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EP2300301B1 - Communication method and system for route secured control - Google Patents

Communication method and system for route secured control Download PDF

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Publication number
EP2300301B1
EP2300301B1 EP08875602.8A EP08875602A EP2300301B1 EP 2300301 B1 EP2300301 B1 EP 2300301B1 EP 08875602 A EP08875602 A EP 08875602A EP 2300301 B1 EP2300301 B1 EP 2300301B1
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EP
European Patent Office
Prior art keywords
control unit
ground
vehicle
information
safety
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EP08875602.8A
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German (de)
French (fr)
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EP2300301A1 (en
Inventor
Armand Pierre Bohe
Patrice Cortial
Regis Degouge
Jean-Luc Halle
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Siemens SAS
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Siemens SAS
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Priority to HUE08875602A priority Critical patent/HUE033175T2/en
Publication of EP2300301A1 publication Critical patent/EP2300301A1/en
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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L21/00—Station blocking between signal boxes in one yard
    • B61L21/04—Electrical locking and release of the route; Electrical repeat locks
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L17/00—Switching systems for classification yards
    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B61—RAILWAYS
    • B61L—GUIDING RAILWAY TRAFFIC; ENSURING THE SAFETY OF RAILWAY TRAFFIC
    • B61L5/00—Local operating mechanisms for points or track-mounted scotch-blocks; Visible or audible signals; Local operating mechanisms for visible or audible signals
    • B61L5/06—Electric devices for operating points or scotch-blocks, e.g. using electromotive driving means

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method and a communication system for secure route control according to the preamble of claims 1 and 8.
  • the so-called secure route control is aimed in particular at public transport vehicles moving there such as a rail transport unit, a metro, a tramway, a trolley, a bus, etc.
  • CBTC Commission-Based Train
  • a secure control system for emergency destruction of the route allows outside of the nominal operating modes to destroy a route while preserving the security of the system.
  • This logic is based on a static definition of parameters necessary for its proper functioning. These parameters are dimensioned to be compatible with the worst case of trains running on a so-called “maneuvering" zone, on which risks of collisions are to be taken into account, needle maneuvering under the train, therefore to be rendered non-drivable. .
  • the safe delay is chosen so long, so that the worst case (collision, derailment) is avoided regardless of the type or approach characteristics of the vehicle, even if it inevitably would not be able to stop at a threshold limit of the approach area.
  • this fixed delay is very long, while the safety technology of trains is improved over the years. This causes long train stops and therefore blocks traffic excessively.
  • the document EP 1 752 355A1 discloses a train that confirms the stopping distance it needs in case of cancellation of its route.
  • an object of the present invention is then to reduce the time required for the emergency destruction of a route in a maneuvering zone while guaranteeing the security character.
  • An embodiment of the invention thus described therefore provides that, following an emergency manual control of the destruction of the route emanating from a closing signaling or from a ground control unit, dynamic parameters of the train are taken into account. , or even transmitted between the train and the ground, in particular the parameters related to the determination of a binary codable physical stopping distance (in the required information) in order to be able to compare it to an acceptable stopping distance or a binary decision module (at the ground control unit). If the binary coded distance is less than the acceptable distance, the safe delay can even be canceled completely.
  • Linear coding can thus also be envisaged so as to transmit more gradual signals such as metric distances that in any case lead to an evaluation of whether the initial security delay can be reduced or canceled. This aspect thus makes it possible to refine the adjustment of the security delay in order to reduce it.
  • the coding can also be secured (for example by means of a redundancy stop distance calculation) and encrypted in order to more securely protect the information exchange between the train and the ground and thus to avoid a reduction in the safe delay. in case the information related to the energy balance was calculated incorrectly or transmitted by mistake or in bad omens.
  • a set of subclaims also has advantages of the invention.
  • figure 1 is an exemplary embodiment adapted to a communication system in the context of a conventional ground signal including a stop light F (visible by a train driver on the approach zone ZA) controlled by the control unit USOL ground control via a control signal C.
  • the USOL ground control unit is itself controlled by an operator F who wishes to activate a possible route (or displacement) destruction on the ZM maneuvering zone via a signal destruction D sent to the USOL ground control unit.
  • the ground control unit USOL activates the closing of the stop light F, in which case the information request RI is also sent from the ground control unit USOL to the onboard security control unit USEMB. .
  • the safe delay TS is still selected by default at its maximum value depending on the type of train / worst-case situation for a required braking.
  • the activation of the sending of the information request RI is carried out after identification of the approach of the train on the approach zone ZA, taking into account a sufficiently high safety distance corresponding to the maximum value of delay safe TS.
  • the driver or an onboard automatism then take immediate steps to stop the train.
  • the ground control unit USOL is then in standby mode of a feedback (information required RI) following the information request RI previously initiated.
  • a safety calculator linked to the USEMB on-board safety control unit of the train A evaluates its energy and compares it with its braking capacity.
  • the safety computer responds positively to the ground control unit USOL by sending the required information IR, that is to say for example a binary type 0-1 message that can be accompanied by its operating range and whether or not the reduction or cancellation of the safe delay TS.
  • the ground control unit USOL On receipt of the required information IR, the ground control unit USOL checks the binary signal 0/1, that the operating range corresponds to the route to be destroyed and that the train A ensures compliance with the signal. In this way, according to the invention, the ground control unit USOL then authorizes the destruction device D to immediately destroy the route (not taking into account the safe time delay TS).
  • the operator F is then informed of the destruction of the route via a signal RES issued by the USOL ground control unit.
  • the exchanges of information request RI and required information IR between the ground control unit USOL and the security unit USEMB onboard control are ideally by air E, for example via radio frequency.
  • the operator F is informed of the destruction of the route via the signal RES.
  • Figure 2 presents a communication system for secure route control adapted to a CBTC type H_CBTC automation interfaced between the USOL ground control unit and the USEMB onboard safety control unit.
  • the H CBTC automation has the role of a train driver knowing all the dynamic parameters of the train and can also have data from any source of information related to traffic on various areas, to the signaling etc. This is therefore very advantageous in the case of dynamic management of driverless vehicle traffic, in particular allowing more tightly controlled walking areas.
  • the F operator commands a manual route destruction to the USOL ground control unit.
  • the ground control unit USOL immediately closes the stop signal F associated with the route, activates the manual route destruction device via the destruction signal D (initialization of the safe delay TS at its maximum value) and sends to the H_CBTC automation equipment on the ground a current route destruction information via the signal, extended D_CBTC to allow the sending of information request RI to the security unit USEMB onboard control.
  • the present driver or the USEMB On-Board Security Unit immediately takes steps to stop Train A.
  • the H_CBTC ground automation then identifies the train A approaching the stop signal F, and a link ground / train sends the information request RI which includes a request to stop the train A.
  • the security unit (also compatibly automated type CBTC) USEMB on-board train A, from its location evaluates its energy and compares it to its braking capacity.
  • the onboard security unit USEMB responds positively to the automation equipment H_CBTC by returning the required information IR, that is to say for example a message binary type 0-1 that can be accompanied by its operating range and whether or not the reduction or cancellation of the safe delay TS.
  • the H_CBTC automation equipment on the ground checks that the walking area corresponds to the route to be destroyed and that the A train guarantees the respect of the stop signal F.
  • the H CBTC automation equipment on the ground informs the USOL ground control unit of the respect (or not) of the signal F by the approaching train A by means of a binary destruction signal DI.
  • the ground control unit USOL then authorizes the destruction device D to immediately destroy the route (not taken into account, canceling the safe delay TS).
  • the operator F is informed of the destruction of the route by the USOL ground control unit.
  • the USOL ground control unit in standby mode, waits until the end of the safe TS timer to destroy the route. Thus, there is no risk of reducing the TS security delay "prematurely".
  • the operator F is then informed of the non-destruction of the route by the USOL ground control unit.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • Train Traffic Observation, Control, And Security (AREA)
  • Electric Propulsion And Braking For Vehicles (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Description

