicle system ;
the future unmanned turret should possess functions of overmatch containment and attenuation, with respect to the crew and the vehicle chassis.

For unmanned turrets, the overmatch attenuation system (OAS) proposed according to the invention should deliver the following benefits:

1. significantly increased crew and chassis survivability against an aggressively expanding top-attack threat, at low cost and with low weight penalty ;
2. form the basis for a broader, integrated, survivability system for future turrets.

The following aspects are considered by the invention:

Attenuation and Containment

The principle of using air to enhance TSP survivability at a low cost in money and weight is well established. A significant air gap gives ballistic penetrators that are destabilized or fragmented the time and space required to physically disperse, typically creating a volume known as an "expansion cone". The larger this expansion cone, the greater is the area over which energetic penetrator material is distributed. This results in a significant reduction in the penetrative performance of the attack, as material and energy cease to be applied at a single point but are instead averaged over a larger area. This is done at a small cost in weight but it does require considerable volume. There is very little free internal volume available within a conventional TSP, making application difficult.
Main battle tank (MBT) track-spaces are often used to enable light armors to defeat HEAT attack, with very high system mass-efficiency being achieved (see ex. in FIG. 1, showing a MBT chassis with a turret equipped with a 105mm HP gun - NATO standard). Track-space contains free air and a limited volume of tough automotive drive components. Turret-space is traditionally full of crewmen, ammunition and fragile fire-control systems. To allow an expansion-cone to form in the track-space may be operationally acceptable but to permit this in manned turret-space is certainly not.
The following current trends permit established practice to be challenged :

relocation of the crew from the turret to the TSP chassis ;
in consequence, the transfer of some critical equipment and function from turret to chassis ;
increasing intolerance of human casualties ;
relocation of large-calibre ammunition (particularly high explosives) out of TSP crew compartments ;
development of insensitive ammunition types.

As these trends progress, the formation of an expansion-cone in the turret-space should become operationally acceptable, on condition that it reduces the probability of death and injury to personnel located in the TSP chassis. Thus the turret may become sacrificial instead of sacrosanct.
If an unmanned turret has both the following :

a roof structure that is designed to destabilize or disrupt the formation of a HEAT jet and/or which is designed to destabilise or fragment a kinetic-energy penetrator, while maintaining the bulk physical integrity of the turret;
a floor structure that is designed to act as a barrier between turret and chassis crew-space, preventing over-pressure and blast propagation into the latter and safely absorbing dispersed energetic material ;

FIG. 2

Turret Roof Structure

Ideally continuous, the turret roof structure (see FIG. 3) comprises a bespoke integrated system, tailored according to need. Typically a composite system, the turret roof structure may or may not be continuous and may vary in composition, geometry and performance across the turret area and between individual turrets. The function of the turret roof structure may include (but is not limited to) the following points :

structural integrity;
access points ;
immunity to basic ballistic threats, e.g. 7.62 mm ball ;
signature management;
KE projectile destabilisation and/or disruption ;
HEAT charge detonation, jet destabilization and/or disruption ;
ammunition "blow-off" venting.

Turret Floor Structure

Ideally continuous, the turret floor structure (see FIG. 4) comprises a bespoke integrated system, tailored according to need. Typically a composite system, the turret floor structure may or may not be continuous and may vary in composition, geometry and performance across the turret area and between individual turrets. The function of the turret floor structure may include (but is not limited to) the following points :

structural integrity;
blast and overpressure protection ;
gas sealing ;
flash, fluid, particulate and aerosol protection ;
access points ;
capture and attenuation of spall, KE projectiles and fragments, HEAT jets or part thereof and of other energetic materiel.

Still under the scope of the invention, the exact design of the turret roof/floor structure will vary over time with the evolving and changing nature of the threat and operational requirements, respectively. As an TSP may be in service for as long as fifty (50) years, so it will also be subject to serial upgrades in the course of its operational life.

Air Gap

Although idealized as free space, the gap between the turret roof and floor structures may be not completely empty. Structures and systems such as the gun breech-ring and recoil cylinders will then contribute to the effectiveness of the invention by increasing the probability that no energetic material penetrates or enters the crew compartment of the TSP chassis.