La présente invention concerne une méthode et un système de communication pour un contrôle sécurisé d'itinéraire selon le préambule des revendications 1 et 8.The present invention relates to a method and a communication system for secure route control according to the preamble of claims 1 and 8.

Le dit contrôle sécurisé d'itinéraire vise en particulier des véhicules de transport publics s'y déplaçant tels qu'une unité de transport ferroviaire, un métro, un tramway, un trolley, un bus, etc. L'invention est également adaptée à un type de véhicule dont le guidage peut être effectué d'une façon complètement autonome d'un chauffeur dans le véhicule. C'est le cas par exemple d'un véhicule géré par un système de guidage automatique sur un itinéraire muni d'un automatisme (ferroviaire) de commande de guidage interfacé à une signalisation tel que du type standard CBTC (= « Communication-Based Train Control »). Par extension toutefois sans restriction sur ce type de véhicule, le terme « train » pourra être communément utilisé dans la suite du document, sans cependant omettre tous les types de véhicules énumérés ci-dessus.The so-called secure route control is aimed in particular at public transport vehicles moving there such as a rail transport unit, a metro, a tramway, a trolley, a bus, etc. The invention is also adapted to a type of vehicle whose guidance can be carried out completely independently of a driver in the vehicle. This is the case, for example, of a vehicle managed by an automatic guidance system on a route equipped with a control rail (automatic) control system interfaced to a signaling such as the standard type CBTC (= "Communication-Based Train"). Control "). By extension however without restriction on this type of vehicle, the term "train" may be commonly used in the rest of the document, without however omitting all types of vehicles listed above.

Classiquement dans une signalisation ferroviaire, une logique de commande sécurisée de destruction d'urgence d'itinéraire, permet en dehors des modes d'exploitation nominaux de détruire un itinéraire en préservant la sécurité du système. Cette logique est fondée sur une définition statique de paramètres nécessaires à son bon fonctionnement. Ces paramètres sont dimensionnés pour être compatibles avec le pire cas de trains circulant sur une zone dite « de manoeuvre », sur laquelle des risques de collisions sont à prendre en compte, de manoeuvre d'aiguille sous le train, donc devant être rendue non circulable.Conventionally in a railway signaling system, a secure control system for emergency destruction of the route, allows outside of the nominal operating modes to destroy a route while preserving the security of the system. This logic is based on a static definition of parameters necessary for its proper functioning. These parameters are dimensioned to be compatible with the worst case of trains running on a so-called "maneuvering" zone, on which risks of collisions are to be taken into account, needle maneuvering under the train, therefore to be rendered non-drivable. .

Actuellement, une méthode de contrôle sécurisé d'itinéraire parcouru par un véhicule circulant sur une zone d'approche d'une zone de manoeuvre est connue, pour laquelle :

  • la zone de manoeuvre est précédée d'une signalisation de fermeture disposée au sol (feux d'arrêt au niveau de la jonction de la zone d'approche et de la zone de manoeuvre) et adaptée pour informer le véhicule de s'arrêter,
  • une temporisation sécuritaire fixe est suffisamment dimensionnée (suffisamment longue en terme de durée d'approche) par une unité de commande au sol pour garantir un arrêt du véhicule avant son franchissement sur la zone de manoeuvre.
Currently, a method of secure control of the route traveled by a vehicle traveling on an approach zone of a maneuvering area is known, for which:
  • the maneuvering area is preceded by a closure signal placed on the ground (stop lights at the junction of the approach zone and the maneuvering zone) and adapted to inform the vehicle of stopping,
  • a fixed safety delay is sufficiently sized (long enough in terms of approach time) by a ground control unit to ensure a stop of the vehicle before crossing over the maneuvering area.

La temporisation sécuritaire est ainsi choisie longue, afin que le pire cas (collision, déraillement) soit évité quelque soit le type ou les caractéristiques d'approche du véhicule, même si celui-ci devait inévitablement ne pas pouvoir s'arrêter à un seuil limite de la zone d'approche. En d'autres termes, cette temporisation fixée se révèle fort longue alors que la technologie sécuritaire des trains se voit améliorée au fil des ans. Ceci provoque des arrêts de trains de longues durées et bloque donc le trafic outre mesure.The safe delay is chosen so long, so that the worst case (collision, derailment) is avoided regardless of the type or approach characteristics of the vehicle, even if it inevitably would not be able to stop at a threshold limit of the approach area. In other words, this fixed delay is very long, while the safety technology of trains is improved over the years. This causes long train stops and therefore blocks traffic excessively.

Le principe de la logique de commande précitée se fonde ainsi sur une signalisation classique pour laquelle la sécurité d'une « destruction » manuelle d'itinéraire (zone de manoeuvre à détruire pour éviter son franchissement) repose sur la temporisation sécuritaire et éventuellement sur une information de présence d'un train sur la zone d'approche associée à un signal d'arrêt (feux d'arrêt lumineux, disjoncteur d'alimentation motrice, etc.). L'itinéraire est détruit suivant une possible séquence selon laquelle:

  1. 1 - à la réception d'une (télé-)commande de destruction d'itinéraire provenant de l'unité de commande au sol, le signal d'arrêt au sol est fermé ;
  2. 2 - la temporisation sécuritaire est initialisée et l'itinéraire (zone de manoeuvre) est détruit après écoulement de celle-ci.
Le principe de cette logique est qu'à la fermeture du signal d'arrêt, le conducteur ou un automatisme embarqué de guidage en approche de ce signal, doit solliciter le système de freinage pour arrêter le train et faire de son mieux pour respecter le signal.
A l'issue de la temporisation sécuritaire, deux cas sont possibles:
  1. 1 - le train a réussi à s'arrêter en amont du signal et ne peut plus franchir le signal (respect du signal fermé). La destruction de l'itinéraire (zone de manoeuvre) peut alors se faire en toute sécurité.
  2. 2 - Le train n'a pas pu s'arrêter en amont du signal mais il est alors protégé d'une collision ou d'un déraillement sur la zone de manoeuvre, soit par un enclenchement d'une aiguille qui verrouille cette dernière et empêche tout autre train de parcourir la même zone de manoeuvre, soit parce que le train a franchi en totalité la zone de manoeuvre et il n'est plus concerné par la destruction d'itinéraire.
Le dimensionnement de la temporisation sécuritaire garantit qu'un train à l'approche du signal qui se ferme devant lui sera à l'arrêt après l'écoulement de la dite temporisation. Ce dimensionnement, pour garantir la sécurité de la fonction, prendra en compte le temps d'arrêt le plus long des différents types de trains circulant sur cette zone à la vitesse maximum autorisée (temps dépendant de l'énergie potentielle et cinétique maximum d'un train en approche et de sa capacité de freinage).The principle of the above-mentioned control logic is thus based on conventional signaling for which the security of a manual "destruction" of the route (maneuvering zone to be destroyed in order to avoid its crossing) is based on the safe delay and possibly on a piece of information. the presence of a train on the approach zone associated with a stop signal (stop lights, power supply circuit breaker, etc.). The route is destroyed in a possible sequence according to which:
  1. 1 - upon receipt of a (remote) command to destroy the route from the ground control unit, the ground stop signal is closed;
  2. 2 - the safe time delay is initialized and the route (maneuvering zone) is destroyed after the flow of the latter.
The principle of this logic is that when closing the stop signal, the driver or an on-board automatic control approaching this signal, must request the braking system to stop the train and do its best to respect the signal .
At the end of the security delay, two cases are possible:
  1. 1 - the train has managed to stop upstream of the signal and can not cross the signal (respect of the closed signal). The destruction of the route (maneuvering area) can then be done safely.
  2. 2 - The train could not stop before the signal but it is then protected from a collision or a derailment on the maneuvering area, either by a lock of a needle which locks the latter and prevents any other train traveling in the same maneuvering area, or because the train has passed the entire maneuvering area and is no longer involved in the destruction of the route.
The sizing of the safe delay ensures that a train approaching the signal that closes in front of it will be stopped after the expiration of said time delay. This dimensioning, to guarantee the safety of the function, will take into account the longest downtime of the different types of trains running on this zone at the maximum speed allowed (time depending on the potential energy and maximum kinetics of a approaching train and its braking capacity).

Le document EP 1 752 355A1 divulgue un train qui confirme la distance d'arrêt dont il a besoin en cas d'annulation de son itinéraire.The document EP 1 752 355A1 discloses a train that confirms the stopping distance it needs in case of cancellation of its route.

Pour ces raisons, un but de la présente invention est alors de réduire le temps nécessaire de la destruction d'urgence d'itinéraire en zone de manoeuvre tout en garantissant le caractère sécuritaire.For these reasons, an object of the present invention is then to reduce the time required for the emergency destruction of a route in a maneuvering zone while guaranteeing the security character.

Une solution avantageuse sous forme de méthode ainsi que sous forme de système est ainsi proposée au travers de revendications indépendantes 1 et 8.An advantageous solution in the form of method as well as in the form of a system is thus proposed through independent claims 1 and 8.