List of reference symbols

1: turret
2: cannon
3: armor plate (track-space)
4: turret roof structure
5: turret floor structure
6: turret interior (air gap)
7: TSP chassis crewspace
8: attack from above
9: schockwave propagation
10: expansion-cone (energetic material)
11: turret roof ballistic protection
12: turret floor ballistic protection

Claims

A remotely operated unmanned turret (1) intended to be mounted on a supporting platform, wherein the turret (1) is provided with a two-level ballistic protection system (11, 12) made of a ballistic protection module respectively comprising a first ballistic protection unit (11) mounted in a roof structure (4) of the turret with a first set of specific ballistic protection functions, and of a second ballistic protection unit (12) mounted in a floor (5) of the turret with a second set of ballistic protections functions, an air gap (6), being provided between the first ballistic protection unit (11) and the second ballistic protection unit (12), said air gap (6) having also a ballistic protection function,
wherein the turret (1) may comprise some operational equipment, while it is devoid of crew ;

wherein the first ballistic protection unit (11) is designed to allow detonation, penetration and expansion cone dispersion of energetic material (10) and/or shockwave propagation (9) within the air gap (6) ; and

wherein the second ballistic protection unit (12) is designed to act as a barrier between the turret (1) and a chassis-crew compartment (7) of the supporting platform, so as to prevent further over-pressure and/or blast propagation into the chassis-crew space (7) and/or to absorb dispersed energetic material.
The remotely operated unmanned turret according to claim 1, wherein the turret (1) comprises a bustle rack holding explosive ammunitions, ammunitions being also possibly present in ammunition delivery systems located in a main compartment of the turret.
The remotely operated unmanned turret according to claim 1, wherein the first set of specific ballistic protection functions comprises assuring structural integrity of the turret, immunity to basic ballistic threats, KE projectile destabilization and/or disruption, HEAT charge detonation and/or disruption, and ammunition blow-off venting.
The remotely operated unmanned turret according to claim 1, wherein the second set of specific ballistic protection functions comprise assuring structural integrity of the turret, blast and overpressure protection, gas sealing, flash, fluid, particulate and aerosol protection, fire-barrier protection, Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CNBC) barrier protection and capture and attenuation of spall, KE projectiles and fragments, HEAT jets or parts thereof and of other energetic material.
The remotely operated unmanned turret according to claim 1, wherein the air gap contains structures and/or systems such as gun breech-ring and recoil cylinders, that cooperate with the two-level ballistic protection system (11, 12) in preventing energetic material and blast to penetrate into the crew compartment.
The remotely operated unmanned turret according to claim 1, wherein at least one of the first ballistic protection unit (11) mounted in a roof structure (4) of the turret and of second ballistic protection unit (12) mounted in a floor (5) of the turret comprises passive armor systems such as plates which are geometrically variable, adaptable, removable, interchangeable in reaction to a detected threat.
The remotely operated unmanned turret according to claim 1, wherein at least one of the first ballistic protection unit (11) mounted in a roof structure (4) of the turret and of second ballistic protection unit (12) mounted in a floor (5) of the turret comprises reactive armor systems that can, in reaction to a threat, explode using explosive material or trigger the production of compressed gas or molten metal.
The remotely operated unmanned turret according to claim 7, wherein the reactive armor system produces an electromagnetic field interfering with a warhead blast.
The remotely operated unmanned turret according to claim 1, wherein at least one of the first ballistic protection unit (11) mounted in a roof structure (4) of the turret and of second ballistic protection unit (12) mounted in a floor (5) of the turret comprises multilayer systems resulting of the superposition of materials having different physical properties.
The remotely operated unmanned turret according to claim 1, wherein at least one of the first ballistic protection unit (11) mounted in a roof structure (4) of the turret and of second ballistic protection unit (12) mounted in a floor (5) of the turret comprises an adaptive array of armor elements capable to move, rotate or orient armor panels with respect to the vehicle body and/or direction of threat.
The remotely operated unmanned turret according to claim 1, wherein at least one of the first ballistic protection unit (11) mounted in a roof structure (4) of the turret and of second ballistic protection unit (12) mounted in a floor (5) of the turret comprises armor systems capable of diffusing or absorbing warhead energy via elastic or plastic deformation of said systems.
The remotely operated unmanned turret according to claim 1, wherein the first ballistic protection unit (11) and the second ballistic protection unit (12) provide the same or different levels of protection.
The remotely operated unmanned turret according to claim 1, wherein the first ballistic protection unit (11) and the second ballistic protection unit (12) are modular.
The remotely operated unmanned turret according to claim 1, wherein the turret (1) is further provided with an anti-explosion system for relieving an excess pressure differential between the interior and the exterior of the turret (1), said system comprising a rupture panel or disk or a venting panel, so as to allow rapidly expanding heated gases to be vented to the outside of the turret and disperse the potential explosion.