Plus précisément, une méthode de contrôle sécurisé d'itinéraire parcouru par un véhicule circulant sur une zone d'approche d'une zone de manoeuvre est proposée, pour laquelle :

  • la zone de manoeuvre est précédée d'une signalisation de fermeture disposée au sol et adaptée pour informer le véhicule de s'arrêter,
  • une temporisation sécuritaire est dimensionnée par une unité de commande au sol pour garantir un arrêt du véhicule avant son franchissement sur la zone de manoeuvre,
  • en parallèle de la signalisation de fermeture une requête d'information provenant de l'unité de commande au sol est transmise à une unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée dans le véhicule,
  • l'unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée ou un module d'évaluation associé évalue la capacité de freinage du véhicule sur la base d'un bilan énergétique lié à la cinétique du véhicule et la code (binairement par exemple) dans une information requise par l'unité de commande au sol, puis transmise en retour à l'unité de commande au sol,
  • suivant un état de l'information, l'unité de commande au sol minimise la temporisation sécuritaire, voire l'annule complètement si l'état de l'information assure un état clairement permissif de l'arrêt du véhicule hors de la zone de manoeuvre.
More specifically, a method of secure control of the route traveled by a vehicle traveling on an approach zone of a maneuvering zone is proposed, for which:
  • the maneuvering area is preceded by a closure signal placed on the ground and adapted to inform the vehicle to stop,
  • a safe time delay is dimensioned by a ground control unit to ensure a stop of the vehicle before crossing over the maneuvering area,
  • in parallel with the closing signaling, an information request from the ground control unit is transmitted to a security control unit on board the vehicle,
  • the onboard safe control unit or an associated evaluation module evaluates the braking capacity of the vehicle on the basis of an energy balance related to the kinetics of the vehicle and the code (binary for example) in information required by the ground control unit, then transmitted back to the ground control unit,
  • following a state of the information, the ground control unit minimizes the safe delay, or cancels it completely if the state of the information ensures a state clearly permissive of stopping the vehicle out of the maneuvering area.

Une réalisation de l'invention ainsi décrite prévoit donc que suite à une commande manuelle d'urgence de destruction d'itinéraire émanant d'une signalisation de fermeture ou d'une unité de commande au sol, des paramètres dynamiques du train soient pris en compte, voire aussi transmis entre le train et le sol, en particulier les paramètres liés à la détermination d'une distance d'arrêt physique codable binairement (dans l'information requise) pour pouvoir la comparer à une distance acceptable d'arrêt ou d'un module de décision binaire (au niveau de l'unité de commande au sol). Si la distance codée binairement est inférieure à la distance acceptable, la temporisation sécuritaire peut même être annulée complètement.An embodiment of the invention thus described therefore provides that, following an emergency manual control of the destruction of the route emanating from a closing signaling or from a ground control unit, dynamic parameters of the train are taken into account. , or even transmitted between the train and the ground, in particular the parameters related to the determination of a binary codable physical stopping distance (in the required information) in order to be able to compare it to an acceptable stopping distance or a binary decision module (at the ground control unit). If the binary coded distance is less than the acceptable distance, the safe delay can even be canceled completely.

Un codage linéaire peut ainsi être également envisagé de façon à transmettre des signaux plus graduels comme des distances métriques aboutissant de toute façon à évaluer si la temporisation sécuritaire initiale peut être diminuée ou voire annulée. Cet aspect permet ainsi d'affiner l'ajustement de la temporisation sécuritaire dans le but de la réduire.Linear coding can thus also be envisaged so as to transmit more gradual signals such as metric distances that in any case lead to an evaluation of whether the initial security delay can be reduced or canceled. This aspect thus makes it possible to refine the adjustment of the security delay in order to reduce it.

Le codage peut aussi être sécurisé (par exemple au moyen d'un calcul de distance d'arrêt en redondance) et crypté afin de protéger plus sécuritairement l'échange d'information entre train et sol et donc pour éviter une réduction de la temporisation sécuritaire au cas où l'information liée au bilan énergétique était calculée de façon erronée ou transmise par erreur voire dans de mauvaises augures.The coding can also be secured (for example by means of a redundancy stop distance calculation) and encrypted in order to more securely protect the information exchange between the train and the ground and thus to avoid a reduction in the safe delay. in case the information related to the energy balance was calculated incorrectly or transmitted by mistake or in bad omens.

Un ensemble de sous-revendications présente également des avantages de l'invention.A set of subclaims also has advantages of the invention.

Afin de décrire l'invention, en particulier sous ses plusieurs aspects techniques et leurs avantages, des exemples de réalisation et d'application sont fournis à l'aide de figures décrites :

Figure 1
Système de communication pour le contrôle sécurisé d'itinéraire.
Figure 2
Système de communication pour le contrôle sécurisé d'itinéraire adapté à un automatisme de type CBTC.
In order to describe the invention, in particular in its several technical aspects and their advantages, examples of realization and application are provided using the figures described:
Figure 1
Communication system for secure route control.
Figure 2
Communication system for secure route control adapted to a CBTC type automation.

Figure 1 présente un système de communication pour le contrôle sécurisé d'itinéraire parcouru par un véhicule A circulant sur une zone d'approche ZA d'une zone de manoeuvre ZM pour lequel :

  • la zone de manoeuvre est précédée d'une signalisation de fermeture D, C, F disposée au sol et adaptée pour informer le véhicule de s'arrêter,
  • une unité de commande au sol USOL comprend une temporisation sécuritaire TS étant dimensionnée pour garantir un arrêt du véhicule avant son franchissement sur la zone de manoeuvre,
  • en parallèle de la signalisation de fermeture D, C, F une requête d'information RI provenant de l'unité de commande au sol est transmise à une unité sécuritaire de commande USEMB embarquée dans le véhicule, de préférence par un moyen de communication aérien,
  • l'unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée USEMB comprend (ou est connectée à) un module d'évaluation ME de la capacité de freinage du véhicule sur la base d'un bilan énergétique lié à la cinétique du véhicule,
  • un module embarqué de décodage de la requête d'information RI commande un module de codage (binaire) MCB d'une l'information requise IR en retour par l'unité de commande au sol USOL, puis transmise en retour à l'unité de commande au sol USOL,
  • suivant l'état (binaire) de l'information requise IR lié au bilan énergétique, l'unité de commande au sol comprend un module de décision et de redéfinition de la temporisation sécuritaire, visant à minimiser celle-ci, voire l'annuler.
Figure 1 presents a communication system for the secure control of the route traveled by a vehicle A traveling on an approach zone ZA of a ZM maneuvering zone for which:
  • the operating zone is preceded by a closure signal D, C, F arranged on the ground and adapted to inform the vehicle to stop,
  • a USOL ground control unit comprises a safe time delay TS being dimensioned to ensure a stop of the vehicle before its crossing over the operating zone,
  • in parallel with the closing signaling D, C, F an information request RI coming from the ground control unit is transmitted to a USEMB security control unit embedded in the vehicle, preferably by an air communication means,
  • the onboard safe control unit USEMB comprises (or is connected to) an evaluation module ME of the braking capacity of the vehicle on the basis of an energy balance linked to the kinetics of the vehicle,
  • an on-board decoding module of the information request RI controls a coding module (binary) MCB of the required information IR back by the ground control unit USOL, and then transmitted back to the control unit. USOL ground control,
  • following the (binary) status of the required IR information related to the energy balance, the ground control unit includes a decision module and redefinition of the safe timing, to minimize it or even cancel it.

Structurellement, figure 1 est un exemple de réalisation adapté à un système de communication dans le cadre d'une signalisation au sol classique comprenant un feu d'arrêt F (visible par un chauffeur de train sur la zone d'approche ZA) commandé par l'unité de commande au sol USOL via un signal de commande C. L'unité de commande au sol USOL est elle-même commandée par un opérateur F qui souhaite activer une destruction d'itinéraire (ou de déplacement) possible sur la zone de manoeuvre ZM via un signal de destruction D envoyé à l'unité de commande au sol USOL. Dans cette situation, l'unité de commande au sol USOL active la fermeture du feu d'arrêt F auquel cas la requête d'information RI est également envoyée de l'unité de commande au sol USOL à l'unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée USEMB. A ce stade, la temporisation sécuritaire TS est encore par défaut choisie à sa valeur maximale suivant le type de train/situation du pire des cas pour un freinage exigé. L'activation de l'envoi de la requête d'information RI est effectuée après identification de l'approche du train sur la zone d'approche ZA, en ayant pris en compte une distance de sécurité suffisamment élevée correspondant à la valeur maximale de temporisation sécuritaire TS. Le conducteur ou un automatisme embarqué prennent alors immédiatement leurs dispositions pour arrêter le train.structurally, figure 1 is an exemplary embodiment adapted to a communication system in the context of a conventional ground signal including a stop light F (visible by a train driver on the approach zone ZA) controlled by the control unit USOL ground control via a control signal C. The USOL ground control unit is itself controlled by an operator F who wishes to activate a possible route (or displacement) destruction on the ZM maneuvering zone via a signal destruction D sent to the USOL ground control unit. In this situation, the ground control unit USOL activates the closing of the stop light F, in which case the information request RI is also sent from the ground control unit USOL to the onboard security control unit USEMB. . At this stage, the safe delay TS is still selected by default at its maximum value depending on the type of train / worst-case situation for a required braking. The activation of the sending of the information request RI is carried out after identification of the approach of the train on the approach zone ZA, taking into account a sufficiently high safety distance corresponding to the maximum value of delay safe TS. The driver or an onboard automatism then take immediate steps to stop the train.

L'unité de commande au sol USOL est alors en mode d'attente d'un retour d'information (information requise RI) suite à la requête d'information RI précédemment initiée.The ground control unit USOL is then in standby mode of a feedback (information required RI) following the information request RI previously initiated.

Plusieurs cas sont alors envisageables :

  • 1 er cas: le train A répond « positivement ».
Several cases are then possible:
  • 1st case: the train A responds "positively".

A la réception de la requête d'information RI, un calculateur de sécurité lié à l'unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée USEMB du train A, à partir de sa localisation évalue son énergie et la compare à sa capacité de freinage.Upon receipt of the RI information request, a safety calculator linked to the USEMB on-board safety control unit of the train A, from its location evaluates its energy and compares it with its braking capacity.

Si le train A a la capacité de s'arrêter sur la zone d'approche ZA sans franchissement de la zone de manoeuvre ZM, le calculateur de sécurité répond positivement à l'unité de commande au sol USOL en envoyant l'information requise IR, c'est-à-dire par exemple un message de type binaire 0-1 pouvant être accompagné de son domaine de marche et autorisant ou non la réduction voire l'annulation de la temporisation sécuritaire TS.If the train A has the ability to stop on the approach zone ZA without crossing the ZM operating zone, the safety computer responds positively to the ground control unit USOL by sending the required information IR, that is to say for example a binary type 0-1 message that can be accompanied by its operating range and whether or not the reduction or cancellation of the safe delay TS.

A la réception de l'information requise IR, l'unité de commande au sol USOL vérifie le signal binaire 0/1, que le domaine de marche correspond bien à l'itinéraire à détruire et que le train A garantit bien le respect du signal d'arrêt F. Ainsi selon l'invention, l'unité de commande au sol USOL autorise alors le dispositif de destruction d'itinéraire D à détruire immédiatement l'itinéraire (non prise en compte de la temporisation sécuritaire TS).On receipt of the required information IR, the ground control unit USOL checks the binary signal 0/1, that the operating range corresponds to the route to be destroyed and that the train A ensures compliance with the signal. In this way, according to the invention, the ground control unit USOL then authorizes the destruction device D to immediately destroy the route (not taking into account the safe time delay TS).

L'opérateur F est alors informé de la destruction de l'itinéraire via un signal RES émis par l'unité de commande au sol USOL.The operator F is then informed of the destruction of the route via a signal RES issued by the USOL ground control unit.

Les échanges de requête d'information RI et d'information requise IR entre l'unité de commande au sol USOL et l'unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée USEMB se font idéalement par voie aériennes E, par exemple via radiofréquence.The exchanges of information request RI and required information IR between the ground control unit USOL and the security unit USEMB onboard control are ideally by air E, for example via radio frequency.

2 ème cas le train A répond « négativement » à la demande ou ne répond pas (panne liée au train ou train non équipé d'un automatisme ou d'unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée USEMB adaptée):

  • Le dispositif de destruction d'itinéraire D attend la fin de la temporisation sécuritaire TS (par défaut maximale) pour détruire physiquement l'itinéraire (= déplacement sur la zone de manoeuvre ZM).
2 nd case the train A has "negatively" request or does not respond (breakdown related to the unequipped train or gear of an automation or security unit USEMB onboard control adapted):
  • The route destruction device D waits for the end of the safe timeout TS (default maximum) for physically destroy the route (= movement on the ZM maneuvering area).

L'opérateur F est informé de la destruction de l'itinéraire via le signal RES.The operator F is informed of the destruction of the route via the signal RES.

Figure 2 présente un système de communication pour le contrôle sécurisé d'itinéraire adapté à un automatisme H_CBTC de type CBTC interfacé entre l'unité de commande au sol USOL et l'unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée USEMB. Figure 2 presents a communication system for secure route control adapted to a CBTC type H_CBTC automation interfaced between the USOL ground control unit and the USEMB onboard safety control unit.

Les échanges de requête d'information RI et d'information requise IR tels qu'à la figure 1 s'effectuent alors ici entre l'unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée USEMB et l'automatisme H_CBTC qui va donc lui-même commander l'unité de commande au sol USOL pour activer une réduction de temporisation sécuritaire TS par le biais d'un signal de destruction DI. Inversement, une requête d'information liée à une demande de destruction d'un opérateur ou de l'unité de commande au sol USOL sera dirigée vers l'unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée USEMB du train via l'automatisme H_CBTC par l'intermédiaire du signal de destruction D, puis d'un signal de destruction « étendu » D_CBTC depuis l'unité de commande au sol USOL vers l'automatisme H_CBTC même.The exchanges of information request RI and information required IR such as the figure 1 then take place here between the on-board safe control unit USEMB and the H_CBTC automation which will therefore itself control the ground control unit USOL to activate a safe delay timer TS by means of a signal of DI destruction. Conversely, an information request related to a request for the destruction of an operator or of the USOL ground control unit will be directed to the USEMB on-board safety control unit of the train via the H_CBTC operator via the destruction signal D, then an "extended" destruction signal D_CBTC from the ground control unit USOL to the H_CBTC automation itself.

Dans cet exemple, l'automatisme H CBTC a le rôle d'un conducteur de train connaissant ainsi tous les paramètres dynamiques du train et peut aussi disposer de données provenant de toute source d'information lié au trafic sur des zones diverses, à la signalisation, etc. Ceci est donc très avantageux dans le cas d'une gestion dynamique du trafic de véhicules sans conducteur, en particulier permettant des zones de marche plus étroitement contrôlées.In this example, the H CBTC automation has the role of a train driver knowing all the dynamic parameters of the train and can also have data from any source of information related to traffic on various areas, to the signaling etc. This is therefore very advantageous in the case of dynamic management of driverless vehicle traffic, in particular allowing more tightly controlled walking areas.

Tel qu'à la figure 1, l'opérateur F commande une destruction manuelle d'itinéraire à l'unité de commande au sol USOL.As at figure 1 , the F operator commands a manual route destruction to the USOL ground control unit.

L'unité de commande au sol USOL ferme immédiatement le signal d'arrêt F associé à l'itinéraire, enclenche le dispositif de destruction manuelle d'itinéraire via le signal de destruction D (initialisation de la temporisation sécuritaire TS à sa valeur maximale) et envoie à l'équipement d'automatisme H_CBTC au sol une information de destruction d'itinéraire en cours via le signal,étendu D_CBTC afin de permettre l'envoi de requête d'information RI vers l'unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée USEMB.The ground control unit USOL immediately closes the stop signal F associated with the route, activates the manual route destruction device via the destruction signal D (initialization of the safe delay TS at its maximum value) and sends to the H_CBTC automation equipment on the ground a current route destruction information via the signal, extended D_CBTC to allow the sending of information request RI to the security unit USEMB onboard control.

Le conducteur si présent ou l'unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée USEMB prennent immédiatement les dispositions pour arrêter le train A.The present driver or the USEMB On-Board Security Unit immediately takes steps to stop Train A.

L'automatisme H_CBTC au sol identifie alors le train A en approche du signal d'arrêt F, et par une liaison sol/train envoie la requête d'information RI qui comprend une requête d'arrêt du train A.The H_CBTC ground automation then identifies the train A approaching the stop signal F, and a link ground / train sends the information request RI which includes a request to stop the train A.

L'équipement d'automatisme H_CBTC au sol se met alors en attente d'une réponse IR à la requête d'information RI:

  • 1 er cas: le train A répond « positivement ».
The H_CBTC automation equipment on the ground then waits for an IR response to the RI information request:
  • 1st case: the train A responds "positively".

A la réception de la requête d'information RI, l'unité sécuritaire (aussi compatiblement automatisée selon le type CBTC) de commande embarquée USEMB du train A, à partir de sa localisation évalue son énergie et la compare à sa capacité de freinage.Upon receipt of the information request RI, the security unit (also compatibly automated type CBTC) USEMB on-board train A, from its location evaluates its energy and compares it to its braking capacity.

Si le train A a la capacité de s'arrêter, l'unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée USEMB répond positivement à l'équipement d'automatisme H_CBTC en lui retournant l'information requise IR, c'est-à-dire par exemple un message de type binaire 0-1 pouvant être accompagné de son domaine de marche et autorisant ou non la réduction voire l'annulation de la temporisation sécuritaire TS.If the train A has the capacity to stop, the onboard security unit USEMB responds positively to the automation equipment H_CBTC by returning the required information IR, that is to say for example a message binary type 0-1 that can be accompanied by its operating range and whether or not the reduction or cancellation of the safe delay TS.

A la réception du message, l'équipement d'automatisme H_CBTC au sol vérifie que le domaine de marche correspond bien à l'itinéraire à détruire et que le train A garantit bien le respect du signal d'arrêt F.On receipt of the message, the H_CBTC automation equipment on the ground checks that the walking area corresponds to the route to be destroyed and that the A train guarantees the respect of the stop signal F.

L'équipement d'automatisme H CBTC au sol informe l'unité de commande au sol USOL du respect (ou non) du signal F par le train A en approche au moyen d'un signal binaire de destruction DI.The H CBTC automation equipment on the ground informs the USOL ground control unit of the respect (or not) of the signal F by the approaching train A by means of a binary destruction signal DI.

Suivant l'état permissif du signal binaire de destruction DI, l'unité de commande au sol USOL autorise alors le dispositif de destruction d'itinéraire D à détruire immédiatement l'itinéraire (non prise en compte, annulation de la temporisation sécuritaire TS).According to the permissive state of the binary destruction signal DI, the ground control unit USOL then authorizes the destruction device D to immediately destroy the route (not taken into account, canceling the safe delay TS).

L'opérateur F est informé de la destruction de l'itinéraire par l'unité de commande au sol USOL.The operator F is informed of the destruction of the route by the USOL ground control unit.

2 ème cas le train A répond « négativement » à la requête d'information RI ou ne répond pas (panne liée au train ou train non équipé d'un automatisme ou d'unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée USEMB adaptée). 2 nd case the train responds "negatively" on the RI information request or does not respond (breakdown related to the train or not equipped gear of an automation or security unit adapted USEMB board control).

L'unité de commande au sol USOL, en mode d'attente, attend si besoin jusqu'à la fin de la temporisation sécuritaire TS pour détruire l'itinéraire. Ainsi, aucun risque de diminuer la temporisation sécuritaire TS « prématurément » ne peut subsister.The USOL ground control unit, in standby mode, waits until the end of the safe TS timer to destroy the route. Thus, there is no risk of reducing the TS security delay "prematurely".

L'opérateur F est ensuite informé de la non-destruction de l'itinéraire par l'unité de commande au sol USOL.The operator F is then informed of the non-destruction of the route by the USOL ground control unit.

Les deux systèmes de communication selon figures 1 et 2 permettent ainsi de mettre en oeuvre la méthode de contrôle sécurisé proposée précédemment aux figures.The two communication systems according to figures 1 and 2 thus make it possible to implement the secure control method previously proposed in the figures.

En résumé :

  • suivant l'état de l'information requise IR, l'unité de commande au sol USOL annule la temporisation sécuritaire TS si un état idéalement binaire de l'information requise IR assure un arrêt du train A sans franchissement de la zone de manoeuvre ZM. Ceci est donc un avantage majeur au niveau de l'épargne de temps destiné au trafic lié à des manoeuvres ou autres actions de service sans fonction de transport public particulier.
  • suivant l'état de l'information requise IR, l'unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée USEMB retransmet un ordre de sûreté d'arrêt accompagné idéalement d'un domaine de marche à l'unité de commande au sol USOL. Cette transmission aérienne est ainsi dynamiquement effectuée tout en restant sécuritaire entre le train A et le sol.
  • l'unité de commande au sol USOL et l'unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée USEMB peuvent communiquer par l'intermédiaire d'un automatisme au sol H_CBTC qui au moins détecte et ordonne un déplacement du véhicule sur la zone d'approche ZA et qui communique par interfaçage à des équipements de signalisation (au sol). Ceci rend donc la méthode selon l'invention flexiblement adaptable à des trains équipés de moyens automatisés pour lesquels les technologies de communication et de commande sont de plus en plus performantes via des outils évolutifs. A l'opposé, l'invention est aussi adaptée à des trains non équipés de tels automatismes, ce qui la rend universellement applicable pour des réseaux de trafic existants et voués à être actualisés ou modernisés.
  • la présente méthode est applicable pour tout type de véhicule de transport public muni d'un émetteur/récepteur radiofréquence et s'affranchit de tout lien de communication physique de type rail ou caténaire entre le train et le sol. Ceci est permis car l'unité sécuritaire de commande embarquée USEMB communique avec des équipements au sol USOL, H_CBTC au moyen d'une liaison aérienne E. Il est ainsi appréciable de pouvoir effectuer en permanence une liaison sécuritaire, alors qu'un châssis de véhicule est guidé par aucun voire au moins un, deux ou trois rails.
  • la requête d'information RI et l'information requise IR peuvent être codées binairement de façon à simplifier les échanges d'informations liés à l'invention, mais aussi de pouvoir être compatibles à des mécanismes d'activation au sol, comme une aiguille dans la zone de manoeuvre, une fois que la sécurisation sur cette zone est assurée conformément à l'invention.
In summary :
  • according to the state of the required information IR, the ground control unit USOL cancels the safe time delay TS if an ideally binary state of the required information IR ensures a stop of the train A without crossing the ZM operating zone. This is therefore a major advantage in terms of time savings for traffic related to maneuvers or other service actions without particular public transport function.
  • according to the state of the required information IR, the on-board secure control unit USEMB retransmits a stop safety command accompanied ideally by a walking range to the USOL ground control unit. This aerial transmission is thus dynamically performed while remaining safe between the train A and the ground.
  • the USOL ground control unit and the on-board safe control unit USEMB can communicate via a ground automation H_CBTC which at least detects and orders a movement of the vehicle on the approach zone ZA and which communicates interfacing with signaling equipment (ground). This therefore makes the method according to the invention flexibly adaptable to trains equipped with automated means for which the communication and control technologies are increasingly efficient through scalable tools. In contrast, the invention is also suitable for trains not equipped with such automation, which makes it universally applicable for existing traffic networks and destined to be updated or modernized.
  • this method is applicable for any type of public transport vehicle fitted with a radiofrequency transceiver and avoids any physical communication link of the rail or catenary type between the train and the ground. This is allowed because the USUB on-board safe unit communicates with USOL, H_CBTC ground equipment by means of an E air link. It is therefore desirable to be able to carry out a secure link at all times while a vehicle chassis is guided by none or at least one, two or three rails.
  • the information request RI and the required information IR can be coded binary in order to simplify the exchange of information related to the invention, but also to be compatible with ground activation mechanisms, such as a needle in the maneuvering area, once securing on this area is provided in accordance with the invention.

Claims (9)

  1. Method for the safe control of a route travelled by a vehicle (A) running on an approach area (ZA) of a manoeuvring area (ZM), wherein:
    - the manoeuvring area is preceded by a closing signal (D, C, F) positioned on the ground and adapted to instruct the vehicle to stop,
    - a safety time delay (TS) is calculated by a control unit on the ground (USOL) to guarantee that the vehicle stops before it crosses the manoeuvring area,
    - in parallel with the closing signal (D, C, F) a request for information (RI) originating from the control unit on the ground is transmitted to a safety control unit (USEMB) on-board the vehicle, characterised in that the on-board safety control unit assesses the braking capacity of the vehicle on the basis of an energy balance related to the kinetics of the vehicle and the code in the information required (IR) by the control unit on the ground, then transmitted back to the control unit on the ground,
    - depending on the status of the required information relating to the energy balance, the control unit on the ground minimises the safety time delay.
  2. Method according to claim 1, wherein according to the status of the required information, the control unit on the ground cancels the safety time delay if this status, ideally binary, ensures that the train stops without crossing the manoeuvring area.
  3. Method according to one of claims 1 to 2, wherein according to the status of the required information, the on-board safety control unit retransmits a safety stoppage command accompanied by an operating domain to the control unit on the ground.
  4. Method according to claim 3, wherein the control unit on the ground and the on-board safety control unit communicate through an automation device on the ground (H_CBTC) which at least detects and commands movement of the vehicle on the approach area (ZA) and which communicates by interfacing with signalling equipment.
  5. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the vehicle is guided by at least one rail.
  6. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the on-board safety control unit communicates with equipment on the ground by means of an aerial connection (E).
  7. Method according to one of the preceding claims, wherein the request for information (RI) and the required information (IR) are encoded using binary code.
  8. Communication system for the safe control of a route travelled by a vehicle running on an approach area (ZA) of a manoeuvring area (ZM) wherein:
    - the manoeuvring area is preceded by a closing signal (D, C, F) positioned on the ground and adapted to instruct the vehicle to stop,
    - a control unit on the ground (USOL) comprises a safety time delay (TS) calculated to guarantee that the vehicle stops before crossing the manoeuvring area,
    - in parallel with the closing signal (D, C, F) a request for information (RI) originating from the control unit on the ground is transmitted to a safety control unit (USEMB) on-board the vehicle,
    characterised in that
    - the on-board safety control unit comprises an evaluation module (ME) of the braking capacity of the vehicle on the basis of an energy balance related to the kinetics of the vehicle,
    - an on-board decoding module of the request for information (RI) which controls a coding module (MCB) for required information (IR) by the control unit on the ground, then transmitted back to the control unit on the ground,
    - depending on the status of the required information (IR) relating to the energy balance, the control unit on the ground comprises a module for redefining the safety time delay, which aims at minimising the latter, or indeed cancelling it.
  9. System according to claim 8, wherein the control unit on the ground and the on-board safety control unit are connected by an automation device on the ground (H_CBTC) which at least detects and commands movement of the vehicle on the approach area (ZA) and which communicates through an interface with the signalling equipment.
EP08875602.8A 2008-07-14 2008-07-14 Communication method and system for route secured control Active EP2300301B1 (en)

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CN106384522A (en) * 2016-09-20 2017-02-08 上海自仪泰雷兹交通自动化系统有限公司 Tramcar level crossing signal priority control system based on PLC
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DE19641521C1 (en) * 1996-09-30 1998-04-09 Siemens Ag Method of controlling railway marshalling track occupancy using automatic signalling systems especially for controlling entry into station
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